Constitutional Law: Taada vs.

Tuvera 136 SCRA 27

(April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
TAADA VS. TUVERA
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
Publication in the Official Gazette (Enforceability of a Statute)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as
the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and
administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the
case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute
becomes valid and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of
this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are
to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem
excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for
the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the
Official Gazette. The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court
declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been

published have no force and effect.

TAADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was otherwise as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws
which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does
not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or
in any other date, without its previous publication.
Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply
to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion
of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid,
the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only
to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the
public of the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is
not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it
impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a
valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the
naked blade is drawn.

Digest 6:VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO vs. THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC
INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND
ELECTORAL REFORMS
G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC
INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE
AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS,
respondents.
x----------------------x
G.R. No. 179275 December 23, 2008
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE
MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.
x----------------------x
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention
x----------------------x
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO,
RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA,
M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. TRILLANES, respondentsintervenors
Facts: During the hype of Arroyo administration, a new controversy arises.
During the 2007 election the conversation of President Arroyo and the
herein petitioner Virgilio Garciliano, COMELEC regional director, regarding
the desire of the president to have a favourable outcome in terms of his
senatoriables. Such conversation was recorded and was played during the
house of representative investigation. Because of such turn of events, a
petition was filed before the court praying that such playing of the illegally
seized communication was in violation of RA 4200 or the anti-wire tapping
law. Also such petition for injunction prays that the Senate committee be

prevented from further conducting such investigation for the basic reason
that there was no proper publication of the senate rules, empowering them
to make such investigation of the unlawfully seized documents.
Issue: Whether or not there was proper publication of the rules as to
empower the senate to further proceed with their investigation?
Held: No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following:
The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the
questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in
clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "the
Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules
is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.Publication is
indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.What constitutes
publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that
"laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines."
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated
publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995
and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for
free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page.
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules
cannot justify the Senates defiance of the clear and unambiguous
language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law
instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of
procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules
have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to
publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition
followed by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No.

8792,otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support
their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect.
R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document
as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary
purposes.In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in
evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or
electronic documents.It does not make the internet a medium for publishing
laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could
not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the
legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of
inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall
have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
Indeed the inquiry to be conducted by the senate in aid of legislation cannot
proceed for the reason that the rules that they will observe was not properly
published as provided by the Fundamental Law of the land. Such inquiry if
allowed without observance of the required publication will put a persons
life, liberty and property at stake without due process of law. Also, the
further assertion of the senate that they already published such rules
through their web page, in observance of the RA 8792 or the Electronic
Commerce Act was only viewed by the court as matter of evidence and still
does not conforme with what the constitution propounded.
In this regard the high court granted the petition for injunction preventing
the senate to conduct such inquiry in aid of legislation.

Gregorio Honasan II petitioner vs.

The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors
Of the Department of Justice
G.R.No. 159747 April 13,2004
Lessons Applicable: Rule on Interpretative Regulations (persons),
Powers of the Ombudsman (consti), concurrent jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct preliminary investigation (consti)
Law Applicable: Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, Art. 2 Civil
Code
Facts:
August 4, 2003: CIDG-PNP/P Director Edguardo Matillano filed an
affidavit-complaint with the Department of Justice (DOJ) which contains
the following in part:
o July 27, 2003: crime of coup d etat was committed by military
personnel who occupied Oakwood and Senator Gregorio Gringo
Honasan, II
o On or about 11 p.m. June 4,2003: A meeting was held and presided by
Senator Honasan in a house located in San Juan, Metro Manila
o Early morning of July 27, 2003: Capt. Gerardo Gambala, in behalf of the
military rebels occupying Oakwood, made a public statement aired on
national television, stating their withdrawal of support to the chain of
command of the AFP and the Government of President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo. Willing to risk their lives to achieve the
National Recovery Agenda (NRA) of Senator Honasan which they
believe is the only program that would solve the ills of society.

Sworn statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil stated that:

o June 4, 2003 about 11 pm: Senator Gregorio Gringo Honasan arrived
with Capt. Turinga to hold the NRP meeting where they concluded the
use of force, violence and armed struggle to achievethe vision of NRP
where a junta will be constituted which will run the new government.

They had a blood compact and that he only participated due to the
threat made by Senator Honasan when he said Kung kaya nating
pumatay sa ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating pumatay sa mga
kasamahang magtataksil.
o July 27, 2003: He saw on TV that Lieutenant Antonio Trillanes, Captain
Gerardo Gambala, Captain Alejano and some others who were present
during the NRP meeting he attended, having a press conference about
their occupation of the Oakwood Hotel. He saw that the letter "I" on
the arm bands and the banner is the same letter "I" in the banner is
the same as their blood compact wound.
August 27, 2003: Senator Honasan appeared with counsel at the DOJ
to file a a Motion for Clarification questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the
case since the imputed acts were committed in relation to his public
office by a group of public officials with Salary Grade 31 which should
be handled by the Office of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan
Senator Honasan then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court against the DOJ Panel and its members, CIDG-PNPP/Director Eduardo Matillano and Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo,
attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in
issuing the aforequoted Order of September 10, 2003 directing him to
file his respective counter-affidavits and controverting evidence on the
ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation
Issues:
1. Whether in regards to Ombudsman-DOJ Circular no. 95-001, the
office of the Ombudsman should deputize the prosecutors of the
DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation.
2. Whether the Ombudsman-DOJ Joint Circular no. 95-001 is
ineffective on the ground that it was not published
3. Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the
preliminary investigation because the petitioner is a public officer
with salary grade 31 (Grade 27 or Higher) thereby falling within
the jurisdiction of the Sandigan Bayan.

Held: Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack

of merit
1.

No.

Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses may be subdivided

into two classes, to wit: (1) those cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,

and (2) those falling under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The
difference between the two, aside from the category of the courts
wherein they are filed, is on the authority to investigate as
distinguished from the authority to prosecute

The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation

on any Ombudsman case may be exercised by an investigator or
prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or
City Prosecutor or their assistance, either in their regular capacities
or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.

circular supports the view of the respondent Ombudsman that it

is just an internal agreement between the Ombudsman and the DOJ

The Constitution, The Ombudsman Act of 1989, Administrative

order no. 8 of the office of the Ombudsman. The prevailing
jurisprudence and under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
All recognize and uphold the concurrent jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct preliminary investigation on
charges filed against public officers and employees.

The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the

Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation for complaints
filed with it because the DOJ's authority to act as the principal law
agency of the government and investigate the commission of
crimes under the Revised Penal Code is derived from the Revised
Administrative Code which had been held in the Natividad case13
as not being contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there is not even a
need to delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation to an
agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first place.

However, the Ombudsman may assert its primary jurisdiction at any

stage of the investigation.
2.

No.
In the case of People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954). The only

circulars and regulations which prescribe a penalty for its violation

should be published before becoming effective.
In the case of Taada V. Tuvera, 146 Scra 453 (1986), The Honorable
Court rules that:
o Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so
called letters of instructions issued by the administrative superiors
concerning the rules on guidelines to be followed by their subordinates
in performance of their duties.

OMB-DOJ Joint Circulars no. 95-001 is merely an internal circular

between the DOJ and the office of the Ombudsman, Outlining
authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and of
the office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary
investigation. It does not regulate the conduct of persons or the
public, in general.
3.

No. Whether or not the offense is within exclusive jurisdiction or not

will not resolve the present petition so as not to pre-empt the result of
the investigation conducted by the DOJ Panel.

Republic vs Claude A. Miller and Jumrus

E. Miller
G.R. No. 125932. April 21, 1999

Facts:

On July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both American citizens, filed

with the RTC, Angeles City a verified petition to adopt Michael Magno Madayag, a
Filipino child, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allows
aliens to adopt. The natural parents executed affidavits giving their irrevocable
consent to the adoption and the DSWD recommended approval of the petition on
the basis of its evaluation. On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision
granting the petition for adoption.

On August 3, 1998, the Family Code became effective, prohibiting the adoption of a
Filipino child by aliens.

The Solicitor General appealed to the granting of the petition for adoption by the
RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not aliens may be allowed to adopt a Filipino child when the petition for
adoption was filed prior to the effectivity of the Family Code prohibiting the same.

Held:
Yes. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was
in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could
not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him.

The enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the
right of respondents who are aliens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has
become vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be
governed by the law then in force. A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity
and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. Vested
rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but
also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested.

As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in
accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires
jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case.

To repeat, the

jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or
civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by a subsequent happenings or

events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from

attaching

in

the

first

instance.

Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the
Family code, although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code, may
continue with his petition under the law prevailing before the Family Code.

Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the
child to be of paramount consideration.

They are designed to provide homes,

parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give
them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter, as well as
childless couples or persons to experience the joy of parenthood and give them
legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural
parent instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.

Manuel vs People of the Philippines

EDUARDO P. MANUEL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
G.R. No. 165842
November 29, 2005
FACTS:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the
petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaa on July 18,
1975, who, according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter
imprisoned and was never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B.
Gandalera in January 1996 when the latter was only 21 years old. Three months after
their meeting, the two got married through a civil wedding in Baguio City without
Gandaleras knowledge of Manuels first marriage. In the course of their marriage,
things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already married
when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo
Manuel. The latters defense being that his declaration of single in his marriage

contract with Gandalera was done because he believed in good faith that his first
marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek for
the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court
ruled against him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to
ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally
liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good
faith and without any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with
modification on the RTCs decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day
to ten years. Pecuniary reward for moral damages was affirmed.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it
ruled that petitioners wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the
Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for
under Article 41 of the Family Code.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it
affirmed the award of Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and
in law.
RULINGS:
1. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted
with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule,
mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a
felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of
the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia
legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present
spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring
the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of
bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good
faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the
present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he
cannot be convicted of the crime. The court rules against the petitioner.
2. The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit before,
during and after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate
and with malice and caused injury to the latter. The Court thus declares that the
petitioners acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family as
a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society.
Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners perfidy,

she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Considering the attendant
circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral
damages to be just and reasonable.

CIR VS BANK OF COMMERCE

-In 1994 and 1995, the respondent Bank of Commerce derived passive
income in the form of interests or discounts from its investments in
government securities and private commercial papers.
On several occasions during that period, it paid 5% gross receipts tax on its
income. Included therein were the respondent banks passive income from
the said investments amounting to P

85M+, which had already been subjected to a final tax of 20%.

Meanwhile, CTA held in the Case ASIA BANK CORP. VS CIR, thatthe 20% final
withholdingtax on interest income from banks does not form part of taxable

gross receipts for Gross ReceiptsTax (GRT) purposes. The CTA relied on Sec
4(e) of Revenue Regulations.12-80.
Relying on the said decision, the respondent bank filed an administrative
claim for refund with theCommissioner of Internal Revenue on July 19, 1996.
It claimed that it had overpaid its grossreceipts tax for 1994 to 1995 by
P853K+ submitted its own computation-Before the Commissioner could
resolve the claim, the respondent bank filed a petition for reviewwith the CTA
CIR ANSWERED
:-The alleged refundable/creditable gross receipts taxes were collected and
paid pursuant to law and pertinent BIR implementing rules and regulations;
hence, the same are not refundable. Petitioner must prove that the income
from which the refundable/creditable taxes were paid from, weredeclared
and included in its gross income during the taxable year under review;-That
the alleged excessive payment does automatically warrant the refund/credit
Claims for tax refund/credit are construed in
strictissimi juris
against the taxpayer as it partakesthe nature of an exemption from tax and it
is incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that it isentitled thereto under the
law. Otherwise refund will not be allowed.
CTA summarized the issues:
-WON the final income tax withheld should form part of the gross receipts of
the taxpayer for GRT purposes;
WON the respondent bank was entitled to a refund of P853,842.54.
RESPONDENT BANKs contends
:that for purposes of computing the 5% gross receipts tax, the final
withholding tax does not form part of gross receipts

CIR contends:
that the Court defined "gross receipts" as "all receipts of taxpayers excluding
those which have beenespecially earmarked by law or regulation for the
government or some person other than the taxpayer" in
CIR v. Manila Jockey Club, Inc.
,
7
he claimed that such definition was applicable only to a proprietor of
anamusement place, not a banking institution which is an entirely different
entity altogether. As such,according to the Commissioner, the ruling of the
Court in
Manila Jockey Club
was inapplicable.
CTA HELD:
ORDERED
to
REFUND
in favor of petitioner Bank of Commerce the amount of P355k+representing
validly proven erroneously withheld taxes from interest income derived from
itsinvestments in government securities for the years 1994 and 1995.
relied on the ruling in
Manila Jockey Club
, and held that the term "gross receipts" excluded thosewhich had been
especially earmarked by law or regulation for the government or persons
other than the taxpayer.
CIR filed for petition for review with CA alleging that:

-There is no provision of law which excludes the 20% final income tax
withheld under Section50(a) of the Tax Code in the computation of the 5%
gross receipts tax.
that the ruling of this Court in
Manila Jockey Club
, which was affirmed in
Visayan Cebu Terminal Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
14
is not decisive. He averred that the factual milieuin the said case is different,
involving as it did the "wager fund."
The Commissioner further pointed out that in
Manila Jockey Club,
the Court ruled that the racetracks commission did not form part of the
gross receipts, and as such were not subjected to the20% amusement tax.
the issue in
Visayan Cebu Terminal
was whether or not the gross receipts corresponding to 28% of the total
gross income of the service contractor delivered to the Bureau of Customs
formed part of the gross receipts was subject to 3% of contractors tax under
Section 191 of the Tax Code.- On the other hand, resp Bank was a banking
institution and not a contractor. The petitioner insisted that the term "gross
receipts" is self-evident; it includes all items of income of therespondent
bank regardless of whether or not the same were allocated or earmarked for
a specific purpose, to distinguish it from net receipts.
CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition

.
CA held that the P17,076,850.90 representing the final withholding tax
derived from passiveinvestments subjected to final tax should not be
construed as forming part of the gross receipts of the respondent bank upon
which the 5% gross receipts tax should be imposed.-That the final
withholding tax was a trust fund for the government; hence, does not form
part of the respondents gross receipts. The legal ownership of the amount
had already been vested in thegovernment.-That subjecting the Final
Withholding Tax (FWT) to the 5% of gross receipts tax would result indouble
taxation.-In favor of resp Bank.Hence the petition by CIR THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 20% FINAL WITHHOLDING TAX
ONBANKS INTEREST INCOME DOES NOT FORM PART OF THE TAXABLE
GROSS RECEIPTS INCOMPUTING THE 5% GROSS RECEIPTS TAX
ISSUE: IS THERE DOUBLE TAXATION?HELD:
SC reverse the ruling of the CA that subjecting the Final Withholding Tax
(FWT) to the 5% of grossreceipts tax would result in double taxation.
In
CIR v. Solidbank CorporatioN, SC
said that the two taxes, subject of this litigation, are differentfrom each other.
The basis of their imposition may be the same, but their natures are
different.-NO DOUBLE TAXATION
Double taxation
means taxing the same property twice when it should be taxed only once;
that is, "xxxtaxing the same person twice by the same jurisdiction for the
same thing." It is obnoxious when thetaxpayer is taxed twice, when it should
be but once. Otherwise described as "direct duplicate taxation," thetwo taxes
must be imposed on the same subject matter, for the same purpose, by the
same taxing authority,within the same jurisdiction, during the same taxing
period; and they must be of the same kind or character.
First,

the taxes herein are imposed on two different subject matters. The subject
matter of theFWT is the passive income generated in the form of interest on
deposits and yield on depositsubstitutes, while the subject matter of the GRT
is the privilege of engaging in the business of banking.
A tax based on receipts is a tax on business rather than on the property;
hence, it is an excise rather than a property tax. It is not an income tax,
unlike the FWT. In fact, we have already held that onecan be taxed for
engaging in business and further taxed differently for the income
derivedtherefrom. Akin to our ruling in
Velilla v. Posadas,
these two taxes are entirely distinct and areassessed under different
provisions.
Second
,

although both taxes are national in scope because they are imposed by the
same taxingauthority the national government under the Tax Code and
operate within the same Philippine jurisdiction for the same purpose of
raising revenues, the taxing periods they affect are different.The FWT is
deducted and withheld as soon as the income is earned, and is paid after
every
calendar
quarter in which it is earned. On the other hand, the GRT is neither deducted
nor withheld, but is paid only after every taxable quarter in which it is
earned.
Third,
these two taxes are of different kinds or characters. The FWT is an income
tax subject towithholding, while the GRT is a percentage tax not subject to
withholding.In short, there is no double taxation, because there is no taxing
twice, by the same taxing authority, withinthe same jurisdiction, for the
same purpose, in different taxing periods, some of the property in the
territory.Subjecting interest income to a 20% FWT and including it in the
computation of the 5% GRT is clearly notdouble taxation.

LORNA GUILLEN PESCA,

petitioner,
vs.
ZOSIMO A. PESCA,
respondents
.
G.R. No. 136921. April 17, 2001. VITUG, J
FACTS:

Petitioner Lorna Pesca, then a student, and respondent Zosimo Pesca, a

seaman,got married March 1975 after a whirlwind courtship. Their union
begot 4 children. However, in1988, petitioner noticed that her husband was
emotionally immature and irresponsible.Respondent became violent. On
March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner. Petitioner filed acomplaint and
respondent was convicted by the MTC of Caloocan for slight physical injuries
andsentenced to 11 days of imprisonment. Petitioner filed before the RTC for
the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity.
On November 1995, RTC decided infavour of the petitioner. CA reversed the
decision of the trial court, stating that petitioner hadfailed to establish that
(1) respondent showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him tobe
incognitive of the basic marital covenant as provided in Article 68 of the
Family Code (2) thatincapacity is grave, (3) preceded the marriage and (4) is
incurable (5) that such incapacity ispsychological (6) that the root cause has
been identified medically/clinically (7) that it has beenproven by an expert
(8) that such incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature. Petitioner
fileda Petition for Review on Certiorari. Petitioner argued that the doctrine
enunciated in Santos v. CA(promulgated on January 1995), as well as the
guidelines set out in Republic v. CA and Molina(February 1997) should have
no retroactive application. Petitioner further argues, the applicationof the
Santos and Molina dicta should at least only warrant a remand of the case to
the trial courtfor further proceedings and not its dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine enunciated in the Santos and Molina cases apply
tothe case at bar
RULING:
The Court held that the doctrine of stare decisis ordained in Article 8 of the
CivilCode, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law
shall form part of thelegal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the
legal maxim legis interpretado legis vimobtinet that the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The
interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the
contemporaneouslegislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted
and construed would thus constitute apart of that law as of the date the
statute was enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of the Courtfinds itself later
overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have
to beapplied prospectively in favour of the parties who have relied on the old

doctrine and have actedin good faith in accordance therewith (lex prospicit,
non respicit). Petitioner utterly failed, both inher allegations and in her
evidence to prove psychological incapacity on the part of therespondent.
HELD:
Petition is DENIED.

Ferrer vs. Diaz

FACTS:
Petitioner Atty. Ferrer represented Comandante, daughter of spouses Diazes
obtainloan to petitioner. The loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage
Contract. Petitioner further claimed that prior to said loan, Comandante, for a
valuable considerationof P600,000.00, which amount formed part of the
abovementioned secured loan,executed in his favor an instrument entitled

Waiver of Hereditary Rights and InterestsOver a Real Property (Still

Undivided). The Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks
issued by Comandante were dishonored uponpresentment. Despite repeated
demands, said respondents still failed and refused tosettle the loan. Thus,
petitioner filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of MoneySecured by Real
Estate Mortgage Contract against the Diazes and Comandante.
ISSUE:
Is a waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another executed by a future heir
while theparents are still living valid?
HELD:
No. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no
contract may beentered into upon a future inheritance except in cases
expressly authorized by law. For the
inheritance to be considered future, the succession must not have been
opened at the time of
the contract. A contract may be classified as a contract upon future
inheritance, prohibitedunder the second paragraph of Article 1347, where
the following requisites concur:(1) That the succession has not yet been
opened.(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and,
(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of
aright which is purely hereditary in nature.
In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of
Comandantes
Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still
Undivided),

succession to either of
her parents properties has not yet been opened since both of them are still
living.
With respectto the other two requisites, both are likewise present considering
that the property subject matter of Comandantes waiver concededly forms
part of

the properties that she expect toinherit from her parents upon their death
and, such expectancy of a right, as shown by thefacts, is undoubtedly purely
hereditary in nature.From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and
petitioner entered into a contract
involving the formers future inheritance as embodied in the Waiver of
Hereditary Rights andInterest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed
by her in petitioners favor.

Isabelo C. Dela Cruz, Petitioner, vs. Lucilla

C. Dela Cruz, Respondent
G.R NO. 192383; December 4, 2013

Facts: Petitioner Isabelo Dela Cruz and his sisters/respondents Lucila and
Cornelia were co-owners of a 240-square meter land in Las Pinas which they
bought on installment from Gatchalian Realty, Inc. Isabelo and Cornelia paid
for the down payment and religiously paid for the monthly amortizations.

Upon Lucias plea to help out a financially distressed cousin (Corazon), the
siblings agreed to make use of the lot as collateral and security for a loan
from the Philippine Veterans Bank. In order to make this possible, Lucia paid
the P8,000 outstanding balance to Gatchalian Realty and had the deed of
title registered in her name. The title was then mortgaged for Corazons
benefit. However, Corazon was not able to pay for the loan and the
mortgaged lot was then foreclosed by the bank. The foreclosed lot was
however redeemed by Lucia.

In 2002, Lucila executed an affidavit of waiver relinquishing all her share,

interest and participation to her brother Isabelo and her niece Emelinda.
Isabelo then filed an action for partition seeking the segregation of his
portion of said lot and the corresponding title in his name. This action was,
however, contested by Lucila claiming that the waiver she executed ceding
ownership of her share to Isabelo was subject to a condition that their family
problems would be resolved. She claims that this condition did not happen
and that she had every right to revoke the waiver. This was made evident by
the revocation she made through an affidavit dated September 24, 2004.
The RTC ruled in favor of Lucia and this was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Lucilas cession of the
property through waiver did not have the effect of making Isabelo part owner
thereof.

Ruling: In deciding this case, the SC considered the wordings used by Lucila
in her waiver. The court noted that the phrase used To put everything in
order, I hereby waive all my share, interest and participation means that
the intention of Lucila was to waive her right to the property, irreversibly
divesting herself of her existing right to it. It disagreed with the lower
courts interpretation that such wordings intends a precondition of waiver for
if such was the intent, the phrase containing words such as subject to the
condition that everything is put in order would have been used. Therefore,
the SC ruled that the affidavit of waiver executed by Lucila makes Isabelo
and Emelinda co-owners of the waived share of Lucila. Isabelo then has the
right to demand partition.

Ining v Vega (Succession)

Ining v Vega
GR No. 174727, August 12, 2013

ANTIPOLO INING (DECEASED), SURVIVED BY MANUEL VILLANUEVA, TEODORA

VILLANUEVA-FRANCISCO, CAMILO
FRANCISCO, ADOLFO FRANCISCO, LUCIMO FRANCISCO, JR., MILAGROS
FRANCISCO,* CELEDONIO FRANCISCO, HERMINIGILDO FRANCISCO; RAMON
TRESVALLES, ROBERTO TAJONERA, NATIVIDAD INING-IBEA (DECEASED)
SURVIVED BY EDILBERTO IBEA, JOSEFA IBEA, MARTHA IBEA, CARMEN IBEA,
AMPARO IBEA- FERNANDEZ, HENRY RUIZ, EUGENIO RUIZ AND PASTOR RUIZ;
DOLORES INING-RIMON (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY JESUS RIMON, CESARIA
RIMON GONZALES AND REMEDIOS RIMON CORDERO; AND PEDRO INING
(DECEASED) SURVIVED BY ELISA TAN INING (WIFE) AND PEDRO INING, JR.,
Petitioners, v. LEONARDO R. VEGA, SUBSTITUTED BY LOURDES VEGA,
RESTONILO I. VEGA, CRISPULO M. VEGA, MILBUENA VEGA-RESTITUTO, AND
LENARD VEGA, Respondents.

FACTS:

Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a

3,120-square meter parcel of land (subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan. Leon
and Rafaela died without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana
Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are now both
deceased.
Sibling #1: Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and
grandson, herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both

deceased). Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and children

Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard
Vega, the substituted respondents.
Sibling # 2: Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children. In
short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and
Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregorias grandchildren or spouses thereof
(Gregorias heirs). Tresvalles and Tajonera are transferees of the said
property.
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to
him as Romanas surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan Civil Case No. 5275 for partition, recovery of ownership
and possession, with damages, against Gregorias heirs.
In their Answer with counterclaim, Gregorias heirs (through son Antipolo)
claimed that Leonardo had no cause of action against them; that they have
become the sole owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr. who
acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who
in turn acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this fact.

ISSUES BEFORE LOWER COURTS:

1. Whether Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leons estate;

2. Whether Leon sold the subject property to Lucimo Sr.; and
3. Whether Leonardos claim has prescribed, or that he is barred by estoppel
or laches.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) RTC
1. No. Declared lot to be the common property of the heirs of Gregoria
Roldan Ining

2. Concluded that Leon never sold the property to Enriquez, and in turn,
Enriquez never sold the property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the subject property
remained part of Leons estate at the time of his death in 1962.
3. Dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription (30 years adverse
possession).
(2) CA:
1. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the plaintiffs as
successors-in-interest of Romana Roldan; Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786
as the share of the defendants as successors-in-interest of Gregoria Roldan
Ining;
2. Trial courts declaration of nullity of the April 4, 1943 and November 25,
1943 deeds of sale in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., respectively, became
final and was settled by petitioners failure to appeal the same.
3. There was no prescription. Prescription began to run not from Leons death
in 1962, but from Lucimo Sr.s execution of the Affidavit of Ownership of Land
in 1979, which amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of the property
with Leonardo. Applying the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil Code,
which provides that [n]o prescription shall run in favor of a co- owner or coheir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership,

ISSUES:
I
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE GROUND THAT
LUCIMO FRANCISCO REPUDIATED THE CO-OWNERSHIP ONLY ON FEBRUARY 9,
1979.
II
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF
PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.

RULING:
No, the Court of Appeals is correct based on the following reasons:
1. The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been
settled and had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal. Thus, the
property remained part of Leons estate.
2. Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria.
3. Gregorias and Romanas heirs are co-owners of the subject property. no
prescription shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs against the others so
long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
4. For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner. The
CA held that prescription began to run against Leonardo only in 1979 or
even in 1980 when it has been made sufficiently clear to him that Lucimo
Sr. has renounced the co-ownership and has claimed sole ownership over the
property. The CA thus concluded that the filing of Civil Case No. 5275 in
1997, or just under 20 years counted from 1979, is clearly within the period
prescribed under Article 1141.
Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of
Gregoria; he is merely Antipolos son-in-law, being married to Antipolos
daughter Teodora.
One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from
the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the decedents property.
Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the
estate that was formed among the decedents heirs.

OTHER NOTES:
1. Possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the other
co- owners but will be held to benefit all, and that a co-owner or co-heir is in
possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in representation of
his co-owners or co- heirs if he administers or takes care of the rest thereof
with the obligation to deliver the same to his co- owners or co-heirs, as is the
case of a depositary, lessee or trustee.
2. Principle of laches cannot apply as against Leonardo and the respondents.
It held that laches is controlled by equitable considerations and it cannot be

used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud; it cannot be utilized to deprive

the respondents of their rightful inheritance.
3. A co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other coowners, absent any clear repudiation of the co- ownership. In order that the
title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must
concur:
(1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting
to an ouster of the other co-owners;
(2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other coowners; and
(3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing.
4. Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for
succession, exclude relations by affinity.
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary
(2) Between parents and children;chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the existing
co-ownership, Leonardo could seek partition of the property at any time.

ALVAREZ vs. IAC May 7, 1990

FACTS: Aniceto Yanes owned 2 parcels of land Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B.

Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora.
Herein private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of
Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio and
Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child,
Jovita (Jovito) Albib.

It is established that Rufino and his children left the province to settle in
other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita,
from the Japanese time up to peace time, they did not visit the parcels of
land in question but after liberation, when her brother went there to get
their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato
Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot
773.

After Fuentebellas death, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for
P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. On May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the
children of her brother Rufino filed a complaint against Fortunato Santiago,
Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental for the return of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and
823.

During the pendency of said case, Alvarez sold the Lots for P25,000.00 to Dr.
Rodolfo Siason. CFI rendered judgment ordering defendant Rosendo Alvarez
to reconvey to plaintiffs the lots.

ISSUE: W/N the liability of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos.
773-A and 773-B could be legally passed or transmitted by operation of law
to the petitioners without violation of law and due process.

RULING: The doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction is on the general

transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate
children and heirs.

The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not
altered by the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a
deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is
distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment
is thus made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs or
distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces
the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.

Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a partys contractual rights
and obligations are transmissible to the successors. The rule is a
consequence of the progressive depersonalization of patrimonial rights and
duties.

Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has

evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony, with the persons
occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the
obligation is strictly personal, in consideration of its performance by a
specific person and by no other. . . .

Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape
the legal consequences of their fathers transaction, which gave rise to the
present claim for damages.

Leal vs. IAC and Santiago

FACTS:
The Compraventa gave right to Leal to own three parcels of land formerly
owned by Santiago. The mentioned contract executed by Santiago in
1941,provides the prohibition of sale of the land by Leal to other parties
other thanSantiago, his heirs or successors.ISSUE:
Whether or not under the Compraventa, a right of repurchase in favor of
the
private respondent exists.RULING:No. Under Article 1508 of the Civil Code of
Spain (which is the same as Art.1606 of the Civil Code of the Philippines), the

right to redeem shall last four (4) years from the date of the contract. This
provision prevents anyone from
perpetually restricting the owners right to freely dispose of his properties,
which is contrary to Public Policy. The Civil Code of Spain, particularly
Article1255, nullifies contracts contrary to Public Policy, as much as the Civil
Code of the Philippines, Article 1306.

Cui vs Arellano University

TITLE: Emetrio Cui v Arellano University
CITATION: GR NO. L15127, May 30, 1961 | 112 Phil 135

FACTS:

Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University. He then
enrolled in its College of Law from first year (SY1948-1949) until first
semester of his 4th year. During these years, he was awarded scholarship
grants of the said university amounting to a total of P1,033.87. He then
transferred and took his last semester as a law student at Abad Santos
University. To secure permission to take the bar, he needed his transcript of
records from Arellano University. The defendant refused to issue the TOR
until he had paid back the P1,033.87 scholarship grant which Emetrio
refunded as he could not take the bar without Arellanos issuance of his TOR.

On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No.
38 addressing all heads of private schools, colleges and universities. Part of
the memorandum states that the amount in tuition and other fees
corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to
the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to
another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and
keep students in a school.

ISSUE: Whether or not Emetrio Cui can refund the P1,033.97 payment for the
scholarship grant provided by Arellano University.

HELD:

The memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law where the
provision set therein was advisory and not mandatory in nature. Moreover,
the stipulation in question, asking previous students to pay back the
scholarship grant if they transfer before graduation, is contrary to public
policy, sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the
security of individual rights and hence, null and void.

The court sentenced the defendant to pay Cui the sum of P1,033.87 with
interest thereon at the legal rate from Sept.1, 1954, date of the institution of
this case as well as the costs and dismissing defendants counterclaim.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

FACTS:

Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child

Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the child's middle name
Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her surname
Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child
and heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as
Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship
with her natural mother should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any
confusion and hardship in the future, and under Article 189 she remains to
be an intestate heir of her mother.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use
the surname of her natural mother as her middle name.

RULING:
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural
father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find
no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An
Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is
silent as to what middle name a child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely
provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is
likewise silent on the matter.

Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child
by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by

law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the

right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.
Categories: G.R. No. 148311, Persons and Family Relations, Philippine Civil
Code

Republic vs Orbecido
Republic vs. Orbecido
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24,
1981 at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They
had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In
1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years
later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained
a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the
trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family
Code.

HELD:

The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and
applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the
time of the solemnization of the marriage.

Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be

interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse
who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under
Philippine law.

Van Dorn vs Romillo

Van Dorn vs. Romillo

139 SCRA 139

FACTS:

Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard
Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established
their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They were divorced in
Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van
Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that
petitioners business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal
property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an
accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator of the
said property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private
respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a
Filipino citizen.

HELD:

Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have

no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is
estopped by his own representation before the court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital
obligations to respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She should not
be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be served.

Llorente vs CA
Facts: On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula were married
before a parish priest in Nabua, Camarines Sur.

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship

and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the
United States District Court, Southern District of New York.

Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945,

Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and
he visited the Philippines. He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant
and was living in and having an adulterous relationship with his brother,
Ceferino Llorente.

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her . He then returned to the
United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior
Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was
represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the
proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of
California, for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true
and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.

On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.

Lorenzo went back to the Philippines and on January 16, 1958 married Alicia
F. Llorente in Manila.

From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and
wife.Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and
Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.

On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was
notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with
attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the
will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children.

On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga,
Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and
testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special
Administratrix of his estate.

On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court
admitted the will to probate but before the proceedings could be terminated ,
Lorenzo died.

Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over
Lorenzos estate in her favor contending that she was Lorenzos surviving
spouse, that such properties were acquired during their marriage and that
Lorenzos will would encroach her legitime.

Alicia filed in the testate proceeding , a petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary.

On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial
court gave due course to Paulas petition.

The Regional Trial Court found that the divorce decree granted to the late
Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the

marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is

likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance
of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any
share from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with
Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).

Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of

the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente.
Issue: Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?

Held: The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it
contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial courts opinion was a
mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two
children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.

The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to
one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their
cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will,
already probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of
Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal
circumstances here obtaining.

Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time
of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will;
and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.

Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed
by foreign law.

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the

order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found.

But the hasty disregard of both the RTC and CA of Lorenzos Will by calling to
the fore the RENVOI doctrine, claiming that American law follows domiciliary
rule is unjustified. There is no such thing as American law for the whole
nation of the US, for the country comprises of a group of States, each State
having its own applicable law, enforceable only within that state.

As to the validity of the foreign divorce , jurisprudence reiterates that once it

is proven that an individual is no longer a Filipino, thus an alien, when he
obtains a divorce abroad, its effects shall be recognized in the Philippines.

The Supreme Court held that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente
from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a
matter of comity.

Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the
decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are
issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved.
Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is
answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.

The decision of the CA is set aside and that of the RTC is reversed. Court
REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic
validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and determination of the parties
successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the
trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the
deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.

Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera
TITLE: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera
CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653

FACTS:

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent,

Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births,
Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They
have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil
Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he
initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the
Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action
for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC
Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of
failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to
the petitioner.

On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before
the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had
an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus
Chua sometime in 1983.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of

adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of
divorce was already issued.

HELD:
The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and
concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that
private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce
in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is
concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing
to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Garcia-Recio vs. Recio

TITLE: Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio
CITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian

Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife
in Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree
of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was

solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since
October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in
Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance
with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground

of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November
1997, Redericks marriage with Editha Samson.

ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is

admissible as evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and
absolved him of bigamy.

HELD:

The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce

decree issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the
respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, there is absolutely no
evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner though
the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign
document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not
authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven

as a public or official record of a foreign country by either:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the
ground of bigamy.

Tenchavez vs Escano
TITLE: Tenchavez vs. Escano
CITATION: 15 SCRA 355

FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of
Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez,
32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt.
Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the
couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita
Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous
relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where
she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew
their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicentas parents.
However after translating the said letter to Vicentas dad , he disagreed for a

new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while
Pastor went back to work in Manila.

Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was
approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce
against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial
Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her
marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an
American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on
August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents
whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding
upon courts of the Philippines.

HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot
give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino
citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would
arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in
foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American
husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In
the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign
divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition
neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines.
Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse
entitled the other for damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of

legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto
Escao and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way
of damages and attorneys' fees.

Republic vs Iyoy (G.R. No. 152577)

Posted: August 8, 2011 in Civil Law
Tags: Divorce, Marriage 1
Facts:

The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General on certiorari praying for thereversal of the decision of the
CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC declaring the
marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void
based on Article 36.

On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other,
they had 5 children. In 1984, Fely went to the US, inthe same year she sent
letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus learned
that Fely married an Americanand had a child. Fely went back to the
Philippines on several occasions, during one she attended the marriage of
one of her children inwhich she used her husbands last name as hers in the
invitation.

March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging
that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family and were
manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus submitted his
testimony, the certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and
the invitation where Fely used her newhusbands last name as evidences.

Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer,
had no job, and thatsince 1988 she was already an American citizen and not
covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences sufficient and granted
thedecree; it was affirmed in the CA.

Issue:

Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological

incapacity?

Held:

The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological

incapacity.

Furthermore, Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to

take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.

Finally, Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the

marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting aparty even before the celebration
of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume.

BAYOT VS CA G.R. NO. 155635

Posted by kaye lee on 6:57 PM
G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008

FACTS:
On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were
married in Muntinlupa. They had a child name Alix, born in November 27,
1982 in California.

In February 22, 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in Dominican

Republic, which was docketed as Civil Decree No. 362/96 ordering the
dissolution of the marriage. The same court also issued Civil Decree No.
406/97 settling the couple's conjugal property in Muntinlupa in March 4,
1997.

She then filed a declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of

Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity,
docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094. She sought dissolution of the conjugal
partnerships of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and
Alix. She also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly
support for their daughter Alix in the amount of P 220,000.00.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of

cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of
divorce.

RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss. CA dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094
and set aside RTC's incidental orders. According the the CA, RTC ought to
have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss, since the marriage between the
spouses is already dissolved when the divorce decree was granted since
Rebecca was an American citizen when she applied for the decree.

Issue:

Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican

Republic is valid.

Ruling:

Yes. Civil Decrees No. 362/96 and 406/97 are valid.

Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an American
citizen and remains to be one, being born to American parents in Guam, an
American territory which follows the principle of jus soli granting American
citizenship to those who are born there. She was, and still may be, a holder
of American passport.

She had consistently professed, asserted and represented herself as an

American citizen, as shown in her marriage certificate, in Alix's birth
certificate, when she secured divorce in Dominican Republic.

Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the
United States of America, a country which allows divorce.

The Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued by the Dominican Republic court properly
adjudicated the ex-couple's property relations.

The Court said, in order that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, the
divorce decree must be proven as a fact and as valid under the national law
of the alien spouse.

The fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the
divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the

Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly

authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

Thus the foreign decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic
court are valid, and consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.

The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognised as a Filipino citizen by
force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by the DOJ Secretary of the October 6,
1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, stand alone, work to nullify or
invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen in
1996. In determining whether or not a divorce is secured abroad would come
within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning
point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.
Categories: Judicial Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage, Persons and
Family Relations

San Luis vs. San Luis

Short Summary: Former Laguna governor had 1st spouse who predeceased
him, then married again to an American citizen who divorced him, then
remarried again. He died with his 3rd wife but his 2nd wife and the children
in the 1st marriage contested the standing of the 3rd wife, claiming that the
said marriage was bigamous since the 2nd marriage was still subsisting
under RP law (can't apply FC retroactively). Court held that even with FC not
applied retroactively, Van Dorn and other jurisprudence sufficiently provides
the validity to the 3rd marriage, thus recognizing divorce obtained by an
alien spouse against the Filipino spouse. However, as the 3rd marriage was
not sufficiently proved, the case was remanded in order for the 3rd spouse to
present further evidence on this.
Facts
FELICISIMO SAN LUIS contracted 3 marriages:
VIRGINIA SULIT: had 6 children, died before he did in 1963
MERRY LEE CORWIN: US citizen, had son Tobias, divorced him before
Hawaiian courts which was granted in 1973
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS SAN LUIS: married before a Presbyterian Church in
California n 1974, lived with him until he died for 18 years in their Alabang
residence
-when Felicisimo died, Felicidad filed for DISSOLUTION OF CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP ASSETS AND SETTLEMENT OF FELICISIMO'S ESTATE, filing for a
letter of administration before RTC Makati
-petition was contested (MTD) by Felicisimo's children for 2 grounds:
Venue improperly laid: should have filed petition in Laguna (domicile) and
not in Makati (covers Alabang, decedent's residence at the time of his death)
No legal personality to sue: Felicidad is only a mistress - marriage to Merry
Lee was still valid (Family Code provision cannot be applied retroactively as it
would impair their vested rights in accordance with Article 256, FC)
---these were denied but Felicidad still filed Opposition to MTD, showing
evidence of the ff:

Felicisimo exercised office in Laguna, but went home in Alabang - to prove

proper venue
Decree of absolute divorce by Hawaii dissolving the marriage of Felicisimo to
Merry Lee - to prove capacity to sue
RTC Makati: Dismissed petition
CA: reversed and set aside
Place of residence should be understood in as the personal, actual or
physical habitation so petition was properly filed
Art26.2, FC should be given effect, allowing a Filipino to remarry under
Philippine law
WON Venue properly laid? YES
-The cases relied upon by the petitioners were election cases.
-there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and
"residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases,
"residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the
fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court,
the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or
actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.
WON Felicidad had capacity to sue? YES
As the legal wife: even if FC not applied retroactively, Van Dorn v. Romillo
(1985) sufficiently provides the legal basis for holding valid divorce obtained
by an alien spouse against the Filipino spouse (as well as other cases which
were in Ma'am's book)
-it look at the legislative intent of FC provision assailed, it was based on the
Van Dorn ruling which validates a divorce decree obtained by an alien
spouse, thus capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry again
---In this case, as Merry Lee obtained a divorce, Felicisimo now is capacitated
to marry Felicidad. However, as the marriage between Felicidad and
Felicisimo was not sufficiently proven, remand the case to RTC

Even if not qualified as the legal spouse, she could still petition for a letter of
administration as an "INTERESTED PARTY" with Art144, CC and A148 FC both
stating that she is considered a co-owner of properties owned by persons
living as husband and wife but whose marriage is void.

Title:
MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN vs. LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE, G. R. No.
183622, February 8, 2012
FACTS
: Deceased Orlando B. Catalan is a naturalized American citizen. After he
obtained a US divorce for his first marriage withFelicitas Amor, he
subsequently contracted a second marriage with herein petitioner Merope
Enriquez Vda. De Catalan.Felicitas, thereafter, filed a bigamy case against
Merope for having contracted a second marriage with her husband despite
anexisting marriage to one Eusebio Bristol.Sometime in 1998, the RTC
acquitted Merope of bigamy . It ruled that since the deceased was a divorced
American citizen,and since that divorce was not recognized under the
Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not
valid.Furthermore, it found out that petitioner had never been married to
Eusebio Bristol.Sometime in 2004, Orlando died inestate in the Philippines.
Thus, on February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a petition for the.Pending said
petition, herein respondent, one of the children of Orlando from his first
marriage, filed a similar petition. The two caseswere subsequently
consolidated.Respondent questioned the legal standing of the petitioner to
file such an action. She alleged that Merope cannot beconsidered as an
interested person to qualified to file such action since she was never
considered married to the deceased by virtue of the decision of the RTC on
the bigamy case.On June 26, 2006, the trial court dismissed the petition filed
by petitioner and granted that of the respondent. It held that themarriage
between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she
married Orlando, and went on to say that petitioner was not an interested
party to file such petition.Hence, the petitioner went to the CA armed with a
marriage certificate of her marriage with Orlando. However, the CAdismissed
the petition for certiorari she filed and ruled that a marriage certificate, like

any public document, is only a prima facieevidence of facts stated therein. In

addition the CA stated that the deduction of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Merope, being the second wife of the deceased
Orlando, has a legal standing on filing a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate
of the latter notwithstanding thededuction of the trial court that the acquittal
of the petitioner in the said case negates the validity of her subsequent
marriage withOrlando B. Catalan has not been disproved by her.
HELD:
Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by thepolicy against absolute divorces,
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However,aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law, as a matter of comity; provided further that before a foreign
judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, thedocument must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by
the divorce decreeitself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an actof
an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.Under Sections 24 and 25 of
Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or officialrecord of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication
or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custodyof the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by theproper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is keptand (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice
of foreign laws. Like anyother facts, they must be alleged and proved. The
power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and everyreasonable
doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negativeIn this case, the US
divorce obtained by Orlando, a naturalized American citizen, for his marriage
with Felicitas maybe recognized in the Philippines.

It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the
validity of Orlandos divorce under the laws of
theUnited States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased.
Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trialcourt

for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.Should

petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she
has the preferential right to be issued theletters of administration over the
estate. Otherwise, letters of administration may be issued to respondent,
who is undisputedly thedaughter or next of kin of the deceased.

CORPUZ vs. STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL G.R. No. 186571
August 11, 2010

Gerbert R. Corpuz, Petitioner

Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas and the Solicitor General, Respondents
Ponente: BRION, J.:

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a direct appeal from the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City. Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpus
is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto.
Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due to work and other professional
commitments. When he returned to the Philippines, he discovered that Sto.
Tomas was already romantically involved with another man. This brought
about the filing of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was
eventually granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A
month later, the divorce decree took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has
fallen in love with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He went to Civil

Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce decree of his
marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration, an
official of National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former marriage
still subsists under the Philippine law until there has been a judicial
recognition of the Canadian divorce by a competent judicial court in view of
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of
marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out
that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided
further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can institute an action
under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates a
Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce
decree.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants
aliens like Corpuz the right to institute a petition for judicial recognition of a
foreign divorce decree.

HELD:
Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes
the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the
complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to
dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC.In other words, the unavailability of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself,
after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been

duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive

evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.

A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the
foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a
right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution
must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is
made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res
judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court.

Case Digest: Roehr v. Rodriguez

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON.
JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch
149, respondents.
G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003

QUISUMBING, J.:

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private respondent

Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their

marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros

Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine.

Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the

Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC). Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss, but it
was denied.

Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First

Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese. Said decree also provides that the parental
custody of the children should be vested to Wolfgang.

Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a divorce

decree had already been promulgated, and said motion was granted by
Public Respondent RTC Judge Salonga.

Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case
proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and
the distribution of the properties between her and Wolfgang. Judge Salonga
partially setting aside her previous order for the purpose of tackling the
issues of support and custody of their children.

1st Issue: W/N Judge Salonga was correct in granting a partial motion for
reconsideration.

Ruling: Yes.

A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet
attained finality, as in the case at bar.

The Supreme Court goes further to say that the court can modify or alter a
judgment even after the same has become executory whenever
circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as
where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such
modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and
executory and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or
when supervening events warrant it.

2nd issue: W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when she assumed and
retained jurisdiction as regards child custody and support.

Ruling: Yes.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries

are recognizable in our jurisdiction. But the legal effects thereof, e.g. on
custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our
courts.

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment,
such as the award of custody to Wolfgang by the German court, it must be
shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the
Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).

In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the
opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is
basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of
Wolfgang to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in
the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of Carmens
participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain
unclear.

Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the
children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to
determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful
of the best interests of the children.

HERALD BLACK DACASIN,

Petitioner
, v.
SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN,

Respondent
.
G.R. No. 168785 : February 5, 2010CARPIO,
J.:
Facts:

Herald, American, and Sharon, Filipino, were

married in Manila in April 1994.
They have one daughter, Stephanie, born on September 21, 1995.

In June 1999, Sharon sought and obtained a divorce decree

from the CircuitCourt, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois
court). In its ruling, the Illinoiscourt dissolved the marriage of petitioner and
respondent, awarded to respondentsole custody of Stephanie and retained
jurisdiction over the case for enforcementpurposes.

On January 28, 2002,

both executed in Manila a contract for joint custody overStephanie.

In 2004,
Herald filed a case against Sharon alleging that Sharon had exercised
solecustody over Stephanie contrary to their agreement.
o
The trial court held that (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over
thesuit considering the Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce
itsdivorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie
torespondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on petitioner following

thenationality rule prevailing in this jurisdiction; and (3) the Agreement is

voidfor contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code
prohibitingcompromise agreements on jurisdiction and dismissed the case.
Issue:
WON the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners suit
andenforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties child
Held/ Rationale:
The trial courts refusal to entertain petitioners suit was grounded not onits
lack of power to do so but on its thinking that the Illinois courts divorce
decree stripped itof jurisdiction. This conclusion is unfounded. What the
Illinois court retained was jurisdictionx x x for the purpose of enforcing all
and sundry the various provisions of [its] Judgment forDissolution.
Petitioners suit seeks the enforcement not of the various provisions of
thedivorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint child custody.
Thus, the actionlies beyond the zone of the Illinois courts so-called retained
jurisdiction.

Fujiki vs. Marinay Digest

G.R. No. 196049 : June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, Petitioner,v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI

MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondents.

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent

Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines On 23 January 2004.
The marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not
bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with
each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without

the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15
May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan.
However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family
court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara
void on the ground of bigamy.On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the
RTC for the Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage. Fujiki prayed that (1) the
Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared voidab initiounder
Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;and (3) for the RTC
to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese
Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and
Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator
and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an
Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil
docket.The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross
violation" of the provisions of the rule. Apparently, the RTC took the view that
only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can
file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered.

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for

reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage.The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e.
lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on

the petition for review.The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO,
participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a
comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTCs
"pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with A.M. No. 02-11-10SC be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings. The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the
first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void.

Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity

in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castroand
Nil v. Bayadog which declared that "the validity of a void marriage may be
collaterally attacked."

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the
directive for them to comment on the petition.Maekara wrote that Marinay
concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki.
Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay.On the
other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition.She
would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause
misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.

ISSUES:

HELD: RTC decision is reversed.

REMEDIAL LAW: Proof of foreign judgments relating to the statues of a

marriage where on of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country; AM 02-11SC not applicable to petition for recognition of foreign judgment

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment

of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic,this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
"does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of

a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the

petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules
of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be
admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.Petitioner may
prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication
or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the
judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as
Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the
seal of office.

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of

foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should
follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition,the
service of summons,the investigation of the public prosecutor,the setting of
pre-trial,the trialand the judgment of the trial court.This is absurd because it
will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."The
interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits.
InMijares v. Rada,this Court explained that "if every judgment of a foreign
court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on
his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation."

CIVIL LAW: remarriage of a Filipino citizen whose alien spouse divorces him or
her

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to

extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here
a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,this Court recognized
the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid

the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse"under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects
of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is
tantamount to trying a case for divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address

the anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do
not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The
anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The
correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign
divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was
rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on
this Courts decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo which declared that the Filipino
spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served."

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a

Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition
abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the
foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is
capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign
judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
discriminated the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse
cannot remarry.

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine

courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still
tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover,
notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have
jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to

the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public
policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and
a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a
ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public
policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by
filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts
have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.

G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007

FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE E.
BRAGANZA, Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4,

1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States
of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years
of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988. On June 16, 1988,
Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Petitioner contends that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a
prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City
against Orlando and Merope.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of
bigamy?

RULING:

A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be
based on a cause of action. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Petitioners
personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be
ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign
law allowing it. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if
the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the
foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes
absolute. We note that it was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint
that they acquired American citizenship and that respondent Orlando
obtained a judicial divorce decree. It is settled rule that one who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional
evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was
granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the
same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree
was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage,
then the trial court should declare respondents marriage as bigamous and
void ab initio.

G.R. No. 195432 Civil Law Persons and Family Relations Foreign Divorce;
how recognized

Remedial Law Evidence Foreign Divorce; Must be proven as a matter of

fact

In 2001, Edelina Tungul married a Japanese citizen named Yuichiro

Kobayashi. In 2004, Kobayashi obtained a divorce decree against Edelina in
Japan. Kobayashi later married someone else.

In 2005, Edelina again married another Japanese citizen named Masatomi

Ando.

Thereafter, Edelina tried to renew her passport but this time she wanted to
use her married name she wanted to use Andos name. However, the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) told her that same cannot be issued to
her until she can prove by competent court decision that her marriage with
her said husband Masatomi Ando is valid until otherwise declared.

In 2010, Edelina filed a petition for declaratory relief as she insists that she
should be issued a passport bearing her married name even without a
judicial declaration that her marriage with Ando is valid because, according
to the law, void and voidable marriages enjoy the presumption of validity
until proven otherwise. And also on that juncture, she prayed that the court
recognize her second marriage as valid.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief should prosper.

HELD No. In the first place, the petition is misplaced. Edelina failed to
exhaust all administrative remedies. When her request for renewal of
passport under her married name was denied, she should have appealed the
denial to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs pursuant to the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act).

Second, her prayer to have her second marriage be honored is not proper.
The proper remedy is for her to file a petition for the judicial recognition of
her foreign divorce from her first husband.

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,

provided the decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce
decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Because our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven
like any other fact.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 171914

July 23, 2014

SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and
EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule
adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the
parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a
divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and
cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a
subsequent marriage.

The Case

The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the
adverse decision promulgated on November 11, 2005,1 whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the decision rendered on August 27,
2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati City.2 The CA
thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the husband in a
condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired during the
second marriage.

Antecedents

The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:

ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the

prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law
Offices at that time when he was living with his first wife, herein intervenorappellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially married ina
civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Paraaque, Rizal on
September 10, 1947 and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the ProCathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNAs
marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L.
Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda,
Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After
almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually
agreed to live apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed to
separation of property, to which end, they entered into a written agreement
entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated
November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve
and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.

On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage
with EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First
Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican
Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY.
LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter,
ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as
husband and wife until 1987.

Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna,
Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the
managing partner.

On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from

Tandang Sora Development Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma
Condominium Project(condominium unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City,
consisting of 517.52 square meters, for P1,449,056.00, to be paid on
installment basis for 36months starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium
unit was to be usedas law office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of

Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983, and
CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which was registered bearing
the following names:

"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO,

married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married
to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio
J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x" Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and
17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium unit was
sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on
February 7, 1992 in the following names:

"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO,

married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to
Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"

Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was
partitioned by the partners but the same was still registered in common
under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA
over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter
established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruzand
used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law
firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.

After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including
the lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over
by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNAs son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna
thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit belonging to his
father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named
Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.

The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well
as the law books, office furniture and equipment became the subject of the
complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of

Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil Case No.
99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired
during the existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD
through their joint efforts that since they had no children, SOLEDAD became
co-owner of the said properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of
pro-indiviso share consisting of her share in the said properties plus her
share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the
latters last will and testament; and thatthe heirs of ATTY. LUNA through
Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the subject properties.
The complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the portion
of the subject properties;that the same be partitioned; that an accounting of
the rentals on the condominium unit pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be
conducted; that a receiver be appointed to preserve ad administer the
subject properties;and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay
attorneys feesand costs of the suit to SOLEDAD.3

Ruling of the RTC

On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the
aforementioned facts,4 disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the
SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS is adjudged to have been acquired
by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry;

(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the
condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No.
21761 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil status of
Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to
Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";

(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports
found in the condominium unit and defendants are ordered to deliver them
to the plaintiff as soon as appropriate arrangements have been madefor
transport and storage.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.5

Aznar vs. Garcia [7 SCRA 95]

Facts: Edward Christensens (citizen of the State of California) will was
executed in Manila where it provides that Helen Christensen Garcia receive a
payment of P3,600 and proposed that the residue of the estate be

transferred to his daughter Maria Lucy Christensen. Helen Christensen Garcia

opposed the project of partition of Edwards estate claiming that she was
deprived of her legitime as acknowledged natural child under the Philippine
law.

Issue: Whether or not the California law or the Philippine law should apply in
the case at bar.

Held: Philippine law should be applied. The State of California prescribes two
sets of laws for its citizens residing therein and a conflict of law rules for its
citizens domiciled in other jurisdictions. Art. 946 of the California Civil Code
states that If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal
property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is
governed by the law of his domicile. Edward, a citizen of the State of
California, is considered to have his domicile in the Philippines. The court of
domicile cannot and should not refer the case back to the California, as such
action would leave the issue incapable of determination, because the case
would then be tossed back and forth between the states(doctrine of renvoi).
The validity of the provisions of Edwards will depriving his acknowledged
natural child of latters legacy, should be governed by the Philippine law.

The decision appealed from is reversed and the case returned to the lower
court with instruction that the partition be made as the Philippine law on
succession provides.

G.R. No. L-23678 (June 6, 1967)

Bellis vs. Bellis

FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States.
He had five legitimate children with his first wife (whom he divorced), three
legitimate children with his second wife (who survived him) and, finally, three
illegitimate children.
6 years prior Amos Bellis death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the
remainder of his estate and properties to his seven surviving children. The
appellants filed their oppositions to the project of partition claiming that they
have been deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled according
to the Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his
Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of
two separate wills.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination
of the illegitimate childrens successional rights
RULING:
Court ruled that provision in a foreigners will to the effect that his properties
shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his
national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in view
of those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states
said national law should govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic
validity of his will should be governed by his national law. Since Texas law
does not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his illegitimate
children of the legitimes, is valid.
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the
legitimes under the texas law, which is the national law of the deceased.

Miciano vs Brimo
TITLE: Juan Miciano v Andre Brimo
CITATION: GR No.22595, November 1, 1927| 50 Phil 867

FACTS:

Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme

of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased (Joseph
Brimo) opposed Micianos participation in the inheritance. Joseph Brimo is a
Turkish citizen.

ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the
distribution of Joseph Brimos estates.

HELD:

Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that it be
made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine
Island, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be
considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any
manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible
conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus,
national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial
administrator, in such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the
legatees.

Insular Government vs. Frank 13 Phil 236, G.R.No.2935. March23,

1909.FACTS:
In 1903 in the state of Illinois, Mr. Frank, a US citizen and arepresentative of
the Insular Government of the Philippines entered into acontract whereby the
former shall serve as stenographer in the Philippinesfor a period of 2 years.
The contract contained a provision that in case of violation of its terms, Mr.
Frank shall be liable for the amount incurred bythe Philippine Government for
his travel from Chicago to Manila and one-half salary paid during such
period. After serving for 6 months, defendantleft the service and refused to
make further compliance with the terms of the contract, therefore the
Government sued him to recover the amount of $269.23 plus damages. The
lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, hencethe defendant appealed
presenting minority as his special defense. Byreason of the fact that under
the laws of the Philippines, contracts made byperson who did not reach
majority age of 23 are unenforceable. Defendantclaim that he is an adult
when he left Chicago but was a minor when hearrived in Manila and at the
time the plaintiff attempted to enforce thecontract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract is valid.
RULING:
Mr. Frank being fully qualified to enter into a contract at the placeand time
the contract was made, he cannot therefore plead infancy as adefense at the
place where the contract is being enforced. Although Mr.Frank was still a
minor under Philippine laws, he was neverthelessconsidered an adult under
the laws of the state of Illinois,the place wherethe contract was made.No rule
is better settled in law than that mattersbearing upon the execution,
interpretation and validity of a contract aredetermined by the law of the
place where the contract is made. Mattersconnected to its performance are
regulated by the law prevailing at theplace of its performance. Matters

respecting a remedy, such as bringing of asuit, admissibility of evidence, and

statutes of limitations, depend upon thelaw of the place where the suit is
brought.Although generally, capacity of the parties to enter into a contract
isgoverned by national law. This is one case not involving real property
whichwas decided by our Supreme Court, where instead of national law,
whatshould determine capacity to enter into a contract is the lex loci
celebrationis. According to Conflict of Laws writer Edgardo Paras, Franks
capacity should be judged by his national law and not by the law of theplace
where the contract was entered into. In the instant case whether it is
the place where the contract was made or Franks nationality, the result
would be the same. However, as suggested by the mentioned author, forthe
conflicts rule in capacity in general, national law of the parties iscontrolling.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD

RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner, v. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN
WILSEM, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated February
19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of
the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal
Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise
known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.

The following facts are culled from the records:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van
Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January
19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem,
who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of
age.3

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a

Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time,
their son was only eighteen (18) months old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her
son came home to the Philippines.6

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly

support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene
(which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less).7 However, since the
arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave
support to the son, Roderigo.8

Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in

Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat.9
Respondent and his new wife established a business known as Paree
Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu
City.10 To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently
living in Cebu City.11

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding
for support from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the
letter.12

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit

with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of
Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latters unjust refusal to
support his minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counteraffidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit.14
Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution

recommending the filing of an information for the crime charged against

herein respondent.

The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20
thereof, states that:

That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the
Municipality of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to
deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old
minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to
the victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.15

Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold
Departure Order against respondent.16 Consequently, respondent was
arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.17

Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to

which respondent filed his Opposition.18 Pending the resolution thereof,
respondent was arraigned.19

Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the

protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1)
lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime
charged.20

On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21
dismissing the instant criminal case against respondent on the ground that

the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect
to the respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and
accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.

The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his
provisional liberty is hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating

respondents obligation to support their child under Article 19523 of the
Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262
which equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to
support their minor children regardless of the obligors nationality.24

On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying

petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling.
Thus:

x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those

advanced earlier in the memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court
hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused is a foreign national he is
not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parents duty
and obligation to give support to his child. Consequently, he cannot be
charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child.
Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who

fails to give support to his child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by our
domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the
considered opinion of the court that no prima facie case exists against the
accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of

merit.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following
issues:

Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child
under Philippine law; and

Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No.
9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.27

At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the

instant petition despite the fact that the same was directly lodged with the
Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty
Development Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a ruling of
the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court
without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:

x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a
Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or

involved. This latter situation was one that petitioners found themselves in
when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law.

In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from
decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error
under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action
by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for
review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on
certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The first mode of appeal
is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of
fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of
fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal is
elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law. (Emphasis
supplied)

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of
the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of
law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue must rest
solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.29

Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law

the response thereto concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e., whether or not a foreign national
has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and
whether or not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to do so.

It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel

question of law concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly
commits acts and omissions punishable under special criminal laws,
specifically in relation to family rights and duties. The inimitability of the
factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by
this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases.

Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and remanding the same to the
CA would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in the
present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration
of justice should prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.

Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition

meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioners contentions.

To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262,
it is imperative that the legal obligation to support exists.

Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the
parents obligation to support his child. Petitioner contends that
notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article
26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying with his
obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.

On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear
basis presented by petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled
to financial support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce
Decree, he is not obligated to petitioner for any financial support.33

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article
19534 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a
foreign citizen, since Article 1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle
of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned,
specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only
applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to
foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to
family rights and duties.36

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family
rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the
Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his
country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to
his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.37

In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that

Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the
principle that family rights and duties are governed by their personal law,
i.e., the laws of the nation to which they belong even when staying in a
foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support

petitioners son under Article 195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the
Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that
respondent is not obliged to support petitioners son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present
case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands,
he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to
support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in
advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never
proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of
the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support
their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree),
because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts
are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proved. 43

In view of respondents failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in

his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this
doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our
courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic
or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the
obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the
instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the
non-compliance therewith.

Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera',45 the Court held that a divorce

obtained in a foreign land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the matter of status of
persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely
show that he is not liable to give support to his son after the divorce decree
was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioners allegation that under the
second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondents obligation to support
his child is specifically stated,46 which was not disputed by respondent.

We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law
of respondent states that parents have no obligation to support their children
or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find
applicability, in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American
Realty Corporation,47 to wit:

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter
were properly pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. SyGonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and
established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or
order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and

those which have for their object public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle
imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of
action.

Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action,
the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a
ground for the dismissal of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice
is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract
that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of
Laws.48

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a
parents obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance
therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because
it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support
when the latter is entitled thereto.

We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no

longer liable to support his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San
Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she
should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she
should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has
to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a
wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just .
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served. (Emphasis added)50

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made
liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or
failing to give support to petitioners son, to wit:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of
violence against women and their children is committed through any of the
following acts:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxxx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in

conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist
from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or
attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of
movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or
threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman
or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed
with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her
child's movement or conduct:

xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial
support legally due her or her family , or deliberately providing the woman's
children insufficient financial support;

xxxx

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the

woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children
of access to the woman's child/children.51

Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support
to the child is considered an act of violence against women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines,

we find strength in petitioners claim that the Territoriality Principle in
criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the
instant case, which provides that:[p]enal laws and those of public security
and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine
territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty
stipulations. On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing
acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is
committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of
the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction
over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that
jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.

Finally, we do not agree with respondents argument that granting, but not
admitting, that there is a legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in
the instant case, the criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of
prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides
that:

SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f)
shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I)
shall prescribe in ten (10) years.

The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No.
9262 is a continuing offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at
present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not
prescribed.

Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support
to petitioners child calls for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being admitted, we
hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has
jurisdiction over the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010
and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of
Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the
same court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.

CARPIO v. VALMONTE
G.R. No. 151866; September 9, 2004; Tinga, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del Rosarioand Jon
Sierra engaged her services for their church wedding. On that day,Valmonte
went to the Manila Hotel to where the bride and her family werebilleted.
When she arrived at the Suite, several persons were alreadythere including
the petitioner Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride who waspreparing to
dress up for the occasion. After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of
the suite carrying the itemsneeded for the wedding rites and the gifts from
the principal sponsors. Sheproceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where the
reception was to be held. She went back to the suite after, and found several
people staring at her when sheentered. . It was at this juncture that
petitioner allegedly uttered the followingwords to Valmonte:
Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mongbag? Saan ka
pumunta? Ikaw lang and lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha.
Petitioner then ordered one of the ladies to search Valmontes bag.

It turned out that after Valmonte left the room to attend to her duties,
petitionerdiscovered that the pieces of jewelry which she placed inside the
comfort room in apaper bag were lost.A few days after the incident,
petitioner received a letter from Valmontedemanding a formal letter of
apology which she wanted to be circulated to thenewlyweds relatives and

guests to redeem her smeared reputation as a result of petitioners

imputations against her. Petitioner did not respond to the letter. Thus,on
20February 1997, Valmonte filed a suit for damages against petitioner.
ISSUE:
W/N respondent Valmonte is entitled to damages
RULING:
Valmonte is entitled to damages. In the case at bar, petitioners
verbalreproach against respondent was certainly uncalled for considering
that by her ownaccount nobody knew that she brought such kind and
amount of jewelry inside thepaper bag. True, petitioner had the right o
ascertain the identity of the malefactor,but to malign respondent without an
iota of proof that she was the one who actuallystole the jewelry is an act
which, by any standard or principle of law isimpermissible. Petitioner had
willfully caused injury to respondent in amanner which is contrary to morals
and good customs. She did not act with justiceand good faith for apparently,
she had no other purpose in mind but to prejudicerespondent. Certainly,
petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 inrelation to Article 21 for
which she should be held accountable.

Nikko Hotel vs. Reyes

TITLE: Nikko Hotel Manila vs. Reyes
CITATION: GR No. 154259, February 28, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim assailed the decision of the
Court of Appeals in reversing the decision of RTC of Quezon City. CA held
petitioner liable for damages to Roberto Reyes aka Amang Bisaya, an
entertainment artist.

There are two versions of the story:

Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at
the lobby of Nikko Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several
years back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to join a birthday
party at the penthouse for the hotels former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka.
Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket of
fruits, the latters gift. He He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it was
ready but to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotels
Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard

by the people around them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati
policeman accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr Filart
ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation.

Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in
the manner claimed by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people
including Dr. Filarts sister, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as the
captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filarts group. She
wasnt able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking over
the phone and doesnt want to interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave
because the celebrant specifically ordered that the party should be intimate
consisting only of those who part of the list. She even asked politely with the
plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party.

During the plaintiffs cross-examination, he was asked how close was Ms. Lim
when she approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered very
close because we nearly kissed each other. Considering the close
proximity, it was Ms. Lims intention to relay the request only be heard by
him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to know what
happened.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to

leave the party.

HELD:

Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes
to leave the party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the
part of Ms. Lim who did all the necessary precautions to ensure that Mr.
Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave the party.

Considering almost 20 years of experience in the hotel industry, Ms. Lim is

experienced enough to know how to handle such matters. Hence,
petitioners will not be held liable for damages brought under Article 19 and
20 of the Civil Code.

Ardiente vs. Javier, et al

[Civil Law: human relations; principle of abuse of rights; Article 19 of the Civil
Code]

Every person must, in the exercise of his right, and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith. (Art. 19. New Ciivil Code of the Philippines)

Joyce V. Ardiente, Petitioner, vs. Sps. Javier and Ma. Theresa Pastorfide,
Cagayan de Oro Water District and Gaspar Gonzales, Jr., Respondents
G.R. No. 161921; July 17, 2013

Facts: A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to set aside the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals

which affirmed the then decision of the RTC regarding its judgment sums of
money for moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees. The
decision being contested sprouted from the cutting off of water supply of
Pastorfide by the Cagayan de Oro Water District as requested by Ardiente. In
this case, Ardiente owned a piece of property, which was subsequently sold
and conveyed to Pastorfide, however, the connection of water supply as well
as other utilities remained in the name of Ardiente which was never
questioned, until such time that Pastorfide became delinquent in paying the
water bill.

Issue: Whether or not it was proper for Ardiente together with Cagayan De
Oro Water district to cut off the water supply of Pastorfide owing to the fact
that Ardiente has already conveyed ownership of property to Pastorfide.

Ruling:
No, it was not proper. Petitioner's acts which violated the
abovementioned provisions of law is her unjustifiable act of having the
respondent spouses' water supply disconnected, coupled with her failure to
warn or at least notify respondent spouses of such intention. The principle of
abuse of Rights in the enshrined Article 19 of the civil Code provides that
every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith. It recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their
exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be
observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by
law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a
right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.

Sesbreno vs CA

RAUL SESBREO vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DELTA MOTORS

CORPORATION AND PILIPINAS BANK

G.R. No. 89252 May 24, 1993

FACTS: Raul Sesbreno made a money market placement in the amount

of P300,000 with PhilFinance, with a term of 32 days. PhilFinance issued to
Sesbreno the Certificate of Confirmation of Sale of a Delta Motor Corporation
Promissory Note (DMC PN No. 2731), the Certificate of Securities Delivery
Receipt indicating the sale of the Note with notation that said security was in
the custody of Pilipinas Bank, and postdated checks drawn against the

Insular Bank of Asia and America for P304,533.33 payable on 13 March 1981.
The checks were dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient
funds. Philfinance delivered to petitioner Denominated Custodian Receipt
(DCR).

Petitioner approached Ms. Elizabeth de Villa of private respondent

Pilipinas, and handed her a demand letter informing the bank that his
placement with Philfinance in the amount reflected in the DCR had remained
unpaid and outstanding, and that he in effect was asking for the physical
delivery of the underlying promissory note. Petitioner then examined the
original of the DMC PN No. 2731 and found: that the security had been
issued on 10 April 1980; that it would mature on 6 April 1981; that it had a
face value of P2,300,833.33, with the Philfinance as payee and private
respondent Delta Motors Corporation (Delta) as maker; and that on face
of the promissory note was stamped NON NEGOTIABLE. Pilipinas did not
deliver the Note, nor any certificate of participation in respect thereof, to
petitioner.

Petitioner later made similar demand letters again asking private

respondent Pilipinas for physical delivery of the original of DMC PN No. 2731.

Petitioner also made a written demand upon private respondent Delta

for the partial satisfaction of DMC PN No. 2731, explaining that Philfinance,
as payee thereof, had assigned to him said Note to the extent of
P307,933.33. Delta, however, denied any liability to petitioner on the
promissory note.

As petitioner had failed to collect his investment and interest thereon,

he filed an action for damages against private respondents Delta and
Pilipinas.

ISSUE: WON DMC PN No. 2731 marked as non-negotiable may be

assigned?

HELD: YES. Only an instrument qualifying as a negotiable instrument

under the relevant statute may be negotiated either by indorsement thereof
coupled with delivery, or by delivery alone where the negotiable instrument
is in bearer form. A negotiable instrument may, however, instead of being
negotiated, also be assigned or transferred. The legal consequences of
negotiation as distinguished from assignment of a negotiable instrument are,
of course, different. A non-negotiable instrument may, obviously, not be
negotiated; but it may be assigned or transferred, absent an express
prohibition against assignment or transfer written in the face of the
instrument:

The words not negotiable, stamped on the face of the bill of lading,
did not destroy its assignability, but the sole effect was to exempt the bill
from the statutory provisions relative thereto, and a bill, though not
negotiable, may be transferred by assignment; the assignee taking subject
to the equities between the original parties. 12 (Emphasis added)

DMC PN No. 2731, while marked non-negotiable, was not at the same
time stamped non-transferable or non-assignable. It contained no
stipulation which prohibited Philfinance from assigning or transferring, in
whole or in part, that Note.

Rosqueta
Emma was formerly Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue Collection and
Monitoring Group. When President Arroyo assumed office, she tendered her
courtesy resignation, but after five months, she withdrew her resignation,
saying she enjoyed security of tenure and she resigned against her will on
orders of her superior. In the meantime, Gil was appointed to her position. To
challenge the appointment, Emma filed a petition for prohibition, mandamus

and quo warrant against Titus, the Customs Commissioner, the Secretary of
Finance and Gil. The RTC issued a temporary restraining order, and later a
writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the respondents from implementing
Gils appointment. The respondents elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals, which also issued its own TRO, which eventually lapsed after 60
days. The CA later dismissed the petition filed by the respondents. While the
preliminary injunction was in force, Titus issued a memorandum authorising
Gil to exercise the powers and function of the office previously held by
Emma. During the centennial ceebration of the Bureau held in 2002, the
steering committee head by titus authorised the printing of a Panorama
magazine where all the officers pictures were posted. On the name
pertaining to Emma, no picture was attached; instead there is a notation
under litigation. On the commemorative billboard posted outside the gate
of the Bureau, Gils picture was included but not Emmas.

Emma thus filed a complaint for damages against Titus, alleging that she
was maliciously excluded from the centennial anniversary memorabilia. The
Regional Trial Court dismissed her complaint, holding that she was validly
replaced by titus seven months before the anniversary.

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. It ruled that Tituss refusal to
comply with the preliminary injunction order issued in the quo warranto case
earned for Emma the right to recover moral damages from him. Citing the
abuse of right principle, the CA said that Titus acted maliciously when he
prevented Emma from performing her duties, deprived her of salaries and
leaves, and denied her official recognition as Deputy Commissioner by
excluding her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia.

Titus appealed the decision to the Supreme Court:

Petitioner Villanueva claims that he merely acted on advice of the Office of

the Solicitor General (OSG) when he allowed Valera to assume the office as
Deputy Commissioner since respondent Rosqueta held the position merely in
a temporary capacity and since she lacked the Career Executive Service
eligibility required for the job.

But petitioner Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged advice that the
OSG gave him. Surely, a government official of his rank must know that a
preliminary injunction order issued by a court of law had to be obeyed,
especially since the question of Valeras right to replace respondent
Rosqueta had not yet been properly resolved.

That petitioner Villanueva ignored the injunction shows bad faith and intent
to spite Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of the law the Deputy
Commissioner. His exclusion of her from the centennial anniversary
memorabilia was not an honest mistake by any reckoning. Indeed, he
withheld her salary and prevented her from assuming the duties of the
position. As the Court said in Amonoy v. Spouses Gutierrez, a partys refusal
to abide by a court order enjoining him from doing an act, otherwise lawful,
constitutes an abuse and an unlawful exercise of right.

That respondent Rosqueta was later appointed Deputy Commissioner for

another division of the Bureau is immaterial. While such appointment, when
accepted, rendered the quo warranto case moot and academic, it did not
have the effect of wiping out the injuries she suffered on account of
petitioner Villanuevas treatment of her. The damage suit is an independent
action.

CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. v. QUINONES

G.R. No. 175822 October 23, 2013
Ponente: Peralta, J.

FACTS:
Respondent went inside the Guess USA Boutique in Robinsons Department
Store in Cebu City and decided to purchase the black jeans worth P2098.
While she was walking, she was confronted by a Guess employee and told
her that she failed to pay for the item she got to which respondent replied
that she did and showed the receipt. Respondent then suggested they talk
about it in the Cebu Pacific office in the mall. While in there, she was
allegedly embarrassed and humiliated by the Guess employees in front of
their clients. The next day, Guess employees event sent a demand letter to
respondents employers. While the RTC ruled for them, CA reversed the
decision saying that the acts done by the employees were not in good faith.
Petitioners pray for the reversal of the decision of CA.

ISSUE:
Did the Guess employees violate Articles 20 and 21 of Civil Code of the
Philippines?

HELD:
The Court affirmed CAs decision and held that the employees abused their
rights and did not have good faith in their actions against respondent where
there was no clear evidence that she was evading to pay for the
merchandise. The petition is thus denied for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013, SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING,
PETITIONERS, VS. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. AND ALLAN
CHOACHUY, RESPONDENTS
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically
everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of
these cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable
expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to
privacy would be affected, was obtained

Bill and Victoria, spouses, filed a Complaint for Injunction and Damages with
prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Alexander and
Allan. According to them, they own the lot adjacent to the lots owned by Aldo
Development and Resources, where Alex and Allan are stockholders. The
corporation built an auto-shop building on Lot 1900-C adjacent to the lot
owned by Bill and Victoria. In April, 2005, Aldo filed a case for injunction and
damages against Bill and Victoria claiming that they were constructing a
fence without a valid permit and the construction would destroy its building.
The court denied the application by Aldo for preliminary injunction for failure
to substantiate its allegations. To gather evidence against the spouses, Aldo
illegally set-up on the building of Aldo two video surveillance camera facing
petitioners party and through their employees and without the consent of
spouses took pictures of their on-going construction; thus it violates their
right to privacy. The spouses prayed that Alexander and Allan be ordered to
remove their video-cameras and stopped from conducting illegal
surveillance.

Answering, Alexander and Allan claimed that they did not install the
cameras, nor ordered their employees to take pictures of the spouses
construction; they also averred that they are mere stockholders of Aldo;

The Regional Trial Court granted the prayer for temporary restraining order
and directed Alexander and Allan to remove their video cameras and install
them elsewhere where the spouses property will no longer be viewed.

Alexander and Allan filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
which granted their petition.

Bill and Victoria therefore elevated the case to the Supreme Court:

The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution and in our laws. It is

defined as the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones
person or from intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to
cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities. It is the right of an
individual to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without
unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the public is not
necessarily concerned. Simply put, the right to privacy is the right to be
let alone.

The Bill of Rights guarantees the peoples right to privacy and protects them
against the States abuse of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the
right of the people to be secure in their houses. No one, not even the State,
except in case of overriding social need and then only under the stringent
procedural safeguards, can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.

xxx

Our Code specifically mentions prying into the privacy of anothers

residence. This does not mean, however, that only the residence is entitled
to privacy, because the law covers also similar acts. A business office is
entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only
such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. x x x[ (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code
should not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places

where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. The
phrase prying into the privacy of anothers residence, therefore, covers
places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private.
And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not
infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the
application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.

xxx

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use

the reasonable expectation of privacy test. This test determines whether a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation
has been violated. In Ople v. Torres, we enunciated that the reasonableness
of a persons expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether,
by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and
(2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. Customs,
community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an
individuals reasonable expectation of privacy. Hence, the reasonableness
of a persons expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case
basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically
everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of
these cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable
expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to
privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used
to pry into the privacy of anothers residence or business office as it would
be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No.
4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel

respect for [ones] personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy
and [non]-interference demands respect.

THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 175540, April 14, 2014, DR. FILOTEO A.
ALANO, PETITIONER, VS. ZENAIDA MAGUD-LOGMAO, RESPONDENT.
Amelito Logmao was brought to the East Avenue Medical Center by sidewalk
vendors who allegedly saw him fall from the overpass in Cubao, Quezon City.
There, his patients data sheet identified him as Angelito Lugmoso. The
clinical abstract prepared by the surgical resident identified him as Angelito
(Logmao), however. Considering that his deterioration progressively
deteriorated, and no vacancy was available at the ICU of East Avenue
Medical Center, and upon recommendation by a resident physician of the
National Kidney Institute who also does the rounds at EAMC,
Logmao/Lugmoso was transferred to NKI. His name was recorded as Angelito
Lugmose at the NKI. There being no relatives around, Jennifer, the transplant
coordinator, was instructed to locate his family by enlisting the assistance of
the police and the media. Dr. Ona, the chairman of the Department of
Surgery, observing the severity of the brain injury of Angelito
Lugmoso/Logmao, requested the Laboratory Section to conduct crossmatching and tissue typing, so that if Angelito expires despite the necessary
medical care and management, and found a suitable organ donor, provided
his family would consent to it, his organs could be detached and
transplanted promptly to a compatible beneficiary. Jennifer secured the
patient data of Agelito from EAMC, where he was identified as Angelito
Lugmoso of Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong and contacted several television and
radio stations for the purpose of locating the family of Lugmoso. She also
sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police to locate the
whereabouts of Angelitos family. As proof, the radio and tv stations she
contacted, as well as the pertinent police station, issued Certifications
attesting to her effort to locate Angelitos family.

Angelito was eventually pronounced dead, hence Dr. Ona set in motion the
removal of organs of Angelito for organ transplantation. He sought
permission from the Executive Director, Dr. Filoteo Alano, who issued a
Memorandum approving the transplant as long as all the requisite
requirements had been complied with and the NBI had been informed of the
planned transplant. The NBI thru Dr. Maximo Reyes gave verbal approval to
the planned transplant. Thus, a medical performed a series of surgeries to
remove Angelitps heart, spleen, pancreas, and liver. One kidney and the
pancreas was transplanted to Lee Tan Hoc, while the other kidney was
transplanted to Alexis Ambustan. A doctor then made arrangements with
Funerario Oro for the embalmment of the remains of Angelito for a period of
15 days to afford more time for the relative of Angelito to locate his remains.
The NBI also conducted an autopsy on Angelitos cadaver where his cause of
death was listed as intracranial haemorrhage secondary to skull fracture.

On March 11, 1988, the NKI issued a press release announcing the successful
organ transplant. A cousin of Angelito heard on the radio that the donor was
a certain Angelitlo Lugmoso who is now at Funeraria Oro. Sensing a vague
resemblance to Angelito Logmao;s name, she reported it to his mother,
Zenaida Logmao. When they went to the Furearia Oro to see the remains, it
was there that they discovered the remains of Angelito in a cheap casket.
Previously, Arnelitos sister Arlen reported on March 3, 1988 that her brother,
Arnelito did not return home after seeing a movie in Cubao.

Because of this discovery, Zenaida filed a complaint for damages against Dr.
Emmanuel Lenon, Taurean Protectors Agency, represented by its Proprietor,
Celso Santiago, National Kidney Institute, represented by its Director, Dr.
Filoteo A. Alano, Jennifer Misa, Dr. Maximo Reyes, Dr. Enrique T. Ona, Dr.
Manuel Chua-Chiaco, Jr., Dr. Rose Marie O. Rosete-Liquete, Dr. Aurea Z.
Ambrosio, Dr. Ludivino de Guzman, Dr. Mary Litonjua, Dr. Jaime Velasquez, Dr.
Ricardo Fernando, Dr. Myrna Mendoza, Lee Tan Koc, Alexis Ambustan, Dr.
Antonio R. Paraiso, La Funeraria Oro, Inc., represented by its President,
German E. Ortega, Roberto Ortega alias Bobby Ortega, Dr. Mariano B. Cueva,
Jr., John Doe, Peter Doe, and Alex Doe in connection with the death of her son
Arnelito. Plaintiff alleged that defendants conspired to remove the organs

of Arnelito while the latter was still alive and that they concealed his true
identity.

Only Dr. Filoteo Albano was held liable for damages by the RTC. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with modification, by reducing the
award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees.

Dr. Alano then filed his appeal before the Supreme Court. In his brief, he
argued that he when he gave authorization for the removal of the organs, he
gave so only in accordance with the letter of the law, Republic Act 349, and
after instructions had been made to locate the deceaseds relatives, even to
the extent of disseminating the information to the media and the police..

The Supreme Court:

Dr. Alano cannot be held liable for damages.

The Memorandum dated March 3, 1988 issued by petitioner, stated thus:

As shown by the medical records, the said patient died on March 3, 1988 at
9:10 in the morning due to craniocerebral injury. Please make certain that
your Department has exerted all reasonable efforts to locate the relatives or
next-of-kin of the said deceased patient, such as appeal through the radios
and television, as well as through police and other government agencies and
that the NBI [Medico-Legal] Section has been notified and is aware of the
case.

If all the above has been complied with, in accordance with the provisions of
Republic Act No. 349 as amended and P.D. 856, permission and/or authority
is hereby given to the Department of Surgery to retrieve and remove the
kidneys, pancreas, liver and heart of the said deceased patient and to

transplant the said organs to any compatible patient who maybe in need of
said organs to live and survive.

A careful reading of the above shows that petitioner instructed his

subordinates to make certain that all reasonable efforts are exerted to
locate the patients next of kin, even enumerating ways in which to ensure
that notices of the death of the patient would reach said relatives. It also
clearly stated that permission or authorization to retrieve and remove the
internal organs of the deceased was being given ONLY IF the provisions of
the applicable law had been complied with. Such instructions reveal that
petitioner acted prudently by directing his subordinates to exhaust all
reasonable means of locating the relatives of the deceased. He could not
have made his directives any clearer. He even specifically mentioned that
permission is only being granted IF the Department of Surgery has complied
with all the requirements of the law. Verily, petitioner could not have been
faulted for having full confidence in the ability of the doctors in the
Department of Surgery to comprehend the instructions, obeying all his
directives, and acting only in accordance with the requirements of the law.

Furthermore, as found by the lower courts from the records of the case, the
doctors and personnel of NKI disseminated notices of the death of
respondents son to the media and sought the assistance of the appropriate
police authorities as early as March 2, 1988, even before petitioner issued
the Memorandum. Prior to performing the procedure for retrieval of the
deceaseds internal organs, the doctors concerned also the sought the
opinion and approval of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI.

Thus, there can be no cavil that petitioner employed reasonable means to

disseminate notifications intended to reach the relatives of the deceased.
The only question that remains pertains to the sufficiency of time allowed for
notices to reach the relatives of the deceased.

If respondent failed to immediately receive notice of her sons death because

the notices did not properly state the name or identity of the deceased, fault
cannot be laid at petitioners door. The trial and appellate courts found that it

was the EAMC, who had the opportunity to ascertain the name of the
deceased, who recorded the wrong information regarding the deceaseds
identity to NKI. The NKI could not have obtained the information about his
name from the patient, because as found by the lower courts, the deceased
was already unconscious by the time he was brought to the NKI.

Ultimately, it is respondents failure to adduce adequate evidence that

doomed this case. As stated in Otero v. Tan, [i]n civil cases, it is a basic rule
that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a
preponderance of evidence. The parties must rely on the strength of their
own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their
opponent. Here, there is to proof that, indeed, the period of around 24
hours from the time notices were disseminated, cannot be considered as
reasonable under the circumstances. They failed to present any expert
witness to prove that given the medical technology and knowledge at that
time in the 1980s, the doctors could or should have waited longer before
harvesting the internal organs for transplantation.

Verily, the Court cannot, in conscience, agree with the lower court. Finding
petitioner liable for damages is improper. It should be emphasized that the
internal organs of the deceased were removed only after he had been
declared brain dead; thus, the emotional pain suffered by respondent due to
the death of her son cannot in any way be attributed to petitioner. Neither
can the Court find evidence on record to show that respondents emotional
suffering at the sight of the pitiful state in which she found her sons lifeless
body be categorically attributed to petitioners conduct.

JOSE V. LAGON, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and

MENANDRO V. LAPUZ, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:

On June 23, 1982, petitioner Jose Lagon purchased from the estate of Bai
Tonina Sepi, through an intestate court,[1] two parcels of land located at
Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. A few months after the sale, private respondent
Menandro Lapuz filed a complaint for torts and damages against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sultan Kudarat.

In the complaint, private respondent, as then plaintiff, claimed that he

entered into a contract of lease with the late Bai Tonina Sepi Mengelen
Guiabar over three parcels of land (the property) in Sultan Kudarat,
Maguindanao beginning 1964. One of the provisions agreed upon was for
private respondent to put up commercial buildings which would, in turn, be
leased to new tenants. The rentals to be paid by those tenants would answer
for the rent private respondent was obligated to pay Bai Tonina Sepi for the
lease of the land. In 1974, the lease contract ended but since the
construction of the commercial buildings had yet to be completed, the lease
contract was allegedly renewed.

When Bai Tonina Sepi died, private respondent started remitting his rent to
the court-appointed administrator of her estate. But when the administrator
advised him to stop collecting rentals from the tenants of the buildings he
constructed, he discovered that petitioner, representing himself as the new
owner of the property, had been collecting rentals from the tenants. He thus
filed a complaint against the latter, accusing petitioner of inducing the heirs
of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him, thereby violating his leasehold
rights over it.

In his answer to the complaint, petitioner denied that he induced the heirs of
Bai Tonina to sell the property to him, contending that the heirs were in dire
need of money to pay off the obligations of the deceased. He also denied
interfering with private respondents leasehold rights as there was no lease
contract covering the property when he purchased it; that his personal
investigation and inquiry revealed no claims or encumbrances on the subject
lots.

Petitioner claimed that before he bought the property, he went to Atty.

Benjamin Fajardo, the lawyer who allegedly notarized the lease contract
between private respondent and Bai Tonina Sepi, to verify if the parties
indeed renewed the lease contract after it expired in 1974. Petitioner averred
that Atty. Fajardo showed him four copies of the lease renewal but these
were all unsigned. To refute the existence of a lease contract, petitioner
presented in court a certification from the Office of the Clerk of Court
confirming that no record of any lease contract notarized by Atty. Fajardo had
been entered into their files. Petitioner added that he only learned of the
alleged lease contract when he was informed that private respondent was
collecting rent from the tenants of the building.

Finding the complaint for tortuous interference to be unwarranted, petitioner

filed his counterclaim and prayed for the payment of actual and moral
damages.

On July 29, 1986, the court a quo found for private respondent (plaintiff
below):

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff:

1.
Declaring the Contract of Lease executed by Bai Tonina Sepi Mangelen
Guiabar in favor of the plaintiff on November 6, 1974 (Exh. A and A-1) over
Lot No. 6395, Pls-73. Lot No 6396. Pls.-73. Lot No. 6399. 3ls-73, and Lot
no.9777-A. CSD-11-000076-D (Lot No. 3-A. 40124), all situated along
Ledesma St., Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat, which document was notarized by
Atty. Benjamin S. Fajardo, Sr. and entered into his notarial register as Doc.
No. 619. Page No. 24. Book No. II. Series of 1974, to be authentic and
genuine and as such valid and binding for a period of ten (10) years specified
thereon from November 1, 1974 up to October 31, 1984;

2.
Declaring the plaintiff as the lawful owner of the commercial buildings
found on the aforesaid lots and he is entitled to their possession and the

collection (of rentals) of the said commercial buildings within the period
covered by this Contract of Lease in his favor;

3.

Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the following:

a)
Rentals of the commercial buildings on the lots covered by the Contract
of Lease in favor of the plaintiff for the period from October 1, 1978 up to
October 31, 1984, including accrued interests in the total amount of Five
Hundred Six Thousand Eight Hundred Five Pesos and Fifty Six Centavos
(P506, 850.56), the same to continue to bear interest at the legal rate of 12%
per annum until the whole amount is fully paid by the defendant to the
plaintiff;

b)
Moral damages in the amount of One Million Sixty Two Thousand Five
Hundred Pesos (P1,062,500.00);

c)
Actual or compensatory damages in the amount of Three Hundred
Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P312, 500.00);

d)
Exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of One Hundred Eighty
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P187,500.00)

e)
Temperate or moderate damages in the amount of Sixty Two Thousand
Five Hundred Pesos (P62,500.00);

f)
Nominal damages in the amount of Sixty Two Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos (P62,500.00);

g)
Attorneys fees in the amount of One Hundred Twenty Five Thousand
Pesos (P125,000.00);

h)
Expenses of litigation in the amount of Sixty Two Thousand Five
Hundred Pesos (P62,500.00);

i)
Interest on the moral damages, actual or compensatory damages
temperate or moderate damages, nominal damages, attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation in the amounts as specified hereinabove from May 24,
1982 up to June 27, 1986, in the total amount of Nine Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P900,000.00); all of which will continue to bear interests at a legal
rate of 12% per annum until the whole amounts are fully paid by the
defendants to the plaintiffs;

4.
For failure of the defendant to deposit with this Court all the rentals he
had collected from the thirteen (13) tenants or occupants of the commercial
buildings in question, the plaintiff is hereby restored to the possession of his
commercial buildings for a period of seventy-three (73) months which is the
equivalent of the total period for which he was prevented from collecting the
rentals from the tenants or occupants of his commercial buildings from
October 1, 1978 up to October 31, 1984, and for this purpose a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction is hereby issued, but the plaintiff is likewise ordered to
pay to the defendant the monthly rental of Seven Hundred Pesos (P700.00)
every end of the month for the entire period of seventy three (73) months.
This portion of the judgment should be considered as a mere alternative
should the defendant fail to pay the amount of Five Hundred Five Pesos and
Fifty Six Centavos (P506,805.56) hereinabove specified;

5.
Dismissing the counterclaim interposed by the defendant for lack of
merit;

6.

With costs against the defendant.[2]

Petitioner appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals.[3] In a decision

dated January 31, 1995,[4] the appellate court modified the assailed
judgment of the trial court as follows:

a)
The award for moral damages, compensatory damages,
exemplary damages, temperate or moderate damages, and nominal
damages as well as expenses of litigation in the amount of P62,500.00 and
interests under paragraph 3-a(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i) are
deleted;

b)

The award for attorneys fees is reduced to P30,000.00;

c)

Paragraphs 1,2,5 and 6 are AFFIRMED;

d)
Additionally, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay to
the plaintiff by way of actual damages the sum of P178,425.00 representing
the amount of rentals he collected from the period of October 1978 to August
1983, and minus the amount of P42,700.00 representing rentals due the
defendant computed at P700.00 per month for the period from August 1978
to August 1983, with interest thereon at the rate until the same is fully paid;

e)

Paragraph 4 is deleted.[5]

Before the appellate court, petitioner disclaimed knowledge of any lease

contract between the late Bai Tonina Sepi and private respondent. On the
other hand, private respondent insisted that it was impossible for petitioner
not to know about the contract since the latter was aware that he was
collecting rentals from the tenants of the building. While the appellate court
disbelieved the contentions of both parties, it nevertheless held that, for
petitioner to become liable for damages, he must have known of the lease
contract and must have also acted with malice or bad faith when he bought
the subject parcels of land.

Via this petition for review, petitioner cites the following reasons why the
Court should rule in his favor:

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred in holding that petitioner is

liable for interference of contractual relation under Article 1314 of the New
Civil Code;

2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not holding that private

respondent is precluded from recovering, if at all, because of laches;

3. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioner liable for actual
damages and attorneys fees, and;

4. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioners

counterclaims.[6]

Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides that any third person who induces
another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other
contracting party. The tort recognized in that provision is known as
interference with contractual relations.[7] The interference is penalized
because it violates the property rights of a party in a contract to reap the
benefits that should result therefrom.[8]

The core issue here is whether the purchase by petitioner of the subject
property, during the supposed existence of private respondents lease
contract with the late Bai Tonina Sepi, constituted tortuous interference for
which petitioner should be held liable for damages.

The Court, in the case of So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals,[9] laid down the
elements of tortuous interference with contractual relations: (a) existence of

a valid contract; (b) knowledge on the part of the third person of the
existence of the contract and (c) interference of the third person without
legal justification or excuse. In that case, petitioner So Ping Bun occupied the
premises which the corporation of his grandfather was leasing from private
respondent, without the knowledge and permission of the corporation. The
corporation, prevented from using the premises for its business, sued So Ping
Bun for tortuous interference.

As regards the first element, the existence of a valid contract must be duly
established. To prove this, private respondent presented in court a notarized
copy of the purported lease renewal.[10] While the contract appeared as
duly notarized, the notarization thereof, however, only proved its due
execution and delivery but not the veracity of its contents. Nonetheless, after
undergoing the rigid scrutiny of petitioners counsel and after the trial court
declared it to be valid and subsisting, the notarized copy of the lease
contract presented in court appeared to be incontestable proof that private
respondent and the late Bai Tonina Sepi actually renewed their lease
contract. Settled is the rule that until overcome by clear, strong and
convincing evidence, a notarized document continues to be prima facie
evidence of the facts that gave rise to its execution and delivery.[11]

The second element, on the other hand, requires that there be knowledge on
the part of the interferer that the contract exists. Knowledge of the
subsistence of the contract is an essential element to state a cause of action
for tortuous interference.[12] A defendant in such a case cannot be made
liable for interfering with a contract he is unaware of.[13] While it is not
necessary to prove actual knowledge, he must nonetheless be aware of the
facts which, if followed by a reasonable inquiry, will lead to a complete
disclosure of the contractual relations and rights of the parties in the
contract.[14]

In this case, petitioner claims that he had no knowledge of the lease

contract. His sellers (the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi) likewise allegedly did not
inform him of any existing lease contract.

After a careful perusal of the records, we find the contention of petitioner

meritorious. He conducted his own personal investigation and inquiry, and
unearthed no suspicious circumstance that would have made a cautious man
probe deeper and watch out for any conflicting claim over the property. An
examination of the entire propertys title bore no indication of the leasehold
interest of private respondent. Even the registry of property had no record of
the same.[15]

Assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner knew of the contract, such

knowledge alone was not sufficient to make him liable for tortuous
interference. Which brings us to the third element. According to our ruling in
So Ping Bun, petitioner may be held liable only when there was no legal
justification or excuse for his action[16] or when his conduct was stirred by a
wrongful motive. To sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant
must have acted with malice[17] or must have been driven by purely
impious reasons to injure the plaintiff. In other words, his act of interference
cannot be justified.[18]

Furthermore, the records do not support the allegation of private respondent

that petitioner induced the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to
him. The word induce refers to situations where a person causes another to
choose one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation.[19] The records
show that the decision of the heirs of the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the
property was completely of their own volition and that petitioner did
absolutely nothing to influence their judgment. Private respondent himself
did not proffer any evidence to support his claim. In short, even assuming
that private respondent was able to prove the renewal of his lease contract
with Bai Tonina Sepi, the fact was that he was unable to prove malice or bad
faith on the part of petitioner in purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim
of tortuous interference was never established.

In So Ping Bun, the Court discussed whether interference can be justified at

all if the interferer acts for the sole purpose of furthering a personal financial
interest, but without malice or bad faith. As the Court explained it:

x x x, as a general rule, justification for interfering with the business relations

of another exists where the actors motive is to benefit himself. Such
justification does not exist where the actors motive is to cause harm to the
other. Added to this, some authorities believe that it is not necessary that the
interferers interest outweigh that of the party whose rights are invaded, and
that an individual acts under an economic interest that is substantial, not
merely de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious motives are negatived,
for he acts in self-protection. Moreover, justification for protecting ones
financial position should not be made to depend on a comparison of his
economic interest in the subject matter with that of the others. It is sufficient
if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in
wrongful motives.[20]

The foregoing disquisition applies squarely to the case at bar. In our view,
petitioners purchase of the subject property was merely an advancement of
his financial or economic interests, absent any proof that he was enthused by
improper motives. In the very early case of Gilchrist v. Cuddy,[21] the Court
declared that a person is not a malicious interferer if his conduct is impelled
by a proper business interest. In other words, a financial or profit motivation
will not necessarily make a person an officious interferer liable for damages
as long as there is no malice or bad faith involved.

In sum, we rule that, inasmuch as not all three elements to hold petitioner
liable for tortuous interference are present, petitioner cannot be made to
answer for private respondents losses.

This case is one of damnun absque injuria or damage without injury. Injury is
the legal invasion of a legal right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm
which results from the injury.[22] In BPI Express Card Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,,[23] the Court turned down the claim for damages of a cardholder
whose credit card had been cancelled by petitioner corporation after several
defaults in payment. We held there that there can be damage without injury
where the loss or harm is not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In that
instance, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone since
the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not

amount to legal injury or wrong.[24] Indeed, lack of malice in the conduct

complained of precludes recovery of damages.[25]

With respect to the attorneys fees awarded by the appellate court to private
respondent, we rule that it cannot be recovered under the circumstances.
According to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorneys fees may be awarded
only when it has been stipulated upon or under the instances provided
therein.[26] Likewise, being in the concept of actual damages, the award for
attorneys fees must have clear, factual and legal bases[27] which, in this
case, do not exist.

Regarding the dismissal of petitioners counterclaim for actual and moral

damages, the appellate court affirmed the assailed order of the trial court
because it found no basis to grant the amount of damages prayed for by
petitioner. We find no reason to reverse the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. Actual damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in
recompense for, loss or injury sustained. To be recoverable, they must not
only be capable of proof but must actually be proved with a reasonable
degree of certainty.[28] Petitioner was unable to prove that he suffered loss
or injury, hence, his claim for actual damages must fail. Moreover, petitioners
prayer for moral damages was not warranted as moral damages should
result from the wrongful act of a person. The worries and anxieties suffered
by a party hailed to court litigation are not compensable.[29]

With the foregoing discussion, we no longer deem it necessary to delve into

the issue of laches.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The

assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Lacson vs lacson
Facts:
- Feb 14, 1953 when they got married

- Jan 9, 1963 when Carmen (respondent) left home in Bacolod to go to

Manila
- March 12, 1963 Carmen filed a complaint for custody of children as well
as support in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila
o Before it pushed through though they reached a settlement where the two
eldest kids would go to petitioner Alfonso and the youngest would stay with
Carmen
o This was affirmed by the CFI
- May 7, 1963 respondent filed a motion for the custody of all children be
given to her in JDRC since she said she only entered into agreement to gain
custody of her younger children and thus should be given custody of the
older ones as well who are all below 7 years old.
- CA: ruled that compromise agreement as relating to custody of children
should be declared null and void and as such the execution of said judgment
is void too.

ISSUE: Whether or Not support should be awarded to the wife

HELD: Yes, should have but was filed out of time

- NCC Art 363 - "No mother shall be separated from her child under seven
years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure."
o Older children at that time were 5 and 6 so agreement should have been
declared null and void since no compelling reasons were stated otherwise
o However the children are now 11 and 10 and thus The 11 year old may
choose which parent they want to live with (sec. 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court, as long as above ten) already 1968
o Court may also award custody to who they deem more fit through
evidence.
Art 356 of the NCC - Every child:
(1) Is entitled to parental care;

(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;

(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian;
(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and
intellectual development.
- However even if custody should have been null and void, the rest of the
agreement is valid with respect to the separation of property of the spouses
and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership since it had judicial sanction.
(art 190/191 of NCC)
Corroborated by already 5-year separation

Ilusorio vs Bildner

Ilusorio vs. Bildner

GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000

FACTS:

Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive

property valued at millions of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of
the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. He was married with
Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children
namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta
and Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived
at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio
Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner
lived in Antipolo City.

In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about
5 months in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during
this time their mother overdose Potenciano which caused the latters health
to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for
guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latters
advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May
1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not
return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In
March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the
custody of his husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands
to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to
Antipolo.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.

HELD:

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or

detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the
one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of
liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The
illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or
moral.

Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or

deprivation of Potencianos liberty that would justify issuance of the writ.
The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under medication does not
necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. He still has the capacity to
discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having the right of choice,
he may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice.
Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy.

The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child
but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband
refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without
threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a
matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a
writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process.

Goitia vs Campos-Rueda
Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda
35 Phil 252

FACTS:

Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda,

respondent, were married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115
Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a month before
petitioner returned to her parents home. Goitia filed a complaint against
respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that
respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his
genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her
husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on
refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries
upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of
respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support
her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree
granting her separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for
review.

ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside
the conjugal home.

HELD:

The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created
merely in the act of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is

obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a
fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However,
this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband
to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven
away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at
bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd
designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support
from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.

Gashem Shookat Baksh vs Court of Appeals

219 SCRA 115 Civil Law Torts and Damages Breach of promise to Marry
Article 21 of the Civil Code

In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City, Pangasinan,

Marilou Gonzales, then 21 years old, met Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year
old exchange student from Iran who was studying medicine in Dagupan. The
two got really close and intimate. On Marilous account, she said that
Gashem later offered to marry her at the end of the semester. Marilou then
introduced Gashem to her parents where they expressed their intention to
get married. Marilous parents then started inviting sponsors and relatives to
the wedding. They even started looking for animals to slaughter for the
occasion.

Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where they
had sexual intercourse. But in no time, their relationship went sour as
Gashem began maltreating Marilou. Gashem eventually revoked his promise
of marrying Marilou and he told her that he is already married to someone in
Bacolod City. So Marilou went home and later sued Gashem for damages.

The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral
damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to Marilou and

that he cannot be adjudged to have violated Filipino customs and traditions
since he, being an Iranian, was not familiar with Filipino customs and
traditions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.

HELD: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not really
because of his breach of promise to marry her but based on Article 21 of the
Civil Code which provides:

Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.

Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it
is the deceit and fraud employed by Gashem that constitutes a violation of
Article 21 of the Civil Code. His promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful
scheme to lure her into sexual congress. As found by the trial court, Marilou
was not a woman of loose morals. She was a virgin before she met Gashem.
She would not have surrendered herself to Gashem had Gashem not
promised to marry her. Gashems blatant disregard of Filipino traditions on
marriage and on the reputation of Filipinas is contrary to morals, good
customs, and public policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of
our country and even taking advantage of the opportunity to study here he is
expected to respect our traditions. Any act contrary will render him liable
under Article 21 of the Civil Code.

The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to expand the
concepts of torts and quasi delict. It is meant to cover situations such as this
case where the breach complained of is not strictly covered by existing laws.
It was meant as a legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which
is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books such as the absence of a law penalizing a the breach of
promise to marry.

The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise
to marry was made and there was carnal knowledge because of it, then
moral damages may be recovered (presence of moral or criminal seduction),

Except if there was mutual lust; or if expenses were made because of the
promise (expenses for the wedding), then actual damages may be
recovered.

Wassmer vs. Velez

G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964
12 SCRA 648

Facts: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer applied for a Marriage License on
August 23, 1954. The wedding was to take place on September 4, 1954. All
the necessary preparations were undertaken for the said event. However,
two days before the wedding, Francisco left a note for Beatriz informing her
that the wedding will not push through because his mother opposed the
union. The following day, he sent her a telegram stating that he will be
returning very soon. Francisco never showed up and has not been heard
since then. Beatriz subsequently sued Francisco for damages. The trial court
ordered Francisco to pay Beatriz actual, moral and exemplary damages.

Francisco filed a petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings
and motion for new trial and reconsideration which was denied by the trial
court. Francisco appealed to the Supreme Court, asserting that the judgment
is contrary to law as there is no provision in the Civil Code authorizing an
action for breach of promise to marry.

Issue: May Francisco be held liable to pay Beatriz damages for breach of
promise to marry?

Held: Yes. Francisco may be held liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code,
which provides: "Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."

Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally

set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk
out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. This is palpably
and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21.

Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals Case Digest/ Brief G.R. No. L-14628
Posted on April 27, 2010 by krizsexzy
>Hermosisima vs. CA Cse Digest/ Brief (link)
Procedural Facts: Case filed in Court of First Instance of Cebu which rendered
decision in favor of P (soledad). Lower Courts decision was modified by the
Court of Appeals by increasing compensatory damages and moral damages.
Substantive Facts: Soledad Cagigas, a teacher and petitioner, who was
almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around together and
were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage
prior thereto their intimacy developed among them Soledad advised
petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry
her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born. However defendant married
one Romanita Perez.

ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for
breach of promise to marry?
HELD: When the woman becomes pregnant and subsequently delivers.
Although she cannot recover moral damages for the breach, nevertheless

she can recover compensatory damages for medical and hospitalization

expenses as well as attorneys fees.
REASONING: Because of defendant-appellants seduction power, plaintiffappellee, overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual
desires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a woman after all, we
hold that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore,
moral damages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article
2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.

THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 161188, June 13, 2008, Heirs of PURISIMA NALA, represented by
their attorney-in-fact EFEGENIA DIGNA DUYAN, petitioners, vs.ARTEMIO CABANSAG,
respondent.

Artemio bought a 50-square meter property from spouses Eugenio and

Felisa, part of a 400-square meter lot registered in the name of the Gomez
spouses.. In October, 1991, he received a demand letter from Atty. Alexander
demanding payment for rentals from 1987 to 1991 until he leaves the
premises, as said property is owned by Purisima; failing which, civil and
criminal charges will be brought against him. This demand letter was
followed by another demand letter. According to Artemio, the demand letter
caused him damages prompting him to file a complaint for damages against
Purisima and Atty. Alexander. In their defense, Atty. Alexander alleged that he
merely acted in behalf of his client Purisima, who contested the ownership of
the lot by Artemio. Purisima alleged that the lot was pat of an 800-sq. meter
property owned by her late husband, Eulogio, which was divided into two
parts. The 400-square meter lot was conveyed to the spouses Gomez by
virtue of a fictitious deed of sale, with the agreement that it will be held in

trust by the Gomezes in behalf of their (Eulogio and Purisima) children.

Artemio is only renting the property which he occupies. She only learned of
the deed of sale by the Gomez spouses to Artemio when the latter filed the
case for damages against her and Atty. Alexander.

The RTC ruled in favour of Artemio and held Atty. Alexander and Purisima
liable for damages, which the Court of Appeals affirmed. The heirs of
Purisima thereafter file a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme
Court.

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.

The foregoing provision sets the standards which may be observed not only
in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. But a right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted
by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A
person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of
his right; that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but not when
he acts with negligence or abuse. There is an abuse of right when it is
exercised only for the purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. The exercise
of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no
intention to injure another.
In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle, the
following requisites must concur: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b)
which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another.

It should be stressed that malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of

the Civil Code. Good faith is presumed, and he who alleges bad faith has the
duty to prove the same. Bad faith, on the other hand, does not simply
connote bad judgment to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some
moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of known duty
due to some motives or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.
Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies
an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.
In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove that Nala and
her counsel, Atty. Del Prado, acted in bad faith or malice in sending the
demand letters to respondent. In the first place, there was ground for Nalas
actions since she believed that the property was owned by her husband
Eulogio Duyan and that respondent was illegally occupying the same. She
had no knowledge that spouses Gomez violated the trust imposed on them
by Eulogio and surreptitiously sold a portion of the property to respondent. It
was only after respondent filed the case for damages against Nala that she
learned of such sale. The bare fact that respondent claims ownership over
the property does not give rise to the conclusion that the sending of the
demand letters by Nala was done in bad faith. Absent any evidence
presented by respondent, bad faith or malice could not be attributed to
petitioner since Nala was only trying to protect their interests over the
property.

Moreover, respondent failed to show that Nala and Atty. Del Prados acts
were done with the sole intention of prejudicing and injuring him. It may be
true that respondent suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety and sleepless
nights when he received the demand letters; however, there is a material
distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the legal invasion of a legal
right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm which results from the
injury.Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which
the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such
cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone; the law
affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount
to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque
injuria.

Nala was acting well within her rights when she instructed Atty. Del Prado to
send the demand letters. She had to take all the necessary legal steps to
enforce her legal/equitable rights over the property occupied by respondent.
One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury. Thus, whatever
damages are suffered by respondent should be borne solely by him.

Tanjanco v. CA
Facts:

Apolonio Trajanco courted Araceli Santos. Since he promised her marriage,

she consented to his pleas for carnal knowledge. As a result, she conceived a
child, and due to her condition, she had to resign from her work. Because she
was unable to support herself and
the baby, and the Apolonio refused to marry her, she instituted an action for
damages, compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child, pay her
monthly support, plus P100,000 in moral and exemplary damages.

Issue:
Whether or not the acts of petitioner constitute seduction as contemplated in
Art. 21.

Held:
No, it is not. Seduction is more than mere sexual intercourse or a breach of
promise to marry. It connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement
superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which
the woman has yielded. In this case, for 1 whole year, the woman
maintained intimate sexual relations with the defendant, and such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly here there is voluntariness
and mutual passion, for had the plaintiff been deceived, she would not have
again yielded to his embraces for a year.

Geluz vs CA

TITLE: Geluz vs CA
CITATION: 2 SCRA 801

FACTS:

Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio
Geluz, the petitioner and physician, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita
became pregnant some time in 1950 before she and Oscar were legally
married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her parents, she
decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted again
on October 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she was employed at
COMELEC. After two years, on February 21, 1955, she again became
pregnant and was accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latters
daughter Lucida at Geluz clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street. Oscar at
this time was in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the
provincial board. He doesnt have any idea nor given his consent on the
abortion.

ISSUE: Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion,

could recover damages from the physician who caused the same.

HELD:

The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the
death of a person does not cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not
endowed with personality which trial court and Court of Appeals predicated.

Both trial court and CA wasnt able to find any basis for an award of moral
damages evidently because Oscars indifference to the previous abortions of
Nita clearly indicates he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental
affections. Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case against Geluz,
he turned his wifes indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for

damages of which not only he but, including his wife would be the
beneficiaries. It shows that hes after obtaining a large money payment
since he sued Geluz for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorneys fees that
serves as indemnity claim, which under the circumstances was clearly
exaggerated.

CD: Continental Steel v. Montao

August 16, 2010 at 12:25 pm (2009, Case Digests) (Case Digest, Civil Law,
Persons & Family Relations)
Continental Steel v. Montao
G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009
Chico-Nazario, J.

Doctrines:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb
already has life.

In case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor,

such should be interpreted in favor of labor.

Facts:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation (Continental Steel) filed a claim for Paternity Leave,
Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent,
pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos
wife had a premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy.
The female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to
uteroplacental insufficiency.

Petitioner immediately granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but

denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits.

It was maintained by Hortillano, through the Labor Union, that the provisions
of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first
been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her
subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits.

Petitioner argued that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate
the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed
that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1)
death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in
Hortillanos case. Continental Steel contended that only one with civil
personality could die, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code
which provides:

Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be
considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born
later with the conditions specified in the following article.

Article 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the
time it is completely delivered from the mothers womb. However, if the
fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed
born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the
maternal womb.

Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death

upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by
contract and by will.

Hence according to the petitioner, the unborn child never died because it
never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of
thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the
moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent
could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality.

Labor arbiter Montao argued that the fetus had the right to be supported by
the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to
rely on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained
himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her
mother.

Petitioner appealed with the CA, who affirmed the Labor Arbiters resolution.
Hence this petition.

Issues:
1. Whether or not only one with juridical personality can die
2. Whether or not a fetus can be considered as a dependent
3. Whether or not any ambiguity in CBA provisions shall be settled in favor of
the employee

Held:
1. No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil
Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a
conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41
defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil
personality is extinguished by death. The issue of civil personality is not
relevant in this case.

The above provisions of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of
death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality
may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those
who have acquired juridical personality could die.

Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb
already has life.

No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If
the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child
being delivered, qualifies as death.

2. Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillanos child

could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending
upon its mother, Hortillanos wife, for sustenance. The CBA did not provide a
qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been
born or must have acquired civil personality. Without such qualification, then
child shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the
unborn fetus in the mothers womb.

3. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of
doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such
should be interpreted in favor of labor. In the same way, the CBA and CBA
provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. As decided by this Court,
any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor
pursuant to the social justice policy. (Terminal Facilities and Services
Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)])

Bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to

give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his
family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the
parents grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child,
who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during
delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died
subsequently.

G.R. No. L-12105

January 30, 1960TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN,
deceased. PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., executor-appellee, vs.MAGDALENA C.
BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY LYDIA BOHANAN, oppositorsappellants.Issues:The oppositors, Magadalena C. Bohanan and her
two children, question the validity of theexecutor/testator C.O.
Bohanans last will and testament, claiming that they have been deprived
ofthe legitimate that the laws of the form concede to them.Another, is the
claim of the testator's children, Edward and Mary Lydia Bohanan, who had
receivedlegacies in the amount of PHP 6, 000 each only, and, therefore, have
not been given their shares inthe estate which, in accordance with the laws,
should be two-thirds of the estate left by the testator.Facts:C.O. Bohanan was
born in Nebraska and therefore a citizen of that state. Notwithstanding his
longresidence in the Philippines, he continued and remained to be a citizen
of the United States and ofthe state of his pertinent residence to
spend the rest of his days in that state. His permanentresidence or
domicile in the United States depended upon his personal intent or desire,
and heselected Nevada as his homicide and therefore at the time of his
death, he was a citizen of thatstate. Held:The first issue refers to the share
that the wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, should beentitled to
receive. The will has not given her any share in the estate left by the
testator. It is arguedthat it was error for the trial court to have recognized the
Reno divorce secured by the testator fromhis Filipino wife Magdalena C.
Bohanan, and that said divorce should be declared a nullity in
thisjurisdiction. The court refused to recognize the claim of the widow on the
ground that the laws ofNevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow
him to dispose of all of his properties withoutrequiring him to leave any
portion of his estate to his former (or divorced) wife. No right to share inthe
inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada, thus the
oppositor can nolonger claim portion of the estate left by the testator.With

regards the second issue, the old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case
because thetestator died in 1944, expressly provides that successional rights
to personal property are to beearned by the national law of the person
whose succession is in question, thus the two-third rule isnot
enforceable.Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan was at
the time of his death a citizen ofthe United States and of the State of Nevada
and declares that his will and testament is fully inaccordance with the laws of
the state of Nevada and admits the same to probate.As in accordance with
Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions are
tobe governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided
and it is not disputed thatthe national law of the testator is that of the State
of Nevada which allows a testator to dispose of allhis property according to
his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the court approving the project
ofpartition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions, must be,
as it is hereby affirmed, withcosts against appellants.

Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon

Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, GR No. 139868 June 8, 2006

Facts:
2 American citizens have resided in the Philippines. They have an adopted
daughter. The wife died and left a will where she left her entire estate to her
husband. 2 years after the wife's death, the husband married a Candelaria. 4
years after, Richard died and left a will where he left his entire estate to
Candelaria except for some of his shares in a company which he left to his
adopted daughter. Audreys will was admitted to probate in CFI Rizal.
Inventory was taken on their conjugal properties. Ancheta, as the
administrator, filed for a partition of the first wife's estate. The will was also
admitted in a court in her native land (Maryland).

Issue: Whether or not the properties in issue should be governed by the law
where the property is situated

Ruling:

Yes, properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is
situated. However, since the first wife is a foreign national, the intrinsic
validity of her will is governed by her national law. The national law of the
person who made the will shall regulate whose succession is in consideration
whatever the nature of the property and regardless of the country where the
property maybe found (Art 16 CC). The first wife's properties may be found in
the Philipppines, however the successional rights over those properties are
governed by the national law of the testator.

LAURO G. VIZCONDE, petitioner, vs., COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT, Branch 120, Caloocan City, and RAMON G. NICOLAS, respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:

Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two
children, viz., Carmela and Jennifer. Petitioners wife, Estrellita, is one of the
five siblings of spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas. The other
children of Rafael and Salud are Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita
Nicolas de Leon, and Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent. Antonio predeceased
his parents and is now survived by his widow, Zenaida, and their four
children.

On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land with an
area of 10,110 sq. m. located at Valenzuela, Bulacan (hereafter Valenzuela
property) covered by TCT No. (T-36734) 13206 for One Hundred Thirty Five
Thousand Pesos (P135,000.00), evidenced by a Lubusang Bilihan ng Bahagi
ng Lupa na Nasasakupan ng Titulo TCT NO. T-36734.[1] In view thereof, TCT

No. V-554 covering the Valenzuela property was issued to Estrellita.[2] On

March 30, 1990, Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property to Amelia Lim and
Maria Natividad Balictar Chiu for Three Million, Four Hundred Five Thousand,
Six Hundred Twelve Pesos (P3,405,612.00).[3] In June of the same year,
Estrellita bought from Premiere Homes, Inc., a parcel of land with
improvements situated at Vinzon St., BF Homes, Paraaque (hereafter
Paraaque property) using a portion of the proceeds was used in buying a car
while the balance was deposited in a bank.

The following year an unfortunate event in petitioners life occurred. Estrellita

and her two daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed on June 30, 1991,
an incident popularly known as the Vizconde Massacre. The findings of the
investigation conducted by the NBI reveal that Estrellita died ahead of her
daughters.[4] Accordingly, Carmela, Jennifer and herein petitioner succeeded
Estrellita and, with the subsequent death of Carmela and Jennifer, petitioner
was left as the sole heir of his daughters. Nevertheless, petitioner entered
into an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita NicolasVizconde With Waiver of Shares,[5] with Rafael and Salud, Estrellitas parents.
The extra-judicial settlement provided for the division of the properties of
Estrellita and her two daughters between petitioner and spouses Rafael and
Salud. The properties include bank deposits, a car and the Paraaque
property. The total value of the deposits deducting the funeral and other
related expenses in the burial of Estrellita, Carmela and Jennifer, amounts to
Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00).[6] The settlement gave fifty percent
(50%) of the total amount of the bank deposits of Estrellita and her
daughters to Rafael, except Saving Account No. 104-111211-0 under the
name of Jennifer which involves a token amount. The other fifty percent
(50%) was allotted to petitioner. The Paraaque property and the car were
also given to petitioner with Rafael and Salud waiving all their claims, rights,
ownership and participation as heirs[7] in the said properties.

On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafaels estate, Teresita

instituted an intestate estate proceeding[8] docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C1679, with Branch 120 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City
listing as heirs Salud, Ramon, Ricardo and the wife (Zenaida) and children of
Antonio. Teresita prayed to be appointed Special Administratrix of Rafaels
estate. Additionally, she sought to be appointed as guardian ad litem of

Salud, now senile, and Ricardo, her incompetent brother. Herein private
respondent Ramon filed an opposition[9] dated March 24, 1993, praying to
be appointed instead as Salud and Ricardos guardian. Barely three weeks
passed, Ramon filed another opposition[10] alleging, among others, that
Estrellita was given the Valenzuela property by Rafael which she sold for not
les than Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) before her gruesome murder.
Ramon pleaded for courts intervention to determine the legality and validity
of the intervivos distribution made by deceased Rafael to his children,[11]
Estrellita included. On May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his own petition, docketed
as Sp. Proc. No. C-1699, entitled InMatter Of The Guardianship Of Salud G.
Nicolas and Ricardo G. Nicolas and averred that their legitime should come
from the collation of all the properties distributed to his children by Rafael
during his lifetime.[12] Ramon stated that herein petitioner is one of Rafaels
children by right of representation as the widower of deceased legitimate
daughter of Estrellita.[13]

In a consolidated Order, dated November 9, 1993, the RTC appointed Ramon

as the Guardian of Salud and Ricardo while Teresita, in turn, was appointed
as the Special Administratrix of Rafaels estate. The courts Order did not
include petitioner in the slate of Rafaels heirs.[14] Neither was the Paraaque
property listed in its list of properties to be included in the estate.[15]
Subsequently, the RTC in an Order dated January 5, 1994, removed Ramon
as Salud and Ricardos guardian for selling his wards property without the
courts knowledge and permission.[16]

Sometime on January 13, 1994, the RTC released an Order giving petitioner
ten (10) days x x x within which to file any appropriate petition or motion
related to the pending petition insofar as the case is concerned and to file
any opposition to any pending motion that has been filed by both the
counsels for Ramon Nicolas and Teresita de Leon. In response, petitioner filed
a Manifestation, dated January 19, 1994, stressing tha the was neither a
compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and he has no interest to
participate in the proceedings. The RTC noted said Manifestation in its Order
dated February 2, 1994.[17] Despite the Manifestation, Ramon, through a
motion dated February 14, 1994, moved to include petitioner in the intestate
estate proceeding and asked that the Paraaque property, as well as the car
and the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property, be

collated.[18] Acting on Ramons motion, the trial court on March 10, 1994
granted the same in an Order which pertinently reads as follows:

xxxxxxxxx

On the Motion To Include Lauro G. Vizconde In Intestate proceedings in

instant case and considering the comment on hi Manifestation, the same is
hereby granted.[19]

xxxxxxxxx

Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order which
Ramon opposed.[20] On August 12, 1994, the RTC rendered an Order
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. It provides:

xxxxxxxxx

The centerpoint of oppositor-applicants argument is that spouses Vizconde

were then financially incapable of having purchased or acquired for a
valuable consideration the property at Valenzuela from the deceased Rafael
Nicolas. Admittedly, the spouses Vizconde were then living with the
deceased Rafael Nicolas in the latters ancestral home. In fact, as the
argument further goes, said spouses were dependent for support on the
deceased Rafael Nicolas. And Lauro Vizconde left for the United States in, defacto separation, from the family for sometime and returned to the
Philippines only after the occurrence of violent deaths of Estrellita and her
two daughters.

To dispute the contention that the spouses Vizconde were financially

incapable to buy the property from the late Rafael Nicolas, Lauro Vizconde
claims that they have been engaged in business venture such as taxi

business, canteen concessions and garment manufacturing. However, no

competent evidence has been submitted to indubitably support the business
undertakings adverted to.

In fine, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the acquisition of the

property from Rafael Nicolas was for a valuable consideration.

Accordingly, the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in favor of Estrellita by

her father was gratuitous and the subject property in Paraaque which was
purchased out of the proceeds of the said transfer of property by the
deceased Rafael Nicolas in favor of Estrellita, is subject to collation.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.[21]

(Underscoring added)

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with respondent Court
of Appeals. In its decision of December 14, 1994, respondent Court of
Appeals[22] denied the petition stressing that the RTC correctly adjudicated
the question on the title of the Valenzuela property as the jurisdiction of the
probate court extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of
its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate of the
deceased (Cf.: Sec. 1, Rule 90, Revised Rules of Court).[23] Dissatisfied,
petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. Finding prima
facie merit, the Court on December 4, 1995, gave due course to the petition
and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

The core issue hinges on the validity of the probate courts Order, which
respondent Court of Appeals sustained, nullifying the transfer of the
Valenzuela property from Rafael to Estrellita and declaring the Paraaque
property as subject to collation.

The appeal is well taken.

Basic principles of collation need to be emphasized at the outset. Article

1061 of the Civil Code speaks of collation. It states:

Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs,
must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may
have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in
the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.

Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who
intervene in the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the
common mass, the property which they received from him, so that the
division may be made according to law and the will of the testator.[24]
Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other
compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by donation or
gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent.[25] The purpose for it is
presumed that the intention of the testator or predecessor in interest in
making a donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give him
something in advance on account of his share in the estate, and that the
predecessors will is to treat all his heirs equally, in the absence of any
expression to the contrary.[26] Collation does not impose any lien on the
property or the subject matter of collationable donation. What is brought to
collation is not the property donated itself, but rather the value of such
property at the time it was donated,[27] the rationale being that the
donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance,
hence any increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the
account of the heir or donee.[28]

The attendant facts herein do no make a case of collation. We find that the
probate court, as well as respondent Court of Appeals, committed reversible
errors.

First: The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the
intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is one of
Rafaels compulsory heirs. Article 887 of the Civil Code is clear on this point:

Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate

parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the following, legitimate parents and ascendants, with

respect to their legitimate children and ascendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in

Nos 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned,

shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this
Code.

With respect to Rafaels estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even shown
to be a creditor of Rafael is considered a third person or a stranger.[29] As
such, petitioner may not be dragged into the intestate estate proceeding.
Neither may he be permitted or allowed to intervene as he has no
personality or interest in the said proceeding,[30] which petitioner correctly
argued in his manifestation.[31]

Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title
or ownership of a property which may or may not be included in the estate
proceedings.[32] Such determination is provisional in character and is
subject to final decision in a separate action to resolve title.[33] In the case
at bench, however, we note that the probate court went beyond the scope of
its jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the
Valenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer
of the subject property between the concerned parties was gratuitous. The
interpretation of the deed and the true intent of the contracting parties, as
well as the presence or absence of consideration, are matter outside the
probate courts jurisdiction. These issues should be ventilated in an
appropriate action. We reiterate:

x x x we are of the opinion and so hold, that a court which takes cognizance
of testate or intestate proceedings has power and jurisdiction to determine
whether or not the properties included therein or excluded therefrom belong
prima facie to the deceased, although such a determination is not final or
ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to the right of the interested
parties, in a proper action, to raise the question bearing on the ownership or
existence of the right or credit.[34]

Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the Paraaque property to
collation is premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings
is still in its initiatory stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that the
legitimate of any of Rafaels heirs has been impaired to warrant collation. We
thus advert to our ruling in Udarbe v. Jurado, 59 Phil. 11, 13-14, to wit:

We are of the opinion that this contention is untenable. In accordance with

the provisions of article 1035[35] of the Civil Code, it was the duty of the
plaintiffs to allege and prove that the donations received by the defendants
were inofficious in whole or in part and prejudiced the legitimate or
hereditary portion to which they are entitled. In the absence of evidence to
that effect, the collation sought is untenable for lack of ground or basis
therefor.

Fourth: Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the
probate court, nonetheless, made a reversible error in ordering collation of
the Paraaque property. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita, by
way of a deed of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The Paraaque property
which Estrellita acquired by using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela
property does not become collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed
collation of the Paraaque property has no statutory basis.[36] The order of
the probate court presupposes that the Paraaque property was gratuitously
conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the
Paraaque property was conveyed for and in consideration of P900,000.00,
[37] by Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has no
participation therein, and petitioner who inherited and is now the present
owner of the Paraaque property is not one of Rafaels heirs. Thus, the probate
courts order of collation against petitioner is unwarranted for the obligation
to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein petitioner who
does not have any interest in Rafaels estate. As it stands, collation of the
Paraaque property is improper for, to repeat, collation covers only properties
gratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs
which fact does not obtain anent the transfer of the Paraaque property.
Moreover, Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any
claims, rights, ownership and participation as heir[38] in the Paraaque
property.

Fifth: Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the
Valenzuela property may be brought to collation. Estrellita, it should be
stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from
Estrellita an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property.[39]
Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela property may be collated collation
may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has long been

returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any determination by the probate

court on the matter serves no valid and binding purpose.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is hereby

REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ de ARROYOGR No. L-17014, August 11, 1921

FACTS:Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo were married in 1910
and have lived together as manand wife until July 4, 1920 when the wife
went away from their common home with the intention of living
separate from her husband. Marianos efforts to induce
her to resume marital relations were all in vain.Thereafter, Mariano initiated
an action to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with
himas a dutiful wife. Dolores averred by way of defense and cross-complaint
that she had been compelled toleave because of the cruel treatment of her
husband. She in turn prayed that a decree of separation bedeclared and the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership as well as permanent separate
maintenance.The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him,
reached the conclusion that the husbandwas more to blame than his wife
and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justificationfor
her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of
marital relations with him.ISSUE: Whether or not the courts can compel one
of the spouses to cohabit with each other HELD: NO.
It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel
one of the spouses tocohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other.
Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaled, an action
for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclinedto

sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may

be entered to compelthe restitution of the purely personal rights of
consortium
. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel
the spouses to live under the same roof; and the experience of these
countries where the court of justice have assumed to compel the
cohabitation of marriedpeople shows that the policy of the practice is
extremely questionable.We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B.
Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditionaland absolute order for the
return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitorypart
of the complaint; though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial
declaration that his wife haspresented herself without sufficient cause and
that it is her duty to return.Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from,
in respect both to the original complaint and thecross-bill, it is declared that
Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital
homewithout sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to
return. The plaintiff is absolvedfrom the cross-complaint, without special
pronouncement as to costs of either instance.