Part 2 Escra

VOL.
200, AUGUST 5, 1991

Aguja vs. Government Service Insurance System
187
G.R. No. 84846. August 5, 1991.*

JESUS D. AGUJA, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
et al., respondents.
Labor Law; Employees Compensation; Work-connected injury; The injury

caused on the left eye of petitioner is considered as work-connected,
hence, compensable.Clearly, from the above findings, the petitioners left
eye is indeed gradually losing vision. The left eye was found to be burned
which only goes to show that the present condition can be traced back to
the accident which occurred in April, 1979 and no
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
188
188
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
other. There is no showing that there was any supervening event which
may have caused the blindness of the left eye. Undeniably, the injury was
caused by the splashing of muriatic acid while the janitor was cleaning the
government buildings toilet. This accident not only blinded the right eye
but also compromised the left eye. According to the medical certificate
issued in 1985, a pterygium was already growing on the nasal side of the
left eye. In such a case, the injury caused on the left eye is considered as
work-connected; hence, compensable.
Same; Same; Same; Total Disability; Total disability does not mean a state
of absolute helplessness, but disablement of an employee to earn wages in
the same kind of work or a work of similar nature, that he was trained for or
accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality
and attachments could do.A persons disability might not emerge at one
precise moment in time but rather over a period of time (See Jimenez v.
ECC, G.R. No. 79193, November 28, 1989, En Banc Minute Resolution). It is
possible that an injury which at first was considered to be temporary may
later on become permanent or one who suffers a partial disability becomes
totally and permanently disabled from the same cause as in the case at bar.
Unfortunately, the petitioners permanent disability has further deteriorated
affecting also the vision of his left eye. The aggravation of petitioners
condition arose from the same injury or disability. The petitioner was
compelled to retire from work on account of the blindness of his right eye.
With the gradual loss of vision of his left eye, it would even be more
difficult, if not impossible for the petitioner to be gainfully employed now.
As stated in numerous cases, total disability does not mean a state of
absolute helplessness, but disablement of an employee to earn wages in
and attachments could do. (Abaya v. ECC, 176 SCRA 507 [1989]; Orlino v.
ECC, G.R. No. 85015, March 29, 1990 En Banc Minute Resolution, Marcelino
v. Seven Up Bottling Co. 47 SCRA 343 [1972]; Landicho v. WCC and
Canlubang Sugar Estate, 89 SCRA 147 [1979]) To deny the petitioner, the
benefits prayed for would certainly be contrary to the liberal and
compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor
Code (Lazo v. ECC, 186 SCRA 569 [1990].
PETITION for review from the decision of the Employees Compensation

Commission.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
petitioners right eye which caused gradual loss of vision, finally

culminating in blindness. The petitioners left eye was not blinded, but it
contracted pterygium nasal side with visions of 20/40, per certification of
Dr. Delfin M. Rosales, an eye, earn, nose and throat (EENT) specialist in
Naga City causing a disturbance of vision. Notwithstanding his blindness on
the right eye, the petitioner continued to work but retired finally from
service on February 26, 1982.
Ariel F. Aguirre, Roberto Y. Mabulay and Cesar R. Vidal for
189
On the basis of the accident in 1979, the petitioner claimed for

compensation benefit with the GSIS. He was awarded temporary total
disability benefits from September 5 to 29, 1979 and was thereafter
granted permanent partial disability benefit for a period of twenty five (25)
months.
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991
189
respondent GSIS.
After receipt of the corresponding monetary benefits from the System, the
petitioner asked for additional benefits on the ground of permanent total
disability under PD 626, claiming that he was also gradually losing vision of
his left eye. This was denied by the GSIS on the ground that he had already
previously received the maximum which could be awarded to him under
the law. Furthermore, the condition of his left eye which allegedly had
normal vision did not satisfy the criteria for a grant of permanent total
disability benefits.
The petitioner then elevated his case to the ECC which later affirmed the
decision of the GSIS on November 10, 1988. (The petitioner was however
notified of such decision only on January 8, 1989).
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Unaware of the denial of his claim, the petitioner sought the
The petitioner, as a pauper litigant seeks the review of the Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC) decision dated November 10, 1987
denying his claim for additional benefits under P.D. 626, as amended on
account of his eye injury.
190
190
Jesus D. Aguja worked as a janitor in the Office of the Municipal Treasurer in
Libmanan, Camarines Sur. While he was cleaning the office toilet sometime
in April, 1979, the bottle of muriatic acid he was using suddenly fell to the
floor, causing the contents to splash all over. Some of the acid hit the
The issue now before the Court is whether or not the petitioner is entitled
to the additional compensation prayed for.
help of this Court praying for the additional benefits.
Petitioner Aguja is claiming for additional benefits because his left eye with
PTERYGIUM is slowly and gradually losing sight. As of now, he can not
recognize people beyond one (1) meter. It is possible he may also totally
lose his vision.
Consequently, in a resolution dated February 10, 1988, the Court denied

the petition for being premature but at the same time directed the ECC to
act speedily on the claim pending with it.
To be entitled to an income benefit for permanent total disability, the

following conditions must be satisfied:
Later, the petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the Courts resolution

attaching to it the decision of the ECC.
Section 1. Condition of entitlement. (a) An employee shall be entitled to an

income benefit for permanent total disability if all of the following
conditions are satisfied:
Thus, on June 15, 1988, the Court resolved to reconsider its February 10,
1988 resolution and revived the case. The respondents, ECC and GSIS were
required to file their comments.
On September 15, 1990, the Court issued another resolution, the pertinent
portion of which reads as follows:
Considering the foregoing, the Court Resolved to require petitioner Aguja

to submit satisfactory medical proof on the condition of his left eye and
whether the same is still capable of treatment and to what extent. Since he
is a pauper litigant who cannot even afford the services of a lawyer, he may
go to the nearest government hospital which has a competent eye doctor,
present a copy of this Courts resolution, and request for the necessary
medical certificate. (Rollo, p. 95)
1) He has been duly reported to the System;

2) He sustains the permanent total disability as a result of the
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VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991
191

In a later resolution dated November 26, 1990, the Court directed the
Public Attorneys Office (PAO) to assist the petitioner in this case specifically
in obtaining the required medical certificate with respect to the condition of
the petitioners left eye necessary for the resolution of the claim.
injury or sickness; and
3) The System has been duly notified of the injury or sickness which
caused his disability. (Sec. 1(a) Rule XI, Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation)
The public respondents denied the petitioners claim on the basis of the
1985 finding that only the right eye was blind at the time while the left eye
was not. The respondents ruled that the petitioner is not qualified for
permanent total disability benefits but only permanent partial disability
which the petitioner has already received.
It must be stressed that the petitioner is claiming for additional benefits

because of the gradual loss of vision of his left eye which the public
respondents never considered anymore in evaluating his claim. From the
records of the case, there is sufficient basis for granting the petition.
(MALOY, Medical Dictionary for Lawyers, 2nd edition, 1951).
OCCLUSIOPUPILLAEis the closure of the opening in the iris of the eye by

formation of an opaque membrane.
IRIDODIALYSISis the separation or loosening of the iris from its

attachment.
PTERYGIUMa triangular fleshy mass of thickened conjunctiva occurring

usually at the inner side of the eyeball, covering part of the cornea and
causing a disturbance of vision. (Dorland, Illustrated Medical Dictionary,
24th edition, 1965)
The medical certificate submitted to this Court with respect to the condition
of the petitioners left eye reveals the following results:
192
CATARACT IMMATURE O.S.
192
OCCLUSIO-PUPILLAE
CHEMICAL BURNS
O.D.
WITH
IRIDODIALYSIS
O.D.
SECONDARY
PTERYGIUM (Rollo, p. 115)

Medical authorities disclose that:
CATARACT IMMATUREis an opacity of the crystalline eye lens or of its

capsule. (DORLAND, Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 24th Edition, 1965)
any cataract in the beginning stages, or one which affects only a part of
the lens or its covering.
Clearly, from the above findings, the petitioners left eye is indeed
gradually losing vision. The left eye was found to be burned which only
goes to show that the present condition can be traced back to the accident
which occurred in April, 1979 and no other. There is no showing that there
was any supervening event which may have caused the blindness of the
left eye. Undeniably, the injury was caused by the splashing of muriatic
acid while the janitor was cleaning the government buildings toilet. This
accident not only blinded the right eye but also compromised the left
eye. According to the medical certificate issued in 1985, a pterygium was
already growing on the nasal side of the left eye. In such a case, the injury
caused on the left eye is considered as work-connected; hence,
compensable.
The fact that the aggravation occurred after the petitioners retirement
does not militate against his claim for additional benefits. There is no
question that the proximate cause of the apparent but gradual loss of vision
of the left eye was the accidental fall of the bottle of muriatic acid. The
presence of secondary chemical burns on the left eye as stated in the
medical certificate buttresses the assumption that the injury of the left eye
was also caused by the accident in 1979. The causal connection between
the resulting disability and the petitioners work is beyond cavil. In
Belarmino v. ECC, 185 SCRA 304 [1990], we stated that:
x x x Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of

employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise
arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent
intervening cause attributable to claimants own negligence or misconduct
(I Larson Workmens Compensation Law 3-279 [1972]. Simply stated, all the
medical consequences and sequels that flow from the primary injury are
compensable. (Ibid.)
A persons disability might not emerge at one precise moment in time but
rather over a period of time (See Jimenez v. ECC, G.R. No. 79193,
November 28, 1989, En Banc Minute Resolution). It is possible that an injury
which at first was considered to be temporary may later on become
permanent or one who suffers a partial disability becomes totally and
permanently disabled from the same cause as in the case at bar.
Unfortunately, the petitioners permanent disability has further dete-
193
riorated affecting also the vision of his left eye. The aggravation of
petitioners condition arose from the same injury or disability. The petitioner
was compelled to retire from work on account of the blindness of his right
eye. With the gradual loss of vision of his left eye, it would even be more
difficult, if not impossible for the petitioner to be gainfully employed now.
As stated in numerous cases, total disability does not mean a state of
absolute helplessness, but disablement of an employee to earn wages in
and attachments could do. (Abaya v. ECC, 176 SCRA 507 [1989]; Orlino v.
ECC, G.R. No. 85015, March 29, 1990 En Banc Minute Resolution, Marcelino
v. Seven Up Bottling Co., 47 SCRA 343 [1972]; Landicho v. WCC and
Canlubang Sugar Estate, 89 SCRA 147 [1979]) To deny the petitioner, the
benefits prayed for would certainly be contrary to the liberal and
compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor
Code (Lazo v. ECC, 186 SCRA 569 [1990].
We hold, therefore, that the petitioner is entitled to a conversion of his

disability benefits from permanent partial to permanent total. The
compensation benefits shall be determined in accordance with Section 5, of
Rule XI of the Amended Rules on Employments Compensation providing as
follows:
For contingencies which occurred before May 1, 1979, the limitation of

P12,000 or 5 years, whichever comes first, shall be enforced.
Since the petitioner has already received income benefits under permanent
partial disability the public respondent shall pay only the difference
between the two.
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Employees Compensation
Commission decision dated November 10, 1988 is SET ASIDE and
REVERSED. The respondents are ordered to pay compensation benefits as
stated above.
193
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J., Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
194
194
establishing retirement plan should be liberally construed and administered

in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby. The liberal
approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order
that the efficiency, security and well-being of government employees may
be enhanced (Bautista vs. Auditor General, 104 Phil. 428; Ortiz vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-78957, June 28, 1988, 162 SCRA 812).
Same; Same; Same; Same.In resolving the question whether or not to

allow a compulsory retiree to continue in the service to complete the 15year service, there must be present an essential factor before an
application under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 may be granted by the
employer or government office concerned. In the case of officials of the
Judiciary, the Court allows a making up or compensating for lack of required
age or service only if satisfied that the career of the retiree was marked by
competence, integrity, and dedication to the public service (Re: Gregorio
Pineda, supra). It must be so in the instant case.
VOL.211,JULY 3,1992
179
Same; Same; Same; Statute; Administrative Law; An administrative circular

of the Civil Service Commission cannot limit the governing retirement law,
P.D. 1146, on extension of service of employees who reach age 65.The
governing retirement law in the instant case is P.D. 1146 otherwise known
as the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977. The rule on
limiting to only one (1) year the extension of service of an employee who
has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but has less than
15 years of service under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 s.
1990, cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has no relation to or
connection with any
Cena vs. Civil Service Commission

________________
G.R. No. 97419. July 3, 1992.*
GAUDENCIO T. CENA, petitioner, vs. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and
THE HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, in her capacity as Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission, respondents.
*EN BANC.
180
Public Officers; Retirement Law; Civil Service Law; GSIS; Government
employee who has reached compulsory retirement age but who has less
than 15 years service can continue to serve the government even beyond
one year.Being remedial in character, a statute creating a pension or
180
provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried into effect. The rule was an
addition to or extension of the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into
effect. The Civil Service Commission has no power to supply perceived
omissions in P.D. 1146.
case, they are allowed, at the discretion of the agency concerned, to

complete the 15-year service requirement.
PADILLA, J., Concurring:
Retirement Law; An employee may continue without prior approval to serve

government to complete 15-year requirement even beyond age 65.A
reading of the cited provision of law which reads as
181
Same; Same; Same; Employee, age 65 with only 11 years service, may opt
to continue in government to complete 15-year service requirement for oldage life pension at 100% of salary.Section 12 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 does
not apply to the case of herein petitioner Cena, because he opted to
continue in the service to complete the 15-year service requirement
pursuant to Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146. The completion of the 15-year
service requirement under Section 11 par. (b) partakes the nature of a
privilege given to an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement
age of 65 years, but has less than 15 years of service. If said employee
opted to avail of said privilege, he is entitled to the benefits of the old-age
pension. On the other hand, if the said employee opted to retire upon
reaching the compulsory retirement age of 65 years although he has less
than 15 years of service, he is entitled to the benefits provided for under
Section 12 of P.D. 1146, i.e. a cash equivalent to 100% of his average
monthly compensation for every year of service.
Same; Same; Same; Malacaang Circular No. 65 dated June 14, 1988
applies only to employees age 65 who have rendered 15-year service
whose services are sought to be extended.Finally, in view of the aforesaid
right accorded under Section 11, par. (b) of P.D. 1146, petitioner Cena
should not be covered by Memorandum Circular No. 65 issued by then
Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig on June 14, 1988. Memorandum
Circular No. 65 allowing retention of service for only six (6) months for
extremely meritorious reasons should apply only to employees or officials
who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years but who, at
the same time, have completed the 15-year service requirement for
retirement purposes. It should not apply to employees or officials who have
reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but who opted to avail
of the old-age pension under par. (b), Section 11 of P.D. 1146, in which
VOL.211,JULY 3,1992
181
follows: x x x would indicate, in my opinion, that the government employee

who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age but has rendered less than
fifteen (15) years of service, has THE RIGHT to continue in the service to
complete fifteen (15) years, and that the government office or agency
where he is employed cannot but allow the exercise of such right of the
subject employee.
GRIO-AQUINO, J., Dissenting:
Retirement Law; P.D. 1146 contemplates only the situation where an

employee has served more than 14, but less than 15, years when he
reaches age 65.I believe that Section 11, paragraph (b) of P.D. 1146
contemplates a borderline situation where a compulsory retiree on his 65th
birthday has completed more than 14, but less than 15, years of
government service, or a few months short of the 15-year requirement
which would enable him to collect an old-age pension. Pursuant to the
beneficent objectives of our retirement laws, said retiree may be granted
an extension of not more than one year to enable him to complete 15 years
of government service and receive full retirement benefits including old-age
pension which, otherwise, he would not be entitled to receive. Such
extension will enable him to retireafter his 65th birthday, but before he
attains 66 years of age, hence, still within the mandatory retirement age of
65 years fixed by law, for as a matter of fact, one is 65 years old upon
reaching his 65th birthday until the eve of his 66th.
Same; There is no point to grant Cena a one-year extension because he

cannot also complete the 15-year requirement.___While I agree with the
stand of the Civil Service Commission that an extension of service may not
exceed one year, I do not agree with the grant to Cena of a service
extension of one (1) year from January 23, 1991, or until January 22, 1992
under paragraph 1 of Memorandum Circular No. 27 for that paragraph
should apply to a compulsory retiree who needs an extension of not
exceeding one year (Cena needs more than 3 years) to complete the 15year-service requirement for old-age pension benefits. There is no point in
granting to a 65-year-old retiree a one-year extension of service, if, anyway,
as in Cenas case, the extension will not enable him to complete 15 years of
government service. Applicable to Cena is paragraph (b), Section 12 of P.D.
1146 which provides that a member who has rendered x x x less than 15
years of service upon separation after age sixty, (shall) receive a cash
payment equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for
every year of service.
182
182
ROMERO, J., Dissenting:
Retirement Law; Majority interpretation of P.D. 1146 is absurd.Moreover,

to interpret the law as meaning that the age limit and the fifteen-year
length of service should concur before a government employee is allowed
the old-age pension may well give rise to a situation wherein a person who
enters government service a year before reaching age sixty-five would
have to wait until he is seventy-nine years old to be entitled to the old-age
pension provided for in P.D. No. 1146, which is an absurdity. Hence, to give
substance to the real signification of the law, the proviso in Sec. 11 (b)
which states that a government employee who has less than fifteen years
of service, x x x shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the
fifteen years, should contemplate a situation wherein the employee has
only aminimal period of time left to complete the fifteen-year period. What
this minimal period is, the Civil Service Commission has correctly declared
to be not exceeding one year. Otherwise, the government may well be
saddled with a corps of civil servants that may be regarded graphically as
liabilities instead of assets.
Same; Majoritys opinion that since the Supreme Court has allowed
Supreme Court Justices and court employees the right to complete the 15year service requirement for old-age pension loses sight of fact that Cena is
with the Executive Department and subject to its administrative rules.The
ponencia proffers the argument that since the Court has allowed the
officials and employees of the Judiciary who have reached the compulsory
age of retirement but lacked the fifteen-year service requirement to
continue working until they complete said period, there is no cogent
reason to rule otherwise in the case of ordinary employees of the Executive
Branch as in the case of petitioner Cena. But there is a cogent reason.
Petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena, being an employee of the Land Registration
Authority under the Department of Justice, falls under the Executive
Department. Accordingly, Memorandum Circular No. 65 quoted in the above
preceding paragraph which allows a retention or extension of only six
months and this, only for extremely meritorious reasons should be
applicable to his case.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of the Civil Service
Commission.
he worked for only three (3) months, or until February 15, 1987, as
Supervising Staff Officer.
Prospero A. Crescini for petitioner.
183
VOL.211,JULY 3,1992
183
On July 16, 1987, he was appointed as Registrar of the Register of Deeds of

Malabon, Metro Manila, the position he held at the time he reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 years on January 22, 1991. By then, he
would have rendered a total government service of 11 years, 9 months and
6 days. Before reaching his 65th birthday, he requested the Secretary of
Justice, through Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), that he be allowed to extend his service to complete the
15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with full benefits of oldage pension under Section 11, par. (b) of P.D. 1146.
The LRA Administrator, for his part, sought a ruling from the Civil Service
Commission whether or not to allow the extension of service of petitioner
Cena as he is covered by Civil Service Memorandum No. 27, series 1990. In
his 2nd Indorsement dated August 6, 1990, the LRA Administrator observed
that if petitioners service as of January 22, 1991 of 10 years, 6 months and
6 days (should be 11 years, 9 months and 6 days) would be extended to 15
years, he would have to retire on April 15, 1994 at the age of 68 years.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
On July 31, 1990, the Civil Service Commission denied petiMay a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement
age of 65 years, but who has rendered 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of
government service, be allowed to continue in the service to complete the
15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the benefits of an
old-age pension under Section 11 par. (b) of the Revised Government
Service Insurance Act of 1977? This is the issue raised before this Court by
petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena, a Registrar of the Register of Deeds of
Malabon, Metro Manila.
The facts are not disputed.
Petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena entered the government service on November

16, 1978 as Legal Officer II of the Law Department of Caloocan City where
he stayed for seven (7) years until his transfer on November 16, 1986 to
the Office of the Congressman of the First District of Caloocan City where
184
184
tioner Cenas request for extension of service in its CSC Resolution No. 90681, declaring therein, that Mr. Cena shall be considered retired from the
service on January 22, 1991, the date when he shall reach the compulsory
retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, unless his retention for another year
is sought by the head of office under Civil Service Memorandum Circular
No. 27, s. 1990.
No. 1146 does not limit nor specify the maximum number of years the
retiree may
Petitioner Cena filed a motion for reconsideration. On October 17, 1990, the
Civil Service Commission set aside its CSC Resolution No. 90-681 and
allowed Gaudencio Cena a one-year extension of his service from January
22, 1991 to January 22, 1992, citing CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27,
series of 1990, the pertinent of which reads:
VOL.211,JULY 3,1992
185
185
1. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retirees to
complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement shall be
allowed only to permanent appointees in the career service who are regular
members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and shall be
granted for a period not exceeding one (12) year.
avail of to complete the 15 years of service.

On January 22, 1991, petitioners second motion for reconsideration was
denied in its CSC Resolution No. 91-101.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari alleging that the Civil
Service Commission committed a grave abuse of discretion when it granted
the extension of petitioners service as Registrar of Deeds of Malabon,
Metro Manila, for a period of only one (1) year pursuant to CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, instead of three (3) years and
three (3) months to complete the 15-year service requirement for his
retirement with full benefits as provided under Section 11, par. (b) of
Presidential Decree No. 1146, otherwise known as the Revised Government
Service Insurance Act of 1977.
Petitioner contends that reliance of the Commission on par. (1) of

Memorandum Circular No. 27 allowing an extension of service of a
compulsory retiree for a period not exceeding one (1) year is both
erroneous and contrary to the benevolent and munificent intentions of
Section 11 of P.D. 1146. Petitioner points out that par. (b), Section 11 of P.D.
The Solicitor-General agrees with petitioner Cena. He argues that the

questioned provision being generally worded, Section 11 par. (b), P.D. 1146
has general application, thus respondent CSC has no authority to limit
through CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 the privilege under said section
to government employees who lack just one year to complete the 15-year
service requirement.
The Civil Service Commission, however, contends that since public

respondent CSC is the central personnel agency of the government, it is
vested with the power and authority, among others, to grant or allow
extension of service beyond retirement age pursuant to Section 14 par.
(14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987). In interpreting Section 11 par. (b) of P.D.
1146, public respondent CSC contends that the phrase Provided, That if he
has less than fifteen years of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the
service to complete the fifteen years, is qualified by the clause: Unless
the service is extended by appropriate authorities, which means that the
extension of service must be first authorized by the Commission, as the
appropriate authority referred to in Section 11, par. (b), P.D. 1146, before
the service of a compulsory retiree (one who has already reached age of 65
years with at least 15 years of service) can be extended.
(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel

matters in the Civil Service including extension of service beyond
retirement age;
We grant the petition.
Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the

Administrative Code of 1987 (November 24, 1987) cannot be interpreted to
authorize the Civil Service Commission to limit to only one (1) year the
extension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 without having completed 15 years of service, when
said limitation has no relation to or connection with the provision of the law
supposed to be carried into effect.
Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the

Administrative Code of 1987 provides thus:
SEC.12. Powers and Functions.___The Commission shall have the following

powers and functions:
xxx
xxx
xxx
186
186
As a law of general application, the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot

authorize the modification of an express provision of a special law (Revised
Government Service Insurance of 1977). Otherwise, the intent and purpose
of the provisions on retirement and pension of the Revised Government
Service Insurance Act of 1977 (P.D. 1146) would be rendered nugatory and
meaningless.
Section 11 paragraph (b) of the Revised Government Service Insurance Act

of 1977 expressly provides, thus:
SEC.11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension.(a) Old-age pension shall be paid

to a member who:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement

shall be compulsory for an employee of sixty-five years of age with at least
fifteen years of service: Provided, That if he has less than fifteen years of
service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the
fifteen years. (Emphasis supplied)
Being remedial in character, a statute creating a pension or establishing

retirement plan should be liberally construed and administered in favor of
the persons intended to be benefited thereby. The liberal approach aims to
achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency,
security and well-being of government employees may be enhanced (Bautista vs. Auditor General, 104 Phil. 428; Ortiz vs. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. L-78957, June 28, 1988, 162 SCRA 812).
The Court stated in Abad Santos vs. Auditor General, 79 Phil. 176, that a
pension partakes of the nature of retained wages of the retiree for a
double purpose: (1) to entice competent men and women to enter the
government service, and (2) permit them to retire from the service with
relative security, not only for those who have retained their vigor, but more
so for those who have been incapacitated by illness or accident.
We have applied the liberal approach in interpreting statutes creating

pension or establishing retirement plans in cases involving officials of the
Judiciary who lacked the age and
187
VOL.211,JULY 3,1992
187
service requirement for retirement. We see no cogent reason to rule

otherwise in the case of ordinary employees of the Executive Branch, as in
the case of petitioner Cena, who has reached 65 but opted to avail of the
statutory privilege under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 to continue in the
service to complete the 15-year service requirement in order to avail of oldage pension.
In Re: Application for Gratuity Benefits of Associate Justice Efren I. Plana,

Adm. Matter No. 5460, En Banc Resolution, March 24, 1988, the Court,
applying the liberal approach, ruled that Justice Plana, who at the time of
his courtesy resignation on March 25, 1986 lacked a few months to meet
the age requirement for retirement under the law, is entitled to full
retirement benefits under R.A. 910 because his accrued leave credits would
have entitled him to go on leave until beyond the age requirement for
retirement.
The above ruling of the Court was reiterated in Re: Application for
Retirement under Rep. Act No. 910 of Associate Justice Ramon B. Britanico
of the Intermediate Appellate Court, Adm. Matter No. 6484Ret., May 15,
1989. By liberally interpreting Section 3 of R.A. 910, as amended, in favor
of the persons intended to be benefited by them, the Court also allowed the
conversion of the application for disability retirement of Justice Ruperto
Martin under said Section 3 of R.A. 910, as amended (10-year lump sum
without the lifetime annuity) into an application for voluntary retirement
under Section 1 (5-year lump sum with lifetime annuity) eleven years after
his disability retirement was approved on January 10, 1978 (In Re:
Application for Life Pension under Rep. Act 910. Ruperto G. Martin,
applicant, 187 SCRA 477). The ten-year lump sum which he had received
was considered by the Court as payment under Section 1 of the five-year
lump sum, to which he was entitled, and of his monthly pensions for the
next five years.
However, the Court pointed out in Re: Gregorio G. Pineda, Adm. Matter No.
2076-RET., July 13, 1990, and its six (6) companion cases, 187 SCRA 469,
that when the Court allows seeming exceptions to fixed rules for certain
retired Judges or Justices, there are ample reasons behind each grant of an
exception. The crediting of accumulated leaves to make up for lack of
required age or length of service is not done indiscriminately. It is always on
a case to case basis.
188
188
There is thus no justifiable reason in not allowing ordinary employees in the

Executive Branch on a case to case basis, to continue in the service to
complete the 15-year service requirement to avail of the old-age pension
under Section 11 of P.D. 1146. By limiting the extension of service to only
one (1) year would defeat the beneficial intendment of the retirement
provisions of P.D. 1146.
VOL.211,JULY 3,1992
189
In resolving the question whether or not to allow a compulsory retiree to
continue in the service to complete the 15-year service, there must be
present an essential factor before an application under Section 11 par. (b)
of P.D. 1146 may be granted by the employer or government office
concerned. In the case of officials of the Judiciary, the Court allows a
making up or compensating for lack of required age or service only if
satisfied that the career of the retiree was marked by competence,
integrity, and dedication to the public service (Re: Gregorio Pineda, supra).
It must be so in the instant case.
It is interesting to note that the phrase he shall be allowed to continue in

the service to complete the fifteen years found in Section 11 (b) of P.D.
1146 is a reproduction of the phrase in the original text found in Section 12
(e) of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended, otherwise known as the
Government Service Insurance Act approved on November 14, 1936.
There is nothing in the original text as well as in the revised version which
would serve as the basis for providing the allowable extension period to
only one (1) year. There is likewise no indication that Section 11 par. (b) of
P.D. 1146 contemplates a borderline situation where a compulsory retiree
on his 65th birthday has completed more than 14, but less than 15 years of
government service., i.e. only a few months short of the 15-year
requirement which would enable him to collect an old-age pension.
While it is true that the Administrative Code of 1987 has given the Civil
Service Commission the authority to take appropriate action on all
appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service including
extension of service beyond retirement age, the said provision cannot be
extended to embrace matters not covered by the Revised Government
Service Insurance Act of 1977 (Sto. Tomas vs. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil.
376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46). The authority referred to therein is limited
only to carrying into effect what the special
189
law, Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977, or any other retirement

law being invoked provides. It cannot go beyond the terms and provisions
of the basic law.
The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in the

nature of an administrative regulation, must be governed by the principle
that administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a
particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law,
and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general
provisions (People vs. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79
SCRA 450; Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June
30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel v. General Auditing Office, L-28952,
December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29,
1969, 29 SCRA 350).
The pronouncement of the Court in the case of Augusto Toledo vs. Civil
Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 92646-47, October 4, 1991, squarely
applies in the instant case. We declared in the case of Toledo that the rule
prohibiting 57-year old persons from employment, reinstatement, or reemployment in the government service provided under Section 22, Rule III
of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies (CSRPAP) cannot
be accorded validity, because it is entirely a creation of the Civil Service
Commission, having no basis in the law itself, which it was meant to
implement and it cannot be related to or connected with any specific
provision of the law which it is meant to carry into effect. The Court,
speaking thru Justice Edgardo L. Paras, stated, thus:
The power vested in the Civil Service Commission was to implement the
law or put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or
execution, not to supply perceived omissions in it. By its administrative
regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended; said regulations
cannot amend an act of Congress. (Teoxon v. Members of the Board of
Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration, 33 SCRA 585, 589
[1970], citing Santos v. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419 [1960]; see also, Animos v.
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, 174 SCRA 214, 223-224 [1989] in turn
citing Teoxon).
The considerations just expounded also conduce to the conclusion of the

invalidity of Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP. The enactment of said
section, relative to 57-year old persons, was also an act of supererogation
on the part of the Civil Service Commission since
190
190
the rule has no relation to or connection with any provision of the law
supposed to be carried into effect. The section was an addition to or
extension of the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect.
(Emphasis supplied)
1990, cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has no relation to or

connection with any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried into
effect. The rule was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a
mode of carrying it into effect. The Civil Service Commission has no power
to supply perceived omissions in P.D. 1146.
As a matter of fact, We have liberally applied Section 11 par. (b) of P.D.

1146 in two (2) recent cases where We allowed two employees in the
Judiciary who have reached the age of 65 to continue in the government
service to complete the 15-year service requirement to be entitled to the
benefits under P.D. 1146.
In a resolution dated January 23, 1990 in A.M. No. 87-7-1329-MTC, We

allowed Mrs. Florentina J. Bocade, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Dagami, Leyte, who at the time she reached the age of 65 years on October
16, 1987 had only 10 years of government service, to continue her services
until October 10, 1992. Thus, she was given a period of 5 years, to
complete the 15-year service requirement to be entitled to the retirement
benefits under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146. The Court observed that
Mrs. Bocade is still performing her duties without any adverse complaints
from her superior and that she is physically fit for work per report of the
Medical Clinic.
The Court, in a resolution dated April 18, 1991, in A.M. No. 91-3-003-SC.-Re:
Request for the extension of service of Mrs. Crisanta T. Tiangco, allowed
Mrs. Crisanta T. Tiangco, Budget Officer V, Budget Division, Fiscal
Management and Budget Office of the Supreme Court to continue her
services until February 10, 1995. She was granted a period of 3 years, 10
191
VOL.211,JULY 3,1992
The governing retirement law in the instant case is P.D. 1146 otherwise
known as the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977. The
rule on limiting to only one (1) year the extension of service of an employee
who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but has less
than 15 years of service under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 s.
191
is separated from the service at the age of 64, it would be only just and
proper as he would have worked for the whole period of 15 years as
required by law for entitlement of the old-age pension. Indeed, a longer
service should merit a greater reward. Besides,
months and 13 days because she has to her credit only 11 years, 1 month
and 17 days of government service at the time she reached the age of 65
on March 29, 1991 in order that she be entitled to the retirement benefits
under P.D. No. 1146.
192
192
It is erroneous to apply to petitioner Cena who has rendered 11 years, 9
months and 6 days of government service, Section 12, par. (b) of P.D. 1146
which provides that a member who has rendered at least three (3) years
but less than 15 years of service at the time of separation shall, x x x upon
separation after age sixty, receive a cash equivalent to 100% of his
average monthly compensation for every year of service.

The applicable law should be Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 which allows
him to extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days to complete the 15-year
of service consistent with the beneficial intendment of P.D. 1146 and which
right is subject to the discretion of the government office concerned.
Section 12 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 does not apply to the case of herein Cena,
because he opted to continue in the service to complete the 15-year
service requirement pursuant to Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146. The
completion of the 15-year service requirement under Section 11 par. (b)
partakes the nature of a privilege given to an employee who has reached
the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but has less than 15 years of
service. If said employee opted to avail of said privilege, he is entitled to
the benefits of the old-age pension. On the other hand, if the said employee
opted to retire upon reaching the compulsory retirement age of 65 years
although he has less than 15 years of service, he is entitled to the benefits
provided for under Section 12 of P.D. 1146, i.e. a cash equivalent to 100%
of his average monthly compensation for every year of service.
The right under Section 11, par. (b) is open to all employees similarly
situated, so it does not offend the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the law. There is nothing absurd or inequitable in rewarding an
employee for completion of the 15-year service beyond the retirement age.
If he would be better off than the one who has served for 14 years but who
his entitlement to the old-age pension is conditioned upon such completion.

Thus, if the service is not completed due to death or incapacity, he would
be entitled to the benefit under Section 12, par. (b), i.e. a cash equivalent
to 100% of his average montly compensation for every year of service.
Finally, in view of the aforesaid right accorded under Section 11, par. (b) of
P.D. 1146, petitioner Cena should not be covered by Memorandum Circular
No. 65 issued by then Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig on June 14,
1988. Memorandum Circular No. 65 allowing retention of service for only six
(6) months for extremely meritorious reasons should apply only to
employees or officials who have reached the compulsory retirement age of
65 years but who, at the same time, have completed the 15-year service
requirement for retirement purposes. It should not apply to employees or
officials who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but
who opted to avail of the old-age pension under par. (b), Section 11 of P.D.
1146, in which case, they are allowed, at the discretion of the agency
concerned, to complete the 15-year service requirement.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted. The Land Registration Authority

(LRA) of the Deparment of Justice has the discretion to allow petitioner
Gaudencio Cena to extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of

government service to complete the 15-year service so that he may retire
with full benefits under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado,

Davide, Jr., Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., See concurring opinion.
Grio-Aquino, J., Please see my dissent.
Romero, J., Please see separate dissenting opinion. [Cena vs. Civil
Service Commission, 211 SCRA 179(1992)]
VOL. 216, DECEMBER 22, 1992
777
778
Profeta vs. Drilon
778
G.R. No. 104139. December 22, 1992.*

LYDIA M. PROFETA, petitioner, vs. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his
capacity as Executive Secretary, Office of the President of the Philippines,
respondent.
Profeta vs. Drilon

Retirement Law; A pension is not a gratuity but rather a form of deferred
compensation for services performed.To a public servant, a pension is not
a gratuity but rather a form of deferred compensation for services
performed and his right to it commences to vest upon his entry into the
retirement system and becomes an enforceable obligation in court upon
fulfillment of all conditions under which it is to be paid. Similarly, retirement
benefits receivable by public employees are valuable parts of the
consideration for entrance into and continuation in public office or
employment. They serve a public purpose and a primary objective in
establishing them is to induce competent persons to enter and remain in
public employment and render faithful and efficient service while so
employed.
Same; Retirement laws liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree.

Retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because
their intention is to provide for his sustenance and hopefully even comfort,
when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood. The
liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in
order that the efficiency, security and well-being of government employees
maybe enhanced.
________________
* EN BANC.
Same; Government Service Insurance System; It is the GSIS which has the
original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a member is
qualified or not to avail of the old-age pension benefit under P.D. 1146
based on its computation of a members years of service with the
government.We hold that it is the GSIS which has the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a member is qualified or not to
avail of the old-age pension benefit under P.D. 1146,based on its
computation of a members years of service with the government. The
computation of a members service includes not only full time but also part
time and other services with compensation as may be included under the
rules and regulations prescribed by the System.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of the Office of the

President.
Valdez, Domondon & Associates and Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro, Arcilla

Law Offices for petitioner.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing a portion of the decision

of the Office of the President, dated 23 October 1991, declaring petitioner
as compulsorily retired as of 15 October 1991 and the resolution dated 31
January 1992 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of said
decision.
The antecedents are the following:
Petitioner, Dr. Lydia M. Profeta, served as Executive Dean of the Rizal

Technological Colleges from 24 October 1974 to 15 October 1978. From 16
October 1978 to 30 April 1979, petitioner was the appointed Acting
President of said College until her promotion to President of the same
college on 1 May 1979.
After the 1986 EDSA revolution or on 5 March 1986, petitioner filed her
courtesy resignation as President of the Rizal Technological Colleges and
the same was accepted on 21 March 1986. A day before the acceptance of
her courtesy resignation, petitioner applied for sick leave.
On 4 November 1988, petitioner was appointed Acting President of Eulogio

Amang Rodriguez Institute of Science and Technology (hereinafter
referred to as EARIST) and was there-
after appointed its President on 29 March 1989.
After reaching the age of sixty-five (65) years on 16 June 1989, petitioner
inquired from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) as to
whether she may be allowed to extend her services with the government as
President of EARIST beyond the age of sixty-five (65) years, to enable her to
avail of the old-age pension retirement benefits under PD 1146 (Revised
Government Service Insurance Act of 1977). In answer to her query,
petitioner was advised by the GSIS to return to the service until she shall
have fulfilled the fifteen (15) years service requirement pursuant to Section
11 of PD 1146, to qualify for the old-age pension retirement plan. The GSIS
declared that petitioner was not yet eligible to retire under PD 1146, as she
had not rendered the sufficient number of years of service on the date of
her supposed retirement on 16 June 1989 and that her creditable service
was only twelve (12) years and two (2) months. As things stood, she could
only claim one hundred percent (100%) of her average monthly
compensation for every year of creditable service or to a refund of her
premium contributions with the GSIS.1
On 6 October 1989, as recommended by the Department of Education,

Culture and Sports (DECS) Secretary and the Board of Trustees of EARIST,
President Aquino, through Deputy Executive Secretary Magdangal B. Elma,
extended the term of petitioner as President of EARIST until she shall have
completed the required fifteen (15) years of service after reaching the age
of sixty five (65) years on the date of her normal retirement on 16 June
1989 or for an additional period of two (2) years, seven (7) months and
twelve (12) days.2
779
In March 1990, the EARIST Faculty and Employees Union filed an

administrative complaint against petitioner before the Office of the
President, for her alleged irregular appointment and for graft and corrupt
practices. In a memorandum, dated 16 August 1990, the Office of the
President furnished petitioner a copy of the complaint with a directive to file
an answer thereto with the DECS Secretary, who was duly authorized to
conduct a
779
________________
Profeta vs. Drilon
1 Rollo, pp. 41-42.
EARIST President. After trial, said petition was dismissed. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari on 2 April 1991.6
2 Ibid., p. 49.
780
Petitioner likewise assailed her reassignment with the DECS Central Office,
before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). On 30 July 1991, the CSC denied
petitioners complaint. She moved for reconsideration of said resolution but
the same was denied on 3 December 1991, which prompted petitioner to
file a petition for certiorari before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 103271.
On 3 March 1992, this Court dismissed said petition.
780
Profeta vs. Drilon
formal investigation of the charges against petitioner. Pending investigation

of the complaint, petitioner was placed under preventive suspension for a
period of ninety (90) days.3 After serving the period of suspension,
petitioner re-assumed her duties and functions as President of EARIST.
After evaluating the evidence presented before the Ad-Hoc Committee, in a

decision7 dated 23 October 1991, the Office of the President dismissed the
administrative complaint against petitioner for lack of substantial evidence.
In the same decision, the Office of the President also declared petitioner as
compulso-
________________
3 Rollo, p. 50.
4 Ibid., pp. 82-83.

In a letter dated 20 July 1990, DECS Secretary Carino recommended the
compulsory retirement of petitioner.4
For the purpose of investigating the administrative charges against

petitioner,5 an Ad-Hoc Committee was created by President Aquino on 12
February 1991. The parties filed their respective pleadings and hearings in
the case were conducted by the committee.
Pending resolution of the administrative charges against her, petitioner was

detailed with the DECS Central Office pursuant to a memorandum dated 13
February 1991 signed by Deputy Executive Secretary Sarmiento III.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40, seeking her reinstatement as
5 Ibid., pp. 53-54.
6 Comment, Rollo, pp. 118-120.
7 Rollo, pp. 25-33.
781
the said office has no jurisdiction over the issue of her compulsory
retirement from the government service.
Profeta vs. Drilon
In a resolution10 dated 31 January 1992, petitioners motion for

reconsideration was denied by the Office of the President. In the same
resolution, the Office of the President clarified that there was an over
extension of petitioners period of service with the government by failure to
reckon with the sixty-two (62) working days during which petitioner went on
sick leave (from
rily retired from government service as of 15 October 1991, holding that:
________________
x x x (I)f the aforesaid sick leave of 62 working days (approximately 3

months) were to be added to the respondents creditable service, together
with the period of two (2) weeks which the respondents counsel admits in
his Memorandum the respondent had served as Professorial Lecturer, the
respondent should be considered as compulsorily retired as of Oct. 15,
1991, having completed the required 15 years in the service on or about
the said date after reaching the age of 65.
8 Ibid., p. 33.
781
9 Rollo, p. 71.
10 Rollo, pp. 35-38.

Accordingly, the administrative charges against Dr. Lydia M. Profeta for her
alleged irregular appointment and graft and corrupt practices are hereby
dismissed. However, Dr. Profeta is hereby considered as now compulsorily
retired from the service as of October 15, 1991, in accordance with the
provisions of Section 11 (b) of Presidential Decree No. 1146, having
completed fifteen (15) years in the government service on or about the said
date after reaching the age of sixty-five (65) on June 16, 1989.8
In a letter dated 23 October 1991, petitioner requested the GSIS to

determine the exact date of her retirement. On 5 November 1991,
petitioner was advised by the GSIS that the exact date of her retirement
falls on 14 August 1992.9
782
782
Profeta vs. Drilon

A motion for reconsideration was then filed by petitioner with the Office of
the President, assailing the portion of its decision declaring her as
compulsorily retired from the service as of 15 October 1991, alleging that
20 March to 17 June 1986) and the period of two (2) weeks during which
petitioner served as Professorial Lecturer. In considering petitioner as
compulsorily retired as of 15 October 1991, the Office of the President held

that it merely resolved motu proprio to shorten by three-and-a-half (3-1/2)
months the extension granted to petitioner to complete the required fifteen
(15) years of service for purposes of retirement. It further declared that it is
for the President to determine whether or not petitioner could still continue
as EARIST President despite her exoneration from the administrative
charges filed against her.
Under Presidential Decree No. 1146 (Revised Government Insurance Act of

1977), one of the benefits provided for qualified members of the GSIS is the
old-age pension benefit. A member who has rendered at least fifteen (15)
years of service and is at least sixty (60) years old when separated from
the service, is entitled to a basic monthly pension for life but for not less
than five (5) years. On the other hand, a member who has rendered less
than fifteen (15) years of service but with at least three (3) years of service
and is sixty (60) years of age when separated from the service is entitled to
a cash payment equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the average
monthly compensation for every year of service.
However, retirement is compulsory for a member who has reached the age
of sixty-five (65) years with at least fifteen (15) years of service. If he has
less than fifteen (15) years of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the
service to complete the fifteen (15) years,11 to avail of the old-age pension
benefit.
To a public servant, a pension is not a gratuity but rather a form of deferred

compensation for services performed and his right to it commences to vest
upon his entry into the retirement system and becomes an enforceable
obligation in court upon fulfillment of all conditions under which it is to be
paid. Similarly, retirement benefits receivable by public employees are
valuable parts of the consideration for entrance into and continuation in
public office or employment. They serve a public purpose and a primary
objective in establishing them is to induce competent persons to enter and
remain in public em-
________________
11 Sections 11 & 12, PD 1146.
783
783
Profeta vs. Drilon
ployment and render faithful and efficient service while so employed.12

Retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because
their intention is to provide for his sustenance and hopefully even comfort,
when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood.13
The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law
in order that the efficiency, security and well-being of government
employees maybe enhanced.14
In the case at bar, at the time petitioner reached the compulsory retirement
age of sixty-five (65) years, she had rendered less than the required fifteen
(15) years of service under Section 11 of P.D. 1146. Thus, to enable her to
avail of the old-age pension benefit, she was allowed to continue in the
service and her term as President of EARIST was extended until she shall
have completed the fifteen (15) year service requirement, or for an
additional two (2) years, seven (7) months, and twelve (12) days, as
determined by the Office of the President.
This period of extended service granted to petitioner was amended by the

Office of the President. In resolving the administrative complaint against
petitioner, the Office of the President, ruled not only on the issues of
alleged irregular appointment of petitioner and of graft and corrupt
practices, but went further by, in effect, reducing the period of extension of
service granted to petitioner on the ground that the latter had already
completed the fifteen (15) year service requirement under P.D. 1146, and
declared petitioner as compulsorily retired as of 15 October 1991.
In other words, the extension of service of petitioner was until January

1992. However, the Office of the President made a new computation of
petitioners creditable service. In the process of determining petitioners
period of service with the government, the Office of the President included
as part of her service the sixty-two (62) days sick leave applied for by peti-
________________
12 Ortiz v. Comelec, G.R. No. 78957, 28 June 1998, 162 SCRA 812,
13 Santiago v. COA, G.R. No. 92284, 12 July 1991, 199 SCRA 125.
14 Ortiz v. Comelec, supra.
On the other hand, the computation made by the GSIS as to the exact date
of retirement of petitioner fell on 14 August 1992.15 Thus, the extension of
service granted to petitioner by the Office of the President for two (2) years,
seven (7) months and twelve (12) days which brought her services only up
to January 1992, would not enable herein petitioner to complete the fifteen
(15) years service requirement for purposes of retirement. To allow the
Office of the President to shorten the extension of service of petitioner by
three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months which consist of petitioners sick leave and
service as lecturer, would further reduce petitioners service with the
government. Such reduction from petitioners service would deprive her of
the opportunity of availing of the old-age pension plan,based on the
computation of the GSIS.
We hold that it is the GSIS which has the original and exclusive jurisdiction
to determine whether a member is qualified or not to avail of the old-age
pension benefit under P.D. 1146,based on its computation of a members
years of service with the government.16 The computation of a members
service includes not only full time but also part time and other services with
compensation as may be included under the rules and regulations
prescribed by the System.17
784
784
Profeta vs. Drilon
tioner covering the period between 20 March to 17 June 1988 and her
service as a lecturer of approximately two (2) weeks, or a total of threeand-a-half (3 1/2) months. As a result of this new computation, petitioners
extension of service which was supposed to end in January 1992 was
reduced by the Office of the President by three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months or
until 15 October 1991.
The sixty-two (62) days leave of absence of petitioner between 20 March to

17 June 1986 and her part-time service as a lecturer of approximately two
(2) weeks, or a total of three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months is not reflected in
her service record. Said period should be considered as part of her service
with the government and it is only but proper that her service record be
________________
15 Rollo, p. 56.
16 Section 24, PD 1146.
17 Section 10, PD 1146.
785
785
Profeta vs. Drilon
WHEREFORE, the portion of the decision of the Office of the President dated
23 October 1991 declaring petitioner as compulsorily retired as of 15
October 1991 is SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby declared to have been in
the service as President of EARIST from 16 October 1991 until 30 April 1992
and therefore entitled to all salaries, benefits and other emoluments of said
office from 16 October 1991 to 30 April 1992. In addition, she is declared as
entitled to her old-age pension benefits for having reached age 65 years
while in the service with 15 years of service to her credit, subject to her
compliance with all applicable regulations and requirements of the GSIS.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,

Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
amended to reflect said period of service.

786
We have observed that the computation made by the GSIS of petitioners
date of retirement failed to take into account the three-and-a-half (3 1/2)
months service of petitioner which was not reflected in her service record. If
we deduct this unrecorded three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months service of
petitioner from 14 August 1992, petitioner is to be considered retired on 30
April 1992.
The order of the Office of the President declaring petitioner as compulsorily

retired as of 15 October 1991 defeats the purpose for allowing petitioner to
remain in the service until she has completed the fifteen (15) years service
requirement. Between the period of 16 October 1991 to 30 April 1992,
petitioner should have been allowed to continue in the service to be able to
complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement; she was prepared to
render services for said period but was not allowed to do so; she should,
therefore, be entitled to all her salaries, benefits and other emoluments
during said period (16 October 1991 - 30 April 1992). However, petitioners
claim for reinstatement to her former position to enable her to complete
the fifteen (15) year service requirement for retirement purposes is no
longer possible, considering that she is deemed to have completed the said
service requirement as of 30 April 1992.
786
Pascual vs. Duncan
Portion of the decision set aside.
Note.Pension partakes of the nature of retained wages of the retiree for a

double purpose (Re: Ruperto G. Martin, 187 SCRA 477).
o0o [Profeta vs. Drilon, 216 SCRA 777(1992)]
Civil Service Commission; Administrative Law; Test of a Valid Subordinate

Legislation; Statutory Construction; In subordinate, delegated rule-making
by administrative agencies, all that may be reasonably demanded is a
showing that the delegated legislation consisting of administrative
regulations are germane to the general purposes projected by the
governing or enabling statute.Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a
considerably higher degree of detail in the statute to be implemented, went
against prevailing doctrine. It seems clear that if the governing or enabling
statute is quite detailed and specific to begin with, there would be very
little need (or occasion) for implementing administrative regulations. It is,
however, precisely the inability of legislative bodies to anticipate all (or
many) possible detailed situations
_______________
* EN BANC.
615
VOL. 244, MAY 31, 1995

614
615
Rabor vs. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 111812. May 31, 1995.*

DIONISIO M.
respondent.
RABOR,
petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL
SERVICE
COMMISSION,
in respect of any relatively complex subject matter, that makes

subordinate, delegated rule-making by administrative agencies so
important and unavoidable. All that may be reasonably demanded is a
governing or enabling statute. This is the test that is appropriately applied
in respect of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, and
to this test we now turn.
Same; Same; Retirement; The extension of service of government retirees

who have reached sixty-five years of age is an area that is covered by both
P.D. 1146 and the Administrative Code of 1987.We consider that the
enabling statute that should appropriately be examined is the present Civil
Service lawfound in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, of Executive Order No. 292
dated 25 July 1987, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987
and not alone P.D. No. 1146, otherwise known as the Revised Government
Service Insurance Act of 1977. For the matter of extension of service of
retirees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age is an area that is
covered by both statutes and not alone by Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146.
This is crystal clear from examination of many provisions of the present civil
service law.
Same; Same; Same; The physiological and psychological processes

associated with ageing in human beings are in fact related to the efficiency
and quality of the service that may be expected from individual persons.
We find it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible
extensions of service after an employee has reached sixty-five (65) years of
age has no reasonable relationship or is not germane to the foregoing
provisions of the present Civil Service Law. The physiological and
psychological processes associated with ageing in human beings are in fact
related to the efficiency and quality of the service that may be expected
from individual persons.
Same; Same; Same; Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of
1990, more specifically par. 1 thereof, is valid and effective, and the
doctrine in Cena v. Civil Service Commission, 211 SCRA 179 (1992), is
modified accordingly.Our conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should
be and is hereby modified to this extent: that Civil Service Memorandum
Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1) thereof, is
hereby declared valid and effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 must,
accordingly, be read together with Memorandum Circular No. 27. We
reiterate, however, the holding in Cena that the head of the government
agency concerned is vested with discretion-
616
616
ary authority to allow or disallow extension of the service of an official or

employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age without completing
fifteen (15) years of government service; this discretion is, nevertheless, to
be exercised conformably with the provisions of Civil Service Memorandum
Circular No. 27, Series of 1990.
PETITION for review of a decision of the Civil Service Commission.
Public Attorneys Office for petitioner.
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor,

Davao City. He entered the government service as a Utility Worker on 10
April 1978 at the age of 55 years.
Sometime in May 1991,1 Alma D. Pagatpatan, an official in the Office of the

Mayor of Davao City, advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement,
considering that he had already reached the age of sixty-eight (68) years
and seven (7) months, with thirteen (13) years and one (1) month of
government service. Rabor responded to this advice by exhibiting a
Certificate of Membership2 issued by the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) and dated 12 May 1988. At the bottom of this Certificate
of Membership is a typewritten statement of the following tenor: Service
extended to comply 15 years service reqts. This statement is followed by a

non-legible initial with the following date 2/ 28/91.
Thereupon, the Davao City Government, through Ms. Pagatpatan, wrote to

the Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission, Region XI, Davao City
(CSRO-XI), informing the latter of the foregoing and requesting advice as
to what action [should] be taken on this matter.
In a letter dated 26 July 1991, Director Filemon B. Cawad of CSRO-XI

advised Davao City Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte as follows:
_______________
1 Annex A, Letter/Petition, Rollo, p. 4.
2 Annex A-1, Letter/Petition, Rollo, p. 5.
617
Officials and employees who have reached the compulsory retirement

age of 65 years shall not be retained in the service, except for extremely
meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall not exceed six (6)
months.
IN VIEW WHEREFORE, please be advised that the services of Mr. Dominador

[M.] Rabor as Utility Worker, in that office, is already non-extend[i]ble.3
Accordingly, on 8 August 1991, Mayor Duterte furnished a copy of the 26

July 1991 letter of Director Cawad to Rabor and advised him to stop
reporting for work effective August 16, 1991.4
Petitioner Rabor then sent to the Regional Director, CSRO-XI, a letter dated
14 August 1991, asking for extension of his services in the City Government
until he shall have completed the fifteen (15) years service [requirement]
in the Government so that [he] could also avail of the benefits of the
retirement laws given to employees of the Government. The extension he
was asking for was about two (2) years. Asserting that he was still in good
health and very able to perform the duties and functions of [his] position as
Utility Worker, Rabor sought extension of [his] service as an exception to
Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President.5 This request
was denied by Director Cawad on 15 August 1991.
VOL. 244, MAY 31, 1995

Petitioner Rabor next wrote to the Office of the President on 29 January
1992 seeking reconsideration of the decision of Director Cawad, CSRO-XI.
The Office of the President referred Mr. Rabors letter to the Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission on 5 March 1992.
617
Please be informed that the extension of services of Mr. Rabor is contrary

to M.C. No. 65 of the Office of the President, the relevant portion of which is
hereunder quoted:
In its Resolution No. 92-594, dated 28 April 1992, the Civil Service
Commission dismissed the appeal of Mr. Rabor and affirmed the action of
Director Cawad embodied in the latters
_______________
3 Annex B, Letter/Petition, Rollo, p. 6.
Considering that as early as October 18, 1988, Rabor was already due for
retirement, his request for further extension of service cannot be given due
course.6 (Italics in the original)
4 Annex B-1, Letter/Petition, Rollo, p. 7.
5 Annex C, Letter/Petition, Rollo, p. 8.
618
618
On 28 October 1992, Mr. Rabor sought reconsideration of Resolution No. 92594 of the Civil Service Commission this time invoking the Decision of this
Court in Cena v. Civil Service Commission.7 Petitioner also asked for
reinstatement with back salaries and benefits, having been separated from
the government service effective 16 August 1991. Rabors motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Commission.
Petitioner Rabor sent another letter dated 16 April 1993 to the Office of the
Mayor, Davao City, again requesting that he be allowed to continue
rendering service to the Davao City Government as Utility Worker in order
to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement under P.D. No. 1146.
This request was once more denied by Mayor Duterte in a letter to
petitioner dated 19 May 1993. In this letter, Mayor Duterte pointed out that,
under Cena, grant of the extension of service was discretionary on the part
of the City Mayor, but that he could not grant the extension requested.
Mayor Dutertes letter, in relevant part, read:
letter of 26 July 1991. This Resolution stated in part:
In his appeal, Rabor requested that he be allowed to continue rendering

services as Utility Worker in order to complete the fifteen (15) year service
requirement under P.D. 1146. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, s. 1990
provides, in part:
The matter was referred to the City Legal Office and the Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission, in the advent of the decision of the Supreme
Court in the Cena vs. CSC, et al. (G.R. No. 97419 dated
_______________
6 CSC Resolution No. 92-594, Rollo, pp. 11-12.

1. Any request for extension of service of compulsory retirees to
complete the fifteen years service requirement for retirement shall be
members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and shall be
granted for a period of not exceeding one (1) year.
7 211 SCRA 179 (1992).
619
VOL. 244, MAY 31, 1995
The Civil Service Commission, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed its comment on 16 November 1993. The Court then resolved to give
due course to the Petition and required the parties to file memoranda. Both
the Commission and Mr. Rabor (the latter through PAO counsel) did so.
619
July 3, 1992), for legal opinion. Both the City Legal Officer and the Chairman
of the Civil Service Commission are one in these opinion that extending you
an appointment in order that you may be able to complete the fifteen-year
service requirement is discretionary [on the part of] the City Mayor.
In this proceeding, petitioner Rabor contends that his claim falls squarely
within the ruling of this Court in Cena v. Civil Service Commission.11
Upon the other hand, the Commission seeks to distinguish this case from
Cena. The Commission, through the Solicitor
_______________
Much as we desire to extend you an appointment but circumstances are
that we can no longer do so. As you are already nearing your 70th birthday
may no longer be able to perform the duties attached to your position.
Moreover, the position you had vacated was already filled up.
8 Rollo, p. 3.
9 Supreme Court Resolution dated 24 August 1993, Rollo, p. 17.

We therefore regret to inform you that we cannot act favorably on your
request.8 (Emphases supplied)
10 Rollo, p. 40-A.
At this point, Mr. Rabor decided to come to this Court. He filed a
Letter/Petition dated 6 July 1993 appealing from Civil Service Resolution No.
92-594 and from Mayor Dutertes letter of 10 May 1993.
The Court required petitioner Rabor to comply with the formal requirements
for instituting a special civil action of certiorari to review the assailed
Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. In turn, the Commission was
required to comment on petitioners Letter/Petition. 9 The Court
subsequently noted petitioners Letter of 13 September 1993 relating to
compliance with the mentioned formal requirements and directed the Clerk
of Court to advise petitioner to engage the services of counsel or to ask for
legal assistance from the Public Attorneys Office (PAO).10
11 211 SCRA 179 (1992).
620
620

_______________
General, stressed that in Cena, this Court had ruled that the employer
agency, the Land Registration Authority of the Department of Justice, was
vested with discretion to grant to Cena the extension requested by him.
The Land Registration Authority had chosen not to exercise its discretion to
grant or deny such extension. In contrast, in the instant case, the Davao
City Government did exercise its discretion on the matter and decided to
deny the extension sought by petitioner Rabor for legitimate reasons.
While the Cena decision is barely three (3) years old, the Court considers
that it must reexamine the doctrine of Cena and the theoretical and policy
underpinnings thereof.12
We start by recalling the factual setting of Cena.
Gaudencio Cena was appointed Registrar of the Register of Deeds of

Malabon, Metropolitan Manila, on 16 July 1987. He reached the compulsory
retirement age of sixty-five (65) years on 22 January 1991. By the latter
date, his government service would have reached a total of eleven (11)
years, nine (9) months and six (6) days. Before reaching his 65th birthday,
Cena requested the Secretary of Justice, through the Administrator of the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) that he be allowed to extend his service
to complete the fifteen-year service requirement to enable him to retire
with the full benefit of an Old-Age Pension under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No.
1146. If Cenas request were granted, he would complete fifteen (15) years
of government service on 15 April 1994, at the age of sixty-eight (68)
years.
The LRA Administrator sought a ruling from the Civil Service Commission on
whether or not Cenas request could be granted considering that Cena was
covered by Civil Service Memorandum No. 27, Series of 1990. On 17
October 1990, the Commission allowed Cena a one (1) year extension of his
service from 22 January 1991 to 22 January 1992 under its Memorandum
Circular No. 27. Dissatisfied, Cena moved for reconsideration, without
success. He then came to this Court, claiming that he was entitled to an
extension of three (3) years, three (3) months and twenty-four (24) days to
complete the fifteen-year service re-
12 Two (2) Justices dissentedGrio-Aquino and Romero, JJ.from the Cena

decision.
621
VOL. 244, MAY 31, 1995
621
quirement for retirement with full benefits under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No.
1146.
This Court granted Cenas petition in its Decision of 3 July 1992. Speaking
through Mr. Justice Medialdea, the Court held that a government employee
who has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years,
but at the same time has not yet completed fifteen (15) years of
government service required under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 to
qualify for the Old-Age Pension Benefit, may be granted an extension of his
government service for such period of time as may be necessary to fill-up
or comply with the fifteen (15)-year service requirement. The Court also
held that the authority to grant the extension was a discretionary one
vested in the head of the agency concerned. Thus the Court concluded:
Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED. The Land Registration Authority

(LRA) and Department of Justice has the discretion to allow petitioner
Gaudencio Cena to extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of
government service to complete the fifteen-year service so that he may

retire with full benefits under Section 11, paragraph (b) of P.D. 1146.13
(Emphases supplied)

The Court reached the above conclusion primarily on the basis of the plain
and ordinary meaning of Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. Section 11 may
be quoted in its entirety:
Sec. 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension.(a) Old-Age Pension shall be paid
to a member who
(1) has at least fifteen (15) years of service;

(2) is at least sixty (60) years of age; and
The Court went on to rely upon the canon of liberal construction which has
often been invoked in respect of retirement statutes:
Being remedial in character, a statute granting a pension or establishing

[a] retirement plan should be liberally construed and administered in favor
of persons intended to be benefitted thereby. The liberal approach aims to
achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that efficiency,
security and well-being of government employees may be enhanced.14
(Citations omitted)
(3) is separated from the service.
(b) unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement

shall be compulsory for an employee at sixty-five (65) years of age with at
least fifteen (15) years of service; Provided, that if he has less than fifteen
(15) years of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to
complete the fifteen (15) years. (Emphases supplied)
_______________
13 211 SCRA at 192.
While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally unqualified terms, there

were (and still are) two (2) administrative issuances which prescribe
limitations on the extension of service that may be granted to an employee
who has reached sixty-five (65) years of
age.
The first administrative issuance is Civil Service Commission Circular No.

27, Series of 1990, which should be quoted in its entirety:
TO : ALL HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS, BUREAUS AND AGENCIES OF THE

NATIONAL/LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS
INCLUDING
GOVERNMENT-OWNED
AND/OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS WITH ORIGINAL CHARTERS
622
SUBJECT: Extension of Service of Compulsory Retiree to Complete the
Fifteen Years Service Requirement for Retirement Purposes
622
Pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 90-454 dated May 21, 1990, the Civil
Service Commission hereby adopts and promulgates the following policies
and guidelines in the extension of services of compulsory retirees to

complete the fifteen years service requirement for retirement purposes:
1. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retirees to

complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement shall be
members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and shall be
granted for a period not exceeding one (1) year.
4. Any request for the extension of service of a compulsory re-tiree who

meets the minimum number of years of service for retirement purposes
may be granted for six (6) months only with no further extension.
This Memorandum Circular shall take effect immediately. (Emphases

supplied)
The second administrative issuanceMemorandum Circular No. 65 of the

Office of the President, dated 14 June 1988pro-vides:
_______________
x x x
xxx
xxx
14 211 SCRA at 186.
623
WHEREAS, this Office has been receiving requests for reinstatement and/or
retention in the service of employees who have reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years, despite the strict conditions provided for in
Memorandum Circular No. 163, dated March 5, 1968, as amended.
VOL. 244, MAY 31, 1995
623
2. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retiree to

complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement who
entered the government service at 57 years of age or over upon prior grant
of authority to appoint him or her, shall no longer be granted.
3. Any request for the extension of service to complete the fifteen (15)
years service requirement of retirement shall be filed not later than three
(3) years prior to the date of compulsory retirement.
WHEREAS, the President has recently adopted a policy to adhere more

strictly to the law providing for compulsory retirement age of 65 years and,
in extremely meritorious cases, to limit the service beyond the age of 65
years to six (6) months only.
WHEREFORE, the pertinent provision of Memorandum Circular No. 163 on

the retention in the service of officials or employees who have reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 years, is hereby amended to read as
follows
Officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of

65 years shall not be retained in the service, except for extremely
meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall not exceed six (6)
months.
All heads of departments, bureaus, offices and instrumentalities of the

government including government-owned or controlled corporations, are
hereby enjoined to require their respective offices to strictly comply with

this circular.
We turn first to the Civil Service Commissions Memorandum Circular No.

27. Medialdea, J. wrote:
This Circular shall take effect immediately.
The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in the

nature of an administrative regulation, must be governed by the principle
that administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a
particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law,
and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general
provisions (People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA
450; Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30,
1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel v. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December
29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29
SCRA 350). x x x. The rule on limiting to one year the extension of service
of an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixtyfive (65) years, but has less than fifteen (15) years of service under Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, S. 1990, cannot likewise be accorded
validity because it has no relationship or connection with any provision of
P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried into effect. The rule was an addition to or
extension of the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect. The Civil
Service Commission has no power to supply perceived omissions in P.D.
1146.16 (Italics supplied)
624
624
By authority of the President

(Sgd.)
It will be seen that Cena, in striking down Civil Service Commission

Memorandum No. 27, took a very narrow view on the question of what
subordinate rule-making by an administrative agency is permissible and
valid. That restrictive view must
CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.

Executive Secretary
_______________
Manila, June 14, 1988.15 (Italics supplied)
15 211 SCRA at 200-201.
Medialdea, J. resolved the challenges posed by the above two (2)

administrative regulations by, firstly, considering as invalid Civil Service
Memorandum No. 27 and, secondly, by interpreting the Office of the
Presidents Memorandum Circular No. 65 as inapplicable to the case of
Gaudencio T. Cena.
16 211 SCRA at 190.
625
VOL. 244, MAY 31, 1995
625
be contrasted with this Courts earlier ruling in People v. Exconde,17 where

Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes said:
It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a

non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress,
nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate authority and
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it
impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the
multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law
into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to
the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law
prescribes.18 (Italics supplied)
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez,19 the Court, in sustaining the validity of a MECS

Order which established passing a uniform admission test called the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as a prerequisite for eligibility for
admission into medical schools in the Philippines, said:
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making
authority by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education
are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice
Fernando in Edu v. Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970])
The standards may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the

non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have
to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and

purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the
legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained in
Calalang v. Williams is safe transit upon the roads .
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in
Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: the standardization and regulation of
medical education and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of
the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient
_______________
17 101 Phil. 1125 (1957).
18 101 Phil. at 1129.
19 152 SCRA 730 (1987).
626
626
compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation principle.20

(Citations omitted; italics partly in the original and partly supplied)
21 35 SCRA 481 (1970).

In Edu v. Ericta,21 then Mr. Justice Fernando stressed the abstract and very
general nature of the standards which our Court has in prior caselaw upheld
as sufficient for purposes of compliance with the requirements for validity
of subordinate or administrative rule-making:
22 35 SCRA at 497 (note 43).
627
This Court has considered as sufficient standards, public welfare,
(Municipality of Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547 [1917]);
necessary in the interest of law and order, (Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39
Phil. 660 [1919]); public interest, (People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328
[1939]); and justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
(International Hardwood v. Pangil Federation of Labor, 17 Phil. 602
[1940]).22 (Italics supplied)
VOL. 244, MAY 31, 1995
627
Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher degree of
detail in the statute to be implemented, went against prevailing doctrine. It
seems clear that if the governing or enabling statute is quite detailed and
specific to begin with, there would be very little need (or occasion) for
implementing administrative regulations. It is, however, precisely the
inability of legislative bodies to anticipate all (or many) possible detailed
situations in respect of any relatively complex subject matter, that makes
subordinate, delegated rule-making by administrative agencies so
important and unavoidable. All that may be reasonably demanded is a
governing or enabling statute. This is the test that is appropriately applied
in respect of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, and
to this test we now turn.
We consider that the enabling statute that should appropriately be

examined is the present Civil Service Lawfound in Book V, Title I, Subtitle
A, of Executive Order No. 292 dated 25
July 1987, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987and not

alone P.D. No. 1146, otherwise known as the Revised Government Service
Insurance Act of 1977. For the matter of extension of service of retirees
who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age is an area that is covered by
both statutes and not alone by Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. This is
crystal clear from examination of many provisions of the present civil
service law.
Section 12 of the present Civil Service Law set out in the 1987
Administrative Code provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Sec. 12. Powers and Functions.The [Civil Service] Commission shall have
the following powers and functions:
_______________
xxx
20 152 SCRA at 740-741.
xxx
xxx
(2) Prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into
effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws;
(3) Promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the Civil Service
and adopt plans and programs to promote economical, efficient and
effective personnel administration in the government;
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel

matters in the Civil Service including extension of service beyond
retirement age;
xxx
xxx
xxx
(17) Administer the retirement program for government officials and

employees, and accredit government services and evaluate qualifications
for retirement;
xxx
xxx
It was on the bases of the above quoted provisions of the 1987

Administrative Code that the Civil Service Commission promulgated its
Memorandum Circular No. 27. In doing so, the Commission was acting as
the central personnel agency of the government empowered to
promulgate policies, standards and guide-
628
lines for efficient, responsive and effective personnel administration in the

government.23 It was also discharging its function of administering the
retirement program for government officials and employees and of
evaluat[ing] qualifications for retirement.
In addition, the Civil Service Commission is charged by the 1987

Administrative Code with providing leadership and assistance in the
development and retention of qualified and efficient work force in the Civil
Service (Section 16 [10]) and with the enforcement of the constitutional
and statutory provisions, relative to retirement and the regulation for the
effective implementation of the retirement of government officials and
employees (Section 16 [14]).
xxx
(19) Perform all functions properly belonging to a central personnel

agency and such other functions as may be provided by law. (Italics
supplied)
628
xxx
(10) Formulate, administer and evaluate programs relative to the

development and retention of a qualified and competent work force in the
public service;
xxx
We find it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible

extensions of service after an employee has reached sixty-five (65) years of
age has no reasonable relationship or is not germane to the foregoing
provisions of the present Civil Service Law. The physiological and
psychological processes associated with ageing in human beings are in fact
related to the efficiency and quality of the service that may be expected
from individual persons. The policy considerations which guided the Civil
Service Commission in limiting the maximum extension of service allowable
for compulsory retirees, were summarized by Grio-Aquino, J. in her
dissenting opinion in Cena:
Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service
Commission that extending the service of compulsory retirees for longer
than one (1) year would: (1) give a premium to late-comers in the
government service and in effect discriminate against those who enter the
service at a younger age; (2) delay the promotion of the latter and of nextin-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for employment of
qualified young civil service applicants who have already passed the
various government examinations but must wait for jobs to be vacated by
extendees who have long passed the mandatory retirement age but are
enjoying extension of their government service to complete 15 years so

they may qualify for old-age pension.24 (Italics supplied)
_______________
23 See Addendum to Comment filed by Civil Service Commission dated 5

August 1991; Cena Rollo, p. 91.
24 211 SCRA at 196.
629
VOL. 244, MAY 31, 1995
629
The very real difficulties posed by the Cena doctrine for rational personnel
administration and management in the Civil Service, are aggravated when
Cena is considered together with the case of Toledo v. Civil Service
Commission.25 Toledo involved the provisions of Rule III, Section 22, of the
Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP) which
prohibited the appointment of persons fifty-seven (57) years old or above in
government service without prior approval of the Civil Service Commission.
Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1983 provided that a
person fifty-seven (57) years of age may be appointed to the Civil Service
provided that the exigencies of the government service so required and
provided that the appointee possesses special qualifications not possessed
by other officers or employees in the Civil Service and that the vacancy
cannot be filled by promotion of qualified officers or employees of the Civil
Service. Petitioner Toledo was appointed Manager of the Education and
Information Division of the Commission on Elections when he was almost
fifty-nine (59) years old. No authority for such appointment had been
obtained either from the President of the Philippines or from the Civil
Service Com-
_______________
25 202 SCRA 507 (1991). We are not here, of course, reexamining Toledo
for this case is not, strictly speaking, involved at present. At the same time,
we cannot disregard the intellectual relevance of the doctrine in Toledo to
the issues that we are presently addressing.

630
Cena laid heavy stress on the interest of retirees or would be retirees,
something that is, in itself, quite appropriate. At the same time, however,
we are bound to note that there should be countervailing stress on the
interests of the employer agency and of other government employees as a
whole. The results flowing from the striking down of the limitation
established in Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 may well be
absurd and inequitable, as suggested by Mme. Justice Grio-Aquino in her
dissenting opinion. An employee who has rendered only three (3) years of
government service at age sixty-five (65) can have his service extended for
twelve (12) years and finally retire at the age of seventy-seven (77). This
reduces the significance of the general principle of compulsory retirement
at age sixty-five (65) very close to the vanishing point.
630
mission and the Commission found that the other conditions laid down in
Section 22 of Rule III, CSRPAP, did not exist. The Court nevertheless struck
down Section 22, Rule III on the same exceedingly restrictive view of
permissible administrative legislation that Cena relied on.26
nothing to carry into effect through an implementing rule on the matter.

(202 SCRA at 513-514, per Paras, J.; italics supplied).
631
When one combines the doctrine of Toledo with the ruling in Cena, very
strange results follow. Under these combined doctrines, a person sixty-four
(64) years of age may be appointed to the government service and one (1)
year later may demand extension of his service for the next fourteen (14)
years; he would retire at age seventy-nine (79). The net effect is thus that
the general statutory policy of compulsory retirement at sixty-five (65)
years is heavily eroded and effectively becomes unenforceable. That
general statutory policy may be seen to embody the notion that there
should be a certain minimum turn-over in the government service and that
opportunities for government service should be distributed as broadly as
possible, specially to younger people, considering that the bulk of our
population is below thirty (30) years of age. That same general policy also
reflects the life expectancy of our people which is still significantly lower
than the life expectancy of, e.g., people in Northern and Western Europe,
North America and Japan.
Our conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be and is hereby

modified to this extent: that Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27,
Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1)
______________
26 Toledo held:
[Section 22, Rule III] is entirely a creation of the Civil Service Commission,
having no basis in the law itself which it was meant to implement. It cannot
be related to or connected with any specific provision of the law which it is
meant to carry into effect, such as a requirement, for instance, that age
should be reckoned as a factor in the employment or reinstatement of an
individual, or a direction that there be a determination of some point in a
persons life at which he becomes unemployable or employable [only]
under specific conditions. x x x [S]ince there is no prohibition or restriction
on the employment of fifty-seven (57) year old persons x x x there was
VOL. 244, MAY 31, 1995
631
thereof, is hereby declared valid and effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No.
1146 must, accordingly, be read together with Memorandum Circular No.
27. We reiterate, however, the holding in Cena that the head of the
government agency concerned is vested with discretionary authority to
allow or disallow extension of the service of an official or employee who has
reached sixty-five (65) years of age without completing fifteen (15) years of
government service; this discretion is, nevertheless, to be exercised
conformably with the provisions of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No.
27, Series of 1990.
We do not believe it necessary to deal specifically with Memorandum

Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President dated 14 June 1988. It will be
noted from the text quoted supra (pp. 11-12) that the text itself of
Memorandum Circular No. 65 (and for that matter, that of Memorandum
Circular No. 163, also of the Office of the President, dated 5 March 1968)27
does not purport to apply only to officers or employees who have reached
the age of sixty-five (65) years and who have at least fifteen (15) years of
government service. We noted earlier that Cena interpreted Memorandum
Circular No. 65 as referring only to officers and employees who have both
reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) and completed the
fifteen (15) years of government service. Cena so interpreted this
Memorandum Circular precisely because Cena had reached the conclusion
that employees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age, but who
have less than fifteen (15) years of government service, may be allowed
such extension of service as may be needed to complete fifteen (15) years

of service. In other words, Cena read Memorandum Circular No. 65 in such
a way as to comport with Cenas own conclusion reached without regard to
that Memorandum Circular. In view of the conclusion that we today reached
in the instant case, this last ruling of Cena is properly regarded as merely
obiter.
We also do not believe it necessary to determine whether Civil Service

Memorandum Circular No. 27 is fully compatible with Office of the
Presidents Memorandum Circular No. 65; this question must be reserved
for detailed analysis in some future
action of CSRO-XI Director Cawad dated 26 July 1991, must be upheld and
affirmed.
ACCORDINGLY, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,

Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
_______________
27 64 Official Gazette 3295 (1 April 1968).
632
632
Padilla, J., I vote to grant the petition for the same reasons stated in my
concurring opinion in Cena vs. CSC reported in 211 SCRA 192.
Quiason, J., On leave.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.The time that a motion for reconsideration is pending with the Civil
Service Commission may not properly be deducted from the 30-day period
within which the ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari. (Gobantes vs. Civil Service Commission, 214 SCRA 495
[1992])
justiciable case.
Applying now the results of our reexamination of Cena to the instant case,
we believe and so hold that Civil Service Resolution No. 92-594 dated 28
April 1992 dismissing the appeal of petitioner Rabor and affirming the
In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the

former must prevail. (Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs. Garcia, Jr., 239
SCRA 386 [1994])
o0o [Rabor vs. Civil Service Commission, 244 SCRA 614(1995)]
_______________
* EN BANC.
442
442
VOL. 434, JULY 14, 2004

441
Government Service Insurance System vs. Montesclaros
G.R. No. 146494. July 14, 2004.*

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Cebu City Branch, petitioner,
vs. MILAGROS O. MONTESCLAROS, respondent.
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS); Pensions; Definition of

Dependent; Under P.D. No. 1146 the primary beneficiaries are (1) the
dependent spouse until such spouse remarries and (2) the dependent
children.Under PD 1146, the primary beneficiaries are: (1) the dependent
spouse until such spouse remarries, and (2) the dependent children. The
secondary beneficiaries are the dependent parents and legitimate
descendants except dependent children. The law defines dependent as the
legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted, acknowledged natural or
illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over
twenty-one years of age or is over twenty-one years of age but physically
or mentally incapacitated and incapable of self-support. The term also
includes
the legitimate spouse dependent for support on the member, and the
legitimate parent wholly dependent on the member for support.
Same; Same; In a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory,

the prevailing view is that the employees have contractual or vested rights
in the pension where the pension is part of the terms of employment.In a
pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing
view is that employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension
where the pension is part of the terms of employment. The reason for
providing retirement benefits is to compensate service to the government.
Retirement benefits to government employees are part of emolument to
encourage and retain qualified employees in the government service.
Retirement benefits to government employees reward them for giving the
best years of their lives in the service of their country.
Same; Same; Due Process; Where the employee retires and meets the
eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is
protected by the due process clause; No law can deprive such person of his
pension rights without due process of law that is without notice and
opportunity to be heard.Where the employee retires and meets the

eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is
protected by the due process clause. Retirees enjoy a protected property
interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under preexisting law. Thus, a pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have
become due as provided under the terms of the public employees pension
statute. No law can deprive such person of his pension rights without due
process of law, that is, without notice and opportunity to be heard.
Same; Same; Same; A widows right to receive pension following the

demise of her husband is also part of the husbands contractual
compensation.In addition to retirement and disability benefits, PD 1146
also provides for benefits to survivors of deceased government employees
and pensioners. Under PD 1146, the dependent spouse is one of the
beneficiaries of survivorship benefits. A widows right to receive pension
following the demise of her husband is also part of the husbands
contractual compensation.
and regulate one class differently from another class provided there are
real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another.
Same; Same; Same; The proviso in question does not satisfy these
requirements.The proviso discriminates against the dependent spouse
who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years before the
pensioner qualified for the pension. Under the proviso, even if the
dependent spouse married the pensioner more than three years before the
pensioners death, the dependent spouse would still not receive
survivorship pension if the marriage took place within three years before
the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the prohibition is vague.
There is no reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any reason or purpose for
such a prohibition.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; A statute based on
reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the
equal protection of the law; Requirements for a Valid and Reasonable
Classification.A statute based on reasonable classification does not
violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The
requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest
on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must
apply equally to all members of the same class. Thus, the law may treat
443
VOL. 434, JULY 14, 2004
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 dated 13

December 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48784. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21,
Cebu City (trial court), which held that Milagros Orbiso Montesclaros is
entitled to survivorship pension.
The Facts
443
Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas Montesclaros (Nicolas) married

Milagros Orbiso (Milagros) on 10 July 1983.3 Nicolas was a 72- year old
widower when he married Milagros who was then 43 years old.
On 4 January 1985, Nicolas filed with the Government Service Insurance

System (GSIS) an application for retirement benefits
surviving spouse contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three
years before the pensioner qualified for the pension.7 According to GSIS,
Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date of
retirement on 17 February 1984.
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, with Associate Justices

Mariano M. Umali and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador concurring.
2 Penned by Judge Peary G. Aleonar.
On 2 October 1992, Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action
for declaratory relief questioning the validity of Section 18 of PD 1146
disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension.
On 9 November 1994, the trial court rendered judgment declaring Milagros

eligible for survivorship pension. The trial court ordered GSIS to pay
Milagros the benefits due including interest. Citing Articles 1158 and 1179
of the Family Code, the trial court
3 See Marriage Contract; Records, p. 5.

_______________
444
4 Records, p. 8.
444
5 See Service Record; Records p. 70.
6 Records, p. 112.
7 Ibid., pp. 9, 12.
effective 18 February 1985 under Presidential Decree No. 1146 or the

Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 (PD 1146). In his
retirement application, Nicolas designated his wife Milagros as his sole
beneficiary.4 Nicolas last day of actual service was on 17 February 1985.5
On 31 January 1986, GSIS approved Nicolas application for retirement
effective 17 February 1984, granting a lump sum payment of annuity for
the first five years and a monthly annuity thereafter.6 Nicolas died on 22
April 1992. Milagros filed with GSIS a claim for survivorship pension under
PD 1146. On 8 June 1992, GSIS denied the claim because under Section 18
of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension if the
8 Article 115 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 115. Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities, gratuities, usufructs and

similar benefits shall be governed by the rules on gratuitous or onerous
acquisitions as may be proper in each case.
9 Article 117 of the Family Code reads:
GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the
trial court. Hence, this petition for review.
Art. 117. The following are conjugal partnership properties:
(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense
of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for
only one of the spouses;
(2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either
or both of the spouses;
xxx
In the meantime, in a letter dated 10 January 2003, Milagros informed the

Court that she has accepted GSIS decision disqualifying her from receiving
survivorship pension and that she is no longer interested in pursuing the
case.10 Commenting on Milagros letter, GSIS asserts that the Court must
decide the case on the merits.11
The Court will resolve the issue despite the manifestation of Milagros. The
issue involves not only the claim of Milagros but also that of other surviving
spouses who are similarly situated and whose claims GSIS would also deny
based on the proviso. Social justice and public interest demand that we
resolve the constitutionality of the proviso.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
445
VOL. 434, JULY 14, 2004
The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the retirement benefits
are onerous and conjugal because the pension came from the deceased
pensioners salary deductions. The Court of Appeals held that the pension is
not gratuitous since it is a deferred compensation for services rendered.
The Issues
445
GSIS raises the following issues:
1. Whether Section 16 of PD 1146 entitles Milagros to survivorship
pension;
held that retirement benefits, which the pensioner has earned for services
rendered and for which the pensioner has contributed through monthly
salary deductions, are onerous acquisitions. Since retirement benefits are
property the pensioner acquired through labor, such benefits are conjugal
property. The trial court held that the prohibition in Section 18 of PD 1146 is
deemed repealed for being inconsistent with the Family Code, a later law.
The Family Code has retroactive effect if it does not prejudice or impair
vested rights.
_______________
10 Rollo, p. 78.
11 Ibid., p. 84.
446
446
SEC. 17. Death of a Member.(a) Upon the death of a member, the primary
beneficiaries shall be entitled to:
(1) the basic monthly pension which is guaranteed for five years;
Provided, That, at the option of the beneficiaries, it may be paid in lump
sum as defined in this Act: Provided, further, That, the member is entitled
to old-age pension at the time of his death; or
(2) the basic survivorship pension which is guaranteed for thirty months
and the dependents pension; Provided, That, the deceased had paid at
least thirty-six monthly contributions within the five-year period
immediately preceding his death, or a total of at least one hundred eighty
monthly contributions prior to his death.
2. Whether retirement benefits form part of conjugal property;

3. Whether Articles 254 and 256 of the Family Code repealed Section 18
of PD 1146.12
(b) At the end of the guaranteed periods mentioned in the preceding subsection (a), the survivorship pension shall be paid as follows:
(1) when the dependent spouse is the only survivor, he shall receive the
basic survivorship pension for life or until he remarries;
The Courts Ruling
(2) when only dependent children are the survivors, they shall be entitled
to the survivorship pension for as long as they are qualified;
The pertinent provisions of PD 1146 on survivorship benefits read:
(3) when the survivors are the dependent spouse and the dependent
children, they shall be entitled to the survivorship pension so long as there
are dependent children and, thereafter, the surviv
SEC. 16. Survivorship Benefits.When a member or pensioner dies, the

beneficiary shall be entitled to survivorship benefits provided for in sections
seventeen and eighteen hereunder. The survivorship pension shall consist
of:
_______________
12 Ibid., pp. 14-15.

(1) basic survivorship pension which is fifty percent of the basic monthly
pension; and
(2) dependents pension not exceeding fifty percent of the basic monthly
pension payable in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by
the System.
447
VOL. 434, JULY 14, 2004
447
the expiration of the said period. This shall also apply to the pensioners
living as of the effectivity of this Act, but the survivorship benefit shall be
based on the monthly pension being received at the time of death.
(Emphasis supplied)
ing spouse shall receive the basic survivorship pension for life or until he
remarries.
(c) In the absence of primary beneficiaries, the secondary beneficiaries

designated by the deceased and recorded in the System, shall be entitled
to:
Under PD 1146, the primary beneficiaries are: (1) the dependent spouse
until such spouse remarries, and (2) the dependent children.13 The
secondary beneficiaries are the dependent parents and legitimate
descendants except dependent children.14 The law defines dependent as
the legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted, acknowledged natural or
illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over
twenty-one years of age or is over twenty-one years of age but physically
or mentally incapacitated
_______________
(1) a cash payment equivalent to thirty times the basic survivorship
pension when the member is qualified for old-age pension; or
(2) a cash payment equivalent to fifty percent of the average monthly
compensation for each year he paid contributions, but not less than five
hundred pesos; Provided, That, the member paid at least thirty-six monthly
contributions within the five-year period immediately preceding his death
or paid a total of at least one hundred eighty monthly contributions prior to
his death.
13 Sec. 2(g), PD 1146.
14 Sec. 2(h), PD 1146.
448
(d) When the primary beneficiaries are not entitled to the benefits
mentioned in paragraph (a) of this section, they shall receive a cash
payment equivalent to one hundred percent of the average monthly
compensation for each year the member paid contributions, but not less
than five hundred pesos. In the absence of primary beneficiaries, the
amount shall revert to the funds of the System.
448

SEC. 18. Death of a Pensioner.Upon the death of a pensioner, the primary
beneficiaries shall receive the applicable pension mentioned under
paragraph (b) of section seventeen of this Act: Provided, That, the
dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage with
the pensioner is contracted within three years before the pensioner
qualified for the pension. When the pensioner dies within the period
covered by the lump sum, the survivorship pension shall be paid only after
and incapable of self-support. The term also includes the legitimate

spouse dependent for support on the member, and the legitimate parent
wholly dependent on the member for support.15
15 Sec. 2(f), PD 1146.
16 Section 6, PD 1146.
The main question for resolution is the validity of the proviso in Section 18
of PD 1146, which proviso prohibits the dependent spouse from receiving
survivorship pension if such dependent spouse married the pensioner
within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension (the
proviso).
17 Ibid.
18 60A Am. Jur. 2D Pensions and Retirement Funds 1620 (1988).

We hold that the proviso, which was the sole basis for the rejection by GSIS
of Milagros claim, is unconstitutional because it violates the due process
clause. The proviso is also discriminatory and denies equal protection of the
law.
19 Government Service Insurance System v. Civil Service Commission, 315

Phil. 159; 245 SCRA 179 (1995).
Retirement Benefits as Property Interest

449
Under Section 5 of PD 1146, it is mandatory for the government employee
to pay monthly contributions. PD 1146 mandates the government to
include in its annual appropriation the necessary amounts for its share of
the contributions. It is compulsory on the government employer to take off
and withhold from the employees monthly salaries their contributions and
to remit the same to GSIS.16 The government employer must also remit its
corresponding share to GSIS.17 Considering the mandatory salary
deductions from the government employee, the government pensions do
not constitute mere gratuity but form part of compensation.
VOL. 434, JULY 14, 2004
449

In a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the
prevailing view is that employees have contractual or vested rights in the
pension where the pension is part of the terms of employment.18 The
reason for providing retirement benefits is to compensate service to the
government. Retirement benefits to government employees are part of
emolument to encourage and retain qualified employees in the government
service. Retirement benefits to government employees reward them for
giving the best years of their lives in the service of their country.19
_______________
Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he
acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected by the due process
clause.20 Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they
acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law.21 Thus, a
pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have become due as
provided under the terms of the public employees pension statute.22 No
law can deprive such person of his pension rights without due process of
law, that is, without notice and opportunity to be heard.23
In addition to retirement and disability benefits, PD 1146 also provides for

benefits to survivors of deceased government employees and pensioners.
Under PD 1146, the dependent spouse is one of the beneficiaries of
survivorship benefits. A widows right to receive pension following the
demise of her husband is also part of the husbands contractual
compensation.24
Denial of Due Process
450
The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which

provides that [n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws. The proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly
denying a dependent spouses claim for survivorship pension if the
dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the threeyear prohibited period. There is outright confiscation of benefits due the
surviving spouse without giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be
heard. The proviso undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure
comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance benefits to
government employees and their dependents in the event of sickness,
disability, death, and retirement of the government employees.
450
WHEREAS, the Government Service Insurance System in promoting the

efficiency and welfare of the employees of the Government of the
Philippines, administers the laws that grant to its members social security
and insurance benefits;
The whereas clauses of PD 1146 state:
_______________
WHEREAS, it is necessary to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of

the funds administered by the System; to guarantee to the government
employee all the benefits due him; and to expand and increase the benefits
made available to him and his dependents to the extent permitted by
available resources;
21 Zucker v. U.S., 758 F.2d 637 (CA Fed. Cir., 1985).
WHEREAS, provisions of existing laws have impeded the efficient and

effective discharge by the System of its functions and have unduly
hampered the System from being more responsive to the dramatic changes
of the times and from meeting the increasing needs and expectations of
the Filipino public servant;
22 Pennie v. Reis, 132 U.S. 464, 33 L.Ed. 426 (1889).
23 Stevens v. Minneapolis Fire Department Relief Assn, 124 Minn. 381, 141
NW 35 (1914).
WHEREAS, provisions of existing laws that have prejudiced, rather than

benefited, the government employee; restricted, rather than broadened, his
benefits, prolonged, rather than facilitated the payment of benefits, must
now yield to his paramount welfare;
WHEREAS, the social security and insurance benefits of government

employees must be continuously re-examined and improved to assure
comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance programs that
will provide benefits responsive to their needs and those of their
dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death, retirement, and other
contingencies; and to serve as a fitting reward for dedicated public service;
WHEREAS, in the light of existing economic conditions affecting the welfare

of government employees, there is a need to expand and improve the
social security and insurance programs administered by the Government
Service Insurance System, specifically, among others, by increasing
pension benefits, expanding disability benefits, introducing survivorship
benefits, introducing sickness and income benefits, and eventually
extending the compulsory coverage of these programs to all government
employees regardless of employment status.
PD 1146 has the following purposes:
a. to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds

administered by the System;
b. to guarantee to the government employee all the benefits due him;
and
c. to expand, increase, and improve the social security and insurance
benefits made available to him and his dependents such as:
increasing pension benefits

expanding disability benefits
451
VOL. 434, JULY 14, 2004
451
introducing survivorship benefits

introducing sickness income benefits
extending compulsory membership to all government employees
irrespective of status25
The law extends survivorship benefits to the surviving and qualified

beneficiaries of the deceased member or pensioner to cushion the
beneficiaries against the adverse economic effects resulting from the death
of the wage earner or pensioner.26
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The surviving spouse of a government employee is entitled to receive

survivors benefits under a pension system. However, statutes sometimes
require that the spouse should have married the employee for a certain
period before the employees death to prevent sham marriages contracted
for monetary gain. One example is the Illinois Pension Code which restricts
survivors annuity benefits to a surviving spouse who was married to a
state employee for at least one year before the employees death. The
Illinois pension system classifies spouses into those married less than one
year before a members death and those married one year or more. The
classification seeks to prevent conscious adverse risk selection of deathbed
marriages where a terminally ill member of the pension system marries
another so that person becomes eligible for benefits. In Sneddon v. The
State Employees Retirement System of Illinois,27 the Appellate Court of
Illinois held that such classification was based on difference in situation and
circumstance, bore a rational relation to the purpose of the statute, and
was therefore not in violation of constitutional guarantees of due process
and equal protection.
A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the

constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law.28 The
and regulate one class differently from another class provided there are
real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another.30
_______________
The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso
discriminates against the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the
pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension.31 Under the proviso, even if the dependent spouse married the
pensioner more than three years before the pensioners death, the
dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the
marriage took place within three years before the pensioner qualified for
pension. The object of the prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable
connection between the means employed and the purpose intended. The
law itself does not provide any reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If
the purpose of the proviso is to prevent deathbed marriages, then we do
not see why the proviso reckons the three-year prohibition from the date
the pensioner qualified for pension and not from the date the
25 Information Primer on Presidential Decree 1146 and other Benefits 14.
26 Section 1, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of PD

1146, Rollo, p. 8.
27 388 N.E.2d 229 (1979).
28 Farias v. The Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, 10 December 2003,

417 SCRA 503; Villarea v. The Commission on Audit, G.R. Nos. 145383-84,
6 August 2003, 408 SCRA 455.
452
_______________
29 Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA) v. The

Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, G.R. No. 143076,
10 June 2003, 403 SCRA 558; Lacson v. The Executive Secretary, 361 Phil.
251; 301 SCRA 298 (1999); Tiu v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 229; 301 SCRA
278 (1999); People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 (1939).
452
30 Farias v. The Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, 10 December 2003,
417 SCRA 503; Abbas v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 89651, 10
November 1989, 179 SCRA 287.
requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest
on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must
apply equally to all members of the same class.29 Thus, the law may treat
31 Section 11 of PD 1146 provides for the qualifications to become entitled

to retirement benefits:
SEC. 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension.(a) Old-age pension shall be paid
to a member who:
(1) has at least fifteen years of service;

(2) is at least sixty years of age; and
32 The pertinent provisions of RA 8291 regarding survivorship benefits

read:
(3) is separated from the service.
(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement

shall be compulsory for an employee at sixty-five years of age with at least
fifteen years of service: Provided, That if he has less than fifteen years of
service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the
fifteen years.
453
VOL. 434, JULY 14, 2004
SEC. 20. Survivorship Benefits.When a member or pensioner dies, the

beneficiaries shall be entitled to survivorship benefits provided in Sections
21 and 22 hereunder subject to the conditions therein provided for. The
survivorship pension shall consist of:
(1) the basic survivorship pension which is fifty percent (50%) of the
basic monthly pension; and
(2) the dependent childrens pension not exceeding fifty percent (50%) of
the basic monthly pension.
SEC. 21. Death of a Member.(a) Upon the death of a member, the primary
beneficiaries shall be entitled to:
(1) survivorship pension: Provided, That the deceased:

453
(i) was in the service at the time of his death; or
pensioner died. The classification does not rest on substantial distinctions.

Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages contracted within three
years before the pensioner qualified for pension as having been contracted
primarily for financial convenience to avail of pension benefits.
Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and arbitrary. This is probably

the reason Congress deleted the proviso in Republic Act No. 8291 (RA
8291),32 otherwise known as the Government Ser-
_______________
(ii) if separated from the service, has at least three (3) years of service at
the time of his death and has paid thirty-six (36) monthly contributions
within the fiveyear period immediately preceding his death; or has paid a
total of at least one hundred eighty (180) monthly contributions prior to his
death; or
(2) the survivorship pension plus a cash payment equivalent to one

hundred percent (100%) of his average monthly compensation for every
year of service: Provided, That the deceased was in the service at the time
of his death with at least three (3) years of service; or
(3) a cash payment equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of his
average monthly compensation for each year of service he paid
contributions, but not less than Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00):
Provided, That the deceased has rendered at least three (3) years of service
prior to his death but does not qualify for the benefits under item (1) or (2)
of this paragraph.
the dependent childrens pension mentioned in the immediately preceding

paragraph hereof.
454
(c) In the absence of primary beneficiaries the secondary beneficiaries shall

be entitled to:
454
(1) the cash payment equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of his
average monthly compensation for each year of service he paid
contributions, but not less than Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00):
Provided, That the member is in the service at the time of his death and
has at least three (3) years of service; or
(2) in the absence of secondary beneficiaries, the benefits under this
paragraph shall be paid to his legal heirs.
vice Insurance Act of 1997, the law revising the old charter of GSIS (PD
1146). Under the implementing rules of RA 8291, the surviving spouse who
married the member immediately before the members death is still
qualified to receive survivorship pension
_______________
(d) For purposes of the survivorship benefits, legitimate children shall

include legally adopted and legitimated children.
SEC. 22. Death of a Pensioner.Upon the death of an oldage pensioner or a

member receiving the monthly income benefit for permanent disability, the
qualified beneficiaries shall be entitled to the survivorship pension defined
in Section 20 of this Act, subject to the provisions of paragraph (b) of
Section 21 hereof. When the pensioner dies within the period covered by
the lump sum, the survivorship pension shall be paid only after the
expiration of the said period.
(b) The survivorship pension shall be paid as follows:

455
(1) when the dependent spouse is the only survivor, he/she shall receive
the basic survivorship pension for life or until he/she remarries;
(2) when only dependent children are the survivors, they shall be entitled
to the basic survivorship pension for as long as they are qualified, plus the
dependent childrens pension equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the basic
monthly pension for every dependent child not exceeding five (5), counted
from the youngest and without substitution;
VOL. 434, JULY 14, 2004
(3) when the survivors are the dependent spouse and the dependent
children, the dependent spouse shall receive the basic survivorship pension
for life or until he/she remarries, and the dependent children shall receive
455
unless the GSIS proves that the surviving spouse contracted the marriage
solely to receive the benefit.33
Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted
within three years before retirement or death of a member are sham
marriages contracted to avail of survivorship benefits. The present GSIS law
does not automatically forfeit the survivorship pension of the surviving
spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS member within three years
before the members retirement or death. The law acknowledges that
whether the surviving spouse contracted the marriage mainly to receive
survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no longer prescribes
a sweeping classification that unduly prejudices the legitimate surviving
spouse and defeats the purpose for which Congress enacted the social
legislation.
10.4.1When the dependent spouse is the only survivor, he/she shall

receive the basic survivorship pension for life or until he/she remarries. For
purposes of this section, the marriage of the surviving spouse immediately
prior to the death of the member or pensioner shall be acceptable, unless it
is proven that the marriage was solemnized solely for the purpose of
receiving the benefit. (Emphasis supplied)
456
456

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for want of merit. We declare VOID for
being violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the law the proviso in Section 18 of Presidential Decree No.
1146, which proviso states that the dependent spouse shall not be entitled
to said pension if his marriage with the pensioner is contracted within three
years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. The Government
Service Insurance System cannot deny the claim of Milagros O.
Montesclaros for survivorship benefits based on this invalid proviso.
Heirs of Geronimo Restrivera vs. De Guzman
SO ORDERED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.
_______________
Petition denied.
33 Section 10.4.1 of the Implementing Rule and Regulation of R.A. No. 8291
reads:
Note.It must be remembered that the need to enforce the law cannot be
justified by sacrificing constitutional rights. (Posadas vs. Ombudsman, 341
SCRA 388 [2000])
Section 10.4. Allocation of the Survivorship Pension Among Beneficiaries.

The survivorship pension shall be paid as follows:
o0o [Government Service Insurance System vs. Montesclaros, 434

SCRA 441(2004)]

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VOL.

200, AUGUST 5, 1991

Aguja vs. Government Service Insurance System

G.R. No. 84846. August 5, 1991.*

Labor Law; Employees Compensation; Work-connected injury; The injury

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PETITION for review from the decision of the Employees Compensation

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

petitioners right eye which caused gradual loss of vision, finally

Ariel F. Aguirre, Roberto Y. Mabulay and Cesar R. Vidal for

On the basis of the accident in 1979, the petitioner claimed for

VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991

Aguja vs. Government Service Insurance System

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Aguja vs. Government Service Insurance System

help of this Court praying for the additional benefits.

Consequently, in a resolution dated February 10, 1988, the Court denied

To be entitled to an income benefit for permanent total disability, the

Later, the petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the Courts resolution

Section 1. Condition of entitlement. (a) An employee shall be entitled to an

Considering the foregoing, the Court Resolved to require petitioner Aguja

1) He has been duly reported to the System;

VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991

Aguja vs. Government Service Insurance System

injury or sickness; and

It must be stressed that the petitioner is claiming for additional benefits

(MALOY, Medical Dictionary for Lawyers, 2nd edition, 1951).

OCCLUSIOPUPILLAEis the closure of the opening in the iris of the eye by

IRIDODIALYSISis the separation or loosening of the iris from its

PTERYGIUMa triangular fleshy mass of thickened conjunctiva occurring

CATARACT IMMATURE O.S.

PTERYGIUM (Rollo, p. 115)

CATARACT IMMATUREis an opacity of the crystalline eye lens or of its

x x x Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of

Aguja vs. Government Service Insurance System

We hold, therefore, that the petitioner is entitled to a conversion of his

For contingencies which occurred before May 1, 1979, the limitation of

VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991

establishing retirement plan should be liberally construed and administered

Same; Same; Same; Same.In resolving the question whether or not to

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Same; Same; Same; Statute; Administrative Law; An administrative circular

Cena vs. Civil Service Commission

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cena vs. Civil Service Commission

case, they are allowed, at the discretion of the agency concerned, to

PADILLA, J., Concurring:

Retirement Law; An employee may continue without prior approval to serve

Cena vs. Civil Service Commission

follows: x x x would indicate, in my opinion, that the government employee

GRIO-AQUINO, J., Dissenting:

Retirement Law; P.D. 1146 contemplates only the situation where an

Same; There is no point to grant Cena a one-year extension because he

ROMERO, J., Dissenting:

Retirement Law; Majority interpretation of P.D. 1146 is absurd.Moreover,

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Prospero A. Crescini for petitioner.

Cena vs. Civil Service Commission

On July 16, 1987, he was appointed as Registrar of the Register of Deeds of

The facts are not disputed.

Petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena entered the government service on November

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED