1NCCritique

The 1ACs security discourse forwards an atomistic approach to global problems

within orthodox IR that makes extinction inevitable
Ahmed 12 Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an
independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, he has taught at the Department of International Relations,
University of Sussex "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity
to the militarisation of society" Global Change, Peace & Security Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011 Taylor Francis 3. From securitisation to
militarisation 3.1 Complicity
This analysis thus calls for a broader approach to environmental security based on retrieving the manner in which political

actors construct discourses of 'scarcity' in response to ecological, energy and economic

crises (critical security studies) in the context of the historically-specific socio-political and
geopolitical relations of domination by which their power is constituted , and which are often
implicated in the acceleration of these very crises (historical sociology and historical materialism).
Instead, both realist and liberal orthodox IR approaches focus on different aspects of interstate behaviour,
conflictual and cooperative respectively, but each lacks the capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state
behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider global system concurrently over-exploiting the biophysical environment in
which it is embedded. They are, in other words, unable

to address the relationship of the inter-state system

itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the
acceleration of global crises. They simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the economy in society
and the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics. Hence, they neglect the profound irrationality of
collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this relationship, globalising
insecurity on a massive scale - in the very process of seeking security .85 In Cox's words,
because positivist IR theory 'does not question the present order [it instead] has the effect
of legitimising and reifying it'.86 Orthodox IR sanitises globally-destructive collective
inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason -thus rationalising what
are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently
erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence . Indeed, the
prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making
in the international system highlights the extent to which both realism

and liberalism are ideologically

implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises. By the same token, the
incapacity to recognise and critically interrogate how prevailing social, political and
economic structures are driving global crisis acceleration has led to the proliferation of
symptom-led solutions focused on the expansion of state/regime military-political power
rather than any attempt to transform root structural causes.88 It is in this context that, as the
prospects for meaningful reform through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nullified
under the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining prevailing geopolitical and economic structures, states have
resorted progressively more to militarised responses designed to protect the concurrent structure of the
international system from dangerous new threats. In effect, the failure of orthodox approaches to accurately
diagnose global crises, directly accentuates a tendency to 'securitise' them - and this,
ironically, fuels the proliferation of violent conflict and militarisation responsible for magnified global
insecurity. 'Securitisation' refers to a 'speech act' - an act of labelling - whereby political authorities
identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going
beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By
labelling issues a matter of 'security', therefore, states

are able to move them outside the remit of democratic

decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival itself.
Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper 'dual' structure of
the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal militarypolice measures in purported response to an existential danger. The problem in the context of
global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels of emergency mobilisation and

militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises generating 'new security
challenges', and are thus entirely disproportionate.90 All that remains to examine is on the 'surface'
of the international system (geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on),

phenomena which are dislocated from their structural causes by way of being unable to
recognise the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social relations of which they
are comprised. The consequence is that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global
systemic crises other than to reduce them to their symptoms. Indeed, orthodox IR theory
has largely responded to global systemic crises not with new theory, but with the
expanded application of existing theory to 'new security challenges' such as 'lowintensity' intra-state conflicts; inequality and poverty; environmental degradation;
international criminal activities including drugs and arms trafficking; proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction; and international terrorism.91 Although the majority of such 'new security
challenges' are non-military in origin - whether their referents are states or individuals - the inadequacy of systemic
theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily examined through the
lenses of military-political power.92 In other words, the escalation of global ecological,
energy and economic crises is recognised not as evidence that the current organisation of the
global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable , requiring urgent transformation, but as
vindicating the necessity for states to radicalise the exertion of their military-political capacities
to maintain existing power structures, to keep the lid on.93 Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying
factors that could mobilise the popular will in ways that challenge existing political and economic structures, which it is presumed
(given that state power itself is constituted by these structures) deserve protection. This justifies the state's adoption of extra-legal

this counter-democratic trendline can result in a growing propensity to problematise potentially recalcitrant populations rationalising violence toward them as a control mechanism. Consequently, for the most part, the policy
implications of orthodox IR approaches involve a redundant conceptualisation of global
systemic crises purely as potential 'threat-multipliers' of traditional security issues such as
'political instability around the world, the collapse of governments and the creation of terrorist
safe havens'. Climate change will serve to amplify the threat of international terrorism, particularly in regions with large
populations and scarce resources. The US Army, for instance, depicts climate change as a 'stressmultiplier' that will 'exacerbate tensions' and 'complicate American foreign policy'; while the EU perceives it as a
'threat-multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability'.95 In practice, this generates an excessive
preoccupation not with the causes of global crisis acceleration and how to ameliorate them through structural
transformation, but with their purportedly inevitable impacts, and how to prepare for them
by controlling problematic populations. Paradoxically, this 'securitisation' of global crises does
not render us safer. Instead, by necessitating more violence, while inhibiting preventive
action, it guarantees greater insecurity. Thus, a recent US Department of Defense report explores the future
measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics. In the context of global crisis impacts,

of international conflict up to 2050. It warns of 'resource competition induced by growing populations and expanding economies',
particularly due to a projected 'youth bulge' in the South, which 'will consume ever increasing amounts of food, water and energy'.
This will prompt a 'return to traditional security threats posed by emerging near-peers as we compete globally for depleting natural
resources and overseas markets'. Finally, climate change will 'compound' these stressors by generating humanitarian crises,
population migrations and other complex emergencies.96 A similar study by the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the
danger of global energy depletion through to 2030. Warning of the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents, the
report concludes that The implications for future conflict are ominous.97 Once again, the subject turns to demographics: In total,
the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s, 95 per cent accruing to
developing countries, while populations in developed countries slow or decline. Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan
Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conflict.98 The
assumption is that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and Muslim-majority will also be sites of violent conflict due to their
rapidly growing populations. A British Ministry of Defence report concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable youth
bulge by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of 25 inhabiting developing countries. In particular, the Middle
East population will increase by 132 per cent and sub-Saharan Africa by 81 per cent. Growing resentment due to endemic
unemployment will be channelled through political militancy, including radical political Islam whose concept of Umma, the global
Islamic community, and resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international system based on nation-states and global
market forces. More strangely, predicting an intensifying global divide between a super-rich elite, the middle classes and an urban
under-class, the report warns: The worlds middle classes might unite, using access to knowledge, resources and skills to shape

transnational processes in their own class interest.99 Thus, the

securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the

problematisation of particular religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical
interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to any social group which might challenge
prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The previous examples illustrate how
secur-itisation paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a process of
militarization against social groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical
and economic order. In other words, the internal reductionism, fragmentation and
compartmentalisation that plagues orthodox theory and policy reproduces precisely these characteristics by
externalising global crises from one another, externalising states from one another, externalising the inter-state system
from its biophysical environment, and externalising new social groups as dangerous 'outsiders*. Hence, a simple discursive
analysis of state militarisation and the construction of new "outsider* identities is insufficient to
understand the causal dynamics driving the process of 'Otherisation' . As Doug Stokes points out, the
Western state preoccupation with the ongoing military struggle against international terrorism
reveals an underlying 'discursive complex", where representations about terrorism and
non-Western populations are premised on 'the construction of stark boundaries* that 'operate to
exclude and include*. Yet these exclusionary discourses are 'intimately bound up with political
and economic processes', such as strategic interests in proliferating military bases in the
Middle East, economic interests in control of oil, and the wider political goal of 'maintaining
American hegemony* by dominating a resource-rich region critical for global
capitalism.100 But even this does not go far enough, for arguably the construction of certain hegemonic
discourses is mutually constituted by these geopolitical, strategic and economic interests
exclusionary discourses are politically constituted. New conceptual developments in genocide studies throw
further light on this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It is now widely recognised, for
instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of primordial groups, one of which destroys the other
on the basis of a preeminence in bureaucratic military-political power. Rather, genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a
particular social group that has been socially constructed as different. As Hinton observes, genocides precisely constitute a process of
'othering* in which an imagined community becomes reshaped so that previously 'included* groups become 'ideologically recast'
and dehumanised as threatening and dangerous outsiders, be it along ethnic, religious, political or economic lines eventually

legitimising their annihilation.102 In other words, genocidal violence is inherently rooted in

a prior and ongoing ideological process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated ,
constructed and 'Otherised' in accordance with a specific socio-political programme . The very process of
identifying and classifying particular groups as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of 'inclusion*, justifying
exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without which genocide would be impossible.1 3 This recalls Lemkin's
recognition that the intention

to destroy a group is integrally connected with a wider socio-political

project - or colonial project designed to perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological
relations of the perpetrators in the place of that of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating
their means of social reproduction. Only by interrogating the dynamic and origins of this
programme to uncover the social relations from which that programme derives can the
emergence of genocidal intent become explicable. Building on this insight, Semelin demonstrates that the
process of exclusionary social group construction invariably derives from political processes emerging from deep-seated
sociopolitical crises that undermine the prevailing framework of civil order and social norms; and which can, for one social group, be
seemingly resolved by projecting anxieties onto a new 'outsider' group deemed to be somehow responsible for crisis conditions.

in this context that various forms of mass violence, which may or may not eventually
culminate in actual genocide, can become legitimised as contributing to the
resolution of crises.105

It is

Their expertism masks politically constructed scenarios as objective this

privileges insulated decision-making authority causes deference to the executive
turns case and results in endless militarism
Aziz Rana 12, Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School; A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Yale Law School; PhD.,
Harvard University, July 2012, NATIONAL SECURITY: LEAD ARTICLE: Who Decides on Security?, 44 Conn. L. Rev. 1417
Despite such democratic concerns, a large part of what

makes today's dominant security concept so

compelling are two purportedly objective sociological claims about the nature of modern
threat. As these claims undergird the current security concept, this conclusion assesses them
more directly and, in the process, indicates what they suggest about the prospects for any future
reform. The first claim is that global interdependence means that the United States faces near
continuous threats from abroad. Just as Pearl Harbor presented a physical attack on the homeland justifying a revised
framework, the American position in the world since has been one of permanent insecurity in the face of
new, equally objective dangers. Although today these threats no longer come from menacing totalitarian regimes like
Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, they nonetheless create a world of chaos and instability in which
American domestic peace is imperiled by decentralized terrorists and aggressive rogue states.
n310 [*1486] Second, and relatedly, the objective complexity of modern threats makes it impossible
for ordinary citizens to comprehend fully the causes and likely consequences of existing dangers.
Thus, the best response is the further entrenchment of the national security state, with the U.S.
military permanently mobilized to gather intelligence and to combat enemies wherever
they strike-at home or abroad. Accordingly, modern legal and political institutions that privilege
executive authority and insulated decision-making are simply the necessary consequence of
these externally generated crises. Regardless of these trade-offs, the security benefits of an
empowered presidency-one armed with countless secret and public agencies as well as with a truly global military footprint
n311 -greatly outweigh the costs. Yet although these sociological views have become commonplace, the conclusions
that Americans should draw about security requirements are not nearly as clear cut as the
conventional wisdom assumes. In particular, a closer examination of contemporary arguments
about endemic danger suggests that such claims are not objective empirical judgments,
but rather are socially complex and politically infused interpretations. Indeed, the openness of existing
circumstances to multiple interpretations of threat implies that the presumptive need for secrecy and centralization is not selfevident. And as underscored by high profile failures in expert assessment, claims

to security expertise are themselves

riddled with ideological presuppositions and subjective biases. All this indicates that the gulf
between elite knowledge and lay incomprehension in matters of security may be far less
extensive than is ordinarily thought. It also means that the question of who decides -and with it the
issue of how democratic or insular our institutions should be- remains open as well. Clearly, technological changes,
from airpower to biological and chemical weapons, have shifted the nature of America's position
in the [*1487] world and its potential vulnerability. As has been widely remarked for nearly a century, the oceans
alone cannot guarantee our permanent safety. Yet in truth, they never fully ensured domestic tranquility. The nineteenth century
was one of near continuous violence, especially with indigenous communities fighting to protect their territory from expansionist
settlers. n312 But

even if technological shifts make doomsday scenarios more chilling than those
faced by Hamilton, Jefferson, or Taney, the mere existence of these scenarios tells us
little about their likelihood or how best to address them. Indeed, these latter security
judgments are inevitably permeated with subjective political assessments-assessments that
carry with them preexisting ideological points of view -such as regarding how much risk constitutional societies
should accept or how interventionist states should be in foreign policy. In fact, from its emergence in the 1930s and 1940s,
supporters of the modern security concept have-at times unwittingly-reaffirmed the political rather than purely objective nature of
interpreting external threats. In particular, commentators have repeatedly noted the link between the idea of insecurity and
America's post- World War II position of global primacy, one which today has only expanded following the Cold War. n313 In 1961,
none other than Senator James William Fulbright declared, in terms reminiscent of Herring and Frankfurter, that security
imperatives meant that "our basic constitutional machinery, admirably suited to the needs of a remote agrarian republic in the 18th
century," was no longer "adequate" for the "20th-century nation." n314 For Fulbright, the driving impetus behind the need to
jettison antiquated constitutional practices was the importance of sustaining the country's "pre-eminen[ce] in political and military

power." n315 Fulbright believed that greater executive action and war- making capacities were essential precisely because the United
States found itself "burdened with all the enormous responsibilities that accompany such power." n316 According to Fulbright, the
United States had [*1488] both a right and a duty to suppress those forms of chaos and disorder that existed at the edges of
American authority. n317 Thus, rather than being purely objective, the

American condition of permanent danger

was itself deeply tied to political calculations about the importance of global primacy. What
generated the condition of continual crisis was not only technological change, but also the belief
that the United States' own national security rested on the successful projection of power into the
internal affairs of foreign states. The key point is that regardless of whether one agrees with such an
underlying project, the value of this project is ultimately an open political question . This
suggests that whether distant crises should be viewed as generating insecurity at home is
similarly as much an interpretative judgment as an empirically verifiable conclusion.
n318 To appreciate the open nature of security determinations, one need only look at the presentation of terrorism as a principle and
overriding danger facing the country. According to National Counterterrorism Center's 2009 Report on Terrorism, in 2009 there

While the
fear of a terrorist attack is a legitimate concern, these numbers-which have been consistent in
recent years-place the gravity of the threat in perspective. Rather than a condition of endemic
danger-requiring ever-increasing secrecy and centralization-such facts are perfectly consistent with a reading
that Americans do not face an existential crisis (one presumably comparable to Pearl Harbor) and actually
were just twenty-five U.S. noncombatant fatalities from terrorism worldwide-nine abroad and sixteen at home. n319

enjoy relative security. Indeed, the disconnect between numbers and resources expended, especially in a time of profound economic
insecurity, highlights the political choice of policymakers and citizens to persist in interpreting foreign events through a World War
II and early Cold War lens of permanent threat. In fact, the continuous alteration of basic constitutional values to fit national
security aims emphasizes just how entrenched Herring's old vision of security as pre-political and foundational has become,
regardless of whether other interpretations of the present moment may be equally compelling. It also underscores a telling and often
ignored point about the nature of [*1489] modern security expertise, particularly as reproduced by the United States' massive
intelligence infrastructure. To

the extent that political assumptions-like the centrality of global primacy

or the view that instability abroad necessarily implicates security at home-shape the
interpretative approach of executive officials, what passes as objective security expertise is itself
intertwined with contested claims about how to view external actors and their
motivations. These assumptions mean that while modern conditions may well be complex, the
conclusions of the presumed experts may not be systematically less liable to subjective bias than
judgments made by ordinary citizens based on publicly available information. It further underlines that the
question of who decides cannot be foreclosed in advance by simply asserting deference to
elite knowledge. If anything, one can argue that the presumptive gulf between elite awareness and
suspect mass opinion has generated its own very dramatic political and legal pathologies. In recent
years, the country has witnessed a variety of security crises built on the basic failure of
"expertise." n320 At present, part of what obscures this fact is the very culture of secret information
sustained by the modern security concept. Today, it is commonplace for government officials to leak security material about
terrorism or external threats to newspapers as a method of shaping the public debate. n321 These "open" secrets allow greater public
access to elite information and embody a central and routine instrument for incorporating mass voice into state decision-making.

Vote neg to reject the 1ACs enframingonly this accesses a healthy middle ground
that reevaluates problematisation
Cheeseman & Bruce 96 (Graeme Cheeseman, Snr. Lecturer @ New South Wales, and Robert Bruce, 1996, Discourses
of Danger & Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9)
This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even
though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends
that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The

inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the

enclosed, elitist world of profession security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is
gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to
this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its knowledge form
as reality in debates on defense and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only

through a long overdue critical re-evaluating of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democraticallyoriented perspectives on Australias identity are both required and essential if Australias thinking on
defense and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it
be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat
alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is
itself a considerable part of the problem to be analyzed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that
questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of
real knowledge on defense and security exist independently of their context in the world, and it
demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that
knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom . All others, from this perspective,
must accept such wisdom to remain outside of the expert domain, tainted by their inability to
comply with the rightness of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at the least its image
of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand
for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in
the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it
ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must
have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that
knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation
in contemporary liberal democracies, which during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy
precisely because they were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one

of the major differences

between open societies and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the
former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and
assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited
occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For
others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it means that for society to become open and
liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. One must be able to
say why to power and proclaim no to power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to
this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic
trappings, Australias security

community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on

defense and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that informs
conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is
integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The

book also calls on policy-makers,

academics and students of defense and security to think critically about what they are reading,
writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions
raised in other disciplines; to recognize, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is
involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but
a realization that terms and concepts state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on
are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is
written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions
can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications
for policymakers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia
through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years . There is also much
interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now
demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible
human costs of international violence. This

is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the
worlds ills in general, or Australias security in particular. There are none. Ever chapter, however in its own way, offers
something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defense and security mind-sets that are
dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defense practice.
Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8) seek to alert policymakers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities that
might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All

chapters confront
the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the

intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid
dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between
policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the
words and the thought process of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws
attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A
sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for
alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific
polices may follow. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not as much at contending policies as they
are made for us but challenging the discursive process which gives [favored interpretations of
reality] their meaning and which direct [Australias] policy/analytical/ military responses. This
process is not restricted to the small, official defense and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in
Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australias academic defense and security community located primarily though not
exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These
discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and
closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australias security community. They also question the discourse of regional
security, security cooperation, peacekeeping and alliance politics that are central to Australias official and academic security
agenda in the 1990s. This

is seen as an important task especially when, as it revealed, the disciplines of

International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical
debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found
in Australian defense and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australias public policies on defense
and security are informed, underpinned, and. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci
and Edward Saids critical intellectuals. The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy makers frame of
reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly
associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western legitimized by a narrowly-based intellectual
enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn
seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australias policy-makers and their
academic advisers are unaware of broader intellectual debates. Or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why? To
summarize: a central concern of this book is to democratize the defense and security theory/practice process in Australia so that
restrictions on debate can be understood and resisted. This

is a crucial enterprise in an analytical/ policy

environment dominated by particularly rigid variants of realism which have become so powerful
and unreflective that they are no longer recognized simply as particular ways of constituting the
world, but as descriptions of the real-as reality itself. The consequences of this (silenced) theory-aspractice may be viewed every day in the poignant, distressing monuments to analytical/policy metooism at the Australian (Imperial)

These
are the flesh and blood installments of an insurance policy strategy which, tragically, remains
integral to Australian realism, despite claims of a new mature independent identity in the 1990s. This is what unfortunately,
continues to be at stake in the potentially deadly debates over defense and security revealed in
this book. For this reason alone, it should be regarded as a positive and constructive
contribution to debate by those who are the targets of its criticisms.
War Memorial in Canberra and the many other monuments to young Australians in towns and cities around the country.

This comes first teaching fear is the infusion point of militarism justifies
perpetual war, colonialism, and academic racism rejection destabilizes the
foundations of interventionism
Nguyen 14 [Nicole, Department of Cultural Foundations of Education at Syracuse University, January 21, Education as
Warfare?: Mapping Securitised Education Interventions as War on Terror Strategy, Vol. 1 No. 1, pg. 20-6]
Since September 11, the

US has renewed its focus on domestic education as a critical component of

protecting national and economic security. This focus includes shifting instruction and curricula toward
preparing students for the military and security industry, infusing ideas of security and safety
into school culture, militarising school space through the implementation of techniques like zero

tolerance policies and surveillance cameras, and teaching students these dominant
representations of the brown Other. In this articulation of the role of schools, ghting the war on terror
begins at home in our public schools, which conscript students into the war effort by
educating them for war and perpetuating fear and anxiety. Such measures are not new
in the post-9 / 11 US security state. Jackson reminds us that educational policies in the United States have been
integrally related to social and economic policies, with domestic and foreign interests linked
inextricably. 112 Following Sputnik , there was a massive infusion of money to enhance the
curriculum of high schools, with a greater emphasis on math and the sciences as well as foreign language instruction in
order to globally compete economically and militarily. 113 Means offers that connections between public
education, crisis, and national security are nothing new in the United States. Cold War anxieties
and concerns over national security provided inspiration for Dwight Eisenhowers National
Education Defense Act (NDEA) in 1958 . . . 114 Three years later the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961 promised to bolster
language and area studies expertise of American students and faculty and to increase understanding and mutual cooperation
between the people of the United States and the people of other countries and to strengthen the ties which unite us with other
nations by demonstrating the educational and cultural interests, developments, and achievements of the people of the United States
and other nations in order to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the United States
and the other countries of the world. 115 In other words, by sending US educators abroad, Fulbright-Hays operated as both a
diplomacy project and an effort in spreading American ideals, values, market economy and epistemologies. David Austell, while
supporting this assertion, argues that these education initiatives work more insidiously in relation to the US war agenda:
International education in the United States has its roots rmly planted in views of homeland security stemming from the Cold
War, and its role and effectiveness as a foil to a purely militaristic foreign policy has changed very little in the intervening sixty
years. 116 Further, Webber, in tracing the genealogy of the use of US domestic public education as a means to warehouse and resocialise immigrants, argues that the

democratic school [in the US] has always been as instrument

of the security state. This is by no means a new idea, pace 9 / 11 . . . . Schools have always been a
hegemonic tool of the security state as schooling by which Ivan Illich understood it to be a process of
training people to believe in the legitimacy of the states orders. 117 The late nineteenth-century
warehousing of Native Americans in white boarding schools in the United States also served to assimilate populations wholesale to
defuse the threat they putatively posed. In present day, such historical efforts an esthetise contemporary educational projects abroad

recent
domestic school reforms rely on fear and insecurity to justify and legitimise reforms that situate
schools squarely in line with the war agenda. Former Chancellor of New York Citys Department of Education Joel
as purely apolitical aid, and provide the humanitarian veneer necessary to continue such efforts. Following this history,

Klein and former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice explain in their 2012 U.S. Education Reform and National Security commissioned report that far too many U.S. schools are failing to teach students the academic skills . . . they need to succeed and, as
such, . . . Americas failure to educate is affecting national security . 118 The Report specically calls for a focus on job training in
math and science human capital development in order to continue to protect and defend the US homeland and economy. This
follows The U.S. Commission on National Security / 21st Century report (Phase III: Roadmap for National Security: Imperative for
Change, Journeys through the Teacher Pipeline addendum, 2001). 119 This report names education as a national security
imperative where [US] education in science, mathematics, and engineering has special relevance for the future of U.S. national
security, for Americas ability to lead . . . 120 Such discourses

around national and economic in/security, risk,

and education do much work to continue to authorise and justify particular school reform
efforts intended to train and recruit students for war and work in the multi-billion dollar
security industry. Following this logic, schools are transformed from a public good to a security risk.
121 Such preparation contributes to the warmachine. 122 Since the Cold War, the US has
increasingly militarised schools, reective of the larger push of militarisation the privileging of the
military and military logics in everyday day life in the US. Militarising and securitising education means that schools adopt harsh

While
fear of nuclear warfare dotted US school curriculum and pedagogy during the Cold War, the global
war on terrorism has continued to reshape US public education. Indeed, since the Cold War,
disciplinary policies, regulate student movement and mobility, and teach students to value and privilege military doctrine.

US cities increasingly militarise, police, and fortify schools and children. 123 In 2008, several greater-DC area counties and their
school districts formed the Mid-Atlantic Homeland Security Network of Educators (MHSNE) in order to respond to the regions
critical shortage of skilled homeland security workers by working to create a kindergarten to career pipeline aimed at training young

The
Network does so by partnering homeland security and emergency preparedness professionals
with educators to develop curriculum together. Such school-industry partnerships
people to work in the homeland security industry in public high schools re-designed to meet security industry needs.

engender a neoliberal militarised and securitised form of education aimed at

training future workers to defend and protect the homeland from the brown Other.
Based on preliminary eldwork I conducted atone such high school, students built rockets with representatives from NASA, learned
to protect nuclear reactors from a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission engineer, and discussed important military weaponry
from AR 15s to Desert Eagles to Remotely Operated Weapons Systems (ROWS). A local base commander congratulated students for
their participation in the homeland security programme, citing this passage from Heinleins military-science novel Starship
Troopers delineating the differences between mere civilian and citizen: The difference lies in the eld of civic virtue. A citizen
accepts personal responsibility for the safety of the body politic, of which he is a member, defending it, if need be, with his life. The
civilian does not. The commander applauded students: You are taking a very large step from walking down the road as a civilian in
the greatest country in the world to a citizen making a difference. 124 In this way public

schools and staff

communicate to students certain versions of militarised citizenship, security, and terrorism that
both perpetuate fear and representations of the brown Other and call them to action as
citizen[s] making a difference by learning to defend the greatest country in the world with
their lives. Perhaps less noticeably, students learned to valorise the military with the JROTC Color Guard
opening meetings, military and security industry banners hanging in the hallway, the encouragement of teachers to discuss guns and
weaponry, the presence

of military gures in their school, the valuing of hyper-masculinities noted

by a knowledge of weapons and military war history, the continual reference to America as the
greatest and freest nation in the country, the perpetual suggestion of bad guys out there
threatening the US, and the framing of military action as the only means to security. US students in
these types of schools are not only drafted as foot soldiers in the war on terror, they are also taught to view the world
according to these hegemonic imaginative geographies. For example, while watching a lm on teen violence,
students remarked, Well, that explains it! when a young brown boy opened a Quran to pray. Students articulated what
they had learned in class and in everyday life in the US: Islam and brown skin communicated
danger and violence. Nationally, the greater DC areas public schools are not alone in their current efforts to supply the
security industry with skilled workers and, historically, such school reforms merely serve as another node on the longer genealogy of
US educations role in supporting military agendas. While these programmes intend to (and do) engage students with hands-on

the inuence of
neoliberal and securitised logic is readily apparent. Students, for example, learned about parabolas
by pretending to be snipers needing to nd and hit their target, North Korea. They shadowed workers at the Defense
lessons, eld trips, and guest lecturers as well as make them marketable for the booming US security industry,

Information Systems Agency (DISA) and secured internships at the National Security Agency (NSA). This type of education excited
students through these hands-on opportunities and lessons seemingly readily applicable to everyday life and future job
opportunities. The

heightened attention toward security that has shaped US school reform projects
means that children develop securitized subjectivities as they are prepared for the long
war. In other words, young people enrolled in these programmes develop a sense of self dened by
heightened fear, anxiety, and uncertainty of an unknown threat. This normalised apprehension
and subsequent practices of militarism are justied in the name of US and personal
safety and security. 125 Building US public schools around a militarised interpretation of
homeland security relies on the aforementioned scenes of legibility that map terror and threat
onto brown bodies. Given this putative threat, students must arm and prepare to enter the
homeland security workforce. These priorities shift the purpose of education away from
fostering critical thinking for democratic participation to training young people for the war on
terror. Corporations partner with public high schools, donating dollars and expertise in order to
ensure a pipeline of diverse talent needed for our future workforce. 126 Northrop Grumman
allocated $20.9 of its $28.2 mil-lion philanthropic donations toward the development of STEM
education across the nation, its core philanthropic focus according to its 2011 Corporate Responsibility Report. Northrop
Grumman argues that supporting STEM initiatives is critical for our business and for U.S. competitiveness, so weve embraced
programs that we think will help build a diverse employee pipeline. 127 For Northrop Grumman, the development of and
investment in STEM K-16 education programmes ensure the health and life of the business and the security of the homeland. Such
school reform projects follow calls from the US state to improve STEM education. The U.S. Commission on National Security / 21st
Century outlines, for instance that to ensure the vitality of all its core institutions, the United States must make it a priority of
national policy to improve the quality of primary and secondary education, particularly in mathematics and the sciences. Moreover,
in an era when private research and development efforts far outstrip those of government, the United States must create more
advanced and effective forms of public / private partnerships to promote public benet from scientic-technological innovation.
128 In this way, homeland

security programmes and schools typify how securitised neoliberal logic,

fuelled by corporate dollars, is infused into school reform, curriculum, and everyday
(normalised) neoliberal and securitised school subjectivities . While the Obama administration
ended the war in Iraq, promised troop reduction in Afghanistan, and increased its use of drones, much of my time in the
homeland security high school revolved around talk of the growing pipeline initiative to
continue to grow the programme throughout the state and to extend it through all grade levels
in order to meet the nations growing security needs. In a meeting with school administrators and
representatives of the defence corporations, students from local elementary, middle, and high schools as well as current college
students presented how the homeland security programme was useful to them, how the corporations might get more young people
interested in working in the industry, and what they found exciting in the programme. The school also holds several recruiting
events at the elementary schools, simulated cyber-security battle labs, and homeland security fairs to spur local interest. The
mushrooming number of regional and national initiatives aimed at further institutionalising homeland security education in US
public schools indicates that this form of securitised education has drastically shifted public schooling in the United States even as
the war on terror strategy continues to morph under the Obama administration. The

continued portrayed need to

secure US borders, cyber space, and the homeland authorised this emphasis on homeland
security in US public schools. The fears of the dangerous brown Other and of ungoverned school
space dramatically altered the architecture of school discipline at Wellington. These changes highlight
how this fear and anxiety can be used to mobilise school reforms intending to fortify US public schools and
control brown bodies, and borrow from the scripts used to make sense of US interventions in Iraq. Further, the US state
portrays a lack of skilled workers as a national security risk, demanding US public schools reform their schools in order to meet the
needs of the security industry. As the reverberations of September 11 and the long war continue to structure US public schools,
children educated in these schools learn to interpret the world and their place in it through a lens of homeland security and war. In
this way, US public schools become yet another site of war on terror strategy. Taken together, these militarised and securitised US
public school reforms instituting homeland security studies programmes, tactical US engagements with madrassas, and the
emphasis on girls education as empowerment highlight the critical role education plays in supporting and furthering war on terror
strategy both materially and discursively. Though disparately located, these

sites of education are connected by

larger social processes invested in the reproduction of difference and inequality, the
advancement of capitalist imperialism, and the furthering of US warfare through the circulation
of specic geographic imaginaries of here and there and us and them. DISRUPTIONS Through this
analysis, we can see how the US constructs and mobilises convenient scripts and imaginative
geographies in order to perpetuate hegemony, justify war, and humanise US military
intervention while refuelling a sense of imminent danger and fear across the US
homeland. We see this in looking specically at three distinct sites of education: Framed by Orientalist understandings of
brown women as oppressed by brown men, girls education initiatives mobilised by the United States work to humanise and justify
war under the guise of advancing human rights and feminism. The representation of madrassas as incubators of terrorism
authorises the implementation of US-style education programmes and military intervention. Lastly, US public schools

organise their schools to abate the threat posed by brown bodies and the spaces they occupy,
and to prepare young people to defend the homeland either militarily or through their work in
the security industry. Gregory proposes that for us to cease turning on the treadmill of the colonial
present it will be necessary to explore other spatializations and other topologies, and to turn our imaginative
geographies into geographical imaginations that can enlarge and enhance our sense of the world
and enable us to situate ourselves within it with care, concern, and humility . 129 As the US continues to
invent and invest in new forms of education to service the war industry, the challenge posed by critical geopolitics is to
work to disrupt the geographies that enable these education and military practices. Throughout this
work, we have seen how the architecture of enmity animated through various Orientalist and patriarchal
discourses shapes and justies US engagements with education to buttress war on terror
efforts and to revivify the USs standing as the worlds moral compass. Informed by a longer colonial genealogy long before
September 11 noted by various inection points during the Cold War, this analysis recognises that these operative
hegemonic discourses and ideologies appear and reappear across time and space their traces always
and everywhere superimposed and enable seemingly unconnected practices to work together to
maintain and extend patriarchal and colonial dominance. 130 Plotting the ideological
and discursive routes that link various sites that make up the topography of imperial, securitised education can
help us map and, in turn, challenge the contours of US interventions with education. A re-

scripting of the Middle East as well as of the United States role in putatively promoting global security while risking the human
security of millions of brown bodies across the globe acts as one step toward dismantling the prevailing geopolitical imagination(s)
that operates on and through brown bodies in dangerous and violent ways. By

exposing the patriarchal and imperial

investments of dominant geopolitical scripts, this analysis has worked to provide some entry
points for reframing the conversation around in/security and education in ways that might decentre and destabilise US hegemonic imaginings and, in turn, privilege Other ways of
knowing.

1NCInherency
Status quo solves cloud computing
Relander 3/27 [Brett, Investment Advisor, 2015, Cloud-Computing: An industry In Exponential Growth,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/032715/cloudcomputing-industry-exponential-growth.asp]

Driving the growth in the cloud industry is the cost savings associated with the ability to
outsource the software and hardware necessary for tech services. According to Nasdaq, investments in
key strategic areas such as big data analytics, enterprise mobile, security and cloud technology,
is expected to increase to more than $40 million by 2018. With cloud-based services expected
to increase exponentially in the future, there has never been a better time to invest, but it is
important to make sure you do so cautiously. (See article: A Primer On Investing In The Tech Industry.)

Lack of EU investment makes solvency impossible every single speech or action

Obamas taken and then failed to fully implement prove the aff would be seen as
another failed attempt AND people dont trust the NSA because they lied in
congress trust is the key internal
Lomas 13 (Natasha, NSA Spying Risks Undermining Trust In U.S. Cloud Computing Businesses, Warns Kroes, Tech Crunch,
July 4, 2013, Accessed April 8, 2015, http://techcrunch.com/2013/07/04/spying-bad-for-business/)//AD

The NSA spying scandal risks undermining trust in U.S. cloud computing businesses, the
European Commissions vice-president, Neelie Kroes, has warned in a speech today. Kroes also
reiterated calls for clarity and transparency from the U.S. regarding the scope and nature of its
surveillance and access to data on individuals and businesses living and conducting business
in Europe in order to avoid a knock-on effect on cloud businesses. Loss of Europeans trust could result in
multi-billion euro consequences for U.S. cloud providers, she added. Kroes was speaking during a
press conference held in Estonia, following a meeting of the ECs European Cloud Partnership Steering Board, which was held to
agree on EU-wide specifications for cloud procurement. In her speech, part of which follows below, she argued that cloud

computing businesses are at particular risk of fallout from a wide-reaching U.S. government
surveillance program because they rely on their customers trust to function trust that the data entrusted
to them is stored securely. Kroes said: If businesses or governments think they might be spied on, they will have less reason to trust
the cloud, and it will be cloud providers who ultimately miss out. Why would you pay someone else to hold your commercial or other
secrets, if you suspect or know they are being shared against your wishes? Front or back door it doesnt matter any smart person
doesnt want the information shared at all. Customers will act rationally, and providers will miss out on a great opportunity.

1NCWarming
No internal link other countries wont model US adaptation or invest especially
true since the other NSA spying programs still exist
Alt cause lack of accurate models faster data processing means nothing if were
using the same approach
Depictions of climate conflict cause pre-emptive military build-up starting great
power conflict before the migration even occurs
Michael Brzoska 8, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg [The securitization of
climate change and the power of conceptions of security, Paper prepared for the International Studies Association Convention
2008, 3/26-29]
It will affect the living conditions of many people. In many cases the

change in living conditions will be for the worse.

This may, in turn, lead to violent conflict. The deterioration of the human environment and the resulting violent conflict
may induce large numbers of people to migrate, thus also creating conflicts in areas less negatively affected by climate change.

Beyond local and regional effects, climate change increases the global risk of violent conflict by
adding another element of contention to the competition among major powers . These dangers
associated with climate change are by now quite well rehearsed. But how high is the probability that they will
occur? How likely is it that climate change will lead to more interstate wars, intrastate wars or terrorism? How much do we know
about the links between climate change and violence? Are

these dangers real in the sense of having a high

likelihood of occurring or are they largely fictitious, edge-of-range possibilities that are used to
draw attention to climate change, a level of attention that would not be attainable by stressing
the more likely, but less spectacular economic and social consequences of the problem? The latter
would be understandable but potentially counterproductive. In the literature on securitization it is implied that when a
problem is securitized it is difficult to limit this to an increase in attention and resources devoted
to mitigating the problem (Brock 1997, Waever 1995). Securitization regularly leads to all-round
exceptionalism in dealing with the issue as well as to a shift in institutional localization towards
security experts (Bigot 2006), such as the military and police. Methods and instruments associated
with these security organizations such as more use of arms, force and violence will gain in
importance in the discourse on what to do. A good example of securitization was the period
leading to the Cold War (Guzzini 2004 ). Originally a political conflict over the organization of societies,
in the late 1940s, the East-West confrontation became an existential conflict that was overwhelmingly
addressed with military means, including the potential annihilation of humankind . Efforts to alleviate
the political conflict were, throughout most of the Cold War, secondary to improving military capabilities. Climate change
could meet a similar fate. An essentially political problem concerning the distribution of the
costs of prevention and adaptation and the losses and gains in income arising from change in
the human environment might be perceived as intractable, thus necessitating the build-up of
military and police forces to prevent it from becoming a major security problem. The portrayal of
climate change as a security problem could, in particular, cause the richer countries in the global
North, which are less affected by it, to strengthen measures aimed at protecting them from the spillover
of violent conflict from the poorer countries in the global South that will be most affected by
climate change. It could also be used by major powers as a justification for improving their
military preparedness against the other major powers, thus leading to arms races.

Social change is key to solve adaptation even if the aff gives us the capabilities
they cant overcome the implementation barrier their card
Romero 08 [Purple, reporter for ABS-CBN news, 05/17/2008, Climate change and human extinction--are you ready to be
fossilized? http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/05/16/08/climate-change-and-human-extinction-are-you-ready-be-fossilized]
Climate change killed the dinosaurs. Will it kill us as well? Will we let it destroy the human race? This was the grim, depressing
message that hung in the background of the Climate Change Forum hosted on Friday by the Philippine National Red Cross at the
Manila Hotel. "Not one dinosaur is alive today. Maybe someday it will be our fossils that another race will dig up in the future, " said
Roger Bracke of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, underscoring his point that no less than
extinction is faced by the human race, unless we are able to address global warming and climate change in this generation. Bracke,
however, countered the pessimistic mood of the day by saying that the human race still has an opportunity to save itself. This more
hopeful view was also presented by the four other speakers in the forum. Bracke pointed out that all peoples of the world must be
involved in two types of response to the threat of climate change: mitigation and adaptation. "Prevention" is no longer possible,
according to Bracke and the other experts at the forum, since climate change is already happening. Last chance The forum's speakers
all noted the increasing number and intensity of devastating typhoons--most recently cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, which killed more
than 100,000 people--as evidence that the world's climatic and weather conditions are turning deadly because of climate change.
They also reminded the audience that deadly typhoons have also hit the Philippines recently, particularly Milenyo and Reming,
which left hundreds of thousands of Filipino families homeless. World Wildlife Fund Climate and Energy Program head Naderev
Sao said that "this generation is the last chance for the human race" to do something and ensure that humanity stays alive in this
planet. According to Sao, while most members of our generation will be dead by the time the worst effects of climate change are
felt, our children will be the ones to suffer. How will Filipinos survive climate change? Well, first of all, they have to be made aware
that climate change is a problem that threatens their lives. The easiest way to do this as former Consultant for the Secretariats of
the UN Convention on Climate Change Dr. Pak Sum Low told abs-cbnews.com/Newsbreak is to particularize the disasters that it
could cause. Talking in the language of destruction, Pak and other experts paint this portrait of a Philippines hit by climate change:
increased typhoons in Visayas, drought in Mindanao, destroyed agricultural areas in Pampanga, and higher incidence rates of
dengue and malaria. Saom said that as polar ice caps melt due to global warming, sea levels will rise, endangering coastal and lowlying areas like Manila. He said Manila Bay would experience a sea level increase of 72 meters over 20 years. This means that from
Pampanga to Nueva Ecija, farms and fishponds would be in danger of being would be inundated in saltwater. Saom added that
Albay, which has been marked as a vulnerable area to typhoons, would be the top province at risk. Saom also pointed out that
extreme weather conditions arising from climate change, including typhoons and severe droughts, would have social, economic and
political consequences: Ruined farmlands and fishponds would hamper crop growth and reduce food sources, typhoons would
displace people, cause diseases, and limit actions in education and employment. Thus, Sao said, while

environmental
protection should remain at the top of the agenda in fighting climate change, solutions to the
phenomenon "must also be economic, social, moral and political." Mitigation Joyceline Goco, Climate Change
Coordinator of the Environment Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, focused her
lecture on the programs Philippine government is implementing in order to mitigate the effects of climate change. Goco said that the
Philippines is already a signatory to global agreements calling for a reduction in the "greenhouse gasses"--mostly carbon dioxide,
chloroflourocarbons and methane--that are responsible for trapping heat inside the planet and raising global temperatures. Goco
said the DENR, which is tasked to oversee and activate the Clean Development Mechanism, has registered projects which would
reduce methane and carbon dioxide. These projects include landfill and electricity generation initiatives. She also said that the
government is also looking at alternative fuel sources in order do reduce the country's dependence on the burning of fossil fuels-oil--which are known culprits behind global warming. Bracke however said that mitigation is not enough. "The ongoing debate about
mitigation of climate change effects is highly technical. It involves making fundamental changes in the policies of governments,
making costly changes in how industry operates. All of this takes time and, frankly, we're not even sure if such mitigation efforts will
be successful. In the meantime, while the debate goes on, the effects of climate change are already happening to us." Adaptation A
few nations

and communities have already begun adapting their lifestyles to cope with the effects
of climate change. In Bangladesh, farmers have switched to raising ducks instead of chickens because the latter easily
succumb to weather disturbances and immediate effects, such as floods. In Norway, houses with elevated foundations have been
constructed to decrease displacement due to typhoons. In the Philippines main body for fighting climate change, the Presidential
Task Force on Climate Change, (PTFCC) headed by Department on Energy Sec. Angelo Reyes, has identified emission reduction
measures and has looked into what fuel mix could be both environment and economic friendly. The

Department of Health has

started work with the World Health Organization in strengthening its surveillance mechanisms for
health services. However, bringing information hatched from PTFCCs studies down to and crafting
an action plan for adaptation with the communities in the barangay level remains a challenge. Bracke said that the
Red Cross is already at the forefront of efforts to prepare for disasters related to climate change. He pointed out that since the Red
Cross was founded in 1919, it has already been helping people beset by natural disasters. "The problems resulting from climate
change are not new to the Red Cross. The Red Cross has been facing those challenges for a long time. However, the frequency and
magnitude of those problems are unprecedented. This is why the

Red Cross can no longer face these problems

alone," he said. Using a medieval analogy, Bracke said that the Red Cross can no longer be a "knight in
shining armor rescuing a damsel in distress " whenever disaster strikes. He said that disaster
preparedness in the face of climate change has to involve people at the grassroots level.

"The role of the Red Cross in the era of climate change will be less as a direct actor and increase as a trainor and guide to other

partners who will help us adapt to climate change and respond to disasters ," said Bracke. PNRC chairman
and Senator Richard Gordon gave a picture of how the PNRC plans to take climate change response to the grassroots level, through
its project, dubbed "Red Cross 143". Gordon explained how Red Cross 143 will train forty-four volunteers from each community at a
barangay level. These volunteers will have training in leading communities in disaster response. Red Cross 143 volunteers will rely
on information technology like cellular phones to alert the PNRC about disasters in their localities, mobilize people for evacuation,
and lead efforts to get health care, emergency supplies, rescue efforts, etc.

1NCDisease
Internal link disconnect the uq card is about human genomes but the internals
are about bacterial genomes which are 0.1% of the size of the human code means
the status quo solves because more computing power isnt necessary
Kosers about TB they have no ev that says genome sequencing is key to every
other disease
Cant solve cross-resistance too many mutations and species variation make
genome specificity impossible also means resistance is inevitable
Diseases wont cause extinction burnout or variation
York 14 Ian, head of the Influenza Molecular Virology and Vaccines team in the Immunology and Pathogenesis Branch,
Influenza Division at the CDC, former assistant professor in immunology/virology/molecular biology (MSU), former RA Professor in
antiviral and antitumor immunity (UMass Medical School), Research Fellow (Harvard), Ph.D., Virology (McMaster), M.Sc.,
Immunology (Guelph), Why Don't Diseases Completely Wipe Out Species? 6/4, http://www.quora.com/Why-dont-diseasescompletely-wipe-out-species
But mostly

diseases don't drive species extinct. There are several reasons for that. For one, the most
dangerous diseases are those that spread from one individual to another. If the disease is highly
lethal, then the population drops, and it becomes less likely that individuals will contact
each other during the infectious phase. Highly contagious diseases tend to burn themselves
out that way. Probably the main reason is variation. Within the host and the pathogen population
there will be a wide range of variants. Some hosts may be naturally resistant. Some pathogens will be less
virulent. And either alone or in combination, you end up with infected individuals who
survive. We see this in HIV, for example. There is a small fraction of humans who are naturally resistant
or altogether immune to HIV, either because of their CCR5 allele or their MHC Class I type. And there are a handful
of people who were infected with defective versions of HIV that didn't progress to disease. We can see
indications of this sort of thing happening in the past, because our genomes contain many instances of
pathogen resistance genes that have spread through the whole population . Those all started off as rare
mutations that conferred a strong selection advantage to the carriers, meaning that the specific infectious diseases were serious
threats to the species.

Their disease descriptions are shaped by political interests and in turn shape
reality turns the aff
MacPhail 09 (Theresa, medical anthropologist at the University of California, Berkeley The Politics of Bird Flu: The Battle
over Viral Samples and Chinas Role in Global Public Health, Journal of language and politics, 8:3, 2009)
In fact, the

health development strategies of international organizations are judged as significant

in reinforcing the role of the state in relation to the production of primary products for the world
market, thereby perpetuating international relations of dominance and dependency. Soheir Morsy,
Political Economy in Medical Anthropology In July of 2007, former Surgeon General Richard H. Carmona
appeared before a congressional committee and testified that during his term in office he had been pressured by the
Bush administration to suppress or downplay any public health information that contradicted
the administrations beliefs and/or policies. Gardiner Harris of the New York Times noted that Dr. Carmona was
only one of a growing list of present and former administration officials to charge that politics often trumped science
within what had previously been largely nonpartisan government health and scientific agencies
(Harris 2007). Dr. Carmona testified that he had repeatedly faced political interference on such varied topics as stem cell research

and sex education. Two days later, an editorial in the Times bemoaned the resultant diminution of public health both its
reputation as non-biased and the general understanding of important public health issues in the eyes of the same public it was
meant to serve (2007). In the wake of Dr. Carmonas testimony, it would appear that these are grave times for public health. And yet,
public health concerns and international measures to thwart disease pandemics have never been more at the forefront of
governmental policy, media focus and the public imagination. Dr. Carmonas testimony on the fuzzy boundaries between science
and state, health and policy, is in line with a recent spate of sensational stories on the dangers of drug-resistant tuberculosis and the
recurrent threat of a bird flu outbreak all of which belie any distinct separation of politics and medical science and highlight the
ever-increasing commingling of the realms of public health and political diplomacy. Until

recently, the worlds of public

health and politics have generally been popularly conceptualized as separate fields . Public health,
undergirded by medicine, is primarily defined as the science and practice of protecting and improving the health of a community
(public health 2007), regardless of political borders on geographical maps. Disease

prevention and care is typically

regarded as neutral ground, a conceptual space where governments can work together for the
direct (or indirect) benefit of all. Politics, on the other hand, is usually referred to in the largely Aristotelian sense of the
word, or politika, as the art or science of government or governing, especially the governing of a political entity, such as a nation,
and the administration and control of its internal and external affairs (politics 2007). If we take to be relevant Clausewitzs
formulation that war is merely the continuation of policy (or such politics) by other means, might we then argue that the

recent
wars on disease specifically the one being waged on the ever-present global threat of bird flu
are merely a continuation of politics by different means ? In an article written for the U.S. Center for Disease
Control (CDC), two health professionals suggest that the flow of influence works optimally when an unbiased science first informs
public health, with public health then influencing governmental policy decisions. The other potential direction of influence, wherein

politics directly informs public health, eventually constraining or directing scientific research ,
has the potential to create a situation in which ideology clouds scientific and public health
judgment, decisions go awry and politics become dangerous (Koplan and McPheeters 2004: 2041). The
authors go on to argue that: Scientists and public health professionals often offer opinions on policy and political issues, and
politicians offer theirs on public health policies, sometimes with the support of evidence. This interaction is appropriate and healthy,
and valuable insights can be acquired by these cross-discussions. Nevertheless the

interaction provides an
opportunity for inappropriate and self-serving commentary, for public grandstanding, and for
promoting public anxiety for partisan political purposes. (ibid.) The authors, however, never suggest that pure
science, devoid of any political consideration, is a viable alternative to an ideologically-driven disease prevention policy. What
becomes important in the constant interplay of science, politics and ideology, is both an awareness of potential ideological pitfalls
and a balance between official public health policy and the science that underlies it. The science/ public health/politics interaction is
largely taken for granted as the foundation of any appropriate, real-world policy decisions (Tesh 1988: 132). Yet the

political
nature of most health policies has, until recently, been overshadowed in popular discourse by the
ostensibly altruistic nature of health medicine. Yet as Michael Taussig reminds us of the doctor/patient
relationship: The issue of control and manipulation is concealed by the aura of benevolence (Taussig 1980: 4). Might the overt
goodwill of organizations such as the WHO, the CDC, and the Chinese CDC belie such an emphasis on politics? Certainly there is
argumentation to support a claim that public health and medicine are inherently tied to politics. Examining the hidden arguments
underlying public health policies, Sylvia Noble Tesh argues: disease

prevention began to acquire political

meaning. No longer merely ways to control diseases, prevention policies became standard-bearers for the contending political
arguments about the form the new society would take (1988: 11). Science is a reason of state in Ashis Nandys Science, Hegemony
and Violence (1988: 1). Echoing current battles over viral samples, Nandy suggests that in the last century science

was used

as a political plank within the United States in the ideological battle against ungodly
communism (1988: 3). Scientific performance is linked to political dividends (1988: 9), with science becoming a
substitute for politics in many societies (1988: 10). What remains novel and of interest in all of this conflation
of state and medicine is the new politics of scale of the war on global disease , specifically its
focus on reemerging disease like avian influenza. As doctor and medical anthropologist Paul Farmer notes:
the WHO manifestly attempts to use fear of contagion to goad wealthy nations into investing in
disease surveillance and control out of self-interest an age-old public health ploy acknowledged as such in the
Institute of Medicine report on emerging infections (Farmer 2001: 5657). What Farmers observation underlines is that public
health has transformed itself into a savvy, political entity. Institutions like the WHO are increasingly needed to negotiate between
nations they function as the new diplomats of health. Modern

politics, then, have arguably turned into

health politics. In 2000, the UN Security Council passed a resolution on infectious diseases. The resolution came in response
to the HIV/AIDS epidemic and was the first of its kind issued (Fidler 2001: 80). What started as a reaction to a
specific disease, AIDS, has since developed into an overall concern with any disease or illness

which is seen as having the potential to lay waste to global health, national security, or economic
and political stability. In other words, disease and public health have gone global. But, as law and international disease
scholar David Fidler points out, the meeting of realpolitik and pathogens that he terms microbialpolitik is anything but new
(Fidler 2001: 81). Microbialpolitiks is as old as international commerce, wars, and diplomacy . Indeed, it
was only the brief half-century respite provided by antibiotics, modern medicine and the hope of a disease-free future that made the
coupling of politics and public health seem out-of-date. But now we have (re)entered a world in which modern public health
structures have weakened, thus making a return to microbialpolitiks inevitable. As Fidler argues: The

reglobalization of
public health is well underway, and the international politics of infectious disease control have
returned (Fidler 2001: 81). Only three years later, Fidler would write that the predicted return of public health was triumphant,
having emerged prominently on the agendas of many policy areas in international relations, including national security,
international trade, economic development, globalization, human rights, and global governance (Fidler 2004: 2). As Nicholas King
suggests, the

resurgence of such microbialpolitiking owes much to the discourse of risk so

prevalent in todays world. The current focus on risk, as it specifically pertains to disease and its
relationship to national security concerns, has been constructed by the interaction of a variety of
different social actors: scientists, the media, and health and security experts (King 2004:62). King
argues: The emerging diseases campaign employed a strategic and historically resonant scale
politics, making it attractive to journalists, biomedical researchers, activists, politicians, and
public health and national security experts. Campaigners identification of causes and consequences at particular
scales were a means of marketing risk to specific audiences and thereby securing alliances; their recommendations for intervention
at particular scales were a means of ensuring that those alliances ultimately benefited specific interests. (2004: 64) King traces this
development to the early 1990s, specifically to Stephen Morses 1989 conference on Emerging Viruses. Like the UN Security
Council resolution on emerging infections, the conference was in the wake of HIV/AIDS. In Kings retelling, it was Morses
descriptions of the causal links between isolated, local events and global effects that changed the politics of public health (2004: 66).
The epidemiological community followed in Morses footsteps, with such luminaries as Morse and Joshua Lederberg calling for a
global surveillance network to deal with emerging or reemerging diseases such as bird flu or SARS. However, although both the
problem and the effort were global by default, any interventions would involve passing through American laboratories,
biotechnology firms, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and the information science experts (King 2004: 69). Following the
conference, disease became a hot topic for the media. Such high -profile

authors as Laurie Garrett (The Coming

Plague) and Richard Preston (The Hot Zone) stoked the emerging virus fires, creating what
amounted to a viral panic or viral paranoia (King 2004: 73). Stories of viruses gone haywire, such as Prestons
account of Ebola, helped reify the notion that localized events were of international importance. Such causal chains having been
formed in the popular imagination, the timing was ripe for the emergence of bioterrorism concerns. In the aftermath of 9/11, the
former cold war had been transformed, using scalar politics, into a hot war with international viruses (King 2004: 76). Of course,

all

of this can be tied into the Foucaultian concept that knowledge is by its very nature political . In
The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault outlines the ways in which medicine is connected to the power of the state. For Foucault,

medicine itself becomes a task for the nation (Foucault 1994: 19). He argues that the practice of
medicine is itself political and that the struggle against disease must begin with a war against
bad government (Foucault 1994: 33). In an article on the politics of emerging diseases, Elisabeth Prescott has echoed
Foucaults equation of disease with bad government. She suggests that a nations capacity to combat both old and
newly emergent diseases is a marker not of just biological, but of political, health . She argues that the
ability to respond [is] a reflection of the capacity of a governing system (2007: 1). Whats more, ruptures in health can lead to breakdowns in effective government or in the ability of governments to inspire confidence. Prescott suggests: Failures in governance in
the face of infectious disease outbreaks can result in challenges to social cohesion, economic performance and political legitimacy
(ibid.). In other words, an outbreak of bird flu in China would equate to an example of Foucaults bad government. In the end, there
can be no doubt that the realms of medicine and (political) power are perpetually intertwined. Foucault writes: There is, therefore,
a spontaneous and deeply rooted convergence between the requirement of political ideology and those of medical technology
(Foucault 1994: 38). In other words, we should not be overly surprised by Richard Carmonas testimony or by debates over bird flu
samples. Politics and health have always arguably gone hand-in-hand

1NCEconomy
Deterrence, trade, and lack of convincing ideology prevent the impacts to China
rise
Posen 14 [Barry, Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and the director of MIT's Security Studies Program,
June 24, Restraint : A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy, Cornell University Press, pg. 94-5/AKG]

Some aspects of the situation will likely make China a less potent competitor than the Soviet Union,
especially on a global scale. First, China faces a geopolitically more problematic environment
than did the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union after World War II faced immediate neighbors exhausted by war, and hence vulnerable.
The opposite is the case today; global

prosperity has been growing since the end of the Cold War. China has two
nuclear neighborsIndia and Russia. One of them is potentially as dynamic economically as China.
Two other neighbors, the Republic of Korea and Japan could easily become nuclear weapons states.
Chinas own population near its land borders often consists of ethnic minorities, restless under
governance from Beijing. China cannot afford war on those borders. 50 Many neighboring countries are
separated from China by bodies of water, which would make it difficult for China to apply
military pressure, if it ever came to that. Finally, at least for the immediate future, Chinas economic
prosperity is inextricably bound up with global trade, which leaves it vulnerable in extremis to
blockade. United States naval, air, and space power allow it to dominate the open oceans. So long as this remains the case, in
the event of hot war, the independent nations on the edge of the East and South China Seas would all
have access to the outside world, while China would not. Second, and related, Chinas geography
makes it at most an Asian land power. The Soviet Union spanned Eurasia and thus it had
inherent potential to be a global power: it had ports and airfields that allowed it to project at least
some power in almost any direction , and it could move resources from one theater to another overland or through its own
controlled airspace. Chinas naval geography, even in Asia, helps hem it in. Independent countries
with their own nationalist sensibilities sit astride Chinas route to open waters. Third, China
does not have ideology working for it. The colonial empires were collapsing as the Cold War opened. In part
due to resentment of the capitalist system of their former colonial masters, and in part due simply to the moment in history,

communism was an attractive ideology and social system in the early Cold War. It served as a
legitimating force for Soviet activities worldwide. Local nationalisms in the developing world were more
suspicious of the West than they were the Soviet Union, creating opportunities for Soviet political penetration in the emergent
countries. Nationalist

sentiment today seems to be omnidirectionally suspicious, which would

make Chinese penetration difficult, and leave Chinese influence vulnerable to constant local
attack. China does not have an ideology or social system that travels, in any case. Authoritarian
capitalism with Chinese nationalist overtones and communist trappings is not much of a brand.

Cant solve China long-term Hsu says China's defense budget could outstrip that of the U.S.
within the next 20 years
Framing economic leadership as the driver of US-China peace strains relations
and causes US aggression
Nilsson 12 (Fredrik, Lund University Graduate School in Poly Sci, Securitizing Chinas Peaceful Rise An Empirical Study of
the U.S. Approach to Chinese Trade Practices, Military Modernization and Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea,
http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=2740544&fileOId=2743569)
The main objective of this study was to investigate how the

United States has approached elements of Chinas

economic growth and military modernization. By employing securitization theory and neorealist
notions of security, I sought to reveal the transformation of the U.S. approach from being of a political nature to becoming
issues of security. I employed a slightly modified model of securitization theory, emphasizing the importance of facilitating

conditions and the institutional power of securitizing actors. I have argued that the

United States has chosen to

securitize a range of issues pertaining to Chinas rise. The securitizations have been successful in instances where
the facilitating conditions have been sufficient. However, securitization ought to be avoided, and the reasons for
this become apparent in situations where attempts to securitize have failed, but where the echo
of the attempt itself contributes to increased insecurity. Despite Chinas claims of a peaceful rise,
the United States approach to Chinas increasing assertiveness in territorial disputes, its military
modernization aimed at developing A2/AD capabilities, and the trade practices that are identified as unfair,
is putting stains on a relationship vital to security and economic growth in the 21 st century. I have suggested that the
securitizations are embedded in a historically unique context and that these facilitating
conditions are enabling securitizations that incorporate regional actors in a strategy to
externally balance China. Furthermore, the construction of security is dependent not only on a single
speech act but rather around these significant facilitating conditions, and sequences of coherent
speech acts that shape a wider order of discourse around security . However, the empirics suggest
that there are, at times, two orders of discourse operating side by side: one of control, and one of
engagement. This is what the Chinese have called the two-handed U.S. policy. This has complicated the analysis and the
findings have at times been conflicting. The thesis studied securitizing acts in three sectors, and through the findings in the cases the
following conclusions can be drawn: Firstly,

in the political sector, Chinas assertiveness and its subsequent

threat to the UNCLOS and vital SLOCs prompted the U.S. to get involved in the South China Sea dispute
in 2010. It did so by announcing its national interest in the freedom of navigation and placing the
issue within the security realm by emphasizing the importance of security and stability for all
nations. The referent object was somewhat difficult to identify since a national interest was
emphasized, which would suggest the state being the referent object, but where the threat is posed to
international order and law. With the referent object being international law and the established
order, the U.S., posing as the main vanguard of these principles, aimed to securitize Chinas
assertiveness in the South China Sea. This is also the case where regional dynamics became most prominent in the
securitization process due to other actors difficulty to assert their legal claims against a vastly more powerful China. For example,
Clinton implied that the U.S. would support the Philippines with the necessary means to protect itself from any aggressor in these

The order of
discourse shaped around the territorial disputes and on Chinas harassment of vessels from
various states, was clearly one drawing on the wider security discourse and the historical notion
of China as a bully. Secondly, I looked at how the U.S. has approached Chinas military modernization
and how, despite major budget cuts, the Obama administration has emphasized the importance
of U.S. operations in the region. The issue of Chinas A2/AD capabilities has been identified in the security discourse as
disputes, and it would not accept any actor asserting its territorial claims through coercion or intimidation.

the main threat to U.S. commitments in the region, mainly with reference to Taiwan. It is clear from the analysis that the Pentagon is
aiming to counter these capabilities by adopting the JOAC and the Air-Sea battle concept. It was, however, somewhat difficult to
apply discourse analysis to issues so clearly pertaining to security. This section therefore had a clear neorealist twist to it.
Nevertheless, the

analytical framework and the discourse analysis illustrated that the aims of
securitizations in the military sector were closely tied to those developing in the political sector
and I argued that the extraordinary measures were aligned in what could be seen as a grand
strategy where securitizations have been deemed a necessary evil. Thirdly, the securitizations of
trade and the Chinese currency showcased a good example of security in the economic sector . It
also illustrated how the intersubjective dimension in securitization is sometimes insignificant, as in the case of Obamas executive
order, which overrides normal political practice but nevertheless stays within the legal framework. However, the economic sector
also illustrated that democratic practice sometimes makes the audience vital, as in the case of the CERORA. This showcased that

It also
illustrated that the performative force of a speech act is dependent on its embeddedness in a
wider discourse. The CERORA was seen as too controversial and risky in the current economic climate, and the stakes were
there are different ways to securitize, and that different instances require distinctive approaches on behalf of the actor.

too high. Chinas currency manipulation has thus not yet been lifted above normal economic practice. It is difficult to determine
when an issue obtains security status without reproducing dominant ideas of security and to contribute to the political process of
securitization.

The temptation to, at times, see issues where there are none can to an extent be avoided
by being critical to the speech acts, and by tracing coherence and continuity in the discursive

practices. Therefore, as a contribution to the field of security studies on the U.S. approach to China, the empirical cases
have illustrated that the U.S. approach is ambiguous, and that the Chinese perception of a twohanded approach is somewhat accurate. U.S. securitizing moves across the three sectors have been successful to a
varying degree. This inconsistency complicated the analysis of securitizing acts but it also illustrated the fact that the construction of
security goes beyond the speech act. In sum, these findings make up the answer to the research question. However, to follow the
important developments in the region it is important that further studies are conducted, and to continuously trace change in the
security of the Asia Pacific region. A missing piece is scholarly work conducted from a Chinese perspective, at least in English. I
acknowledge that my approach is by its nature to some extent western-centric, and there are always two sides to a coin. Security is a
different concept in different parts of the world, and as I stated in the thesis, it is highly dependent on regional and even national
differences. The U.S. approach to China under the Obama administration, this thesis argued, is characterized by increasing
competition, failure to cooperate on vital issues due to the possibility of a looming power-shift, and difficulties to facilitate the
important economic growth of China under its current premises. According to this, and with the facilitating conditions outlined
throughout the study, the

United States has securitized elements of Chinas economic growth and

military development to protect American exceptionalism, the ILEO, American jobs and naval
supremacy. These ambitions strain the relationship and moves the two powers further apart. As a result,
security in the Asia Pacific is not becoming stronger, but might result in increasing
unpredictability.

Thats part and parcel with a broader China threat doctrine which relies on a
false epistemology, ignores history, and justifies US aggression
Chen 12 -- Senior Professor, Law School, Xiamen University, Peoples Republic of China; Chairman, Chinese Society of
International Economic Law, 19932011; International Arbitrator, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) under the Washington Convention, since 1993 (An, 2012, "On the Source, Essence of Yellow Peril Doctrine and Its Latest
Hegemony Variant the China Threat Doctrine: From the Perspective of Historical Mainstream of Sino-Foreign Economic
Interactions and Their Inherent Jurisprudential Principles,"
http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/docserver/22119000/13/1/22119000_013_01_S01_text.pdf?
expires=1359819574&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=F52EBADF2C41BB3C4ABD9774E2A182EA)
To its close succession, Chinas

State Council released a volume of white book as lengthy as 13,000 words, entitled
The Peaceful Development of China. This book has made comprehensive elaborations on the
inevitability and steadiness of Chinas pursuing the path of peaceful development, as well as
comprehensive refutation against the absurdness of China Threat Doctrine . 7 The merit of abovementioned recent advocacy of China Threat Doctrine by certain Americans is of course a very serious
reality problem. However, it would be difficult to clearly understand the origin and development of this reality problem, if
one merely stays at the level of talking about reality. Without profound knowledge of the source and essence of this reality problem,

ones understanding could not avoid being superficial and partial. On the contrary, in order to
know from points to facets, from outward appearance to inner essence, thus to keep a sober mind and to deal with it calmly, one
should carry out synthetic research by tracing to the very root of the matter and closely com bining
the reality problem to its historical sources. Moreover, one should further carry out synthetic dissection by returning
from the history to the reality prob lem. This Article is trying, through such approach, to carry out synthetic discussion and
comprehensive dissection on the past and present, the points and facets, as well as the appearance and essence of China Threat
Doctrine. As is known to all, from late 20 th century to early 21 st century, confronting

the reality of Chinas gradual

and peaceful rising, certain American politicians, army-men and scholars have been vigorously
and repeatedly preaching China Threat Doctrine under various occasions and in various forms. Such
preaches are due to their habitual hegemonic practice and inopportune Cold War
mentality; or for meeting certain special demands and pursuing some ugly interests; or out of
their ignorance to the world and Chinese history. This Doctrine, with its seeming certainty and
innovation, is not hard to be seen through as vaguely similar as historical Yellow Peril Doctrine 8
preached by Russian Tsar and German Emperor, which once caused a temporary clamor in the 19 th
century. In other words, the contemporary version of China Threat Doctrine by American Hegemonism is
in essence no more than the newest recension and variant of the Yellow Peril Doctrine by Russian Tsar
and German Emperor. Their DNAs come down in one continuous line in distorting the mainstream history

of Sino-foreign interactions for the past thousands of years, as well as in conducting the political
legerdemain with exaggerated and fabricated statements in order to create a sensation and
seduce the people, who would be thus spiritually mobilized and publicly prepared for invasive
activities and aggressions against China.

Competitiveness discourse mobilizes populations for economic warfare its

produced by threat construction rather than economic reality
Dr. Gillian Bristow, Senior Lecturer in Economic Geography @ Cardiff University, 04 (Journal of Economic Geography 5.3:
285-304, Everyones a winner)

This begs the question as to why a discourse with ostensibly confused, narrow and ill-defined
content has become so salient in regional economic development policy and practice as to constitute the
only valid currency of argument (Schoenberger, 1998, 12). Whilst alternative discourses based around
co-operation can be conceived (e.g. see Hines, 2000; Bunzl, 2001), they have as yet failed to make a
significant impact on the dominant view that a particular, quantifiable form of output-related regional
competitiveness is inevitable, inexorable and ultimately beneficial. The answer appears to lie within the policy
process, which refers to all aspects involved in the provision of policy direction for the work of the public sector. This therefore
includes the ideas which inform policy conception, the talk and work which goes into providing
the formulation of policy directions, and all the talk, work and collaboration which goes into
translating these into practice (Yeatman, 1998; p. 9). A major debate exists in the policy studies
literature about the scope and limitations of reason, analysis and intelligence in policy-making a
debate which has been re-ignited with the recent emphasis upon evidence-based policy-making (see Davies et al., 2000). Keynes is
often cited as the main proponent of the importance of ideas in policy making, since he argued that policy-making should be
informed by knowledge, truth, reason and facts (Keynes, 1971, vol. xxi, 289). However, Majone (1989) has

significantly
challenged the assumption that policy makers engage in a purely objective, rational, technical
assessment of policy alternatives. He has argued that in practice, policy makers use theory, knowledge
and evidence selectively to justify policy choices which are heavily based on value judgements . It
is thus persuasion (through rhetoric, argument, advocacy and their institutionalisation) that is the key to the policy
process, not the logical correctness or accuracy of theory or data. In other words, it is interests rather
than ideas that shape policy making in practice. Ultimately, the language of competitiveness is the
language of the business community. Thus, critical to understanding the power of the discourse is
firstly, understanding the appeal and significance of the discourse to business interests and,
secondly, exploring their role in influencing the ideas of regional and national policy elites . Part of
the allure of the discourse of competitiveness for the business community is its seeming comprehensibility.
Business leaders feel that they already understand the basics of what competitiveness means and thus it offers them the gain of
apparent sophistication without the pain of grasping something complex and new . Furthermore,
competitive images are exciting and their accoutrements of battles, wars and races have an
intuitive appeal to businesses familiar with the cycle of growth, survival and sometimes collapse (Krugman, 1996b). The
climate of globalisation and the turn towards neo-liberal, capitalist forms of regulation has empowered business interests and
created a demand for new concepts and models of development which offer guidance on how economies can innovate and prosper in
the face of increasing competition for investment and resources. Global

policy elites of governmental and corporate

share the same neo-liberal consensus, have played a critical role in promoting both
the discourse of national and regional competitiveness, and of competitiveness policies which they think are good
institutions, who

for them (such as supportive institutions and funding for research and development agendas). In the EU, for example, the European
Round Table of Industrialists played a prominent role in ensuring that the Commission's 1993 White Paper placed the pursuit of
international competitiveness (and thus the support of business), on an equal footing with job creation and social cohesion
objectives (Lovering, 1998; Balanya et al., 2000). This discourse rapidly spread and competitiveness policies were transferred
through global policy networks as large quasi-governmental organisations such as the OECD and World Bank pushed the national
and, subsequently, the regional competitiveness agenda upon national governments (Peet, 2003). Part
regional competitiveness discourse for

of the appeal of the

policy-makers is that like the discourse of globalisation, it presents a

relatively structured set of ideas, often in the form of implicit and sedimented assumptions ,
upon which they can draw in formulating strategy and, indeed, in legitimating strategy pursued
for quite distinct ends (Hay and Rosamond, 2002). Thus, the discourse clearly dovetails with discussions about the
appropriate level at which economic governance should be exercised and fits in well with a growing trend towards the decentralised,
bottom-up approaches to economic development policy and a focus on the indigenous potential of regions. For example, in the
UK:the Government believes that a successful regional and sub-regional economic policy must be based on building the indigenous
strengths in each locality, region and county. The best mechanisms for achieving this are likely to be based in the regions themselves
(HM Treasury, 2001a, vi). The devolution of powers and responsibilities to regional institutions, whether democratic or more
narrowly administrative, is given added tour de force when accompanied by the arguments contained within the regional
competitiveness discourse. There is clear political capital to be gained from highlighting endogenous capacities to shape economic
processes, not least because it helps generate the sense of regional identity that motivates economic actors and institutions towards a
common regional purpose (Rosamond, 2002). Furthermore, the regional competitiveness discourse points to a clear set of agendas
for policy action over which regional institutions have some potential for leverageagendas such as the development of universitybusiness relationships and strong innovation networks. This

provides policy-makers with the ability to point to

the existence of seemingly secure paths to prosperity , as reinforced by the successes of exemplar regions. In this
way, the discourse of regional competitiveness helps to provide a way of constituting regions as
legitimate agents of economic governance. The language of regional competitiveness also fits in
very neatly with the ideological shift to the Third Way popularised most notably by the New Labour
government in the UK. This promotes the reconstruction of the state rather than its shrinkage (as under
neo-liberal market imperatives) or expansion (as under traditional socialist systems of mass state intervention). Significantly, this
philosophy sees state economic competencies as being restricted to the ability to intervene in line with perceived microeconomic or
supply-side imperatives rather than active macroeconomic, demand-side interventionan agenda that is thus clearly in tune with
the discourse around competitiveness. The attractiveness

of the competitiveness discourse may also be partly a

product of the power of pseudo-scientific, mathematised nature of the economics discipline and
the business strategy literature from which it emanates. This creates an innate impartiality and
technicality for the market outcomes (such as competitiveness) it describes (Schoenberger, 1998). Public
policy in developed countries experiencing the marketisation of the state, is increasingly driven by managerialism
which emphasises the improved performance and efficiency of the state. This managerialism is founded upon economistic and
rationalistic assumptions which include an emphasis upon measuring performance in the context of a
planning system driven by objectives and targets (Sanderson, 2001). The result is an increasing requirement for
people, places and organisations to be accountable and for their performance and success to be
measured and assessed. In this emerging evaluative state, performance tends to be scrutinised through a variety of means,
with particular emphasis placed upon output indicators. This provides not only a means of lending legitimacy to
the institutional environment, but also some sense of exactitude and certainty, particularly for
central governments who are thus able to retain some top-down, mechanical sense that things
are somehow under their control (Boyle, 2001). The evolutionary, survival of the fittest basis of the
regional competitiveness discourse clearly resonates with this evaluative culture. The discourse of
competitiveness strongly appeals to the stratum of policy makers and analysts who can use it to
justify what they are doing and/or to find out how well they are doing it relative to their rivals. This helps explain
the interest in trying to measure regional competitiveness and the development of composite indices and league tables. It also helps
explain why particular elements of the discourse have assumed particular significanceoutput indicators of firm performance are
much easier to compare and rank on a single axis than are indicators relating to institutional behaviour, for example. This in turn
points to a central paradox in measures of regional competitiveness. The

key ingredients of firm competitiveness and

and information which are, by
definition, intangible or at least difficult to measure with any degree of accuracy. The obsession with performance
measurement and the tendency to reduce complex variables to one, easily digestible number brings a kind of blindness
with it as to what is really important (Boyle, 2001, 60)in this case, how to improve regional prosperity. Thus while a
regional prosperity are increasingly perceived as lying with assets such as knowledge

composite index number of regional competitiveness will attract widespread attention in the media and amongst policy-makers and
development agencies, the difficulty presented by such a measure is in knowing what exactly needs to be targeted for appropriate
remedial action. All of this suggests that regional competitiveness

is more than simply the linguistic

expression of powerful exogenous interests. It has also become rhetoric. In other words, regional competitiveness is
deployed in a strategic and persuasive way, often in conjunction with other discourses (notably globalisation) to
legitimate specific policy initiatives and courses of action. The rhetoric of regional competitiveness

serves a useful political purpose in that it is easier to justify change or the adoption of a particular
course of policy action by reference to some external threat that makes change seem inevitable .
It is much easier for example, for politicians to argue for the removal of supply-side rigidities and flexible hire-andfire workplace rules by suggesting that there is no alternative and that jobs would be lost anyway if productivity
improvement was not achieved. Thus, the language of external competitiveness...provides a rosy glow of
shared endeavour and shared enemies which can unite captains of industry and representatives
of the shop floor in the same big tent (Turner, 2001, 40). In this sense it is a discourse which provides
some shared sense of meaning and a means of legitimising neo-liberalism rather than a material
focus on the actual improvement of economic welfare . 5. Conclusions The discourse of regional
competitiveness has become ubiquitous in the deliberations and statements of policy actors and regional
analysts. However, this paper has argued that it is a rather confused, chaotic discourse which seems to
conflate serious theoretical work on regional economies, with national and international policy
discourses on globalisation and the knowledge economy. There are, however, some dominant axioms which
collectively define the discourse, notably that regional competitiveness is a firm-based, output-related conception, strongly shaped
by the regional business environment. However, regional competitiveness tends to be defined in different ways, sometimes
microeconomic, sometimes macroeconomic, such that it is not entirely clear when a situation of competitiveness has been achieved.
It is argued here that the discourse is based on relatively thinly developed and narrow conceptions of how regions compete, prosper
and grow in economic terms. The

discourse chooses to ignore broader, non-output related modalities of

regional competition which may tend to have rather more negative than positive connotations.
Moreover, it over-emphasises the importance of the region to firm competitiveness and indeed the importance of firm
competitiveness to regional prosperity. In this sense proponents

of regional competitiveness are guilty of what the

eminent philosopher Alfred North Whitehead termed the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness. In other words, they
have assumed that what applies to firms can simply be read across to those other entities called
regions, and that this is a concrete reality rather than simply a belief or opinion.

Empirics like the great recession prove no impact to economic collapse, especially
from the cloud industry which is a smaller internal
Economic growth is unsustainable de-development is necessary to prevent
crossing the threshold to biosphere collapse and extinction this is the newest
study
Barry 14 (Glen, Independent Political Ecologist and Data Scientist, Madison, Wisconsin, USA President and Founder of
Ecological Internet, an online portal for the global environmental movement, Ph.D. in Land Resources from the University of
Wisconsin-Madison, M.S. in Conservation Biology and Sustainable Development from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and
B.A. in Political Science from Marquette University , Terrestrial ecosystem loss and biosphere collapse, Management of
Environmental Quality: An International Journal Vol. 25 No. 5, 2014 pp. 542-563 r Emerald Group Publishing Limited 1477-7835
DOI 10.1108/MEQ-06-2013-0069)
From Malthus (1798), through Aldo Leopolds (1949) land ethic, to The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al., 1972), the Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment (2005), and finally current planetary boundary and global change science (Rockstrom et al., 2009a, b) runs
a strand of concern

about human growths impacts upon Earths biophysical systems terrestrial

ecosystems in particular and about requirements for global ecological sustainability , while avoiding
biosphere collapse. Our biosphere is composed of Earths thin mantle of life present at, and just above and below, the
Earths surface. Some have indicated that human impacts upon the biosphere are analogous to a large,
uncontrolled experiment, which threatens its collapse (Trevors et al., 2010). Little is known regarding
what collapse of the biosphere would look like, how long it would take, what are its ecosystem and spatial patterns, and whether it is
reversible or survivable. But it

is becoming more widely recognized that Earths ecosystem services

depend fundamentally upon holistic, well-functioning natural systems (Cornell, 2012). Accelerating
human pressures on the Earth System are exceeding numerous local, regional, and
global thresholds, with abrupt and possibly irreversible impacts upon the planets life-

support functions (United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2012). Planetary boundaries provide a framework
to study these phenomena, by defining a safe operating space for humanity with respect to the Earth System (Rockstrom et al.,
2009a). Planetary boundary studies seek to set control variable values that are a safe distance from thresholds of key biophysical
processes governing the planets self-regulation to maintain conditions conducive to life (Rockstrom et al., 2009b). This builds
upon landmark efforts by Meadows et al. (1972) to first define global limits to growth. Their prediction that key

resource
scarcities would emerge has proven remarkably accurate (Turner, 2008), albeit delayed but not
avoided through the advent of computer technology. Ecological and economic warnings since at least Malthus
have called attention to economies dependence upon natural resources. The observation that near-exponential growth of
human population and economic activity cannot be sustained, far from being disproven, is more valid than ever
(Brown et al., 2011). Those who deny limits to growth are unaware of biological realities
(Vitousek et al., 1986). The initial planetary boundary exercise identified nine global-scale processes, including climate change,
rate of biodiversity loss (terrestrial and marine), nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, ozone depletion, ocean
acidification, freshwater, land use change, chemical pollution, and atmospheric aerosol loading
(Figure 1). Preliminary safe planetary thresholds were established for seven of these , and three rate of
biodiversity loss, climate change, and the nitrogen cycle were found to have already surpassed such a
threshold (Rockstrom et al., 2009a). Many such changes occur in a nonlinear, abrupt manner; others are more
incremental and subtle. Yet both types of change threaten the viability of contemporary human
societies by diminishing or destroying ecological life-support systems. If one or more of
these boundaries are crossed, it could be deleterious or even catastrophic as nonlinear,
abrupt environmental change occurs at the continental to planetary scale (Rockstrom et al.,
2009b). Here an ecologically rich revision to the planetary boundary framework is proposed in the tradition of political ecology,
not ignoring politics to set the threshold of how many intact terrestrial ecosystems are required to sustain the biosphere .

It is
not possible to carry out controlled experiments upon our one biosphere to know at what point collapse occurs.
We are thus left with observational studies and synthesis papers regarding what is known about ecosystem collapse
at other scales. This paper first reviews what is known about biodiversity and old-growth forest loss, abrupt climate change, and
ecosystem collapse as ecological systems are diminished at lesser scales. Next, the

critical phase shift seen as

landscapes percolate from nature surrounding humanity, to small reserves surrounded by human works,
is presented as analogous to outcomes for the biosphere, whose terrestrial ecosystems are after all simply a large-scale landscape.
The remainder of the paper synthesizes these findings regarding ecosystem loss and thresholds in loss of ecosystem connectivity into
a rationale for recognition of a tenth planetary boundary in regard to terrestrial ecosystem loss. It is suggested that some two-thirds
of Earths land surface should be protected totally (44 percent) or partially (another 22 percent) to avoid biosphere collapse. Given
current best estimates are that approximately one-half of Earths terrestrial ecosystems have already been lost, the discussion
centers around biocentric policy measures required to protect and restore terrestrial ecosystem connectivity in order to maintain
global ecological sustainability. Currently

nine planetary systems are recognized as providing a safe

operating space for humanity, as long as boundaries are not exceeded. It is thought three systems
(denoted with) have already surpassed their boundaries. This paper proposes a terrestrial ecosystem boundary
of 66 percent ecosystem land cover (44 percent as intact natural ecosystems and 22 percent as agro-ecological buffers)
to avoid biosphere collapse. Best estimates are that about 50 percent of terrestrial
ecosystems have been lost; thus this boundary has been surpassed too, albeit full impacts may not yet be
realized due to time lags (adapted from Rockstrom et al., 2009a). Setting boundaries requires normative decisions on risk
and uncertainty. Planetary boundary details and methodology are not without critics, as they are in themselves an imperfect social
construct, prone toward bias and political boundaries favoring the rich. Setting thresholds may itself prolong the risk of continued
degradation, falsely implying that there is time and it is safe to delay action (Schlesinger, 2009). Yet there is no escaping the

Given the welldocumented plethora of environmental decline, there is little question that carefully
quantifying when these changes become dangerous (specifying uncertainties) and what can
be done to avoid possible human extinction and biosphere collapse remains a valuable field
of inquiry. Civilization depends upon humanity remaining within thresholds (Folke et al., 2011). This
observation that humans have become a powerful agent in Earth System evolution (Biermann, 2012).

study takes a whole-system approach to studying the needs of the Earth System. The Gaia hypothesis holds that the Earth System is
in some ways analogous to a living, self-regulating organism with air, land, soil, and oceans as her organs; plants and animals as
cells; and water as blood, cycling nutrients and energy to sustain life. Formulated by James Lovelock (1979), the Gaia hypothesis
noted the role of biology in promoting homeostasis in the Earth System; that is, life maintains the conditions for life. Coordinated
activity between species and the environment is similar to interactions between cells and organs in multicellular organisms

(Kondratev et al., 2001). Earth has gone through many changes. The last 10,000 years of the Holocene epoch has
been an unusual period of stability, with temperature, freshwater, and biogeochemical flows staying in a relatively narrow range. It is

human activities, including use of fossil fuel and industrial agriculture,

are destroying ecosystems and changing the climate, threatening this stability. A growing human
population extracts goods and services from the Earth System at a rate that erodes its capacity to
support us (Steffen et al., 2011). Humanitys deleterious effects upon ecosystems have clearly become a
force of nature, impacting Earth System functioning and threatening this stability (Zalasiewicz et al., 2011). Some
have proposed that human dominance signals a new geological epoch that could supplant the
Holocene; it has been dubbed the Anthropocene (Crutzen, 2002; Steffen et al., 2011). As we move further into the
Anthropocene, humanity risks driving the Earth into hostile states from which we
cannot easily return (Steffen et al., 2011). Humans depend upon the biosphere the global Earth
System integrating life with its environment for the human life-support system. Human development and
advancement are often not perceived as being connected with the biosphere and ecosystem
services. Given human domination of the biosphere, ecology must account for human behavior
increasingly acknowledged that

(Peterson, 2000). Recently a group of ecological and development luminaries called the Blue Planet Laureates (Brundtland et al.,
2012) noted the almost certain impossibility of achieving global ecological sustainability without addressing related issues of
poverty, inequity, and injustice, noting that infinite

growth on a finite planet is not possible. Kosoy et al. (2012)

dominant economic system, stressing industrial growth, is delusional, not
acknowledging that economies must live within Earths biogeochemical constraints and that
human system growth accumulates ecological debt. Industrial capitalism has not been systematically
reviewed in light of 200 years of science. This economic model is based upon a mechanistic worldview that
destroys its own life-support system through failure to see the essence of
interrelated social and ecological systems (Taylor and Taylor, 2007), as all growth-based
development is ultimately unsustainable (Daly, 2005).
go so far as to say the

1NCFraming
Theres no distinction between cloud industry growth in the status quo and postplan means no solvency even if theres a difference NONE of their internals
assume it
Alt cause XO 12333 the NSA constructs individuals as threats to steal data
Benson 14 [Thor, Independent Writer, July 23, President Obama Needs to Cancel Executive Order 12333,
http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/president_obama_needs_to_cancel_executive_order_12333_20140723]
Besides Internet traffic from inside the U.S., any calls you make while visiting another country could be recorded and stored. Phone
network connections for making calls are unlikely to be routed outside the country, but that doesnt mean you wont leave the
country some day and make a call. Unlike

Section 215 of the Patriot Act, the law that allows metadata collection,
Executive Order 12333 requires no oversight from other government branches. So the NSA
can record any call you make on your trip to Canada as long as it thinks you are a threat of some kind. It
does have to get a court order to individually target someone, Tye points out in his article, but there are ways of getting around that
requirement. As Tye notes: If

the contents of a U.S. persons communications are incidentally

collected (an NSA term of art) in the course of a lawful overseas foreign intelligence
investigation, then Section 2.3(c) of the executive order explicitly authorizes their retention. It
does not require that the affected U.S. persons be suspected of wrongdoing and places no limits
on the volume of communications by U.S. persons that may be collected and retained. The loopholes in
Executive Order 12333 are large enough to sail a ship through. President Obama has the power to make and overturn executive

Obama
has proposed several reforms to NSA practices, but he has not mentioned altering or
canceling this executive order. He could end it today, and he should.
orders unilaterally. He does not need to consult Congress, the NSA or any other government body to end this practice.

Focus on short-term impacts is epistemologically bankrupt greater attention to

structural conditions and root causes is key their model of debate creates an
extinction fetish that privileges poor scholarship as long as the impact cards sound
good
Bilgin & Morton 4 [Pinar, Associate Professor of International Relations at Bilkent University, & Adam David, Lecturer in
the Department of Politics and International Relations at Lancaster University, Politics, 24(3), From Rogue to Failed States? The
Fallacy of Short-termism, p. 176-178]

Calls for alternative approaches to the phenomenon of state failure are often met with the criticism that
such alternatives could only work in the long term whereas something needs to be done here
and now. Whilst recognising the need for immediate action, it is the role of the political scientist to point to
the fallacy of short-termism in the conduct of current policy. Short-termism is defined by Ken Booth
(1999, p. 4) as approaching security issues within the time frame of the next election, not the next generation. Viewed as such,

short-termism is the enemy of true strategic thinking. The latter requires policymakers to
rethink their long-term goals and take small steps towards achieving them . It also requires
heeding against taking steps that might eventually become self-defeating. The United States has presently
fought three wars against two of its Cold War allies in the post-Cold War era, namely, the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and the
Taliban in Afghanistan. Both were supported in an attempt to preserve the delicate balance between the United States and the Soviet
Union. The Cold War policy of supporting client regimes has eventually backfired in that US policymakers now have to face the
instability they have caused. Hence the need for a comprehensive understanding of state failure and the role Western states have
played in failing them through varied forms of intervention. Although some commentators may judge that the road to the existing
situation is paved with good intentions, a

truly strategic approach to the problem of international terrorism requires a

more sensitive consideration of the medium-to-long-term implications of state building in different parts of the
world whilst also addressing the root causes of the problem of state failure. Developing this line of argument further,
reflection on different socially relevant meanings of state failure in relation to different time increments shaping policy-making
might convey alternative considerations. In line with John Ruggie (1998, pp. 167170), divergent issues might then come to the fore

when viewed through the different lenses of particular time increments. Firstly, viewed through the lenses of an incremental time
frame, more immediate concerns to policymakers usually become apparent when linked to precocious assumptions about terrorist
networks, banditry and the breakdown of social order within failed states. Hence relevant players and events are readily identified
(al-Qaeda), their attributes assessed (axis of evil, strong/weak states) and judgements made about their long-term significance
(war on terrorism). The key analytical problem for policymaking in this narrow and blinkered domain is the one of choice given the
constraints of time and energy devoted to a particular decision. These factors lead policymakers to bring

conceptual

baggage to bear on an issue that simplifies but also distorts information. Taking a second temporal form,
that of a conjunctural time frame, policy responses are subject to more fundamental epistemological
concerns. Factors assumed to be constant within an incremental time frame are more variable
and it is more difficult to produce an intended effect on ongoing processes than it is on actors
and discrete events. For instance, how long should the war on terror be waged for? Areas of policy in this realm can
therefore begin to become more concerned with the underlying forces that shape current trajectories. Shifting attention to a third
temporal form draws attention to still different dimensions. Within

an epochal time frame an agenda still in the

making appears that requires a shift in decision-making, away from a conventional problemsolving mode wherein doing nothing is favoured on burden-of-proof grounds, towards a risk-averting mode, characterised
by prudent contingency measures. To conclude, in relation to failed states, the latter time frame entails reflecting on
the very structural conditions shaping the problems of failure raised throughout the present discussion,
which will demand lasting and delicate attention from practitioners across the academy and policymaking communities alike.