[Cayetano vs.

Leonidas, 129 SCRA 522(1984)]

Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus,
the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private
respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her
death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which
respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
xxx

xxx

xxx

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
the law which governs Adoracion Campos will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.,
which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the
Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given
away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law
should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and established public
policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as
provided for by Article 16 (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the
decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20
SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same
to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter
alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedents national law. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Texas, U.S.A., and under the law of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine Law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. [Cayetano vs.
Leonidas, 129 SCRA 522(1984)]

[Lukban vs. Republic of the Philippines, 98 Phil. 574(1956)]

1.PRESUMPTION OF DEATH, JURIS TANTUM" ONLY; CANNOT BE SUBJECT OF
JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENT.A petition for judicial declaration that petitioners
husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it is not authorized
by law, and if such declaration cannot be made in a special proceeding much less
can the court determine the status of petitioner as a widow since this matter must
of necessity depend upon
the fact of death of the husband. This the Court can declare upon proper evidence,
but not to decree that he is merely presumed to be dead. (Nicolai Szartraw, 46 Off.
Gaz., 1st Sup., 243).
2.ID.; ID.; PHILOSOPHY BEHIND THE RULING.The philosophy behind this ruling is
that A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still
be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it
cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only
question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass
* * *. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively
dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris
tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become
final. (Nicolai Szartraw, supra).
3.SPECIAL PROCEEDING DEFINED; WHEN CAN REMEDY BE INVOKED.While it is true
that a special proceeding is an application or proceeding to establish the status or
right of a party, or a particular fact, that remedy can be invoked if the purpose is to
seek the declaration of death of the husband, and not, as in the present case, to
establish a presumption of death. If it can be satisfactorily proven that the husband
is dead, the court would not certainly deny a declaration to that effect. [Lukban vs.
Republic of the Philippines, 98 Phil. 574(1956)]

[Baybayan vs. Aquino, 149 SCRA 186(1987)]

The findings of the respondent Judge as to the ownership of Lot E after the hearing
conducted in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R do not justify the order to amend the complaint
since the determination of the ownership of the said lot by the respondent Judge
presiding over a court exercising probate jurisdiction is not final or ultimate in
nature and is without prejudice to the right of an interested party to raise the
question of ownership in a proper action.15

It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of

decisions, that "when questions arise as to ownership of property alleged to be a
part of the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his
property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title
adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be
determined in the courts of administrative proceedings. The Court of First Instance,
acting, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which
must be submitted to the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction as a court of first instance.'"16
Besides, the order to amend the complaint is vague and hazy and does not specify
what the amendments should be or how the complaint should be amended so that
the petitioners should not be f aulted if the amended complaint subsequently filed
by them in Civil Case No. 231-R does not contain the allegations that the
respondent Judge would want to appear therein. [Baybayan vs. Aquino, 149 SCRA
186(1987)]