Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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[8]
1 An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the
Privacy of Communications and for Other Purposes.
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It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative
inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly
state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they
are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
Also, publication of the rules via a booklet form available to anyone for free, and
accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page is insufficient to comply with
the publication requirement. R.A. 8792 (The E-Commerce Act) considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a
written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data
messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for
publishing laws, rules and regulations.
The Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its
unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall
have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure.
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila
Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication
does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant
petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative
investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate
Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the
Constitution.
Page 2 of 51
The debtors failed to pay again. Because of this, Law instituted a collection case
against the debtors. The trial court ruled in favor of Law.
ISSUE:
WON the additional obligation of 6k constituted usurious interest???
RULING:
NO.
Usury has been legally non-existent. Interest can now be charged as lender and
borrower may agree upon. The Rules of Court in regards to allegations of usury,
procedural in nature, should be considered repealed with retroactive effect.
ISSUE
Whether the SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 should be the basis for
computing the filing fee relative to GMAs application for the amendment of its articles
of incorporation for purposes of extending its corporate term?
RULING
The SEC assailed the Decision dated February 20, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
which directed that SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 should be the
basis for computing the filing fee relative to GMA Network, Inc.s (GMAs) application
for the amendment of its articles of incorporation for purposes of extending its
corporate term. The appellate court agreed with the SECs submission that an
extension of the corporate term is a grant of a fresh license for a corporation to act as
a juridical being endowed with the powers expressly bestowed by the State. As such,
it is not an ordinary amendment but is analogous to the filing of new articles of
incorporation. However, the Court of Appeals ruled that Memorandum Circular No. 2,
Series of 1994 is legally invalid and ineffective for not having been published in
accordance with law. The challenged memorandum circular, according to the
appellate court, is not merely an internal or interpretative rule, but affects the public in
general. Hence, its publication is required for its effectivity. Rate-fixing is a legislative
function which concededly has been delegated to the SEC by R.A. No. 3531 and
other pertinent laws. The due process clause, however, permits the courts to
determine whether the regulation issued by the SEC is reasonable and within the
bounds of its rate-fixing authority and to strike it down when it arbitrarily infringes on a
persons right to property. The instant appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.
Judicial Decisions
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which essentially shows that Paula admitted her adulterous acts and that the couple
agreed to separate.
Computation of Time
Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce which was granted. Lorenzo returned
to the Philippines and married Alicia Llorente. Alicia had no knowledge of the first
marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the
marriage or cohabitation. Lorenzo and Alicia lived together for 25 years and produced
3 children.
Quiqui vs Boncaros
Facts: (wont name who private respondents and petitioners are coz there are a lot)
Private respondents obtained a free patent over a parcel of land. Petitioners contest
this alleging that the land belongs to them because their late father purchased the
same and that they continuously and actually possessed it.
Petitioners filed a case for reconveyance against respondents on the ground
that the patent was obtained through fraud. Answer was filed, pre trial commenced
but no amicable settlement until trial was set. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
On July 16, 1979 the trial court dismissed the complaint. Counsel for
petitioners received copy of the decision on July 17, 1989. A motion for
reconsideration was filed on August 17, 1979. Trial court denied the MR because it
was filed beyond the 30-day reglementary period.
Issue: Whether MR was filed beyond the reglementary period?
Held: YES!
Under the rules enforced at the time of this case, an appeal may be taken
within 30days from notice of the judgment of the trial court. In relation thereto, the
st
New Civil Code states that in computing period, the 1 day shall be excluded and the
last day included.
In this case, counting 30days from July 17 (day petitioners counsel
st
th
received copy of the judgment) excluding 1 day the 30 day would be August 16.
Petitioners filed their MR one day late or on August 17. Because of this, the order of
the trial court dismissing the complaint has become final and executor.
Before Lorenzo died, he executed a will, which was pending before the probate court,
bequeathing all his property to Alicia and their 3 children. After Lorenzo died, Paula
filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over his estate in his
favor. Alicia filed as well.
RTC found that the divorce decree granted to Lorenzo is void and inapplicable in the
Philippines therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia is void. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce is valid.
HELD: YES.
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., the court held that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the CC, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to the concept of
public policy and morality. In the same case, the court ruled that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Furthermore, in the case of Quita v. CA, that once proven that respondent was no
longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van
Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit
from him.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the CA must be reversed. The
divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity. (The SC remand the case to the TC for ruling on the
intrinsic validity of the will is left to the TC.)
Application of Chapter 2: Human Relations
De Tavera vs PTS
Petitioner is a doctor, specializing in treating tuberculosis. She was appointed as
member of the Board Directors of defendant Phil. Tuberculosis Society. However,
she was alleging that she was removed from her post without informing her of the
lawful cause and thereafter, Romulo was appointed as her replacement. She was
claiming that 4 members of the Board were not members of the Society and hence,
they did not have the power to be appointed in the Board and to vote. She filed a
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are 2 kinds of duties exercised by public officers. One is the duty owing to the public
collectively and duty owing to particular individuals. The former pertains to officers
who act for the public at large and are ordinarily paid out of the treasury. Ex.
Governors duty to the public is to see to it that laws are properly executed, that
competent officials are appointed by him, etc. Legislators owe a duty to the public to
pass wise and proper laws. For this kind of duty, no one individual could single
himself out and assert that the duties are owed to him alone. The second kind covers
those who perform duties to an individual by reason of their employment by a
particular person to do some act for him in an official capacity. They usually receive
their compensation from that particular individual. Ex. A sheriff in serving civil process
for a private suitor, a recorder of deeds in recording a deed or mortgage in favor of a
private individual, a notary public in protesting a negotiable paper, etc.
When what is involved is a duty owing to the public in general, an individual can have
no cause of action for damages against the public officer. The exception to this is if
the individual suffers a particular or special injury on account of the public officers
improper or non-performance. The principle may now translate into the rule that an
individual can hold a public officer personally liable for damages on account of an act
or omission that violates a constitutional right only if it results in a particular wrong or
injury to the former.
A public officer like Chato, vested with quasi-legislative or rule-making power, owes a
duty to the public to promulgate rules which are compliant with the requirements of
valid admin regulations. Its a duty owed not to the respondent alone, but to the entire
public who would be affected by such rule.
Note that in CIR v. CA, the RMC was not declared unconstitutional for violating the
due process requirement or the equal protection clause. Court only said that the RMC
did not meet the requirements for a valid admin issuance. Fortune relies heavily on
that case as its cause of action. It shows therefore that it really has no cause of action
for failing to show its allegation that Chato violated Art. 32. Fortune failed to show that
it incurred some particular wrong or injury.
Finally, Sec. 227 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997 provides: Satisfaction of Judgment
Recovered Against any Internal Revenue Officer. When an action is brought against
any Internal Revenue officer to recover damages by reason of any act done in the
performance of official duty!any judgment, damages or costs recovered in such
action shall be satisfied by the Commissioner!. No such judgment, damages or
costs shall be paid or reimbursed in behalf of a person who has acted negligently or
in bad faith, or with willful oppression. Because the respondents complaint does not
impute negligence or bad faith to the petitioner, any money judgment by the trial court
against her will have to be assumed by the Republic of the Philippines. As such, the
complaint is in the nature of a suit against the State.
Duty to act with Justice, Observe Honesty and Good Faith
Llorente v. Sandiganbayan
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Facts: Conrado Bunag, Jr. brought Zenaida Cirilo to a motel where they had sexual
intercourse. Later that evening, said Bunag brought Cirilo to the house of his
grandmother in Las Pias, Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband and
wife for 21 days. Soon, Bunag and Cirilo filed their respective applications for a
marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite.
However, Bunag left Cirilo and soon filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a
marriage license.
Cirilo claims that she was abducted and raped. One of the cases she filed
was a suit for damages based on a breach of a promise to marry. The trial court
decided in her favor. This was affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Should damages be awarded based on a breach of a promise to marry?
Decision: No.
In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for
breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to
recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise.
Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except
where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary
incidents thereof.
In this case however, moral damages were awarded based on art. 21 of the
Civil Code which states that any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for moral damages. As such, the act of Bunag forcibly
abducting Cirilo and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter
promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege
on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute
acts contrary to morals and good customs.
Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which
leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes. Thus, the damages awarded to
Cirilo were proper.
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jure suspended. This includes labor actions. True, the implementation of the
reinstatement order is a ministerial duty of the LA unless it is restrained by a higher
court. In this case, the injunction partook the nature of suspension of action by
legislative fiat i.e. law on corporate rehabilitation. This is equally effective as when the
injunction was issued by a higher court.
Liability of public officers
14. Aberca v Ver (1988)
Ver, et al, are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. They conducted raids
against the houses of the petitioners (Aberca, etc), claiming that they were
communists. In doing so, Ver, et al, used spurious judicial search warrants. Ver, et al,
took the personal belongings of the petitioners and even arrested some of them
without warrants.
Aberca, et al, sued for damages. Ver, et al, claim that they are immune from suit.
Held: Yes, under Art 32 of the Civil Code, public officials and private citizens can be
held liable for damages for infringing upon the rights of others.
FACTS: Petitioners Juanito Garcia and Alberto Dumago are employees of PAL who
have been dismissed after being caught in the act of sniffing shabu in the toolroom.
Garcia et al filed an illegal dismissal case against PAL before the Labor Arbiter (LA).
The LA ruled in favor of Garcia et al and ordered PAL to immediately reinstate
petitioners. On appeal to the NLRC by PAL, the decision of the LA was reversed.
Meanwhile, the LA issued a Notice of Garnishment the Writ of Execution for the
reinstatement aspect of its decision. When PAL tried to enjoin the reinstatement and
garnishment, NLRC affirmed such Notice and Writ but suspended and referred the
action to the Rehabilitation Receiver of PAL which at that time was undergoing
rehabilitation receivership. However, when PAL manifested that SEC had approved
its exit from the rehabilitation, SC resolved to entertain the issue of whether PAL
should pay backwages to the Garcia et al from the time the LA ordered their
reinstatement up to the time the NLRC reversed the findings of the LA
ISSUE: Whether or not compelling PAL to pay backwages despite the fact that the
NLRC ruled in its favor on appeal constitutes unjust enrichment
HELD: NO. the social justice principles of labor law outweigh or render inapplicable
the civil law doctrine of unjust enrichment. According to article 223 of the Labor Code,
the order of reinstatement of the labor arbiter is immediately executor even pending
appeal. The reinstatement may be actual or payroll reinstatement at the option of the
employer. HOWEVER, in this case, PAL is excused from complying with the
obligation to reinstate Garcia et al either actually or otherwise because while the case
was before the LA and the NLRC, it was under rehabilitation. It is basic in corporate
rehabilitation that all actions against a corporation undergoing rehabilitation is ipso
Art 32 provides a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in
the Constitution. No man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In
times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is
strongest to yield to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is necessary to
remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be
sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule
of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any
private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties
of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from
responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided
their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal
statute.
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case should have been suspended during the pendency of the annulment case.
Petitioner, in fact, eventually obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Narcisa on October 29, 1999.
ISSUE: Is the petition for annulment or declaration of nullity a prejudicial question?
HELD: NO it is not. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal
action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a
criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.
Moreover, petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases
considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous
marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the
criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to Narcisa had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case
for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the
first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner
eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is,
both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled.
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PIMENTEL V PIMENTEL
FACTS
Maria Chrysantine Pimentel (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated
parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner) before the RTC QC.
Petitioner received summons to appear before the RTC Antipolo, for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC QC on
the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since
the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the
outcome of the case filed in RTC Antipolo would have a bearing in the criminal case
filed against him before the RTC QC.
The RTC QC held that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a
prejudicial question. Petitioner filed a MR. RTC QC denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. CA dismissed the petition.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before the SC.
ISSUE
W/N the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question
that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against
petitioner?
HELD
The petition has no merit. Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question in
Criminal Case for Parricide.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both
pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively
resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised
in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the
victim.
In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is
whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as
a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of petitioners will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
petitioner and respondent were married. Thus, even if the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is annulled by RTC Antipolo, petitioner could still be held
criminally liable, since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still
married to respondent.
We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals that the
judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
vinculum between the spouses is concerned. First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect
of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of
prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that there is a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may
still produce legal consequences. In fact, the Court declared in that case that a
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are
concerned.
Concept of Marriage
In re: Bucana (ACTUAL CASE NO DIGEST KASI)
FACTS: Acting upon the letter of Mrs. Angela Drilon Baltazar, Barangay Captain of
Victories, Dumangas, Iloilo, dated February 26, 1976, respondent Notary Public
Rufillo D. Bucana was required by this Court in its Resolution of March 23, 1976, to
show cause within ten (10) days from notice, why he should not be disciplinarily dealt
with for having notarized on November 10, 1975 at Dumangas, Iloilo an Agreement
executed by the spouses Gonzalo Baltazar and Luisa Sorongon wherein the aforementioned spouses agreed therein that "in case anyone of them will remarry both
parties offer no objection and waive all civil and criminal actions against them" and
that the afore-mentioned Agreement was "entered into for the purpose of agreement
to allow each and everyone of them to remarry without objection or reservation ...",
which affidavit is contrary to law because it sanctions an illicit and immoral purpose.
On April 21, 1976, respondent . submitted his explanation, admitting that he notarized
the afore-mentioned document and that the Agreement is "immoral and against public
policy", but in mitigation he asserted that the document in question was Prepared by
his clerk, Lucia D. Doctolero without his previous knowledge; that when said
document was presented to him for signature after it was signed by the parties, he
vehemently refused to sign it and informed the parties that the document was
immoral; that he placed the said document on his table among his files and more than
a week later, he asked his clerk where the document was for the purpose of
destroying it, but to his surprise he found that the same was notarized by him as per
his file copies in the office; that he dispatched his clerk to get the copy from the
parties, but the afore-mentioned parties could not be found in their respective
residences; that he must have inadvertently notarized the same in view of the
numerous documents on his table and at that time he was emotionally disturbed as
his father (now deceased) was then seriously ill. The foregoing contentions of
respondent were corroborated substantially by the separate sworn statements of his
1
clerk, Lucia D. Doctolero and Angela Drilon Baltazar, both dated April 20, 1976.
Page 10 of 51
RATIO: A persons first name cannot be changed because of sex reassignment. The
State has an interest in the names carried by individuals and entities for the purpose
of identification. Change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of
name are thus controlled by statute. Art. 376 of the Civil Code2 was amended by R.A.
9048.3 Section 1 of the said law provides:
Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or
Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and
change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.
Thus, the petition should have been filed with the local civil
registrar, assuming it could be legally done, instead of the trial
court.
Moreover, the petition has no merit as the use of his true and official name worked no
prejudice towards him.
R.A. 9048 provides for the following grounds for which a change of first name may be
allowed:
1. First name or nickname ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;
2. First name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by
petitioner and has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or
3. Change will avoid confusion.4
Here, Silverio failed to even allege any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of
using his true name. His basis in praying for the change of his first name was the sex
reassignment to make his name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed
himself into. A change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. The
law does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Rather than avoiding confusion, granting the petition may only create complications in
the civil registry and the public interest.
Under R.A. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a
mere clerical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The entries correctable under Rule 108 and Art. 412
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2 No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority
3 Clerical Error Law
4 Section 4, Republic Act 9048.
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5 Art. 407. Acts, events, and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions;
(9)acknowledgements; (10) naturalization; (11) loss or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil
interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and
(16) changes of name.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by R.A. 9048
in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of
such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the
need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to
substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. In short, a
correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Further, the medical testimony proves that Cagandahan has this unique condition
which makes her feel and appear like a man. In other words, the Court respects her
congenital condition and her mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for
the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with her
unordinary state and thus help make her life easier, considering the unique
circumstances in this case. As for her change of name under Rule 103, this Court has
held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be
exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.
Considering the consequence that respondent's change of name merely recognizes
his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's change of name. Such a change
will conform with the change of the entry in her birth certificate from female to male.
Prior existing marriage
Lilia Wiegel v. Hon. Semio-Dy
143 SCRA 499 (1986)
Facts:
Karl Heinz Wiegel filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Lilia Wiegel (Petitioner LILIA) on the ground of LILIAs previous existing
marriage to Eduardo Maxion.
LILIA admitted the existence of her prior marriage to Maxion but claimed that
their marriage was null and void because she and Maxion were allegedly
forced to enter said marital union.
During pre-trial, the issue agreed upon by LILIA and Karl Wiegel was the
status of the first marriage (void or voidable?).
LILIA contested validity of the pre-trial order and asked the court for an
st
opportunity to present evidence that: (1) 1 marriage was vitiated by force
exercised upon both her and Maxion and (2) Maxion, at the time of their
marriage, was already married to someone else.
Page 12 of 51
24. TY v. CA
FACTS: Private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil
ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August
27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage
license. The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null and void ab
initio for lack of consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private
respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies
officiated by the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a
church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a civil case praying that his marriage to
petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they had no marriage license
when they got married. He also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was
still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the
decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The decree of
nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his
civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim
that their marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted
their Marriage License No. 5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979, as
Exh. 11, 12 and 12-A. He did not question this document when it was submitted in
evidence. Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Quezon City dated August 4, 1980, which declared null and void
his civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977,
and his church marriage to said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents
were submitted as evidence during trial and, according to petitioner, are therefore
deemed sufficient proof of the facts therein. The fact that the civil marriage of private
respondent and petitioner took place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment declaring
his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed. It also appears indisputable that
private respondent and petitioner had a church wedding ceremony on April 4, 1982.
The Pasig RTC sustained private respondents civil suit and declared his marriage to
herein petitioner null and void ab initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both
parties appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the appellate
court affirmed the trial courts decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage
could be validly contracted.
ISSUE: Whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a
subsequent marriage can be entered into validly
HELD: The provisions of the Family Code requiring judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage before a subsequent marriage can be contracted is not applicable in the
present case. In the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was
entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. The first marriage of private respondent being
void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its
nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we
conclude that private respondents second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Thus, the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present
case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children.
As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless
there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested
rights of petitioner and the children is patent. Additionally, we are not quite prepared
to give assent to the appellate courts finding that despite private respondents deceit
and perfidy in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from her silence
on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein
petitioner married private respondent using the marriage license used three years
earlier in the civil ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter
properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful private respondents allegation that
he wed petitioner but they lacked a marriage license. Indeed we find there was a
marriage license, though it was the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in
both the civil and the church rites. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory
of their civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the appellate court erred when it
refused to recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a
technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative defense
during trial. She argues that such failure does not prevent the appellate court from
giving her defense due consideration and weight. She adds that the interest of the
State in protecting the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution,
outweighs such technicality. In our view, petitioner and private respondent had
complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the
requirement of a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies. That this license was
used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the
ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for
we hold that the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first. The
Page 13 of 51
dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a
woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium period. Section 2 of
ART. XV states that Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the state. Respondents grossly immoral conduct
runs afoul of the constitution and the laws, that he as a lawyer has sworn to uphold.
Hence the court declared Atty. Jose Emmanul M. Eala DISBARRED for grossly
immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of canon 1, Rule 1.01
and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Authority of Solemnizing Officer
Beso v. Daguman
FACTS: Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing
marriage outside his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not
registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar.
Judge Daguman is a municipal judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar. He solemnized the
marriage of Beso in his residence in J.P.R. Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar.
ISSUE: Whether or not Daguman is liable for solemnizing marriage outside his area
of jurisdiction.
HELD: YES. As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan,
Samar, the authority to solemnize marriage is only limited to those municipalities
under his jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no longer within his area of
jurisdiction.
There are only 3 instances, as provided by Article 8 of the FC, wherein a marriage
may be solemnized by a judge outside of his chambers or at a place other than his
sala, to wit:
1.when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death;
2.when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;
3.where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect.
In this case, there is no pretense that either Beso or his fianc Yman was at
the point of death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request
made by the contracting parties to the Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside
his chambers or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact appears on record is that
respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to solemnize the marriage
because Beso was an overseas worker.
Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdiction may officiate in weddings
Page 14 of 51
27 Aranes v Occiano
Facts: Merceditas Aranes charged Judge Occiano with gross ignorance of the law in
a letter complaint because said judge solemnized her marriage (Feb. 17, 2000) with
Dominador Orobia outside of his territorial jurisdiction and without the requisite
marriage license. She and Orobia relying on the marriage lived together as husband
and wife for many years but on his death she was deprived of inheriting from him
because their marriage was a nullity. She was likewise deprived of receiving Orobias
pension from the navy.
In his comment, the Judge said that on Feb. 15, 2000, a Juan Arroyo asked him to
solemnize the marriage between the parties on the assurance that all the necessary
documents were complete.He agreed to conduct the wedding at Nabua because
Orobia suffered from a stroke and couldnt travel to Balatan. On the day of the
wedding, he noticed that no marriage license was presented and he informed the
parties that their marriage will be a nullity and had wanted to move the date of the
wedding but out of human compassion decided to continue because the visitors were
already coming in, the delivery of provisions for the reception, the possibility of further
aggravating Orobias condition (nastroke) and the parties assured him that they will
give him the license the afternoon of the same day. No license was ever delivered.
Aranes later desisted upon realization that it was her fault BUT the Office of the Court
Administrator still found the judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly
issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction and was
fined 5K.
ISSUE: Whether the decision is correct?
HELD: Tama! Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the
authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to
solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the
Supreme Court. Judge Occiano only had jurisdiction to solemnize marriages in
Balatan and not Nabua and he should be held administratively liable for violating the
law on marriage. He should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the
requisite marriage license because thats considered a gross ignorance of the law.
The fact of desistance of Aranes doesnt exculpate him from liability. Disciplinary
actions like this arent private matters, the Court has the power to discipline judges.
ignorance of the law. First, he solemnized a wedding despite knowing that the groom
is merely separated from his first wife. Second, he performed another marriage
ceremony outside his courts jurisdiction. His jurisdiction was Sta. Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte, but he solemnized the wedding at his residence in Dapa.
Judge Domagtoy seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the wedding of
a married man because he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the MTC Judge
confirming the fact that the husband has not seen his first wife for almost 7 years.
Regarding the second charge, he did not violate Art. 7, par. 1 of the FC (marriage
may be solemnized by any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts
jurisdiction) and that Art.8 applies: The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the
chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church!and not elsewhere, except in
cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places!or where
both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may
be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement!
Issues:
Should he have solemnized the wedding to another of a married man on the basis of
an affidavit of presumptive death? NO
Did the judge have the authority to solemnize the other wedding outside his courts
jurisdiction? NO
Ratio:
Summary Proceeding for Declaration of Presumptive Death Necessary
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in the FC for the declaration of the death
of the absentee. Absent this judicial declaration, the husband remains married to his
first wife. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous marriage
under Article 35, par. 4 (those bigamous marriage not falling under Art. 41).
Authority of the Judge
Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage
ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as
provided under Art. 7. Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions may
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity
in the formal requisite, which while not affecting the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
Marriage License
Filipina Y. Sy v. CA
Facts: Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy got married on 1973. They were blessed with 2
children. Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity. The RTC denied the petition, which was later
on affirmed by the CA. MR was denied as well. Hence, this appeal by certiorari.
Page 15 of 51
between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a
marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and
thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals,
arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis
of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child when the
latter is not, and could not have been, his own child.
ISSUES: First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of
the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine
the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked. However, other than for purposes of
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in
a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the
case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary
even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause is the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code
connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal
requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a
man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before
the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation,
shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons
outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a
marriage license. In the instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation
to
protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner
and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value
whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage
license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders
their marriage void ab initio.
Marriages exempt from marriage license
Ninal v. Badayog
Note: This digest is for the exemption to marriage license doctrine. Case is also
discussed under declaration of nullity.
Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of
their marriage were born herein petitioners(ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as
Page 16 of 51
There is no dispute that the marriage of Pepito to Norma Badayog was celebrated
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that
"they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other."
The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five
year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license.
Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein
both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife
during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either
disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband
and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words,
the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before
the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality
and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the
same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and Badayogs marriage, it cannot be said that they
have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their
wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming
that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years,
the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under
the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito
had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It
is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated
in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and
wife".
Page 17 of 51
capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage
license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a
subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Page 18 of 51
FACTS: Petitioner, Alice Van Dorn is a Filipino citizen while private respondent,
Richard Upton is a citizen of the U.S. They were married in Hongkong in 1972, but
established their residence in the Philippines. In 1982, the parties were divorced in
Nevada, U.S. and the petitioner has re-married also in Nevada to Theodore Van
Dorn.
In 1983, Richard filed a suit against Alice in RTC, stating that Alices business (the
Galleon Shop) is a conjugal property. He is asking for an accounting of the business
to be rendered, and seeking to be declared with right to manage the conjugal
property. Alice moved to dismiss on the ground that the cause of action is barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court where
Richard had acknowledged that he and Alice had no community property.
The Court below denied the MTD on the ground that the property is located in the
Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is the
subject of this Certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged
conjugal property in the Philippines?
HELD: A divorce decree granted by a U.S. Court between a Filipina and her
American husband is binding on the American husband. The decree is therefore
binding upon Richard, being a citizen of the U.S.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. 15 of the CC, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized here in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released Richard from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves marriage.
An American granted absolute divorce in his country with his Filipina wife is estopped
from asserting his rights over property allegedly held in the Philippines as conjugal
property. Pursuant to his national law, Richard is no longer the husband of Alice. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as Alices husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own
countrys court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he
did not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain that under our laws, Alice has to be considered still married to Richard
and still subject to a wifes obligation cannot be just. Alice should not be obliged to
live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Richard. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.
Page 19 of 51
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2)
a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. But here, Recio has not
presented any evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry Garcia.
The divorce decree did not ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal
capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to
show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to
prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
38. Amor-Catalan v. CA
Felicitas Amor-Catalan married Orlando Catalan on June 1950 in Pangasinan. They
migrated to the US and became naturalized American citizens. They divorced in
1988.
2 months after the divorce, Orlando married Merope in Pangasinan. Felicitas filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Merope, contending that she had
a subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She also wanted damages, claiming that
the marriage brought her embarrassment.
RTC ruled for Felicitas. It declared the Orlando-Merope marriage null and void for
being bigamous and awarded damaged to Felicitas. CA reversed.
Issue: Does Felicitas have standing to question the nullity of the Orlando-Merope
marriage?
Ruling: This issue may not be resolved without first determining whether Felicitas and
Orlando had indeed become naturalized American citizens and whether they had
actually been divorced.
Other than allegations in the complaint, records are bereft of evidence to prove their
naturalization. Felicitas merely alleged in her complaint that they had acquired
American citizenship and Orlando also only alleged their divorce. A divorce obtained
abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is
valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, before it can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved
considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Also, the kind of
divorce obtained is important, since there is an absolute divorce (vincula matrimonii)
which severs the marital ties, and a limited divorce (mensa et thoro), which leaves the
bond in full force.
Under the NCC which is the law in force at the time Orlando and Merope were
married, and even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file
a petition to declare the nullity of marriage. Only a party who can demonstrate "proper
interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other
actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest and must be based on a cause of action. Section 2(a) of The Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Page 20 of 51
Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the
United States of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property
relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their Agreement
executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on
February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4,
1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a
foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a
fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. Be this as it may, the fact
that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that
divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation
of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing
said decree is, as here, sufficient.
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the
foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr.
Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees
rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently,
bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino
citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the
October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify
or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on
February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a
divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against
absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a
valid divorce is obtained.
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same
shall be given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the
divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is
considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain
language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other.
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be
subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be
obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the
applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Page 21 of 51
41. Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas (GR No. 186571, August 11, 2010)
Facts: Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship. He
married respondent Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig. Shortly after the wedding,
Corpuz went back to Canada for business. When he returned to the Philippines he
found out that Sto. Tomas was having an affair (mga babae talaga!tsk, tsk, tsk).
Corpuz went to Canada and got a divorce. He wanted to marry another Filipina so he
registered the divorce decree with the Pasig City Civil Registry Office. Nevertheless,
he was informed by a NSO official that his marriage with Sto. Tomas still subsists and
that for the divorce decree to be enforceable, it must first be judicially recognized by
Philippine courts. So Corpuz filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of marriage. The RTC ruled that he was not the proper party to
institute the action because he was an alien; that only the Filipino spouse can avail of
nd
the remedy provided in the 2 paragraph of Article 26 of the New Civil Code.
Issue:
Can the alien spouse avail of the remedy in par. 2 of Article 26?
Held:
No! Given the rationale and intent of the provision to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse only the Filipino
nd
spouse can invoke the 2 paragraph of Article 26. The said provision bestows no
rights in favor of aliens.
nd
However, the unavailability of the 2 paragraph of Article 26 does not
necessarily strip Corpuz of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and
conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to the rules
of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Corpuz, pursuant to
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments.
nd
In other words, although an alien spouse cannot avail of the 2 paragraph of
Article 26, he/she can still avail of Section 48, Rule 39.
Page 22 of 51
Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest. He also
claims that he can impugn the validity of the marriage because it was void, even if
after the death of his brother.
Issue: Does he have standing?
Held: Yes.
2.
The SC AM states that only the husband or the wife can bring an action for the nullity
of the marriage. However, in Carlos v Sandoval, the Court said that this wont apply
to:
1. those actions commenced before March 15, 2003 (when the rules came out)
2. those filed for marriages celebrated before March 15, 2003
The marriage between Cresence and Leonila was under the Civil Code. It was way
back in 1949. The AM has no application to them.
The old Civil Code does not specify who can bring actions. However, this does not
mean that anyone can just bring actions to declare absolute nullity. The plaintiff must
still be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted
and defended in the name of the real party in interest.Thus, only the party who can
demonstrate a "proper interest" can file the action. Interest within the meaning of the
rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question
involved or a mere incidental interest.
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos brother and surviving
heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a
material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any
judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir
under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased
brother under the conditions stated in the Rules of Succession.
However, petitioner must implead Leonila since there are some cases under the Civil
Code wherein a marriage license was not needed for a valid marriage. She must be
given a chance to say her side.
Page 23 of 51
annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married
respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her
marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of
her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though
void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all
legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the
time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the
marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.
DINO V. DINO
Facts: Petitioner, Lolita D. Enrico, is the second wife of Eulogio Medinacili. They were
married on August 24, 2004. This marriage was celebrated 4 months after Eulogios
first wife died on May 2004.
On February, 2005, or six months after his second marriage, Eulogio died.
The respondents are Eulogios heirs and seek a declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Petitioner Lolita and Eulogio on the ground that the marriage was
celebrated without a valid marriage license. And that 5-year cohabitation exception
could not apply since Eulogio was a bachelor for only 4 months.
Petitioner answered the complaint and alleged that they have been living as
husband and wife for 21 years as in fact they had 2 children. Further, petitioner
contended that it is only the contracting parties while living can file an action for
declaration of nullity of their marriage.
RTC dismissed the complaint but on reconsideration reinstated the case.
Petitioner Enrico directly filed for Rule 65 in the SC.
Issue: Do the heirs have standing to file the action for the declaration of nullity? NO.
Ruling: SC grants the petition and dismisses the petition for declaration of nullity filed
by the heirs.
First, Void marriages solemnized under the Family Code are governed by
the A.M. 02-11-10 of the SC, that is, marriages entered into on and after August 3,
1988. The A.M. of the SC provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. It is clear. Thus, the
heirs have no standing. Case Dismissed!
Second, as to the Ninal v. Badayog ruling that allows heirs to file a petition
for declaration of nullity, this applies only to those marriages under the Civil Code.
What is the remedy now of the heirs? Remember that a void marriage can
be collaterally attacked, hence since they only seek to protect their property rights
they can always impugn the legitimacy of the marriage of petitioner and their father in
the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of their deceased faither.
CA decision AFFIRMED.
Lilia Olivia Wiegel got married to Karl Heinz Wiegel on July 1978 at the Holy Catholic
Apostolic Christian Church in Makati. Karl, upon learning that Lilia had a subsisting
marriage, filed for a declaration of nullity of their marriage. Lilia contracted her first
marriage with Eduardo Maxion on June 25, 1972. She claims that the first marriage is
not valid because they were forced to enter the union and Maxion was married to
someone else at that time.
ISSUE: WON Lilias first marriage is void?
HELD: No. Its voidable. Petition dismissed.
RATIO: There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by
force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage
will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until
Page 24 of 51
Page 25 of 51
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
The root of psychological incapacity must be: a.) clinically identified; b.)
alleged in the complaint; c.) proven by experts; and d.) clearly explained in
the decision. The evidence should satisfy the court that either, or both, of the
parties is mentally ill to the extent that s/he could not have known the
obligation s/he was assuming; or knowing the obligations, could not validly
assume them.
Incapacity must exist at the time the marriage was celebrated. Perception of
a manifestation is unnecessary at the time of the celebration, but the illness
must be proven to exist at such moment.
Incapacity must be shown to be incurable or permanent.
Illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
The essential obligations are those covered by Art. 68 to 71 of the Family
Code, between spouses, and Art. 220, 221 and 225 as regards parents and
their children.
Interpretation by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not decisive, should be given great respect
by the courts.
Trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the State. No decision shall be handed
down without the Solicitor Generals issuance of a certificate, stating his
reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition. Such certificate will
be quoted in the decision. The certificate must be submitted within 15 days
from the date the case is submitted for resolution.
The trial court declared the marriage void and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
ISSUE: W/N Reynaldo is psychologically incapacitated NO. The marriage subsists.
RATIO: It has not been established that the defect spoken of is an incapacity. It is
more of a difficulty, if not an outright refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations. Roridels evidence simply showed that she and Reynaldo could not get
along.
Facts: Noel and Maribel were college sweethearts. Then, sometime in November
1998, Maribel informed Noel that she was pregnant with his child. They immediately
wed days after before RTC QC. After the marriage ceremony, both agreed to live with
Noel's family in their house. During all the time she lived with Noel's family, Maribel
remained aloof and did not go out of her way to endear herself to them. She would
just come and go from the house as she pleased, She never contributed to the
family's coffer leaving Noel to shoulder all expenses for their support, she refused to
have any sexual contact with Noel. Surprisingly, despite Maribel's claim of being
pregnant, Noel never observed any symptoms of pregnancy in her!
Trouble ensued and so Noel filed for declaration of nullity of the marriage, to which
the Court granted, stating that Maribel failed to perform the essential marital
obligations of marriage, and such failure was due to a personality disorder called
Narcissistic Personality Disorder characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability as determined by a clinical psychologist. CA reversed, hence this petition.
Page 26 of 51
Lastly, he failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity and
establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. As
correctly observed by the CA, the report of the psychologist, who concluded that
Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder traceable to her
experiences during childhood, did not establish how the personality disorder
incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the essential obligations of the marriage.
Issue: Whether there is basis to nullify the petitioners marriage to the respondent on
the ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations?
Held: No. Petition denied.
1.
2.
Page 27 of 51
3.
Summary of Evidence
a. Petitioners testimony: Petitioners theory that the respondents
psychological incapacity is premised on her refusal or unwillingness to
perform certain marital obligations, and a number of unpleasant
personality traits such as immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness.
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of psychological
incapacity that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the
difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect, in the performance of
some marital obligations that characterize some marriages.
Petitioners testimony failed to establish that the respondents condition
is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted on some
incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that makes her
completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations. If at all,
the petitioner merely showed that the respondent had some personality
defects that showed their manifestation during the marriage; his
testimony sorely lacked details necessary to establish that the
respondents defects existed at the inception of the marriage. In
addition, the petitioner failed to discuss the gravity of the respondents
condition; neither did he mention that the respondents malady
was incurable, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
respondents means to undertake. The petitioners declarations that the
respondent does not accept her fault, does not want to change, and
refused to reform are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental
defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as contemplated by Article 36
of the Family Code.
b.
c.
d.
Ting v. Velez-Ting & Suazo v. Suazo: clarified that Ngo Te did not
abandon Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent
requirements. Ngo Te merely stands for a more flexible approach in
considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on PI.
Page 28 of 51
FACTS: It appears that Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he was a young
lieutenant in the AFP while the latter was a seventeen-year-old first year college dropout. They had a whirlwind romance that culminated into sexual intimacy and eventual
marriage on 27 October 1973 before the Honorable Judge Cesar S. Principe in
Basilan. The couple did not acquire any property. Neither did they incur any debts.
Their union produced no offspring. In 1976, however, they found an abandoned and
neglected one-year-old baby girl whom they later registered as their daughter, naming
her Ramona Celeste AlanoOchosa.
During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the Philippine
archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit with him in his posts,
preferring to stay in her hometown of Basilan. Neither did Bona visit him in his areas
of assignment, except in one (1) occasion when Bona stayed with him for four (4)
days.
Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion Commander of the Security
Escort Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were given living quarters at Fort
Bonifacio, Makati City where they resided with their military aides.
In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in the failed
coup detat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame.
It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse. Even at the onset of their marriage
when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country, she had illicit relations with
other men. Bona apparently did not change her ways when they lived together at Fort
Bonifacio; she entertained male visitors in her bedroom whenever Jose was out of
their living quarters. On one occasion, Bona was caught by Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a
security aide, having sex with Joses driver, Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of Bonas
sexual infidelity circulated in the military community. When Jose could no longer bear
these rumors, he got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona.
During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal Gagarin who
also made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away from their living
quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went to Basilan.
In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is currently
supporting the needs of Ramona.
Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, docketed as Civil Case No.
97-2903 with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, seeking to nullify his marriage to
Bona on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential
obligations of marriage. One of the evidence presented is the testimony of
psychiatrist, who reached the conclusion that respondent (Bona)was suffering from
histrionic personality disorder. The RTC granted the nullity of marriage, but the CA
reversed the decision of RTC. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations.
HELD: NO.
After a careful perusal of the evidence presented in this case, that Bona had been, on
several occasions with several other men, sexually disloyal to her spouse, Jose.
Likewise, Bona had indeed abandoned Jose. However, we cannot apply the same
conviction to Joses thesis that the totality of Bonas acts constituted psychological
Page 29 of 51
Issue: (1) Whether or not the respondent is right to contend that no need of marriage
license was necessary for Pepito and her have cohabited for at least five years.
(2)Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito valid.
Held: Pepito and Norma could not have possibly be legally cohabited for at least five
years since Pepito was still married to Teodulfa counting backwards from the time he
and Norma celebrated their marriage. A period of cohabitation is characterized by
exclusivity and continuity. There should be no legal impediment on either party to
marry. Pepitos previous marriage to Teodulfa is a legal impediment disqualifying him
to the exception of a marriage license. Thus, his second marriage should have a
marriage license to be valid. In this case, the marriage of Pepito and Norma lacking
the formal requisite of a marriage licese is therefore void.
Cojuango v. Palma
FACTS: Eduardo Cojuangco filed with the court the instant complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Leo Palma alleging as grounds deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in
office, violation of his oath as a lawyer and grossly immoral conduct.
Cojuangco and Palma met sometime in the 70s . Cojjuangco was a client of ACCRA
and Palma was the lawyer assigned to handle his cases. Consequently, Palmas
relationship with Cojuangcos family became intimate. He traveled and dined with
them abroad. He frequented their house and even tutored Cojuangcos 22-year old
daughter, Maria Luisa, then a student of Assumption Convent.
Without the knowledge of Cojuangco, Palma married Lisa in H.K. It was only the next
day that Conjuangco was informed and Palma assured him that everything is legal.
Cojuangco was shocked, knowing fully well that Palma is a married man and has 3
children.
ISSUE: Whether or not Palma should be held liable.
HELD: YES. Palma married LIsa while he has a subsisting marriage with
Elizabeth Hermosisima. Undoubtedly, Palmas act constitute grossly immoral
conduct, a ground for disbarment. He made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage is
contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust and abuse of
confidence. Moreover, he availed of Cojuangcos resources by securing a plane ticket
from Cojuangcos office in order to marry his daughter in H.K. without his consent.
Palmas culpability is aggravated by the fact that Lisa was 22 and was under
psychological treatment for emotional immaturity.
Palma is disbarred from the practice of law.
Page 30 of 51
Law (Act 3613) instead of Art. 40 of the FC, which requires a final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void before a person may contract a subsequent marriage.
FACTS: Reilen and Annabelle De Castro applied for a marriage license which
however expired so instead they executed an affidavit stating that they had been
living together as husband and wife for five years and got married in a civil rite with a
judge. They in fact became sweethearts during 1991 and only started engaging in sex
in October 1994. They executed the affidavit on March 1995.
Annabelle gave birth to Reinna and is now asking for support from Reilen as his wife
and for their child. He says that their marriage was void ab initio because they
executed a fake affidavit; that he was just asked to sign the marriage contract
because she wanted to be saved from embarrassment because she was pregnant
and he didnt obtain the necessary parental advice. He avers that they never lived as
husband and wife and he never acknowledged the child.
Trial Court: No valid marriage because no marriage license but as father of child need
to give support.
CA: Since the presumption is marriage is valid until declared null and void then child
is presumed his and he must give support and TC is wrong in declaring the marriage
a nullity when the action was for support.
Background: In the original case kase, she got married twice to two different guys.
Her second husband filed an annulment case against her which ended up with her
conviction of bigamy. But during the proceedings, she instituted an annulment case
against her first husband. The RTC declared her first marriage null and void because
of psychological incapacity. She filed an MR with the CA on her bigamy case using
this subsequent declaration as a defense. But the CA and the SC did not allow it
because a judicial declaration of nullity is needed before a person can enter into a
subsequent marriage (Art. 40).
Antone v. Beronilla
Facts: Antone executed a complaint for bigamy against Beronilla, alleging that her
marriage with respondent had not yet been legally dissolved when the latter
contracted a second marriage with Maguillo. Beronilla moved to quash the
information because his marriage with Antone was declared null and void by the RTC.
Absent a first marriage, he cannot be charged with bigamy. The court quashed the
information. MR denied. CA dismissed the case as well.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
sustained the motion to quash on the basis of a fact contrary to those alleged in the
information
Held: Yes
Page 31 of 51
certain Dr. Nogales. When she confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this
point, Leonida took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel
stopped giving support to their children.
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove
Leonidas claim. Dr. del Fonso Garcia testified that she conducted evaluative
interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time
interview with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with Ma. Paulina Corrinne (the
eldest child). She concluded that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated. Such
incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even before the marriage and
appeared to be incurable.
ISSUE: Whether not the marriage could be annulled based on homosexuality? NO.
Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not
homosexuality per se.
Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his marriage.
Persistent in his quest, he fought back all the heavy accusations of incapacity, cruelty,
and doubted masculinity thrown at him. The trial court declared that Leonidas petition
for nullity had no basis at all because the supporting grounds relied upon can not
legally make a case under Article 36 of the Family Code. It went further by citing
Republic v. Molina: Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities,
irreconcilable differences, incessant quarrels and/or beatings, unpredictable mood
swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty, neglect, or failure in the
performance of some marital obligations do not suffice to establish psychological
incapacity. If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not
meeting the guidelines set in Molina. What Leonida attempted to demonstrate were
Manuels homosexual tendencies by citing overt acts generally predominant among
homosexual individuals. She wanted to prove that the perceived homosexuality
rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling the essential marital obligations.
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations
that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their
marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of Manuels sexual
preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of
Manuels peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality. Even assuming, ex
gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as
a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear a marriage may be
annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, such as
concealment of homosexuality. Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by
preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his
marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife. It is the concealment of
homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent
party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party
in giving consent to the marriage. Consent is an essential requisite of a valid
marriage. To be valid, it must be freely given by both parties. An allegation of vitiated
consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The Family Code has
enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances constituting fraud. Homosexuality per
se is not among those cited, but its concealment.
Page 32 of 51
hearings on the ground that he was then "confined for medical and/or rehabilitation
reasons." The records, however, show that the former counsel of Tuason did not
inform the trial court of this confinement. And when the court rendered its decision,
the same counsel was out of the country for which reason the decision became final
and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom.
The failure of petitioners counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to
enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence which is not excusable. Notice sent to
counsel of record is binding upon the client. Similarly inexcusable was the failure of
his former counsel to inform the trial court of Tuasons confinement and medical
treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the scheduled hearings. Tuason
has not given any reason why his former counsel, intentionally or unintentionally, did
not inform the court of this fact.
2. Because of the danger of collusion, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity
of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to
appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the
parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the
defendant spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in
default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion
exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the
application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own
evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.
The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of
the Family Code. For one, Tuason was not declared in default by the trial court for
failure to answer. Tuason filed his answer to the complaint and contested the cause
of action alleged by Maria. He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing
several pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of private Respondent. It is
crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred
contest and not by collusion.
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal
separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties
and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Tuasons
vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that
collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by Tuason that evidence
was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we
are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of
collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings
in the trial court.
Page 33 of 51
resort in Cavite. When the husband wanted to marry again, he filed before the
Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the
petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity on June 5, 1995. Although he
knew that the petitioner was already residing at the resort in Cavite, he alleged in his
petition that the petitioner was residing at Las Pias, Metro Manila, such that
summons never reached her. Nevertheless substituted service was rendered to their
son at his residence in Cavite. Petitioner was then declared in default for failing to
answer the said petition. Just over a month after it was filed, the trial court granted the
petition and declared the marriage of the parties void ab initio.
Five years later, petitioner challenged the trial courts order declaring as void ab initio
her marriage with respondent Rodolfo, citing extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction
over her person, among others. She alleged that the respondent lied on her real
address in his petition so she never received summons on the case, hence depriving
her of her right to be heard. The Court of Appeals dismissed her petition so she now
comes to the Supreme Court for review on certiorari.
ISSUE Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage was valid?
HELD NO. The trial court and the public prosecutor defied Article 48 of the Family
Code and Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the
danger of collusion, says the Court. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of
nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered
to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between
the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the
defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her
in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion
exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the
application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own
evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated. Here, the
trial court immediately received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and rendered
judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of protest from the public
prosecutor who even did not challenge the motion to declare petitioner in default.
The Supreme Court reiterates: The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social
institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma
compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the
defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.
YU VS. YU
FACTS: Eric Jonathan Yu filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA, alleging
that his estranged wife, Caroline Tanchay-Yu, unlawfully withheld from him the
custody of their minor child, Bianca Yu. The petition included a prayer for the award to
him of the custody of Bianca.
Eric also filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and the dissolution of
absolute community of property before the Pasig RTC. The petition also included a
prayer for the award to him of the custody of Bianca, subject to the final resolution by
the CA of his petition for habeas corpus. Because of this, the CA dismissed the
petition for habeas corpus, having been rendered moot and academic.
ISSUE: WON the Pasig RTC acquired jurisdiction over the custody issue???
RULING: YES.
Art. 49. During the pendency of the action [for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage] and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between
the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses
and the custody and support of their common children. x x x It shall also
provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. (Emphasis and
17
underscoring supplied)
Art. 50. x x x x
The final judgment in such cases [for the annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage] shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of
their presumptive legitimes, unless such other matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings." (Emphasis and underscoring added)
By Erics filing of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC
he automatically submitted the issue of the custody of Bianca as an incident thereof.
After the CA subsequently dismissed the habeas corpus case, there was no need for
Eric to replead his prayer for custody for, as above-quoted provisions of the Family
Code provide, the custody issue in a declaration of nullity case is deemed pleaded.
Legal separation: Procedure
ENRICO L. PACETE, CLARITA DE LA CONCEPCION, EMELDA C. PACETE,
EVELINA C. PACETE and EDUARDO C. PACETE vs. HON. GLICERIO V.
CARRIAGA, JR. and CONCEPCION (CONCHITA) ALANIS PACETE
Facts: Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between her husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as
well as for legal separation (between Alanis and Pacete), accounting and separation
of property. In her complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete in 1938 in
Cotabato. In 1948, Pacete contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la
Concepcion in Kidapawan, North Cotabato which Alanis only learned of in 1979.
During Alanis marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large
tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles and placed the several pieces of
property either in his name and Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and
other dummies.
Page 34 of 51
Page 35 of 51
automatically dissolved. The law clearly spells out the effects of a final decree of legal
separation on the conjugal property. Thus, the rules on dissolution and liquidation of
the conjugal partnership of gains under the provisions of the Civil Code would be
applied effective January 4, 1973 when the decree of legal separation became final.
Side note..
Due to the death of the petitioner, the law on intestate succession should take over in
the disposition of whatever remaining properties have been allocated to petitioner.
Petition is dismissed.
Effects of Legal Separation Pendente Lite
Lerma vs CA
Lerma and Diaz were married. However, Lerma filed a case against his wife Diaz
and a certain Ramirez for adultery. While this case was pending, Diaz likewise filed a
complaint for legal separation against Lerma based on 2 grounds: concubinage and
attempt against her life. During the pendency of the legal separation case, Diaz
moved for and was granted support pendente lite. Lerma opposed, saying that the
pending adultery case against her is a sufficient basis to deny the motion for support
pendente lite. (it must be noted that later on, Diaz was found guilty of adultery by the
trial court)
ISSUE: Is the pending adultery case valid ground to deny the other spouse support
pendente lite?
SC: YES
Jurisprudence provides that adultery is a good defense.
The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership
property, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming
such right to live separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of the Civil Code, which
states that after the filing of the petition for legal separation the spouses shall be
entitled to live separately from each other. A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by
one who is himself or herself guilty of an act which constitutes a ground for legal
separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered as within the
intendment of the law granting separate support. In fact under Article 303 of the same
Code the obligation to give support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a forced
heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance;" and under
Article 921 one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse has
given cause for legal separation."
67. Sabalones v. CA
Petitioner Samson Sabalones was a member of our diplomatic service assigned to
different countries during his successive tours of duties. He left to his wife, herein
Page 36 of 51
plaintiff respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit. It may issue to
prevent future wrongs although no right has yet been violated.
When Samson retired as an ambassador, he came back to the Philippines but not to
his wife and kids. 4 years later, he sought judicial authorization to sell a lot and
building in Greenhills. It belonged to the conjugal partnership, but he claimed that he
was 68 y.o, then, very sick and living alone without any income. He needed his share
of the proceeds to defray his hospitalization costs.
The Court noted that the wife has been administering the subject properties for
almost 19 years now without complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has not
alleged that her administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal partnership.
Remedios filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged that the property in
Greenhills was being occupied by her and her 6 kids and that they merely depended
on support from the rentals earned by another conjugal property in Forbes Park. She
also alleged that Samson was living with another woman, Thelma, and their 3 kids.
She wanted a decree of legal separation and to order the liquidation of their
properties, and that her husbands share be forfeited because of his adultery.
It was found out in trial that Samson contracted a bigamous marriage with Thelma.
Court granted legal separation and forfeiture of Samsons shares in the conjugal
properties.
On appeal to the CA by Samson, Remedios filed for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin Samson from interfering with the administration of their properties.
She alleged that he harassed the tenant of the Forbes Park property and that he
disposed of their valuable conjugal property in U.S in favor of his paramour. CA
granted the preliminary injunction.
Samson now assails the order of the CA arguing that the law provides no injunctive
relief in such a case, since the law provides for joint administration of conjugal
properties. He cites Art 124 of the FC.
Issue: w/n it was proper for the CA to issue injunctive relief YES
Ruling: The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the
conjugal properties as provided in Art. 124. However, Art. 61 states that after a
petition for legal separation has been filed, the court shall, in the absence of a written
agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to
act as the administrator.
While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, it was
implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the
conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That
designation was approved by the CA when it issued in favor of the respondent wife
the preliminary injunction.
The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status
quo of the things or the relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the
In her motion for the preliminary injunction, the wife alleged that the petitioner's
harassment of their tenant at Forbes Park would jeopardize the lease and deprive her
and her children of the income therefrom. She also testified the numerous properties
they owned - dollar accounts, houses in QC and Cebu and a Benz. Remedios also
complained that Samson executed a quitclaim over their conjugal property in
California, U.S.A., in favor of Thelma, to improve his paramour's luxurious lifestyle to
the prejudice of his legitimate family. These allegations, none of which was refuted by
the husband, show that the injunction is necessary to protect the interests of the
private respondent and her children and prevent the dissipation of the conjugal
assets.
The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual
or threatened violation. Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be denied
that as the petitioner's legitimate wife, Remedios has a right to a share of the conjugal
estate. There is also enough evidence to raise the apprehension that entrusting said
estate to the petitioner may result in its improvident disposition to the detriment of his
wife and children. Inasmuch as the trial court had earlier declared the forfeiture of the
petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, it would be prudent not to allow him in the
meantime to participate in its management.
Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed the respondent
wife as the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed
her to continue administering the properties in the meantime without interference from
the petitioner, pending the express designation of the administrator in accordance
with Article 61 of the Family Code.
Page 37 of 51
validity. The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was without the written
consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely void.
As regards Marios contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which
may be perfected by Elviras acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that
the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI
clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.
We disagree with the CA when it held that the " share of Alfredo in the
conjugal partnership was already forfeited in favour of the daughter. Among the
effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved
and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net
profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredos share in the net profits
which is forfeited in favor of Winifred. Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is
not Alfredos share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of
the conjugal partnership property.
With regard to IDRI, we agree with the Court of Appeals in holding that IDRI
is not a buyer in good faith. As found by the RTC Malabon and the Court of Appeals,
IDRI had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances which should impel a
reasonably cautious person to make further inquiries about the vendors title to the
property.
Exercise of Profession
HELD This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since the
disposition of the property occurred after the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law is the Family Code.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors.
In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because
Elvira, with whom Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal property. However, as sole administrator of the
property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property without the written consent of Elvira or
the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is void. The
absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including
the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale.
Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the
property, that other spouses written consent to the sale is still required by law for its
Facts: The Ong spouses contracted the services of Alex and Nancy Go to provide
video coverage of their (Ong spouses) wedding. Three times thereafter, the Ongs
tried to claim the video tape of their wedding, which they planned to show to their
relatives in the United States where they were to spend their honeymoon, and thrice
they failed because the tape was apparently not yet processed. The parties then
agreed that the tape would be ready upon the return of the Ong spouses.
Go v CA
When the Ongs came home from their honeymoon, however, they found out
that the tape had been erased and therefore, could no longer be delivered. They sued
the Go spouses for damages. The lower court and CA ruled in favor of the Ongs.
The SC ruled in favor of the Ongs and held that the Gos are solidarily liable.
However, Alex Go contended that his wife, Nancy Go should be the only one liable as
when his wife entered into the contract with the Ongs, she was acting alone for her
sole interest.
Issue: Are the Go spouses solidarily liable to the Ong spouses?
Decision: No, only Nancy is liable.
Under Article 73 of the Family Code, the wife may exercise any profession,
occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband.
Page 38 of 51
Held:
No! The order of the lower court violated Section 26 of CA186 (GSIS
Charter) which prohibits the attachment, garnishment or freezing of any benefit
granted by the Act. The order was in effect, a freeze order.
The directive to deliver " of the retirement benefits to Norma makes the
default judgment doubly illegal because retirement benefits have been adjudged as
gratuities or reward for lengthy and faithful service of the recipient and should be
treated as separate property of the retiree-spouse. Thus, if the monetary benefits are
given gratis by the government because of previous work (like the retirement pay of a
provincial auditor in Mendoza vs. Dizon, L-387, October 25, 1956) or that of a Justice
of the Peace (Elcar vs. Eclar, CA-40 O.G. 12th Supp. No. 18, p. 86), this is a gratuity
and should be considered separate property (Art. 148, Civil Code).
NB. See the comment in page 144 of the reviewer, differentiating contributory and
non-contributory retirement plans. The latter forms part of the separate property while
the former, which is given by most private companies where EEs contribute to their
own retirement plans, should form part of the conjugal partnership.
Charges upon the Obligations of Absolute Community/Conjugal Partnership
71. WONG V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
FACTS: Romarico Henson and Katrina Pineda were married. During their marriage
Romarico bought a parcel of land from his father using money borrowed from an
officemate. Most of the time, the spouses were living separately; Romarico stayed in
Angeles while Katrina was in Manila. One time, while Katrina was in Hong Kong,
pieces of jewelry were consigned to her by Anita Chan. Katrina issued a check for
55,000 as payment for the jewelry but was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
Thereafter, Anitan Chan, assisted by her husband Ricky Wong , filed a complaint for
estafa. However the lower court dismissed the complaint on the theory that estafa
cannot be committed when the issuance of the check was for the payment of a preexisting obligation. Hence, the liability was only civil.
Thus, petitioners filed a civil case for collection of a sum of money. The
lower court ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered that the property of the spouses
Romarico and Katrina be levied upon. Take note that during the hearing only Katrina
was represented by counsel.
Romarico assails the levy of the parcel of lands belonging to him saying that
(1) he was deprived of his day in court and (2) he had nothing to do with the
transaction. Lower court sustained this contention.
The CA sustained the decision of the lower court saying that the parcel of
lands levied were not conjugal properties but was exclusive capital of Romarico
bought using his own funds; that even assuming it was conjugal property, it cannot be
proceeded against because the debt of Katrina was not consented to by Romarico
neither was it for the daily expenses of the family nor did it redound to the benefit of
the family. In fact, there was no evidence to the effect that administration of the
property was transferred to Katrina.
ISSUE: Whether or not the parcels of land levied upon form part of the conjugal
property YES
Whether or not the obligation incurred by Katrina is chargeable against the
conjugal
property
NO
HELD:
1.
2.
Page 39 of 51
Spouses filed a case of injunction against petitioners with the court to enjoin the
auction sale alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the
conjugal partnership levied on the ground that, among others, the subject loan did not
redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership.
But it could be argued that even in such kind of contract of accommodation, a benefit
for the family may also result, when the guarantee is in favor of the husbands
employer. However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the
Civil Code. The benefits must be one directly resulting from the loan. It cannot
merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself. There must be the requisite
showing x x x of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the
spouses or benefits to his family or that such obligations are productive of some
benefit to the family. Unfortunately, the petition did not present any proof to show:
(a) Whether or not the corporate existence of PBM was prolonged and for how many
months or years; and/or (b) Whether or not the PBM was saved by the loan and its
shares of stock appreciated, if so, how much and how substantial was the holdings of
the Ching family.
The CA correctly applied the provisions of the Family Code to this case. These
provisions highlight the underlying concern of the law for the conservation of the
conjugal partnership; for the husbands duty to protect and safeguard, if not augment,
not to dissipate it.
This is the underlying reason why the Family Code clarifies that the obligations
entered into by one of the spouses must be those that redounded to the benefit of the
family and that the measure of the partnerships liability is to the extent that the
family is benefited.
These are all in keeping with the spirit and intent of the other provisions of the
Civil Code which prohibits any of the spouses to donate or convey gratuitously any
part of the conjugal property. Thus, when Ching entered into a surety agreement he,
from then on, definitely put in peril the conjugal property (in this case, including the
family home) and placed it in danger of being taken gratuitously as in cases of
donation.
The fact that on several occasions the lending institutions did not require the
signature of the wife and the husband signed alone does not mean that being a
surety became part of his profession. Neither could he be presumed to have acted
for the conjugal partnership.
Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that the payment of
personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage
shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except to the extent that they
redounded to the benefit of the family.
Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home. The loan is a
corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of
an industry or profession nor an act of administration for the benefit of the family.
On June 25, 1982, the auction sale took place. Ayala won the auction. HOWEVER,
the trial court declared the sale on execution null and void. On appeal to the CA, the
court stated that the debt incurred by husband Ching did not incur to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership, hence, it could not be levied upon. Ayala claims that the
provisions of Civil Code and the Family Code are different and that jurisprudence is
on their side.
Issue: Did it redound to the benefit of the spouses?
SC: We do not agree with petitioners that there is a difference between the terms
redounded to the benefit of or benefited from on the one hand; and for the benefit
of on the other. They mean one and the same thing. Article 161 (1) of the Civil
Code and Article 121 (2) of the Family Code are similarly worded, i.e., both use the
term for the benefit of. On the other hand, Article 122 of the Family Code provides
that The payment of personal debts by the husband or the wife before or during the
marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family. As can be seen, the terms are used
interchangeably.
Petitioners further claim that the husband as head of the family and as
administrator of the conjugal partnership is presumed to have contracted obligations
for the benefit of the family or the conjugal partnership (Cobb-Perez). They are wrong.
The court derived the following rules from jurisprudence:
a. If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly
received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own
profession, that contract falls within the term obligations for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the
benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. Simply
stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the
law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
b. If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband
acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be
categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal
debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when
Page 40 of 51
Page 41 of 51
2.
value than the paraphernal property, the paraphernal property will become
part of the conjugal partnership subject to reimbursement in favor of the
spouse who lost property. In this case, the house had a value less than the
lot. Because of this, the property remained parphernal. The signatures of
Eliseo are therefore immaterial.
It was an equitable mortgage.
Spouses Estonina v. Court of Appeals 266 SCRA 627 January 27, 1997
Facts: A lot was owned by Santiago Garcia, who has 9 children and a wife named
Consuelo Garcia. Santiago already died when this controversy arose.
Petitioners, the spouses Estonina, filed a case against Consuelo Garcia and
was able to obtain an attachment over the land. While the case was pending, the 9
children sold their 1/10 share in the lot to Spouses Atayan, who are the respondents
here.
Estonina were able to obtain a favorable judgment against Consuelo Garcia.
The land was sold at public auction and a TCT was issued in the name of Estonina.
Atayan however filed a complaint for annulment of the sheriff sale and the
TCT claiming that they own 9/10 of the land.
The RTC said that the land was presumed to be conjugal hence Consuelo
Garcia owned 50% of the land plus 5% as her share in the intestate estate of her
husband Santiago Garcia. RTC ordered the amendment of the TCT to show that
Estonina owns 55% while Atayan owns 45%.
Both parties appealed.
The CA modified the judgment. The CA held that lot was the exclusive
property of Santiago Garcia and not conjugal. It held that Estonina only owns 1/10 or
10% and Atayan owns 9/10 or 90%.
Issue: Is the property exclusive or conjugal? Exclusive share of the deceased
Santiago
Whats the real share of Estonina and Atayan? 10% and 90%, respectively.
Ruling: SC affirms CA in toto.
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the
marriage. Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition
sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
Here, Estonino failed to present any proof that the property was acquired
during the marriage. Estonino merely relies on the certificate of title which was issued
during the marriage. The TCT does not suffice to establish the conjugal nature of the
property.
Acquisition of property and registration of title are two different acts.
Registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing.
Thus, the property is the exclusive property of the deceased Santiago and
when he died leaving 10 compulsory heirs, each one got 10% of the lot. Hence, what
the Estonino spouses purchased in the public auction was merely the rights of
Consuelo Garcia consisting of 10% of the lot.
CRUZ V LEIS
FACTS Adriano Leis and Gertrudes Isidro were married on 19 April 1923.
On 27 April 1955, Gertrudes acquired from the DANR a parcel of land in Marikina.
The Deed of Sale described Gertrudes as a widow. Thereafter, TCT No. 43100 was
issued in the name of "Gertrudes Isidro," who was also referred to therein as a widow.
On 2 December 1973, Adriano died.
On 5 February 1985, Gertrudes obtained a loan from petitioners, the spouses Cruz, in
the amount of P15,000.00 at 5% interest, payable on or before 5 February 1986. The
loan was secured by a mortgage over the property.
On March 11 1986, due to her inability to pay her outstanding obligation when the
debt became due and demandable, Gertrudes executed two contracts in favor of the
petitioners. The first is denominated as "Kasunduan," a pacto de retro sale, granting
Gertrudes one year within which to repurchase the property. The second is a
"Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan," a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the same
property. For failure of Gertrudes to repurchase the property, ownership thereof was
consolidated in favor of the petitioners.
On 9 June 1987, Gertrudes Isidro died. Thereafter, her heirs, herein private
respondents, received demands to vacate the premises from petitioners, the new
owners of the property. Private respondents responded by filing an action before the
RTC of Pasig seeking the nullification of the contracts of sale executed by Gertrudes
Isidro.
The RTC ruled in favour of the respondents. It held that the land was conjugal
property, no fraud attended the execution of the contracts, and that the petitioners
failed to comply with the provisions of Article 1607 of the Civil Code requiring a
judicial order for the consolidation of the ownership in the vendee a retro to be
recorded in the Registry of Property.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE W/N the petitioners acquired ownership over the land?
HELD It is conceded that, as a rule, a co-owner such as Gertrudes could only dispose
of her share in the property owned in common.
Unfortunately for private respondents, however, the property was registered solely in
the name of "Gertrudes Isidro, widow." Where a parcel of land, forming part of the
undistributed properties of the dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, is sold by a
widow to a purchaser who merely relied on the face of the certificate of title thereto,
Page 42 of 51
Anno v. Anno
G.R. No. 163743 (480 SCRA 419)
Facts: Petitioner Dolores Pintiano-Anno (Dolores) and respondent Albert Anno
(Albert) were married in 1963. Dolores claims that during their marriage, they
acquired a 4-hectare agricultural land in La Trinidad, Benguet. In 1974, the land was
declared for tax purposes solely in the name of her husband, respondent Albert.
Dolores further claims that without her knowledge, Albert executed two documents of
transfer covering the subject land: 1) Affidavit of Waiver where Albert waived and
quitclaimed in favor of Dolores first cousin, respondent Patenio Suanding, his rights
over a portion of the land; 2) Deed of sale where Albert conveyed to Suanding the
remainder of the land more than a year later. In both documents, Albert declared that
he is the lawful owner and possessor of the land. Thus, the documents of transfer did
not bear the signature and written consent of Dolores as the wife of the vendor. The
land was transferred by Suanding to third persons, Myrna Nazarro and Silardo
Bested.
Dolores filed a case against Albert and Suanding for Cancellation of the Waiver of
Rights, Deed of Sale and Transfer Tax Declarations, and Damages. She alleged the
land belongs to their conjugal partnership and thus could not have been validly
conveyed by Albert to Suanding without her written consent as spouse. Suanding
testified that Albert represented to him that the land was his exclusive property as the
land was part of his inheritance and he had been in possession thereof prior to his
marriage to petitioner.
MTC ruled in favor of Dolores. RTC reversed the MTC. CA affirmed the RTC.
Issue: whether the subject land belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains of
spouses Anno and thus cannot be validly conveyed by one spouse without the
consent of the other.
Held and Ratio: Land belongs to Albert not to the conjugal partnership of gains of the
spouses.
All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal in nature. However, for this
presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition
sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. However, a careful examination of the records shows that Dolores
evidence (their marriage contract and the initial 1974 tax declaration over the
property) failed to prove that the subject land belongs to their conjugal partnership.
Moreover, since it is Dolores allegation that the land belongs to their conjugal
partnership of gains, then she has the burden of proof to substantiate, by
preponderance of evidence, that the land was conjugal in nature. This she failed to do
(i.e. Dolores failed to identify when she and Albert, first occupied and possessed the
land). While the initial tax declaration she presented was dated 1974, it cannot be
automatically deduced therefrom that occupation of the subject land was likewise
done in the same year. To so conclude will amount to speculation or conjecture on
the part of the court. Declaration of a land for taxation purposes cannot be equated
with its acquisition for, in the ordinary course of things, occupation of a piece of land
usually comes prior to the act of declaring it for tax purposes. More importantly, the
1974 tax declaration presented by Dolores cannot be made a basis to prove its
conjugal nature as the land was declared for tax purposes solely in the name of her
husband, Albert, who sold the land as his exclusive property. Tax declarations,
especially of untitled lands, are credible proof of claim of ownership and are
good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner.
Since the circumstances do not show when the property was acquired by spouses
Anno, the presumption of the conjugal nature of the property allegedly acquired by
the spouses Anno during the subsistence of their marriage cannot be
applied. Consequently, the land is the exclusive property of Albert which he could
validly dispose of without the consent of his wife.
Sole/Transfer of Administration
REYES v. ALEJANDRO (RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF ABSENCE)
141 SCRA 65, G.R. No. L-32026. January 16, 1986.
Doctrine: It is not necessary that a declaration of absence be made in a proceeding
separate from and prior to a petition for administration
FACTS: On October 25, 1969, Erlinda Reynoso Reyes filed a petition praying for the
declaration of her husband, Roberto L. Reyes, as an absentee.
Page 43 of 51
Uy v. CA
Topic under Joint Administration; Sole/Transfer of Administration
Doctrine: Incapacitated spouse warrants Judicial Guardianship under Rules of
Court, not under the Family Code.
Facts: Ernesto Jardeleza suffered stroke, so his son Teodoro filed a petition for
guardianship of his father. Son averred that there was a need for a court-appointed
guardian to save his fathers properties and assets, and further added that in the
meantime, no properties shall be alienated or mortgaged to third persons.
Ernestos wife then filed petition declaring Ernestos incapacity and assumption of
powers as sole administrator of conjugal properties, and prayed to Court that she be
granted permission to dispose of a land for the medical expenses of her husband.
Court granted.
Teodoro opposed, saying that such assumption as sole admin is in effect a petition
for guardianship over person and properties of Ernesto, and should be covered by
Special Proceedings under the ROC. Also, Ernesto already acquired vested rights as
a conjugal partner and thus cannot be impaired without consent. He also averred that
the CPG has sufficient assets to cover the medical expenses! Nonetheless, Ernestos
wife still sold land to her daughter Glenda Uy. TC affirms, but CA reverses, ordering
sale of land void.
Issue: Comatose condition of husband warrants the assuming of sole power of
administration over properties and dispose of land with court approval?
Held: Petition denied.
Ratio: the condition of her husband makes the Rule on Art. 124 of CC inapplicable
(covers only absence, separation in fact, abandonment, or withheld consent). And so
Rule 93 of the Rules of Court 1964 applies, as this covers a non-consenting spouse
due to incapacity or incompetence to give consent.
As such, ernestos wife should observe procedure for sale of wards estate required of
judicial guardians under the Rules of Court, not the summary proceedings under the
Family Code. In the case at bar, RTC failed to comply with procedures of the ROC,
and even FC (no notice to incapacitated spouse and to show cause why petition
should not be granted).
Dispositions/Donations
SIOCHI V. GOZON
Facts: This case involves a 30,000 SQ.M. parcel of land (property)registered in the
name of the Spouses Gozon.
Elvira filed with Cavite RTC a petition for legal separation against her
husband Alfredo. Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, while the legal separation case
was still pending. Meanwhile, Alfredo and Mario Siochi (Mario) entered into an
Agreement to Buy and Sell involving the property for the price of P18 million. They
stipulated that Alfredo was to remove the notice of lis pendens on the title, to have the
land excluded from the legal separation case and to secure an affidavit from the wife
Elvira that the property was the exclusive property of Alfredo.
However, despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to comply
with these stipulations. After paying the P5 million earnest money as partial payment
of the purchase price, Mario took possession of the property in September 1993.
Meanwhile, the courts declared the Gozon spouses legally separated. As
regards the property, the RTC declared it conjugal. Alfredo also executed a deed of
donation over the said property in favour of their daughter Winifred without annotating
the notice of lis pendens. Alfredo, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney executed in
his favor by Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for
P18 million.
Mario then filed with the Malabon RTC a complaint for Specific Performance
and Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. RTC ruled in favour of
Mario. CA affirmed. Mario appealed, contending that the Agreement should be
treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the acceptance of the other
spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Since Elviras conduct signified her
acquiescence to the sale, Mario prays for the Court to direct Alfredo and Elvira to
execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property upon his payment of P9 million to
Elvira.
IDRI alleges that it is a buyer in good faith and for value.
ISSUE Could Alfredo /dispose alienate the property? NO.
Was Alfredos share in the conjugal property already forfeited in favour of
their daughter by virtue of the decree of legal separation? NO.
Page 44 of 51
Fuentes v. Roca
Facts: Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar,
ZamboangaCity. In 1982, she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a
deed of absolute sale. But Tarciano did not for the meantime have the registered title
transferred to his name. In 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel
and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). They later signed an agreement to sell
prepared by one Atty. Plagata dated April 29, 1988, which agreement expressly
stated that it was to take effect in six months.
The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a down
payment of P60,000.00 for the transfer of the lots title to him. And, within six months,
Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of
his estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale. Upon Tarcianos
compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take possession of
the lot and pay him an additional P140,000.00 orP160,000.00, depending on whether
or not he succeeded in demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano was unable
to comply with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of the
lot without any further formality and payment.
As soon as Tarciano met the other conditions, Atty. Plagata
notarized Rosarios affidavit in Zamboanga City. On January 11, 1989 Tarciano
executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the Fuentes spouses. They then paid
him the additional P140,000.00 mentioned in their agreement. A new title was issued
in the name of the spouses who immediately constructed a building on the
lot. On January 28, 1990 Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who
died nine months afterwards.
Eight years later, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed an action for
annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses with
the RTC- Zamboanga City. The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void
since Tarcianos wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on the
affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the property be
reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid
Tarciano.
RTC dimissed the action. CA reversed. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to
the spouses already prescribed
Held:
Page 45 of 51
85 Partosa-jo v C.A.
FACTS: Jose Jo admits to cohabiting with 3 women and fathering 15 children. (wow)
Prima Jo is allegedly the legal wife who has a daughter named Monina. Prima filed for
separation of conjugal property and support. The TC ruled in favor of Prima in the
support case but failed to render a decision on the separation of property. Jose
appealed, CA affirmed support but dismissed the separation of property for lack of a
cause of action and on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by
Article 178 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Did the CA err in saying that (1) the judicial separation of conjugal property
sought was not allowed under Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil Code and (2) no
such separation was decreed by the TC- Jose says since the TC decision became
final sorry nalang si Prima
HELD: The Court decided (2) first so even if Jose is correct in saying that the
decision of the TC failed to state the separation the Court cant let technicality prevail
over substantive issues so the Court may clarify such an ambiguity by an amendment
even after the judgment have become final.
On (1) -The CA dismissed the complaint on the ground that the separation of the
parties was due to their agreement and not because of abandonment. It held that an
agreement to live separately without just cause was void under Article 221 of the Civil
Code and could not sustain any claim of abandonment by the aggrieved spouse. Its
conclusion was that the only remedy available to her was legal separation which will
result in the termination of the conjugal partnership.
Prima contends that CA misinterpreted Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil
Code. She says that the agreement was for her to temporarily live with her parents
during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They
never agreed to separate permanently. And even if they did, this arrangement ended
in 1942, when she returned to him and he refused to accept her.
Art. 128 which superseded Art. 178 states that the aggrieved spouse may petition for
judicial separation on either of these grounds:
1. Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and
2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the
family without just cause, even if she said spouse does not leave
the other spouse.
Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the intent never to return,
followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and without providing for one's
family although able to do so. The acts of Jose in denying entry to the conjugal home
to his wife as early as 1942 and consistently refusing to give support from 1968
constitutes abandonment.
Since Jose had abandoned her and their child she is entitled to ask for the dissolution
of their property regime. Jose used a dummy to keep the properties from Prima but
the Court said that these properties that should now be divided between them, on the
assumption that they were acquired during coverture and so belong to the spouses
half and half. The division must include such properties properly belonging to the
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The brother and sister of Victorina are claiming 2/3 of the estate, while the
mother of Bienvenida and the other sister of Victorina are claiming 1/3
Issue: How should the estate of Victorina be partitioned?
Held:
When Bienvenida died, the first conjugal partnership was automatically
dissolved. That conjugal partnership was then converted into an implied ordinary coownership. It was also at this point of time that the inheritance was transmitted to the
heirs of Bienvenida (5 children). The heirs will receive " of the conjugal partnership
property which pertained to Binevenida. The other half belongs to Cesario.
Due to the marriage of Cesario and Victorina, the fruits and income of
Cesarios share in the inheritance from Bienvenida and of his conjugal share in the
property of the first conjugal partnership would form part of the conjugal partnership of
properties of he second marriage. The fruits and income derived or acquired through
these properties would also be conjugal in nature.
The problem is how to apportion the properties involved between the two
conjugal partnerships. According to the Civil Code, whenever the liquidation of the
partnership of 2 or more marriages contracted by the same person should be carried
out at the same time and there is no evidence to show the capital or the conjugal
property belonging to each of the partnerships to be liquidated, the total mass of the
partnership property shall be divided between the different partnerships in proportion
to the duration of each and to the property belonging to the respective spouses.
Property Relations of Union without Marriage: Either not Capacitated to marry
or not living together exclusively
TUMLOS V. TUMLOS
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the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those
acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the
absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a
suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on
contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in
the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage
settlements. Thus, the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be
governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family
Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of
conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply
only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and
consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the
subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express
provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or
written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal
property shall be void.
2. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, '[T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
. . . (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the
other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . . For the subject
property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The burden of proof
that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies
with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Homeowner's sweeping conclusion
that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of
housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing
adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than petitioner's bare allegation,
there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan
obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the
principal obligation.
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Thereafter, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and
the settlement of Felicisimos estate before the RTC. However, one of the children of
Felicisimo in the first marriage, Rodolfo San Luis, filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that Felicidad has no legal personality since she was just a mistress of
Felicisimo, the latter being legally married to Merry Lee. The RTC ruled in favor of
Rodolfo. However, CA reversed.
ISSUE: WON Felicidad has the legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration???
RULING: YES.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for
letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is
divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code,
considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974,
or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we
need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26,
par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in
the affirmative.
52
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. involved a marriage between a foreigner and
his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce
obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine
law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal
partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the
divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by
the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As
stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45
L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus
severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a
penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is
still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation
before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no
longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required
to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
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Cario vs Cario
st
Facts: Santiagio Carino contracted 2 marriages during his liftetime. The 1 was with
nd
Susan Nicdao and the 2 was with Susan Yee (hindi sya mahilig sa mga Susan eh
noh? Haha). When Santiago died, both Susan Nicdao and Susan Yee filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance from the offices in which Santiago worked
for (he was a police).
Susan Yee filed a case for the collection of a sum of money against Susan
Nicdao for some benefits she received. Susan Nicdao did not file her answer and was
declared in default. Susan Yee admits that her marriage to Santiago took place
without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity on the marriage of Santiago to
st
Susan Nicdao. However, Susan Yee argued that the 1 marriage was void ab initio
because it was solemnized without the required marriage license. She presented the
marriage certificate of Santiago and Susan Nicdao which bears no marriage license
number. In addition, a certification from the local civil registrar showed that they had
no record of the marriage license.
Issue: Whether Susan Yee is entitled to the monetary benefits she is claiming from
Susan Nicdao?
Held: 1) In this case, the marriage of Susan Nicdao and Santiago does not fall within
the marriages exempt from the license requirement. Despite this however, the
records reveal that their marriage was solemnized without a marriage license. As
such, their marriage is void ab initio.
nd
However, this does not automatically mean that the 2 marriage is already
valid. Under art40 of the family code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a
st
prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage. Even though the 1
nd
marriage is void, the parties will still have to wait for the declaration otherwise the 2
marriage will also be void. Hence, since Susan Yees marriage to Santiago was
solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the earlier marriage void,
theirs is also void ab initio.
2) One of the effects of the declaration of nullity is the separation of property
of the spouses. Considering that the 2 marriages are void ab initio, the applicable
property regime wont be absolute community nor conjugal partnership. The
marriages are governed by Art147 and 148 of the FC on Property Regime of Unions
Without Marriage.
Under art. 148 refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships...etc. Under this regime, the property acquired by the parties
through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and
salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively.
Considering that the marriage of Susan Yee and Santiago is bigamous
having been solemnized during the subsistence of another marriage which is
presumed to be valid, article 148 applies.
The disputed claims in this case are clearly renumerations, incentives and
benefits from governmental agencies by the deceased as a police officer. Unless
proof to the contrary is shown, it cannot be said that Susan Yee contributed money,
property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not
owned in common they belong to the deceased alone and Susan Yee has no right
to claim them.
By intestate succession, these death benefits shall pass to the legal heirs.
But since Susan yee is not legal wife, she is not a legal heir.
st
3) Article 147 govern the property regime of Santiago and Susan Nicdao (1
null marriage). This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and
not barred by any impediment to marry but whose marriage is nonetheless void for
other reasons.
Under this article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the
cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally
between them even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not
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