PP. vs.

Que Po Lay
G.R. No. L-6791

March 29, 1954

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant.
Prudencio de Guzman for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lauro G. Marquez for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty of violating
Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, and sentencing him to suffer six
months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.
The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks
and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within
one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. the appeal is based on the
claim that said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the
appellant, and that consequently, said circular had no force and effect. It is contended that Commonwealth Act. No.,
638 and Act 2930 both require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of
general applicability. The Solicitor General answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930
do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to
have force and effect.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in question do not require the publication of the circulars, regulations
and notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that said two laws provide is that laws,
resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be of no
force and effect. In other words, said two Acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the
Official Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of the Government issuing same, and of the
Bureau of Printing.
However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress shall, in the
absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of
the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the
implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence.
(See U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil., 119 and authorities cited therein.) Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations
especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be
published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its
contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially
and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.
Our Old Civil code, ( Spanish Civil Code of 1889) has a similar provision about the effectivity of laws, (Article 1
thereof), namely, that laws shall be binding twenty days after their promulgation, and that their promulgation shall be
understood as made on the day of the termination of the publication of the laws in the Gazette. Manresa, commenting
on this article is of the opinion that the word "laws" include regulations and circulars issued in accordance with the
same. He says:
El Tribunal Supremo, ha interpretado el articulo 1. del codigo Civil en Sentencia de 22 de Junio de 1910, en el
sentido de que bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los Reglamentos, Reales
decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el
Gobierno en uso de su potestad. Tambien el poder ejecutivo lo ha venido entendiendo asi, como lo prueba el
hecho de que muchas de sus disposiciones contienen la advertencia de que empiezan a regir el mismo dia
de su publicacion en la Gaceta, advertencia que seria perfectamente inutil si no fuera de aplicacion al caso el
articulo 1.o del Codigo Civil. (Manresa, Codigo Civil Espaol, Vol. I. p. 52).
In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not published
until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear that said circular,

particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official
Gazzette or after November 1951. In other words, appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not
binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession thereof.
But the Solicitor General also contends that this question of non-publication of the Circular is being raised for the first
time on appeal in this Court, which cannot be done by appellant. Ordinarily, one may raise on appeal any question of
law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is within the issues made by the parties in their
pleadings. (Section 19, Rule 48 of the Rules of Court). But the question of non-publication is fundamental and
decisive. If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20 had not been published as required by law before its violation, then in
the eyes of the law there was no such circular to be violated and consequently appellant committed no violation of the
circular or committed any offense, and the trial court may be said to have had no jurisdiction. This question may be
raised at any stage of the proceeding whether or not raised in the court below.
In view of the foregoing, we reverse the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de oficio.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Diokno, JJ., concur.

Taada vs. Tuvera

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his
capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as
Director, Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of
the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298,
303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473,
486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800,
802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246,
1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173,
180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245,
248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315,
325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445,
473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641,
642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538,
1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649,
1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762,
1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829,
1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868,
1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028,
2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522,
524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604,
609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107,
120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners
have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any
showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the
presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this
mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some
other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay
the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is
to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due
course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this
Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those
cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected,
independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the
writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question
is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are
regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show
that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such
interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal
president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is
a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the
general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for
the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in
mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule
does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States,
inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we
have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the
people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply
squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding,
it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General,
the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in
this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the
presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the
Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its
date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date
when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of
publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached
that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative
orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of
sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be
required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President
of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or
which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which
are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for
the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by
the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan
Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative recordsno such publicity accompanies the lawmaking process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential
decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents
and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se
comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de
conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official
Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance
and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind,
leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a
burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which
apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be
published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the
land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the
official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and
instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall
have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this
decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only
during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to
P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar

situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage
District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties,
and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442;
Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications.
The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have
become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly,
of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention
of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement
of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the
Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an
operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by
petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and
1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be
ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none
of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the
Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of
[penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding
is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government,
as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in
the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect
immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

R E S O L U T I O N (1986)
CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which
they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary
as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the
necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect.
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that
decision. 1Specifically, they ask the following questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be
made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2
In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory
opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in
Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication,
when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was
concurred in only by three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments.
Came next the February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the
supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances
intended only for the internal administration of a government agency or for particular persons did not have to be
'Published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision
under reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by eight members of this Court. 5
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the
instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to
the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause
does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date,
without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day
period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate
concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its
publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was
"otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason. is that
such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed
to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the
lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it
would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they
did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think
of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may
affect before they can begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes that
the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to
remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the
government.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate
to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting
citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It
surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all
the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in
the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the
public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as anultra vires act of the legislature. To be
valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or
some of the people only, and t to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by
the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. administrative rules and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters
of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national
territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including
even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or
requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret
but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case
studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the
assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are
not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential
decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in
a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial
compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential
decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The evident
purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication in the Official
Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently
informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without indicating
where it should be made. 11 It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear
consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its
erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the
function of communicating, the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or
authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The
Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has
not yet been published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it
impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply
the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed
procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of
laws must be made in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days
from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law
pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law
could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as
required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is
untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open society, with all the
acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our
country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating from
them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of their delegates
and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This
they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep
secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon
thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their
publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur..

La Bugal vs. Ramos

LA BUGAL BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. VICTOR O. RAMOS, Secretary Department of
Environment and Natural Resources; HORACIO RAMOS, Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGBDENR); RUBEN TORRES, Executive Secretary; and WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC.
G.R. No. 127882, 27 January 2004, En Banc (Carpio-Morales, J.)
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception to the rule that
participation in the nations natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be
construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
FACTS: RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on
March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a
corporation organized under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan
Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued
DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on
December 20, 1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and WMCP be
declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and
develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.
In January 2001, WMC - a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company - sold its whole stake in WMCP
to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an

Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius name but Lepanto
Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before the Court of Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to accept, consider and evaluate
proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving wither technical
or financial assistance for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals which upon appropriate
recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise
contended that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which provides
for the protection of Australian investments.
ISSUES:
1.

Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to

exploit the Philippine mineral resources.

2.

Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a service contract that permits fully

foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.

HELD:
First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned corporations to
exploit the Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states that All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. The same section also states that, the exploration and development and utilization of natural resources shall
be under the full control and supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution authorizing the State to grant
licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources. By
such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through license, concession or lease is no
longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a
particular natural resource within a given area. The concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire
over the countrys natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the
point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase management or other forms of assistance in the 1973
Charter. The present Constitution now allows only technical and financial assistance. The management and the
operation of the mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the service contracts was precisely the
evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation in
the nations natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed
strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said act authorizes
service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase financial and technical agreements in accordance with
the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial
ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.

The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral resources
just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the
aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over the nations mineral
resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 6040% capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and
utilization of Philippine natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements or
compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts
are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to merely technical or
financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils.
Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract
The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the agreement itself is
a service contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize
and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same
agreement provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology, management, and personnel necessary for the
Mining Operations.
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership
over natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These
stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to
avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring must be struck down.

Umali vs. Estanislao

G.R. No. 104037 May 29, 1992
REYNALDO V. UMALI, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JESUS P. ESTANISLAO, Secretary of Finance, and HON. JOSE U. ONG, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, respondents.
G.R. No. 104069 May 29, 1992
RENE B. GOROSPE, LEIGHTON R. SIAZON, MANUEL M. SUNGA, PAUL D. UNGOS, BIENVENIDO T.
JAMORALIN, JR., JOSE D. FLORES, JR., EVELYN G. VILLEGAS, DOMINGO T. LIGOT, HENRY E. LARON,
PASTOR M. DALMACION, JR., and, JULIUS NORMAN C. CERRADA, petitioners,
vs
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.

Rene B. Gorospe, Leighton R. Siazon, Manuel M. Sunga, Bienvinido T. Jamoralin, Jr and Paul D. Ungos for
petitioners.
PADILLA, J.:
These consolidated cases are petitions for mandamus and prohibition, premised upon the following undisputed facts:
Congress enacted Rep. Act 7167, entitled "AN ACT ADJUSTING THE BASIC PERSONAL AND ADDITIONAL
EXEMPTIONS ALLOWABLE TO INDIVIDUALS FOR INCOME TAX PURPOSES TO THE POVERTY THRESHOLD
LEVEL, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 29, PARAGRAPH (L), ITEMS (1) AND (2) (A) OF THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." It provides as follows:
Sec. (1). The first paragraph of item (1), paragraph (1) of Section 29 of the National Internal Revenue
Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
(1) Personal Exemptions allowable to individuals (1) Basic personal exemption as follows:
For single individual or married individual judicially decreed as legally separated with
no qualified dependents P9,000
For head of a family P12,000
For married individual P18,000
Provided, That husband and wife electing to compute their income tax separately shall be entitled to a
personal exemption of P9,000 each.
Sec. 2. The first paragraph of item (2) (A), paragraph (1) of Section 29 of the same Code, as
amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
(2) Additional exemption.
(a) Taxpayers with dependents. A married individual or a head of family shall be allowed an
additional exemption of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000) for each dependent: Provided, That the total
number of dependents for which additional exemptions may be claimed shall not exceed four
dependents: Provided, further, That an additional exemption of One Thousand Pesos (1,000) shall be
allowed for each child who otherwise qualified as dependent prior to January 1, 1980: Provided,
finally, That the additional exemption for dependents shall be claimed by only one of the spouses in
case of married individuals electing to compute their income tax liabilities separately.
Sec. 3. This act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved. 1
The said act was signed and approved by the President on 19 December 1991 and published on 14 January 1992 in
"Malaya" a newspaper of general circulation.
On 26 December 1991, respondents promulgated Revenue Regulations No. 1-92, the pertinent portions of which read
as follows:
Sec. 1. SCOPE Pursuant to Sections 245 and 72 of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation
to Republic Act No. 7167, these Regulations are hereby promulgated prescribing the collection at
source of income tax on compensation income paid on or after January 1, 1992 under the Revised
Withholding Tax Tables (ANNEX "A") which take into account the increase of personal and additional
exemptions.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Section 8 of Revenue Regulations No. 6-82 is amended by Revenue Regulations No. 1-86 is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
Section 8. Right to claim the following exemptions. . . .

Each employee shall be allowed to claim the following amount of exemption with
respect to compensation paid on or after January 1, 1992.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. EFFECTIVITY. These regulations shall take effect on compensation income from January
1, 1992.
On 27 February 1992, the petitioner in G.R. No. 104037, a taxpayer and a resident of Gitnang Bayan Bongabong,
Oriental Mindoro, filed a petition for mandamus for himself and in behalf all individual Filipino taxpayers, to COMPEL
the respondents to implement Rep. Act 7167 with respect to taxable income of individual taxpayers earned or received
on or after 1 January 1991 or as of taxable year ending 31 December 1991.
On 28 February 1992, the petitioners in G.R. No. 104069 likewise filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition on
their behalf as well as for those other individual taxpayers who might be similarly situated, to compel the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to implement the mandate of Rep. Act 7167 adjusting the personal and additional
exemptions allowable to individuals for income tax purposes in regard to income earned or received in 1991, and to
enjoin the respondents from implementing Revenue Regulations No. 1-92.
In the Court's resolution of 10 March 1992, these two (2) cases were consolidated. Respondents were required to
comment on the petitions, which they did within the prescribed period.
The principal issues to be resolved in these cases are: (1) whether or not Rep. Act 7167 took effect upon its approval
by the President on 19 December 1991, or on 30 January 1992, i.e., after fifteen (15) days following its publication on
14 January 1992 in the "Malaya" a newspaper of general circulation; and (2) assuming that Rep. Act 7167 took effect
on 30 January 1992, whether or not the said law nonetheless covers or applies to compensation income earned or
received during calendar year 1991.
In resolving the first issue, it will be recalled that the Court in its resolution in Caltex (Phils.), Inc. vs. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 97282, 26 June 1991 which is on all fours with this case as to the first
issue held:
The central issue presented in the instant petition is the effectivity of R.A. 6965 entitled "An Act
Revising The Form of Taxation on Petroleum Products from Ad Valorem to Specific, Amending For the
Purpose Section 145 of the National Internal Revenue Code, As amended by Republic Act Numbered
Sixty Seven Hundred Sixty Seven."
Sec. 3 of R.A. 6965 contains the effectivity clause which provides. "This Act shall take effect upon its
approval"
R.A. 6965 was approved on September 19, 1990. It was published in the Philippine Journal, a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, on September 20, 1990. Pursuant to the Act, an
implementing regulation was issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Revenue
Memorandum Circular 85-90, stating that R.A. 6965 took effect on October 5, 1990. Petitioner took
exception thereof and argued that the law took effect on September 20, 1990 instead.
Pertinent is Article 2 of the Civil Code (as amended by Executive Order No. 200) which provides:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication either in the official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. . . .
In the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera (L-63915, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 446, 452) we construed
Article 2 of the Civil Code and laid down the rule:
. . .: the) clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and
not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This
clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. . . .

Inasmuch as R.A. 6965 has no specific date for its effectivity and neither can it become effective upon
its approval notwithstanding its express statement, following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the
doctrine enunciated in Tanada,supra, R.A. 6965 took effect fifteen days after September 20, 1990, or
specifically, on October 5, 1990.
Accordingly, the Court rules that Rep. Act 7167 took effect on 30 January 1992, which is after fifteen (15) days
following its publication on 14 January 1992 in the "Malaya."
Coming now to the second issue, the Court is of the considered view that Rep. Act 7167 should cover or extend to
compensation income earned or received during calendar year 1991.
Sec. 29, par. (L), Item No. 4 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, provides:
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, the President shall automatically adjust not
more often than once every three years, the personal and additional exemptions taking into account,
among others, the movement in consumer price indices, levels of minimum wages, and bare
subsistence levels.
As the personal and additional exemptions of individual taxpayers were last adjusted in 1986, the President, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, could have adjusted the personal and additional exemptions in 1989 by
increasing the same even without any legislation providing for such adjustment. But the President did not.
However, House Bill 28970, which was subsequently enacted by Congress as Rep. Act 7167, was introduced in the
House of Representatives in 1989 although its passage was delayed and it did not become effective law until 30
January 1992. A perusal, however, of the sponsorship remarks of Congressman Hernando B. Perez, Chairman of the
House Committee on Ways and Means, on House Bill 28970, provides an indication of the intent of Congress in
enacting Rep. Act 7167. The pertinent legislative journal contains the following:
At the outset, Mr. Perez explained that the Bill Provides for increased personal additional exemptions
to individuals in view of the higher standard of living.
The Bill, he stated, limits the amount of income of individuals subject to income tax to enable them to
spend for basic necessities and have more disposable income.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Perez added that inflation has raised the basic necessities and that it had been three years since
the last exemption adjustment in 1986.
xxx xxx xxx
Subsequently, Mr. Perez stressed the necessity of passing the measure to mitigate the effects of the
current inflation and of the implementation of the salary standardization law. Stating that it is
imperative for the government to take measures to ease the burden of the individual income tax filers,
Mr. Perez then cited specific examples of how the measure can help assuage the burden to the
taxpayers.
He then reiterated that the increase in the prices of commodities has eroded the purchasing power of
the peso despite the recent salary increases and emphasized that the Bill will serve to compensate
the adverse effects of inflation on the taxpayers. . . . (Journal of the House of Representatives, May
23, 1990, pp. 32-33).
It will also be observed that Rep. Act 7167 speaks of the adjustments that it provides for, as adjustments " to the
poverty threshold level." Certainly, "the poverty threshold level" is the poverty threshold level at the time Rep. Act 7167
was enacted by Congress, not poverty threshold levels in futuro, at which time there may be need of further
adjustments in personal exemptions. Moreover, the Court can not lose sight of the fact that these personal and
additional exemptions are fixed amounts to which an individual taxpayer is entitled, as a means to cushion the
devastating effects of high prices and a depreciated purchasing power of the currency. In the end, it is the lowerincome and the middle-income groups of taxpayers (not the high-income taxpayers) who stand to benefit most from
the increase of personal and additional exemptions provided for by Rep. Act 7167. To that extent, the act is a social
legislation intended to alleviate in part the present economic plight of the lower income taxpayers. It is intended to
remedy the inadequacy of the heretofore existing personal and additional exemptions for individual taxpayers.

And then, Rep. Act 7167 says that the increased personal exemptions that it provides for shall be available
thenceforth, that is, after Rep. Act 7167 shall have become effective. In other words, these exemptions are available
upon the filing of personal income tax returns which is, under the National Internal Revenue Code, done not later than
the 15th day of April after the end of a calendar year. Thus, under Rep. Act 7167, which became effective, as
aforestated, on 30 January 1992, the increased exemptions are literally available on or before 15 April 1992 (though
not before 30 January 1992). But these increased exemptions can be available on 15 April 1992 only in respect of
compensation income earned or received during the calendar year 1991.
The personal exemptions as increased by Rep. Act 7167 cannot be regarded as available in respect of compensation
income received during the 1990 calendar year; the tax due in respect of said income had already accrued, and been
presumably paid, by 15 April 1991 and by 15 July 1991, at which time Rep. Act 7167 had not been enacted. To make
Rep. Act 7167 refer back to income received during 1990 would require language explicitly retroactive in purport and
effect, language that would have to authorize the payment of refunds of taxes paid on 15 April 1991 and 15 July 1991:
such language is simply not found in Rep. Act 7167.
The personal exemptions as increased by Rep. Act 7167 cannot be regarded as available only in respect of
compensation income received during 1992, as the implementing Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 purport to provide.
Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 would in effect postpone the availability of the increased exemptions to 1 January-15
April 1993, and thus literally defer the effectivity of Rep. Act 7167 to 1 January 1993. Thus, the implementing
regulations collide frontally with Section 3 of Rep. Act 7167 which states that the statute "shall take effect upon its
approval." The objective of the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in postponing through
Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 the legal effectivity of Rep. Act 7167 is, of course, entirely understandable to defer
to 1993 the reduction of governmental tax revenues which irresistibly follows from the application of Rep. Act 7167.
But the law-making authority has spoken and the Court can not refuse to apply the law-maker's words. Whether or not
the government can afford the drop in tax revenues resulting from such increased exemptions was for Congress (not
this Court) to decide.
WHEREFORE, Sections 1, 3 and 5 of Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 which provide that the regulations shall take
effect on compensation income earned or received from 1 January 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE. They should take
effect on compensation income earned or received from 1 January 1991.
Since this decision is promulgated after 15 April 1992, the individual taxpayers entitled to the increased exemptions on
compensation income earned during calendar year 1991 who may have filed their income tax returns on or before 15
April 1992 (later extended to 24 April 1992) without the benefit of such increased exemptions, are entitled to the
corresponding tax refunds and/or credits, and respondents are ordered to effect such refunds and/or credits. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Fortune vs. Metropolitan

G.R. No. 115068 November 28, 1996
FORTUNE MOTORS (PHILS.) INC. petitioner,
vs.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R CV No. 38340 entitled
"Fortune Motors (Phils.) Inc., v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company et al. 1 The appellate court's decision
reversed the decision in Civil Case No. 89-5637 of Branch 150 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
It appears that Fortune Motors (Phils.) Inc. obtained the following loans from the Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company: (1) P20 Million, on March 31, 1982; (2) P8 Million, on April 30, 1983; (3) P2,500,000.00, on June 8,
1983 and; (4) P3 Million, on August 16, 1983.
On January 6, 1984, respondent bank consolidated the loans of P8 Million and P3 Million into one promissory
note, which amounted to P12,650,000.00. This included the interest that had accrued thereon in the amount of
P1,650,000.00.

To secure the obligation in the total amount of P34,150,000.00, petitioner mortgaged certain real estate in
favor of respondent bank.
Due to financial constraints, petitioner failed to pay the loan upon maturity. Consequently on May 25, 1984,
respondent bank initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings and in effect, foreclosed the real estate
mortgage.
The extrajudicial foreclosure was actually conducted by Senior Deputy Sheriff Pablo Y. Sy who had sent
copies of the Notice of Extrajudicial Sale to the opposing parties by registered mail. In accordance with law, he
posted copies of the Notice of Sheriff's Sale at three conspicuous public places in Makati the office of the
Sheriff, the Assessor's Office and the Register of Deeds in Makati. He thereafter executed the Certificates of
Posting on May 20, 1984. The said notice was in fact published on June 2, 9 and 16, 1984 in three issues of
"The New Record." An affidavit of publication, dated June 19, 1984, 2 was executed by Teddy F. Borres,
publisher of the said newspaper.
Subsequently, the mortgaged property was sold at public auction for P47,899,264.91 to the mortgagee bank,
the highest bidder.
Petitioner failed to redeem the mortgaged property within the one-year redemption period and so, the titles
thereto were consolidated in the name of respondent bank by which token the latter was entitled to the
possession of the property mortgaged and, in fact possessed the same.
Petitioner then filed a complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure, which covered TCT Nos.
461087, 432685, 457590, 432684, S-54185, S-54186, S-54187, and S-54188.
On December 27, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment annulling the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage.
On May 14, 1992, an appeal was interposed by the respondent to the Court of Appeals. Acting thereon, the
Court of Appeals reversed the decision rendered by the lower court. Subsequently, the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied on April 26, 1994.
Aggrieved by the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals, petitioner appealed before this Court. On May
30, 1994, however, we issued a Resolution denying said petition. Hence, this motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner raises the following issues before us, to wit:
I
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE PUBLICATION OF THE
NOTICE OF EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE WAS VALID. 3
II
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE NOTICES OF
EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE, AND SALE WERE DULY RECEIVED BY THE PETITIONER. 4
III
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO ADJUDGE THE IRREGULARITIES IN
THE BIDDING, POSTING, PUBLICATION, AND THE SALE OF FORTUNE BUILDING. 5
IV
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RENDERING A JUDGMENT BASED
ON PRESUMPTION. 6
Petitioner contends that the newspaper "Daily Record" 7 where the notice of extrajudicial foreclosure was
published does not qualify as a newspaper of general circulation.
It further contends that the population that can be reached by the "Daily Record" is only .004% as its
circulation in Makati in 1984, was 1000 to 1500 per week. Hence, it concludes that only 1648 out of a

population of 412,069 were probable readers of the "Daily Record," and that this is not the standard
contemplated by law when it refers to a newspaper of general circulation.
In the case of Bonnevie v. Court of Appeals, 8 we had already made a ruling on this point:
The argument that the publication of the notice in the "Luzon Weekly Courier" was not in accordance
with law as said newspaper is not of general circulation must likewise be disregarded. The affidavit of
publication, executed by the publisher, business/advertising manager of the Luzon Weekly Courier,
states that it is "a newspaper of general circulation in . . . Rizal; and that the Notice of Sheriffs sale
was published in said paper on June 30, July 7 and July 14, 1968." This constitutes prima
facieevidence of compliance with the requisite publication. (Sadang v. GSIS, 18 SCRA 491).
To be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough that "it is published for the dissemination of
local news and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that
it is published at regular intervals." (Basa v. Mercado, 61 Phil. 632). The newspaper need not have the
largest circulation so long as it is of general circulation. (Banta v. Pacheco, 74 Phil. 67).
In the case at bench, there was sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law regarding publication of
the notice in a newspaper of general circulation. This is evidenced by the affidavit of publication executed by
the New Record's publisher, Teddy F. Borres, which stated that it is a newspaper edited in Manila and Quezon
City and of general circulation in the cities of Manila, Quezon City et. al., and in the Provinces of Rizal . . . ,
published every Saturday by the Daily Record, Inc. This was affirmed by Pedro Deyto, who was the executive
editor of the said newspaper and who was a witness for petitioner. Deyto testified: a) that the New Record
contains news; b) that it has subscribers from Metro Manila and from all over the Philippines; c) that it is
published once a week or four times a month; and d) that he had been connected with the said paper since
1958, an indication that the said newspaper had been in existence even before that year. 9
Another contention posited by petitioner is that the New Record is published and edited in Quezon City and
not in Makati where the foreclosed property is situated, and that, when New Record's publisher enumerated
the places where said newspaper is being circulated, Makati was not mentioned.
This contention of petitioner is untenable. In 1984, when the publisher's affidavit relied upon by petitioner was
executed, Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Paraaque et. al., were still part of the province of Rizal.
Apparently, this is the reason why in the New Record's affidavit of publication executed by its publisher, the
enumeration of the places where it was being circulated, only the cities of Manila, Quezon, Caloocan, Pasay,
Tagaytay et. al., were named. Furthermore, as aptly ratiocinated by the Court of Appeals:
The application given by the trial court to the provisions of P.D. No. 1079 is, to our mind, too narrow
and restricted and could not have been the intention of the said law. Were the interpretation of the trial
court (sic) to be followed, even the leading dailies in the country like the "Manila Bulletin," the
"Philippine Daily Inquirer," or "The Philippine Star" which all enjoy a wide circulation throughout the
country, cannot publish legal notices that would be honored outside the place of their publication. But
this is not the interpretation given by the courts. For what is important is that a paper should be in
general circulation in the place where the properties to be foreclosed are located in order that
publication may serve the purpose for which it was intended. 10
Petitioner also claims that the New Record is not a daily newspaper because it is published only once a week.
A perusal of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1079 and Act 3135 shows that the said laws do not require that the
newspaper which publishes judicial notices should be a daily newspaper. Under P.D. 1079, for a newspaper to
qualify, it is enough that it be a "newspaper or periodical which is authorized by law to publish and which is
regularly published for at least one (1) year before the date of publication" which requirement was satisfied by
New Record. Nor is there a requirement, as stated in the said law, that the newspaper should have the largest
circulation in the place of publication.
Petitioner claims that, when its representative went to a newspaper stand to look for a copy of the new
Record, he could not find any. This allegation can not be made a basis to conclude that the newspaper "New
Record" is not of general circulation. By its own admission, petitioner's representative was looking for a
newspaper named "Daily Record." Naturally, he could not find a newspaper by that name as the newspaper's
name is "New Record" and not "Daily Record." Although it is the Daily Record Inc. which publishes the New
Record, it does not mean that the name of the newspaper is Daily Record.
Petitioner contends that, since it was the Executive Judge who caused the publication of the notice of the sale
and not the Sheriff, the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage should be deemed annulled.

Petitioner's contention in this regard is bereft of merit, because Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1079 clearly provides that:
The executive judge of the court of first instance shall designate a regular working day and a definite
time each week during which the said judicial notices or advertisements shall be distributed
personally by him 11 for publication to qualified newspapers or periodicals . . . , which distribution shall
be done by raffle.
The said provision of the law is clear as to who should personally distribute the judicial notices or
advertisements to qualified newspapers for publication. There was substantial compliance with the
requirements when it was the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati who caused the
publication of the said notice by the newspaper selected by means of raffle.
With regard to the second assigned error wherein petitioner claims that it did not personally receive the
notices of extrajudicial foreclosure and sale supposedly sent to it by Metrobank, we find the same
unmeritorious.
Settled is the rule that personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not
necessary. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 governing extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages, as
amended by Act No. 4118, requires only the posting of the notice of sale in three public places and the
publication of that notice in a newspaper of general circulation. It is pristine clear from the above provision that
the lack of personal notice to the mortgagor, herein petitioner, is not a ground to set aside the foreclosure
sale. 12
Petitioner's expostulation that it did not receive the mailed notice to it of the sale of the mortgaged property
should be brushed aside. The fact that respondent was able to receive the registry return card from the mail in
regular course shows that the postal item represented by the return card had been received by the addressee.
Otherwise, as correctly contended by respondent, the mailed item should have been stamped "Returned to
Sender," still sealed with all the postal markings, and the return card still attached to it.
As to the contention that the signature appearing on the registry return card receipt appears to be only a dot
and that the photostat copy does not contain a signature at all we find, after a close scrutiny of the registry
return card, that there are strokes before and after the dot. These strokes appear to be a signature which
signifies: a) that the registry claim card was received at the given address; b) that the addressee had
authorized a person to present the claim card at the post office and receive the registered mail matter; and c)
that the authorized person signed the return card to acknowledge his receipt of the mail matter. Even the trial
court in its decision ruled that:
. . . the Court finds no cogent reason to overcome the presumption that Sheriff Pablo Sy performed
his task regularly and in accordance with the rules. A closer look at the assailed xerox copy of the
registry receipt and the original form which said xerox was admittedly copied would indeed show that
the xerox is not a faithful reproduction of the original since it does not bear the complete signature of
the addressee as appearing on the original. It does not, however, follow that the xerox is a forgery.
The same bears slight traces of the signature appearing on the original but, there is no indication that
the one was altered to conform to the other. Rather, there must have been only a misprint of the xerox
but not amounting to any attempt to falsify the same. 13
Petitioner also claims that it had transferred to a different location but the notice was sent to its old address.
Petitioner failed to notify respondent of its supposed change of address. Needless to say, it can be surmised
that respondent had sent the notice to petitioner's official address.
Anent its third assigned error, petitioner assails the posting of the notices of sale by the Sheriff in the Office of
the Sheriff, Office of the Assessor and the Register of Deeds as these are not the conspicuous public places
required by law. Furthermore, it also questions the non-posting of the notice of sale on the property itself
which was to be sold.
Apparently, this assigned error of petitioner is tantamount to a last ditch effort to extricate itself from the
quagmire it is in. Act 3135 does not require posting of the notice of sale on the mortgaged property. Section 3
of the said law merely requires that the notice of the sale be posted for not less than twenty days in at least
three public places of the municipality or city where the property is situated. The aforementioned places, to
wit: the Sheriff's Office, the Assessor's Office and the Register of Deeds are certainly the public places
contemplated by law, as these are places where people interested in purchasing real estate congregate.
With regard to the fourth assigned error of petitioner, we do not subscribe to the latter's view that the decision
of the Court of Appeals was mainly based on the presumption of the regularity of the performance of official

function of the officers involved. A perusal of the records indubitably shows that the requirement of Act No.
3135 on the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage had been duly complied with by Senior Deputy
Sheriff Sy.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision rendered in CA-G.R CV No. 38340 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.