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I. INTRODUCTION
RANSMISSION expansion planning with open access to
the grid has become a hot issue in the electric utility industry in recent years [1], [2]. The recent blackouts that have
occurred in countries worldwide suggest that more reliable grid
structures may be needed to establish successful deregulated
electricity markets. These incidents call for the development
of new tools that can address system uncertainties and significantly enhance the effectiveness of transmission planning [3],
[4]. However, the basic objective of strengthening a transmission grid is relevant for most countries.
Manuscript received December 13, 2005; revised July 24, 2007. This work
was supported in part by the Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions (CERTS) program in the U.S. Department of Energy through the Power
System Engineering Research Center (PSERC), Cornell University, Ithaca, NY,
and in part by the Electrical Power Reliability/Power Quality Research Center
(EPRRC), Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy (MOCIE), Korea. The
supporting parties are not responsible for any conclusions and remaining errors.
Paper no. TPWRS-00799-2005.
J. Choi is with the School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14850 USA, and also with the Department of Electrical Engineering, ERI Gyeongsang National University, Chinju, Korea (e-mail:
jc548@cornell.edu; jschoi@gnu.ac.kr).
T. D. Mount is with the Department of Applied Economics and Management,
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14850 USA (e-mail: tdm2@cornell.edu).
R. J. Thomas is with School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Cornell
University, Ithaca, NY 14850 USA (e-mail: rjt1@cornell.edu).
Color versions of one or more of the figures in this paper are available online
at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TPWRS.2007.908478
2250
, can be
(2)
where
set of all transformers and transmission lines,
which are represented as branches (segments
connecting nodes) in a network model;
A composite power system that includes generation and transrefers to the transmismission facilities is shown in Fig. 1.
sion system,
is the number of generators,
is the load
duration curve at load bus, and
is the number of load
points. Some generators such as solar or wind power may be
sited at a load point. Fig. 1 illustrates the situation. A composite
power system is designated as hierarchical level II (HLII) in this
paper. HLI is used to designate generation and load components
only [30], [31].
where
construction cost of the th ckt connecting buses
and ;
decision (integer) variable associated with the
ckt connecting buses and (1 if the first ckt
to the th ckt lines are to be constructed, and 0
otherwise).
A. Objective Function
The conventional definition of cost in transmission expansion
planning is to minimize the total construction costs plus the operating costs. This paper proposes a new definition of the total
cost
that includes the construction cost
associated
with investing in new transmission lines, the operation/production cost
, and the standby cost
of generators, as expressed in (1). In the case of a competitive electricity market environment, a grid owner, or independent system operator (ISO),
or grid reliability committee will want to consider the problem
of searching for a better plan from the point of view of a generation company (GENCO) as well as the grid owners. This paper
considers production cost instead of the transmission line loss
cost for the
. A network model and network flow method
that neglects line loss are used in this paper [25]. Consequently,
the objective is to minimize the total cost given by
(1)
1) Construction Cost: The total cost of construction is
the summation of the construction costs of new elements. In
general, stricter reliability criteria are expected to increase
the construction cost because additional transmission lines
will be required in order to increase reliability. Therefore, the
with
with
sum of the capacities of the first ckt through the
th ckt connecting buses and ;
capacity of the th ckt connecting buses
and .
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where
marginal standby cost of generator
[$/MWh];
[MW];
Fig. 2. Deterministic operating/production energy of x-generator on load duration curve at k load bus.
1) Minimum Cut-Set Flow Constraint: In a general deterministic approach, meeting load requires that the total capacity
of the branches (segments connecting nodes in a network) in
a minimum cut-set should be greater than or equal to the total
load
, including the reserve rate. This is also referred to as the
bottleneck capacity. Therefore, a no-shortage of power supply
constraint can be expressed as follows [12][15]:
(5)
where
[$/MWh]
Here,
is the capacity of the minimum cut-set of the
two subsets and containing source node and terminal node
, respectively, when all nodes are separated by a minimum cutset.
is the peak load at load bus .
is the bus reserve/
marginal rate at load bus , which is defined as
.
and
are the maximum arrival power and
peak load, respectively, at load bus .
The demand constraint (5) can be expressed as
(6)
where is the cut-set number
and is the
number of cut-sets.
In a security constraint approach to adequacy, the criterion of
no-shortage of power supply requires that the total capacity of
the branches in the minimum cut-set under
contingencies should be greater than or equal to the total load, . This is
also referred to as the bottleneck capacity. Therefore, the constraint of no-shortage of power supply under
contingencies can be expressed by (8) [2]
(7)
(3)
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where
depth of a contingency;
capacity of the minimum cut-set of two
subsets ( and ) containing source node
and terminal node , respectively, when all
nodes are separated by a minimum cut-set
contingencies.
under
2) Security State Probability Constraint: Generally, to use
a security criterion stricter than (N-3) contingencies requires a
substantial amount of computation for a realistic system. Development of a modified or simplified method (for example, by
considering outages of selected elements only) is necessary in
order to make deep contingency criteria practical. In a contingency analysis, the actual occurrence of a deep contingency has
a very low probability. For example, the occurrence of an (N-6)
contingency in a power system with 100 generators each having
a forced outage rate(FOR) equal to 0.01 and 500 lines each
if the outages are mutuhaving a FOR of 0.001 is less than
ally independent. This type of rare contingency can be ignored
for planning purposes. Based on this principle, the method used
in this paper is to eliminate all contingencies with probabilities
(Note that
lower than a given probability limit
was used in the case studies presented later in the paper.). The
under the
security criterion
system probability
is formulated as [17], [33]
(8)
where
forced outage rate of element (generators and
lines);
(10)
where
flow under
contingencies;
contingency;
(11)
contingency.
for the
where
under
TABLE I
ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF (N
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0 ) CONTINGENCIES
Third, the
,
11) Check the security criterion; if
set
, and
,
, and go to step 13.
,
, and go to step 14.
12) Set
13) Add this
solution to the solution graph.
have
14) If all the candidate branches/lines in the cut-set
been considered, go to step 15. Otherwise, set
and go to step 5.
, continue to the next step. Otherwise, set
15) If
and go to step 4.
, the solution graph has been constructed
16) For
has the lowest cost
fully and the optimal solution
, and it also satisfies the required security criterion
in step 11.
VI. CASE STUDIES
A. Case Study I: Five-Bus System
The method presented in Section V was applied to a five-bus
sample system, shown in Fig. 3, with 1530 MW of generation
capacity and 900 MW of peak load. This initial system satisfies at least the (N-3) contingency criterion. After ten years, it
is forecasted that loads will increase from the initial level of
300 MW to 550 MW, 600 MW and 650 MW at load bus 2, 3,
and 4, respectively. It is assumed that all generators have decided to increase existing generating capacity by 50%. Transmission companies (TRANSCOs) should respond to this decision by generators and determine how to strengthen the grid in
order to deliver the electrical energy reliably to meet the higher
load. The TRANSCOs identify the candidate elements for con,
, and
structing new lines shown in Table II, where
represent the generators, transmission lines, and loads, respectively;
and
are the start and end buses of a line;
and
are the capacity and cost of the existing line that
connects nodes and . In this study, three candidate lines are
considered, appearing
in (2) and (6). In Table II,
the parentheses for
and
are omitted for convenience. The cost unit, M$ in this table stands for millions of
dollars. Table III shows the forced outage rates of the generators
and transmission lines. The NN column is the ckt of elements
(generators or lines). Fig. 4 shows the inverted load duration
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TABLE II
NEW GENERATION CAPACITY, FUTURE LOAD AND CAPACITY, AND COST DATA
)
AND
OF SYSTEM CANDIDATE LINES (
1P( ) : (MW)
1C( ) : (M$)
Fig. 5. Optimal system under (N-1) contingency security criterion (case 1).
Fig. 6. Optimal system under (N-2) contingency security criterion (case 2).
TABLE IV
CONFIGURATION OF POWER DELIVERED FROM GENERATORS TO LOADS FOR
THE NEW SYSTEM OF CASE 1 [(N-1) CONTINGENCY]: [MW]
curves at the load buses for the higher forecast loads. Therefore, the grid expansion problem is what is the optimal/best
line choice (solution) with the minimum total cost under a security criterion constraint for the increased load? Initially, the bus
reserve rate in (5) is set to zero,
, for Cases 115, and
the effects of setting
are evaluated in Cases 1618.
Figs. 5 and 6 show the optimal systems for the (N-1) and
(N-2) criteria, respectively, where the dotted line and bold
number represent the new construction of generators and lines.
Configurations of the power dispatched, energy delivered, and
operating cost for the optimal system using the (N-1) criterion
are shown in Tables IVVI, respectively. From these tables,
it is interesting to note that although the marginal cost of
the generator at bus 5 is the lowest, part of this generators
capacity should be operated on standby and the standby cost
(22.776[M$/year]) should be paid to the generators owner. The
reason for this is that the delivery capacity of the grid is still
TABLE V
CONFIGURATION OF ENERGY DELIVERED FROM GENERATORS TO LOADS FOR
THE NEW SYSTEM OF CASE 1 [(N-1) CONTINGENCY]: [GWh/YEAR]
TABLE VI
CONFIGURATION OF OPERATING COST FROM GENERATORS TO LOAD FOR THE
NEW SYSTEM OF CASE 1 [(N-1) CONTINGENCY]: [M$/YEAR]
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TABLE VIII
ALTERNATIVE SECURITY CRITERIA RANKED BY TOTAL COST
(FIVE-BUS SYSTEM)
TABLE VII
OPTIMAL EXPANSION PLANS AND COSTS USING ALTERNATIVE
SECURITY CRITERIA (FIVE-BUS SYSTEM)
respectively. Cases 710 present results using the more complex criteria of
contingencies. Cases 1115
present results for
contingencies. Testing (N-4)
contingencies for the five-bus system failed because the candidate lines cannot support a feasible solution.
The security probabilities for all contingency criteria were
evaluated, and the results are shown in the last column of
Table VII. The highest security probability (0.99995) was
obtained for Case 6 [(N-3G-3T) contingencies]. Although the
(N-3G-3T) criterion has the highest security probability, this
does not mean that it is necessarily the most reliable. The
expansion plans for Case 10 [(N-2G-3T) contingencies] and
Case 6 [(N-3G-3T) contingencies] are identical, and they are
both equally reliable. The security probability is lower for Case
10 because fewer contingency events are considered compared
to Case 6.
Fig. 7 shows how the components of total cost vary for the
different security criteria. Cases 1115 are omitted for convenience because the costs are identical to Cases 1, 4, 2, 8, and
3, respectively. It is interesting to note how much the operating
costs decrease with the stronger contingency criteria. For example, while the operating cost is 199.281[M$/year] for (N-1)
contingencies, it is 171.456[M$/year] and 166.397[M$/year] for
(N-2) and (N-3) contingencies, respectively, because congestion costs are lower when the grid is more flexible. In general,
as the security criterion gets stronger, the investment cost increases substantially while the operating cost decreases slightly.
These characteristics do not always hold because of the non-coherency of the composite power system. Security criteria using
composite contingencies of the
type generally
require higher total costs than the simpler criteria using
contingencies. However, the ranking of the security criteria in
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TABLE IX
OPTIMAL EXPANSION PLANS BY COMBINING AN (N-1) CONTINGENCY
CRITERION WITH BRR = 20 AT BUSES 24
0 L ) 2 100=L
Fig. 7 is based on the total cost, and this is not necessarily the
same as ranking the level of reliability.
This paper evaluates a number of modified contingency/security criteria as alternatives to the standard criterion of
contingencies. The basic objective is to provide additional intermediate criteria between (N-2) and (N-3) contingencies, for
example, when the former is considered too weak and the latter
too strong. In practice, the step from (N-2) to (N-3) contingencies may be too ambitious because meeting an (N-3) criterion
is too expensive and computationally demanding for real systems. One alternative criterion uses the bus reserve rate index
, defined in (5) and below in (12), to represent situations in which customers at a particular load bus ask for additional reliability. The deterministic reliability (reserve) constraint for a specified load bus increases when
(12)
where
is
and
and
are
the maximum arrival power and peak load, respectively, at load
bus .
Table IX shows the results for three case studies using the
modified security criterion. In Cases 1618, the basic criterion
is (N-1) contingencies, and in addition,
at load
busses 24, respectively. Comparing the results in Table IX with
Case 1 in Table VII shows that more candidate lines are connected directly or indirectly with load bus when
.
Therefore, the modified constraint in (12) with
can
be used as an alternative criterion to give greater reliability than
the simple criterion of (N-1) contingencies.
B. Case Study II: 21-Bus System
The proposed reliability criteria were also tested on the
21-bus system shown in Fig. 8 that is part of the grid in the
southeastern region (Youngnam) of Korea. After specifying a
forecast of the future system load, the alterative criteria were
applied and the results compared [15], [19]. The marginal
operating costs, the forced outage rates, and the capacity and
construction costs are shown in Tables XVI XVIII, respectively, of part C of the Appendix. Fig. 9 shows the inverted load
duration curves for the four largest loads.
Fig. 9. Inverted load duration curves at the buses with the four largest loads.
(a) ILDC at bus 17. (b) ILDC at bus 2. (c) ILDC at bus 21. (d) ILDC at bus 13.
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Fig. 11. Optimal system by the N-2 security criterion approach (case II-2).
TABLE X
CONFIGURATION OF POWER DELIVERED FROM GENERATORS TO
LOADS FOR THE OPTIMAL SYSTEM IN CASE II-1 [MW]
TABLE XI
CONFIGURATION OF POWER DELIVERED FROM GENERATORS TO LOAD FOR THE
NEW SYSTEM OF CASE II-2 (N-2 CONTINGENCY): [MW]
,
, and
. Table X shows the configuration
of power delivered from generators to loads for the new system
in Fig. 10.
The criterion with (N-2) contingencies was applied to the
same initial system shown in Fig. 8 (Case II-2), and Fig. 11
shows the new system. The optimal expansion plan in Case II-2
has a total cost of 1,979.81[M$], and the new transmission lines
are
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
and
. Table XI shows the configuration of power delivered
from generators to loads in Case II-2.
Comparing Cases II-1 and II-2 in Tables X and XI, the pattern
of deliveries from G3 and the levels of generation for G10, G18,
and G20 are substantially different. Therefore, the distributions
of both generation and reserve capacity change when the reliability criterion changes, even though the total generation and
the total reserve capacity remain unchanged.
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TABLE XII
OPTIMAL EXPANSION PLANS AND COSTS USING ALTERNATIVE
SECURITY CRITERIA (21-BUS SYSTEM)
TABLE XIV
OPTIMAL EXPANSION PLANS BY COMBINING AN (N-1) CONTINGENCY
CRITERION WITH BRR = 20 AND 30 AT BUSES 6 AND 17
0 L ) 2 100=L
that the optimal expansion plans have more candidate lines conin
nected directly or indirectly to the load bus with
order to satisfy the higher reliability requirements of that load.
These results also confirm that setting
for a load
is a practical way to augment the reliability of a conventional
(N-1) criterion using a larger, more realistic system.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Table XIV shows the results from four case studies using
in (12) to 20% and 30%
(N-1) contingencies and setting
at the two main load buses, bus 6 and bus 17. The results show
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TABLE XV
VARIOUS ASPECTS OF POWER SUPPLY BOTTLE NECK
a higher investment cost, but at the same time, the operating cost
may be slightly lower due to less congestion on the grid.
This paper concludes that the modified security criteria can
be used effectively for transmission expansion planning in both
regulated and deregulated electricity markets. Since grid operators are often asked to adopt a stronger security criterion, such
as a criterion covering (N-2) contingencies rather than the conventional (N-1) contingencies, if the (N-2) criterion requires too
much investment, for example, it is useful to consider intermediate security criteria between the (N-1) criterion and the (N-2)
criterion. This paper proposes a more flexible security criterion,
such as a criterion covering (N-1G-1T) contingencies, as a sensible way to find a transmission expansion plan that is more reliable than a plan based on the (N-1) criterion and less expensive
than a plan based on the (N-2) criterion.
The objective of future research will be to extend the methodology in this paper to consider probabilistic operating/production costs, nodal reliability criteria, stronger security criteria,
simultaneous generation, and transmission expansion and AC
load flow.
Fig. 14. Network model, cut sets, and minimum cut-set of Fig. 12 system.
TABLE XVI
OPERATING MARGINAL COST AND STANDBY MARGINAL COST OF GENERATORS
APPENDIX
A. Traditional Work Procedure for Power System Planning
Fig. 12 shows the traditional work procedure for power
system planning.
B. Network Modeling of Power System
Generators, substations, and load points have limited capacities. It is difficult to check for a shortage of power supply in
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TABLE XVII
FORCED OUTAGE RATES OF GENERATORS, TRANSFORMERS, AND LINES
TABLE XVIII
SYSTEM CAPACITY AND COST DATA FOR 21-BUS SYSTEM
P( ) : (MW) fAND C( ) : (M$)
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