ENBANC

FELIXB.PEREZandG.R.No.152048
AMANTEG.DORIA,
Petitioners,
Present:
PUNO,C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARESSANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,
versusCORONA,
CARPIOMORALES,
TINGA,
CHICONAZARIO,
VELASCO,JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDODECASTRO,
BRIONand
PERALTA,JJ.
PHILIPPINETELEGRAPHAND
TELEPHONECOMPANYand
JOSELUISSANTIAGO,
Respondents.Promulgated:

April7,2009
xx

DECISION
CORONA,J.:

Petitioners Felix B. Perez and Amante G. Doria were employed by respondent

PhilippineTelegraphandTelephoneCompany(PT&T)asshippingclerkandsupervisor,
respectively,inPT&TsShippingSection,MaterialsManagementGroup.

Acting on an alleged unsigned letter regarding anomalous transactions at the

ShippingSection,respondentsformedaspecialauditteamtoinvestigatethematter.Itwas
discovered that the Shipping Section jacked up the value of the freight costs for goods
shipped and that the duplicates of the shipping documents allegedly showed traces of
tampering,alterationandsuperimposition.

On September 3, 1993, petitioners were placed on preventive suspension for 30

[1]

daysfortheirallegedinvolvementintheanomaly.
15daystwice:firstonOctober3,1993

Theirsuspensionwasextendedfor

[2]
[3]
andsecondonOctober18,1993.

On October 29, 1993, a memorandum with the following tenor was issued by
respondents:

InlinewiththerecommendationoftheAVPAuditaspresentedinhisreportofOctober
15,1993(copyattached)andthesubsequentfilingofcriminalchargesagainsttheparties
mentionedtherein,[Mr.FelixPerezandMr.AmanteDoriaare]herebydismissedfromthe

[4]

serviceforhavingfalsifiedcompanydocuments.

(emphasissupplied)

On November 9, 1993, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal suspension and

[5]
TheyallegedthattheyweredismissedonNovember8,1993,thedate

illegaldismissal.

theyreceivedtheabovementionedmemorandum.

Thelaborarbiterfoundthatthe30dayextensionofpetitionerssuspensionandtheir
subsequent dismissal were both illegal. He ordered respondents to pay petitioners their
salaries during their 30day illegal suspension, as well as to reinstate them with
backwagesand13thmonthpay.

The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of the

labor arbiter. It ruled that petitioners were dismissed for just cause, that they were
accorded due process and that they were illegally suspended for only 15 days (without
statingthereasonforthereductionoftheperiodofpetitionersillegalsuspension).

[6]

PetitionersappealedtotheCourtofAppeals(CA).InitsJanuary29,2002decision,
[7]
the CA affirmed the NLRC decision insofar as petitioners illegal suspension for 15
daysanddismissalforjustcausewereconcerned.However,itfoundthatpetitionerswere
dismissedwithoutdueprocess.

PetitionersnowseekareversaloftheCAdecision.Theycontendthattherewasno
justcausefortheirdismissal,thattheywerenotaccordeddueprocessandthattheywere
illegallysuspendedfor30days.
Weruleinfavorofpetitioners.

RESPONDENTSFAILEDTOPROVEJUST
CAUSEANDTOOBSERVEDUEPROCESS

TheCA,inupholdingtheNLRCsdecision,reasonedthattherewassufficientbasis
[8]

forrespondentstolosetheirconfidenceinpetitioners forallegedlytamperingwiththe
shipping documents. Respondents emphasized the importance of a shipping order or
request,asitwasthebasisoftheirliabilitytoacargoforwarder.

[9]

Wedisagree.
Without undermining the importance of a shipping order or request, we find
respondents evidence insufficient to clearly and convincingly establish the facts from

which the loss of confidence resulted.

[10]
Other than their bare allegations and the fact

thatsuchdocumentscameintopetitionershandsatsomepoint,respondentsshouldhave
providedevidenceofpetitionersfunctions,theextentoftheirduties,theprocedureinthe
handling and approval of shipping requests and the fact that no personnel other than
petitioners were involved. There was, therefore, a patent paucity of proof connecting
petitionerstotheallegedtamperingofshippingdocuments.
The alterations on the shipping documents could not reasonably be attributed to
petitionersbecauseitwasneverproventhatpetitionersalonehadcontroloforaccessto
these documents. Unless duly proved or sufficiently substantiated otherwise, impartial
tribunalsshouldnotrelyonlyonthestatementoftheemployerthatithaslostconfidence
[11]

initsemployee.

Willfulbreachbytheemployeeofthetrustreposedinhimbyhisemployerorduly
authorized representative is a just cause for termination.

[12]
However, in General Bank

[13]
andTrustCo.v.CA,
wesaid:

[L]oss of confidence should not be simulated. It should not be used as a subterfuge for
causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified. Loss of confidence may not be
arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. It must be
genuine,notamereafterthoughttojustifyanearlieractiontakeninbadfaith.

Theburdenofproofrestsontheemployertoestablishthatthedismissalisforcause
in view of the security of tenure that employees enjoy under the Constitution and the
Labor Code. The employers evidence must clearly and convincingly show the facts on
whichthelossofconfidenceintheemployeemaybefairlymadetorest.

[14]
Itmustbe

[15]
adequately proven by substantial evidence.
Respondents failed to discharge this
burden.

Respondentsillegalactofdismissingpetitionerswasaggravatedbytheirfailureto
observe due process. To meet the requirements of due process in the dismissal of an
employee, an employer must furnish the worker with two written notices: (1) a written
notice specifying the grounds for termination and giving to said employee a reasonable
opportunity to explain his side and (2) another written notice indicating that, upon due
considerationofallcircumstances,groundshavebeenestablishedtojustifytheemployer's
decisiontodismisstheemployee.

[16]

Petitionerswereneitherapprisedofthechargesagainstthemnorgivenachanceto
defend themselves. They were simply and arbitrarily separated from work and served
notices of termination in total disregard of their rights to due process and security of
tenure. The labor arbiter and the CA correctly found that respondents failed to comply
withthetwonoticerequirementforterminatingemployees.

Petitionerslikewisecontendedthatdueprocesswasnotobservedintheabsenceof
ahearinginwhichtheycouldhaveexplainedtheirsideandrefutedtheevidenceagainst
them.

Thereisnoneedforahearingorconference.Wenoteamarkeddifferenceinthe
standards of due process to be followed as prescribed in the Labor Code and its
implementing rules. The Labor Code, on one hand, provides that an employer must
provide the employee ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the

assistanceofhisrepresentativeifhesodesires:

ART.277.Miscellaneousprovisions.xxx
(b)Subjecttotheconstitutionalrightofworkerstosecurityoftenureandtheirrighttobe
protectedagainstdismissalexceptforajustandauthorizedcauseandwithoutprejudiceto
therequirementofnoticeunderArticle283ofthisCode,theemployershallfurnishthe
worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a
statementofthecausesforterminationandshallaffordthelatterampleopportunityto
be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so
desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to
guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the
employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or
legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National
LaborRelationsCommission.Theburdenofprovingthattheterminationwasforavalid
orauthorizedcauseshallrestontheemployer.(emphasissupplied)

The omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code, on the other hand, require a
hearingandconferenceduringwhichtheemployeeconcernedisgiventheopportunityto
respondtothecharge,presenthisevidenceorrebuttheevidencepresentedagainsthim:
[17]

Section2.SecurityofTenure.xxx

(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due

processshallbesubstantiallyobserved:

ForterminationofemploymentbasedonjustcausesasdefinedinArticle282of
theLaborCode:

(i)Awrittennoticeservedontheemployeespecifyingthegroundorgroundsfor
termination,andgivingsaidemployeereasonableopportunitywithinwhichtoexplainhis
side.

(ii)A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the
assistanceofcounselifhesodesires,isgivenopportunitytorespondtothecharge,
presenthisevidenceorrebuttheevidencepresentedagainsthim.

(iii)Awrittennoticeofterminationservedontheemployee,indicatingthatupon
due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his
termination.(emphasissupplied)

Which one should be followed? Is a hearing (or conference) mandatory in cases

involvingthedismissalofanemployee?Cantheapparentconflictbetweenthelawandits
IRRbereconciled?

At the outset, we reaffirm the timehonored doctrine that, in case of conflict, the
[18]
law prevails over the administrative regulations implementing it.
The authority to
promulgate implementing rules proceeds from the law itself. To be valid, a rule or
regulationmustconformtoandbeconsistentwiththeprovisionsoftheenablingstatute.
[19]
[20]
Assuch,itcannotamendthelaweitherbyabridgingorexpandingitsscope.

Article 277(b) of the Labor Code provides that, in cases of termination for a just
cause,anemployeemustbegivenampleopportunitytobeheardandtodefendhimself.
Thus, the opportunity to be heard afforded by law to the employee is qualified by the
[21]
wordamplewhichordinarilymeansconsiderablymorethanadequateorsufficient.
In
this regard, the phrase ample opportunity to be heard can be reasonably interpreted as
extensiveenoughtocoveractualhearingorconference.Tothisextent,Section2(d),Rule
IoftheImplementingRulesofBookVIoftheLaborCodeisinconformitywithArticle
277(b).

Nonetheless, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the

LaborCodeshouldnotbetakentomeanthatholdinganactualhearingorconferenceisa
conditionsinequanonforcompliancewiththedueprocessrequirementinterminationof
employment. The test for the fair procedure guaranteed under Article 277(b) cannot be
whethertherehasbeenaformalpreterminationconfrontationbetweentheemployerand

the employee. The ample opportunity to be heard standard is neither synonymous nor
similartoaformalhearing.Toconfinetheemployeesrighttobeheardtoasolitaryform
narrows down that right. It deprives him of other equally effective forms of adducing
evidence in his defense. Certainly, such an exclusivist and absolutist interpretation is
overly restrictive. The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible
[22]
proceduresuniversallyapplicabletoeveryimaginablesituation.

Thestandardforthehearingrequirement,ampleopportunity,iscouchedingeneral
languagerevealingthelegislativeintenttogivesomedegreeofflexibilityoradaptability
to meet the peculiarities of a given situation. To confine it to a single rigid proceeding
suchasaformalhearingwilldefeatitsspirit.
Significantly, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the
Labor Code itself provides that the socalled standards of due process outlined therein
shall be observed substantially, not strictly. This is a recognition that while a formal
hearingorconferenceisideal,itisnotanabsolute,mandatoryorexclusiveavenueofdue
process.

An employees right to be heard in termination cases under Article 277(b) as

implementedbySection2(d),RuleIoftheImplementingRulesofBookVIoftheLabor
Code should be interpreted in broad strokes. It is satisfied not only by a formal face to
face confrontation but by any meaningful opportunity to controvert the charges against
himandtosubmitevidenceinsupportthereof.

A hearing means that a party should be given a chance to adduce his evidence to
support his side of the case and that the evidence should be taken into account in the

adjudication of the controversy.

[23]
To be heard does not mean verbal argumentation

alone inasmuch as one may be heard just as effectively through written explanations,
[24]
Therefore,whilethephraseampleopportunitytobeheard

submissionsorpleadings.

mayinfactincludeanactualhearing,itisnotlimitedtoaformalhearingonly.Inother
words, the existence of an actual, formal trialtype hearing, although preferred, is not
absolutelynecessarytosatisfytheemployeesrighttobeheard.

This Court has consistently ruled that the due process requirement in cases of
termination of employment does not require an actual or formal hearing. Thus, we
categoricallydeclaredinSkippersUnitedPacific,Inc.v.Maguad:

[25]

TheLaborCodedoesnot,ofcourse,requireaformalortrialtypeproceedingbefore
anerringemployeemaybedismissed.(emphasissupplied)

[26]
weruled:

InAutobusWorkersUnionv.NLRC,

The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of
due process. Due process of law simply means giving opportunity to be heard before
judgment is rendered. In fact, there is no violation of due process even if no hearing
was conducted, where the party was given a chance to explain his side of the
controversy.Whatisfrowneduponisthedenialoftheopportunitytobeheard.

xxxxxxxxx
Aformaltrialtypehearingisnotevenessentialtodueprocess.Itisenough
that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a
fair decision can be based. This type of hearing is not even mandatory in cases of
complaintslodgedbeforetheLaborArbiter.(emphasissupplied)

In Solid Development Corporation Workers Association v. Solid Development

[27]
wehadtheoccasiontostate:

Corporation,

[W]ellsettledisthedictumthatthetwinrequirementsofnoticeandhearingconstitutethe
essentialelementsofdueprocessinthedismissalofemployees.Itisacardinalruleinour
jurisdictionthattheemployermustfurnishtheemployeewithtwowrittennoticesbefore
theterminationofemploymentcanbeeffected:(1)thefirstapprisestheemployeeofthe
particularactsoromissionsforwhichhisdismissalissoughtand(2)thesecondinforms
theemployeeoftheemployersdecisiontodismisshim.Therequirementofahearing,
ontheotherhand,iscompliedwithaslongastherewasanopportunitytobeheard,
andnotnecessarilythatanactualhearingwasconducted.

Inseparateinfractionreports,petitionerswerebothapprisedoftheparticularacts
or omissions constituting the charges against them. They were also required to submit
theirwrittenexplanationwithin12hoursfromreceiptofthereports.Yet,neitherofthem
complied.Hadtheyfoundthe12hourperiodtooshort,theyshouldhaverequestedforan
extensionoftime.Further,noticesofterminationwerealsosenttotheminformingthem
ofthebasisoftheirdismissal.Infine,petitionersweregivendueprocessbeforetheywere
dismissed. Even if no hearing was conducted, the requirement of due process had
been met since they were accorded a chance to explain their side of the controversy.
(emphasissupplied)

[28]
Our holding in National Semiconductor HK Distribution, Ltd. v. NLRC
is of
similarimport:

Thattheinvestigationsconductedbypetitionermaynotbeconsideredformal
orrecordedhearingsorinvestigationsisimmaterial.Aformalortrialtypehearingis
notatalltimesandinallinstancesessentialtodueprocess,therequirementsofwhich
aresatisfiedwherethepartiesareaffordedfairandreasonableopportunitytoexplaintheir
side of the controversy. It is deemed sufficient for the employer to follow the natural
sequenceofnotice,hearingandjudgment.

The above rulings are a clear recognition that the employer may provide an
employeewithampleopportunitytobeheardanddefendhimselfwiththeassistanceofa
representativeorcounselinwaysotherthanaformalhearing.Theemployeecanbefully
affordedachancetorespondtothechargesagainsthim,adducehisevidenceorrebutthe
evidenceagainsthimthroughawidearrayofmethods,verbalorwritten.

After receiving the first notice apprising him of the charges against him, the
employee may submit a written explanation (which may be in the form of a letter,

memorandum, affidavit or position paper) and offer evidence in support thereof, like
relevant company records (such as his 201 file and daily time records) and the sworn
statementsofhiswitnesses.Forthispurpose,hemaypreparehisexplanationpersonally
or with the assistance of a representative or counsel. He may also ask the employer to
provide him copy of records material to his defense. His written explanation may also
includearequestthataformalhearingorconferencebeheld.Insuchacase,theconduct
of a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory, just as it is where there exist
[29]
substantialevidentiarydisputes
orwherecompanyrulesorpracticerequiresanactual
hearing as part of employment pretermination procedure. To this extent, we refine the
decisionswehaverenderedsofaronthispointoflaw.

ThisinterpretationofSection2(d),RuleIoftheImplementingRulesofBookVIof
theLaborCodereasonablyimplementstheampleopportunitytobeheardstandardunder
Article 277(b) of the Labor Code without unduly restricting the language of the law or
excessively burdening the employer. This not only respects the power vested in the
Secretary of Labor and Employment to promulgate rules and regulations that will lay
down the guidelines for the implementation of Article 277(b). More importantly, this is
faithful to the mandate of Article 4 of the Labor Code that [a]ll doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of [the Labor Code], including its
implementingrulesandregulationsshallberesolvedinfavoroflabor.

In sum, the following are the guiding principles in connection with the hearing
requirementindismissalcases:
(a) ample opportunity to be heard means any meaningful opportunity (verbal or
written)giventotheemployeetoanswerthechargesagainsthimandsubmit

evidenceinsupportofhisdefense,whetherinahearing,conferenceorsome
otherfair,justandreasonableway.
(b)aformalhearingorconferencebecomesmandatoryonlywhenrequestedbythe
employee in writing or substantial evidentiary disputes exist or a company
ruleorpracticerequiresit,orwhensimilarcircumstancesjustifyit.
(c)theampleopportunitytobeheardstandardintheLaborCodeprevailsoverthe
hearingorconferencerequirementintheimplementingrulesandregulations.
PETITIONERSWEREILLEGALLY
SUSPENDEDFOR30DAYS

Anemployeemaybevalidlysuspendedbytheemployerforjustcauseprovidedby
law.Suchsuspensionshallonlybeforaperiodof30days,afterwhichtheemployeeshall
[30]

eitherbereinstatedorpaidhiswagesduringtheextendedperiod.

In this case, petitioners contended that they were not paid during the two 15day
extensions, or a total of 30 days, of their preventive suspension. Respondents failed to
adduce evidence to the contrary. Thus, we uphold the ruling of the labor arbiter on this
point.
Where the dismissal was without just or authorized cause and there was no due
process, Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, mandates that the employee is
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time the compensation was not paid up to the time of actual
[31]
In this case, however, reinstatement is no longer possible because of

reinstatement.

the length of time that has passed from the date of the incident to final resolution.

[32]

Fourteenyearshavetranspiredfromthetimepetitionerswerewrongfullydismissed.To
orderreinstatementatthisjuncturewillnolongerserveanyprudentorpracticalpurpose.
[33]

WHEREFORE,thepetitionisherebyGRANTED. The decision of the Court of

AppealsdatedJanuary29,2002inCAG.R.SPNo.50536findingthatpetitionersFelix
B. Perez and Amante G. Doria were not illegally dismissed but were not accorded due
process and were illegally suspended for 15 days, is SET ASIDE. The decision of the
labor arbiter dated December 27, 1995 in NLRC NCR CN. 110693093 is hereby
AFFIRMEDwiththeMODIFICATIONthatpetitionersshouldbepaidtheirseparation
payinlieuofreinstatement.

SOORDERED.

RENATOC.CORONA
AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

LEONARDOA.QUISUMBING
AssociateJustice

REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice

CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO
AssociateJustice

ANTONIOT.CARPIO
AssociateJustice

ONCHITACARPIOMORALES
AssociateJustice

MINITAV.CHICONAZARIO
AssociateJustice

TONIOEDUARDOB.NACHURA
AssociateJustice

ARTUROD.BRION
AssociateJustice

(OnOfficialLeave)
MA.ALICIAM.AUSTRIAMARTINEZ
AssociateJustice

DANTEO.TINGA
AssociateJustice

PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.
AssociateJustice

TERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTRO
AssociateJustice

DIOSDADOM.PERALTA
AssociateJustice

CERTIFICATION

PursuanttoSection13,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitution,Icertifythattheconclusionsin
theabovedecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothe
writeroftheopinionoftheCourt.

REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice
Onofficialleave.
[1]
Records,pp.7071.
[2]
Id.,pp.7273.

[3]
Id.,pp.7475.
[4]
Id.,p.76.
[5]
Id.,p.39.
[6]
DecisionpennedbyCommissionerIreneoB.Bernardo,andconcurredinbyPresidingCommissionerLourdesC.Javier
andCommissionerJoaquinA.Tanodra.
[7]
Decision of the Court of Appeals, penned by Associate Justice (now retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court)
Ruben T. Reyes, and concurred in by Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Mariano C. del Castillo of the
NinthDivisionoftheCourtofAppeals.
[8]
Rollo,p.34.
[9]
Records,p.107.
[10]
CommercialMotorsCorporationv.Commissioners,etal.,G.R.No.14762,10December1990,192SCRA191,197.
[11]
Santosv.NLRC,G.R.No.L76991,October28,1988,166SCRA759,765.DeLeonv.NLRC,G.R.No.52056,October
30,1980,100SCRA691,700.
[12]
LABORCODE,BookVI,Title1,Art.282(c).
[13]
G.R.No.L42724,9April1985,135SCRA569,578.
[14]
ImperialTextileMills,Inc.v.NLRC,G.R.No.101527,19January1993,217SCRA237,244245.
[15]
StarlitePlasticIndustrialCorp.v.NLRC,G.R.No.78491,16March1989,171SCRA315,324.
[16]
OmnibusRulesImplementingtheLaborCode,BookVI,Rule1,Sec.2(a)and(c).
[17]
Section2(d),RuleI,ImplementingRulesofBookVIoftheLaborCode.
[18]
SeeContev.Palma,332Phil.20(1996)citingKilusangMayoUnoLaborCenterv.Garcia,Jr.,G.R.No.115381,23
December1994,239SCRA386.
[19]
Id.citingLinaJr.v.Cario,G.R.No.100127,23April1993,221SCRA515.
[20]
Implementingrulesandregulationsmaynotenlarge,alterorrestricttheprovisionsofthelawtheyseektoimplement
they cannot engraft additional requirements not contemplated by the legislature (Pilipinas Kao, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,423Phil.834[2001]).
[21]
WEBSTERS THIRD NEW COLLEGIATE INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED,p.74,1993edition.
[22]
CafeteriaWorkersv.McElroy,367U.S.886(1961).
[23]
Gonzalesv.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.52789,19December1980,101SCRA752.
Inthelandmarkcaseonadministrativedueprocess,AngTibayv.CourtofIndustrialRelations(69Phil.635[1940]),this
Courtlaiddownsevencardinalprimaryrights:
(1)Thefirstoftheserightsistherighttoahearing,whichincludestherightoftheparty
interestedoraffectedtopresenthisowncaseandsubmitevidenceinsupportthereof.xxx(2)
Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.xxx
[24]
Rizal CommercialBanking Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 168498, 16 June 2006, 491
SCRA213.

[25]

G.R.No.166363,15August2006,498SCRA639.
[26]
353Phil.419(1998).
[27]
G.R.No.165995,14August2007,530SCRA132.

[28]
353Phil.551(1998).
[29]
SeeClevelandBoardofEducationv.Loudermill,470U.S.532(1985)(BrennanJ.,concurringinpartanddissentingin
part)citingArnettv.Kennedy,416U.S.134(1974)(MarshallJ.,dissenting).
[30]
OmnibusRulesImplementingtheLaborCode,BookV,RuleXXIII,Sec.9,asamendedbyDepartmentofLaborand
EmploymentOrderNo.9(1997).
[31]
Agabonv.NLRC,G.R.No.158693,17November2004,442SCRA573,610.
[32]
Pandayv.NLRC,G.R.No.67664,20May1992,209SCRA122,126127.
[33]
SealandService,Inc.v.NLRC,G.R.No.90500,5October1990,190SCRA347,355.