Civil Case Digests No Highlight

San Beda College of Law CIVIL LAW REVIEW
Effectivity of Laws

TANADA v. TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915, 29 December 1986
FACTS:
Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern as well
as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners Taada,
Sarmiento, and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and
Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette
of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative
orders. However, respondents contend that publication in the Official Gazette
is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws
themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. The point stressed is
anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided, x x x.
In the decision of this case on 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity
for all presidential decrees and issuance of general application to be
published in the Official Gazette otherwise, these laws shall have no binding
force and effect. Petitioners Taada et al. moved for reconsideration and
clarification.
ISSUE: Is publication still required in the light of the clause unless it is
otherwise provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code?
RULING:
YES. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any
event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make
the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its
previous publication. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the
legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen day period shall
be shortened or extended.
The requirement of publication applies to (1) all statutes, including those of
local application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or directly
conferred by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations for the
purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation; (4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies only to a portion
of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place;
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(5) Monetary Board circulars to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act
which that body is supposed to enforce.
On the other hand, publication requirements does not apply to (1)
interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, i.e. regulating
only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public; (2) Letters
of Instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties; and (3) instructions of Ministry heads on case studies, assignments of
personnel, etc. Municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the
Local Government Code.
Further, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since the
purpose of publication itself is to make the public aware of the contents of the
laws.
DE ROY v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 80718, 29 January 1988
FACTS:
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and
destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents,
resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a
daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their
shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so.
On the basis of such facts, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding
the petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarded damages in favor of the
respondents. On appeal, the decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto by the CA.
On the last day of the fifteen-day period for filing of the appeal, petitioners filed a
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration which was
eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987.
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this
was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987. The Court of Appeals, in
denying the same, applied the Ruling under Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v.
Japzon. The petitioners contended that the CA erred in applying the said Ruling
because the case cited was not yet published in the Official Gazette as of the
time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated.
ISSUE: Are Supreme Court decisions required to be published in the Official

Gazette to be binding?
RULING:
NO. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in
the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their
becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law
practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where
issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the
advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such
publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law
journals.
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PEOPLE v. QUE PO LAY
G.R. No. L-6791, 29 March 1954
FACTS:
Que Po Lay was convicted after violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 by
possessing foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S.
money orders amounting to about $7,000 and failure to sell the same to the
Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such
foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. He appealed his conviction by
averring that said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette prior to
the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said circular
had no force and effect. It is contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and
Act 2930 both require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being
an order or notice of general applicability. The Solicitor General answering this
contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the
publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of
a law in order to have force and effect.
ISSUE: Should Que Po Lay be held liable for the violation Central Bank
Circular No. 20 which was was not published in the Official Gazette prior to
the act or omission imputed to him?
RULING:
NO. It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law
but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it
has the force and effect of law, according to settled jurisprudence. Moreover,
as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the
Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be
published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory
that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions,
a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially
and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.
Although Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it
was not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after
appellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly
its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its
publication in the Official Gazzette or after November 1951. In other words,
appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the
time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his
possession thereof.
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Ignorance of the Law Excuses No One (Art. 3)
GARCIA v. RECIO
G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001
FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian
citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband
and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly
dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. On June
26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate
of Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian government.
On January 2, 1994, Redrick Recio and Grace Garcia, a Filipina, was married.
In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as
single and Filipino. Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent
lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the
two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996,
in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
On March 3, 1998, Petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the ground of bigamy. She claimed that she learned of
respondents marriage to Editha Samson only in November 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed
to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. He contended
that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a
divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated
to marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998, about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit
for the declaration of nullity was pending, respondent was able to secure a
divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage
had irretrievably broken down.
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce
issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the
marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of
the marriage; that is, respondents alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry.
ISSUE: Did the divorce obtained by Recio in Australia ipso facto capacitated
him to remarry?
RULING:
No, the Court remanded the case to the court a quo to receive more evidence.
The court agreed with the petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in
finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal
capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to
show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to
prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
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Neither can the Court grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to
respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out
that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a
direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, the most judicious course is to
remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show
petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a
quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of bigamy,
there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were
both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1,
1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
Waiver of Rights (Art. 6)

D.M. CONSUNJI v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 137873, 20 April 2001
FACTS:
The case at bar is about a complaint for damages filed by a widow against the
employer of her deceased spouse. Her husband, working as a construction
worker for the appellant, fell from the 14th floor of a tower which caused his
death. The employer asserts that the widows prior availment of benefits from
the State Insurance Fund prevented her from claiming further benefits from
the employer.
ISSUE: Was the widow precluded from recovering damages under the Civil
Code after having previously availed of the death benefits of her husband
under the Labor Code?
RULING:
YES. An injured worker has a right of selection between availing of the
workers right under the Workmens Compensation Act and suing under the
Civil Code for higher damages, but he cannot pursue both at the same time.
When a party makes an election, it becomes final and results in a waiver of
election. But, if there is a lack of knowledge of fact, the waiver is not
applicable.
There was no proof that the widow knew how exactly her husband died nor
the remedies available before claiming damages under the Labor Code.
Therefore, it was held that the employer should pay the widow, provided that
whatever she already received from the Insurance Fund be deducted from the
courts award of damages.
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CUI vs. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY
G.R. No. L-15127, 30 May 1961
FACTS:
Plaintiff Emeterio Cui finished his law studies in Arellano University up to and
including the first semester of the fourth year. He left the defendant's law
college and enrolled for the last semester of his fourth year law in the college
of law of the Abad Santos University. He was awarded scholarship grants
during the time he was in Arellano University. To secure permission to take
the bar he needed the transcripts of his records in defendant Arellano
University. The defendant refused to issue transcripts until after he had paid
back the total amount of scholarship grants, which is P1,033.87. Plaintiff paid
to defendant the said sum under protest. Before plaintiff was awarded
scholarship grants, he was made to sign a contract with the defendant
university wherein he waived his right to transfer to another school without
having refunded to the defendant the equivalent of his scholarship cash.
ISSUE: Is the provision of the contract between the plaintiff Emeterio Cui and
the defendant Arellano University, whereby the former waived his right to
transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his
scholarships in cash, valid or not?
RULING:
The stipulation in question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and
void. In order to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must
find that the contract as to consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes
some established interest of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and
good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights.
Scholarships are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep outstanding
students in school to bolster its prestige. Thus conceived it is not only
inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals or those generally
accepted principles of morality which have received some kind of social and
practical confirmation. In educational institutions, scholarships are granted not
to attract and to keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda mine but
to reward merit or help gifted students in whom society has an established
interest or a first lien.
Repeal of Laws
BESO v. DAGUMAN
A.M.MTJ-99-1211, 28 January 2000
FACTS:
Respondent Juan Daguman, MCTC Judge of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan
Pagsanjan, Samar, solemnized the marriage of complainant Beso to
BERNARDITO yman, on August 28, 1987, at the Judges residence in Calbayog
City, Samar, or outside his jurisdiction, because complainant was to leave abroad
the same day as she was an OFW. After the wedding, Yman abandoned Beso for
no clear reason. Beso went to check the marriage contract with the Local Civil
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Registrar of Calbayog, from which she learned that the marriage has not been
registered. Beso inquired about the non-registration of her marriage with the
Judge. Responding to Besos letter about the matter, Daguman told her that all
the copies of the marriage contract were taken by Yman.
ISSUE: Did Judge Daguman commit nonfeasance in office when he

solemnized a marriage outside his jurisdiction?
RULING:
YES. Respondent Judge has not only committed nonfeasance in office, he
also undermined the very foundation of marriage, which is the basic social
institution in our society whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law.
A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must
also live and abide by it and render justice at all times without resorting to
shortcuts clearly uncalled for. A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the
law; he must be conscientious and thorough in doing so.
An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws - let alone that enacted in
order to preserve so sacrosant an inviolable social institution as marriage and the stability of judicial Rulings laid down by superior authority should
have given judge pause and made him more vigilant in the exercise of his
authority and the performance of his duties as a solemnizing officer. A judge
is, furthermore, presumed to know the constitutional limits of the authority or
jurisdiction of his court.
Judicial Decisions Form Part of the Laws of the Land

PEOPLE v. LICERA
G.R. No. L-39990, 2 July 1975
FACTS:
In 1961, accused was granted an appointment as secret agent of Governor
Leviste. In 1965, accused was charged with illegal possession of firearms. In
1968, he was convicted of the offense charged. He claims that as secret
agent, he was a "peace officer" and, thus, pursuant to People vs.
Macarandang (1959), was exempt from the requirements relating to the
issuance of license to possess firearms. He alleges that the court a quo erred
in relying on the later case of People vs. Mapa (1967) which held that section
879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides no exemption for persons
appointed as secret agents by provincial governors from the requirements
relating to firearm licenses.
ISSUE: Should the Macarandang ruling, the prevailing Ruling at the time of the
appointment, operate despite being abrogated by a new ruling removing the
exemption?
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RULING:
YES. Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this
jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in themselves not laws,
constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation
placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the
enactment of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation
merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed
law purports to carry into effect.
Where a new Ruling abrogates an old rule, the new Ruling should operate
respectively only and should not adversely affect those favored by the old
rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof. This
holds more especially true in the application or interpretation of statutes in the
field of penal law, for, in this area, more than in any other, it is imperative that
the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
PEOPLE v. JABINAL
G.R. No. L-30061, 27 February 1974
FACTS:
Sometime in 1964, JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN was charged with Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition. However, although he had no license or
permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of
Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial
Commander.
In view of said appointments accused contends that he was entitled to acquittal
on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People vs. Macarandang, 106
Phil. (1959), 713, and People vs. Lucero3 103 Phil. (1958), 500.
However, in its decision dated December 27, 1968, the Municipal Court of
Batangas found the accused guilty as charged and only considered as mitigating
circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret Agent and Confidential
Agent on the ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of
Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa L22301, which was decided on August 30, 1967
ISSUE: Should the Ruling enunciated in the case of People v. Mapa be applied
in the case against Jabinal even if the said Ruling was pronounced after the
commission of the crime and after the filing of the criminal action against him?
HELD: NO.
1ST ISSUE: Applicability and nature of Supreme Court Decisions.
RULING:
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless
evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of
the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The interpretation upon
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a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that
law originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed intends to
effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a
restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force
of law.
2ND ISSUE: Application of the new view when a Ruling laid by the Supreme
Court in its previous decision is overruled.
RULING:
When a Ruling of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the
new Ruling should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties
who had relied on the old Ruling and acted on the faith thereof. This is
especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is
necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the
guidance of society.
Duty of Judges (Art. 9)

CHUAYAN v. BERNAS
G.R. No. 10010, 1 August 1916
FACTS:
On the afternoon of June 26, 1913, a match was held in the cockpit of the
municipality of Tabaco, Albay, between two cocks belonging to the plaintiff
and to the defendant respectively. Each of said persons had put up a wager of
P160; and as the referee of the cockpit had declared the defendant's cock the
winner in the bout, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant in the justice
of the peace court of the said pueblo, asking that his own rooster be declared
the winner. The justice of the peace court decided that the bout was a draw.
From this judgment the defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance of
the province. On September 11, 1913, the said Court of First Instance
rendered judgment dismissing the appeal. The grounds for the dismissal
pronounced by the lower court in the judgment appealed from were that that
court has always dismissed cases of this nature, that he is not familiar with
the rules governing cockfights and the duties of referees thereof; that he does
not know where to find the law on the subject and, finally, that he knows of no
law whatever that governs the rights of the plaintiff and the defendant in
questions concerning cockfights.
ISSUE: Does lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable to a case justifies
a judge's dismissal of a case submitted to him for decision?
RULING:
NO. The ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding the law
applicable to a case submitted to him for decision, the fact that the court does
not know the rules applicable to a certain matter that is the subject of an
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appeal which must be decided by him and his not knowing where to find the
law relative to the case, are not reasons that can serve to excuse the court for
terminating the proceedings by dismissing them without deciding the issues.
The Civil Code, in the second paragraph of article 6, provides that the
customs of the place shall be observed, and, in the absence thereof, the
general principles of law.
PEOPLE v. VENERACION
G.R No. 119987-88, 12 October 1995
FACTS:
The cadaver of a young girl, later identified as Angel Alquiza wrapped in a
sack and yellow table cloth tied with a nylon cord with both feet and left hand
protruding from it was seen floating along Del Pan St. near the corner of
Lavesares St., Binondo, Manila. On the basis of the sworn statement of the
witnesses, Abundio Lagunday, Henry Lagarto and Ernesto Cordero, were
charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide in an Information filed with
RTC-Manila. the trial court rendered a decision finding the defendants Henry
Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto Cordero y Maristela guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced both accused with
the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided for by
law. Disagreeing with the sentence imposed, the City Prosecutor of Manila
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Decision be modified in
that the penalty of death be imposed against respondents Lagarto and
Cordero, in place of the original penalty (reclusion perpetua). Refusing to act
on the merits of the said Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Judge
issued an Order denying the same for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Did the judge act with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of
jurisdiction when he failed and/or refused to impose the mandatory penalty of
death under Republic Act No. 7659, after finding the accused guilty of the
crime of Rape with Homicide?
RULING:
YES. If judges, under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to
roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to
exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A
government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary
powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, judges are
guided by the Rule of Law, and ought to protect and enforce it without fear or
favor, resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the
interference of their own personal beliefs.
As long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our
criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial
officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions. It is a
well settled rule that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or
morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of the
Legislature which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or
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vetoes them. The only function of the judiciary is to interpret the laws and, if
not in disharmony with the Constitution, to apply them.
In the case at bench, respondent judge, after weighing the evidence of the
prosecution and the defendant at trial found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide. Since the law in force
at the time of the commission of the crime for which respondent judge found
the accused guilty was Republic Act No. 7659, which provides that the penalty
imposable for such crime is death penalty, he was bound by its provisions.
Doubtful Statutes (Art. 10)

PEOPLE v. PURISIMA
G.R. No. L-42050-66, 20 November 1978
FACTS:
In this case are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the
Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of
Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor
General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic
questionof law.
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused
with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree
No. 9 but it was dismissed by the lower courts. In dismissing or quashing the
Informations, the trial courts concurred with the submittal of the defense that
one essential element of the offense charged is missing from the Information
that is, the carrying outside of the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed
or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or
related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or
public disorder. Respondent judges also ruled that a reasonable, logical, and
valid construction given to P.D. 9(3).
Furthermore, Judge Macaren, in its decision, stated it is imperative for the
specific statute violated to be designated or mentioned 4 in the charge since
he carrying of so-called "deadly weapons" is the subject of another penal
statute and a Manila city ordinance and Act No. 1780.
The Solicitor General argued that a perusal of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 shows
that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities; that the
act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of
public policy. And that P.D. 9(3) covers one and all situations where a person
carries outside his residence any of the weapons mentioned or described in
the decree irrespective of motivation, intent, or purpose, converts these cases
into one of "statutory construction." Moreover, the city ordinance and the
statute as stated by Judge Macaren are deemed repealed by P.D. 9 (3).
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ISSUES:
1. Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to
constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized
under P.D. No. 9?
2. Whether the ambiguity in the statutes shall be construed according to the
spirit of the law?
RULING:
1. NO. The Court is faced with the situation where a particular act may be
made to fall, at the discretion of a police officer or a prosecuting fiscal, under
the statute, or the city ordinance, or the presidential decree. That being the
case, the right becomes more compelling for an accused to be confronted
with the facts constituting the essential elements of the offense charged
against him, if he is not to become an easy pawn of oppression and
harassment, or of negligent or misguided official action a fear
understandably shared by respondent Judges who by the nature of their
judicial functions are daily exposed to such dangers.
P.D. No. 9 carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's residence of
any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or
implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon
was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion,
rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon,
if concealed, outside of the scope of the statute or the city ordinance
mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons
described in the presidential decree is not a criminal offense in itself. What
makes the act criminal or punishable under the decree is the motivation
behind it. Without that motivation, the act falls within the purview of the city
ordinance or some statute when the circumstances so warrant.
2. YES. When ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task to construe and
interpret the true meaning and scope of the measure, guided by the basic
principle that penal statutes are to be construed and applied liberally in favor
of the accused and strictly against the state. In the construction or
interpretation of a legislative measure a presidential decree in these cases
the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the
law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for in the words of this Court in
Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, per Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within the
spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence
to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions.
In this case, the problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of
P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree
and this can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses
which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the
decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.
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Customs (Arts. 11-12)

MARTINEZ v. VAN BUSKIRK
G.R. No. 5691, 27 December 1910
FACTS:
Carmen Ong de Martinez, together with her child, was riding a carromata in
Ermita along the left side of the street when a delivery wagon belonging to the
defendant to which a pair of horses was attached came along the street in the
opposite direction at great speed. The horses ran into the carromata and
wounded Martinez severely. The defendant presented evidence that the
cochero was a good servant and a reliable and safe cochero. And that he was
delivering stuff so he tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the
delivery wagon and went inside the wagon to unload the stuff to be delivered.
But while unloading, another vehicle drove by whose driver cracked a whip
and made some noises which frightened the horses and which made it ran
away. The cochero was thrown from the inside of the wagon and was unable
to stop the horses. The horses collided with the carromata.
ISSUE: Is the coachman, in leaving his horse unhitched to assist in unloading
the wagon, considered negligent?
RULING:
The acts, the performance of which has not proven destructive or injurious
and which have been generally acquiesced in by society for so long a time as
to have ripened into a custom, can not be held to be unreasonable or
imprudent and that, under the circumstances, the driver was not guilty of
negligence in so leaving his team while assisting in unloading his wagon.
YAO KEE v. SY-GONZALES
G.R. No. L-55960, 24 November 1988
FACTS:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died leaving behind real and personal properties
in the Philippines. The respondents filed a petition for the grant of letters of
administration claiming that they are the deceased's acknowledged natural
children with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with whom he lived for 25 years
without the benefit of marriage.
The petition was opposed by the petitioners, including Yao Kee, who claims
that she is the lawful wife of the deceased by virtue of a marriage celebrated
in accordance with Chinese law and custom. However, she does not have a
marriage certificate because the practice during that time was for elders to
agree upon the betrothal of their children and that a written document is
exchanged just between the parents of the bride and groom, or any elder for
that matter.
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ISSUE: May the marriage celebrated in accordance with Chinese law and
custom be recognized in this jurisdiction in the absence of proof of such law
and custom?
RULING:
Custom is defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly
observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. The law
requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of
evidence."
The Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two things must
be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact;
and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.
Petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and
custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot
be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only
because they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no
showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to
prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the
marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao
Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
Computation of Period and Time (Art. 13)

GARCIA v. RECIO
G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001
FACTS:
citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989, a decree of
divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family
court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a
"Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government.
Petitioner a Filipina and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our
Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy respondent allegedly had
a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She
claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in
November, 1997.
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the
suit for the declaration of nullity was pending respondent was able to secure a
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divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage
ha[d] irretrievably broken down.
ISSUES:
1. Was the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson proven?
2. Was respondent proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner?
RULINGS:
1. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to
the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office.
2. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union
for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two
basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the
second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. There is no showing in
the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree involved in the case at bar
contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the
other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."
This quotation bolsters the contention that the divorce obtained by respondent
may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to
remarry according to his national law.
CIR v. PRIMETOWN
G.R. No. 162155, 28 August 2007
FACTS:
Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied
for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. According to
Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable for income taxes.
Respondent complied, but the claim was not acted upon. Thus on April 14,
2000, it filed a Petition for Review with the CTA. CTA dismissed the petition
having been filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial
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claim for tax refund or credit under Section 229 of the NIRC. The CTA found
that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right
to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date.
Applying Article 13 of the Civil Code, the CTA ruled that the two-year
prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial
claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year,
respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days after respondent filed its final
adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period. The CA reversed
the CTA decision ruling that Article 13 of the Civil Code does not distinguish
between a regular year and a leap year.
ISSUE: Is the Court of Appeals correct in referring to Article 13 of the NCC as
the basis in the correct computation of time?
RULING:
NO. The Court of Appeals is correct in finding that the petition was filed within
the prescriptive period but its basis is not. Article 13 of the Civil Code provides
that when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be equivalent to 365
days. However, in 1987, EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was
enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:
Sec. 31. Legal Periods. Year shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; month
of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed
according to the number of days the specific month contains; day, to a day of twenty-four
hours and; night from sunrise to sunset.
A calendar month is a month designated in the calendar without regard to the

number of days it may contain. It is the period of time running from the
beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the
corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient
number of days in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that
month. To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be
from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January
31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until February 29, 2008.
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter the
computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365
days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative
Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless
to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is
irrelevant. But being the more recent law, Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of
the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law and having
impliedly repealed in its repealing clause all laws inconsistent therewith,
governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.
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Civil Laws (Arts. 15-17)

MICIANO v. BRIMO
G.R. No. L-22595, 1 November 1927
FACTS:
Andre Brimo opposed the appeal of Juan Miciano, administrator of the estate
of the deceased Joseph Brimo. The property was said to be in the Philippines
and the testatrix wished that the distribution of his properties and everything in
connection with it be in accordance with the Philippine laws. Oppositorappellant Brimo claimed that the will of the testatrix is not in accordance with
the laws of his Turkish nationality.
ISSUE: May the Philippine law govern the testamentary disposition of Turkish
national contrary to the express provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the
intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of
the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of
the property or the country in which it may be situated?
RULING:
The fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary dispositions
are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present
any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the
absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as
those of the Philippines (Lim and Lim v. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472).
VAN DORN v. ROMILLO
G.R. No. L-68470, 8 October 1985
FACTS:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while Richard Uptont is a
citizen of the United States. Van Dorn and Upton were married in Hongkong
in 1972 and after their marriage, they established their residence in the
Philippines. Their marriage begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and
December 18, 1975 respectively. The couple subsequently obtained a divorce
in Nevada, United States in 1982. Van Dorn remarried in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.
In June 8, 1983, Upton filed suit against Van Dorn at the Pasay City Regional
Trial Court stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon
Shop) is a conjugal property of the parties. He asked that petitioner be
ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent
be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Van Dorn sought to
dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous
judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein
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respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community
property" as of June 11, 1982.
Van Dorn contends that Upton is estopped from laying claim on the alleged
conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce
proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of
property and that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal
funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
Upton maintains that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot
prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national
policy and that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if
the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Does Upton (the respondent) have the legal standing to sue as (Van
Dorn) petitioners husband notwithstanding the divorce decree obtained in
Nevada?
RULING:
NO. Notwithstanding the nationality principle enshrined in Article 15 of the
New Civil Code, aliens may obtain divorces abroad and such will be
recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to their
respective national law.
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by
a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic
relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The
marriage tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law.
When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall
not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from
the bond of the former marriage.
In line with this, Upton, the respondent, no longer has the legal standing to
sue for entitlement to exercise control over conjugal assets. As per his
national law, he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over
him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.
PILAPIL v. IBAY-SOMERA
G.R. No. 80116, 30 June 1989
FACTS:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino Citizen married private respondent, Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German National in Germany. They have a child born on
April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling.
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Conjugal disharmony eventauted in private respondent and which prompted
him to initiate a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. Petitioner,
on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation
of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of
failure of marriage of the spouse. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed
2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila, alleging that while
still married to Imelda, the latter had an affair with William Chia as early as
1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.
Petitioner submits that the Court has no jurisdiction to try and decide the
charge of adultery, since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not
qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under
his national law prior to his filing of the criminal complaint.
ISSUE: Is it necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery
that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be
unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action?
RULING:
YES. The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and
concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse, and nobody else. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power
to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such
initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the
time of the filing of the criminal action. The person who initiates the adultery
case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married
to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
After a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right
to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that
the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for
adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a
divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of
the criminal proceedings to a conclusion.
BARRETTO vs. GONZALEZ
G.R. No. L-37048, 7 March 1933
FACTS:
ISSUE: Will any foreign divorce relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands, be
recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions
for which the courts of Philippine Islands would grant a divorce?
RULING:
The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the
case was submitted to this court, in which they all prayed that the Reno
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divorce be ratified and confirmed, clearly indicates a purpose to circumvent
the laws of the Philippine Islands regarding divorce and to secure for
themselves a change of status for reasons and under conditions not
authorized by our law. At all times the matrimonial domicile of the couple has
been within the Philippine Islands and the residence acquired in the State of
Nevada by the husband for the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona
fide residence and did not confer jurisdiction upon the Court of that State to
dissolve the bonds of matrimony in which he had entered in 1919.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. GEORGE FRANK
G.R. No. 2935, 23 March 1909
FACTS:
That on or about the 17th day of April, 1903, in the city of Chicago, in the
State of Illinois, in the United States, the defendant, through a representative
of the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, entered into a contract for
a period of two years with the plaintiff, by which the defendant was to receive
a salary of 1,200 dollars per year as a stenographer in the service of the said
plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to be paid in advance the expenses
incurred in traveling f rom the said city of Chicago to Manila, and one-half
salary during said period of travel. Said contract contained a provision that in
case of a violation of its terms on the part of the defendant, he should become
liable to the plaintiff for the amount expended by the Government by way of
expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila and the one-half salary
paid during such period. That on the 11th day of February, 1904, the
defendant left the service of the plaintiff and refused to make a further
compliance with the terms of the contract. On the 3d day of December, 1904,
the plaintiff commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila to recover from the defendant the amount the plaintiff claimed had
been paid to the defendant as expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to
Manila, and as half salary for the period consumed in travel. The defendant
alleged in his special defense that he was a minor and therefore the contract
could not be enforced against him. The plaintiff [the defendant] claims that, by
reason of the fact that, under the laws of the Philippine Islands at the time the
contract was made, male persons in said Islands did not reach their majority
until they had attained the age of 23 years, he was not liable under said
contract, contending that the laws of the Philippine Islands governed.
ISSUE: Is the contention of the defendant that he was a minor when he
entered into the contract tenable?
RULING:
NO. The defendant being fully qualified to enter into the contract at the place
and time the contract was made, he cannot plead infancy as a defense at the
place where the contract is being enforced. The record discloses that, at the
time the contract was entered into in the State of Illinois, he was an adult
under the laws of that State and had full authority to contract. It is not
disputedupon the contrary the fact is admittedthat at the time and place of
the making of the contract in question the defendant had full capacity to make
20 4S 2014-2015


the same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the
execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are determined by the law
of the place where the contract is made (Scudder vs. Union National Bank, 91
U. S., 406). Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the law
prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as
the bringing of suit, admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations,
depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought.
BARNUEVO V. FUSTER
G.R. No. 7487, 29 December 1913
FACTS:
Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yaez were joined in a Catholic or canonical
marriage in the city of Malaga, Spain. Fuster came to the Philippine Islands,
settled, and acquired real and personal property. Toward the middle of 1896,
Yaez came to Manila, where her husband was residing, and here lived with
him in conjugal relations until 1899. On that year they made an agreement, in
a public document, by which they "resolved to separate and live apart, both
consenting to such separation, and by virtue thereof the husband authorized
the wife to move to Spain, there to reside in such place as the said lady
pleases."
In 1909, the wife returned to the Philippines and commenced divorce
proceedings against her husband, alleging as cause of action the adultery
committed by him in or about the year 1899 with a certain woman that she
named in the complaint and with whom he had lived and cohabited and by
whom he had had two children. She prayed that she be granted a decree of
divorce.
The defendant denied that either he or his wife was a resident of the city of
Manila, as they had their domicile in Barcelona, Spain, and he alleged that
both of them were natives and subjects of Spain. Thus, there is utter lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court and of all other courts of the Islands to try the case
and to decree a divorce or suspension of life in common between the
spouses. Petitioner alleged that there is lack of jurisdiction over the persons of
the contending parties because neither of the spouses was a resident of the
Philippines on the date of the complaint.
ISSUE: Does the Court have jurisdiction to issue a decree of divorce
concerning spouses that are resident of the Philippine Islands but natives of
Spain?
RULING:
YES. The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce is not
comprised within the personal status of the husband and wife, simply because
the whole theory of the statutes and of the rights which belong to everyone
does not go beyond the sphere of private law, and the authority and
jurisdiction of the courts are not a matter of the private law of persons, but of
the public or political law of the nation. "The jurisdiction of courts and other
21 4S 2014-2015


questions relating to procedure are considered to be of a public nature and
consequently are generally submitted to the territorial principle.
NOTE: The Ruling is no longer controlling. Divorce is considered a violation of
public policy, thus, the courts cannot issue the same.
TESTATE ESTATE OF C.O. BOHANAN v. BOHANAN et al.
G.R. No. L-12105, 30 January 1960
FACTS:
On 24 April 1950, the CFI admitted to probate a last will and testament of
C.O. Bohanan. In its decision, the lower court stated that the testator is a
citizen of the United States and of the state of his particular choice, which is
Nevada, despite his long residence in the Philippines. His permanent
residence or domicile in the United States depended upon his personal intent
or desire, and he selected Nevada as his domicile and therefore at the time of
his death, he was a citizen of that state. Nobody can choose his domicile or
permanent residence for him. That is his exclusive personal right. In the
project of partition, the children of the testator were only able to get a legacy
of P6000 each, which was not in compliance with the supposed legitime of
children under the (old) Civil Code.
ISSUE: Is the failure of the testator, a citizen of Nevada, to give his children
their legitime, in accordance with the laws of the forum, valid?
RULING:
YES. Article 10 of the old Civil Code (Article 16, new Civil Code) provides that
the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national
law of the person whose succession is in question. In the case at bar, the
testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada. Since the laws of said state
allow the testator to dispose of all his property according to his will, his
testamentary dispositions depriving his wife and children of what should be
their legitimes under the laws of the Philippines, should be respected and the
project of partition made in accordance with his testamentary dispositions
should be approved.
BELLIS v. BELLIS
G.R. No. L-23678, 6 June 1967
FACTS:
Amos Bellis, was born and a citizen of Texas. Amos executed a will in the
Philippines, in which he directed that his distributable estate should be
divided, in trust, to his first wife, Mary; his three illegitimate children, Amos Jr.,
Maria Cristina, Miriam Palma, or and after the foregoing two items have been
satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and
second wives in equal shares. Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio,
Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
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Maria Cristina and Miriam filed their respective oppositions to the project of
partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
ISSUE: Should the national law of the decedent determine successional rights
of the illegitimate children?
RULING:
YES. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the
State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced
heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of
the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos Bellis.
AZNAR v. GARCIA
G.R. No. L-16749, 31 January 1963
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao
approving among other things the final accounts of the executor to deliver to
Maria Lucy Christensen her legacy, and declaring her entitled to the residue
of the property, and one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie
Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the
testator Edward E. Christensen, a national of California and domiciled in the
Philippines.
Facts show that Edward E. Christensen, executed a will in Manila declaring
Maria Lucy Christensen as her sole heir. The will also provides a devise of
3,600 in favor of Maria Helen Christensen, and stating among others that
Maria Helen Christensen is not related to him.
In accordance with the above-quoted provisions, the executor in his final
account and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen
Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred
to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen
Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an
acknowledged natural child. The legal grounds of the opposition are (a) that
the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that
the distribution is contrary to law in so far as it denies to Helen Christensen,
her legitime.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the
United States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the
successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be
governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the
23 4S 2014-2015


right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of
absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable.
ISSUE: Is the will of Edward E. Christensen governed by the law of California, his
national law, or the law of his domicile, the Philippines?
RULING:
Applying the renvoi Ruling, the will of Edward E. Christensen is governed by the
law of his domicile, the Philippines. Under Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is
provided as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the
meaning of the term "national law" is used therein. There is no single American
law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each
state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in
force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil
Code can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.
Under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will
in the form and manner he desires. However, appellant invokes Art. 946 of the
same California Probate Code which provides the following:
Art. 946. If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed
to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
Appellant insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance

therewith and following the Ruling of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the
testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the
decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines. The recognition of the renvoi theory
implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating
not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of
the conflict of laws as well. In the instant case, the rules of the conflict of laws in
California is provided under Art. 946.
The laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for
residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. If we must
enforce the law of California, then we must enforce the law of California in
accordance with the express mandate thereof, i.e., apply the internal law for
residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
The national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of
laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference
or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws
rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a
decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines
24 4S 2014-2015


in the case at bar. The court of the domicile cannot and should not refer the case
back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination
because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the
two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the
country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in
the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be
decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no
legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of
the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the
parent recognizing them.
ROEHR v. RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. 142820, 20 June 2003
FACTS:
Wolfang O. Roehr, a German citizen married Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina in
1980 in Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified in Tayasan,
Negros Oriental. They begot two children. In 1996, Carmen filed an action for
declaration of nullity of their marriage. A motion to dismiss was denied and the
subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied. Petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but was denied and the case
was remanded to the RTC. Meanwhile, Wolfang obtained a decree of divorce
in Germany and granted parental custody over their children to him. In view of
said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss in 1999 on the
ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action or suit as a decree of divorce had already been promulgated dissolving
the marriage of petitioner and private respondent.
An order granting the Motion to Dismiss was issued because of the
dissolution of the marriage. A motion was filed by the respondent asking that
the case be set for hearing for the purpose of determining the issues of
custody of children and the distribution of their properties. It was opposed on
the ground that there was nothing to be done anymore as the marital tie of the
spouses had already been severed by the divorce decree and that the decree
has already been recognized by the court in its order. The lower Court issued
an order partially setting aside the former order for the purpose of tackling the
issues of property relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of
their children. This order was questioned on the basis of the contention that
the divorce decree obtained in Germany had already severed the marital
relations of the parties, hence, nothing can be done anymore.
ISSUE: Is a foreign divorce decree recognized in our jurisdiction and does it
affect the obligations on care and support of the children?
RULING:
NO. In Garcia v. Recio, Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., and Llorente v. Court of
Appeals, it has been consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an
alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner. Relevant to the present case is
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Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera where the Court specifically recognized the validity of a
divorce obtained by a German citizen in his country. It was held in Pilapil that
a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our
civil law on the status of persons.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries
are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on
custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our
courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign
judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it
must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given
ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of
the Rules of Court.
GARCIA v. RECIO
G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2002
FACTS:
citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband
and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly
dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a
"Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government.
Petitioner a Filipina and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in
Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. In their application for
a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino."
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without
prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia,
their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their
Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy respondent allegedly
had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12,
1994.
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the
suit for the declaration of nullity was pending respondent was able to secure
a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the
"marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down." Respondent prayed in his Answer
that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of
action.
ISSUE: Is Rederick still bound by our law relating to family rights?
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RULING:
NO. The court stated that compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52)
of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by
Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.
Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the
political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from
the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive
countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to
the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal
laws.
To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the
national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of
the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of
respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and
admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was
then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the
court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce
sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status;
or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second
marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent
null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under
Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result
of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to
remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show
petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a
quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy,
there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were
both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1,
1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
Human Relations (Arts. 19-36)

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 137916, 8 December 2004
FACTS:
The Spouses Jacinto Gotangco and Charity Bantug were the owners of seven
parcels of land located in Palayan City. On August 22, 1980, the Spouses
Gotangco secured a loan for their poultry project in Palayan City from the
27 4S 2014-2015


Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). They then executed a real estate
mortgage over the parcels of land.
On July 17, 1982, the Spouses Gotangco, as vendors, executed in favor of
Elpidio O. Cucio a contract to sell over the seven parcels of land mortgaged to
DBP for P50,000.00, payable in two installments. The parties agreed that the
said amount shall be paid directly to DBP and applied to the mortgage
indebtedness of the Spouses Gotangco and that, upon full payment of the
purchase price, the Spouses shall execute a deed of sale over the said
parcels of land in favor of Cucio. The contract to sell was known to DBP. On
February 20, 1989, the DBP wrote the Spouses Gotangco demanding
payment of the balance of their loan in the amount of P408,026.96 within ten
(10) days from notice thereof. However, the Spouses failed to respond or pay
their account with the DBP.
Cucio then filed a complaint against the Spouses Gotangco and the DBP with
the RTC of Palayan City for injunction and damages. Cucio alleged, inter alia,
that despite his payment of the full purchase price of the seven (7) parcels of
land and his demands for the turnover of the owners duplicates of the said
title to the Spouses Gotangco, the DBP refused to do so. He further alleged
that the DBP even demanded the payment of the interest on the loan account
of the Spouses Gotangco. Furthermore, the Spouses Gotangco refused to
execute a deed of absolute sale of the said parcels of land in his favor.
While the case was pending, the DBP informed the Spouses Gotangco in a
Letter dated February 20, 199020 that it was going to have the mortgage
foreclosed for their failure to settle their account. On June 8, 1990, the
Spouses Gotangco wrote the DBP requesting for an updated statement of
their account and the application of their payments, inclusive of the proceeds
of their insurance claims. On the same date, the DBP filed an application for
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed in its favor
by the Spouses Gotangco. The Spouses Gotangco forthwith filed a petition
before the trial court for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the public
auction, alleging that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate in favor of
the DBP would render the decision of the court on the merits moot and
academic. During the trial, Jacinto Gotangco testified that he suffered mental
anguish and serious anxieties because of the threatened extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage in favor of DBP. The Trial Court
ordered DBP to pay the Gotangcos the sum of P250,000.00 as moral
damages. On appeal by the DBP, the CA affirmed the decision, but reduced
the award of moral damages to P50,000.00.
ISSUE: Is there a factual or legal basis for the grant of moral damages in favor of
the Gotangcos as against DBP?
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that there is no sufficient basis for the award of moral
damages in favor of the respondents spouses based on Article 19 of the New
Civil Code as a result of petitioners application for foreclosure of real estate
28 4S 2014-2015


mortgage. For one thing, Charity Bantug Gotangco did not testify. There is no
factual basis for the award of moral damages in her favor.
Abuse of right under Article 19 of the New Civil Code, on which the RTC
anchored its award for damages and attorneys fees, provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a legal right
or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another. Malice or bad faith is at the core of said provision.
Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the
same. Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is manifested by the acts
of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an
unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Bad faith does not
simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to
some motives or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice
connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention
to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.
The Spouses Gotangco failed to prove malice on the part of the petitioner. The
bare fact that the petitioner filed its application of the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the mortgage, notwithstanding those differences, cannot thereby give rise to the
conclusion that the petitioner did so with malice, to harass the Spouses
Gotangco. The records show that, time and again, the petitioner had sent notices
to the respondents spouses and demanded the updating of their account and the
payment of the balance thereof, but the respondents spouses failed to comply. In
the meantime, interests and penalties on the loan considerably accrued. Under
the terms of the real estate mortgage and its charter, the petitioner had the right
to foreclose the said mortgage extrajudicially. Hence, the petitioner was
constrained to file its application for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage
for the Spouses Gotangcos past due obligation. Instead of settling their account,
the Spouses filed their petition for a writ of preliminary injunction. Because of the
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, the foreclosure was aborted.
Under the circumstances, it cannot be gainsaid that the petitioner acted in bad
faith or with malice in seeking the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage in its
favor.
UYPITCHING v. QUIAMCO
G.R. No. 146322, 6 December 2006
FACTS:
In 1982, respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached by Juan Davalan,
Josefino Gabutero and Raul Generoso to amicably settle the civil aspect of a
criminal case for robbery filed by Quiamco against them. They surrendered to
him a red Honda XL-100 motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of
registration. Respondent asked for the original certificate of registration but
the three accused never came to see him again. Meanwhile, the motorcycle
29 4S 2014-2015


was parked in an open space inside respondent's business establishment,
Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, where it was visible and accessible to the public.
It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had been sold on
installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc., a
family-owned corporation managed by petitioner Atty. Ernesto Ramas
Uypitching. To secure its payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to
petitioner corporation.
When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, Davalan assumed the
obligation and continued the payments. In September 1982, however,
Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments and told petitioner
corporation's collector, Wilfredo Verao, that the motorcycle had allegedly
been "taken by respondent's men."
Nine years later, on January 26, 1991, petitioner Uypitching, accompanied by
policemen, went to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover the motorcycle. The
leader of the police team, P/Lt. Arturo Vendiola, talked to the clerk in charge
and asked for respondent. While P/Lt. Vendiola and the clerk were talking,
petitioner Uypitching paced back and forth inside the establishment uttering
"Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle."
On learning that respondent was not in Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, the
policemen left to look for respondent in his residence while petitioner
Uypitching stayed in the establishment to take photographs of the motorcycle.
Unable to find respondent, the policemen went back to Avesco-AVNE
Enterprises and, on petitioner Uypitching's instruction and over the clerk's
objection, took the motorcycle.
On February 18, 1991, petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for
qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law against respondent in
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City. Respondent moved for
dismissal because the complaint did not charge an offense as he had neither
stolen nor bought the motorcycle. The Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed
the complaint[8] and denied petitioner Uypitching's subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners in the RTC of
Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, Branch 37.He sought to hold the petitioners
liable for the following: (1) unlawful taking of the motorcycle; (2) utterance of a
defamatory remark (that respondent was a thief) and (3) precipitate filing of a
baseless and malicious complaint. These acts humiliated and embarrassed
the respondent and injured his reputation and integrity.
ISSUE: Did the filing of a complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the
Anti-Fencing Law in the Office of the City Prosecutor warrant the award of
moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs in favor of
respondent?
30 4S 2014-2015


RULING:
Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere. To live
virtuously, not to injure others and to give everyone his due. These supreme
norms of justice are the underlying principles of law and order in society.
YES. Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for petitioner
corporation's exercise of its right as seller-mortgagee to recover the
mortgaged vehicle preliminary to the enforcement of its right to foreclose on
the mortgage in case of default. They are clearly mistaken.
True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to
enable it to enforce or protect its foreclosure right thereon. There is, however,
a well-defined procedure for the recovery of possession of mortgaged
property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged
property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to
recover such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial
foreclosure.
Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to
acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uypitching
descended on respondent's establishment with his policemen and ordered the
seizure of the motorcycle without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in
the course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even
mouthed a slanderous statement.
No doubt, petitioner corporation, acting through its co-petitioner Uypitching,
blatantly disregarded the lawful procedure for the enforcement of its right, to
the prejudice of respondent. Petitioners' acts violated the law as well as public
morals, and transgressed the proper norms of human relations.
The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil
Code, provides:
Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give every one his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes that a
person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith,
otherwise he opens himself to liability. It seeks to preclude the use of, or the
tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends.
There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure
another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for
which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there
must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the
injured party will attach.
31 4S 2014-2015


WASSMER v. VELEZ,
G.R. No. L-20089, 26 December 1964
FACTS:
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes,
followed by appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in
frustration and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of
love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On
September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
Dear Bet
Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the
Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why That would only
create a scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON
APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE .
PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in
default.
ISSUE: Is Velez liable for damages?
RULING:
YES. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept.
30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is
that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We
pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new
Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary
to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said
Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
32 4S 2014-2015


Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere
breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity,
only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21
aforesaid.
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDENS, et al. v. REYES
G.R. No. 152259, 28 February 2005
FACTS:
Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name "Amay Bisaya,"
alleged that while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, he was
spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached
him. Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at the hotels penthouse in
celebration of the natal day of the hotels manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.
Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for which she replied: "of
course." Mr. Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the
basket of fruits which was the latters present for the celebrant. At the
penthouse, after a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr.
Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and
embarrassment, he was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed
to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof. In a loud voice and
within the presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a
queue at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party ("huwag ka
nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang"). Mr. Reyes tried to
explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart. Dr. Filart, who was within hearing
distance, however, completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and
humiliation. Not long after, while he was still recovering from the traumatic
experience, a Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out of the
hotel. Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the
policeman.
ISSUE: Whether or not Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim are jointly and severally
liable with Dr. Filart for damages for the humiliation suffered by herein
respondent.
RULING:
NO. In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate
Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she
would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the
hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues
to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary
does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Ms. Lim, not having abused
her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited,
cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable
as its liability springs from that of its employee.
33 4S 2014-2015


Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Its
elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20
or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation
of law which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right
to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,
and that is, the act complained of must be intentional. As applied to herein
case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was
driven by animosity against him. If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad
judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.
BAKSH v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 97336, 19 February 1993
FACTS:
Private respondent Marilou T. Gonzales, 22 years of age, single, Filipino and
a lass of good moral character met petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh, an
Iranian citizen and an exchange student taking a medical course at Lyceum
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City. Private respondent alleged that
petitioner courted and proposed to marry her. She accepted his love on the
condition that they would get married after the end of the school semester.
Petitioner went to private respondents house to ask her parents approval to
the marriage. Petitioner forced private respondent to live with him in his
apartment. Private respondent was a virgin before she lived with him.
Because of petitioners persuasive promise to marry her, private respondent
allowed herself to be deflowered by petitioner. However, petitioners attitude
towards her changed and he maltreated her. Petitioner repudiated their
marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore telling her
that he is already married to someone else. Consequently, private respondent
filed a complaint for damages against petitioner. Petitioner, in his defense,
denied all the allegations of private respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code may be applied in case of
breach of promise to marry.
RULING:
YES. Where a mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that
promise, thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto
him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying
her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to
entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual
act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of
such promise to marry but because of fraud and deceit behind it and the willful
injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential,
however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy.
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In the instant case, respondent court found that it was the petitioners
fraudulent or deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff
that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with
him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it
was likewise these fraud and deception on appellants part that made
plaintiffs parents agree to their daughters living-in with him preparatory to
their supposed marriage.
Petitioner clearly violated the Filipinos concept of morality and brazenly
defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be
said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of
Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give
everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his obligations. No foreigner must be allowed
to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
PE v. PE
G.R. No. L-17396, 30 May 1962
FACTS:
Plaintiffs are parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman
24 years of age. Defendant, a married man, frequently visited Lolitas house
on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him to pray the rosary. They fell in
love and conducted clandestine trysts. When the parents learned about this
they prohibited defendant from going to their house. The affair continued just
the same. On April 14, 1957 Lolita disappeared from her brothers house
where she was living. A note in the handwriting of the defendant was found
inside Lolitas aparador The present action was instituted under Article 21 of
the Civil Code. The lower court dismissed the action and plaintiffs appealed.
ISSUE: May a married man be held liable for moral damages for seducing an
unmarried woman into an illicit relationship?
RULING:
YES, on the ground that he has caused the woman and her family
immeasurable wrong considering the fact that he is a married man. No other
conclusion can be drawn from the chain of events that he not only
deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the woman's
affection and love to the extent of having illicit relations with her. Verily he has
committed an injury to the woman's family in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil
Code.
SPOUSES QUISUMBING v. MERALCO
G.R. No. 142943, 3 April 2002
FACTS:
Sps. Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are owners of a house and
lot. MERALCO inspectors headed by Emmanuel Orlino were assigned to
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conduct a routine-on-the-spot inspection of all single-phase meters at
Greenmeadows. The house owned by the Quisumbings was inspected after
asking permission from the Quisumbings through their secretary. The
inspectors discovered that the terminal seal of the meter was missing; the
meter cover was deformed and the meter dials were mis-aligned. They
relayed the same to the secretary, who in turn relayed it to the
Quisumbings. Lorna was outraged by the inspection and denied liability as to
the tampering of the meter.
After laboratory testing, Orlino informed the Quisumbings that they were liable
to pay the amount of P178,875.01 as differential billing for tampering the
meter and unless they pay, their electric supply will be disconnected. At the
time the alleged meter tampering was discovered, only the MERALCO
inspection team and Quisumbings secretary were present.
The Quisumbings filed a complaint for damages despite the immediate
reconnection alleging that MERALCO disconnected their power supply,
without due process.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Quisumbings. On Appeal, the CA held that
MERALCOs representatives had acted in good faith when they disconnected
petitioners electric service.
Under Section 4 of R.A. 7832, Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission
Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994, the prima facie presumption that will
authorize disconnection will arise only upon satisfaction of certain
requisites. One of these requisites is the personal witnessing and attestation
by an officer of the law or by an authorized (Energy Regulatory Board) ERB
representative when the discovery was made.
ISSUE: Is MERALCO liable to spouses Quisumbings for the disconnection of their
electrical supply without the presence of the ERB representative?
RULING:
YES, as there was no due process in disconnecting the same. There was no
officer of the law of ERB representative at that time. The presence of government
agents who may authorize immediate disconnections go into the essence of due
process.
Although MERALCO has a right by law and equity to protect itself from any fraud,
such right should not be exercised arbitrarily but with great caution and with due
regards to the rights of the consumer. MERALCO should have given the
Quisumbings simple opportunity to dispute the electric charges brought about by
the alleged meter-tampering. Procedural due process requires reasonable notice
to pay the bill and reasonable notice to discontinue supply. Absent due process
the defendant may be held liable for damages.
One of the cases that entitle an individual to damages is, violation of the right
against deprivation of property without due process of law. Had respondent been
more circumspect and prudent, Quisumbings could have been given the
36 4S 2014-2015


opportunity to controvert the initial finding of alleged meter tampering. Citing the
RTC, for public utilities, broad as their powers are, have a clear duty to see to it
that they do not violate nor transgress the rights of the consumers. Any act on
their part that militates against the ordinary norms of justice and fair play is
considered an infraction that gives rise to an action for damages.
Observance of the rights of our people is sacred in our society. We cannot allow
such right to be trifled with or trivialized. Although the Court sympathizes with
MERALCOs efforts to stamp out the illegal use of electricity, such action must be
done only with strict observance of the rights of our people. There is a right way
to do the right thing at the right time for the right reason.
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 81262, 25 August 25, 1989
FACTS:
ISSUE: Are petitioners liable for damages to private respondent because of
petitioners' abusive manner in dismissing him as well as for the inhuman
treatment he got from them?
RULING:
YES. Art. 19 states that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. This article, known to contain what is
commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but
also in the performance of one's duties. A right, though by itself legal
because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the
source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does
not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it
does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages
under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides
that:
Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any
provision of law since they were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss
private respondent. This does not, however, leave private respondent with no
relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
37 4S 2014-2015


This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which
leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have
actually suffered material and moral injury" [Id.] should "vouchsafe adequate
legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for
human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes IIt bears repeating
that even granting that petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias
from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted to
a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the
damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive
manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result of several other
quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners.
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST v. JADER
G.R. No. 132344, 17 February 2000
FACTS:
Respondent Romeo Jader was enrolled in the University of the East College
of Law from 1984 to 1988. In the first semester of SY 1987-1988, he failed to
take the regular final examination in Practice Court 1 for which he was given
an incomplete grade. He enrolled the following semester, and filed an
application for the removal of the incomplete grade on February 1, 1988,
given by Prof. Ortega which was approved by Dean Tiongzon. Thereafter, he
took the removal examination on March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988, Prof.
Ortega submitted his grade of five (5).
Respondents name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for
Graduation, with the annotation that he had an incomplete grade in Practice
Court 1.
The 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies for the candidates of
Bachelor of Laws was scheduled on the 16th of April 1988 and in the
invitation for that occasion the name of the respondent appeared as one of
the candidates, with footnote that the list was tentative. Respondent attended
the investiture ceremonies and tendered a blow-out thereafter.
He took a leave from work for five (5) months to attend a review class in
preparation for the Bar examination. Upon learning of his deficiency, he
dropped the review class and was not able to take the Bar examination.
Respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral
shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings and sleepless nights when he was not able to take the 1988 bar
examinations arising from the latter's negligence. He prayed for an award of
moral and exemplary damages, unrealized income, attorney's fees, and costs
of suit. The petitioner denied liability arguing that it never led respondent to
believe that he completed the requirements for an LLB degree when his name
was included in the tentative list of graduating students. The RTC ruled in
respondents favor. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision.
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ISSUE: May an educational institution be held liable for damages for
misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the
requirements for graduation when such is not the case?
RULING:
YES. When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a
contract of education is entered into between said institution and the student.
The professors, teachers or instructors hired by the school are considered
merely as agents and administrators tasked to perform the school's
commitment under the contract. It is the contractual obligation of the school to
timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every
student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the
requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether they would be
included among those who will graduate.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal
examination, particularly at a time when he had already commenced
preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith.
Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful
prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19
of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from
taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities
of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would
render the transaction unconscientious.
Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the
performance of its obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign
ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since
that is precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate.
Petitioners liability arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of the
result of an examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he had
satisfied all requirements for the course.
However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to
respondent for the latter's actual damages; we hold that respondent should
not have been awarded moral damages. It is also respondents duty to verify
for himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be
eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law student, respondent should
have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those
pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order. Certainly, taking the bar
examinations does not only entail a mental preparation on the subjects
thereof; there are also prerequisites of documentation and submission of
requirements which the prospective examinee must meet.
39 4S 2014-2015


Unjust Enrichment

VILLALVA v. RCBC SAVINGS BANK
G.R. NO. 165661, 28 August 2006
FACTS:
In June 1993, petitioner spouses issued forty-eight (48) checks totaling
P547,392.00 to cover installment payments due on promissory notes
executed in favor of Toyota, Quezon Avenue (TQA) for the purchase of a 93
Toyota Corolla. The promissory notes were secured by a Chattel Mortgage
executed by the petitioner spouses on the vehicle in favor of TQA. Under the
Deed of Chattel Mortgage, petitioner spouses were to insure thevehicle
against loss or damage by accident, theft and fire, and endorse and deliver
the policies to the mortgagor.
On June 22, 1993, the promissory notes and chattel mortgage were assigned
to Rizal Commercial BankingCorporation (RCBC). They were later assigned
by RCBC to RCBC Savings Bank. 5 In time, all forty-eight (48) checks issued
by the petitioner spouses were encashed by respondent RCBC Savings Bank.
The evidence shows that the petitioner spouses faithfully complied with the
obligation to insure the mortgaged vehicle from 1993 until 1996. 7 For the
period of August 14, 1996 to August 14, 1997, 8 petitioner spouses procured
the necessary insurance but did not deliver the same to the respondent until
January 17, 1997. 9 As a consequence, respondent had the mortgaged
vehicle insured for the period of October 21, 1996 to October 21, 1997 and
paid a P14,523.36 insurance premium. 10 The insurance policy obtained by
respondent was later cancelled due to the insurance policy secured by
petitioner spouses over the mortgaged vehicle, and respondent bank was
reimbursed P10,939.86 by Malayan Insurance Company. 11 The premium
paid by respondent bank exceeded the reimbursed amount paid by Malayan
Insurance Company by P3,583.50.
On February 10, 1999, respondent sent a letter of demand to the petitioners
for P12,361.02 allegedly representing unpaid obligations on the promissory
notes and mortgage as of January 31, 1999. In lieu thereof, respondent
demanded that petitioner spouses surrender the mortgaged vehicle within five
days from notice. 12The petitioner spouses ignored the demand letter.
On April 5, 1999, respondent, in order to get the 93 Toyota Corolla, filed a
complaint for Recovery of Possession with Replevin with the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasay City, which was raffled to Branch 45 thereof. 13 Two
weeks later, or on April 19, 1999, the respondent caused the enforcement of a
writ of replevin and recovered possession of the mortgaged vehicle. 14 On
June 18, 1999, petitioner spouses filed their Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim for moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees. 15
Petitioners asserted that they insured the mortgaged vehicle in compliance
with the Deed of Chattel Mortgage. The lower courts ruled in favor of the
petitioner but the CA reversed their rulings and issued a writ of replevin in
favor of private respondents. The respondent Bank argued that no reversible
40 4S 2014-2015


errors were made by the Court of Appeals, and to set aside its decision would
result in the unjust enrichment of the petitioners.
ISSUE: Were the petitioners unjustly enriched when the respondent Bank paid
the insurance premiums on behalf of the former?
RULING:
NO. Enrichment consists of every patrimonial, physical or moral advantage,
so long as it is appreciable in money. It may also take the form of avoidance
of expenses and other indispensable reductions in the patrimony of a person.
It may also include the prevention of a loss or injury. In the case at bar,
petitioner spouses were not enriched when respondent obtained insurance
coverage for the mortgaged vehicle as the petitioner spouses had already
obtained the required insurance coverage for the vehicle from August 14,
1996 to August 14, 1997.
Respect for Others Privacy, Personality, Etc. (Art. 26)

TENCHAVEZ v. ESCANO
G.R. No. L-19671, 29 November 1965
FACTS:
Vicenta Escao exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez without the
knowledge of her parents. The marriage was duly registered with the local
civil register. She, thereafter, admitted to her parents that she had already
married Pastor. The shocked Escao spouses then sought an advice from the
priest who suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an
invalid marriage.The recelebration did not take place because the father
received a letter disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor
Tenchavez and Pacita Noel, their supposed matchmaker. To escape from the
scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society, Vicenta had gone to
Jimenez, Misamis Occidental. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted
by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign
the petition. The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her nonappearance at the hearing.
Without informing her husband, Vicenta left for the United States and
subsequently filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in
the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County
of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." A
decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said
tribunal. Vicenta, thereafter, married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in
Nevada. She now lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten
children; she also acquired American citizenship.
Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint against
Vicenta F. Escao, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escao, whom he
41 4S 2014-2015


charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her
husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic
Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of
the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in
damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid
marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents
denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and
counterclaimed for moral damages.
ISSUE: Should the parents of Vicenta Escao be held liable for alienating the
affections of their daughter and influencing Vicenta Escao's conduct toward
her husband?
RULING:
NO. An action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort
does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their
part. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escao's animosity toward
him strikes the Court to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are
belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun. In these
letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for "misjudging them" and
for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful
pride," "effrontery and audacity".
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives,
aided and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce;
she appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled
to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her
parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections
in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown,
good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved.
In falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination
and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and
divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to
recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by actual
malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and
circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to
their prejudices or spleen.
ST. LOUIS REALTY v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-46061, 14 November 1984
FACTS:
On December 15, 1968, St. Louis realty published an ad with the permission
of Arcadio Arcadio (but without permission from Dr. Aramil, an advertisement
with the heading WHERE THE HEART IS. In the advertisement, the house
featured was that of Dr. Aramil and not that of Mr. Arcadio with whom the
company asked permission. The same advertisement was republished on
January 5, 1969.
42 4S 2014-2015


After Mr. Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis demaning
explanation. No rectification or apology was published despite reciept of the
letter by Ernesto Magtoto, the officer in charge of the advertisement.
On March 18, 1969, St. Louis published an ad now with Mr. Arcadios real
house but no apology or explanation was given by the company about the
error. Dr. Aramil then filed a complaint for damages on March 29. On April 15,
1969, an ad with a notice of rectification was published.
ISSUE: Is St. Louis Realty liable to pay damages for misrepresenting (in an
advertisement) the house of Dr. Conrado Aramil as that of Mr. Arcadio?
RULING:
YES. St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under 21 and 26
of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful
house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who was annoyed
by the contretemps. St. Louis Realty was grossly negligent in mixing up
residences in a widely circulated publication. It never made any written
apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier
rectification.
Prejudicial Question (Art. 36)

CHING v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124642, 23 February 2004
FACTS:
Alfredo Ching was charged with four counts of estafa punishable under Article
315 par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Presidential Decree
115, otherwise known as the "Trust Receipts Law" for having executed a trust
receipt agreement in favor of Allied Banking Corporation in consideration of
the receipt of some goods. Under the terms of the agreement, the accused
agreed to sell those goods for cash with the express obligation to remit to the
bank the proceeds of the sale and/or to turn over the goods, if not sold, on
demand. But Ching, once in possession of said goods, misappropriated,
misapplied and converted to his own personal use and benefit the said goods
and/or the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, failed
and refused to account for and/or remit the proceeds of sale thereof to the
bank.
Thereafter, petitioner Ching, together with Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc.,
filed a case before the Regional Trial Court of Manila for declaration of nullity
of documents and for damages entitled "Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. et. al.
vs. Allied Banking Corporation." Then, Ching filed a petition before the said
court for the suspension of the criminal proceedings on the ground of
prejudicial question in a civil action.
43 4S 2014-2015


ISSUE: Does the pendency of a civil action for damages and declaration of
nullity of documents, specifically trust receipts, warrant the suspension of
criminal proceedings instituted for violation of Article 315 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation to P.D. 115, otherwise known as the "Trust Receipts
Law?
RULING:
NO. Under the prevailing circumstances, the alleged prejudicial question in
the civil case for declaration of nullity of documents and for damages, does
not juris et de jure determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal action for estafa. Thus, even on the assumption that the documents
are declared null, it does not ipso facto follow that such declaration of nullity
shall exonerate the accused from criminal prosecution and liability.
For the court to appreciate the pendency of a prejudicial question, the law, in
no uncertain terms, requires the concurrence of two essential requisites, to
wit:
1. The civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the criminal action; and
2. The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
The criminal liability of the accused for violation of Article 315 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code, may still be shown through the presentation of evidence
to the effect that: (a) the accused received the subject goods in trust or under
the obligation to sell the same and to remit the proceeds thereof to Allied
Banking Corporation, or to return the goods, if not sold; (b) that accused
Ching misappropriated or converted the goods and/or the proceeds of the
sale; (c) that accused Ching performed such acts with abuse of confidence to
the damage and prejudice of Allied Banking Corporation; and (d) that demand
was made by the bank to herein petitioner.
TE v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 126746, 29 November 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil
rites. While petitioners marriage with private respondent was subsisting,
petitioner contracted a second marriage with a certain Julieta Santella.
Respondent filed an action against petitioner for bigamy. Meanwhile,
petitioner filed an action for the annulment of his marriage to private
respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her. He alleged that
private respondent concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of
their marriage and that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her
essential marital obligations.
Petitioner filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC where the
administrative case for the revocation of his engineering license was pending,
a motion to suspend the proceedings therein in view of the pendency of the
44 4S 2014-2015


civil case for annulment of his marriage to private respondent and criminal
case for bigamy. The Board denied the motion. The Court of Appeals ruled
that the denial of petitioners motion to suspend the proceedings on the
ground of prejudicial question was in accord with law. Respondent court held
that no prejudicial question existed since the action sought to be suspended is
administrative in nature, and the other action involved is a civil case.
ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals commit a serious error in refusing to suspend
the legal (criminal and administrative) proceedings despite the pendency of
the civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage?
RULING:
NO. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct
and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also
that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale
behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil
case for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent
did not pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal
case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated. The outcome
of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to private respondent
had no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the
criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy
to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage is contracted. The prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family
Code, which states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be
invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void. It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency
of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to private respondent
did not give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of
the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at the time of the
alleged commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid
and subsisting. Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment
necessitate the suspension of the administrative proceedings before the PRC
Board. The concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case.
We have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case
is administrative and the other is civil.
45 4S 2014-2015


MERCADO v. TAN
G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000
FACTS:
Accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got
married on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J.
Ibaez [by reason of] which a Marriage Contract was duly executed and
signed by the parties. As entered in said document, the status of accused
was single. There is no dispute either that at the time of the celebration of
the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married man, having
been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony
solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Caares, CFI-Br. XIV,
Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued in connection therewith, which
matrimony was further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10,
1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. In the same
manner, the civil marriage between accused and complainant was confirmed
in a church ceremony on June 29, 1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas,
Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were consummated
when out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children,
while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by accused with complainant Ma.
Consuelo Tan. On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed
by complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City,
which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case before this
Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an
Information dated January 22, 1993. On November 13, 1992, or more than a
month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutors Office, accused
filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V.
Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the
marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared
null and void.
Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code for having contracted a second marriage with herein complainant Ma.
Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously united in
lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City,
without said first marriage having been legally dissolved.
ISSUE: Is the element of previous legal marriage present in order to convict a
person of bigamy?
RULING:
YES. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. But in the instant case,
the final judgment declaring null and void accuseds previous marriage came
not before the celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the case for
bigamy against accused was already tried in court. And what constitutes the
crime of bigamy is the act of any person who shall contract a second
subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally dissolved.
46 4S 2014-2015


It is now settled that the fact the first marriage is void from the beginning is not
a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage before contracting the second
marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that, The Code Commission
believes that the parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that a
marriage is void.
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there
was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he
instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after
complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By
contracting a second marriage while the first is still subsisting, he committed
acts punishable under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
MORIGO v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 145226, 6 February 2004
FACTS:
Morigo and Barrete got married in 1990. Barrete went to Canada to work, but
after a year filed a petition for divorce in Ontario court, which was granted. In
1992, Morigo contracted a second marriage to Lumbago. He subsequently
filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground
that there was no marriage ceremony conducted because they merely signed
a marriage contract without the presence of the solemnizing officer. He was
then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment since
the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His
motion was denie and he was convicted of bigamy. In his appeal, he
maintained that he contracted the second marriage in good faith and his first
marriage was void ab initio.
ISSUE: Should Morigo have filed a declaration of nullity of his marriage before
contracting a second marriage to be free from the bigamy case?
RULING:
NO. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential
element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of.
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a
valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act
alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid
marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first
secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent
marriage.
47 4S 2014-2015


SPOUSES YU v. PCIB
G.R. No. 147902, March 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of the Philippine
Commercial International Bank (respondent) as security for the payment of a
loan in the amount of P9,000,000.00.
As the petitioners failed to pay the loan, the property was foreclosed and
respondent emerged as the highest bidder.
About two months before the expiration of the redemption period, respondent
filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Writ of Possession to which a Motion to dismiss
was filed by petitioners.
In the meantime, petitioners filed a complaint for Annulment of Certificate of
Sale stating that the Certificate of Sale issued to respondent is void because
respondent violated Article 2089 of the Civil Code on the indivisibility of the
mortgaged by conducting two separate foreclosure proceedings on the
mortgage properties.
Later on, the petitioners motion to dismiss was denied. In its motion for
reconsideration, it argued among others that the pendency of the complaint
for Annulment of certificate of sale is a prejudicial issue to the petition for Writ
of Possession, because the resolution of which is determinative on the
propriety of the issuance of a writ of possession.
The RTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, holding that the
principle of prejudicial question is not applicable because both cases involved
are civil cases.
ISSUE: What is a prejudicial question?
RULING:
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into play in a situation where a
civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the
former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action
may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
48 4S 2014-2015


DONATO v. LUNA
G.R. No. 53642, 15 April 1988
FACTS:
An information for bigamy against petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato was filed with
the Court of First Instance of Manila. Before the petitioner's arraignment,
private respondent Paz Abaya filed a civil action for declaration of nullity of
her marriage with petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings of the criminal case contending that the civil case seeking the
annulment of his second marriage filed by private respondent raises a
prejudicial question which must first be determined or decided before the
criminal case can proceed. Judge Artemon D. Luna denied the motion. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner which was similarly denied.
Hence, petitioner filed before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: Does the annulment case constitute a prejudicial question which would
warrant the suspension of the criminal action for bigamy?
RULING:
NO. A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case,
the resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in
said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is one
based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and
for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in
the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.
In this case, petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions
since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial
question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the
petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress,
violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent
marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the basis
for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar.
Petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained by private respondent
through force, violence, intimidation and undue influence in entering a
subsequent marriage is belied by the fact that both petitioner and private
respondent executed an affidavit which stated that they had lived together as
husband and wife without benefit of marriage for five years, one month and
one day until their marital union was formally ratified by the second marriage.
Also, it was petitioner's second wife, private respondent Paz B. Abayan who
filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that
her consent was obtained through deceit.
49 4S 2014-2015


Persons (Arts. 37-51)

QUIMIGUING v. ICAO
G.R. No. L-26795, 31 July 1970
FACTS:
Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in an action for
support. In her complaint it was averred that defendant Icao, although
married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by
force and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she became
pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to
stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages
and attorneys fees. Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for
lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had
been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendants
motion and dismissed the complaint.hereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the
complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given
birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that
no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause
of action.
ISSUE: Is a conceived child entitled to support?
RULING:
YES. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in
Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has
a right to support from its progenitors, even if the said child is unborn, it may
receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the Civil Code.
It is true that Article 40 prescribing that the conceived child shall be
considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it adds further
provided it be born later with the conditions, specified in the following article
(i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the
mothers womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the
right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would
become entirely useless and ineffective.
GELUZ v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-16439, 20 July 1961
FACTS:
Respondent Oscar Lazo, the husband of Nita Villanueva who voluntarily
procured her abortion, filed an action to recover damages against petitioner
Antonio Lazo who caused the same. The trial court and the Court of appeals
awarded damages in favor of Lazo under Article 2206 of the Civil Code for the
death of person. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari.
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The facts show that Nita Villanueva came to know petitioner Antonio Geluz
through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950
before she and Oscar were legally married. As advised by her aunt and to
conceal it from her parents, she decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had
her pregnancy aborted again on October 1953 since she found it inconvenient
as she was employed at COMELEC. After two years, on February 21, 1955,
she again became pregnant and was accompanied by her sister Purificacion
and the latters daughter Lucida at Geluz clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez
Street. Oscar at this time was in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his
election to the provincial board. He doesnt have any idea nor given his
consent on the abortion.
ISSUES:
1. Does an unborn child acquire civil personality?
2. Can an action for damages be instituted on behalf of the unborn child?
RULINGS:
1. NO. A conceived child has no provisional personality under Article 40 of the
Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional
personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently
born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the
following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was
dead when separated from its mother's womb.
2. NO. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death
pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for
damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of
injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its
parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the
unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no
transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical
personality. Moreover, the prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same
effect; and it is generally held that recovery cannot had for the death of an
unborn child.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages. However, such
damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from
injury or violation of the rights of the deceased child.
NOTE: A conceived child has no provisional personality under Article 40 of the
Civil Code, hence, no action for damages could be filed on its behalf. If no
action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on
account of injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue
to its parents or heirs.
51 4S 2014-2015


LIMJOCO v. ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGANTE
G.R. No. L-770, 27 April 1948
FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a
certificate of public convenience(CPC)to install and maintain an ice plant in
San Juan Rizal. Since intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the
proposed service, the Public Service Commission (PSC) issued a certificate
of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing said
Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the
proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said plant.
Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate to the estate is a contravention
of law because, among others, it is neither a person nor a citizen.
ISSUES:
1. Is the estate of Fragrante a person for purposes of settlement and
distribution of his estate?
2. May the estate of Fragrante be considered as a citizen?
RULINGS:
1. Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself,such as under
the bill of rights (Article III), it seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed
therein in the majority of cases relate to natural persons, the term "person"
used in section 1 (1) and (2) thereof must be deemed to include artificial or
juridical persons, for otherwise these latter would be without the constitutional
guarantee against being deprived of property without due process of law, or
the immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. Among these
artificial or juridical persons are estates of deceased persons.
Thus, it has been the constant Ruling that the estate or the mass of property,
rights and assets left by the decedent, directly becomes vested and charged
with his rights and obligations which survive after his demise. The underlying
reason for the legal fiction by which, for certain purposes, the estate of the
deceased person is considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice or
prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and
fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death
unless the fiction is indulged.
2. If by legal fiction the decedents personality is considered extended so that
any debts or obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid, and any
surviving rights may be exercised for the benefit of his creditors and heirs,
respectively, there is no sound and cogent reason for denying the application
of the same fiction to his citizenship.
The fiction of such extension of his citizenship is grounded upon the same
principle, and motivated by the same reason, as the fiction of the extension of
personality. The fiction is made necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting
his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death to the loss of the
investment.
52 4S 2014-2015


DUMLAO v. QUALITY PLASTICS, INC.
G.R. No. L-27956, 30 April 1976
FACTS:
The petitioners herein are the heirs of one Pedro Oria, one of the defendants
in a civil case filed by the respondent before the CFI of Pangasinan. Upon
failure of the defendants therein to satisfy the judgment obtained by the
respondent, the lower court ordered the foreclosure of the surety bond and
the sale at public auction of the land of Pedro Oria which he had given as
security under the bond.
It turned out that Oria died long before the action was filed but such death was
not known to the respondents.
The petitioners sued the respondent for the annulment of the judgment
against Oria and the execution against his land on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the deceased.
The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's counsel also appeared as
counsel for Oria, there was a voluntary appearance which enabled the court
to acquire jurisdiction over Oria. Soliven's counsel could not have validly
appeared for a dead co-defendant. Estoppel has no application to this case.
ISSUE: Is the judgment of the lower court valid as against Oria who was
already dead and was never served with summons?
RULING:
NO. Since no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, the judgment against him is
a patent nullity.
He was not, and he could not have been, validly served with summons. He
had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be
the subject of legal relations, was lost through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil
Code).
The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's counsel also appeared as
counsel for Oria, there was a voluntary appearance which enabled the court
to acquire jurisdiction over Oria. Soliven's counsel could not have validly
appeared for a dead co-defendant. Estoppel has no application to this case.
MO YA LIM v. CID
G.R. No. L-21289, 4 October 1971
FACTS:
On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the
Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with
her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she
stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she
53 4S 2014-2015


desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great (grand)
uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month.
She was permitted to come into the Philippines on March 13, 1961, and was
permitted to stay for a period of one month which would expire on April 13,
1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of
P1,000.00 to undertake, among others that said Lau Yuen Yeung would
actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her
authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his
discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative
might properly allow.
After repeated extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in
the Philippines up to February 13, 1962.
On January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the
contemplated action of respondent to confiscate her bond and order her arrest
and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she
brought this action for injunction with preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: Did Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto become a Filipino Citizen upon her
marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao, a Filipino citizen?
RULING:
YES. Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying
a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided
she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the
same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently
naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment
he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from
any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow
of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings,
is not required to go through a naturalization preceeding, in order to be
considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living
Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain common sense and
there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them
differently.
The point that bears emphasis in this regard is that in adopting the very
phraseology of the law, the legislature could not have intended that an alien
wife should not be deemed a Philippine citizen unless and until she proves
that she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Far from it, the law states in
plain terms that she shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines if she is one
"who might herself be lawfully naturalized." The proviso that she must be one
"who might herself be lawfully naturalized" is not a condition precedent to the
vesting or acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact
54 4S 2014-2015


necessary to establish her citizenship as a factum probandum, i.e., as a fact
established and proved in evidence. The word "might," as used in that phrase,
precisely replies that at the time of her marriage to a Philippine citizen, the
alien woman "had (the) power" to become such a citizen herself under the
laws then in force. (Owen v. Kelly, 6 DC 191 [1867], aff'd Kelly v. Owen, 76
US 496, 19 L ed 283 [1869). That she establishes such power long after her
marriage does not alter the fact that at her marriage, she became a citizen.
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a
Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure
followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file
a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging,
among other things, that she is married to a Filipino, citizen and that she is not
disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition,
which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the
petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not
belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming
naturalized Filipino citizen, the Bureau of Immigration conducts an
investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or
denying the petition.
FRIVALDO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 120295, 28 June 1996
FACTS:
Juan Frivaldo was disqualified to run for the office of Governor of Sorsogon on
the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines, and Raul Lee, the
candidate with the second highest number of votes and the proponent of the
petition for disqualification was sworn in to office.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition docketed as
SPC No. 95-317, praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation
of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at
2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the
Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed
with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been
granted." As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the
Comelec) x x x was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at
5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the
proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor.
ISSUE: Can Frivaldos repatriation cure his ineligibility and may it be given
retroactive effect?
RULING:
YES. It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines," laws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled
exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or
REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
55 4S 2014-2015


A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also
provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its
preamble, P.D. 725 expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women
(who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who
could not, under the existing law (C. A. No. 63, as amended) avail of
repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of their
marital status" and who could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's
new provision allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her
Philippine citizenship xxx" because "such provision of the new Constitution
does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said
constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these
womenthe right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital
coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said
statute also provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural
born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to reacquire Philippine citizenship," because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725
such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and
cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they
could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified
procedure of repatriation.
ROMULADEZ-MARCOS v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 119976, 18 September 1995
FACTS:
Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the
First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification with the Commission of Election alleging that
petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his
petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the
Constitutions one year residency requirement for candidates to the House of
Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter
Registration Record 94-No.3349772 and in her Certificate of Candidacy.
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE
ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:------Years and seven Months
ISSUE: Was petitioner Romualdez-Marcos a resident of Leyte for a period of
one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections?
RULING:
YES. Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that for the exercise of civil and
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of
habitual residence. In Ong vs. Republic, this court took the concept of
domicile to mean an individuals permanent home, a place to which, whenever
absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on the
facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent.
56 4S 2014-2015


Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies factual relationship of an
individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence in a given area,
community or country. The essential distinction between residence and
domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose
for which the residence has taken up his abode end.
Residence in the civil law is material fact, referring to the physical presence of
a person in place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a
country residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in
place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without living in the place. The
important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in
one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence
is also established in some other place.
A minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is
retained until a new one gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioners
being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation
of law.
Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one;
3. Acts with which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the
residence of origin should be deemed to continue.
When petitioner was married to the then Congressman Marcos, in 1954,
petitioner was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her
husbands actual place of residence fixed by him. What petitioner gained
upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile or
residence.
57 4S 2014-2015

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San Beda College of Law CIVIL LAW REVIEW

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Waiver of Rights (Art. 6)

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Doubtful Statutes (Art. 10)

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Customs (Arts. 11-12)

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Computation of Period and Time (Art. 13)

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A calendar month is a month designated in the calendar without regard to the

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Appellant insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance

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Human Relations (Arts. 19-36)

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GLOBE MACKAY CABLE v. COURT OF APPEALS

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Prejudicial Question (Art. 36)

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