LAWYERS DUTIES IN HANDLING

CASES
1. A.C. No. 4103 September 7, 1995
VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR.
SOCORRO F. MANAS, and TRINIDAD
NORDISTA, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS, respondent.
FACTS:
In their letter of 8 September 1993, the complainants, former
clients of the respondent, pray that the latter be disbarred for
"malpractice, neglect and other offenses which may be discovered
during the actual investigation of this complaint." They attached
thereto an Affidavit of Merit wherein they specifically allege: (1)
That the said attorney without informing us the reason why and
riding high on the trust and confidence we repose on him either
abandoned, failed to act accordingly, or seriously neglected to
answer the civil complaint against us in the sala of Judge Teresita
Capulong; (2) That under false pretenses Atty. Fojas assured us
that everything was in order, that he answered the complaint when
he never did; (3) That because of Atty. Amado Foja's neglect and
malpractice of law we lost the Judge Capulong case and our
appeal to the Court of Appeals.
In his Comment, the respondent admits his "mistake" in failing to
file the complainants' answer, but alleges that it was cured by his
filing of a motion for reconsideration, which was unfortunately
denied by the court. He asserts that the case was a "losing cause"
for the complainants because it was based on the expulsion of the
plaintiff therein from the Far Eastern University Faculty Association
(FEUFA) which was declared unlawful in the final decision. He
further claims that the complainants filed this case to harass him
because he refused to share his attorney's fees in the main labor
case he had handled for them.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the
complainants herein to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff Salvador
the amounts of P200,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages or corrective damages; and P65,000.00 as
attorney's fees; plus cost of suit.
The complainants, still assisted by the respondent, elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals, which, however, affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court.
The respondent asserts that he was about to appeal the said
decision to this Court, but his services as counsel for the
complainants and for the union were illegally and unilaterally
terminated by complainant Veronica Santiago.
ISSUE:
WoN respondent committed culpable negligence, as would
warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complainants an
answer.
RULING:
A lawyer has the right to decline employment, subject, however, to
Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he
agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to
such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
The respondent admits that it was his duty to file an answer in Civil
Case No. 3526-V-91. The complainants, however, want to impress

upon this Court that the respondent has given inconsistent

reasons to justify his failure to file an answer.
We agree with the complainants. In his motion for reconsideration
of the default order, the respondent explained his non-filing of the
required answer by impliedly invoking forgetfulness occasioned by
a large volume and pressure of legal work, while in his Comment
in this case he attributes it to honest mistake and excusable
neglect due to his overzealousness to question the denial order of
the trial court.
Certainly, "overzealousness" on the one hand and "volume and
pressure of legal work" on the other are two distinct and separate
causes or grounds. The first presupposes the respondent's full and
continuing awareness of his duty to file an answer which,
nevertheless, he subordinated to his conviction that the trial court
had committed a reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in
issuing an order reconsidering its previous order of dismissal of
Salvador's complaint and in denying the motion to reconsider the
said order. The second ground is purely based on forgetfulness
because of his other commitments.
Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that
the respondent did not comply with his duty to file an answer in
Civil Case No. 3526-V-91.
All told, the respondent committed a breach of Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which requires him to serve
his clients, the complainants herein, with diligence and, more
specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which provides: "A lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable."
The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil
Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a "losing cause" for the
complainants since the claims therein for damages were based on
the final decision of the Med-Arbiter declaring the complainants'
act of expelling Salvador from the union to be illegal. This claim is
a mere afterthought which hardly persuades us.
WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby
REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be, henceforth, more
careful in the performance of his duty to his clients.
2. A.M. Case No. 3195. December 18, 1989
MA. LIBERTAD SJ CANTILLER, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. HUMBERTO V. POTENCIANO, respondent.
FACTS:
Complainant herein is the sister of Peregrina Cantiller, defendant
in an action for "ejectment" before the MTC of Manila. Another
action, likewise involving Peregrina but this time as plaintiff, was
then pending before the RTC of Pasig for "reconveyance with
damages." Both actions involve the apartment unit being rented by
complainant and her sister.
Peregrina came out the losing party in both. Thus, they consulted
a certain Sheriff Pagalunan, on the matter. Pagalunan, in turn,
introduced them to herein respondent. After such introduction, the
parties "impliedly agreed" that respondent would handle their
case.
Thereafter, the complainant was made to sign by respondent what
she described as a "[h]astily prepared, poorly conceived, and
haphazardly composed petition for annulment of judgment.
Complainant alleges that respondent promised her that the

necessary restraining order would be secured if only because the

judge who would hear the matter was his "katsukaran" (close
friend). When the case was raffled and assigned to Branch 153,
the presiding judge asked respondent to withdraw as counsel in
the case on the ground of their friendship. Here, respondent asked
for P1,000 as attorneys fees.
Later on, respondent went to the house of complainant and asked
her to be ready P 2,000 to be given to another judge who will issue
the restraining order in the ejectment case. Only P1,000 was
given. However, respondent informed them that he could not
anymore locate the judge. They went instead to Maxs Restaurant
where respondent ordered some food - including two plastic bags
of food allegedly to be given to the judge who would issue the
restraining order. At this juncture, respondent asked for the
remaining balance of the P2,000 which he earlier demanded.
Complainant gave her last money- 10-dollar bill.
Sometime after the filing of the civil case, respondent informed
complainant and Peregrina that there was a need to file another
case with the RTC to enable them to retain possession of the
apartment. Thus, he asked complainants to prepare again
P10,000 to be deposited to the Pasig Treasurers Office and
another P1,000 to cover the suits expenses. Out of the kindness
of their friends, complainants were able to raise said amounts.
At the hearing of the preliminary injunction, respondent, contrary to
his promise that he would secure a restraining order, withdrew his
appearance as counsel for complainant. Complainant was not able
to get another lawyer as replacement. Thus, no restraining order
or preliminary injunction was obtained. As a consequence, the
order to vacate in Civil Case No. 6046 was eventually enforced
and executed.
Complainants thereafter discovered that the P11,000-deposit was
not really necessary. They thus sent a demand letter to respondent
which was never answered.
Respondent in his answer contends that the filing of Civil Cases
Nos. 55118 and 55210 was done in good faith and that the
allegations of complainant relative to the administrative charge
against him are all lies, product of one's imagination and only
intended to harrass him.
ISSUE:
WoN respondent failed to exercise due diligence in protecting his
clients interests.

that he would be asked to withdraw, the record is quite clear that

four (4) days prior to the hearing of the preliminary injunction,
respondent already filed a motion therein withdrawing as
complainant's counsel interposing as reason therefor his frequent
attacks of pain due to hemorrhoids. Despite this void, respondent
failed to find a replacement. He did not even ask complainant to
hire another lawyer in his stead. His representation that there was
an immediate need to file Civil Case No. 55210 when he already
knew that he could no longer physically handle the same is an act
of deception of his client. It shows lack of fidelity to his oath of
office as a member of the Philippine bar.
The allegation of respondent that the P 10,000.00 was given to
him as fee for his services is simply incredible. Such amount is
grossly disproportionate with the service he actually rendered.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds Atty. Humberto V. Potenciano to be
guilty of the charges against him and hereby SUSPENDS him
from the practice of law for an indefinite period until such time he
can demonstrate that he has rehabilitated himself as to deserve to
resume the practice of law. Finally, respondent is hereby ordered
to return to complainant herein the sum of P11,000.00 with legal
interest from the date of this resolution until it is actually returned.

3. A.C. No. 3283 July 13, 1995

RODOLFO MILLARE, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO, respondent.
Pacifica Millare, the mother of the complainant, obtained a
favorable judgment from the MTC of Bangued, Abra which ordered
Elsa Dy Co to vacate the premises subject of the ejectment case.
Co, through respondent as counsel, appealed the decision to the
RTC, Bangued, Abra. She neither filed a supersedeas bond nor
paid the rentals adjudged by the MTC. The RTC affirmed in
toto the decision of the MTC. The CA dismissed Co's appeal from
the decision of the RTC for failure to comply with Section 22 of
B.P. Blg. 129 and Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines. According to the CA, Co should have filed a petition for
review and not an ordinary appeal.
On January 2, 1987, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by
respondent as counsel for Co, arguing that the decisions of the
MTC and the RTC were null and void for being contrary to law,
justice and equity for allowing the lessor to increase by 300% the
rentals for an old house. Respondent, admitting his mistake in
filing an ordinary appeal instead of a petition for review, prayed
that he be allowed to file an action for annulment.

RULING:
This Court agrees that the petitions appear to be poorly prepared
and written. Likewise, complainant reposed full faith in him. His
first duty was to file the best pleading within his capability.
Apparently respondent was more interested in getting the most out
of the complainant who was in a hopeless situation. The Court
finds that respondent failed to exercise due diligence in protecting
his client's interests. Respondent had knowledge beforehand that
he would be asked by the presiding judge in Civil Case No. 55118
to withdraw his appearance as counsel by reason of their
friendship. Despite such prior knowledge, respondent took no
steps to find a replacement nor did he inform complainant of this
fact. Even assuming that respondent had no previous knowledge

ISSUE:
WoN respondent should be suspended as per recommendation of
the IBP Board of Governors.
RULING:
SC holds that they have no reason to reverse the findings of the
IBP Board of Governors. Under Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to represent his
client "within the bounds of the law." The Code enjoins a lawyer to
employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives

of his client (Rule 19.01) and warns him not to allow his client to
dictate the procedure in handling the case (Rule 19.03). In short, a
lawyer is not a gun for hire.

(4) G.R. No. 86084 Petition For Review On Certiorari filed with
the Supreme Court;

Advocacy, within the bounds of the law, permits the attorney to use
any arguable construction of the law or rules which is favorable to
his client. But the lawyer is not allowed to knowingly advance a
claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law. He cannot
prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute
clearly groundless actions. Professional rules impose limits on a
lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and
qualifications.

(6) SP Civil Action No. 624 Petition For Certiorari,

Prohibition, Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory
Order filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra.

Under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a

lawyer is required to exert every effort and consider it his duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Implementing said Canon are the following rules:
Rule 12.02. A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from
the same cause.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 12.04. A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.
It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial
process, like the filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and
frivolous appeals for the sole purpose of frustrating and delaying
the execution of a judgment.
The rights of respondent's client in Civil Case No. 844 of the MTC
were fully protected and her defenses were properly ventilated
when he filed the appeal from the MTC to the RTC. But
respondent thereafter resorted to devious and underhanded
means to delay the execution of the judgment rendered by the
MTC adverse to his client. The said decision became executory
even pending its appeal with the RTC because of the failure of Co
to file a supersedeas bond and to pay the monthly rentals as they
fell due. Furthermore, his petition for annulment of the decisions of
the MTC and RTC which he filed with the CA (CA-G.R. No. 11690)
was defective and dilatory. According to the CA, there was no
allegation therein that the courts had no jurisdiction, that his client
was denied due process, or "that the judgments in the former
cases were secured through fraud."

(5) CA-G.R. SP No. 17040 Appeal And/Or Review By Certiorari,

Etc. filed also with the Court of Appeals; and,

Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall

the execution of the same judgment, respondent is also guilty of
forum shopping.
By having wilfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse in
his efforts to get a favorable judgment, which efforts were all
rebuffed, respondent violated the duty of a member of the Bar to
institute actions only which are just and put up such defenses as
he perceives to be truly contestable under the laws (Garcia v.
Francisco, 220 SCRA 512 [1993]). As correctly noted by the
Committee on Bar Discipline "in filing a number of pleadings,
actions and petitioner, respondent 'has made a mockery of the
judicial processes' and disregarded canons of professional ethics
in intentionally frustrating the rights of a litigant in whose favor a
judgment in the case was rendered, thus, 'abused procedural rules
to defeat ends of substantial justice'" (Report and
Recommendation, IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, p. 2).
WHEREFORE, respondent is SUSPENDED for one year.
4. [Syllabus]
THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-95-1063. February 9, 1996]
ALFONSO C. CHOA, complainant, vs. JUDGE ROBERTO S.
CHIONGSON, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In the complaint signed by Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz as counsel
for the complainant and verified by the latter, the respondent is
charged with grave misconduct, gross bias and partiality, and
having knowingly rendered an unjust judgment in Criminal Case
No. 50322 entitled, People of the Philippines vs. Alfonso C.
Choa.

Moreover, when the CA ordered that the records of the case be

remanded, respondent knew very well that the decision of the
MTC was already ripe for execution.

Criminal Case No. 50322 was for Perjury and initiated by the
complainants wife, Leni L. Ong-Choa, through the filing of a lettercomplaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City.
This complaint arose from the alleged untruthful statements or
falsehoods in the complainants Petition for Naturalization dated
30 March 1989 which was docketed as Case No. 5395, of Branch
41 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City.

Respondent filed a total of six appeals, complaints or petitions to

frustrate the execution of the MTC judgment in Civil Case No. 844,
to wit:

In due course, an Information was filed, in the Municipal Trial

Court in Cities (MCTC) of Bacolod City by the Office of the
Prosecutor, charging the complainant herein with perjury allegedly
committed

(1) Civil Case No. 344 Appeal from the decision rendered in
Civil Case No. 844 of the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra,
with the Regional Trial Court, Abra;
(2) CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 Appeal from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Abra;
(3) CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 An Action For the Annulment of
Decisions And/Or Reformation or Novation of Decisions filed with
the Court of Appeals;

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 50322 and was
assigned to Branch III thereof where the respondent is the
presiding Judge.
After trial, the respondent Judge rendered judgment on 21
February 1995 and found the complainant herein guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of perjury. The respondent Judge
accordingly sentenced him to suffer the penalty of six months and
one day of prision correccional and to pay the costs.

The complainant moved for a reconsideration of the judgment.

The respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit in an order dated 31 March 1995.
The complainant filed the instant complaint on 14 July. 1995 and
prayed for the removal of the respondent fudge from office.
The respondent Judge refutes the charge in his Comment dated
12 September 1995, thus:
He denies being the next-door-neighbor of Leni Ong Choa there
being a house, belonging to the Sia family, separating his house
and that of Leni Choa; he and the rest of the members of his
family are not acquainted with Leni Choa or any member of her
family and had not exchanged greetings nor is he even a nodding
acquaintance of Leni Choa or any member of her family.
He asserts that if the allegations in the Information do not
constitute an offense, the complainant should have filed a Motion
to Quash but he did not. Just the same, when the complainant
stated in the Petition that he together with his wife and children
lived at 46 Malaspina St., Bacolod City, he committed a falsehood
under oath because the truth is two (2) years before the filing of
the Petition, his wife and two (2) children were not living with him
anymore, making him liable for perjury.
Respondent also avers that the complainant is not of good moral
character contrary to what he stated in the Petition for
Naturalization since he is conducting an extra-marital relationship
with Stella Flores Saludar, his former employee, with whom he has
begotten two (2) children. As a matter of fact, a case for
concubinage against complainant was filed and is now pending in
Court.
According to the respondent, a reading of the Order granting the
Motion to Withdraw the Petition will show that the Prosecutor
representing the Office of the Solicitor General opposed the
Motion to Withdraw the Petition for the reason that the
complainant had abandoned his wife and two (2) children, is not
giving them support and is now living with his paramour.
The respondent Judge then prays for the dismissal of the
complaint for being patently without merit and for the censure and
reprimand of the complainants counsel with a warning to refrain
from filing similar harassment suits.
In the Evaluation contained in a Memorandum dated 17 November
1995 and duly approved by the Court Mministrator, Hon. Zenaida
N. Elepao, Deputy Court Administrator, makes the following
findings and conclusion:
A careful study of the records shows that the allegations of the
complainant are devoid of any merit.

ISSUE: whether there is a willful and deliberate assertion of

falsehood.
RULING: As shown by the records Alfonso C. Choa declared in his
petition dated 30 March 1989 that his wife Leni Ong Choa resides
at 46 Ma!aspina St. Bacolod City while in the administrative
complaint he filed against respondent Judge, he stated that his
wife Leni Ong Choa left their family residence (46 Malaspina St.,
Bacolod City) in the latter part of 1984 . This simply means that
when he filed his petition for naturalization, Leni Ong Choa was
not residing at the abovementioned address anymore.

It was also proven that Alfonso C. Choa had a child with a woman
not his wife and he himself signed the birth certificate as the father
of that child. This is contrary to what he declared in his petition that
he is of good moral character which is required under the
Naturalization Law.
There was therefore a deliberate assertion of falsehood by Alfonso
C.. Choa to warrant conviction for perjury as found by Judge
Chiongson.
As earlier stated, the foregoing discussion is in no way the final
appreciation of the Courts decision which is on appeal, but is
made only to illustrate the utter lack of merit of this charge.
Counsel for the complainant must be reprimanded for assisting in
the filing of this complaint.
Deputy Court Administrator Elepaflo then recommends:
Premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that this
complaint against Judge Roberto S. Chiongson be DISMISSED for
lack of merit. It is further recommended that Atty. Raymundo A.
Quiroz be REPRIMANDED for assisting in the filing of a patently
unmeritorious complaint.
We fully agree with Deputy Court Administrator Elepaflo that the
allegations in the complaint are utterly devoid of merit. Good faith
and good motive did not seem to have inspired the filing of the
complaint.
The withdrawal of the Petition for Naturalization did not and cannot
amount to a recall of the questioned untruthful statements. Neither
could it extinguish any offense which may have been committed
by reason of such untruthful statements.
As to the respondent Judges being a next-door neighbor of the
complainants wife - the complainant in the perjury case - it must
be stressed that that alone is not a ground for either a mandatory
disqualification under the first paragraph or for a voluntary
disqualification under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137
of the Rules of Court. In any event, the complainant has failed to
disclose in his complaint that he had raised this matter at any time
before the rendition of the judgment. In fact, the summary of the
grounds of his motion for reconsideration in the respondents order
denying the said motion does not include this matter. If indeed the
complainant honestly believed in the justness of this grievance, he
would have raised it in an appropriate pleading before the trial
court.
Finally, the nature and character of the complainants grievances
relative to the respondents judgment finding the former guilty of
perjury. May only be properly ventilated in an appropriate judicial
proceeding, such as an appeal from the judgment.
This kind of recourse, whether made in addition to a regular
appeal from the judgment, or in lieu thereof, if none had been
made, is clearly without any basis and cannot be tolerated for it
robs Judges of precious time which they could otherwise devote to
the cases in their courts or to the unclogging of their dockets.
Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz, counsel for the complainant, must have
been aware of the utter lack of merit of the charges against the
respondent. As a Member of the Philippine Bar he is bound: (1) by
his oath, not to, wittingly or willingly, promote or sue any
groundless, false, or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the
same; (2) by Section 20(c), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to
counsel or maintain such action or proceedings only as appear to
him to be just; and (3) to uphold the Code of Professional

Responsibility. It was incumbent upon him to give a candid and

honest opinion on the merits and probable results of the
complainants case (Rule 15.05, Canon 15, Code of Professional
Responsibility) with the end in view of promoting respect for the
law and legal processes (Canon 1, Id.). He should, therefore, be
required to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him for his apparent failure to observe the foregoing duties
and responsibilities.
WHEREFORE, for want of merit, the instant complaint is
DISMISSED.
For the reasons above stated, Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz is hereby
directed to SHOW CAUSE, within fifteen (15) days from notice
hereof, why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for his
apparent failure to comply with his duties and responsibilities
above stated.
SO ORDERED.

5.COSMOS FOUNDRY SHOP WORKERS UNION and FILEMON

G. ALVAREZ, petitioners,
vs.
LO BU and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Filemon G. Alvarez for petitioners.
Yolando F Busmente for respondent Lo Bu.

FERNANDO, J.
The facts show that on January 16, 1973, petitioner Cosmos
Foundry Shop Workers Union was able to obtain from the Court of
Industrial Relations the third alias writ of execution for the
satisfaction and enforcement of the judgment in its favor.
Thereafter, Deputy Sheriff Mario Abiog of Manila, who was
especially deputized to serve the writ, did so on January 17 and
18, 1973 levying on the personal properties of the Cosmos
Foundry Shop or the New Century Foundry Shop for the purpose
of conducting the public auction sale.
It was then that respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion to recall
writ of execution, asserting lack of jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations, a point stressed in another motion dated
February 2, 1973, on the further ground that petitioner Cosmos
Foundry Shop Workers Union failed to put up an indemnity bond.
The Court of Industrial Relations in its order dated February 23,
1973 denied his motions. So likewise was the motion for
reconsideration, as shown in its order dated March 23, 1973.
Private respondent appealed by certiorari such order to this Court.
However it was denied. In the meanwhile, there was a replevin
suit by private respondent in the Court of First Instance of Manila
covering the same properties. Upon receipt of the order from this
Court denying certiorari, petitioner labor union filed a second
motion to dismiss the complaint. It was therein alleged that private
respondent has no cause of action, he being a fictitious buyer
based on the findings of the Court of Industrial Relations in its
order dated June 22, 1970 and affirmed by the Supreme Court in
its resolution dated July 17, 1973. The lower court dismissed the
complaint. That is the decision elevated to the Court of Appeals,

and it is precisely because of its obvious character as a further

delaying tactic that this petition is filed.
ISSUE. Whether or not certiorari may issue
It was set forth in the Petition that respondent Lo Bu filed an
urgent motion with the Court of Industrial Relations to recall the
writ of execution alleging as one of his grounds lack of jurisdiction
to pass upon the validity of the sale of the New Century Foundry
Shop, followed by another motion praying for the return of the
levied properties this time asserting that petitioner labor union
failed to put up an indemnity bond and then a third, this time to
allow the sheriff to keep the levied properties at his factory, all of
which were denied by the Court en banc in its order of March 23,
1973, assailed in the certiorari proceeding, dismissed by this Court
for lack of merit.
Counsel Yolando F. Busmente in his Answer to this petition, filed
on February 20, 1975, had the temerity to deny such allegations.
Such conduct on the part of counsel is far from commendable. He
could, of course, be casuistic and take refuge in the fact that the
paragraph of the petition, which he denied, was, in addition to
being rather poorly and awkwardly worded, also prolix, with
unnecessary matter being included therein without due regard to
logic or coherence or even rules of grammar. He could add that his
denial was to be correlated with his special defenses, where he
concentrated on points not previously admitted.
That is the most that can be said of his performance, and it is not
enough. For even if such be the case, Attorney Busmente had not
exculpated himself. He was of course expected to defend his
client's cause with zeal, but not at the disregard of the truth and in
defiance of the clear purpose of labor statutes. He ought to
remember that his obligation as an officer of the court, no less
than the dignity of the profession, requires that he should not act
like an errand-boy at the beck and call of his client, ready and
eager to do his every bidding. If he fails to keep that admonition in
mind, then he puts into serious question his good standing in the
bar.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of
December 19, 1974 of respondent Court of Appeals reinstating the
appeal is nullified and set aside. The writ of prohibition is likewise
granted, respondent Court of Appeals being perpetually restrained
from taking any further action on such appeal, except that of
dismissing it. Triple costs.

6. A.C. No. 3695 February 24, 1992

DOMINGO C. GAMALINDA, complainant,
vs.
AYTYS. FERNANDO ALCANTARA and JOSELITO LIM,
respondents.
NARVASA, C.J.:
In his verified letter-complaint dated June 19, 1991, 1 complainant
Domingo Gamalinda charges retired Judge Fernando Alcantara
and Atty. Joselito Lim with grave abuse of their profession ("labis
nilang pag-abuso sa kanilang propesyon"), deception, threats,
dishonoring and injuring the reputation of said complainant and
bringing about the loss of his land.
ISSUE: whether or not the respondents are guilty

RULING:
The Court finds the charges to be without basis and accordingly
dismisses them.
The administrative complaint against retired Judge Fernando
Alcantara is a futile attempt to resurrect the charges filed against
him for having become moot and academic. It was filed only on
July 22, 1987, or five (5) months after the respondent judge's
retirement from the service on February 3, 1987. No motion for
reconsideration having been seasonably filed by complainant, that
resolution has become final and executory. It serves as a bar to a
relitigation of the same charges against respondent judge. 2 That
those charges are now being brought against respondent judge in
his capacity as an attorney does not help the cause of
complainant, for the change in the form of action or remedy
pursued does not bar the application of the rule of res judicata. 3
On the other hand, the record establishes that Atty. Lim was
merely performing his duty as counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 3827 when he did what is now complained of. 4
In Civil Case No. 3827 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac,
Branch LXIII, Salud Balot and Felicidad Balot had sued the heirs
of Apolinario Gamalinda 5 for reconveyance, with damages, of the
eastern half of Lot No. 3217 of the cadastral survey of Victoria,
Tarlac, which was allegedly inadvertently included in the original
certificate of title of Apolinario Gamalinda.
The questioned acts of Atty. Lim were all done in line with his duty
to prosecute his clients' cause in Civil Case No. 3827. The first
motion was filed to protect his clients' possessory rights over the
property in dispute while the second motion was made to procure
execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 3827.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and must be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. 13 He shall
serve his client with competence and diligence, 14 and his duty of
entire devotion to his client's cause not only requires, but entitles
him to employ every honorable means to secure for the client what
is justly due him or to present every defense provided by law to
enable the latter's cause to succeed. 15 An attorney's duty to
safeguard the client's interests commences from his retainer until
the effective release from the case 16 or the final disposition of the
whole subject matter of the litigation. 17 During that period, he is
expected to take such reasonable steps and such ordinary care as
his client's interests may require.
This is precisely what Atty. Lim was doing when he filed the
motions complained of. He should be commended, not
condemned, for diligently and competently performing his duties
as an attorney;
With respect to the complainant's contention that the Deed of Sale
of Unregistered Land relied upon by the lower and appellate courts
in Civil Case No. 3827 is a forged or fake instrument, suffice it to
say that this is a matter that should have been litigated in said
case instead of being raised for the first time in these proceedings.
In any case, there being no showing that Atty. Lim was aware of
any defect in that deed, the charge of deception against him will
not lie. Absent, too, is any showing that Atty. Lim had anything to
do with the preparation of the criminal information, and for the
same reason he cannot be called to account for it.
ACCORDINGLY, the administrative charges against retired Judge
Fernando Alcantara and Atty. Joselito Lim are DISMISSED for lack
of merit.

7.
G.R. No. L-25137
J.P. Juan and Sons Inc. v. Lianga Industries Inc., 28 SCRA
807
Facts:

In a complaint originally filed with the City Court of Manila

on October 30, 1963, plaintiff (J.P juan and sons Inc.) sought
recovery from defendant (Lianga industries inc.) of the sum of
P900.00, representing the unpaid balance of office equipment
amounting to P1,890.00 sold and delivered on October 15, 1962
by plaintiff to defendant under a purchase order, copy of which
was duly annexed to the complaint. Plaintiff also asked for the
payment of legal interests and costs and P200.00 for attorney's
fees.
Defendant filed its Answer on January 27, 1964, where it
"denied specifically all the allegations of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the
complaint", which are the material allegations referring to its
purchase of the office equipment, its partial payment and refusal
and failure to pay the unpaid balance of P900.00 despite repeated
demands of plaintiff and alleged as a "special and affirmative
defense" that "defendant has no obligation to pay to the plaintiff
the amount or sum of money claimed in the complaint." Defendant
did not deny under oath the authenticity of the purchase order
annexed to the complaint, as required by Rule 8, section 8 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Summing up, the lower Court found that "Said material
allegations deemed admitted by the defendant establish that on
October 15, 1962, the defendant purchased from the plaintiff office
equipment listed in the Purchase Order No. 001/62, a photostatic
copy of which was attached to the complaint as Annex A, the
authenticity of which has not been denied under oath. The
equipments therein listed, with a total selling price of P1,890.00,
were delivered to the defendant which paid only the amount of
P990.00, thereby leaving an unpaid balance of P900.00.
Notwithstanding the fact that said purchase was payable in thirty
days from October 15, 1962, the defendant failed and refused to
pay the outstanding balance of P900.00 despite repeated
demands for payment. It therefore rendered judgment in favor of
plaintiff, although it made no award for attorney's fees for lack of
proof.
Defendant filed its notice of appeal from the lower Court's
decision, on the ground that the same is 'contrary to law and the
evidence" and asked that its appeal be elevated to the Court of
Appeals. CA rules in favour of plaintiff.
Issue:

W/N there was specific denial done by the defendant.

W/N the attorney of the defendant should be subjected to
disciplinary action for causing unnecessary delay in
contrast to the right to speedy trial.

Held:
We find defendant's appeal to be frivolous. No error was
committed by the Court below in ruling that defendant-appellant's
"specific denials" are in law general denials amounting to
admissions of the material allegations of the complaint and in
rendering judgment on the pleadings, in accordance with the
settled doctrine in this jurisdiction based on the provisions of Rule
8, section 10 and Rule 9, section 1 in relation to Rule 19, section 1
and Rule 20, section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Cases such as this contribute to the needless clogging of
the court dockets. The Rules of Court were devised to limit the

issues and avoid unnecessary delays and surprises. Hence, the

mandatory provisions of Rule 20 of the Revised Rules of Court for
a pre-trial conference for the simplification of the issues and the
consideration of all matters which may aid in the prompt
disposition of an action. The Rules further require in Rule 7 section
5 that "every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall
be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name"
and that "the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by
him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support
it; and that it is not interposed for delay" with the express
admonition that "for a willful violation of this rule, an attorney may
be subjected to disciplinary action." The cooperation of litigants
and their attorneys is needed so that the salutary objectives of
these Rules may be attained.

8.
[A.C. No. 1054. March 25, 1975.]
JUAN AZOR, Complainant, v. ATTORNEY EUSTAQUIO
BELTRAN, Respondent.
Facts:
Beltran was accused of taking or causing to be detached
from the rollo of Special Proceedings No. 667 of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur, the financial report of complainant
Juan Azor as executor, as well as the order of the court
terminating the same; of thereafter filing a motion to require
complainant to render an accounting and to deliver the property
left in the will to the beneficiaries; and of having instructed his
client Lorelie Bornales and the latter's mother, Aniana SadolEscriba to enter forcibly a parcel of land forming a part of the
estate when he knew of its having been previously sold, thus
necessitating a complaint for forcible entry. The answer with
supporting documents of respondent did present an entirely
different picture. What motivated complainant to file this
administrative case became apparent as respondent represented
clients with opposing interest. With the allegations of facts in the
complaint thus being controverted, the matter was referred to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.

Camarines Sur attesting to the fact that the records of the

aforecited probate proceedings, including the allegedly missing
financial report and order, are all intact and unaltered ... . Needless
to state, mere assumptions cannot be the basis of any finding
against any member of the bar who, as an official of the court, is
presumed to act with the utmost decorum and good faith in all his
dealings. This presumption in favor of the respondent in the
probate proceedings in question can not be overcome by
complainant's aforesaid mere assumption or imputation without
any evidence in support of the same."
The Court accepts such recommendation. The
investigation appeared to be thorough and the appraisal of the
evidence both meticulous and correct. Respondent should he
absolved of the charges hurled against him. Complainant ought to
have displayed a greater sense of responsibility. He should have
refrained from imposing on this Court or the Office of the Solicitor
General a needless burden and inconvenience. Apparently what
motivated him in filing his complaint was the zeal with which
respondent fought for the interests of his client. Complainant
should be aware that this Court does not look with favor upon
accusations arising from dissatisfaction and resentment at the
mode in which a lawyer diligently and tenaciously prosecutes
matters entrusted to him. Instead of being condemned under the
circumstances, he should be commended. Nor is this all. There
are intimations in the record that the ill-will of complainant was
aroused by respondent coming into possession of information that
did cause a reflection on the discharge of his trust as executor.
Incensed, he would utilize what appeared to be a dominant
economic position in the community to make things difficult for
respondent. Such an actuation, meriting disapproval then, is even
more reprehensible now under the temper of the present
dispensation that seeks to do away with every vestige of
malodorous practices indulged in by the rich and the powerful in
the community.
Fairness to both complainant and respondent compels the
observation that the latter, as a member of the bar, is called upon
to be much more careful and meticulous in examining the records
of a case and noting every pleading, even if as has happened in
not a few cases, the papers are not kept in as orderly a manner as
is both proper and desirable

9.
Issue:

Visitacion vs. Manit

W/N Beltran is liable for malpractice and gross misconduct.

27 SCRA 523, March 28, 1969

Held:

J. Teehankee

No. Solicitor general Estelito Mendoza and Assistant Sol

Gen Smpio Diy recommended for the dismissal of the charges.
The records are entirely bereft of any direct, positive and
competent evidence to support the charge that respondent
detached and removed official records from the Office of the Clerk
of Court of Camarines Sur, particularly the financial report in, and
the order of closure of, Special Proceeding No. 667. If at all,
complainant appears to have merely assumed that because, when
he was allegedly shown by the clerk of court the records of said
case, the same purportedly contained at the time only the
probated will and respondent's motion for an accounting therein ...
then respondent must have spirited away the financial report filed
therein by complainant and the order of the court for the closure of
said proceedings. On the other hand, respondent did not only
vigorously deny the imputation that he took said records from
the expediente of the case, ... but he also submitted in evidence a
certification of the branch clerk of the Court of First Instance of

Facts:
Alfonso Visitacion, plaintiff-appellee, filed a case against
defendant Victor Manit to hold him liable subsidiarily as employer
for the death of his son, Delano Visitacion, as a result of injuries
sustained in vehicular collision involving Manits driver, Rudolfo
Giron, who was found insolvent after being convicted and
sentenced. The case was heard without defendant or his counsel
being present which resulted in plaintiff presenting evidence and
the case was submitted for decision. The defendant filed a motion
for new trial which was granted and the proceeding continued with
the defendants presenting their evidence. On October 14, 1958,
Atty. Garcia, defendants counsel, manifested that Victor Manit had
recently died and the plaintiffs counsel amended the complaint by
impleading the widow and heirs of the deceased. On January 27,
1960, Atty. Garcia filed a motion to withdraw as counsel alleging
that Manits heirs did not hire him to represent them and both
counsel and his client failed to appear at the trial the next day. The

Court considered them having renounced their right to appear and

present evidence to contest plaintiffs claim and rendered
judgment in favor of plaintiff. Atty. Garcias motion to withdraw was
not passed upon and his subsequent motion for reconsideration
was denied. Thus, he filed this present appeal
Issue/s:

Whether or not the lower court had jurisdiction to

continue the case without the defendants brought to it by
summons and without informing said defendants that
they have become parties to the case?

Whether or not the lower court erred in ignoring the

motion to withdraw filed by Atty. Garcia?

Whether or not the new defendants were not given their

day in court?

Held:
Appealed judgment affirmed w/ double costs to be paid
by attorney for defendants.
No error was committed because the record shows that
Atty. Garcia had acknowledged the receipt of the amended
complaint substituting the defendant heirs as counsel for
defendants. They were impleaded and submitted to the Courts
jurisdiction through their counsels acknowledgment of the
amended complaint; the issuance of a summons was
unnecessary.
The last-hour motion to withdraw filed one day before the
hearing came too late and was properly ignored. The motion was
not verified and also carried no notice to his clients on record
which was in violation of the Rules of Court (Rule 15, Sec. 4 and
Rule 138, Sec. 26, respectively). An attorney who could not get the
written consent of his client must make an application to the court,
for the relation does not terminate formally until there is a
withdrawal of record. The decision rendered by the lower court,
upon failure of defendants and counsel to appear, despite
notification was in effect a denial of counsels application for
withdrawal. Atty. Garcias failure to appear was unexcusable and
he had no right to assume that the Court would grant his
application. Counsel had no right to presume that the court would
grant his withdrawal and therefore must still appear on the date of
hearing. The attorneys duty to safeguard the clients interests
commences from his retainer until his defective release from the
case or the final disposition of the whole subject matter of the
litigation. The circumstances had lead the Court to believe that the
last-hour application to withdraw was merely a device to prolong
the case and delay execution of judgment.
There was no premature judgment rendered because the
record shows that the defendant heirs were shown to be aware of
the existence of the case. Leonarda Manit was called upon as
witness during the deceaseds lifetime by Atty. Garcia and
submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the Court. Neither her nor
her 3 children of age can claim ignorance of the pendency of the
case.

10. De roy v ca
De Roy was the owner of a burnt building. The firewall of said
building collapsed on the house of Luis Bernal thereby killing his
daughter. Bernal sued De Roy. Bernal won in the trial court.
Eventually, De Roy appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court. De Roy received a copy of the

decision on August 25, 1987. Under the Rules, they have 15 days
to file a motion for reconsideration.
On September 9, 1987, the last day for them to file said MFR, De
Roys counsel filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion
for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals ruled that pursuant to the case of Habaluyas
Enterprises vs Japzon (August 1985), the fifteen-day period for
appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be
extended.
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the
rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time
to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the
Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts,
and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed
only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last
resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the
extension requested
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case
should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the nonpublication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of
the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was
promulgated.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Roys contention is correct.
HELD: No. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring
the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law
practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court
particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently
reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court
decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court
Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

11. Cuaresma v daquis

An order to demolish the property where Cuaresma was staying
was issued by a trial judge pursuant to a civil case filed by Daquis.
Cuaresmas lawyer, Atty. Macario Directo, filed a petition for
certiorari before the Supreme Court where he alleged that they
had no knowledge of the said civil case hence the order of
demolition is unjust. The Supreme Court however later found out
that Cuaresma and his lawyer in fact knew of the existence of said
civil case. The Supreme Court then directed Directo to show
cause why he should not be disciplined.
In his explanation, Directo stated that what he meant was that he
and his client belatedly learned of the civil case; that had there
been a mistake committed, it had been an honest one, and would
say in all sincerity that there was no deliberate attempt and intent
on his part of misleading this Honorable Court, honestly and totally
unaware of any false allegation in the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Directo should be subject to disciplinary

actions.
HELD: No. But he was reprimanded by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court gave Directo the benefit of the doubt although it
did say that Directos reasoning could very well be just an
afterthought. The Supreme Court also stated that Directo is
presumed to be in good faith especially so that the misstatements
in his petition could be attributed either to his carelessness or his
lack of English proficiency. The Supreme Court admonished
Directo to prepare pleadings carefully in the future so that the least
doubt as to his intellectual honesty cannot be entertained. Every
member of the bar should realize that candor in the dealings with
the Court is of the very essence of honorable membership in the
profession.

12. AURORA CAMARA VDA. DE ZUBIRI, vs.WENCESLAO ZUBIRI

alias BEN, ET AL.,
FACTS:
Aurora Camara Vda. de Zubiri, filed with the Court of First Instance of
Lanao del Norte a complaint for the recovery of her alleged share in two
commercial lots situated in Iligan City against Wenceslao Ben Zubiri,
and the Standard Vacuum Oil Co., the occupant of portions of the said
properties. The plaintiff alleged that the said lots were conjugal, having
been purchased by her and her late husband during their marriage, so that
at least one-half of the same belonged to her "plus the equal share of the
heir or heirs of the decedent." Moreover, the plaintiff claimed that the said
parcels were in the possession of the defendant who, "unless he can prove
before this Honorable Court that he is a duly recognized natural child of the
late Jesus Zubiri, [he] has no right, interest, and participation whatsoever
over the abovementioned two lots."
Four (4) pleadings were filed namely: 1) the herein appellant's answer
which showed on its face that it was signed by the latter in his own behalf
and unassisted by counsel; 2) a Stipulation of Facts, signed by the plaintiff,
assisted by counsel, and the defendant, without such assistance; 3) a
motion to render judgment on the pleadings, again signed by the plaintiff,
duly assisted by counsel, and the defendant- appellant herein, signing
alone, without benefit of counsel; and 4) the defendant Standard Vacuum
Oil Company's answer to the above complaint.
Trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the aforementioned
Stipulation of Facts. Since in both the answer of the herein defendantappellant and the stipulation of facts the latter admitted practically all
the allegations of the complaint, the decision rendered in accordance
therewith was actually in favor of the plaintiff.
Wenceslao Zubiri for the first time thru counsel, filed with the trial court a
petition to set aside judgment upon two grounds, to wit: first, the three
pleadings filed namely: appellant's answer, the stipulation of facts and the
motion to render judgment on the pleadings were all prepared by the
plaintiff's counsel and that he, the appellant, was made to sign all of them
when he was ill and incapable of realizing the full consequences of the act.
Wenceslao seeks annulment of judgment based on the allegations to wit:
that it was the plaintiff's counsel who prepared and induced the defendant
to sign all the pleadings upon which the assailed decision was based,
including and particularly the said defendant's answer, that the dismissal of
the same, in the absence of the petitioner and without affording him the
chance to be heard thereon, indeed was incompatible with the exercise of
sound judicial discretion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lawyer of the plaintiff can communicate with the
defendant directly and testify upon the
signing of documents
HELD:

The active participation of a lawyer in one party's affairs relating to a

pending case in which the said lawyer is the counsel for the opposing party
is brazenly unethical to say the least. The Canons of Legal Ethics very
explicitly declare that "it is unprofessional to represent conflicting
interests" (No. 6), and command that
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of
controversy with a party represented by counsel; much less should he
undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should deal
only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to
avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by
counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to the law.
(No. 9)
As we have already said in the case of Cantorne v. Ducusin, 57 Phil. 23,
the simultaneous representation by a lawyer of both parties to a suit
constitutes malpractice which should be severely condemned and the
lawyer corrected by disciplinary action. If but for this consideration alone,
the court below should have allowed the motion for postponement pleaded
by the appellant and heard the merits of the latter's petition to set aside
judgment.
Moreover, the affidavits of merit appended to the petition to set aside
judgment recited that the defendant- appellant was seriously sick at the
time he was made to sign and swear to the above three repudiated
pleadings. To be sure, no less than the officer before whom the said
pleadings were subscribed and sworn to admitted that this verification was
conducted at the appellant's residence in Cebu where the latter was
confined "suffering from fever, with an ice cap on his head and profusely
perspiring." Under the circumstances, therefore, the mental capacity of the
appellant to responsibly assent to commitments set forth in the same three
pleadings became doubtful and the trial court should have exerted its
earnest efforts to resolve the doubt. Especially so when account is taken of
the fact that the subject matter of the suit was not just an insubstantial sum
but properties allegedly worth some P165,000.00.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the court below denying
the appellant's petition to set
aside judgment is hereby revoked and set aside.

13. INOCENCIA DELUAO and FELIPE DELUAO vs. NICANOR

CASTEEL and JUAN DEPRA
G.R. No. L-21906 December 24, 1968 CASTRO, J.
FACTS: Nicanor Casteel filed several fishpond applications for a
big tract of swampy land in Davao, which applications were
disapproved for equal times.
Meanwhile, several applications were submitted by other
persons for portions of the area covered by Casteel's application,
one of which was herein plaintiff-appellee Felipe Deluao, who was
also Casteels uncle.
Sometime in 1949, Inocencia Deluao (wife of Felipe
Deluao) and Casteel executed a "contract of service" whereby it
was agreed that Deluao will finance (as she has financed) the
improvements on the fishpond made by Casteel, who renders only
his services for the construction of the improvements.
Subsequently, the Director of Fisheries rejected the
application filed by Felipe Deluao. The application of Casteel was
then reinstated and given due course.
Thereafter, Casteel forbade Inocencia Deluao from
further administering the fishpond. Alleging violation of the contract
of service, Felipe Deluao and Inocencia Deluao filed an action for
specific performance and damages against Casteel.
The case was set for trial, after several issues were
joined. Then came a series of postponements.
The lower court (Branch I, presided by Judge Enrique
A. Fernandez) finally issued an order on March 21, 1956, in
open court, that the hearing of this case was transferred to May
2 and 3, 1956 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. And that since the
case was filed on April 1951, the court will not entertain any

other transfer of hearing of this case under any circumstance

and if the parties will not be ready on that day set for hearing,
the court will take the necessary steps for the final determination
of this case.
The defendants' counsel received a notice of hearing
(dated April 21, 1956) issued by the office of the Clerk of Court,
setting the hearing of the case for May 2 and 3, 1956 before
Judge Amador Gomez of Branch II. The defendants, thru
counsel, filed a motion for postponement, which was denied by
Judge Gomez (and held that case should be referred back to
Branch I since that the case has been under advisement of the
Judge Fernandez).
On the scheduled date of hearing, that is, on May 2,
1956, the lower court (Branch I, with Judge Fernandez presiding),
when informed about the defendants' motion for postponement,
issued an order reiterating its previous order handed down in open
court and directing the plaintiffs to introduce their evidence ex
parte, there being no appearance on the part of the defendants or
their counsel.
The defendant Casteel filed a petition for relief from the
foregoing decision, alleging, inter alia, lack of knowledge of the
order of the court a quo setting the case for trial.
ISSUE: WON the lower court committed gross abuse of discretion
when it ordered reception of the appellees evidence in the
absence of the appellant at the trial on May 2, 1956.
HELD: NO. The record indisputably shows that in the order given
in open court, the lower court set the case for hearing on May 2
and 3, 1956 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
An order given in open court is presumed received by the
parties on the very date and time of promulgation, and amounts to
a legal notification for all legal purposes. The order given in open
court, was a valid notice to the parties, and the notice of hearing
dated April 21, 1956 was a superfluity.
Moreover, as between (a) the order of March 21, 1956,
duly promulgated by the lower court, thru Judge Fernandez, and
(b) the notice of hearing dated April 21, 1956 signed by a
"special deputy clerk of court" setting the hearing in another
branch of the same court, the former's order was the one legally
binding. This is because the incidents of postponements and
adjournments are controlled by the court and not by the clerk of
court
It is of no moment that the motion for postponement had
the conformity of the appellees' counsel. The postponement of
hearings does not depend upon agreement of the parties, but
upon the court's discretion.
The record further discloses that Casteel was
represented by a total of 12 lawyers, none of whom had ever
withdrawn as counsel. Notice to one of his counsel, Atty. Ruiz, of
the order dated March 21, 1956 was sufficient notice to all the
appellant's eleven other counsel of record. This is a well-settled
rule in our jurisdiction.
It was the duty of Atty. Ruiz, or of the other lawyers of
record, not excluding the appellant himself, to appear before
Judge Fernandez on the scheduled dates of hearing Parties and
their lawyers have no right to presume that their motions for
postponement will be granted. For indeed, the appellant and his
12 lawyers cannot pretend ignorance of the recorded fact the case
has been under the advisement of Judge Fernandez who presided
over Branch I. There was, therefore, no necessity to "reassign" the
same to Branch II because Judge Fernandez had exclusive
control of said case, unless he was legally inhibited to try the case
and he was not.
There is truth in the appellant's contention that it is the
duty of the clerk of court not of the Court to prepare the trial
calendar. But the assignment or reassignment of cases already

pending in one sala to another sala, and the setting of the date of
trial after the trial calendar has been prepared, fall within the
exclusive control of the presiding judge.
The appellant does not deny the appellees' claim that on
May 2 and 3, 1956, the office of the clerk of court was located
directly below Branch I. If the appellant and his counsel had
exercised due diligence, there was no impediment to their going
upstairs to the second storey of the Court of First Instance building
in Davao on May 2, 1956 and checking if the case was scheduled
for hearing in the said sala. The appellant after all admits that on
May 2, 1956 his counsel went to the office of the clerk of court.

14. HEIRS OF ELIAS LORILLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 118655 April 12, 2000 QUISUMBING, J.
FACTS: Private respondent Commercial Credit Corporation (now
known as Pentacapital Finance Corporation or PENTACAPITAL)
filed a complaint with the RTC of Makati for a sum of money
against Sanyu Machineries Agencies, Inc. and several other
defendants, among whom was Elias Lorilla, (now deceased) who
had acted as sureties for the two corporate debtors.
PENTACAPITAL sought for, and obtained a writ of
attachment on the real property of defendant Elias L. Lorilla and
which levy was duly annotated on the certificate of title.
During the pendency of the case, Elias L. Lorilla executed
a dacion en pago over the property attached in favor of the Joint
Resources Management Development Corporation (JRMDC). The
levy caused to be made by PENTACAPITAL over the property was
carried over to the new certificate of title of JRMDC.
The Makati Court, after due hearing, rendered judgment
in favor of PENTACAPITAL and against the defendants therein,
including Elias L. Lorilla. Despite receipt of a copy of the aforesaid
decision by Alfredo Concepcion, then counsel of record of
defendant Elias L. Lorilla, no appeal whatsoever was interposed
from said judgment by said lawyer in behalf of defendant Lorilla.
Upon motion of PENTACAPITAL, the Makati Court issued
a writ of execution and PENTACAPITAL thereafter proceeded
against the property in the name of defendant Lorilla.
Petitioners herein as heirs of Elias L. Lorilla, filed a
motion to quash the writ of execution arguing that since defendant
Elias L. Lorilla passed away on January 15, 1988, or one year and
three months before the Makati Court rendered decision, the case
should have been dismissed insofar as Elias L. Lorilla is
concerned (in keeping with Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court).
ISSUES:
1. WON the judgment should be final and executory against
petitioners.
2. WON petitioners were denied due process of law as there was
no substitution due to Atty. Concepcions fault.
HELD:
1. YES. No notice of death was filed by Atty. Alfredo Concepcion,
counsel of record of Elias Lorilla before the Makati Court. Thus,
neither the Makati Court nor PENTACAPITAL were made aware of
the death of Elias Lorilla. The trial court could not be expected to
know or take judicial notice of the death of Lorilla, absent such
notice.
Apparently, Lorilla's counsel failed in his duty to promptly
inform the court of the death of his client, as the Rules require. As
far as the Makati Court was concerned, until the Writ of Execution
was issued and the levy thereof, Lorilla continued to be
represented by counsel of record, Atty. Concepcion; and that upon
service of a copy of the decision on said counsel at the latter's
address, Lorilla was deemed to have been validly served notice of

the judgment. The failure of Atty. Concepcion to serve notice on

the court and the adverse parties regarding his client's death binds
herein petitioners as much as the client himself could be so bound.
Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that a client is bound
by the conduct, negligence and mistakes of his counsel.
2. NO. While petitioners were not properly substituted for Elias
Lorilla as defendants, absent any notice of his death, it could not
be said that petitioners were deprived of due process of law, for as
far as the trial court was concerned, they were not parties to the
case. To rule otherwise would be, in fact, a more obvious and
grievous transgression of due process.
Moreover in this case, the property which petitioners
claim as their lawful inheritance was no longer part of the estate of
Elias Lorilla at the time of his death. For Elias Lorilla had earlier
executed a dacion en pago over this property in favor of JRMDC.
The subject property was validly transferred to JRMDC already.
Hence petitioners could not claim that they were deprived of their
lawful inheritance without due process of law.
15. VALENTIN AVELINO vs. ATTY. PEDRO K. PALANA
A.M. No. 405 May 31, 1971 DIZON, J.
FACTS: Respondent Atty. Pedro Palana was engaged by the
petitioner to be their counsel in a civil case where the petitioner is
one of the defendants (case regarding the ownership and
possession of a property).
Respondent alleged that he verbally advised the
petitioner of the hearing of the aforestated case on November 15,
1957, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning at least three days before the
scheduled hearing.
When the scheduled hearing of the case arrived, the
respondent failed to be present in court or appear thereat
because: "at about 3:00 o'clock in the morning of that day, I had a
severe stomach ache followed by constant moving of bowel and
vomiting. As a consequence I became very weak and I felt that I
was about to die," as shown by a medical certificate which is
attached to the "motion for new trial" filed by the respondent.
He also alleged: (a) that the failure of the defendants to
appear in court when their case was set for hearing despite the
verbal notice to them by the herein respondent is not until the
present known to herein respondent; and (b) that when the herein
respondent was appointed Administrative Officer in the Office of
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Congress of the
Philippines, sometime in March 1958, he already advised the
petitioner to look for another lawyer to represent him.
A complaint was filed by Valentin Avelino against Atty.
Pedro K. Palaa. The latter was charged with malpractice in
connection with his professional conduct as the complainant's
counsel, which malpractice gave rise to the rendition of judgment
against said complainant and his wife.
The case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation report and recommendation. The Office
found, among others, that Atty. Palaa did not duly inform his
client of the date of the trial scheduled for November 15, 1957
when the evidence shows that he received notice of such hearing
on October 11, 1957. And that the filing of the motion for new was
made out of time, exactly 40 days after the decision was received.
The delay in the filing of the said motion remains unexplained in
the record.
On the basis of such findings the Solicitor General found
the respondent "guilty of negligence in the performance of his
duties as a member of the Bar" and consequently recommended
"that he be suspended from the practice of law for at least six
months."

ISSUE: WON Atty. Palana is guilty of negligence in the

performance of his duties as a member of the Bar.
HELD: YES. As regards respondent's failure to appear in court on
the day set for the trial, the Court inclined to accept his claim that it
was due to the fact that early in the morning of that date he had "a
severe stomach ache, followed by constant moving of bowel and
vomiting and that as a consequence he became very weak."
But while this might be, to a certain extent, a good
excuse for his non-appearance in court, it is obviously not
sufficient to explain his failure to notify his clients in due time of the
date of the trial. Had he done so, his clients would probably have
tried to contact him in due time, and upon discovering that he was
sick they would have either gone to court to ask for the
postponement of the trial, or they would have looked for another
lawyer to represent them in court.
The Court also found no sufficient exculpatory evidence
for respondent filing a motion for new trial "out of time," exactly
forty days after notice of the decision rendered by the court.
The respondent, was found guilty as charged in the
report and complaint filed by the Solicitor General, and considering
all the circumstances of the case, he was suspended from the
practice of law for a period of three months.
16. CRISTINA DIMAN et.al.vs. HON. FLORENTINO M.
ALUMBRES
G.R. No. 131466. November 27, 1998
Related to PALE
FACTS:
The petition for review on certiorari in this case was initially
dismissed by Resolution dated January 14, 1998; but after
deliberating on petitioners' Motion for reconsideration dated
February 23, 1998, the private respondents' comment thereon, the
reply to the comment, as well as the record of the case itself, the
Court was convinced that the order of dismissal should be
reconsidered and the petition reinstated. It accordingly
promulgated a resolution requiring the respondents to file their
Comment on the petition within ten (10) days from notice. The
private respondents' attorney filed a motion for extension of time of
thirty (30) days to file comment. The Court granted the extension
sought, but only for fifteen (15) days. However, the comment was
filed late for five days. Counsel's explanation is that he had sought
an extension of 30 days due to the volume of legal works similarly
situated and school work, being a professor of law and dean of the
University of Manila, and had entertained "the honest belief" that it
would be granted. However, he learns, belatedly that only a 15day extension had been conceded.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of the private respondents attorney
proper.
HELD:
No. Although the Court admits the late comment, it takes this
occasion to reiterate the familiar doctrine that no party has a right
to an extension of time to comply with an obligation within the
period set therefor by law; motions for extension are not granted
as a matter of course; their concession lies in the sound discretion
of the Court exercised in accordance with the attendant
circumstances; the movant is not justified in assuming that the
extension sought will be granted, or that it will be granted for the
length of time suggested by him. It is thus incumbent on any
movant for extension to exercise due diligence to inform himself as
soon as possible of the Court's action on his motion, by timely
inquiry of the Clerk of Court. Should he neglect to do so, he runs

the risk of time running out on him, for which he will have nobody
but himself to blame.
FACTS:
The case began in the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias, where a
complaint for "Quieting of Title and Damages" was filed by the
Heirs of Veronica V. Moreno Lacalle (represented by Jose Moreno
Lacalle) against Cristina Diman, Clarissa Diman, GeorgeDiman.
Felipe Diman and FlorinaDiman. The Lacalle heirs claimed that
their motherwas the owner of a "parcel of land situated at Brgy.
PulangLupa Uno, Las Pias, and had acquired the land in 1959 by
virtue of a deed of absolute sale, and retained as caretakers the
persons she found in occupancy of the lot at the time of the sale.
The later, a case for "ejectment with damages" filed by the Dimans
against the Narios, the caretaker, judgment in which, commanding
the Nario's ouster, had supposedly been affirmed by the Makati
Regional Trial Court.
The REQUEST FOR ADMISSION was received by Jose Lacalle
himself through registered mail on February 6, 1995, and copy
thereof by the latter's lawyer (Atty. Cesar T. Ching) on February 4,
1995. However no response whatever was made to the request by
Lacalle, his lawyer or anyone else, despite the lapse of the period
therefor fixed by Section 2 of Rule 26. The Dimans thereupon filed
with the Court, a "MANIFESTATION WITH MOTION TO REQUIRE
PLAINTIFFS TO ANSWER REQUEST FOR ADMISSION," dated
March 28, 1995, 10 giving the Heirs ten (10) more days to file their
answer to the request for admission, a copy of which was
personally delivered to the latter's lawyer; but again, no response
whatever was made.
The Dimans then submitted a "MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT", thatheirs' failure to file any Pre-Trial Brief, and the
several instances when the Heirs failed to appear at scheduled
hearings resulting in the dismissal of their complaint, which was
however later reinstated. They argued that because the Heirs had
failed to respond to their REQUEST FOR ADMISSION, each of
the matters of which an admission was requested, was deemed
admitted pursuant to Section 2, Rule 26.
The Trial Court denied the Dimans' motion for summary judgment.
It stressedthat a summary judgment "is not proper where the
defendant presented defenses tendering factual issues which call
for the presentation of evidence." The case proceeded to trial in
due course.
The Heirs closed their evidence as party plaintiffs and the Dimans
moved to dismiss on ground of insufficiency of the Heirs' evidence.
Both parties exchanged oppositions and reconsiderations. The
trial court, however, the Trial Judge commanded to dismiss the
case before it. On appeal, the
Appellate Tribunal promulgated judgment decreeing that their
petition be "DENIED due course and DISMISSED."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court refusal to render a summary
judgement proper.
HELD:
No. The Trial Judge was charged with the duty to assess the
evidence to ascertain whether or not "upon the facts and the law
the plaintiff have shown no right to relief." It was in the first place
incumbent on to hold the Heirs bound to their admissions
appearing in the record, express and implied. In accordance with
Section 2, Rule 26 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the Heirs were
impliedly, but no less indubitably, deemed to have admitted the

facts on which admissions had been duly requested by reason of

their failure to reply thereto.
A Trial Court has no discretion to determine what the
consequences of a party's refusal to allow or make discovery
should be; it is the law which makes that determination; and it is
grave abuse of discretion for the Court to refuse to recognize and
observe the effects of that refusal as mandated by law. Particularly
as regards requests for admission under Rule 26 of the Rules of
Court, the law ordains that when a party is served with a written
request that he admit: (1) the genuineness of any material and
relevant document described in and exhibited with the request, or
(2) the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in
the request, said party is bound within the period designated in the
request, 27 to file and serve on the party requesting the admission
a sworn statement either (1) denying specifically the matters of
which an admission is requested or (2) setting forth in detail the
reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those
matters. If the party served does not respond with such a sworn
statement, each of the matters of which an admission is requested
shall be deemed admitted.
The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
September 9, 1997 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
17. LUCIANO A. SAULOG vs. CUSTOMBUILT
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, ET AL.
G.R. No.L-29612. November 15, 1968
FACTS:
On September 12, 1961, plaintiff Luciano A. Saulog sued in the
City Court of Manila for damages and attorneys' fees against
defendants Custombuilt Manufacturing Corporation, and the City
Sheriff of Manila. The plaintiff complained that Custombuilt
caused to be sold on execution of certain properties belonging to
him which he leased to one Adriano Go. Plaintiff filed a third-party
claim thereon to stave off levy. But Custombuilt posted a
P1,200.00-bond issued by Northwestin favor of the City Sheriff.
This paved the way for the execution sale of said properties on
July 29, 1961.
On March 3, 1962, the City Court of Manila rendered judgment on
plaintiff's evidence introduced ex-parte against Custombuilt, the
City Sheriff, and the defaulting Northwest all of whom failed to
appear on the date set for the trial despite due notice.
On November 5, 1964, pre-trial was had. Custombuilt's counsel
was in the courtroom that day, but left before the case was called.
On plaintiff's motion, the judge, on the same day, dismissed the
appeal and revived the city court's judgment, without costs.
Custombuilt's counsel filed a petition for relief. On November 19,
plaintiff opposed. On November 27, the court below denied the
petition for lack of merit. Custombuilt appealed.
The city court's judgment as revived by the Court of First Instance
must be sustained.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial courts denial of defendants petition for
relief from judgement proper.
HELD:

Yes. At the start of pre-trial on November 5, Custombuilt's attorney

was present. But he unceremoniously left the courtroom for the
reason that he was summoned home all too suddenly as his
pregnant wife had been having labor pains and later finally
delivered on November 10, 1964.
Counsel did not have the foresight required of him. Pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court, both client and counsel
must appear at the pre-trial. This is mandatory. Failure of the client
to appear is ground for dismissal. If one representing his client
a corporation was present, counsel could have easily left word
for the former to tell the judge that he was suddenly summoned to
his home. If the client were not present, then the case just the
same would have been dismissed. But, the point is that allegedly
someone summoned said attorney to go back home. If this were
true, then it would have been quite easy for the lawyer to have
asked that man to stay around and tell the judge or the clerk or the
branch deputy clerk of court of his predicament.
All of these facts point to one conclusion: lack of interest on the
part of appellant to defend itself against the complaint. Rather, the
pattern of conduct discloses a desire to delay disposal of the
present case. Failure to prosecute is a ground for dismissal of the
appeal and revival of the judgment of the city court under Section
9, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.
For, the appeal to the Court of First Instance of Manila has already
been dismissed by the latter court. All that is left is to execute the
city court's judgment.
For the reasons given, the trial court's order of November 5, 1964
is hereby affirmed.
18. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HILARION
CASIMIRO, ET AL.
G.R. No.L-33416. June 29, 1972
FACTS:
Respondent Manuel N. Sanglay was administratively proceeded
against for failure to file the brief within the reglementary period for
appellants Benjamin Icalla, Rodolfo Soriano and Benjamin Cinco.
He explained that upon receiving the notice from the Court
advising him to file the brief for the appellants, he immediately
contacted the parents of the three appellants. Pablo Icalla and the
father of Benjamin Cinco came but the mother of Rodolfo Soriano
failed to appear. At that time Rodolfo Soriano was already at large
for he escaped from prison at the La Union Provincial Jail. In the
conference with the parents, the father of Benjamin Cinco
reiterated his former desire not to appeal the case of his son. But
later on, Pablo Icalla, father of appellant Benjamin Icalla prevailed
on the father of Benjamin Cinco that they continue the appeal.
According to Pablo Icalla they had already engaged the services
of a good lawyer to prepare their brief. Atty. Sanglay reminded
them that failure to file the brief within the period prescribed by law
would mean automatic withdrawal of the appeal. The parents of
the appellants disauthorized Atty. Sanglay to prepare and file the
brief for the appellants by engaging another lawyer to do the
same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Atty. Sanglay is liable for failure to comply with
his duty as officer of the Court.
HELD:
Yes. It is true that the appellant's failure to file the brief was not a
willful act on his part. At least his good faith cannot be impugned.
Atty. Sanglay knew that the period for filing the brief was running.

He was equally aware that the Court expected that the matter will
be taken care of by him, as he was the counsel of record.
However, under the circumstances, the least that was expected of
him was that he would inform the Tribunal of the developments set
forth in his explanation and as that he be allowed to withdraw as
counsel. He should not wait until after the resolution of February 3,
1972. It did not wipe out the previous manifestation of negligence
on his part. He cannot therefore escape liability. If this sad state of
affairs came to pass, he had only himself to blame. Respondent
Manuel N. Sanglay is reprimanded.
19. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. ELEGIO NADERA, JR. Y SADSAD, accused-appellant.
Facts: On May 17, 1992, at around 10 o'clock in the evening, while
Daisy, wife of accused-appellant Elegio Nadera, was away
working as a domestic helper in Bahrain, Elegio pulled Oleby, his
daughter, then nine years of age, towards a bed, removed her
panties and shorts and ordered her to keep quiet. He then placed
himself on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. He
proceeded to make an up and down motion while on top of his
daughter. All the while, Oleby was crying, pleading with her
father, "Huwag po!", "Huwag po!". On another occasion, on April
17, 1995, accused-appellant again raped her. Oleby was 12 years
old at that time. Oleby was raped again by her father for the third
time on April 24, 1995.
Maricris also testified that accused-appellant placed himself on top
of Maricris and inserted his penis into her vagina. Maricris pleaded
"Papa, huwag po, maawa naman kayo sa amin." Ignoring his
daughter's pleas, accused-appellant continued raping her by
making a pumping motion and threatened to kill all of them if she
cried
On April 28, 1996, Oleby and Maricris, assisted by a neighbor, Lita
Macalalad, told their mother that they had been raped by their
father, herein accused-appellant. Thereupon, they went to the
police authorities of Naujan and filed a complaint against accusedappellant.[4]
After preliminary examination, on June 6, 1996, four informations
charging accused-appellant with rape of her two daughters on
various dates were filed in the Regional Trial Court, Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro.
The accused initially pleaded not guilty to the charges but after the
prosecution presented its witness Dr. Fesalbon, appellants two
daughters and his wife, accused pleaded guilty to all information.
Accused-appellant did not present any evidence in his defense.
Thereafter, the trial court convicted him of 4 counts with the crime
of rape.
Issue: Whether the Atty. Manolo A. Brotonel, as counsel de oficio,
is negligent in the performance of his duty to defend the cause of
accused-appellant.
Held: The cavalier attitude of accused-appellant's counsel, Atty.
Manolo A. Brotonel of the Public Attorney's Office, cannot go
unnoticed.
Only faithful performance by counsel of his duty towards his client
can give meaning and substance to the accused's right to due
process and to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise.
Hence, a lawyer's duty, especially that of a defense counsel, must
not be taken lightly. It must be performed with all the zeal and
vigor at his command to protect and safeguard the accused's
fundamental rights.
As the court enunciated in the case of People vs Bermas:
The right to counsel must be more than just the
presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere
propounding of standard questions and objections.

The right to counsel means that the accused is

amply accorded legal assistance extended by a
counsel who commits himself to the cause for the
defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an
active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings,
particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing
constantly in mind of the basic rights of the
accused, his being well-versed on the case and his
knowing the fundamental procedures, essential
laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an
accused to counsel finds substance in the
performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of
fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient
and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple
perfunctory representation.
Measured by this standard, the defense counsels conduct in this
case falls short of the quality of advocacy demanded of him,
considering the gravity of the offense charged and the finality of
the penalty. A glaring example of his manifest lack of enthusiasm
for his client's cause is his decision not to cross examine Oleby
Nadera, It may be so that defense counsel personally found
Oleby's testimony to be believable. Nonetheless, he had the
bounden duty to scrutinize private complainant's testimony to
ensure that the accused's constitutional right to confront and
examine the witnesses against him was not rendered for naught.
The same may be said of defense counsel's treatment of Maricris'
testimony. While she was cross examined by defense counsel, the
examination was at best a half-hearted attempt to comply with a
lawyer's obligation, lacking the rigor and zeal required considering
that a man's life is at stake
Lastly, not only did defense counsel fail to object to the
documentary evidence presented by the prosecution, according to
the trial court's decision, he even expressed his conformity to the
admission of the same. Neither did he present any evidence on
behalf of accused-appellant.[37] Worse, nowhere in the records is it
shown that accused-appellant was informed, either by his counsel
or by the court, of his right to present evidence, if he so desires.
Atty. Brotonel, as counsel de oficio, had the duty to defend his
client and protect his rights, no matter how guilty or evil he
perceives accused-appellant to be. The performance of this duty
was all the more imperative because the life of accused-appellant
hangs in the balance. His duty was no less because he was
counsel de oficio.
The criminal cases are remanded to the trial court.
20. JOSE TOPACIO NUENO, complainant,
vs.
PASCUAL SANTOS, respondent.
Facts: Judge Anacleto Diaz of the Court of First Instance made a
special investigation of the conditions in the city government of
Manila. In the course of the investigation, a complaint was filed by
Jose TopacioNueno, a member of the municipal board of the City
of Manila, against Pascual Santos, another member of municipal
board, it being alleged that the latter had interested himself in
prohibited games. Santos denied the charges and hearing ensued.
At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Diaz made a report to the
Secretary of the Interior, in which he recommended the removal of
the respondent from his office of member of the municipal board
and and that all the papers connected with the chargethat
Santos had openly been running a club for gambling purposes,
such as the CirculoNationalistaConsolidado Club and had directly
taken part in said games, be transmitted to the Supreme Court for
action.

During the investigation at the Attorney General, it was

also discovered that Santos was counsel for one Inigo Hernandez
for a case involving violation of an ordinance prohibiting the game
monte. Santos entered a plea of guilty for Hernandez although
he knew that the latter was a mere waiter who in fact was not
guilty of the said charge.
Issue: W/N Santos violated his oath of office for committing
falsehood and deceived the court when he had an accused plead
guilty to an offense which he had not committed.
Held: Yes. The respondent attorney consented to the doing of a
falsehood and deceived the court when he had an accused plead
guilty to an offense which he had not committed. The background
of the administrative investigation showing the respondent's
connection with prohibited games, under circumstances of the
case, can only be taken into consideration in so far as it relates to
the precise charge laid against him. There was a clear violation of
the lawyer's oath that he would do no falsehood nor consent to the
doing of any in court.
A brief period of suspension will serve to indicate our
disapprobation of the deceit practiced by the respondent on the
court and will be fair to the respondent. Pascual Santos is
suspended from the practice of Law for a period of three months.