Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Eufemio
43 SCRA 177
FACTS:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on
August 1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after
nine days. They had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any
children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during
their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese
woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of
legal separation, which among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should
be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on
the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the
parties adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be
completed, respondent already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner
died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her
death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the
grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article
102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal
separation. Petitioners counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her
father, Macario Lapuz.
ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal
separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.
HELD:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property
rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source
being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so
that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If
death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming,
death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could
be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically
dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result
of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in
a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
deceased spouse duly issued and authenticated by the Office of the Civil Registrar
General: Provided, That in case of a divorce decree, annulment or declaration of
marriage as void, the woman applicant may revert the use of her maiden name
Provided, further, That such divorce is recognized under the existing laws of the
Philippines; xxx
3. Section I, Article 12 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8239
The passport can be amended only in the following cases:
(a)
Amendment of womans name due to marriage
(b)
Amendment of womans name due to death of spouse, annulment of marriage or
divorce initiated by a foreign spouse; or
(c)
Change of surname of a child who is legitimated by virtue of a subsequent marriage of
his parents
4.
The DFA allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the first time to use
her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt to her husbands name
5.
In case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husbands
surname or continuously use her maiden name.
6.
Once a the woman adopted her husbands surname in her passport, she may not revert
to the use of her maiden name, except in cases enumerated inspection 5(d) of RA 8239.
APPLICATION1.
The petitioner used her maiden first name and her husbands last name, thus, Maria
Virginia V. Remo. This is in accord to Article 370(2), Title XIII of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
2.
it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her husbands name. Use of maiden
name is allowed in passport application only if the married name has not been used in
previous application. The Implementing Rules and Regulations for Philippines Passport
Act of 1996 (RA 8239) clearly defines the conditions when a woman may revert to her
maiden name, that is, of only incases annulment of marriage, divorce and death of the
husband. Ms. Remo case does not meet any of these conditions. DFA Asst. Sec.
Belen F. Anota
CONCLUSION
No.
Ms. Remo cannot revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport,
despite the subsistence of her marriage because she used her husbands last name
when she applied for her passport for the first time. According to the rule, upon renewal
of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husbands surname or
continuously use her maiden name. And once a the woman adopted her husbands
surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in
cases enumerated in section 5(d) of RA 8239.
No.
There is no conflict between Article 370 of the Civil Code and Section5(d) of RA
8239.Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA8239
which is a special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the
provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code which is a general law on the use of surnames.
A basic tenet in statutory construction is that special law prevails over a general law.
The Court
DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the May 27, 2005 Decision and August 2, 2005
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.87710.
An agreement of the tenor entered into between the parties herein, operates, within the
plain language and manifest policy of the law, to bar the offended party from
prosecuting the offense Article 344 of the RPC provides: The offended party cannot
institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both
alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offender.
mother for its support 150 pesos, and on the second 200 pesos; that he stated in these
interviews to the mother, in the presence of other witnesses, that he was the father of
the child, and that he would always take care of it; that afterwards he sent money from
Manila to the mother in Molo, for the purpose of supporting and maintaining the child.
The court rejected this evidence, to which the plaintiff excepted.
The plaintiff also offered in evidence twelve letters proved to have been written by Don
Isidro to the mother of the plaintiff. These were all rejected, to the rejection of which the
plaintiff excepted. Seven of them were In the others no mention whatever was made of
the child. In the others no mention whatever was made of the child They indicate that
certain relations existed between the mother of the plaintiff and Don Isidro, but nothing
in regard to the plaintiff.
An examination of the case of Buenaventura vs. Urbano, above cited, will show that this
evidence falls far short of proving the continuous possession of the status of a natural
child. As was said in that case, it is not sufficient to prove that the defendant, Don Isidro,
was the father of the child, and that is practically all that the evidence offered tended to
show.
In the case of Llorente vs. Rodriguez2 (2 Off. Gaz., 535), cited by the appellant in his
brief, the court was considering the case of a child born before the Civil Code went into
effect, and of the obligation of the mother to recognize it. It therefore has no bearing
upon this case.
To support the complaint so far as it is based upon the third case mentioned in article
135, viz, the cases provided for by the Penal Code, the plaintiff offered to prove that in
the year 1893 Don Isidro de la Rama visited the house of the mother at Molo, abducted
her, and carried her away by force. The court rejected this evidence, to which ruling the
plaintiff excepted.
Article 449 of the Penal Code provides as follows:
Los reos de violacion, estupro o rapto seran tambien condenados por via de
indemnizacion:
1. A dotar a la ofendida, si fuere soltera o viuda.
2. A reconocer la prole, si la calidad de su origen no lo impidiere.
3. En todo caso a mantener la prole.
This case presents the question whether the liability declared in that article of the Penal
Code must be enforced exclusively in a criminal proceeding or whether it can be
enforced in a civil proceeding, without resort to the criminal courts. No criminal
prosecution was ever commenced against Don Isidro de la Rama during his lifetime for
this alleged crime of abduction. It is evident that if this action can be maintained against
the heirs of Isidro de la Rama, it could have been maintained against him in his lifetime
without first proceeding against him criminally. The appellant has cited no authority to
show that such action can be maintained, and we do not think any such exists. Manresa
says in his commentaries on article 135 of the Civil Code that a civil action can not be
maintained in such cases unless a final judgment in a criminal proceeding for abduction
is attached to the complaint. (1 Commentaries on the Civil Code, p. 508.)
Alcubilla says:
O se limita a hacer eficaces las senticias en que se impone comopena el
reconocimiento de la prole, conforme al articulo 464 del Codigo Penal.
(Diccionario de la Administracion Espaola, vol. 6 p. 14.)
Groizard says:
El logico enlace de la ley criminal y de la ley civil en esta delicada materia, se
demuestra por el articulo 135 del novisimo Codigo Civil. En el se fijan los casos
en que el padre esta obligado a reconocer al hijo natural y despues se aade:
"En los casos de violacion, estupro o rapto, se estara a lo dispuesto en el Codigo
Penal, en cuanto al reconocimiento de la prole." Lo cual equivale a decir que
tambien el padre estara obligando a reconocer la prole cuando deba hacerlo,
con areglo a lo que la ley penal tiene establecido. Pero como sobre la forma y
medios de realizar ese reconocimiento, nada el Codigo Penal nos ha dicho, lo
logico es que, una vez declarada por sentencia la obligacion, esta se consigne,
en cuanto sea posible, en una de las formas legales, establecidas por el articulo
131 del Codigo Civil. (Codigo Penal, vol. 5, p. 259.)
Scaevola says, speaking of the exception in regard to the investigation of paternity,
made in cases of abduction:
Tal exception es la consecuencia de un crimen, y de un crimen probado.
(Comentarios al Codigo Civil, vol. 3, p. 184.)
As far as we have been able to ascertain, this is the first time that such a case as this
was ever presented, and therefore it is not surprising that no judgments can be found
relating to the question, and no positive statements by the commentators, but it is
apparent that all of the commentators have taken it for granted that this liability was a
consequence of a criminal prosecution, and that could not be enforced except by means
of a criminal prosecution, or if attempted to be enforced in a civil suit there must
necessarily exist a final judgment, rendered in a criminal case. We hold that this action
can not be maintained on the ground that the crime of abduction was committed by Don
Isidro de la Rama, he not having been prosecuted criminally for that act during his
lifetime.
The contention of the appellant is that article 449 of the Penal Code imposes a civil
responsibility upon the criminal, and by the terms of article 133 of the same code, that
civil responsibility survives the death of the criminal. It is to be borne in mind, however,
that the liability declared by article 449 can not exist independently of the crime, and we
have just held in the cases of Infante vs. Figueras3 (No. 1884) andBuenaventura vs.
Urbano et al. (No. 2205) that the fact of paternity, in cases where no crime is committed,
imposes no liability upon the father. This is not true in those cases of civil responsibility
mentioned in the other articles cited from the Penal Code.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant, and after the expiration of twenty days judgment should be entered in
accordance herewith, and the case remanded to the court below for execution of said
judgment. So ordered.
Matubis v. Praxedes
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent agreed to separate. Petitioner filed a complaint for legal
separation and change of surname. In January 1955, respondent begun cohabitating
with another. Petitioner instituted the complaint in April 1956.
Issues:
Held:
An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the
date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from
after the date when cause occurred.
The condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed. The law (Art.
100 Civil Code), specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery
or concubinage. Having condoned and/or consented in writing, the plaintiff is now
undeserving of the court's sympathy (People vs. Scheneckenburger, 73 Phil., 413).
Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the
petition.
that there had been consent and connivance, and because Brown's action had prescribed under
Article 102 of the same Code:
ART. 102 An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and
after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years
from and after date when such cause occurred.
since the evidence showed that the learned of his wife's infidelity in 1945 but only filed action in
1945.
Brown appeared to this Court, assigning the following errors:
The court erred in permitting the Assistant Fiscal Rafel Jose of Manila to act as counsel
for the defendant, who defaulted.
The court erred in declaring that there was condonation of or consent to the adultery.
The court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.
Appellant Brown argues that in cross-examining him with regard to his marital relation with Lilia
Deito, who was not his wife, the Assistant Fiscal acted as consel for the defaulting wife, "when
the power of the prosecuting officer is limited to finding out whether or not there is collusion, and
if there is no collusion, which is the fact in the case at bar, to intervene for the state which is not
the fact in the instant case, the truth of the matter being that he intervened for Juanita Yambao,
the defendant-appellee, who is private citizen and who is far from being the state.".
The argument is untenable. Collusion in matrimonial cases being "the act of married persons in
procuring a divorce by mutual consent, whether by preconcerted commission by one of a
matrimonial offense, or by failure, in pursuance of agreement to defend divorce proceedings"
(Cyclopedia Law Dictionary; Nelson, Divorce and Separation, Section 500), it was legitimate for
the Fiscal to bring to light any circumstances that could give rise to the inference that the wife's
default was calculated, or agreed upon, to enable appellant to obtain the decree of legal
separation that he sought without regard to the legal merits of his case. One such circumstance
is obviously the fact of Brown's cohabitation with a woman other than his wife, since it bars him
from claiming legal separation by express provision of Article 100 of the new Civil Code.
Wherefore, such evidence of such misconduct, were proper subject of inquiry as they may
justifiably be considered circumstantial evidence of collusion between the spouses.
The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of the state attorneys
in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under
Article 88), is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social
institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption cannot be
made depend upon the parties themselves (Civil Code, Article 52; Adong vs, Cheong Gee, 43
Phil, 43; Ramirez vs. Gmur 42 Phil. 855; Goitia vs. Campos, 35 Phil. 252). It is consonant with
this policy that the injury by the Fiscal should be allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that
may indicate whether the proceedings for separation or annulment are fully justified or not.
The court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's action was already barred,
because Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned
of his wife's adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of
the new Civil Code, action for legal separation can not be filed except within one (1) year from
and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the
date when such cause occurred. Appellant's brief does not even contest the correctness of such
findings and conclusion.
It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the courts can
take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of
marriage, involve public interest and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be issued if
any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.
Hence, there being at least two well established statutory grounds for denying the remedy
sought (commission of similar offense by petitioner and prescription of the action), it becomes
unnecesary to delve further into the case and ascertain if Brown's inaction for ten years also
evidences condonation or connivance on his part. Even if it did not, his situation would not be
improved. It is thus needless to discuss the second assignment of error.
The third assignment of error being a mere consequence of the others must necessarily fail with
them.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
Bengzon, Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 06928-SP entitled "Manuel J. C. Reyes, petitioner, versus, The Hon. Leonor InesLuciano as Judge of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court (Quezon City) and Celia
Ilustre-Reyes, Respondents", dismissing the petition to annul the order of the
respondent Judge directing the petitioner to give support pendente lite to his wife, Celia
Ilustre-Reyes, private respondent herein, in the amount of P40,000.00 a month. 1
The private petitioner, Celia Ilustre-Reyes, filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Quezon City a complaint dated June 3, 1976 against her husband, Manuel J.
C. Reyes, for legal separation on the ground that the defendant had attempted to kill
plaintiff. The pertinent allegations of the complaint are:
6.8 On March 10, 1976, defendant went to V. Ilustre and attacked plaintiff.
He pummeled her with fist blows that floored her, then held her head and,
with intent to kill, bumped it several times against the cement floor. When
she ran upstairs to her father for protection, he pushed her at the stairway
of 13 flights and she fell sliding to the ground floor. Determined to finish
her off, he again gave her a strong swing at her abdomen which floored
her half unconscious. Were it not for plaintiff's father, he would have
succeeded killing her;
6.9. On May 26, 1976, although on May 11 previous she ceased holding
office with defendant at Bel-Air Apartments elsewhere adverted to, she
went thereto to get her overnight bag. Upon seeing her, defendant yelled
at her to get out of the office. When he did not mind him, he suddenly
doused her with a glass of grape juice, kicked her several times that
landed at her back and nape, and was going to hit her with a steel tray as
her driver, Ricardo Mancera, came due to her screams for help. For fear of
further injury and for life, she rushed to Precinct 5 at united Nations
Avenue, Manila Metropolitan Police, for assistance and protection; 2
The plaintiff asked for support pendente lite for her and her three children. The
defendant, petitioner herein, opposed the application for support pendente lite on the
ground that his wife had committed adultery with her physician.
The application for support pendente lite was set for hearing and submitted for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings and the documents attached thereto by the
parties.
The respondent Judge issued an order dated March 15, 1977 granting plaintiff's prayer
for alimony pendente litein the amount of P5,000.00 a month commencing from June
1976. 3
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating that his wife is not entitled to
support during the pendency of the case, and, alleging that even if she entitled, the
amount awarded was excessive. The respondent Judge reduced the amount from
P5,000.00 to P44,00.00 a month in an order dated June 17, 1977. 4
Manuel J. C. Reyes filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals dated July 25,
1977 asking that the order granting support pendente lite to private respondent. Celia
Ilustre-Reyes, be annulled on the ground that the respondent Judge, Leonor InesLuciano, had committed a grave abuse of discretion or that said order be modified
inasmuch as the amount awarded as support pendente lite is excessive.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because:
Considering the plight of the wife during the pendency of the case for legal
separation and that the husband appears to be financially capable of
giving the support, We believe that the petitioner has not presented a clear
case of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent in issuing
The complaint or legal separation contains allegations showing that on at least two
occasions the defendant, petitioner herein, had made attempts to kill the private
respondent. Thus it is alleged that on March 10, 1976, the defendant attacked plaintiff,
pummeled her with fist blows that floored her, held her head and with intent to kill,
bumped it several times against the cement floor and when she ran upstairs to her
father for protection, the petitioner pushed her at the stairway of thirteen (13) flights and
she fell sliding to the ground floor and defendant gave her a strong swing at her
abdomen which floored her half unconscious and were it not for plaintiff's father,
defendant would have succeeded in killing her. 10 It is also alleged that on May 26,
1976, the defendant doused Celia Ilustre-Reyes with a glass of grape juice, kicked her
several times at her back and nape and was going to hit her with a steel tray if it were
not for her driver who came due to her creams for help." 11
In fixing the amount of monthly support pendente lite of P4,000,00, the respondent
judge did not act capriciously and whimsically. When she originally fixed the amount of
P5,000.00 a month, the respondent Judge considered the following:
On record for plaintiff's cause are the following: that she and defendant
were married on January 18, 1958; that she is presently unemployed and
without funds, thus, she is being supported by her father with whom she
resides: that defendant had been maltreating her and Cried to kill her; that
all their conjugal properties are in the possession of defendant who is also
president, Manager and Treasurer of their corporation namely:
1. Standard Mineral Products, which was incorporated on February 9,
1959: presently with paid-in capital of P295,670.00; assets and liabilities of
P757,108.52; Retained Earnings of P85,654.61: and majority stockholder
is defendant;
2. Development and Technology Consultant Inc. incorporated on July 12,
1971, with paid-in capital of P200,000.00; Assets and liabilities of
P831,669.34; defendant owns 99% of the stocks; and last Retained
Earnings is P98,879.84.
3. The Contra-Prop Marine Philippines, Inc. which was incorporated on
October 3, 1975, with paid-in capital of P100,000 defendant owns 99% of
the stocks.
To secure some of the of said Agreement of Counter-Guaranty Mortgage
with Real Estate, and Real Estate Mortgage were undertaken by plaintiff
of their properties outside of other accommodations; and that she needs of
P5,000.00 a month for her support in accordance with their station in
life. 12
The amount of support pendente lite was reduced to P4,000.00 inasmuch as the
children are in the custody of the petitioner and are being supported by him.
It is thus seen that the respondent judge acted with due deliberation before fixing the
amount of support pendente lite in the amount of P4,000.00 a month.
DIZON, J.:
Appeal taken by Elena Contreras from a decision of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 00138 dismissing her complaint upon the
ground that the same was filed more than one year from and after the date on which
she had become cognizant of the cause for legal separation.
The following, facts found by the trial court are not in dispute:
Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952 in the Catholic
Church of Quiapo, Manila. Out of their Marriage, three children were born:
Eusebio C. Macaraig, on January 11, 1953; Victoria C. Macaraig, on
March 26, 1956; and Alexander C. Macaraig, on August 4, 1958. All the
children are in the care of plaintiff wife.
Sometime in 1958, the couple acquired rights, as lessee and purchaser
under a conditional sale agreement, to own a house and lot, known as Lot
4, Block 8 of the Philamlife Homes in Quezon City which they transferred
in favor of their three children on October 29, 1958 (Exh. F). Installment
payments are being made by plaintiff's father. The spouses own no other
conjugal property.
Immediately before the election of 1961, defendant was employed as
manager of the printing establishment owned by plaintiff's father known as
the MICO Offset. In that capacity, defendant met and came to know Lily
Ann Alcala, who place orders with MICO Offset for propaganda materials
for Mr. Sergio Osmea, who was then a Vice-Presidential candidate. After
the elections of 1961, defendant resigned from MICO Offset to be a
special agent at Malacaang. He began to be away so often and to come
home very late. Upon plaintiff's inquiry, defendant explained that he was
out on a series of confidential missions.
In September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car, told plaintiff
that defendant was living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala. When
defendant, the following October, returned to the conjugal home, plaintiff
refrained from verifying Lubos' report from defendant in her desire not to
anger nor drive defendant away. Although plaintiff, in April 1963, also
received rumors that defendant was seen with a woman who was on the
family way on Dasmarias St., she was so happy that defendant again
return to the family home in May, 1963 that she once more desisted from
discussing the matter with him because she did not wish to precipitate a
quarrel and drive him away. All this while, defendant, if and whenever he
returned to the family fold, would only stay for two or three days but would
be gone for a period of about a month.
After plaintiff received reports that Lily Ann Alcala had given birth to a
baby, she sent Mrs. Felicisima Antioquia, her father's employee, to verify
the reports. The latter was driven by Lubos to the house in Singalong and
between 5:00 and 6:00 o'clock that afternoon, she saw defendant was
carrying a baby in his arms. Mrs. Antioquia then went to the parish priest
of Singalong where she inquired about the child of Cesar Macaraig and
Lily Ann Alcala and she was given a copy of the baptismal certificate of
Maria Vivien Mageline Macaraig (Exh. G) which she gave to plaintiff
sometime in October, 1963.
Plaintiff then entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with
defendant and to convince him to return to his family. Mr. Macaraig, after
talking to his son and seeking him with the latter's child told plaintiff that he
could not do anything.
In November, 1963, plaintiff requested the cooperation of defendant's
older sister, Mrs. Enriqueta Majul, and the latter obliged and arranged a
meeting at her home in Buendia between plaintiff and Lily Ann Alcala. Lily
Ann said she was willing to give up defendant as she had no desire to be
accused criminally but it was defendant who refused to break relationship
with her.
In the early part of December, 1963, plaintiff, accompanied by her two
children, Victoria and Alexander, and by Mrs. Leticia Lagronio went to talk
to defendant at his place of work on Espaa Extension in front of Quezon
Institute. They repaired to Victoria Peak, a nearby restaurant, where
plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to return to
the conjugal home, assuring him that she was willing to forgive him.
Defendant informed plaintiff that he could no longer leave Lily Ann and
refused to return to his legitimate family.
On December 14, 1963, plaintiff instituted the present action for legal
separation. When defendant did not interpose any answer after he was
served summons, the case was referred to the Office of the City Fiscal of
Manila pursuant to the provisions of Article 101 of the Civil Code. After a
report was received from Asst. Fiscal Primitivo M. Pearanda that he
believed that there was no collusion present, plaintiff was allowed to
present her evidence. Defendant has never appeared in this case.
The reasons relied upon by the trial court in dismissing the complaint are set forth in the
appealed decision as follows:
Under the facts established by plaintiff's evidence, although the infidelity of
the husband is apparent, yet the case will have to be dismissed. Article
102 provides that, an action for legal separation cannot be instituted
except within one year after plaintiff "became cognizant of the cause." In
the absence of a clear-cut decision of the Supreme Court as to the exact
import of the term "cognizant," the practical application of said Article can
be attended with difficulty. For one thing; that rules might be different in
case of adultery, which is an act, and for concubinage, which may be a
situation or a relationship.
In respect of concubinage, the word 'cognizant' may not connote the date
when proof thereof sufficient to establish the cause before a court of law is
possessed. Otherwise, the one year period would be meaningless for
practical purposes because all a wife would have to do would be to claim
that the necessary proof was secured only within one year before the filing
of the complaint. On the other hand, it should be hard to concede that
what the law envisages (and, in a way, encourages) is the filing of a
complaint within one year after the innocent spouses has received
information of the other's infidelity, howsoever baseless the report might
be.
The Court believes that the correct rule lies between the two extremes. At
the time a wife acquired information, which can be reasonably relied upon
as true, that her husband is living in concubinage with another woman, the
one-year period should be deemed to have started even if the wife shall
not then be in possession of proof sufficient to establish the concubinage
before a court of law. The one-year period may be viewed, inter alia, as an
alloted time within which proof should be secured. It is in the light of this
rule that the Court will determine whether or not plaintiff's action for legal
separation has prescribed.
After her husband resigned from MICO Offset to be a special agent in
Malacaan, subsequent to the elections of 1961, he would seldom come
home. He allayed plaintiff's suspicions with the explanation that he had
been away on 'confidential missions.' However, in September, 1962,
Avelino Lubos, plaintiff's driver, reported to plaintiff that defendant was
living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala. As a matter of fact, it was also
Lubos who brought Mrs. F. Antioquia (when plaintiff had asked to verify the
reports) to the house in Singalong where she saw defendant, Lily Ann and
the baby.
The requirement of the law that a complaint for legal separation be filed
within one year after the date plaintiff become cognizant of the cause is
not of prescriptive nature, but is of the essence of the cause of action. It is
consonant with the philosophy that marriage is an inviolable social
institution so that the law provides strict requirements before it will allow a
disruption of its status.
In the instant action, the Court has to find that plaintiff became cognizant
of defendant's infidelity in September, 1962. Plaintiff made successive
attempts to induce the husband to amend his erring ways but failed. Her
desire to bring defendant back to the connubial fold and to preserve family
solidarity deterred her from taking timely legal action.
The only question to be resolved is whether the period of one year provided for in Article
102 of the Civil Code should be counted, as far as the instant case is concerned from
September 1962 or from December 1963. Computing the period of one year from the
former date, it is clear that plaintiff's complaint filed on December 14, 1963 came a little
too late, while the reverse would be true if said period is deemed to have commenced
only in the month of December 1963.
The period of "five years from after the date when such cause occurred" is not here
involved.
Upon the undisputed facts it seems clear that, in the month of September 1962,
whatever knowledge appellant had acquired regarding the infidelity of her husband, that
is, of the fact that he was then living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala, was only through
the information given to her by Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car. Much as such
hearsay information had pained and anguished her, she apparently thought it best
and no reasonable person may justifiably blame her for it not to go deeper into the
matter herself because in all probability even up to that time, notwithstanding her
husband's obvious neglect of his entire family, appellant still cherished the hope
however forlorn of his coming back home to them. Indeed, when her husband
returned to the conjugal home the following October, she purposely refrained from
bringing up the matter of his marital infidelity "in her desire not to anger nor drive
defendant away" quoting the very words of the trial court. True, appellant likewise
heard in April 1963 rumors that her husband was seen with a woman on the family way
on Dasmarias Street, but failed again to either bring up the matter with her husband or
make attempts to verify the truth of said rumors, but this was due, as the lower court
itself believed, because "she was so happy that defendant again returned to the family
home in May 1963 that she once more desisted from discussing the matter with him
because she did not wish to precipitate a quarrel and drive him away." As a matter of
fact, notwithstanding all these painful informations which would not have been legally
sufficient to make a case for legal separation appellant still made brave if desperate
attempts to persuade her husband to come back home. In the words of the lower court,
she "entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with defendant and to
convince him to return to his family" and also "requested the cooperation of defendant's
older sister, Mrs. Enriqueta Majul" for the same purpose, but all that was of no avail. Her
husband remained obdurate.
After a careful review of the record, We are persuaded that, in the eyes of the law, the
only time when appellant really became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in
the early part of December 1963 when, quoting from the appealed decision, the
following happened
In the early part of December, 1963, plaintiff, accompanied by her two
children, Victoria and Alexander, and by Mrs. Leticia Lagronio went to talk
to defendant at his place of work on Espaa Extension in front of Quezon
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINE
vs.
URSULA SENSANO and MARCELO RAMOS,
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
BUTTE, J.:
The appellants were sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte for the
crime of adultery to three years, six months and twenty-one days of prision
correccional and appealed to this court, assigning the following error: "The court below
erred in not holding that the offended husband contested to the adultery committed by
his wife Ursula Sensano in that he refused to live with her after she extinguished her
previous sentence for the same offense, and by telling her then that she could go where
she wanted to and do what she pleased, and by his silence for seven years
notwithstanding that he was informed of said adultery."
LACSON VS LACSON
Facts:
- Feb 14, 1953 when they got married
- Jan 9, 1963 when Carmen (respondent) left home in Bacolod to go to Manila
- March 12, 1963 Carmen filed a complaint for custody of children as well as support
in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila
o Before it pushed through though they reached a settlement where the two eldest kids
would go to petitioner Alfonso and the youngest would stay with Carmen
o This was affirmed by the CFI
- May 7, 1963 respondent filed a motion for the custody of all children be given to her
in JDRC since she said she only entered into agreement to gain custody of her younger
children and thus should be given custody of the older ones as well who are all below 7
years old.
- CA: ruled that compromise agreement as relating to custody of children should be
declared null and void and as such the execution of said judgment is void too.
file a case of adultery against private respondent and the latter's paramour.
Consequently, both accused were convicted of the crime charged.
Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages
imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner. During the pre-trial of the
said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for the repudiation of the AGREEMENT. This
motion was denied. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the
Court of Appeals on the ground that the conviction of the respondent of the crime of
adultery disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal property. The Petition was
dismissed.
ISSUE: Is the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery a disqualification for
her to share in the conjugal property?
HELD: No. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction.
Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the consequences of civil interdiction:
Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of
his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person
or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of
the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should be read with Article 43 of the same
Code. The latter provides:
Art. 43. Prision correccional Its accessory penalties. The penalty of prision
correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to
follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right
of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The
offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to
the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the
pardon.
It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime of adultery does not
carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to
manage her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos.
Save for one child (already of legal age), the three minor children remains in the
custody of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.
The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between them subject
to the respective legitimes of their children; however, Brigidos share of the net profits
earned by the conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in
accordance to par. 9 of Article 129 of the FC.
A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the trial
court. By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the writ was
partially executed.
After more than 9 months later, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC to
define Nets Profits Earned. In answer, the court held that the phrase denotes the
remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of
each of the spouses and debts.
Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision stating that
NET PROFIT EARNED shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the
FC. However, it later reverted to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governs the couples
property relations.
HELD: Yes. Brigido and Rita tied the knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of
exchange of martial vows, the operative law was the NCC and since they did not agree
on a marriage settlement, the property relations between them is the system of relative
community or the conjugal partnership of gains. Under this property relation, the
husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the
income from their work and industry. The husband and wife also own in common all the
property of the conjugal partnership of gains.
.
Valdes vs. RTC
260 SCRA 221
FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children.
Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on
the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed
under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which
they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for
the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on
the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the
property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.
incapacity under article 36. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital
obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the
family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that
depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful,
and would at times become violent and hurt him. The trial court declared their marriage
void ab initio.
The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be
issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. It later altered it
to A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the
Family
Code
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code
HELD:
The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in
a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the
period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the
Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of
the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only
to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under
Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not
apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code,
which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the
parties.
Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are governed by absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate,
partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued.
That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of
the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of
properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on coownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void
marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article
148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the
spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on coownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, [p]artition may be made by agreement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x. It is not necessary to liquidate the
properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Carino vs carino
Facts:
In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan Nicdao Cario. He had 2 children with
her. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Cario. In
1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the
care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the
spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of
P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an
action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the
P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the
subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between
Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as
certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the
previous marriage on SPO4s funeral.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim
presumptive legitimes.
HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a
valid marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void
for the same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the
marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of
a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However,
for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage
an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an
absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for
their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries
earned by each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is
entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise
void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there were no
impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their
situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that
everything they earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally
contributed by each party this includes salaries and wages earned by each party
notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have contributed at all.
HELD: SC denied. The action originally filed was annulment of marriage based on
Article 45, paragraph 5 of the Family Code. Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to
lack of power to copulate.[16] Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent
inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual intercourse. No
evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that respondent was in any way
physically incapable to consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even
admitted during her cross-examination that she and respondent had sexual intercourse
after their wedding and before respondent left for abroad. Petitioner was actually
seeking for declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent based on the latters
psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code. he Court declared that psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It
should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 26,
1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with
modification the Decision dated January 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 (a) dismissing
petitioners petition for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent and (b)
ordering him to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs. Also
assailed is the March 5, 1998 Resolution denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
FACTS:
In April 1988, Orlando Villanueva married Lilia Canalita- Villanueva before a trial court
judge in Puerto Princesa. In November 1992, Orlando filed before the trial court a
petition for annulment of his marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress
forced him to marry Lilia who was then pregnant. Orlando anchored his prayer for the
annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not freely consent to be married to
Lilia. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and wellgrounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the
harassing phone calls from Lilia and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three
men at the premises of the University of the East after his classes thereat, and the
threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New Peoples
Army whom appellant claimed to have been hired by Lilia and who accompanied him in
going to her home province of Palawan to marry her. On the other hand Lilia denied
Orlandos allegations and she said that Orlando freely cohabited with her after the
marriage and she showed 14 letters that shows Orlandos affection and care towards
her.
ISSUE:
(a) Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent
under Article 45 of the Family Code; and
ANSWER:
No. The court ruled that vitiation of consent is not attendant in this case.Therefore, the
petition for annulment, which is anchored to his allegation that he did not freely give his
consent, should be dismissed.
REASONING:
The SC ruled that Orlandos allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its
face, it is obvious that Orlando is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to
have the pending appealed bigamy case [filed against him by Lilia] to be dismissed.
On the merits of the case, Orlandos allegation of fear was not concretely established.
The Court is not convinced that appellants apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage.
It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as
a security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to
assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the
proper way to keep himself out of harms way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats
were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the
assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities
of those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his
predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as
well. His allegation that he never had an erection during their sexual intercourse is
incredible and is an outright lie. His counsel also conceded before the lower court that
his client had a sexual relationship with Lilia.
HOLDING:
Thus, the petition for annulment was granted, but the award of moral and exemplary
damages is deleted for lack of basis.
TITLE: ONE ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, petitioner vs. LUCITA
ONG, respondentDATE: October 2006PONENTE: J. Austria-Martinez
FACTS:
William Ong and Lucita Ong were married on July 13, 1975. Union was blessed with3
children. On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a complaint for legal separation under Art 55
(1) of FC on grounds of physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive
conduct of petitioner. RTC granted prayer for legal separation. CA upheld RTCs
decision when herein petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR). The climax of
the couples drama was on December 14, 1995 when the respondent asked petitioner
to bring Kingston, their son, back from Bacolod which turned into a violent quarrel with
the petitioner hitting the respondent on the head, left cheek, eye, stomach, arms, and
ultimately pointing a gun at respondents head askingher to leave the conjugal house.
ISSUES: Whether or not CA erred in upholding the RTCs decision granting legal
separationto Lucita when she herself has given ground for legal separation when
abandoned her family.
HELD: No.RATIO: It is true that a decree of legal separation should not be granted
when both parties have given ground for legal separation (Art 56 (4) FC). However, the
abandonment referred to inthe Familu Code is abandonment without justifiable cause
for more than one year. Also, it was established that Lucita left William due to his
abusive conduct which does not constitute the abandonment contemplated in the said
provision
.DISPOSITION: Petition denied for lack of merit.
Mario Siochi vs. Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon, Elvira Gozon Inter-Deimensional
Realty, Inc; GR No. 169900; March 18, 2010
FACTS: Alfredo and Elvira are married. Winifred is their daughter. The property involved
in this case is a 30,000 sq. m. lot in Malabon which is registered in the name of Alfredo.
The property regime of the couple is conjugal partnership of gains.
Elvira filed for legal separation. B filed a notice of lis pendens over the title of the lot in
Malabon.
While the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo entered into an agreement
with Mario who paid P5 million in earnest money and took possession of the property.
Title
still
with
notice
of
lis
pendens.
Cavite RTC granted legal separation. CPG was dissolved andliquidated. Alfredo,
the guilty spouse, did not receive his share in the net profits, which instead went to their
daughter, Winifred. Cavite RTC ruled land in Malabon as conjugal property.
Alfred executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favour of Winifred. Malabon
RTC issued new TCT in the name of Winifred without annotating the
agreement between Alfredo and Mario Siochi, nor the notice of lis pendens filed by
Elvira, the wife. Then, through an SPA, Winifred gave authority to her father, Alfred, to
sell the lot. Alfred sold it to Inter-Dimensional Realty for P18 million. A TCT was issued
to
Inter-Dimensional
Realty.
Mario filed a case with Malabon RTC (property was in Malabon) to Annul donation to
Winifred, Annul the Sale to Inter-Dimensional, and to remove notice of lis pendens over
title
of
land.
Malabon RTC upheld original agreement to buy and sell between Mario and Alfredo and
declared void the sale by Alfredo and Winifred to Inter-Dimensional.
However, Court of Appeals said agreement between Mario and Alfredo is void because
(1) it was entered into without the consent of Elvira, Alfredos wife; and, (2) Alfredos
undivided share has been forfeited in favour of Winifred by the grant of legal separation
by
the
Cavite
RTC.
(Note
these
reasons
given
by
the
CA.)
ISSUES:
(1) Was the agreement between Mario and Alfredo valid? Mario argues that even if
the sale to Mario was done without the consent of Elvira, the sale should be treated as a
continuing offer which may be perfected by the acceptance of the other spouse before
the offer is withdrawn. Mario alleges that Elviras conduct showed her acquiescence to
the
sale.
SC says the CA was right in declaring the sale between Mario and Alfredo as void.
Under Art 124 of the Family Code, if one of the spouses was incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers, however do not include the
power to dispose or encumber the properties which require a court order or the written
consent of the other spouse. The agreement is void in its entirety, not just to the share
of the husband, Alfredo. The Court however said that the CA erred in saying that the
undivided share of Alfredo was forfeited in favour of Winifred. As regards Marios
contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elviras
acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently
donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was
already
withdrawn.
The Court said the CA erred in saying that Alfredo forfeited his share in
the conjugal property as a result of the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC. Art
63 (Effects of legal separation) in relation to Art 43(2) (Effects of termination of
subsequent marriage) provides that the guilty spouse in legal separation forfeits his
share in the net profits of the property. The Court said, Clearly, what is forfeited in favor
of Winifred is not Alfredos share in the conjugalpartnership property but merely in the
net profits of the conjugalpartnership property. Thus, as regards this point, the CA
erred.
(2) Was the donation to Winifred valid? No, the donation was not valid. Elviras
consent
was
absent.
(3) Was the sale to Inter-Dimensional valid? Inter-Dimensional says it is a buyer in
good faith. SC says no. Inter-Dimensional knew of the notice of lis pendens.
Facts:
Joseph Goyanko and Epifania dela Cruz were married. During the marriage,
they acquire a certain property in Cebu. In 1993, Joseph executed a deed of sale over
the property in favor of his common-law-wife Maria B. Ching. After Joseph's death, his
children with Epifania discovered the sale. They thus filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City a complaint for recovery of property and damages against Ching, praying
for the nullification of the deed of sale and of the TCT and the issuance of a new one in
favor of their father Goyanko.
Issue:
Was the sale made by Joseph Goyanko in favor of his common-law wife valid?
Held:
No. The proscription against sale of property between spouses applies even to common
law relationships.
Article 1409 of the Civil Code states inter alia that: contracts whose cause, object, or
purposes is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy are void
and
inexistent
from
the
very
beginning.
Article 1352 also provides that: Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause,
produce no effect whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good
customs,
public
order,
or
public
policy.
Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling property to each
other subject to certain exceptions. Similarly, donations between spouses during
marriage are prohibited. And this is so because if transfers or conveyances between
spouses were allowed during marriage, that would destroy the system
of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the
exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the
institution of marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law. The prohibitions apply to a
couple living as husband and wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise, the condition
of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.
As the conveyance in question was made by Goyangko in favor of his common- lawwife, it was null and void.
FACTS:
Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owners of a parcel of land with
improvements. Arturo made a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement in favor of
Macatangay, binding himself to sell to latter the subject property and not to offer the
same to any other party within 30 days from date. Full payment would also be effected
as soon as possession of the property shall have been turned over to Macatangay.
Macatangay gave an earnest money amounting to P5,000.00 to be deducted from the
purchase price of P1,300,000.00 in favor of the spouses.
Subsequently, Arturo and Esther had a marital squabble brewing at that time and
Macatangay, to protect his interest, made an annotation in the title of the property. He
then sent a letter informing them of his readiness to pay the full amount of the purchase
price. Esther, through her SPA, executed in favor of Macatangay, a Contract to sell the
property to the extent of her conjugal interest for the sum of P650,000 less the sum
already received by her and Arturo. She agreed to surrender the property to
Macatangay within 20 days along with the deed of absolute sale upon full payment,
while he promised to pay the balance of the purchase price for P1, 290,000.00 after
being placed in possession of the property. Macatangay informed them that he was
ready to pay the amount in full. The couple failed to deliver the property so he sued the
spouses.
RTC dismissed the complaint, because the SPA could not have authorized Arturo to sell
the property to Macatangay as it was falsified. CA reversed the decision, ruling the SPA
in favor of Arturo, assuming it was void, cannot affect the transaction between Esther
and Macatangay. On the other hand, the CA considered the RMOA executed by Arturo
valid to effect the sale of his conjugal share in the property.
ISSUE:
RULING:
No. Arturo and Esther appear to have been married before the effectivity of the Family
Code. There being no indication that they have adopted a different property regime,
their property relations would automatically be governed by the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains. The subject land which had been admittedly acquired during the
marriage of the spouses forms part of their conjugal partnership.
Under the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. This
right is clearly granted to him by law. More, the husband is the sole administrator. The
wife is not entitled as of right to joint administration.
More significantly, it has been held that prior to the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere
expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not
ripen into title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the
liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder
or remanente liquido (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of
the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of
the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after
settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided
between the spouses or their respective heirs.
The Family Code has introduced some changes particularly on the aspect of the
administration of the conjugal partnership. The new law provides that the administration
of the conjugal partnership is now a joint undertaking of the husband and the wife. In
the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal partnership, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. However, the power of administration does not include the power to
dispose or encumber property belonging to the conjugal partnership. In all instances,
the present law specifically requires the written consent of the other spouse, or authority
of the court for the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal partnership property without
which, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
Inescapably, herein Arturos action for specific performance must fail. Even on the
supposition that the parties only disposed of their respective shares in the property, the
sale, assuming that it exists, is still void for as previously stated, the right of the husband
or the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership. Nemo dat qui non habet. No one can give what he has not.
CASE DIGEST
THELMA A. JADER-MANALO vs. NORMA FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA
G.R. No. 147978. January 23, 2002.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Thelma A. Jader-Manalo made an offer to buy the properties of the
respondents from the husband of Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa, respondent Edilberto
Camaisa. After some bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase
price and terms of payment. The agreement handwritten by the petitioner was signed by
Edilberto, with assurance from him that he would secure his wifes consent. Petitioner
was later on surprised when she was informed that respondent spouses were backing
out of the agreement. Hence, she filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the
wife's written consent.
HELD:
Under Art. 124 of the Family Code: In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the
powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
The properties subject to the contract in this case were conjugal; hence, for the
contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must be obtained.
Respondent Norma Camaisa did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting
that respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject
properties, which she denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for its
validity. She may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal
properties, however that is not sufficient to demonstrate consent.
PATROCINIA
RAVINA
AND
WILFREDO
RAVINA, Petitioners,
vs.
MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE, for herself and in behalf of INGRID D'LYN P. VILLA
ABRILLE, INGREMARK D'WIGHT VILLA ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS VILLA
ABRILLE AND INGRELYN DYAN VILLA ABRILLE,Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, Acting C.J.:
For review are the Decision 1 dated February 21, 2002 and the Resolution 2 dated
October 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54560. The appellate court
modified the Decision3 dated September 26, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Davao City, Branch 15.
Simply stated, the facts as found by the Court of Appeals 4 are as follows:
Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife.
They have four children, who are also parties to the instant case and are represented by
their mother, Mary Ann.
In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land denominated as Lot 7,
located at Kamuning Street, Juna Subdivision, Matina, Davao City, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-88674 in their names. Said lot is adjacent to a
parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and which is registered
solely in his name under TCT No. T-26471.
Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP), the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedros lot. The house was
finished in the early 1980s but the spouses continuously made improvements, including
a poultry house and an annex.
In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary Ann was forced to
sell or mortgage their movables to support the family and the studies of her children. By
himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia
and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her objections,
but Pedro nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Anns consent, as
evidenced by a Deed of Sale5 dated June 21, 1991. It appears on the said deed that
Mary Ann did not sign on top of her name.
On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in
school, Pedro together with armed members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical
Unit (CAFGU) and acting in connivance with petitioners 6 began transferring all their
belongings from the house to an apartment.
When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped
from entering it. They waited outside the gate until evening under the rain. They sought
help from the Talomo Police Station, but police authorities refused to intervene, saying
that it was a family matter. Mary Ann alleged that the incident caused stress, tension
and anxiety to her children, so much so that one flunked at school. Thus, respondents
Mary Ann and her children filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale, Specific
Performance, Damages and Attorneys Fees with Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction7 against Pedro and herein petitioners (the Ravinas) in the RTC of Davao City.
During the trial, Pedro declared that the house was built with his own money. Petitioner
Patrocinia Ravina testified that they bought the house and lot from Pedro, and that her
husband, petitioner Wilfredo Ravina, examined the titles when they bought the property.
On September 26, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of herein respondent Mary Ann P.
Villa Abrille as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The sale of lot 8 covered by TCT No. 26471 by defendant Pedro Abrille
appearing in the Deed of Sale marked as Exh. "E" is void as to one half or 277.5
square meters representing the share of plaintiff Mary Villa Abrille.
2. That sale of Lot 7 covered by TCT No. [88674] by defendant Pedro Villa Abrille
in the Deed of Sale (Exh. "A") is valid as to one half or 277.5 square meters of
the 555 square meters as one half belongs to defendant Pedro Abrille but it is
void as to the other half or 277.5 square meters as it belongs to plaintiff Mary
Abrille who did not sell her share nor give her consent to the sale.
3. That sale of the house mentioned in the Deed of Sale (Exh. "A") is valid as far
as the one half of the house representing the share of defendant Pedro Abrille is
concerned but void as to the other half which is the share of plaintiff Mary Abrille
because she did not give her consent/sign the said sale.
4. The defendants shall jointly pay the plaintiffs.
4. A. Seventeen Thousand Pesos (P17,000.00) representing the value of
the movables and belonging[s] that were lost when unknown men
unceremoniously and without their knowledge and consent removed their
movables from their house and brought them to an apartment.
4. B. One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P 100,000.00) to plaintiff Mary
Abrille as moral damages.
4. C. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to each of the four children as
moral damages, namely:
a) Ingrid Villa Abrille Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), b) Ingremark
Villa Abrille Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), c) Ingresoll Villa Abrille
faith, a person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller
need only show that he relied on the face of the sellers certificate of title. But for a
person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller whose
capacity to sell is restricted, such as by Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code or Article
124 of the Family Code, he must show that he inquired into the latters capacity to sell in
order to establish himself as a buyer for value in good faith. 161avvphi1
In the present case, the property is registered in the name of Pedro and his wife, Mary
Ann. Petitioners cannot deny knowledge that during the time of the sale in 1991, Pedro
was married to Mary Ann. However, Mary Anns conformity did not appear in the deed.
Even assuming that petitioners believed in good faith that the subject property is the
exclusive property of Pedro, they were apprised by Mary Anns lawyer of her objection
to the sale and yet they still proceeded to purchase the property without Mary Anns
written consent. Moreover, the respondents were the ones in actual, visible and public
possession of the property at the time the transaction was being made. Thus, at the
time of sale, petitioners knew that Mary Ann has a right to or interest in the subject
properties and yet they failed to obtain her conformity to the deed of sale. Hence,
petitioners cannot now invoke the protection accorded to purchasers in good faith.
Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been given is proper.
The relationship between the parties in any contract even if subsequently annulled must
always be characterized and punctuated by good faith and fair dealing. 17 Hence, in
consonance with justice and equity and the salutary principle of non-enrichment at
anothers expense, we sustain the appellate courts order directing Pedro to return to
petitioner spouses the value of the consideration for the lot covered by TCT No. T88674 and the house thereon.
However, this court rules that petitioners cannot claim reimbursements for
improvements they introduced after their good faith had ceased. As correctly found by
the Court of Appeals, petitioner Patrocinia Ravina made improvements and renovations
on the house and lot at the time when the complaint against them was filed. Ravina
continued introducing improvements during the pendency of the action. 18
Thus, Article 449 of the New Civil Code is applicable. It provides that, "(h)e who builds,
plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown
without right to indemnity."19
On the last issue, petitioners claim that the decision awarding damages to respondents
is not supported by the evidence on record.20
The claim is erroneous to say the least. The manner by which respondent and her
children were removed from the family home deserves our condemnation. On July 5,
1991, while respondent was out and her children were in school, Pedro Villa Abrille
acting in connivance with the petitioners21 surreptitiously transferred all their personal
belongings to another place. The respondents then were not allowed to enter their
rightful home or family abode despite their impassioned pleas.
Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: "Every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." 22 When a right is exercised in a
manner that does not conform with such norms and results in damages to another, a
legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrong doer must be held responsible.
Similarly, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damages caused.23 It is patent in this case that petitioners alleged acts fall short of
these established civil law standards.
WHEREFORE, we deny the instant petition for lack of merit. The Decision dated
February 21, 2002 and the Resolution dated October 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 54560 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent corporation was not able to pay all its debt balance as it suffered business
reversals, eventually ceasing operations. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent
corp and individual respondents.
RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of respondent
corporation and individual respondent Martinez including the conjugal house and lot of
the spouses but it found that it did not redound to the benefit of his family, hence, it
ordered the lifting of the attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses
Martinez.
Petitioner
appealed
to
CA.
It
affirmed
RTC
decision.
Petitioned
to
SC.
ISSUE: WON the conjugal partnership may be held liable for an indemnity agreement
entered into by the husband to accommodate a third party
HELD:
No. SC upheld the CA. Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership
is liable for all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
The court ruled in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia that, in acting as a guarantor or
surety for another, the husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
as the benefit is clearly intended for a third party.
In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that, if
the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the
money and services to be used in or for his own business or profession, the transaction
falls within the term obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. In other
words, where the husband contracts an obligation on behalf of the family business,
there is a legal presumption that such obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity and
the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be
deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It is for the benefit of
the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family.
In the case at bar, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner
and respondent corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The accessory
contract (the indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent Martinez
assumed the obligation of a surety for respondent corporation was similarly for the
latters benefit. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to discharge that burden.
Tumlos vs Fernandez
GR No. 137650, April 12, 2000
FACTS:
Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed against
Guillerma, Gina and Toto Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses Fernandez alleged that
they are the absolute owners of an apartment building that through their tolerance they
allowed the Tumlos to occupy the apartment for the last 7 years without payment of any
rent. It was agreed that Guillerma will pay 1,600 a month while the other defendants
promised to pay 1,000 a month which was not complied with. Demand was made
several times for the defendants to vacate the premises as they are in need of the
property for the construction of a new building.
Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma had an amorous relationship
and that they acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was likewise
alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their 2 children for
about 10 years and that Gullerma administered the property by collecting rentals from
the lessees until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of their
marriage.
ISSUE: WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148.
HELD:
SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-owners of the subject property.
The claim was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were no other evidence
presented to validate it except for the said affidavit. Even if the allegations of having
cohabited with Mario and that she bore him two children were true, the claim of coownership still cannot be accepted. Mario is validly married with Lourdes hence
Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated to marry each other. The property relation
governing their supposed cohabitation is under Article 148 of the Family Code. Actual
contribution is required by the said provision in contrast to Art 147 which states that
efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as
contributions to the acquisitions of common property by one who has no salary, income,
work or industry. Such is not included in Art 148. If actual contribution is not proven
then there can be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
Posted by hyper_jetsetter at 7:26:00 AM
VILLEGAS VS LINGAN
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision [ 1 ] dated November 28, 2001
promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 55837,
which affirmed in toto the Decision dated December 19, 1996 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tuguegarao, Caga yan in Civil Case
No. 5036; and the CA Resolution [ 2 ] dated June 10, 2002, denying the
Motion for Reconsideration filed b y Isaac Villegas (petitioner).
On the basis of the pre-trial order and upon motion of counsel for
petitioner, without an y objections from respondent, the case was
submitted for summary judgment.
As found b y the RTC and confirmed b y the CA, the undisputed facts are
as follows:
execute the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the respondent, since from
the very wordings of the power of attorne y, she had no special authority to
sell or convey any specific real property. [ 6 ]
On December 19, 1996, the RTC dismissed the Complaint, ruling that the
tenor of the power of attorney in question is broad enough to include the
authority to sell any property of the principal, who, in this case, is the
petitioner; that the act of the agent, Catral, in executing the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of respondent was within her power or authority;
that the power to enter into any and all contracts and agreements
qualified the said power of attorney as a special power of attorne y; that
the Deed of Absolute Sale is valid and binds the principal, herein
petitioner; that the authority to sell came from both the petitioner and his
wife, Marilou, since the petitioner himself signed the power of attorne y
affirming the authority of the agent, Catral; and that even if Catral in fact
exceeded her authority, the act is deemed to have been performed within
the scope of the agents authority if such is within the terms of the power
of attorne y as written.
The CA held that when the redemption of the property had been made by
Catral by virtue of a General Power of Attorney executed in her favor by
Marilou, it follows that the petitioner is no longer the owner of the subject
property but his wife, Marilou; that the issue as to whether the power of
attorney was a special or general one is of no moment, because the
petitioner was no longer the owner of the property when it was sold; in
other words, an y disposition of the property needs no power of attorney
from the petitioner himself; that the petitioner signed the General Power of
Attorne y above the word conforme, connoting an implied admission that
he was not an ymore the owner of the said property; and, finally, that the
Deed of Sale between Marilou (through Catral) and respondent is valid.
I.
II.
x x x x
Under the above provision, petitioner could have redeemed the property
from Marilou after she had redeemed it. The pleadings filed and the
records of this case do not show that petitioner exercised said
right. Consequently, as correctly held by the CA, Marilou acquired
ownership of the subject property. All rights and title of the judgment
obligor are transferred upon the expiration of the right of redemption. [ 1 3 ]
Clearly, therefore, Marilou, as owner, had the right to sell the property to
another.
In the present case, there is no property right that exists in favor of the
petitioner, and, with more reason, no such obligation arises in behalf of
the defendant, herein respondent, to respect such right. There was no
violation of a legal right of the petitioner.
Consequentl y, the question whether Catral had validly sold the subject
property to respondent b y virtue of the General Power of Attorne y
executed by Marilou, is not within the realm of the Courts jurisdiction to
resolve in this case as said issue is not properl y raised by the right
person, Marilou.
Divested of all interest over the property, the petitioner has ceased to be
the proper party who may challenge the validity of the sale. Moreover,
since, as a rule, the agency, as a contract, is binding onl y between the
contracting parties, [ 1 5 ] then only the parties, as well as the third person
who transacts with the parties themselves, may question the validity of the
agency or the violation of the terms and conditions found therein. This
rule is a corollary of the foregoing doctrine on the rights of real parties in
interest.
The Court cannot grant the relief prayed for in petitioners Complaint
as to damages, considering that the issue on damages was deemed
waived when the parties limited themselves to the legal issue arrived at
during the pre-trial in the RTC. [ 1 6 ]
Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife.
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one
Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings
and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City.
Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan from petitioner. As security therefor,
Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the
subject property in favor of petitioner. The abovementioned transactions, including the
execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and
consent of respondent.[
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial
sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder.
After the lapse of one year without the property being redeemed, petitioner consolidated
the ownership thereof by executing an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a
Deed of Absolute Sale.
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her visits to the subject property,
Miguela learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Brion to clean its
premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to
play with fire within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject
property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the RTC San Pablo
City a Civil Case for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the latters Answer with Counterclaim,
petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in
question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision declaring the said documents
null and void and further ordered the defendant is ordered to reconvey the property
subject of this complaint to the plaintiff, to pay the plaintiff the sum representing the
value of the car which was burned, the attorneys fees, moral and exemplary damages.
The appellate court affirmed the trial courts Decision, but deleted the award for
damages and attorneys fees for lack of basis. Hence, this petition
ISSUE:
1. WON THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR.
ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS
UNDIVIDED SHARE.
2. WON THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE
LOAN OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING
REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY.
correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject property for
lack of respondents consent.
2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, [T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable
for: . . .
(1)
Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the
other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . .
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to
the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code
to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.[
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit
probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove).
Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino to finance
the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family,
without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Consequently, the
conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.
NOTES:
In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial, petitioner
vigorously asserted that the subject property was the exclusive property of the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial court was it alleged that
the proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the family. Even on appeal,
petitioner never claimed that the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When a
party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his
theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party
but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. A
party may change his legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would
not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to
enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory.
conjugal share in order to support her minor children; that Narcisas claim was barred by
laches and prescription; and that the Philippine Homesite and Housing Corporation, not
the respondents, was the real party in interest to question the sale within the prohibited
period.
On April 2, 1997, the court a quo[8] dismissed the complaint. It found that the sale
was valid; that the Agreement to Purchase and Sale and the Deed of Absolute
Sale were duly executed; that the sum of P10,500.00 as selling price for the subject
property was fully paid there being no demand for the payment of the remaining
balance; that the introduction of improvements thereon by the petitioners was without
objection from the respondents; and that Roberto and Erlinda failed to contest the
transaction within four years after the discovery of the alleged fraud and reaching the
majority age in violation of Article 1391 of the Civil Code. [9]
Petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 56843. On October 3, 2002, a decision[10] was rendered by the Court of
Appeals declaring that respondents were co-owners of the subject property, thus the
sale was valid only insofar as Narcisas 1/7 undivided share thereon was
concerned. The dispositive portion of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the
sale in dispute is declared valid only with respect to the one-seventh (1/7) share of
plaintiff-appellant NARCISA H. PRADO in the subject property, which is equivalent to
78.8857 square meters. In all other respects, the same decision stands. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution dated
January 14, 2003.[12] Hence this petition for review on the following assigned errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN MODIFYING THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT WITHOUT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THAT, ASIDE FROM THE
DECLARATION OF THE VALIDITY OF THE SALE, THE PETITIONERS HEREIN HAVE
TAKEN ACTUAL POSSESSION OF THE SAID ONE-HALF (1/2) TO THE EXCLUSION
OF THE RESPONDENTS AND INTRODUCED IMPROVEMENTS THEREON.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN MODIFYING THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT WITHOUT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE CLEAR AND
UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT IN THE SALE THAT THE SAME PERTAINS TO THE
CONJUGAL SHARE OF RESPONDENT NARCISA PRADO AND THE OTHER
RESPONDENTS HAD NO FINANCIAL CAPACITY TO ACQUIRE THE SAID
PROPERTY SINCE THEY WERE MINORS THEN AT THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID
TCT NO. 71344 ON AUGUST 15, 1963.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN NOT DECLARING THE HEREIN RESPONDENTS GUILTY OF
LACHES IN FILING THE INSTANT CASE ONLY ON APRIL 8, 1991, THAT IS 18
YEARS AFTER THE SAID SALE WITH THE PETITIONERS TAKING ACTUAL
POSSESSION OF SAID PORTION OF THE PROPERTY.
IV
THAT THE DECISION OF THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS WILL UNDULY ENRICH
THE RESPONDENTS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE HEREIN PETITIONERS.[13]
At the outset, it must be stressed that only questions of law may be raised in
petitions for review before this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. [14] It was thus
error for petitioners to ascribe to the Court of Appeals grave abuse of discretion. This
procedural lapse notwithstanding, in the interest of justice, this Court shall treat the
issues as cases of reversible error.[15]
The issues for resolution are: (1) Is the subject property conjugal or paraphernal?
(2) Is the transaction a sale or a mortgage? (3) Assuming that the transaction is a sale,
what was the area of the land subject of the sale?
Article 160 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time the sale was entered
into, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non in order for the
presumption in favor of conjugal ownership to operate. [16]
In the instant case, while Narcisa testified during cross-examination that she bought
the subject property from Peoples Homesite Housing Corporation with her own funds,
[17]
she, however admitted in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the Deed of
Absolute Sale that the property was her conjugal share with her first husband, Patricio,
Sr.[18] A verbal assertion that she bought the land with her own funds is inadmissible to
qualify the terms of a written agreement under the parole evidence rule. [19] The socalled parole evidence rule forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a
written instrument by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that, at or before
the execution of the parties written agreement, other or different terms were agreed
upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract. Whatever is not found in
the writing is understood to have been waived and abandoned. [20]
Anent the second issue, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Narcisa in favor of
Tomas is contained in a notarized [21] document. In Spouses Alfarero, et al. v. Spouses
Sevilla, et al.,[22] it was held that a public document executed and attested through the
intervention of a notary public is evidence of the facts in a clear, unequivocal manner
therein expressed. Otherwise stated, public or notarial documents, or those instruments
duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented in
evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima
facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. In order to
contradict the presumption of regularity of a public document, evidence must be clear,
convincing, and more than merely preponderant.
It is well-settled that in civil cases, the party that alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it.[23] Except for the bare allegation that the transaction was one of mortgage and
not of sale, respondents failed to adduce evidence in support thereof. Respondents also
failed to controvert the presumption that private transactions have been fair and regular.
[24]
Furthermore, Narcisa, in fact did not deny that she executed an Affidavit allowing
spouses Wilfredo and Flordeliza Flora to construct a firewall between the two-storey
duplex and her house sometime in 1976. The duplex was made of strong materials, the
roofing being galvanized sheets. While the deed of sale between Tomas and Narcisa
was never registered nor annotated on the title, respondents had knowledge of the
possession of petitioners of the northern half portion of the property. Obviously,
respondents recognized the ownership of Tomas, petitioners predecessor-in-interest.
Respondents belatedly claimed that only P5,000.00 out of the P10,500.00
consideration was paid. Both the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the Deed of
Absolute Sale state that said consideration was paid in full. Moreover, the presumption
is that there was sufficient consideration for a written contract. [25]
The property being conjugal, upon the death of Patricio Prado, Sr., one-half of the
subject property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Narcisa, as her
share in the conjugal partnership. Particios rights to the other half, in turn, were
transmitted upon his death to his heirs, which includes his widow Narcisa, who is
entitled to the same share as that of each of the legitimate children. Thus, as a result of
the death of Patricio, a regime of co-ownership arose between Narcisa and the other
heirs in relation to the property. The remaining one-half was transmitted to his heirs by
intestate succession. By the law on intestate succession, his six children and Narcisa
Prado inherited the same at one-seventh (1/7) each pro indiviso.[26]Inasmuch as Narcisa
inherited one-seventh (1/7) of her husband's conjugal share in the said property and is
the owner of one-half (1/2) thereof as her conjugal share, she owns a total of 9/14 of the
subject property. Hence, Narcisa could validly convey her total undivided share in the
entire property to Tomas. Narcisa and her children are deemed co-owners of the subject
property.
Neither can the respondents invoke the proscription of encumbering the property
within 25 years from acquisition. In Sarmiento, et al. v. Salud, et al.,[27] it was held that:
xxx The condition that the appellees Sarmiento spouses could not resell the property
except to the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC for short) within the
next 25 years after appellees purchasing the lot is manifestly a condition in favor of the
PHHC, and not one in favor of the Sarmiento spouses. The condition conferred no
actionable right on appellees herein, since it operated as a restriction upon their jus
disponendi of the property they bought, and thus limited their right of ownership. It
follows that on the assumption that the mortgage to appellee Salud and the foreclosure
sale violated the condition in the Sarmiento contract, only the PHHC was entitled to
invoke the condition aforementioned, and not the Sarmientos. The validity or invalidity of
the sheriff's foreclosure sale to appellant Salud thus depended exclusively on the
PHHC; the latter could attack the sale as violative of its right of exclusive reacquisition;
but it (PHHC) also could waive the condition and treat the sale as good, in which event,
the sale can not be assailed for breach of the condition aforestated.
Finally, no particular portion of the property could be identified as yet and delineated
as the object of the sale considering that the property had not yet been partitioned in
accordance with the Rules of Court.[28] While Narcisa could validly sell one half of the
subject property, her share being 9/14 of the same, she could not have particularly
conveyed the northern portion thereof before the partition, the terms of which was still to
be determined by the parties before the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals on October 3, 2002, as well as
the Resolution dated January 14, 2003 is PARTLY AFFIRMED subject to the following
MODIFICATIONS:
1) Narcisa Prado is entitled to 9/14 of the residential land consisting of 552.20
square meters, more or less, situated at 19 th Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 71344;
2) the sale of the undivided one half portion thereof by Narcisa Prado in favor of
Tomas Calpatura, Sr. is valid.
Furthermore, the case is REMANDED to the court of origin, only for the purpose of
determining the specific portion being conveyed in favor of Tomas Calpatura, Sr.
pursuant to the partition that will be agreed upon by the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
decision was in favor of the petitioner, however CA reversed and set aside trial courts
decision for insufficiency of evidence. Evidently, there was a check issued worth
$25,000 paid to the owner of the Paranaque property which became the conjugal
dwelling of the spouses. The wife executed an instrument acknowledging the loan but
Abelardo did not sign.
ISSUE: WON a loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be charged against
the conjugal partnership.
HELD:
Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. They did not deny that the same
served as their conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Hence, the spouses are jointly
and severally liable in the payment of the loan. Abelardos contention that it is not a
loan rather a profit share in the construction firm is untenable since there was no proof
that he was part of the stockholders that will entitle him to the profits and income of the
company.
Hence, the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered to pay the petitioner in the
amount of $25,000 plus legal interest including moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees.
According to private respondent, she entrusted the administration of the lot and building
to the brother of her husband, petitioner Ong Ching Po when the spouses settled in
Iloilo. When her husband died, she demanded that the lot be vacated because she was
going to sell it. Unfortunately, petitioners refused to vacate the said premises.
On March 19, 1984, Parian filed a case for unlawful detainer against petitioner Ong
Ching Po before the MTC of Manila. The inferior court dismissed her case, and so did
the RTC, Manila and the CA, the CA decision final and executory.
Petitioners, on the other hand, claimed that on July 23, 1946, petitioner Ong Ching Po
bought the said parcel of land from Joi Jong. The sale was evidenced by a photo copy
of a Deed of Sale written in Chinese. An English translation of said document read as
follows:
Deed of Sale
I, Ong Joi Jong, a party to this Deed of Sale hereby sell in absolutely (sic) manner a lot
located on No. 4 Fundidor Street, San Nicolas an (sic) area consisting 213 square
meters including a one-story house erected thereon unto Mr. Ong Ching Po for the sum
of P6,000.00 the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by me and consequently I
have executed and signed the government registered title (sic) the said lot inclusive of
the house erected thereon, now belong (sic) to Mr. Ong Ching Po unequivocally. And
the purpose of this document is to precisely serve as proof of the sale.
Addendum: I have acceded to the request of Mr. Ong Ching Po into signing another
document in favor of Soledad Parian (She is the Filipino wife of Ong Yee, brother of
Ong Ching Po) for the purpose of facilitating the issuance of the new title by the
City Register of Deeds and for the reason that he is not yet a Filipino. I certify to the
truthfulness of this fact.
Lot Seller: Ong Joi Jong
On Dec. 6, 1983, petitioner Ong Ching Po executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying
to his children, petitioners Jimmy and David Ong, the same property sold by Joi Jong to
private respondent Parian in 1947.
On Dec. 12 1985, petitioners Ong Ching Po, Jimmy and David filed an action for
reconveyance and damages against private respondent in the RTC, Manila.
On July 26, 1986, private respondent Parian filed an action for quieting of title against
petitioners Ong Ching Po and his wife, petitioner Yu Siok Lian, in the RTC, Manila. Upon
her motion, the case was consolidated with the earlier civil case. (petitioner Ong Ching
Po died in October 1986.)
On May 30 1990, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondent.
On appeal by petitioners to the CA, the said court affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: According to petitioners, the CA erred:
(1) When it gave full faith and credit to the Deed of Sale (Exh. A) in favor of private
respondent, instead of the Deed of Sale (Exh, B) in favor of petitioner Ong Ching Po.
(2) When it concluded that the acts of petitioners were not acts of ownership; and
(3) When it ruled that no express nor implied trust existed between petitioners and
private respondent (as stated in Exh. B)
HELD: The petition is dismissed
1. The CA did not give any credence to Exhibit B and its translation, because these
documents had not been properly authenticated. Petitioners likewise failed to adduce
evidence as to the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale, Exhibit B.
On the other end of the legal spectrum, the deed of sale executed by Joi Jong in favor
of private respondent (Exh. A) is a notarized document.
2. As to the contention of petitioners that all the tax receipts, tax declaration, rental
receipts, deed of sale (Exh. B) and transfer certificate of title were in their possession,
private respondent explained that she and her husband entrusted said lot and building
to petitioners when they moved to Iloilo.
As observed by the Court of Appeals:
We find, however, that these acts, even if true, are not necessarily reflective of
dominion, as even a mere administrator or manager may lawfully perform
them pursuant to his appointment or employment
It is markworthy that all the tax receipts were in the name of private respondent and her
husband. The rental receipts were also in the name of her husband.
3. We cannot go along with the claim that petitioner Ong Ching Po merely used private
respondent as a dummy to have the title over the parcel of land registered in her name
because being an alien he was disqualified to own real property in the Philippines. To
sustain such an outrageous contention would be giving a high premium to a violation of
our nationalization laws.
Assuming that Exhibit B is in existence and that it was duly executed, still petitioners
cannot claim ownership of the disputed lot by virtue thereof.
Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution provides, as follows:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred
or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides, as follows:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in
the public domain.
lived in the building constructed on said land, it was because her family had settled in
Iloilo.
2. Under Section 4, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court:
Secondary Evidence when Original is lost or destroyed. When the original writing
has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution
and lost or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection of the
witnesses.
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or
destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must
establish the former existence of the document. The correct order of proof is as follows:
existence; execution; loss; contents. This order may be changed if necessary in the
discretion of the court.
The due execution of the document may be established by
1.
2.
3.
HELD:
1.
YES.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired duringthe
marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it be proved that
itpertains exclusively to the husband, or to the wife. In Tan v. Court of Appeals, we held
that it isnot even necessary to prove that the properties were acquired with funds of the
partnership. Aslong as the properties were acquired by the parties during the marriage,
they are presumed to beconjugal in nature. In fact, even when the manner in which the
properties were acquired does notappear, the presumption will still apply, and the
properties will still be considered conjugal. Thepresumption of the conjugal nature of the
properties acquired during the marriage subsists in theabsence of clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence to overcome the same.In this case, the evidence adduced by the
petitioners in the RTC is that the 100,000 sharesof stocks in the Citycorp Investment
Philippines were issued to and registered in its corporate booksin the name of the
petitioner-husband when the said corporation was incorporated on May 14,1979. This
was done during the subsistence of the marriage of the petitioner-spouses. The shares
ofstocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners.
The privaterespondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired
the stocks with hisexclusive money. The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were
registered in the corporatebooks of Citycorp Investment Philippines solely in the name
of the petitioner-husband does notconstitute proof that the petitioner-husband, not the
conjugal partnership, owned the same.2.
NO.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to
thehusband alone, there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the
spouses. Certainly,to make a conjugal partnership responsible for a liability that should
appertain alone to one of thespouses is to frustrate the objective of the New Civil Code
to show the utmost concern for thesolidarity and well being of the family as a unit. The
husband, therefore, is denied the power toassume unnecessary and unwarranted risks
to the financial stability of the conjugal partnership.In this case, the private respondent
failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitionerswas benefited by the
petitioner-husband's act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyshipagreement
with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan
wasbetween the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter.
No presumptioncan be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered
into an accommodationagreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership
would thereby be benefited. Theprivate respondent was burdened to establish that such
benefit redounded to the conjugalpartnership.
BUADO VS CA
FACTS:
On 30 April 1984, Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado (petitioners) filed a complaint for
damages against Erlinda Nicol (Erlinda) with Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bacoor, Cavite. Said action originated from Erlinda Nicols civil liability arising
from the criminal offense of slander filed against her by petitioners. On 6 April 1987,
the trial court rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to pay damages. Said decision was
affirmed, successively, by the Court of Appeals and this Court. Finding Erlinda Nicols
personal properties insufficient to satisfy the judgment, the Deputy Sheriff issued a
notice of levy on real property on execution addressed to the Register of Deeds of
Cavite. Two (2) days before the public auction sale on 28 January 1993, an affidavit
of third-party claim from one Arnulfo F. Fulo was received by the deputy sheriff
prompting petitioners to put up a sheriffs indemnity bond. The auction sale proceeded
with petitioners as the highest bidder. On 4 February 1993, a certificate of sale was
issued in favor of petitioners. Almost a yearlater on 2 February 1994, Romulo Nicol
(respondent), the husband of Erlinda Nicol, filed a complaint for annulment of certificate
of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and the deputy
sheriff. Respondent, as plaintiff therein, alleged that the defendants, now petitioners,
connived and directly levied upon and execute his real property without exhausting the
personal properties of Erlinda Nicol. Respondent averred that there was no proper
publication and posting of the notice of sale. Furthermore, respondent claimed that his
property which was valued at P500,000.00 was only sold at a very low price of
P51,685.00, whereas the judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol was only P40,000.00.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied on 23 August 2000. Hence, the
instant petition attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
WON the wife's criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership WON the
husband of the judgment debtor may file an independent action to protect the conjugal
property subject to execution.
HELD:
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the
Family Code explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Unlike in the
system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a
crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the
absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same
advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal
partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the
debtor-spouse. Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the
civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable
for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit
is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership. Hence, the filing of a separate
action by respondent is proper and jurisdiction is thus vested on Branch 21. Petitioners
failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
remanding the case to Branch 21 for further proceedings. WHEREFORE, the petition is
DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
Carlos vs Sandoval
Facts:
Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each have three
parcels of land by virtue of inheritance. Later Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by
respondents Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilos death,
two parcels of land were registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August
1995, Carlos commenced an action against respondents before the court a quo. In his
complaint, Carlos asserted that the marriage between his late brother and Felicidad was
a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained
that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo
Carlos II. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including
the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.
HELD: The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be
proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So
is confession of judgment disallowed. Carlos argues that the CA should have applied
Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on
judgment on the pleadings. Petitioner is misguided. Whether it is based on judgment on
the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the summary
judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and
summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage and even in annulment of marriage.
A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced
before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during
the effectivity of the Civil Code. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. A
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition
forannulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the
State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the
petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of
their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the
State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. The Rule extends only to
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on
August 3, 1988.
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the
beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of
marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the
compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still
protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on
Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages,
compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in
a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts.
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced
before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the
Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is
prospective in its application.
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in
1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would
govern depends upon when the marriage took place.
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void.
Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of
marriage?
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents
were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate proper interest can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of
marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v.
Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects
their successional rights.
In 1974, the company co-owned by Tan, acquired a P250k loan from Metrobank. In
1976, the same company acquired another P150k loan from Metrobank. In 1979, it
again got a P600k loan from Metrobank. These 3 loans were secured by a mortgage
executed by spouses See in favor of Metrobank. See was not part of Tans company not
until 1979 but theyve been securing the loans. The loans were consolidated as a P1
Million loan in 1980 payable at P125k in 8 quarterly payments until fully paid.
Meanwhile, Tan had a separate unsecured loan of P970k owed from Metrobank which it
failed to pay. Metrobank won a collection suit against Tan for said sum of money. Loan
was still unpaid.
In 1984, Tan defaulted from paying the P1 M loan. Metrobank foreclosed the property of
See located in Paco, Manila (June 1984). Metrobank was the highest bidder at P1.7M.
The Sale was registered same month/year.
In December 1984, See assailed the foreclosure averring that the P1M loan is no longer
covered by the mortgage for the same was novated when the 3 loans were
consolidated. The CA ruled the foreclosure to be valid but proceeds therefrom should
only cover the P1M loan, excess has to be returned.
While pending on appeal before SC, Tan offered to pay P2M: P600k as downpayment
and the rest payable in 2 years w/o interest in order to release the foreclosed
mortgaged property. This was denied by the bank.
Tan and See then petitioned that Metrobank allow them to redeem the property at
P1.6M. This was in 1997.
SCs decision (G.R. 118585) finally went out and made final CAs ruling that the
foreclosure is valid. This was interpreted later by the RTC and the CA as giving the right
to Tan to repurchase the property.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tan may redeem the said property?
HELD: No. The decision of the SC in GR 118585 did not give the right to redeem way
past the period of redemption. This was an error in the RTC and the CA.
Tan was clearly in default hence Metrobank had the right to foreclose which it did in 85.
Tan had a year to redeem. Though See was the registered owner, Tan had the right of
redemption because they were the actual mortgagors. But Tan never redeemed the
property within the redemption period of 1 year.
The filing of a civil suit did not forestall the period of redemption though said suit drag for
more than ten years until a decision was laid down in 97.
Though Tan made offers and proposals to redeem property, Tan did not make
simultaneous payments (which is required in redemption) which further bolstered the
fact that he did not make valid offers of redemption (considering arguendo).
After the 1 year redemption period, the right has already vested in Metrobank, hence it
could provide for any purchase price i.e. P11M offer to sell property to spouses See.
Pana v Heirs of Jose Juanite, Sr. and Jose Juanite, Jr. December 10, 2012
FACTS:
The prosecution accused Efren Pana, his wife Melencia, and others of murder before
the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, and eventually a decision was rendered
acquitting Efren of the charge for insufficiency of evidence but finding Melencia and
another person guilty as charged and was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court
affirmed RTCs decision but modified the penalty to Reclusion Perpetua. As for the
monetary awards, the court affirmed the award of civil indemnity and moral damages
but deleted the award for actual damages for lack of evidentiary basis. In its place the
court made an award of php15, 000 each by way of temperate damages. In addition,
the court awarded Php50, 000.00 exemplary damages per victim to be paid solidarily by
them. The decision became executory of October 1, 2001. Upon motion for execution
by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ resulting in the
levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melencia. Subsequently, a
notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution were issued. On April 3, 2002, Efren and
his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution claiming that the properties
levied were conjugal assets and not paraphernal of Melecia. On September 16, 2002,
the RTC denied the motion. The spouses moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied
the same. In this case, it is submitted that Efren and Melencia were married when the
Civil Code was still in effect. They did not execute a pre-nuptial agreement, hence CPG
governed their property relations. However, both RTC and CA held that property regime
changed into ACP when family code took effect it reason out that Art. 256 of the Family
Code provides that the Code shall have retroactive effect in so far as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws. Both the RTC and the Court of the Appeals are in error on this point. While it is
true that the personal stakes of each spouses in their conjugal assets are inchoate or
unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of hains and, therefore none
of them can be said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets , it is evident that
Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to react back and automatically convert
into absolute community of property relations all conjugal partnership of gains that
existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melencia can be levied
and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melencias civil liability in the aforesaid murder
case.
SUPREME COURT: YES, provided that the conditions under Article 121 of the Family
Code have been covered.
First of all, the Supreme Court explained that it is clear from the facts that Efren and
Melencia were married when the Civil code was still the operative law on marriages.
The presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary, is that they were married under
the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. Furthermore, Article 119 of the Civil Code
provides that the future spouses main in marriage settlements agree upon absolute or
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains or upon a complete separation of
property, or upon any other regime. The family code itself provides in Article 76 that
marriage settlements cannot be modified except prior to marriage, and clearly, under
this situation, the spouses cannot modify their regime. Post marriage modification of
settlements can take place only where (a) the absolute community or conjugal
partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal separation; (b) the
spouses who were legally separated reconciled and agreed to revive their former
property regime; (c)judicial separation of property had been had on the ground that a
spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply with his obligations to
the family; (d) there was judicial separation of property under article 135; (e) the
spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution of their absolute community
or conjugal partnership of gains. None of these circumstances exists in this case
Furthermore, Article 119 provides as well, that in the absence of marriage settlements,
or when the same is void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of
gains established under the civil code shall govern the property regime of the spouses.
the family code contains terms governing the conjugal partnership of gains that
supersede the terms of the conjugal partnership of gains under the civil code. Article
105 of the family code states that the provisions of such chapter on the conjugal
partnership of gains shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already
established between spouses before the affectivity of this code, without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the civil or other laws as provided in
Article 256.
J claimed that a warehouse was constructed on the lot using conjugal funds
J also averred that M occupied one door of the apartment building, as well as the
warehouse but stopped paying rentals in September 1991 claiming that she had
acquired ownership over the property by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by A in favor
of M and I and their spouses
J contended that I and F deceived into signing what he thought was his last will and
testament but in fact was a Deed of Sale
Upon discovery of this, A filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale but was dismissed
both in the RTC and CA
J contended that she had the right to be reimbursed for half of the cost of the
improvements on the lot which amounted to P500,000.
J sought from M and I moral and exemplary damages, litigation and incidental
expenses.
M and Is motion to dismiss was denied by RTC but was granted by CA for failing to
state a cause of action
Issue:
Whether or not J has the right to be reimbursed for half of the cost of the
improvements on the lot
Held:
When the cost of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses
shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the
property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property
shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement
of the cost of the improvement.
Respondents were the buyers of the property. Hence, they dont have the
obligation to respect petitioners right to be reimbursed
She then filed a complaint to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale
and consolidation of the property (after the lapse of 1 year). The trial court rendered its
decision in favor of petitioners but was later reversed by the appellate court upon
appeal.
ISSUE: WON the property is considered as redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
HELD: Yes. Petition denied.
The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the
consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is
voidable.17 Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros encumbrance of
the subject property. However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts will
declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding
that the wife did not give her consent.
It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the contract. From
the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the
loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is
immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply
stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the
law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
Ros loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence, the
debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
Leticias cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow
and took care of Franciscos house as well as the store inside.
According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same
room. On the other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that
the latter told her that Cirila was his mistress. However, Cirila defensed herself that she
was a mere helper who could enter the masters bedroom when Francisco asked her to
and that Francisco was too old for her. She denied having sexual intercourse with
Francisco. When the nieces got married, Cirila who was then 34 year-old widow started
working for Francisco who was 75 year old widower. The latter did not pay him any
wages as househelper though her family was provided with food and lodging.
Franciscos health deteriorated and became bedridden. Tabancura testified that
Franciscos only source of income was the rentals from his lot near the public streets.
In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a Deed of Donation
Inter Vivos where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together
with his house to Cirila who accepted the same. The larger portion of 268 sq m. was
left under his name. This was made in consideration of the 10 year of faithful services
of the petitioner. Atty Lacaya notarized the deed and was later registered by Cirila as its
absolute owner.
In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market
value of P57,105 and assessed value of P28,550. The decedents nephews and nieces
and his heirs by intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of
Francisco.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in
Arcabas favor was valid.
HELD:
The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein
donation is not valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and
certain documents bearing the signature of Cirila Comille such as application for
business permit, sanitary permit and the death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact
that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication that she was not simply a
caregiver employee.
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is
already old and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is a
public assumption of men and women holding themselves out to the public as such.
Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the
Family Code.
ARTURO SARTE FLORES, Petitioner, vs.SPOUSES ENRICO L. LINDO, JR. and
EDNA C. LINDO,Respondents.G.R. No. 183984April 13, 2011Carpio, J.:
Topic: Unjust Enrichment Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment, and Disposition of the
Community Property Administration of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains Real Mortgage
FACTS:
Edna Lindo obtained a loan from Arturo Flores amounting to Php 400,000.00 with
monthly interest and surcharge in case of late payment. Edna executed a deed of real
mortgage and promissory note to secure the said loan. Edna issued three checks as
partial payments which were dishonored later for insufficiency of funds. This prompted
petitioner to file a complaint for the foreclosure of mortgage with damages against the
respondents.RTC branch 33 held that Flores was not entitled to judicial foreclosure of
the mortgage because it found out that the Deed was executed by Edna without her
husbands consent. Special Power of Attorney by Enrico was only constituted days after
the Deed. However, it further ruled that petitioner Flores was not precluded from
recovering the loan from Edna as he could file a personal action against her. Petitioner
then filed a complaint for Sum of Money with damages against respondents. It was
raffled to Branch 42. Respondents admitted their loan but in the tune of Php340,000.00
and prayed for dismissal on the grounds of improper venue, res judicata, and forum
shopping. RTCBranch 42 denied the motion to dismiss. CA set aside decision of RTC
Branch 42 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. CA ruled in general
that the creditor may institute two alternative remedies: either a personal action for the
collection of debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, but not both.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners can no longer file complaint for collection of sum of
money on the ground of multiplicity of suits
Held: The Court ruled that generally, it is true that
the mortgage-creditor has the option of either filing a personal action for collection of
sum of money or instituting a real action to foreclose onthe mortgage security.An
election of the first bars recourse to the second, otherwise therewould be multiplicity of
suits in which the debtor would be tossed from one venue to another depending on the
location of the mortgaged properties and the residence of the parties.
In this case, however, there are circumstances that the Court takes into consideration.
Accordingly since the Deed was executed by respondent Edna without the consent and
authority of her husband, it is void pursuant to Article 96 of the Family Code.
Any disposition or encumbrance without the written consent shall be void. However,
both provisions also state that "the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer
on the part of the consenting spouseand the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spousex x x before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors."
The execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the
continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties, making the Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
But, as noted by CA, petitioner allowed the decision of RTC Branch 33 to become final
and executory without asking for an alternative relief. Nevertheless, the petitioner is not
without remedy. The principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense
of another applies. Article 22 of the Civil Code provides:
Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just
or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
There is unjust enrichment "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of
another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience."
rule on multiplicity of suits. The Court directed RTC Branch 42 to proceed with the trial
of collection of sum.
the Regional Trial Court, Branch XCVIII, Quezon City, dated November 22, 1984, are
sought by the petitioner in this petition for review on certiorari.
Culled from the records, the facts are as follows:
The spouses Amadeo and Estela Costuna (hereinafter referred to as Amadeo and the
petitioner, respectively) during their marriage acquired three parcels of land with an
aggregate area of 599 square meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer
Certificates of title Nos. 1235,18118, and 24365, all of which lots are located in San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, and registered in the name of Amadeo Costuna.
On November 8,1976, Amadeo executed his last will and testament. He was then 68
years old. Following the execution of the last will and testament aforesaid, the spouses
were beset with marital problems.
Sometime in November, 1977, Amadeo sustained third degree burns on his legs for
which he was treated at various hospitals, such as the Bonifacio Maternity Clinic and
the Bago-Bantay General Hospital, on different dates. While already ill, or on April
17,1977, relatives of Amadeo requested that he be brought to Samar as there were
documents that needed his signature pertaining to his Samar properties. Since then,
Amadeo was never returned to the petitioner and stayed with his sister. Thus, a feud
ensued among Amadeo's relatives (sister Zosima Barada, nephews, and nieces) and
the petitioner over his custody prompting the latter to institute a petition for habeas
corpus on June 1 8, 1978, before the then Court of First Instance of Quezon City,
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 25601. Five days later, or on June 23, 1978,
Amadeo filed an action for partition before the then Juvenile Domestic and Relations
Court, docketed as Case No. Q-25545. Failing to get the petitioner's consent to the
desired partition notwithstanding repeated demands therefor, Amadeo was constrained
to execute a deed of sale, on July 10, 1978, over the one-half (1/2) undetermined
portion of the conjugal property, without his wife's consent, in favor of Laureana
Domondon (hereinafter referred to as the respondent). The death of Amadeo on
November 5, 1978, however, rendered the aforecited cases moot and academic.
With Amadeo's death, Special Proceedings No. Q-26351 was instituted by his widow
(petitioner) with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch LVIII.
Claiming pro indiviso one half (1/2) share over the earlier mentioned three lots by virtue
of the deed of sale executed in her favor by Amadeo on July 10, 1978, the respondent
opposed the allowance of the will. For lack of jurisdiction, no ruling was however made
on her claim, but the probate court decreed the allowance of the last will and testament
and ordered the issuance of Letters of Administration (should correctly be letters
testamentary) in favor of petitioner in a decision rendered on December 29,1981. 1
Consequently, an action to compel the petitioner to give her conformity to the deed of
sale executed by her husband in favor of the respondent was instituted by the latter in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch XCVIII, docketed as Q34527, which
court, making the following disquisition:
On the confronting issue of whether or not the defendant can be
compelled to signify her conformity in the deed of sale, it is the considered
opinion of the court that weighing their respective evidence and the end
Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court, Estela Costuna appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 10948. In disposing the issue
as to the validity of the sale, the Court of Appeals stated thus:
The third assignment of error is primarily based on the allegation that no
sale of conjugal properties by the husband may be validly made without
the consent of the wife. Appellant cited Articles 166 and 167 of the New
Civil Code which provide, viz:
Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a
spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the
husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnership without the wife's consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give
her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same.
This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal partnership
before the effective date of this Code. (1413a).
Art. 167. In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal
partnership property by the husband, the courts, on petition of the wife,
may provide for a receivership, or administration by the wife, or separation
of property. (n).
The general rule is, the husband may not validly sell real estates
belonging to the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. However,
this rule accepts exceptions, wherein the husband may sell the real
properties owned by the conjugal partnership even without the consent of
the wife: 1) sale of personal properties; 2) real properties acquired before
the effectivity of the New Civil Code; 3) real properties acquired after
effectivity of the New Civil Code if wife is confined in a leprosarium,
declared non compos mentis or spendthrift, or under civil interdiction; 4) if
the purpose is to pay conjugal liabilities (Article 161); 5) if the purpose is to
secure the future of their chi1dren or finishing a career (Art. 162); and 6)
moderate gift for charity (Art. 174).
The sale by Amadeo of one-half (1/2) of each of the conjugal properties to
Domondon was allegedly for the purpose of paying the husband's hospital
expenses in order that he would get well. In a decided case, it was held
that while the marriage and the legal conjugal partnership subsists, the
support of the wife, conversely, of the husband, is a charge upon the
partnership. (Sumulong v. Cembrano, 51 Phil. 719). The partnership is not
relieved of this obligation by the mere fact that the spouses do not live
under the same roof (Ibid.). The amounts advanced by third persons for
the subsistence of the wife (or husband) are chargeable against the
property of the conjugal partnership (Sochayseng v. Trijillo, 31 Phil.
153; Galang v. CA, 103 SCRA 90).
Estela Costuna never rebutted the appellee's assertion that the proceeds
of the sale were utilized for the hospitalization and medication of Amadeo.
Whether her refusal to support her ailing and aging husband was because
The petitioner submits that the deed of sale executed by Amadeo in favor of private
respondent over his undetermined one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal partnership is
spurious and simulated, hence invalid. Firstly, the element of consent (her consent) is
wanting. Secondly, the alleged sale was not a voluntary act of Amadeo but was
orchestrated by the persons who were desirous of depriving her of her inheritance
which fact is bolstered by the following: a) at the time of the execution of the deed of
sale, Amadeo was 81 years old and gravely ill; b) while the deed of sale was signed by
Amadeo, his signature was illegible; c) the probability that he was unconscious at the
time that he signed the document and that somebody may have guided his hand is not
remote; d) the absence of the signature of both parties in the acknowledgment portion
of the deed, and e) the variance between the dates appearing in the deed itself and the
acknowledgment; thirdly, because of want of consideration. Not only is the supposed
buyer financially incapable to pay the purchase price, there is also the uncertainty of the
amount actually paid. The petitioner maintains that Amadeo's hospital and medical
expenses should not be chargeable against the conjugal partnership as Amadeo by his
own free will deserted and abandoned her and their conjugal home when he opted to
live with his relatives. She claims that never was she remiss in her duties to her
husband. She asserts that her husband's relatives held him (husband) in "captivity"
making it impossible for her to give him the care, attention, and love that he most
needed. Nonetheless, she avers that all efforts were exerted by her, to regain custody of
her husband but in vain. In fact, as a last ditch effort, she filed habeas corpus
proceedings which case was unfortunately rendered moot and academic by the death of
Amadeo on November 5,1979. She claims to have shouldered the funeral bills and
other miscellaneous expenses of Amadeo as the relatives suddenly abandoned him.
Finally, she theorizes that Art. 161 of the new Civil Code does not include illness or old
age of one or both of the spouses as among the expenses for which the conjugal
partnership may be held hable and that the case of Sumulong vs. Cembrano 5 is not
applicable to the case at bar because here Amadeo abandoned her and the conjugal
home.
The private respondent on the other hand naturally supports the common ruling of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals that the deed of sale is valid, notwithstanding the
absence of consent, because the disposition of the one-half (1/2) undivided portion of
the conjugal partnership properties was intended to generate funds to cover Amadeo's
hospital and medical expenses. She argues that the disposition of one half (1/2) of the
conjugal estate should be effected by either one of the spouses without the consent and
conformity of the other for as long as what belongs to the other by such act would not
suffer or be prejudiced. She submits that if consent is wanting, it was not Amadeo's fault
as it can not be denied that the petitioner's consent, first to the intended partition and
later to the sale, was repeatedly sought by Amadeo, as required by law and out of
marital courtesy, but the petitioner tenaciously withheld her consent. She asserts that
the petitioner's refusal was not only unreasonable, unjustified, but above all, cruel, for
Amadeo was asking for his legitimate share not to squander but to enable him to settle
his hospital bills and defray the cost of his medication. The private respondent theorizes
that the petitioner in turning her back and denying her husband the moral and financial
assistance at the time when most needed and her refusal to stamp her approval on the
deed of sale are devoid of cogent reason. She asserts that no other motive could be
attributed to the petitioner but her selfishness and cupidity thinking that perhaps she
could own all the conjugal partnership properties upon her husband's death, they having
no children. She contends that the Court of Appeals did not err when it applied the
provisions of Art. 161 of the Civil Code because the payment of the hospital and medical
expenses no doubt redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. She maintains
that there is here no case of abandonment. That while it is true that Amadeo left the
conjugal home, the reason for his leaving was his desire for survival.
There is no denying that Amadeo sought the petitioner's consent to the deed of sale
which consent was adamantly withheld by the petitioner. As may be gleaned from the
records, her refusal stemmed from her belief that the deed of sale was executed in
fraud of her, yet she did not do anything to impugn the said deed notwithstanding that
the right is vested on her by law. 6 She assailed for the first time the validity of the sale
only when Civil Case No. Q-34527 was instituted by the respondent in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, to compel her to give her consent.
Notably, what was sold by Amadeo without the petitioner's consent was only an
undetermined one-half (1/2) share in the community properties. He left intact that other
undetermined 1/2 share which should belong to the petitioner. And the reason for the
sale was, as correctly found by the trial court and Court of Appeals, for Amadeo's
hospitalization and medication. It was therefore Amadeo's understandable human spirit
to live longer that induced him to execute the deed of sale without the consent of the
petitioner.
We concede that the consent of the petitioner is essential for the validity of the sale, but,
in this case, where consent was unreasonably withheld, we are constrained to relax the
application of the law and consider the sale as falling within the recognized exceptions,
The Court can not overlook the vital fact that Amadeo executed a last will and testament
designating the petitioner as his sole heir. In this connection, we find merit in the
respondent's assertion that no other motive could be attributed to the petitioner but her
greed.
The question of whether or not Amadeo's hospital and medical expenses are
chargeable to the conjugal partnership is answered in the affirmative and finds firm
support in Art. 161 of the Civil Code, which provides inter alia:
The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) all debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and
those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases
where she may legally bind the partnership.
The benefit required by this article need not be quantified into pesos or square meters
of real property. It is enough that the transaction would result to some discernible
advantage or good to the conjugal partnership, directly or indirectly. Thus, the health
and well-being of both or either of the spouses would undeniably redound to the benefit
of their conjugal partnership. The advancement of the interests of the conjugal
partnership depends in great measure on the soundness of the body and mind of the
partners.
Considering all the foregoing, we hold that the conjugal partnership property is liable for
the hospital and medical expenses of Amadeo.
There is in this case no convincing reason to disturb the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals which are generally binding on this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
plaintiff having exclusive rights to the disputed property. Because Petronila and Felix
Matabuena were legally married before Felix died, Petronila is his widow. Hence, she is
entitled to 1/2 of the property of the deceased. The other half would be given to Felix
Matabuenas sister, Cornelia Matabuena.
retroactive
effect
and/or
the
right
of
Held: Yes. Besides, even assuming that it is the Civil Code that applies to the
transaction as the CA held, Article 173 provides that the wife may bring an action for
annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent during the marriage within
10 years from the transaction. Consequently, the action that the Rocas, her heirs,
brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of the January 11, 1989 sale. It did not yet
prescribe.
Notes:
CC Art. 173: The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband
entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract
of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal
partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the
dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by
the husband.
FC Art. 124: x x x In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. x x x
JACINTO SAGUID vs. CA, RTC, BRANCH 94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE and GINA S.
REY
October 25, 2012 Leave a comment
FACTS:
Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband,
when she met and cohabited with petitioner Jacinto Saguid In 1996, the couple decided
to separate and end up their 9-year cohabitation. private respondent filed a complaint
for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner.
She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties and that
the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the construction of their
house,
be
reimbursed
to
her.
ISSUE: WON there are actual contributions from the parties
HELD:
it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other
because the former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation
with the latter. Their property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family
Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a
state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions Proof of actual contribution is required.
Even if cohabitation commenced before family code, article 148 applies because this
provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.
The fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an
adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual
contribution in the acquisition of the property.
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the
parties. Private respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for
the completion of their house. However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the
extent of her contribution. What appears in the record are receipts in her name for the
purchase of construction materials.
While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit,
there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares
therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of
the parties respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal.
rights and interests over the subject properties in consideration of P50,000.00. The
Deed of Assignment was signed by, among others, Henry Andrade (Henry), one of
Rosarios sons, as instrumental witness. Notwithstanding the aforementioned Deed of
Assignment, Bobby extended an Option to Buy 11 the subject properties in favor of
Proceso, Jr., giving the latter until 7:00 in the evening of July 31, 1984 to purchase the
same for the sum of P310,000.00. When Proceso, Jr. failed to do so, Bobby
consolidated his ownership over the subject properties, and the TCTs12 therefor were
issued
in
his
name.
On October 7, 1997, Rosarios children, namely, Grace, Proceso, Jr., Henry, Andrew,
Glory, Miriam Rose, Joseph (all surnamed Andrade), Jasmin Blaza, and Charity A.
Santiago (Andrades), filed a complaint 13 for reconveyance and annulment of deeds of
conveyance and damages against Bobby before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB 20969. In their complaint, they alleged that the transaction between Rosario and
Bobby (subject transaction) was not one of sale but was actually an equitable mortgage
which was entered into to secure Rosarios indebtedness with Bobby. They also claimed
that since the subject properties were inherited by them from their father, Proceso
Andrade, Sr. (Proceso, Sr.), the subject properties were conjugal in nature, and thus,
Rosario had no right to dispose of their respective shares therein. In this light, they
argued that they remained as co-owners of the subject properties together with Bobby,
despite
the
issuance
of
the
TCTs
in
his
name.
In his defense, Bobby contended that the subject properties were solely owned by
Rosario per the TCTs issued in her name14 and that he had validly acquired the same
upon Proceso, Jr.s failure to exercise his option to buy back the subject properties. 15 He
also interposed the defenses of prescription and laches against the Andrades. 16cralaw
virtualaw library
The RTC Ruling
On April 6, 2001, the RTC rendered a Judgment 17 dismissing the Andrades complaint.
It ruled that the subject transaction was a bona fide sale and not an equitable mortgage
as can be gleaned from its terms and conditions, noting further that the subject deed of
sale was not even questioned by the Andrades at the time of its execution. As Proceso,
Jr. failed to exercise his option to buy back the subject properties, the titles thereto were
validly consolidated in Bobbys favor, resulting to the issuance of TCTs in his name
which are deemed to be conclusive proof of his ownership thereto. 18 As regards the
nature of the subject properties, the RTC found that they appeared to be the exclusive
properties of Rosario.19 Finally, it found that the Andrades claim over the subject
properties had already prescribed and that laches had already set in.20cralaw virtualaw
library
Dissatisfied, the Andrades elevated the matter on appeal.
The CA Ruling
On July 26, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed Decision 21 upholding in part the RTCs
ruling.
It found that the subject deed of sale was indeed what it purports to be, i.e., a bona
fide contract of sale. In this accord, it denied the Andrades claim that the subject
transaction was an equitable mortgage since their allegation that the purchase price
was unusually low was left unsupported by any evidence. Also, their averment that they
have been in continuous possession of the subject properties was belied by the
testimony of Andrew Andrade (Andrew) who stated that Bobby was already in
possession
of
the
same. 22cralaw
virtualaw
library
Nevertheless, the CA ruled that the subject properties belong to the conjugal
partnership of Rosario and her late husband, Proceso, Sr., and thus, she co-owned the
same together with her children, the Andrades. 23 In this respect, the sale was valid only
with respect to Rosarios pro-indiviso share in the subject properties and it cannot
prejudice the share of the Andrades since they did not consent to the sale. 24 In effect, a
resulting trust was created between Bobby and the Andrades 25 and, as such,
prescription and/or laches has yet to set in so as to bar them from instituting the instant
case.26Accordingly, the CA ordered Bobby to reconvey to the Andrades their share in the
subject
properties.27cralaw
virtualaw
library
In view of the CAs pronouncement, the parties filed their respective motions for
reconsideration. For the Andrades part, they sought the reconsideration of the CAs
finding as to its characterization of the subject transaction as one of sale, insisting that it
is actually an equitable mortgage. 28 As for Bobbys part, he maintained that the sale
should have covered the entirety of the subject properties and not only Rosarios proindiviso share.29 Both motions for reconsideration were, however, denied by the CA in a
Resolution30 dated
March
3,
2006.
Hence, the present consolidated petitions.
Issues Before the Court
The present controversy revolves around the CAs characterization of the subject
properties as well as of the subject transaction between Rosario and Bobby.
In G.R. No. 172017, the Andrades submit that the CA erred in ruling that the subject
transaction is in the nature of a sale, while in G.R. No. 171904, Bobby contends that the
CA erred in ruling that the subject properties are conjugal in nature.
The Courts Ruling
A.
Characterization
of
the
subject
transaction.
Settled is the rule that when the trial court's factual findings have been affirmed by the
CA, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon the Court, and may no
longer be reviewed on Rule 45 petitions. 31 While there exists exceptions to this rule
such as when the CAs and RTCs findings are in conflict with each other 32 the Court
observes that none applies with respect to the ruling that the subject transaction was
one of sale and not an equitable mortgage. Records readily reveal that both the RTC
and the CA observed that there is no clear and convincing evidence to show that the
parties agreed upon a mortgage. Hence, absent any glaring error therein or any other
compelling reason to hold otherwise, this finding should now be deemed as conclusive
and perforce must stand. As echoed in the case of Ampo v. CA:33cralaw virtualaw library
x x x Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not
reviewable by this Court and they carry even more weight when the Court of Appeals
affirms the factual findings of the trial court, and in the absence of any showing that the
findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the evidence on record, or that
they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such
findings must stand.34cralaw virtualaw library
Consequently, the Andrades petition in G.R. No. 172017 must therefore be denied.
B.
Characterization
of
the
subject
properties.
With respect to the nature of the subject properties, the courts a quo were at variance
such that the RTC, on the one hand, ruled that the said properties were exclusive
properties of Rosario,35 while the CA, on the other hand, pronounced that they are
conjugal in nature.36 In this regard, the consequent course of action would be for the
Court to conduct a re-examination of the evidence if only to determine which among the
two is correct, 37 as an exception to the proscription in Rule 45 petitions.
Pertinent to the resolution of this second issue is Article 160 of the Civil Code 38 which
states that [a]ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife. For this presumption to apply, the party invoking the same must, however,
preliminarily prove that the property was indeed acquired during the marriage. As held
in Go v. Yamane:39cralaw virtualaw library
x x x As a condition sine qua non for the operation of [Article 160] in favor of the
conjugal partnership, the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the
property
was
acquired
during
the
marriage.
In other words, the presumption in favor of conjugality does not operate if there is no
showing of when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, the
presumption may be rebutted only with strong, clear, categorical and convincing
evidence. There must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses,
and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it. 40 (Citations omitted)
Corollarily, as decreed in Valdez v. CA,41 the presumption under Article 160 cannot be
made to apply where there is no showing as to when the property alleged to be conjugal
was acquired:
x x x The issuance of the title in the name solely of one spouse is not determinative of
the conjugal nature of the property, since there is no showing that it was acquired during
the marriage of the Spouses Carlos Valdez, Sr. and Josefina L. Valdez. The
presumption under Article 160 of the New Civil Code, that property acquired during
marriage is conjugal, does not apply where there is no showing as to when the property
alleged to be conjugal was acquired. The presumption cannot prevail when the title is in
the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.
Moreover, when the property is registered in the name of only one spouse and there is
no showing as to when the property was acquired by same spouse, this is an indication
that
the
property
belongs
exclusively
to
the
said
spouse.
In this case, there is no evidence to indicate when the property was acquired by
petitioner Josefina. Thus, we agree with petitioner Josefinas declaration in the deed of
absolute sale she executed in favor of the respondent that she was the absolute and
sole owner of the property. x x x.42cralaw virtualaw library
In this case, records reveal that the conjugal partnership of Rosario and her husband
was terminated upon the latters death on August 7, 1978 43 while the transfer certificates
of title over the subject properties were issued on September 28, 1979 and solely in the
name of Rosario Vda. de Andrade, of legal age, widow, Filipino. 44 Other than their bare
allegation, no evidence was adduced by the Andrades to establish that the subject
properties were procured during the coverture of their parents or that the same were
bought with conjugal funds. Moreover, Rosarios declaration that she is the absolute
owner of the disputed parcels of land in the subject deed of sale 45 was not disputed by
her son Proceso, Jr., who was a party to the same. Hence, by virtue of these incidents,
the Court upholds the RTCs finding 46 that the subject properties were exclusive or sole
properties
of
Rosario.
Besides, the Court observes that laches had already set in, thereby precluding the
Andrades from pursuing their claim. Case law defines laches as the failure to assert a
right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. 47cralaw
virtualaw
library
Records disclose that the Andrades took 14 years before filing their complaint for
reconveyance in 1997. The argument that they did not know about the subject
transaction is clearly belied by the facts on record. It is undisputed that Proceso, Jr. was
a co-vendee in the subject deed of sale, 48 while Henry was an instrumental witness to
the Deed of Assignment49 and Option to Buy50 both dated July 26, 1983. Likewise,
Rosarios sons, Proceso, Jr. and Andrew, did not question the execution of the subject
deed of sale made by their mother to Bobby.51 These incidents can but only lead to the
conclusion that they were well-aware of the subject transaction and yet only pursued
their
claim
14
years
after
the
sale
was
executed.
Due to the above-stated reasons, Bobbys petition in G.R. No. 171904 is hereby
granted.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby (a) GRANTS the petition of Bobby Tan in G.R. No.
171904; and (b)DENIES the petition of Grace Andrade, Charity A. Santiago, Henry
Andrade, Andrew Andrade, Jasmin Blaza, Miriam Rose Andrade, and Joseph Andrade
in G.R. No. 172017. Accordingly, the Decision dated July 26, 2005 and Resolution dated
March 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71987 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the April 6, 2001 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19 in Civil Case No. CEB 20969 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
For example:
The shopping trolley was loaded high with bottles of beer, fruit, vegetables, toilet rolls,
cereals and cartons of milk.
Note that in a list, the final two items are linked by the word and rather than by a
comma.
Commas are used to separate adjectives.
For example:
The boy was happy, eager and full of anticipation at the start of his summer holiday.
As commas represent a pause, it is good practice to read your writing out loud and
listen to where you make natural pauses as you read it. More often than not, you will
indicate where a comma should be placed by a natural pause. Although, the rules of
where a comma needs to be placed should also be followed.
For example:
However, it has been suggested that some bees prefer tree pollen.
Full Stop (.)
A full stop should always be used to end a sentence. The full stop indicates that a
point has been made and that you are about to move on to further explanations or a
related point.
Less frequently, a series of three full stops (an ellipsis) can be used to indicate where a
section of a quotation has been omitted when it is not relevant to the text, for example:
The boy was happy at the start of his summer holiday.
A single full stop may also be used to indicate the abbreviation of commonly used words
as in the following examples:
Telephone Number = Tel. No.
September = Sept.
Pages = pp.
Exclamation Mark (!)
An exclamation mark indicates strong feeling within a sentence, such as fear, anger or
love. It is also used to accentuate feeling within the written spoken word.
For example:
Help! I love you!
In this way, it can also be used to indicate a sharp instruction
Stop! Police!
or to indicate humour
Ha! Ha! Ha!
The exclamation mark at the end of a sentence means that you do not need a full stop.
Exclamation marks are a poor way of emphasising what you think are important points
in your written assignments; the importance of the point will emphasise itself without a
sequence of !!! in the text. An exclamation mark should only be used when absolutely
essential, or when taken from a direct quote.
The exclamation mark should be used sparingly in formal and semi-formal writing.
Question Mark (?)
The question mark simply indicates that a sentence is asking a question. It always
comes at the end of a sentence:
For example:
Are we at the end?
Note that the question mark also serves as a full stop.
Semi-colon (;)
The semi-colon is perhaps the most difficult sign of punctuation to use accurately. If in
doubt, avoid using it and convert the added material into a new sentence.
As a general rule, the semi-colon is used in the following ways:
When joining two connected sentences.
For example:
We set out at dawn; the weather looked promising.
or
Assertive behaviour concerns being able to express feelings, wants and desires
appropriately; passive behaviour means complying with the wishes of others.
The semi-colon can also be used to assemble detailed lists.
For example:
The conference was attended by delegates from Paris, France; Paris, Texas; London,
UK; Stockholm, Sweden; Colombo, Sri Lanka; and Mumbai, India.
Colon (:)
The colon within a sentence makes a very pointed pause between two phrases. There
are two main uses of the colon:
It is most commonly used when listing.
For example:
She placed the following items into the trolley: beer, fruit, vegetables, toilet rolls, cereals
and cartons of milk.
Or it can be used within a heading, or descriptive title.
For example:
Human Resource Management: Guidelines for Telephone Advisers
Apostrophe ()
The apostrophe, sometimes called an inverted comma has two main uses.
The apostrophe indicates possession or ownership.
For example:
The girl's hat was green, (girl is in the singular).
This shows the reader that the hat belongs to the girl.
The girls' hats were green, (girls in this instance are plural, i.e. more than one girl, more
than one hat).
This indicates that the hats belong to the girls.
Another use of the apostrophe is to indicate where a letter is omitted:
For example:
We're going to do this course. (We are going to do this course.)
Isnt this a fine example of punctuation? (Is not this a fine example of punctuation?)
The time is now 7 o clock. (The time is now 7 of the clock)
Note that a common mistake is to confuse its with its.
Its indicates to the reader that a letter has been omitted.
For example:
Its a lovely day is an abbreviated way of saying: It is a lovely day.
Note that in most formal writing, the practice of using abbreviated words is
inappropriate.
See also: Common Mistakes in Writing for more on using apostrophes correctly.
Quotation or Speech Marks (.)
Quotation or speech marks are used to:
To mark out speech
When quoting someone else's speech
For example:
My grandpa said, "Share your chocolates with your friends."
"George, don't do that!"
"Will you get your books out please? said Mrs Jones, the teacher, and quieten down!"
It is worth noting that to report an event back does not require speech or quotation
marks.
For example:
Mrs Jones told the pupils to take out their books and to quieten down.
Hyphen (-)
The hyphen is used to link words together.
For example:
sub-part
eighteenth-century people
week-end
second-class post
gender-neutral
non-verbal
The hyphen is also used when a word is split between two lines. The hyphen should
be placed between syllables at the end of the upper line and indicates to the reader that
the word will be completed on the next line.
Computer applications such as Word Processors can be set to automatically hyphenate
words for you, although it is more common to use extra spacing to avoid hyphenation.
Brackets ( )
Brackets always come in pairs ( ) and are used to make an aside, or a point which is
not part of the main flow of a sentence. If you remove the words between the brackets,
the sentence should still make sense.
For example:
The strategy (or strategies) chosen to meet the objectives may need to change as the
intervention continues.
Another example is as follows:
We can define class as a large-scale grouping of people who share common economic
resources, that strongly influence the types of lifestyle they are able to lead. Ownership
of wealth, together with occupation, are the chief basis of class differences. The major
classes that exist in Western societies are an upper class (the wealthy, employers and
industrialists, plus tops executives those who own or directly control productive
resources); a middle class (which includes most white-collar workers and
professionals); and a working class (those in blue-collar or manual jobs). (Giddens,
1997, p.243)
Square Brackets []
A different set of square brackets [ ] can be used:
to abbreviate lengthy quotations
to correct the tense of a quotation to suit the tense of your own sentence
to add your own words to sections of an abbreviated quotation.
To abbreviate lengthy quotations in an essay or report
We can define class as a large-scale grouping of people who share common economic
resources, that strongly influence the types of lifestyle they are able to lead. Ownership
of wealth, together with occupation, are the chief basis of class differences. The major
classes that exist in Western societies are an upper class []; a middle class [] and a
working class [].
(Giddens, 1997, p.243)
Calimlim-Canullas v. Fortun
Facts:
Petitioner Mercedes Calimlim-Canullas and Fernando Canullas were married
in 1962, with 5 children, and were living on a house situated on a land
inherited by the latter. In 1978, Fernando abandoned his family and lived with
Corazon Daguines. In 1980, Fernando sold the house and lot to Daguines, who
initiated a complaint for quieting of title. Mercedes resisted, claiming that the
house and lot were conjugal properties, and the sale was null nad void for she
had not consented thereto.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the construction of a conjugal house on the exclusive
property of the husband ipso facto gave the land the character of conjugal
property
(2) Whether or not the sale of the lot together with the house and
improvements thereon was valid under the circumstances surrounding the
transaction
Held:
(1) Both the land and the building belong to the conjugal partnership but the
conjugal partnership is indebted to the husband for the value of the land. The
spouse owning the lot becomes a creditor of the conjugal partnership for the
value of the lot, which value would be reimbursed at the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership. FERNANDO could not have alienated the house and lot
to DAGUINES since MERCEDES had not given her consent to said sale.
(2) The contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to morals and
public policy. The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine after he
had abandoned his family and left the conjugal home where his wife and
children lived and from whence they derived their support. That sale was
subversive of the stability of the family, a basic social institution which public
policy cherishes and protects. The law emphatically prohibits the spouses
from selling property to each other subject to certain exceptions. Similarly,
donations between spouses during marriage are prohibited. And this is so
because if transfers or con conveyances between spouses were allowed during
marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy
in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by
one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the institution of marriage,
which is the cornerstone of family law. The prohibitions apply to a couple
living as husband and wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise, "the
condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in
legal union." Those provisions are dictated by public interest and their
criterion must be imposed upon the wig of the parties.
J contended that she had the right to be reimbursed for half of the cost of
the improvements on the lot which amounted to P500,000.
J sought from M and I moral and exemplary damages, litigation and
incidental expenses.
M and Is motion to dismiss was denied by RTC but was granted by CA for
failing to state a cause of action
Issue:
Whether or not J has the right to be reimbursed for half of the cost of
the improvements on the lot.
Held:
When the cost of the improvement, the entire property of one of the
spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement
of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the
improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the
owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the
improvement.
Respondents were the buyers of the property. Hence, they dont have
the obligation to respect petitioners right to be reimbursed
Short Summary: Former Laguna governor had 1st spouse who predeceased him,
then married again to an American citizen who divorced him, then remarried
again. He died with his 3rd wife but his 2nd wife and the children in the 1st
marriage contested the standing of the 3rd wife, claiming that the said marriage
was bigamous since the 2nd marriage was still subsisting under RP law (can't
apply FC retroactively). Court held that even with FC not applied retroactively,
Van Dorn and other jurisprudence sufficiently provides the validity to the 3rd
marriage, thus recognizing divorce obtained by an alien spouse against the
Filipino spouse. However, as the 3rd marriage was not sufficiently proved, the
case was remanded in order for the 3rd spouse to present further evidence on
this.
Facts
FELICISIMO SAN LUIS contracted 3 marriages:
1.
VIRGINIA SULIT: had 6 children, died before he did in 1963
1.
MERRY LEE CORWIN: US citizen, had son Tobias, divorced him before
Hawaiian courts which was granted in 1973
1.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS SAN LUIS: married before a Presbyterian
Church in California n 1974, lived with him until he died for 18 years in
their Alabang residence
Pana v Heirs of Jose Juanite, Sr. and Jose Juanite, Jr. December 10, 2012 FACTS:
The prosecution accused Efren Pana, his wife Melencia, and others of murder before
the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, and eventually a decision was rendered
acquitting Efren of the charge for insufficiency of evidence but finding Melencia and
another person guilty as charged and was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court
affirmed RTCs decision but modified the penalty to Reclusion Perpetua. As for the
monetary awards, the court affirmed the award of civil indemnity and moral damages
but deleted the award for actual damages for lack of evidentiary basis. In its place the
court made an award of php15, 000 each by way of temperate damages. In addition,
the court awarded Php50, 000.00 exemplary damages per victim to be paid solidarily by
them. The decision became executory of October 1, 2001. Upon motion for execution
by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ resulting in the
levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melencia. Subsequently, a
notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution were issued. On April 3, 2002, Efren and
his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution claiming that the properties
levied were conjugal assets and not paraphernal of Melecia. On September 16, 2002,
the RTC denied the motion. The spouses moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied
the same. In this case, it is submitted that Efren and Melencia were married when the
Civil Code was still in effect. They did not execute a pre-nuptial agreement, hence CPG
governed their property relations. However, both RTC and CA held that property regime
changed into ACP when family code took effect it reason out that Art. 256 of the Family
Code provides that the Code shall have retroactive effect in so far as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws. Both the RTC and the Court of the Appeals are in error on this point. While it is
true that the personal stakes of each spouses in their conjugal assets are inchoate or
unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of hains and, therefore none
of them can be said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets , it is evident that
Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to reac back and automatically convert
into absolute community of property relations all conjugal partnership of gains that
existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melencia can be levied
and
executed upon for the satisfaction of Melencias civil liability in the aforesaid murder
case.
SUPREME COURT: YES, provided that the conditions under Article 121 of the Family
Code have been covered.
First of all, the Supreme Court explained that it is clear from the facts that Efren and
Melencia were married when the Civil code was still the operative law on marriages.
The presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary, is that they were married under
the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. Furthermore, Article 119 of the Civil Code
provides that the future spouses main in marriage settlements agree upon absolute or
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains or upon a complete separation of
property, or upon any other regime. The family code itself provides in Article 76 that
marriage settlements cannot be modified except prior to marriage, and clearly, under
this situation, the spouses cannot modify their regime. Post marriage modification of
settlements can take place only where (a) the absolute community or conjugal
partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal separation; (b) the
spouses who were legally separated reconciled and agreed to revive their former
property regime; (c)judicial separation of property had been had on the ground that a
spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply with his obligations to
the family; (d) there was judicial separation of property under article 135; (e) the
spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution of their absolute community
or conjugal partnership of gains. None of these circumstances exists in this case.
Furthermore, Article 119 provides as well, that in the absence of marriage settlements,
or when the same is void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of
gains established under the civil code shall govern the property regime of the spouses.
the family code contains terms governing the conjugal partnership of gains that
supersede the terms of the conjugal partnership of gains under the civil code. Article
105 of the family code states that the provisions of such chapter on the conjugal
partnership of gains shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already
established between spouses before the affectivity of this code, without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the civil or other laws as provided in
Article 256.
The information disclosed that Jose Ros (petitioner) obtained a loan of P115,000 from
ONB and executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land as security thereof.
Upon maturity, the loan remained unpaid and as a result, PNB initiated extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the said property. After which, the lot was sold to PNB as
the highest bidder. Petitioner claims that she had no knowledge of the loan incurred by
her husband nor did she consent to the mortgage instituted on their conjugal property.
She then filed a complaint to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale
and consolidation of the property (after the lapse of 1 year). The trial court rendered its
decision in favor of petitioners but was later reversed by the appellate court upon
appeal.
ISSUE: WON the property is considered as redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the contract. From
the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the
loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is
immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply
stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the
law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
Ros loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence, the
debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
his retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticias cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila
Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of Franciscos house
as well as the store inside.
According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the
same room. On the other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco
claimed that the latter told her that Cirila was his mistress. However, Cirila
defensed herself that she was a mere helper who could enter the masters
bedroom when Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for her.
She denied having sexual intercourse with Francisco. When the nieces got
married, Cirila who was then 34 year-old widow started working for Francisco
who was 75 year old widower. The latter did not pay him any wages as
househelper though her family was provided with food and lodging. Franciscos
health deteriorated and became bedridden. Tabancura testified that Franciscos
only source of income was the rentals from his lot near the public streets.
In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150
sq m., together with his house to Cirila who accepted the same. The larger
portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name. This was made in consideration of
the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner. Atty Lacaya notarized the deed
and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.
In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a
market value of P57,105 and assessed value of P28,550. The decedents
nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession alleged that Cirila was
the common-law wife of Francisco.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in
Arcabas favor was valid.
HELD:
The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship
wherein donation is not valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony of
Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of Cirila Comille such
as application for business permit, sanitary permit and the death certificate of
Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication
that she was not simply a caregiver employee.
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the
parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least,
cohabitation is a public assumption of men and women holding themselves out
to the public as such.
Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of
the Family Code.
In October 1995, Edna Lindo obtained a loan amounting to P400k from Arturo Flores. To
secure the loan, Edna executed a deed of real estate mortgage on a property which is
however part of the conjugal property (it was both in her name and her husbands name
Enrico Lindo). Only Edna signed the deed. But in November 1995, Enrico executed a
special power of attorney authorizing Edna to mortgage the property.
Edna was not able to pay the loan despite repeated demands from Flores. Flores then filed
an action to foreclose the mortgage.
The trial court (RTC Manila, Branch 33) ruled that the action for foreclosure cannot prosper
because it appears that there was no valid mortgage between Edna and Flores. Edna
mortgaged the property without the consent of her husband and the special power of
attorney executed by Enrico a month after the execution of the deed did not cure the defect.
The trial court however ruled that Flores can instead file a personal action (collection suit)
against Edna.
Eventually, Flores filed a suit for collection of sum of money against Edna and Enrico
(raffled to RTC Manila, Branch 42). The Lindo spouses filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of res judicata. The trial court denied the motion. The spouses then filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The CA ruled in favor of the spouses. It ruled that when Flores filed an action for the
foreclosure of the mortgage, he had abandoned the remedy of filing a personal action to
collect the indebtedness. These remedies are mutually exclusive.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: No. It is true that as a rule, a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action against
a mortgagor-debtor, that is, to recover the debt; and that he has the option of either filing a
personal action for collection of sum of money or instituting a real action to foreclose on the
mortgage security. These remedies are indeed mutually exclusive. However, in this case,
the Supreme Court made a pro hac vice decision (applicable only to this case and as an
exception to the rule) which allows Flores to recover via a personal action despite his prior
filing of a real action to recover the indebtedness. This procedural rule cannot be
outweighed by the rule on unjust enrichment. Here, Edna admitted her liability of
indebtedness.
Further, the ruling of the Manila RTC Branch 33 is erroneous when it ruled that the
mortgage between Edna and Flores is invalid. It is true that a disposition (or in this case a
mortgage, which is an act of strict dominion) of a conjugal property by one spouse without
the consent of the other spouse is VOID. However, under the second paragraph of Article
124 of the Family Code:
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority
of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus it is clear, the mortgage was void at the outset but it was ratified when a month later,
Enrico executed a special power of attorney authorizing Edna to mortgage the subject
property. (So I guess this is an exception to the rule that no void act can be ratified.)