Heidegger on Nature

Author(s): DAVID E. COOPER

Source: Environmental Values, Vol. 14, No. 3, Nature and Continental Philosophy (August 2005),
pp. 339-351
Published by: White Horse Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30302105
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Heidegger

on Nature

DAVID E. COOPER
Department
ofPhilosophy
University
ofDurham
50 OldElvet
DurhamDH1 3HN
Email:D.E.Cooper@durham.ac.uk
ABSTRACT
The primary
purposeof thepaperis thebroadlyexegeticalone of explaining
madein severaldifferent
andconnecting
contexts
Heidegger'smanyremarks,
on nature.
The threemaincontexts
arethoseofontology,
scientific
ofenquiry,
and technology.
AftershowinghowHeidegger'scentraltheses
methodology,
in thesecontextsare relatedto one another,
I argue,in thefinalsection,that
hisobservations
on scientific
methodarepivotal.Unlessthesearesecured,his
lose theiressentialsupport.
further
claimsaboutontologyandtechnology
KEYWORDS
nature,
science,technology,
Environment,
Heidegger
CONTEXTS OF ENQUIRY
ofEnvironmental
Tomanyreaders
Values,Martin
( 1889-1976) iswell
Heidegger
rank
oftheveryfirst
knownas almosttheonlytwentieth
century
philosopher
oftheearth'and
tohaveaddressedtheissueofwhathe called'thedevastation
ofthenatural
withnaturein thesense,roughly,
henceto havebeenconcerned
His voluminous
environment.
however,
writings,
engagewithmanyotherissues
he is a
ofnature'.In particular,
subsumableundertheheadingof 'philosophy
thenatural
attitudes
towards
maincriticnotonlyofwhatheseesas ourprevailing
world.
ofnatureinthemodern
butofthepredominant
environment,
conception
andto demonstrate
andexplainhiscriticisms,
In thispaper,I hopeto identify
tookthereto
betweenthemwhichHeideggercertainly
theclose connections
this
be. Onlyin thefinalsectiondo I venture
beyond broadlyexegeticalaim,
that
as
in
a
does,that
Heideggernever, faras I know,explicitly
arguing, way
ofthenaturalsciences.
centraltohiswholecritiqueis hisphilosophy
Environmental
Values14(2005):339-51
2005TheWhite
HorsePress

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340

DAVID E. COOPER

The mainexegeticalaimmaybe a relatively

modestone,butitis noteasy
to execute.Heideggerwrotea greatdeal aboutnature,
oftenin an inimitably
inhisthinking
What
densestyle,andthereoccurimportant
shifts
aboutnature.
the
matter
is
that
discusses
the
most,however,
complicates
Heidegger
topic(s)
Itis important
ofnatureina variety
ofcontexts
ofenquiry.
tosortoutthesedifferent
relatedthoughHeideggerhimself
takesthemtobe. I
enquiries,
certainly
in whichHeidegger'sremarks
shalllabelthethreemaincontexts
aremadethe
and
ones.
ontological,
methodological, technological
Whenenquiring
intonaturein thefirst,
context,
ontological,
Heidegger's
concernis withthekindofbeingthatnature
from
possessesandhowthisdiffers
thekindenjoyedby,say,humanbeingsor artefacts.
Forourpurposes,littleor
is lost,I think,
thisenquiry
intothebeingofnatureas one
nothing
byconstruing
- inparticular,
intoconceptions
ofnature
intothequestionofwhich,outofmany
ofnature
thathaveflourished
overthecenturies,
is the'primordial'
conceptions
or fundamental
and
which
'derivative'
or
one,
secondary.
Heidegger'scentral
in
this
is
that
the
ofnature- the
claim,
context,
currently
prevailing
conception
dominant
that
of
the
kind
it
of
has
is
not
derivative,
interpretation, is,
being
'primordial'.
Inthesecond,methodological,
iswiththestatus
concern
context,
Heidegger's
andself-understanding
ofthenaturalsciences,especiallyofphysics,whichhe
of thesesciencesin moderntimes.He is concerned,
regardsas paradigmatic
inparticular,
toquestionthefamiliar
that,invirtueoftheirmethod,
perception
thenaturalsciencesare,or one daywillbe, providing
a uniquelytrueaccount
ofhownaturefundamentally,
andindependently
ofanyhumanperspective,
is.
central
claim
in
this
connection
is
that
the
sciences
do
of
Heidegger's
nothing
thesort.Rather,
sciencerepresents
in
all
'one
...
which
that
is
only
way
presents
itself(QCT 156).
In thefinal,technological,
context,
Heidegger'sconcernis to exposewhat
he takestobe theprevailing
in
inmodernity,
natureis 'revealed'to
which,
way
us. 'Technology'
is hisnameforthis'wayofrevealing'.His mainclaimsinthis
contextarethatthiswayofrevealingis a peculiarly
partialandimpoverished
a 'monstrous'
and 'supremedanger',
one, and that,worsestill,it represents
in
an
for
'devastation
oftheearth'andfor
beingresponsible, effect,
increasing
ourcontemporary
'distress'(QCT 26ff).
Whiletheseareverydifferent
contexts
ofenquiry,
itis clearthatHeidegger
them
and
the
main
he
makes
in
connection
witheach- as intiregards
points
related.
It
he
because
a
is, argues,
fundamental,
mately
'primordial'
conception
ofnaturehasbeen'forgotten'
andsubordinated
toa quitedifferent,
'secondary'
one thatthecurrent
of thesciences,as arbiters
of hownaself-understanding
turetrulyis,has beenmadepossible.Boththis'forgetfulness'
andtheensuing
ofthescientific
oftheworldhave,in turn,servedtofoster
prestige
conception
the'monstrous',
is twotechnological
wayofrevealingnature.Butthetraffic
of thetechnological
way.The current
hegemony
wayof revealingreinforces

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HEIDGEGGER ON NATURE

341

thenaturalsciences'ownunderstanding
ofwhattheyachieve,andthis,inturn,
a morecomplete'forgetfulness'
ofthatprimordial
notionofnature
guarantees
thathas succumbedto thederivative
one assumedbythesciences.
Inthefollowing
I elaborate
onthemainpointsthatHeidegger
makes
sections,
ineachcontext
ofenquiry,
comment
morefullyon theconnections
hediscerns
betweenthesepointsand,finally,
on thestatus
arguethatit is his reflections
ofthenaturalscienceswhicharepivotalsince,unlessthesearewelltaken,the
claimshe makesintheothertwocontexts
lose all ormuchoftheirgrounding.
CONCEPTIONS OF NATURE
Inwritings
overforty
maintains
thatthe
stretching
years,Heidegger
consistently
modernconception
ofnature,
whichhasbecomeincreasingly
entrenched
since
itsoriginsin theworksofGalileoandDescartes,is a derivative
or 'privative'
one- theresultofa severeabstraction
fromconceptions
closertooureveryday
ofandengagement
withtheworld.Thismodernconception
is that
experience
- as, forexample,'matter
ofnatureas resextensa,as a 'world-stuff'
endowed
withforce'.(See, especially,BT 122ff.)Whileaccountsof matterand force
sincetheseventeenth
thegenmayhavebecomemoresophisticated
century,
eralpictureis stilltheCartesianoneofnatureas a complexofmaterial
entities
behavingin accordancewith'laws ofnature'or,at anyrate,reliablestatistical
regularities.
For Heidegger,
theentrenchment
of thisconception
is no accident,and is
notdue,simply,
tothestriking
andexplanatory
successesofthescipredictive
encesthatembraceit.Itis theresult,
ofanepistemological
turntakenby
rather,
Descartesand mostlaterphilosophers
thatprivilegesa certaintypeof human
- knowledgein the'spectator
sense'(BP 276): thekindof ununderstanding
thatis,whichis obtainedthrough
detached,
derstanding,
objectiveobservation
and analysisand which,at a sophisticated
level,takestheformof theories.
Withthisturn,
itis inevitable
thatunderstanding
ofnatureshouldbe construed
as theoretical
realmstanding
overagainst
knowledgeofan objective,material
us spectating
subjects.
InBeingand Time,Heideggerdescribestheworldornatureso construed
as
andarguesthatitis parasiticon a quitedifferent
something
'present-at-hand',
modeofunderstanding
theworld,as something
or'equipmental'
'ready-to-hand'
themodernconception
cannot,as itschampi(BT 97). Because itis parasitic,
ons maintain,
be thefundamental
or 'primordial'
one. This primary
modeof
is an intelligent
understanding
'coping'or 'engaging'withthingsin so faras
in ourpracticalactivities.For example,ourprimary
untheyare significant
at an object
of a hammeris notthatofthemerespectator,
derstanding
staring
withsuch-and-such
of size, shapeand colour,butthe'concernful'
properties
an
whom
thehammer
like
of
for
understanding agent
playsa rolein activities

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342
DAVID E. COOPER
a giant
building.The worldas we experienceit in everydaylifeis, in effect,
of
a
of
in
which
the
items
various
complex 'equipment', totality 'significance',
- hammers,
we encounter
tables
and
so
on
owe
their
not
nails,
identity onlyto
theirrelations
tooneanother,
butultimately
tohumanpurposesandendeavours.
The worldas 'world-stuff'
or materialsubstanceis a notionwe arriveat only
when
we
stand
back
fromourengagedactivities
and 'stopandstare'at
'later',
thethingsaroundus.
Butwhatofthenatural,
as againsttheartefactual,
world?ForHeidegger,
the
constituents
ofnature,
are
or
encountered
as
too, originally
experienced
'equipas itwere- thewood,forexample,as a forest
ment',ready-made
equipment,
oftimber,
andthesouthwindinrelationto activities
likefarming
(as a signof
to a crop).Moregenerally,
'ourconcerndiscoversnature
rain,say,or a threat
as havinga certaindirection'
relativeandrelevant
toourpracticalprojects(BT
The
natural
environment
must
first
be
as itis bythefanner,
100).
experienced
forester
orhunter
beforeitcanbecomeanobjectofdetached,
spectatorial
enquiry
forthebiologistorzoologist.Thispriority
of'concernful',
engagedexperience,
itis important
tostress,is not,forHeideggera merelyempirical
matter.
Unless
like
trees
or
winds
first
'lit
for
us
as
in
entities
hammers,
things
up'
significant
relationtoourpractices,
would
not
be
'accessible'
to
and
they
thought enquiry
ofa spectatorial
viewof
(BT 122).The greaterroroftheCartesianprivileging
theworldandnatureis thatitignoreshowtheseeverbecameaccessibletothe
Natureas itdisplaysitselftothespectator
mustalreadyhavedisplayed
spectator.
itselfin a quitedifferent
modefortheretobe anything
to spectate.
In Beingand Time,then,twoconceptions
of nature,a 'primordial'
and a
are
described:
nature
as
a
of
one,
'privative'
totality ready-made
'equipment',
andnatureas a 'world-stuff'
setoveragainstdetachedhumancognition.
In fact
a thirdconception
when
refers
to
'the
nature
which
briefly
popsup
Heidegger
"stirsandstrives",
whichassailsandenthralls
us' (BT 70). Heideggeris aware,
thatthesedescriptions
surely,
scarcelyapplytonatureeitheras so muchreadymadeequipment
or as 'matterendowedwithforce'.It is not,however,until
severalyearslaterthatHeidegger
returns
toandelaborates
thisthird
conception.
- ineffect
Andwhenhe does,itcomestooccupya centralplaceinhisthinking
the
as
the
one
which
on
our
replacing 'equipmental'conception
'primordial'
Cartesian
is
In
such
later
as
An
Introducmodern,
conception parasitic.
writings
'
tiontoMetaphysics
andContributions
toPhilosophy
this' primordial
conception
is identified
withwhatHeideggertakesto have been thepre-Socratic
Greek
notionofphysis.In experiencing
natureas physis,theGreeksencountered
it
as a 'processofarising',as a 'self-blossoming
or
emergence' 'upsurging
presof
encing'forus of thenaturalworld(see, eg, IM 14-15).In theterminology
nature
is
not
the
natural
world
but
Contributions,
itself, the'event',
qua physis
a natural
worldbecomespresent
forhumanbeingsto
'gift'or 'source'whereby
totranslate
theGreekterm
experience.'Natura'and 'nature',whilepurporting
referto theoutcomeofthis'event',notthe'event'itself,and
physis,in effect

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343
HEIDGEGGER ON NATURE
henceto whatbecomespresent,
notto the'presenting'whichenablesthings
tobecomepresent.
In callingnaturequaphysis'primordial',
Heideggerdoesnotmean,simply,
thatit is theearliestconception.
The priority
is also a conceptualone: unless
nature
as
the
werefirst
ofnature
as a 'world-stuff'
experienced physis, conception
couldneverhavearisen.It is onlybecauseof thewonderandawe thatnature
- becauseofa visionofnature
as something
that'assailsand
quaphysisinspires
- thatenquiry
enthralls'
tounderstand
intothenatural
world,thedetermination
itandexplainitsworkings,
becamea possibility
forhumanbeings.
The questionarisesof therelationship
betweenthe'early'and 'later'acwas
countsofthe'primordial'
of
nature.
conception
Heidegger'sowntendency
thathislaterthought
a
radical
'turn'
from
toresistsuggestions
away
represented
thepositionstakeninBeingand Time.Despitethat,itis difficult
nottoregard
the'equipmental'
accountin thatbookas being,fromthelaterpointof view,
an
lateconceparticulation
of thatparticular,
only
'privative'andhistorically
AND
the
section
TECHNOLOGY
to technology.
tionof natureintegral
(See
thesalientdifferences
NATUREbelow.)Be thatas itmay,andnotwithstanding
ofnature,
betweenthe'early'and 'later'viewson the'primordial'
conception
first
is
that
our
his
The
twoconvictions
modern,
persistthroughout writings.
eitherupona pragofnatureis a derivative
Cartesianconception
one,parasitic
ortheGreekconception
maticconception
ofnatureas ready-made
'equipment'
maintains
as 'self-blossoming'/j/ivMs.
ofnature
Second,Heidegger
consistently
related
are
nature
as
thatthe'primordial'
of
essentially
something
conceptions
- whether
in
humanexistence
as so much'equipment'
to,andhencerequiring,
that
oras a mysterious
relationtoourpracticalpurposes,
'presenting' requires
.
ofthat'presenting'
ofbeing'(LH 239),tobe therecipients
us,as 'theshepherds
for
to
or
would
ever
become
thatreception,
Without
anything.
nothing
present
mustpass
thisis becausebeings,inordertobe anything,
(In part,forHeidegger,
he
hall
of
as
it
the
wrote,
were,
famously
Language,
reception
language.
through,
inBeingand
oftheinsistence,
is 'thehouseofBeing'(LH 239) - a descendant
canbe thatcouldnotbe takenupinto'discourse'.) Thesetwo
Time,thatnothing
discussion.
abidingthemesshouldbe bornein mindduringtheremaining
THE STATUS OF NATURALSCIENCE
on these,are,
The naturalsciences,as well as thosethatmodelthemselves
essence'
their
access
...
to
of
holds,
[own]
'utterly
incapable gaining
Heidegger
and
theories.
status
of
their
assertions
the
real
that
Indeed,
to,
is,
(QCT 177)
is
the
sciences
of
the
continues,
entirely
typicalself-understanding
Heidegger
take
ofthenaturalsciencesstandardly
mistaken.
Championsandpractitioners
about
andtheories
tobe,oratleasttoapproximate
scientific
assertions
to,truths
ofhumaninterests,
as itanywayis,quiteindependently
'natureas such'- nature

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344

DAVID E. COOPER

Whatthisself-understanding
andperspectives.
Heidegger
ignores,
conceptions
is thoroughly
is
that
modern
science
shapedby certainmethodologiargues,
in 'natureas such'dictates.The fundamental
cal decisions,ones thatnothing
decisionon whichmodernsciencerestswas to countonlywhatis measurable
as theproperfieldof scientific
andquantifiable
This,
enquiryanddescription.
withwhat
to 'natureas such',whenitis identified
in effect,
meansattributing
whichare thusmeasurable
to delineate,onlythosefeatures
scienceattempts
andquantifiable.
inadvance',upon'theprojecNaturalsciencerests,then,upona 'stipulation
Far fromsciencediscovering
how
tion[ontonature]of a fixedground-plan'.
whathas already
back' to scientists
naturein realityis, naturesimply'reports
beensettledbytheadoptionofthisa priori'ground-plan'
(QCT 118ff).Itis not,
that
forexample,a triumphant
scientific
magnitudes
discovery 'spatio-temporal
andemotions,
ofmotion'belongto'natureas such',whilecolours,meanings
say,
- tosubjective
this
ofnature,
forexample.Rather,
experience
belongelsewhere
as
to
the
is theinevitable
of
consequence
pre-emptive
stipulation countenance,
what
is
measurable
and
the
real
furniture
of
to
nature,
only
quantifibelonging
of
able.This,as Heideggersees it,is obviouswhenone considersthestrategy
from
the
domain
of
GalileoandDescartesin expellingthesecondary
qualities
nature.
Forthatexpulsionwas,ofcourse,theconsequenceofa priorireasoning,
notofexperimental
enquiry.
thattheremarkable
by thefamiliarsuggestion
Heideggeris unimpressed
a
reason
forholdingthat
successes
of
modern
science
provide good
explanatory
in
is.
ityieldsanaccountofhownature
or
Scientific
itself,
explanations,
anyway,
of'causalities': theseare,'strictly
Heideggerargues,restupontheestablishment
in theformof when-then'
ones (CP 102).
speaking... "if-then"
relationships
them
Sciencehas indeedbeen successfulin explainingeventsby subsuming
undersuchgeneral'when-then'
One
for
regularities. may, example,successfully
explain,in thatsense,whythewaterin thekettlejust boiled,by subsuming
theeventundera 'when-then'
andalso explainsomeregularities
regularity,
by
them
under
wider
But
before
fromsuch
ones.
hastilyconcluding,
subsuming
'natureas such',we shouldbearin
successes,thatthesciencesaredelineating
mindthatitis,oncemore,a methodological
decisiontocountonlyexplanations
ofthis'when-then'
as authentic.
variety
The explanatory
successof naturalscienceis success,therefore,
onlyas
measuredby a yardstick
thatsciencehas itselfdetermined.
there
Historically,
havebeendifferent
like
For
some
older
thinkers, Aristotle,
yardsticks.
things
are comprehensively
towards
explainedonlywhentheirtelos- theend-state
whichtheynaturally
tend- is identified.
likeLeibniz,things
arefully
Forothers,
when
their
within
a
is
exhibited.
divine
explainedonly
necessity
dispensation
scientific
Heidegger'spointis thatitis notempirical,
enquiryitselfwhichhas
inmetaphysishownsuchyardsticks
tobe chimerical.
Insteadithasbeenshifts
cal predilections,
inthestipulation
ofa certainnotionofexplanation,
resulting

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345
HEIDGEGGER ON NATURE
whichhavebeenresponsible
fortheatrophy
ofthoseolderconceptsofexplanation.Lurkingbehindthatpointis one thatHeideggerinherits
fromhisteacher,
EdmundHusserl.It is changesin whatHusserlcalls the' life-world',
whichis
and
'themeaning-fundament
of naturalscience'- shiftsin humanambitions
in people'ssenseof whatmatters,
in theircomportment
towardsthe
interests,
determinanaturalworld- thathavebeenresponsible
forthemethodological
and accountsof naturefurnished
tionswhichnow privilegetheexplanations
bynaturalscience.
TECHNOLOGY AND NATURE
tomanyreaders
on technology
will,torepeat,be familiar
Heidegger'sremarks
them.His accountoftechnolbriefinrehearsing
ofthisjournal,so I canbe fairly
elaborates
ogyineffect
aspectsoftheclaimmadeinBeingand Timethatnature
- theforest,
as 'ready-to-hand'
or 'equipmental'
is 'primordially'
experienced
as
that
as
timber.
indicated
(The aspects,
example,
by
particular
say, potential
dimensions
arethoserelatedto themoreobviously'economic'andutilitarian
in his sense,refersnotto theuse of tools
of 'equipment'.)For 'technology',
oftechnical
inproductive
ortoapplications
andmachinery
knowledge
activity,
- of
to suchactivity,
butto a 'wayofrevealing'or 'rendering
thingsmanifest'
is
which
the
natural
world
and
paradigmatically
experiencing interpreting
inthosefamiliar
senses(QCT 5). In thetechnologimanifested
bytechnology
orencounthenaturalworldis experienced
cal wayofrevealing,
specifically,
- something
'on tap' forus, to be drawn
teredas so much'standing-reserve'
on andfromso as to serveourpracticalneeds.Wheresucha wayofrevealing
theresultsare,forexample,that'theearth... revealsitselfas
predominates,
a coal-mining
thesoil as a mineraldeposit',and theriverRhineas a
district,
'water-power
supplier'(QCT 14ff).
betweentheearlierdiscussion
difference
Thereis, however,an important
Thatthenaturalworld
of 'equipment'andthelaterone of 'standing-reserve'.
as 'equipment'is advanced,in Beingand Time,
is 'primordially'
encountered
as an abidingandnecessary
aspectofhumanexistence.In thelateressays,on
modeof
orrevealingnatureinthepragmatic
theotherhand,ourencountering
the
be
a
modern
is
taken
to
culmination,
distinctively
phenomenon,
technology
ofmetaphysics'.
as Heideggersees it,of'thehistory
Bythis,hemeansanever'in relationto man'as
the
world
and
understand
to
view
increasing
tendency
thebeingwho'decide[s]... how[other]
beingsappear'(LH 234). Thetendency
exmanencounters
... thateverything
'theimpression
is towards,eventually,
the
because
It
istsonlyin so faras itis hisconstruct'
(QCT 27). is, moreover,
and
not
the
latest
is
one
of
possibleway,
way revealing just
technological
is now
ineveryepoch,thatHeidegger
essentialtohumanexperience
something
he
is
not
In
so
able to regarditas a 'monstrous'
it,
suggesting
regarding
way.

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346
DAVID E. COOPER
thatit is mistaken
to view thenaturalworldas 'standingreserve'.Plainly,a
certainregionmaybe a coal-mining
district
or a rivermaysupplypower,and
therecan be nothing
in so recognising
incorrect
it.
is
in
that
it
'drives
outeveryotherpossibilrather,
Technology monstrous,
a
of
to
such
that
it
is
no
as justone
ity revealing',
degree
longerappreciated
for
in
the
even
modern
'aesthetic'
world,
(QCT 27). So,
possibility
example,
of
nature
is
with
the
river
Rhine,say,beingputon
experience
technological,
the
tourist
as
'for
so
to
by
tap
inspection
industry'
yielditsquotaof 'aesthetic'
sensations.
Otherhistorical
of
did
ways revealing notpossessthisall-devoura
character:
could
be revealedas something
butalso
ofbeauty,
flower,
ing
say,
as something
forth'
from
a
of
'blossoming
mysterious
process physis,and as
with
a
in
a
role
sense
of theircommunity.
As
something
significant
people's
is
at
the
farthest
remove
from
that
stance
towards
the
such,technology
possible
natural
worldwhich'letsbeingsbe': forto 'letbe' is,precisely,
tostandopento
a fullrangeofwaysin whichthingsmaybe 'rendered
manifest'
to us.
Fromthishegemony
of technology,
further
of
developments a monstrous
kindensue.Foronething,
thetechnological
viewofnature
comestoencompass
humanbeings,so that'manhimselfwillhavetobe takenas standing-reserve'
(QCT 27). Humanbeingsbecome'manpower','humanresources'andthelike.
Andhumannatureitselfis indangerofbeingputontap.Anticipating
theambitionsofsomeoftoday'sbiotechnologists,
withtheirreadinessto 'shuntaround'
humangeneticmaterial,
Heideggerwritesofan 'attackuponthenatureofman
with
which
the
bombmeanslittle'(DT 52).
compared
explosionofthehydrogen
Eveniftheirgeneshavenotyetbeenshunted
around,ina worlddominated
by
themselves
have
technology,
people
certainly been- 'drivenfromtheirnative
soil [and]resettled
inthewastelands
ofindustrial
districts'
(DT 48). In that,and
otherrespects,
thehegemony
oftechnology
with
it
the
modern'destiny'
brings
of 'homelessness'.Again,withnature'dimmeddown' or levelleddownto
itis, so to speak,without
theresourcesto resistthemodern
standing-reserve,
to
'order'
it
and
it
forth
to
to producea 'maximumyieldat
urge
'challenge'
minimum
Hence
the
of
a
'devastation
oftheearth',appeals
expense'.
process
in
which
the
name
of
the
or
of
against
integrity meaning naturalthingssound,
to themodernear,onlyholloworquaint.
INTERCONNECTIONS
areHeidegger'sobservations
on naturemade
Such,takenrelatively
separately,
in thethreecontextsof his enquiriesintotheontologyof (or conceptionof)
of
nature,themethodsand statusof thenaturalsciences,and thecharacter
As
noted
takes
there
be
to intimate
connections
earlier,Heidegger
technology.
betweentheseobservations.
Forexample,thehegemony
oftechnology,
as I put
thesciences'ownself-understanding
oftheirdeliverances,
which
it,reinforces

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HEIDGEGGER ON NATURE

347

inturnreinforces
the'forgetfulness'
ofa more'primordial'
ofnature
conception
thanthenaturalscientific
one.
I devotethissection,however,
to considering
thecomplaint
that,farfrom
at
observations
are
withone
odds
connected,
beingintimately
Heidegger's
another.
it
is
the
stance
towards
nature
and
Specifically, alleged, technological
thenaturalscientific
of
it
can
reinforce
one
since
another,
conception
hardly
Fromthestandpoint
oftheformer,
thenaturalworldis
theyarein opposition.
revealedin purelypragmatic,
terms;
whereas,
'equipmental'
accordingto the
scientific
nature
is
what
is
revealed
to
detached
an
conception,
spectatorship,
which
is
what
it
is
of
human
interests
'objective'entity
quiteindependently
andperspectives.
So how,forinstance,
can a viewoftheforestas nextyear's
timbersupplyreinforce
and be reinforced
by a viewof it as so much'matter
endowedwithforce'?
To understand
Heidegger'sresponseto thischarge,we need to consider
hisremarks
on therelationship
of scienceandtechnology.
Thesearedirected,
the
usual
view
that
is
typically,
against
technology appliedscience.Whileitis
truethat'moderntechnology'
so thatitis
developedintheeighteenth
century,
'later',ona 'chronological
than
modern
,
(Galilean)physicalscience,
reckoning'
itis nevertheless
earlier'whenconsidered
from'thepointofview
'historically
oftheessenceholdingswaywithin
it'(QCT 23). Moresuccinctly,
andcrudely,
scienceis notindependent
oftechnology,
butan 'offshoot
ofa ... proliferation
of tool-preparation'
(CP 50). His point,here,is nottheempiricalone that,as
a matter
of fact,modernphysicsrequiredthestimulus
of burgeoning
technoactivities
in
order
to
take
off
and
is
it
the
one
Nor
logical
develop.
cynical that
scientific
researchat anygiventime,however'theoretical',
is alwaysshaped
anddirected
technical
andeconomicneeds.Heidegger
is quite
bycontemporary
to
that
much
scientific
research
is
its
undertaken
'for
own
sake',
happy accept
oroutofsheer'curiosity'.
The keyto thepointHeideggerdoes wantto makelies in hisreference
to
'theessenceholdingswaywithin'technology.
Thatessenceis theordering,
challengingstancetowardsthenaturalworldfromwhichit is addressedas
as something
to be madeto yieldwhatwe requirefromit.
'standing-reserve',
Butthissamestance,Heideggerargues,also belongstotheessenceofmodern
science.The argument
is thatexperimentation
is an essentialaspectofscience,
andthatexperimentation
as itwasbyFrancisBacon,
shoulditselfbe construed,
as an ordering
and challenging
of materialsso as to 'produceevents'.That
thatmodern
is a propermethodofenquirywas notsomething
experimentation
sciencehituponas a luckyafter-thought.
Rather,giventhe'stipulation'
only
itbelongstothe'ground-plan'
toconsiderwhatis measurable
andquantifiable,
willcountas measurable
and
of scienceto engagein experiment.
Fornothing
that
lend
in
at
method.
does
not
to
itself, principle least, experimental
quantifiable
itis
Andsincetheaimofsuchenquiriesis toestablish'when-then'
regularities,
essentialto scientific
to
events'
under
specificexperimental
practice 'produce

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348

DAVID E. COOPER

to therequiredlevelofexactness,
Forhowelse is one toestablish,
conditions.
thatwhenX happens,thenY happens?
sharea similar'mindresearch
andtechnology
Crudelyput,then,scientific
nature
and thetechnologist
on therack,in the
set'. Boththeresearcher
put
Baconianspirit;bothdemandthatnatureyieldsomething
up. Thatin theone
condiunder
the
is
information
case,
acquired
experimental
yield quantified
or whateverin satisfaction
of
tionswhile,in theother,it is coal, electricity
the
of
be
to
conceal
One
should
not
allowed
affinity. way appracticalwants,
attitude
theaffinity
is torecognisehowdecisivelyboththescientific
preciating
stanceareopposedto theGreekexperience
ofnatureas
andthetechnological
is notsomething
whose
physis.Natureas a mysterious
'upsurging
presenting'
it
the
rack.
be
on
could
understanding
gainedbyputting
experimenter's Noris
thus
could
for
itsomething
that,
experienced,
figure humanbeingsonlyas so
at
resources
our
many
disposal.
theaffinity,
One appreciates
too,byreflecting
that,forscienceandtechnolnature
must
be
'dis-enchanted'
of all thoseaspects(relistripped
ogyalike,
it
for
that
would
make
resistant
bothto complete
gioussignificance, example)
in
'when-then'
terms
and
to
beingregardedas mere
explanation quantifiable
With
these
affinities
it
is
then
easyto see how,invariequipment.
appreciated,
reinforce
ous ways,naturalscienceandtechnology,
onceup andrunning,
one
of science,whichowes so muchto a reliance
another'sprojects.The prestige
and'tool-preparation',
is inherited
and
onprecision
machinery
bysophisticated
in
that
interventions
nature
themselves
on
The
sucrely machinery.
'gigantic'
ingetting
cessesoftechnological
interventions
naturetoproduce'a maximum
thatscienceis
confirm
theimpression
yieldat minimum
expense'themselves
in
its
the
world
announcement
of
the
'when-then'
that
getting
right
regularities
inform
theseinterventions.
To return
to thechargeto whichtheseremarks
of Heideggerhavebeena
it
is
while
indeed
one
the
to
response:
thing experience naturalworldpragmatior
as
andanother
cally anthropocentrically
'standing-reserve',
thingtospectate
as so much'world-stuff',
in passing
thereis no difficulty
it,in thelaboratory,
fromtheone to theother.Forwhat'holdssway'in bothmodesofexperience
is thesame,andall theobstaclestoexperiencing
natureinboththosewaysand
no otherhavelongbeen'forgotten'.
THE PIVOTAL CLAIM
Iftheremarks
intheprevioussectionarewelltaken,thenHeideggerisjustified
inholdingthattheclaimshemakesaboutnature
inthethreecontexts
ofenquiry
identified
In
this
final
I
section, wanttosuggest,as Heidegger
'hangtogether'.
himselfdoes notexplicitly
do to myknowledge,
thatthereis a rather
specific,
andcrucialwaytheyholdtogether.
In myjudgement,
theclaimshemakesabout

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HEIDGEGGER ON NATURE

349

themistaken
ofthenaturalsciencesarepivotalinthesense
self-understanding
thenhisotherclaims- concerning
thederivative
that,iftheseareunwarranted,
character
of our prevailingconceptionof natureand the 'monstrousness'
of
- lose theforceHeideggergivesthem.(Maybethosefurther
claims
technology
couldbe defended,
butnoton thegroundsthatHeideggerdoes.) If I am right,
itis theleastwellknownofHeidegger'sdiscussions
thatis most
then,ironically,
central.
onHeidegger
onnature,
such
(Mostcommentators
including competent
onesas MichaelZimmerman
(1990) andCharlesTaylor(1992),havepaidless
attention
tohisphilosophy
ofthenaturalsciencesthanto hisontologyandhis
discussionoftechnology.
An exceptionis GeorgePattison(2000).)
Let'srecallHeidegger'smainclaimaboutthestatusofthenaturalsciences.
These do not,as theirchampionsstandardly
assume,deliverassertionsand
theories
thataretrueof 'natureas such',natureas itanywayandobjectively
is
of all humaninterest
andperspective.
Norwouldithelpifthese
independent
maintained
thatthesciences,in theircurrent
state,
championsmoremodestly
to
a
such
true
account
that
it
must
be
left
to an
onlyapproximate providing
idealphysicsofthefuture
to
it.
since
the
deliverances
of
For,
actually provide
thesciencesowe to a 'stipulation
in advance',to theadoptionof an a priori
thesciencescannotbe construed
as offering
evenan approxi'ground-plan',
mationto a trueaccountof 'natureas such'. Rather,theyofferjust one,not
ofhowtheworldmayrevealitselftous,and
especiallyprivileged,
description
froma certainangleofinterest.
Now supposeHeideggeris wrongaboutthisandthattheself-understanding
ofthenatural
sciencesis after
all warranted.
Suppose,inotherwords,thatscientificrealism,
inonesenseofthatelasticexpression,
is true:thereis oneandonly
one waytheworldanywayandfundamentally
is, andthesciencestellus that
way.What,to beginwith,wouldthenbe thefateofHeidegger'sclaimsabout
thederivative,
character
ofthisscientific
ofnature?
The
secondary
conception
answeris thatthefamiliar
notin
chargemadeagainstHeideggerofengaging,
butin 'mere'anthropology
wouldbe aneffective
one.In otherwords,
ontology,
hiscriticscouldreasonably
thedependence
oftheprevailchargethatintracing
- thatofphysis,say- Heidegger
onearlierconceptions
ofnature
ingconception
is onlytellingan empirical,
historical
It maywellbe true,thecriticwill
story.
scientific
ofnaturewouldneverhavearisen
concede,thattheCartesian,
picture
- butso what?Thehistorical,
ofearlierpictures
exceptagainstthebackground
is
anthropological
storycannotshowthatthecurrently
prevailing
conception
in
the
crucial
sense
of
less
than
fundamental,
secondary
philosophically
being
of failingto capturegenuine,butnow 'forgotten',
dimensions
of nature.The
admitthattheprevailing
has
critic,inotherwords,maycheerfully
conception
risenfromtheashesofa forgotten
but
then
wish
riddance
to
conception,
good
thelatter
Put
the
of
conception. simply,
Heidegger'scritique
self-understanding
ofthenaturalsciencesmustbe correctifhe is to be warranted
in complaining
oftheatrophy
andoblivionofearlierconceptions
ofnature.

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350

DAVID E. COOPER

thenwhatbecomesofhis
Second,ifHeidegger'scritiqueis notwarranted,
' as nomore
'
as
thattorevealnature
insistence
,
technologically standing-reserve
ofcourse,stilladduce
One might,
thana resourceforus totap,is 'monstrous'?
familiar
moralreasonsagainstsucha partialwayofrevealing:itmayresultin
of future
generations,
endangerthesurvivalprospects
ecologicaldevastation,
to animals,and so on. But whileHeideggeroccasionallyadcause suffering
theseareclearlynottheonesthatprimarily
ducessuchconsiderations,
ground
of
His owncase restson theincompatibility
hisownantipathy
to technology.
a
with
that
be'
which
manifests
properappreciation
technology
'lettingthings
a senseof ourselvesas theguardiansof mysterious
of theintegrity
of things,
thatit is hubristic
forhumanbeingsto
processesof being,and a recognition
themeasureof'howbeingsappear'andtoregardthemselves
makethemselves
as answerable
to nothing
beyondtheirownprojects.
- ifmodern
Butnow,ifthescientific
realistis right
physics'imageofitsown
tonatureas something
statusis accurate- thenappealstotheintegrity
ofnature,
a
we couldbe answerable
or
to
to,
mysterious
significance
possessedbynatural
Nature
is
'matter
withforce',in
are
misconceived.
endowed
simply
processes
measure
of
natural
events
whichcasepredicating
or
normative
integrity
meaning,
ofthephysicists
is a dis-enchanted
one.As
andprocessesis senseless.Thenature
as depictedbyphysicsis notanything
JohnPassmore( 1980) hasinsisted,
nature
humanbeingscouldbe responsible
even
moralreasons,itis
to,
if,forfamiliar
should
hold
themselves
they
for.
something
responsible
ofscientific
oftheselfthen,needstosecurehiscritique
realism,
Heidegger,
if
claims
of
the
natural
his
further
are
to
have
theforce
sciences,
understanding
he imagines.Ifunsecured,
thenhisclaimaboutthederivative
character
ofthe
Cartesianconception
is in dangerof reducingto a philosophically
unexciting
historical
whilehis chargeof 'monstrousness'
hypothesis,
againsttechnology
is leftwithout
thedistinctive
kindof grounding
thatHeideggerinvokes.As it
scientific
a powerof
realism
is,inmyjudgement,
happens,
Heidegger'scritique
fulone.Thatis nota judgement
I can argueforhere,thoughelsewhereI have
(see Cooper2002). The
developeda critiquethatowestoHeidegger'sinsights
centralinsights,
itseemsto me,arethat'concerndiscoversnatureas havinga
certaindirection'
toimaginethatwe couldso
(HCT 210),andthatitis hubristic
setasideortranscend
our'concern'- ourinterests,
oursenseofwhatmatters,
and so on - as to treatthisas a 'discovery'ofhowtheworldanywayis, quite
fromour'concern'.It is disappointing,
of
independently
giventheimportance
- bothin themselves
theseinsights
and in thewidereconomyof Heidegger's
- thatfewof thecommentators
who writeon Heidegger'sviewsof
thought
naturehave devotedmuchattention
to his critiqueof theself-understanding
ofthesciences.

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351
HEIDGEGGER ON NATURE
REFERENCES
(a) WorksbyHeidegger
BP Basic Questions
trans.
A. Hofstadter,
Indiana
ofPhenomenology,
Bloomington:
Press,1982.
University
BT BeingandTime,
trans.
J.Macquarrie
andE. Robinson,
Oxford:
1980.
Blackwell,
CP Contributions
toPhilosophy
trans.
P.
Emad
and
K.
Bloom(From
Enowning),
Maly,
Indiana
Press,1999.
ington:
University
DT Discourse
on Thinking,
trans.
andE. Freund,
J.Anderson
NewYork:Harper
&
Row,1966.
HCT History
tr.T. Kiesel,Bloomington:
IndianaUniversity
oftheConcept
ofTime,
Press,1985.
IM AnIntroduction
R. Mannheim,
toMetaphysics,
trans.
NewHaven:YaleUniversity
Press,1959.
LH 'Letter
inBasicWritings,
& Kegan
onhumanism*,
ed.D.Krell,
London:
Routledge
Paul,1978,189-242.
W.Lovitt,
New
(andother
QCT TheQuestion
essays),trans.
Concerning
Technology
York:Harper
& Row,1977.
(b) Otherworkscited
andMystery,
Oxford:
D.E. (2002)TheMeasure
Humanism,
ofThings:
Humility
Cooper,
Press.
Clarendon
2ndedn,London:
Duckworth.
J.(1980)Man'sResponsibility
Passmore,
forNature,
G. (2000)TheLaterHeidegger,
London:
Pattison,
Routledge.
andH. Hall
C. (1992) 'Heidegger,
Taylor,
LanguageandEcology',in H. Dreyfus
(eds.),
A Critical
Reader.Oxford:
Blackwell,
Heidegger:
pp.247-69.
withModernity,
M.E.
Zimmerman, (1990)Heidegger's
Bloomington:
Confrontation
Indiana
Press.
University

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