Third Battle of Kharkov

1 Background

The Third Battle of Kharkov was a series of battles

on the Eastern Front of World War II, undertaken by
the German Army Group South against the Red Army,
around the city of Kharkov (or Kharkiv[4] ) between 19
February and 15 March 1943. Known to the Germans as
the Donets Campaign, and to the Soviets as the Donbas
and Kharkov operations, the German counterstrike led
to the destruction of approximately 52 Soviet divisions
and the recapture of the cities of Kharkov and Belgorod.

At the start of 1943, the German Wehrmacht faced a

crisis[5] as Soviet forces encircled and reduced the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad and expanded their Winter Campaign towards the Don River.[6] On 2 February 1943 the Sixth Armys commanding ocers surrendered, and an estimated 90,000 men were captured by
the Red Army.[6][7] Total German losses at the Battle of
Stalingrad, excluding prisoners, were between 120,000[8]
and 150,000.[6] Throughout 1942 German casualties totaled around 1.9 million personnel,[9] and by the start
of 1943 the Wehrmacht was around 470,000 men below full strength on the Eastern Front.[10] At the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, the Wehrmacht was
equipped with around 3,300 tanks;[11] by 23 January only
495 tanks, mostly of older types, remained operational
along the entire length of the SovietGerman front.[12]
As the forces of the Don Front were destroying the
German forces in Stalingrad, the Red Armys command
(Stavka) ordered the Soviet forces to conduct a new offensive, which encompassed the entire southern wing of
the SovietGerman front from Voronezh to Rostov.[13]

As the German Sixth Army was encircled in Stalingrad,

the Red Army undertook a series of wider attacks against
the rest of Army Group South. These culminated on
2 January 1943 when the Soviets launched Operation
Star and Operation Gallop, which between January and
early February broke German defenses and led to the
Soviet recapture of Kharkov, Belgorod, Kursk, as well
as Voroshilovgrad and Izium. The Soviet victories
caused participating Soviet units to over-extend themselves. Freed on 2 February by the surrender of the German Sixth Army the Red Armys Central Front turned
its attention west and on 25 February expanded its oensive against both Army Group South and Army Group
Center. Months of continuous operations, however, had
taken a heavy toll on the Soviets and some divisions were
reduced to 1,0002,000 combat eective soldiers. On 19
February, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein launched his
Kharkov counterstrike, using the fresh SS Panzer Corps
and two panzer armies.

On 2 February, the Red Army launched Operation Star,

threatening to recapture the cities of Belgorod, Kharkov
and Kursk.[14] A Soviet drive, spearheaded by four
tank corps organized under Lieutenant-General Markian
Popov, pierced the German front by crossing the Donets
River and pressing into the German rear.[15] On 15 February, two fresh Soviet tank corps threatened the city of
Zaporizhia on the Dnieper River, which controlled the
last major road to Rostov and housed the headquarters of
Army Group South and Luftotte 4 (Air Fleet Four).[16]
Despite Hitler's orders to hold the city, Kharkov was
abandoned by German forces and the city was recaptured
by the Red Army on 16 February.[17] Hitler immediately
ew to von Mansteins headquarters at Zaporizhia. Von
Manstein informed him that an immediate counterattack
on Kharkov would be fruitless, but that he could successfully attack the overextended Soviet ank with his ve
Panzer Corps, and recapture the city later.[18]

The Wehrmacht, while also understrength, anked, encircled, and defeated the Red Armys armored spearheads
south of Kharkov. This enabled von Manstein to renew his oensive against the city of Kharkov proper on
7 March. Despite orders to encircle Kharkov from the
north the SS Panzer Corps instead decided to directly
engage Kharkov on 11 March. This led to four days of
house-to-house ghting before Kharkov was recaptured
by the 1st SS Panzer Division on 15 March. The Germans recaptured Belgorod two days later, creating the
salient which in July 1943 would lead to the Battle of
Kursk. The German oensive cost the Red Army an estimated 90,000 casualties. The house-to-house ghting in
Kharkov was also particularly bloody for the German SS On 19 February Soviet armored units broke through the
Panzer Corps, which had lost approximately 4,300 men German lines and approached the city. In view of the
by the time operations ended in mid March.
worsening situation, Hitler gave Manstein operational
freedom. When Hitler departed, the Soviets were only
some 30 kilometers (19 mi) away from the aireld.[19]
In conjunction with Operation Star the Soviets also
launched Operation Gallop south of Star, pushing the
Germans away from the Donets, taking Voroshilovgrad
1

2 COMPARISON OF FORCES
ing to surround and cut o the German Second Panzer
Army and the Second Army, to the south.[28] However,
unexpected German resistance began to slow the operation considerably,[27] oering Rokossovsky only limited
gains on the left ank of his attack and in the center.[29]
Elsewhere, the Soviet 2nd Tank Army had successfully
penetrated 160 kilometers (99 mi) of the German rear,
along the left ank of the Soviet oensive, increasing the
length of the armys ank by an estimated 100 kilometers
(62 mi).[30]
While the Soviet oensive continued, Field Marshal von
Manstein was able to put the SS Panzer Corpsnow reinforced by the 3rd SS Panzer Divisionunder the command of the Fourth Panzer Army, while Hitler agreed to
release seven understrength panzer and motorized divisions for the impending counteroensive. The Fourth Air
Fleet, under the command of Field Marshal Wolfram von
Richthofen, was able to regroup and increase the amount
of daily sorties from an average of 250 in January to
1,000 in February, providing German forces strategic air
superiority.[24] On 20 February, the Red Army was perilously close to Zaporizhia, signaling the beginning of the
German counterattack,[31] known to the Germans as the
Donets Campaign.[32]

2 Comparison of forces
Soldiers of the 1st SS Panzer Division near Kharkov, February
1943

and Izium, worsening the German situation further. By

this time Stavka believed it could decide the war in the
southwest Russian SFSR and eastern Ukrainian SSR , expecting total victory.[20][21]
The surrender of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad freed six Soviet armies, under the command of
Konstantin Rokossovsky, which were retted and reinforced by the 2nd Tank Army and the 70th Army.[22]
These forces were repositioned between the junction of
German Army Groups Center and South.[23] Known to
the Soviets as the Kharkov[4] and Donbas operations,[24]
the oensive sought to surround and destroy German
forces in the Orel salient, cross the Desna River and surround and destroy German Army Group Center.[22] Originally planned to begin between 1215 February, deployment problems forced Stavka to push the start date back
to 25 February.[25] Meanwhile, the Soviet 60th Army
pushed the German Second Armys 4th Panzer Division
away from Kursk, while the Soviet 13th Army forced the
Second Panzer Army to turn on its ank. This opened
a 60 kilometers (37 mi) breach between these two German forces, shortly to be exploited by Rokossovskys
oensive.[26] While the Soviet 14th and 48th Armies attacked the Second Panzer Armys right ank, making minor gains,[27] Rokossovsky launched his oensive on 25
February, breaking through German lines and threaten-

Between 13 January and 3 April 1943, an estimated

500,000 Red Army soldiers took part in what was known
as the VoronezhKharkov Oensive.[1][4] In all, an estimated 6,100,000 Soviet soldiers were committed to the
area, with another 659,000 out of action with wounds. In
comparison, the Germans could account for 2,200,000
personnel on the Eastern Front, with another 100,000
deployed in Norway. As a result, the Soviets deployed
around twice as many personnel as the Wehrmacht in
early February.[33] However, as a result of their overextension and the casualties they had taken during their
oensive, at the beginning of Mansteins counterattack
the Germans could achieve a tactical superiority in numbers, including the number of tanks presentfor example, Mansteins 350 tanks outnumbered Soviet armor almost seven to one at the point of contact.[31]

2.1 German forces

At the time of the counterattack, Manstein could count on
the Fourth Panzer Army, composed of XLVIII Panzer
Corps, the SS Panzer Corps[34] and the First Panzer
Army, with the XL and LVII Panzer Corps.[35] The
XLVIII Panzer Corps was composed of the 6th, 11th and
17th Panzer Divisions, while the SS Panzer Corps was
organized with the 1st SS, 2nd SS and 3rd SS Panzer
Division.[34] In early February, the combined strength of
the SS Panzer Corps was an estimated 60,000 soldiers.[36]

2.2

Red Army

3
mally in better shape, with an estimated 150 tanks, a
battalion of self-propelled assault guns and enough halftracks to motorize most of its infantry and reconnaissance
soldiers[38] and these had an authorized strength of an
estimated 19,000 personnel.[42] At this time, the bulk of
Germanys armor was still composed of Panzer IIIs and
Panzer IVs,[43] although the 2nd SS Panzer Division had
been outtted with a number of Tiger I tanks.[44]
The Fourth Panzer Army was commanded by General Hermann Hoth, while the First Panzer Army fell
under the leadership of General Eberhard von Mackensen.[45] The 6th, 11th and 17th Panzer Divisions were
commanded by Generals Walther von Hnersdor,[46]
Hermann Balck[47] and Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin,[48] respectively. The SS Panzer Corps was commanded by General Paul Hausser, who also had the 3rd
SS Panzer (Totenkopf) Division under his command.[3]

2.2 Red Army

Portrait of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, commander of
Army Group South at the time of the battle.

The Fourth Panzer Army and the First Panzer Army were
situated south of the Red Armys bulge into German lines,
with the First Panzer Army to the east of the Fourth
Panzer Army. The SS Panzer Corps was deployed along
the northern edge of the bulge, on the northern front of
Army Group South.[35]
The Germans were able to amass around 70,000 men
against the 210,000 Red Army soldiers.[2] The German
Wehrmacht was understrength, especially after continuous operations between June 1942 and February 1943, to
the point where Hitler appointed a committee made up of
Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Martin Bormann and Hans
Lammers, to recruit 800,000 new able-bodied menhalf
of whom would come from nonessential industries.[37]
However, the eects of this recruitment were not seen
until around May 1943, when the German armed forces
were at their highest strength since the beginning of the
war, with 9.5 million personnel.[38]
By the start of 1943 Germanys armored forces had sustained heavy casualties.[39] It was unusual for a Panzer
Division to eld more than 100 tanks, and most averaged
only 7080 serviceable tanks at any given time.[40] After
the ghting around Kharkov, Heinz Guderian embarked
on a program to bring Germanys mechanized forces up
to strength. Despite his eorts, a German panzer division
could only count on an estimated 10,00011,000 personnel, out of an authorized strength of 13,00017,000.[41]
Only by June did a panzer division begin to eld between 100130 tanks each.[38] SS divisions were nor-

Since the beginning of the Red Armys exploitation of

Germanys Army Group Souths defenses in late January and early February, the fronts involved included the
Bryansk, Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts.[35] These
were under the command of Generals M. A. Reiter,[49]
Filipp Golikov[45] and Nikolai Vatutin,[50] respectively.
On 25 February, Marshal Rokossovskys Central Front
also joined the battle.[26] These were positioned in such
a way that Reiters Briansk Front was on the northern
ank of Army Group South, while Voronezh was directly
opposite of Kursk, and the Southwestern Front was located opposite their opponents.[35] Central Front was deployed between the Briansk and Voronezh Fronts, to exploit the success of both of these Soviet units,[51] which
had created a gap in the defenses of the German Second
Panzer Army.[26] This involved an estimated 500,000 soldiers, while around 346,000 personnel were involved in
the defense of Kharkov after the beginning of the German counterstroke.[1]
Like their German counterparts, Soviet divisions were
also seriously understrength. For example, divisions in
the 40th Army averaged 3,5004,000 men each, while
the 69th Army elded some divisions which could only
count on 1,0001,500 soldiers. Some divisions had as
little as 2050 mortars to provide re support. This shortage in manpower and equipment led Vatutins Southwestern Front to request over 19,000 soldiers and 300 tanks,
while it was noted that the Voronezh Front had only received 1,600 replacements since the beginning of operations in 1943.[52] By the time Manstein launched his
counteroensive, the Voronezh Front had lost so much
manpower and had overextended itself to the point where
it could no longer oer assistance to the Southwestern
Front, south of it.[53]

3 MANSTEINS COUNTERATTACK

Mansteins counterattack

What was known to the Germans as the Donets Campaign took place between 19 February[54] and 15 March
1943.[45] Originally, Manstein foresaw a three-stage offensive. The rst stage encompassed the destruction of
the Soviet spearheads, which had over-extended themselves through their oensive. The second stage included the recapture of Kharkov, while the third stage
was designed to attack the Soviets at Kursk, in conjunction with Army Group Centerthis nal stage was ultimately called o due to the advent of the Soviet spring
thaw (Rasputitsa) and Army Group Centers reluctance to
German Panzer IV tanks at Kharkov, 1943.
participate.[45]

3.1

First stage: 19 February 6 March

On 19 February, Haussers SS Panzer Corps was ordered to strike southwards, to provide a screen for the
4th Panzer Armys attack. Simultaneously, Army Detachment Hollidt was ordered to contain the continuing
Soviet eorts to break through German lines.[55] The
1st Panzer Army was ordered to drive north in an attempt to cut o and destroy Popovs Mobile Group, using accurate intelligence on Soviet strength which allowed the Germans to pick and choose their engagements
and bring about tactical numerical superiority.[56] The 1st
and 4th Panzer Armies were also ordered to attack the
overextended Soviet 6th Army and 1st Guards Army.[55]
Between 2023 February, the 1st SS Panzer Division
LSSAH (1st SS Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler)
cut through the 6th Armys ank, eliminating the Soviet
threat to the Dnieper River and successfully surrounding and destroying a number of Red Army units south
of the Samara River. The 2nd SS Panzer Division Das
Reich advanced in a northeastern direction, while the 3rd
SS Panzer Division Totenkopf was put into action on 22
February, advancing parallel to the Das Reich. These
two divisions successfully cut the supply lines to the Soviet spearheads.[57] First Panzer Army was able to surround and pocket Popovs Mobile Group by 24 February, although a sizable contingent of Soviet troops managed to escape north.[58] On 22 February, alarmed by the
success of the German counterattack, the Soviet Stavka
ordered the Voronezh Front to shift the 3rd Tank Army
and 69th Army south, in an eort to alleviate pressure on
the Southwestern Front and destroy German forces in the
Krasnograd area.[59]

Army and 69th Army continued to attack this portion of

the German line, but without much success. With supporting Soviet units stretched thin, the attack began to
falter.[62] On 25 February, Rokossovkys Central Front
launched their oensive between the German Second and
Third Panzer Armies, with encouraging results along the
German anks, but struggling to keep the same pace in
the center of the attack. As the oensive progressed, the
attack on the German right ank also began to stagnate in
the face of increased resistance, while the attack on the
left began to over-extend itself.[63]

In the face of German success against the Southwestern

Front, including attempts by the Soviet 6th Army breaking out of the encirclement, Stavka ordered the Voronezh
Front to relinquish control of the 3rd Tank Army to the
Southwestern Front. To ease the transition, the 3rd Tank
Army gave two rie divisions to the 69th Army, and attacked south in a bid to destroy the SS Panzer Corps.
However, low on fuel and ammunition after the march
south, the 3rd Tank Armys oensive was postponed until 3 March.[64] Furthermore, the 3rd Tank Army was
harassed and severely damaged by continuous German
aerial attacks with Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive bombers.[65]
Launching its oensive on 3 March, the 3rd Tank Armys
15th Tank Corps struck into advancing units of the 3rd SS
Panzer Division and immediately went to the defensive.
Ultimately, the 3rd SS was able to pierce the 15th Tank
Corps lines and link up with other units of the same division advancing north, successfully encircling the Soviet
tank corps.[66] The 3rd Tank Armys 12th Tank Corps
was also forced on the defensive immediately, after the
1st and 2nd SS Panzer Divisions threatened to cut o the
3rd Tank Armys supply route.[67] By 5 March, the attackThe Red Armys 3rd Tank Army began to engage Ger- ing 3rd Tank Army had been badly mauled, with only a
northwards, and was
man units south of Kharkov, performing a holding action small amount of men able to escape [67]
forced
to
erect
a
new
defensive
line.
[60]
By 24 Februwhile Mansteins oensive continued.
ary, the Germans had pulled the Grodeutschland Panz- The destruction of Popovs Mobile Group and the 6th
ergrenadier Division o the line, leaving the 167th and Army during the early stages of the German counterat320th infantry divisions, a regiment from the Totenkopf tack created a large gap between Soviet lines. Taking addivision and elements from the Leibstandarte division to vantage of uncoordinated and piecemeal Soviet attempts
defend the Western edge of the bulge created by the So- to plug this gap, Manstein ordered a continuation of the
viet oensive.[61] Between 2427 February, the 3rd Tank oensive towards Kharkov.[68] Between 15 March the

3.3

Fight for the city: 1115 March

4th Panzer Army, including the SS Panzer Corps, covered

80 kilometers (50 mi) and positioned itself only about 16
kilometers (9.9 mi) south of Kharkov.[58] By 6 March,
the 1st SS Panzer Division made a bridgehead over the
Mosh River, opening the road to Kharkov.[69] The success of Mansteins counterattack forced Stavka to stop
Rokossovskys oensive.[70] The First Panzer Army was
able to regain a defensive line on the Donets River, and
Manstein began to plan subsequent attacks to clear Soviet
units west of the Donets.[71] According to the Germans,
the German counterattack had cost the Red Army an estimated 23,000 soldiers dead, along with 615 tanks and
352 artillery pieces lost.[72]

3.2

Advance towards Kharkov:

March

710

While Rokossovskys Central Front continued its oensive against the German Second Army, which had by
now been substantially reinforced with fresh divisions,
the renewed German oensive towards Kharkov took it
by surprise.[73] On 7 March, Manstein made the decision
to press on towards Kharkov, despite the coming of the
spring thaw. Instead of attacking east of Kharkov, however, Manstein decided to orient the attack towards the
west of Kharkov and then encircle it from the north.[74]
The Grodeutschland Panzergrenadier Division had also
returned to the front, and threw its weight into the attack,
threatening to split the 69th Army and the remnants of the
3rd Tank Army.[75] Between 89 March, the SS Panzer
Corps completed its drive north, splitting the 69th and
40th Soviet Armies, and on 9 March it turned east to complete its encirclement. Despite attempts by the Stavka to
curtail the German advance by throwing in the freshly released 19th Rie Division and 186th Tank Brigade, the
German drive continued.[76]
On 9 March, the Soviet 40th Army counterattacked
against the Grodeutschland Division in a nal attempt
to restore communications with the 3rd Tank Army. This
counterattack, however, was caught by the expansion of
the German oensive towards Kharkov on 10 March.[77]
That same day, the 4th Panzer Army issued orders to
the SS Panzer Corps to take Kharkov as soon as possible, prompting Hausser to order an immediate attack on
the city by the three SS Panzer divisions. The Das Reich would come from the West, the LSSAH would attack
from north, and the Totenkopf would provide a protective
screen along the north and northwestern anks. Despite
attempts by General Hoth to order Hausser to stick to the
original plan, the SS Panzer Corps commander decided
to continue with his own plan of attack on the city, although Soviet defenses forced him to postpone the attack
until the next day. Manstein issued an order to continue
outanking the city, although leaving room for a potential
attack on Kharkov if there was little Soviet resistance, but
Hausser decided to disregard the order and continue with
his own assault.[74] According to von Manstein, the Army

Group headquarters was forced to intervene on a number

of occasions to bring the SS Panzer Corps to swing eastwards to encircle the city, instead of launching a frontal
attack on Kharkov.[78]

3.3 Fight for the city: 1115 March

Early morning 11 March, the LSSAH launched a
two-prong attack into northern Kharkov. The 2nd
Panzergrenadier Regiment, advancing from the Northwest, split up into two columns advancing towards northern Kharkov on either side of the Belgorod-Kharkov railroad. The 2nd Battalion, on the right side of the railroad,
attacked the citys Severnyi Post district, meeting heavy
resistance and advancing only to the Severenyi railway
yard by the end of the day. On the opposite side of the
railroad, the 1st Battalion struck at the district of Alexeyevka, meeting a T-34-led Soviet counterattack which
drove part of the 1st Battalion back out of the city. Only
with aerial and artillery support, coming from Ju 87 Stuka
dive bombers and StuG assault guns, were the German infantry able to battle their way into the city. A anking attack from the rear nally allowed the Germans to achieve
a foothold in that area of the city.[79] Simultaneously, the
1st SS Panzergrenadier Regiment, with armor attached
from a separate unit, attacked down the main road from
Belgorod, ghting an immediate counterattack produced
over the Kharkovs airport, coming on their left ank.
Fighting their way past Soviet T-34s, this German contingent was able to lodge itself into Kharkovs northern
suburbs. From the northeast, another contingent of German infantry, armor and self-propelled guns attempted to
take control of the road exits to the cities of Rogan and
Chuhuiv. This attack penetrated deeper into Kharkov,
but low on fuel the armor was forced to entrench itself
and turn to the defensive.[80]

German armored personnel carrier advancing through the Sumskaya street of Kharkov, March 1943

The Das Reich division attacked on the same day, along

the west side of Kharkov. After penetrating into the citys
Zalyutino district, the advance was stopped by a deep
anti-tank ditch, lined with Soviet defenders, including
anti-tank guns. A Soviet counterattack was repulsed after

6
a bloody reght. A detachment of the division fought its
way to the southern approaches of the city, cutting o the
road to Merefa. At around 15:00, Hoth ordered Hausser
to immediately disengage with the Das Reich, and instead redeploy to cut o escaping Soviet troops. Instead,
Hausser sent a detachment from the Totenkopf division
for this task and informed Hoth that the risk of disengaging with the Das Reich was far too great. On the night of
1112 March, a breakthrough element crossed the antitank ditch, taking the Soviet defenders by surprise, and
opening a path for tanks to cross. This allowed the Das
Reich to advance to the citys main railway station, which
would be the farthest this division would advance into the
city. Hoth repeated his order at 00:15, on 12 March, and
Hausser replied as he had replied on 11 March. However, a third attempt by Hoth was obeyed, and Das Reich
disengaged, using a corridor opened by LSSAH to cross
northern Kharkov and redeploy east of the city.[81]
On 12 March, the LSSAH made progress into the citys
center, breaking through the staunch Soviet defenses in
the northern suburbs and began a house to house ght towards the center. By the end of the day, the division had
reached a position just two blocks north of Dzerzhinsky
Square.[82] The 2nd Panzergrenadier Regiments 2nd Battalion was able to surround the square, after taking heavy
casualties from Soviet snipers and other defenders, by
evening. When taken, the square was renamed "Platz der
Leibstandarte".[83] That night, 2nd Panzergrenadier Regiments 3rd Battalion, under the command of Joachim
Peiper linked up with the 2nd Battalion in Dzerzhinsky
Square and attacked southwards, crossing the Kharkiv
River and creating a bridgehead, opening the road to
Moscow Avenue. Meanwhile, the divisions left wing
reached the junction of the Volchansk and Chuhuiv exit
roads and went on the defensive, ghting o a number of
Soviet counterattacks.[84]
The next day, the LSSAH struck southwards towards the
Kharkov River from Peipers bridgehead, clearing Soviet
resistance block by block. In a bid to trap the citys
defenders in the center, the 1st Battalion of the 1st SS
Panzergrenadier Regiment re-entered the city using the
Volchansk exit road. At the same time, Peipers forces
were able to breakout south, suering from bitter ghting
against a tenacious Soviet defense, and link up with the
divisions left wing at the Volchansk and Chuhuiv road
junction. Although the majority of Das Reich had, by
now, disengaged from the city, a single Panzergrenadier
Regiment remained to clear the southwestern corner of
the city, eliminating resistance by the end of the day.
This eectively put two-thirds of the city under German
control.[85]
Fighting in the city began to wind down on 14 March.
The day was spent with the LSSAH clearing the remnants
of Soviet resistance, pushing east along a broad front. By
the end of the day, the entire city was declared to be back
in German hands.[86] Despite the declaration that the city
had fallen, ghting continued on 15 and 16 March, as

4 AFTERMATH
German units cleared the remnants of resistance in the
tractor works factory complex, in the southern outskirts
of the city.[87]

4 Aftermath
Army Group Souths Donets Campaign had cost the
Red Army some 52 divisions,[88] including over 70,000
80,000 personnel casualties. Of these troops lost, an estimated 45,200 were killed or went missing, while another 41,200 were wounded.[89][90] Between April and
July 1943, the Red Army took its time to rebuild its forces
in the area and prepare for an eventual renewal of the German oensive, known as the Battle of Kursk.[91] Overall
German casualties are more dicult to come by but clues
are provided by examining the casualties of the SS Panzer
Corps, taking into consideration that the elite WaenSS divisions were frequently deployed where the ghting
was expected to be the harshest. By 17 March, it is estimated that the SS Panzer Corps had lost around 44%
of its ghting strength, including around 160 ocers and
about 4,300 enlisted personnel.[3]
As the SS Panzer Corps began to emerge from the city,
they engaged Soviet units positioned directly southwest
of the city, including the 17th NKVD Brigade, 19th
Rie Division and 25th Guards Rie Division. Attempts by the Red Army to re-establish communication with the remnants of the 3rd Tank Army continued, although in vain. On 1415 March these forces
were given permission to withdraw to the northern Donets
River.[92] The Soviet 40th and 69th armies had been engaged since 13 March with the Grodeutschland Panzergrenadier Division, and had been split by the German
drive.[93] After the fall of Kharkov the Soviet defense of
the Donets had collapsed,[94] allowing Mansteins forces
to drive to Belgorod on 17 March,[95] and take it by the
next day.[94] However, weather and exhaustion forced
Mansteins counterstroke to end soon thereafter,[96] despite the Field Marshals ambitions to also attack the
Kursk salient which had been created as a result of the
recapture of Kharkov and Belgorod.[78]
One historian wrote that the Third Battle of Kharkov[4]
was the last great victory of German arms in the eastern front. [97] Experts on a documentary series even argued that German victory in the battle had delayed the
advance of the Red Army into Germany by at least six
months.[98] Following the German success at Kharkov,
Hitler was presented with two options. The rst, known
as the backhand method was to wait for the inevitable
renewal of the Soviet oensive and conduct another operation similar to that of Kharkovallowing the Red Army
to take ground, extend itself and then counterattack and
surround it. The second, or the forehand method, encompassed a major German oensive by Army Groups
South and Center[99] against the protruding Kursk salient.
Because of Hitlers obsession with preserving the front, he

7
chose the forehand method, which led to the Battle of
Kursk.[100]

[27] Glantz (1995), p. 146

[28] Glantz (1995), pp. 145146
[29] Glantz (1996), p. 132

See also

[30] Glantz (1996), p. 133

First Battle of Kharkov

[31] McCarthy & Syron (2002), pp. 179180

Second Battle of Kharkov

[32] Glantz (1995), p. 147

[33] Glantz (1995), p. 303

Notes

[34] von Mellenthin (1956), p. 252

[35] McCarthy & Syron (2002), p. 181

[1] Glantz (1995), p. 296

[2] Glantz (1991), pp. 152153
[3] Reynolds (1997), p. 10
[4] Kharkov is the Russian language name of the city
(Kharkiv the Ukrainian one); both Russian and
Ukrainian were ocial languages in the Soviet Union
(Source:Language Policy in the Soviet Union by L.A.
Grenoble & Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of
Independent States by Routledge)
[5] Cooper (1978), p. 451
[6] Glantz (1995), p. 141
[7] McCarthy & Syron (2002), pp. 177178
[8] McCarthy & Syron (2002), p. 177
[9] Megargee (2000), p. 193
[10] Cooper (1978), pp. 451452
[11] Cooper (1978), p. 270

[36] Weidinger, Pg. 45, Das Reich IV

[37] Glantz (1999), p. 15
[38] Glantz (1999), p. 16
[39] Clark (1965), p. 294
[40] Clark (1965), p. 297
[41] Glantz (1999), pp. 1617
[42] Slaughterhouse, p. 393
[43] Glantz (1999), pp. 1718
[44] Clark (1965), p. 304
[45] McCarthy & Syron (2002), p. 180
[46] Slaughterhouse, p. 163
[47] Slaughterhouse, p. 165
[48] Slaughterhouse, p. 167
[49] Slaughterhouse, p. 301

[12] Cooper (1978), p. 452

[50] Slaughterhouse, p. 304

[13] Glantz (2009), p. 110

[51] Glantz (1996), p. 126

[14] Glantz (1999), p. 10

[52] Glantz (1991), p. 182

[15] Glantz (1995), pp. 143144

[53] Glantz (1991), pp. 185186

[16] Glantz (1995), p. 144

[54] Margry (2001), p. 18

[17] McCarthy & Syron (2002), pp. 178179

[55] Thompson (2000), p. 8

[18] McCarthy & Syron (2002), p. 179

[56] Sikes (1988), pp. 89

[19] Krause & Phillips 2005, pp. 162163

[57] Margry (2001), pp. 1819

[20] Glantz (1995), pp. 143147.

[58] Margry (2001), p. 19

[21] Nipe (2000), pp. 5464, 67, 100.

[59] Glantz (1991), p. 186

[22] Glantz (1996), p. 125

[60] Glantz (1991), pp. 186188

[23] Glantz (1999), p. 11

[61] Glantz (1991), p. 188

[24] Glantz (1996), p. 124

[62] Glantz (1991), pp. 188189

[25] Glantz (1995), p. 145

[63] Glantz (1996), pp. 130133

[26] Glantz (1996), p. 128

[64] Glantz (1991), p. 189

[65] Sikes (1988), p. 9

[66] Glantz (1991), pp. 189191
[67] Glantz (1991), p. 191
[68] Sikes (1988), pp. 910
[69] Margry (2001), pp. 1920
[70] Glantz (1996), pp. 133134
[71] von Manstein (1982), p. 432
[72] von Manstein (1982), p. 433
[73] Glantz (1996), pp. 134135
[74] Margry (2001), p. 20
[75] Glantz (1991), p. 195
[76] Glantz (1991), p. 197
[77] Glantz (1991), p. 199
[78] von Manstein (1982), p. 436
[79] Margry (2001), pp. 2022
[80] Margry (2001), p. 22
[81] Margry (2001), p. 25
[82] Margry (2001), p. 27
[83] Margry (2001), p. 30
[84] Margry (2001), p. 35
[85] Margry (2001), p. 36

REFERENCES

7 References
Clark, Alan (1965). Barbarossa: The RussianGerman Conict, 19411945. New York City, New
York: William Morrow. ISBN 0-688-04268-6.
Cooper, Matthew (1978). The German Army 1933
1945. Lanham, Maryland: Scarborough House.
ISBN 0-8128-8519-8.
Glantz, David M. (1991). From the Don to the
Dnepr: Soviet Oensive Operations, December 1942
August 1943. Routledge. ISBN 0-7146-4064-6.
Glantz, David M. (January 1996). Soviet Military
Strategy During the Second Period of War (November 1942 December 1943): A Reappraisal. The
Journal of Military History (Society for Military
History) 60 (1): 35. doi:10.2307/2944451. JSTOR
2944451.
Glantz, David M.; Jonathan House (1999). The Battle of Kursk. Lawrence, Kansas: Kansas University
Press. ISBN 0-7006-0978-4.
Glantz, David M. (2009). After Stalingrad: The Red
Armys Winter Oensive 19421943. Helion and
Company. ISBN 978-1-906033-26-2.
Glantz, David M.; Jonathan House (1995). When
Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler.
Lawrence, Kansas: Kansas University Press. ISBN
0-7006-0717-X.

[86] Thompson (2000), p. 11

[87] Margry (2001), p. 39
[88] Thompson (2000), pp. 1112
[89] Glantz (1995), p. 296; this gure includes personnel
losses between 19 February and 15 March 1943.
[90] McCarthy & Syron (2002), pp. 180181

Krause, Michael; Cody Phillips (2005). Historical

Perspectives of the Operational Art. Washington,
United States: Government Printing Oce. ISBN
978-0-16-072564-7.
Margry, Karel (2001).
The Four Battles for
Kharkov. London, United Kingdom: Battle of
Britain International Ltd.

[91] Glantz (1999), p. 28

[92] Glantz (1991), p. 203
[93] Glantz (1991), pp. 203205
[94] Margry (2001), p. 40
[95] Glantz (1996), pp. 135136
[96] Glantz (1996), p. 137
[97] Alexander, Bevin. How Hitler Could Have Won World
War II: The Fatal Errors That Led to Nazi Defeat (Three
Rivers Press: 2001), p 168
[98] Narrow Escapes of World War II (2012) IMG Media. Retrieved 5 December 2012
[99] BattleField: The Battle of Kursk
[100] Cooper (1978), p. 456

McCarthy, Peter; Mike Syryon (2002). Panzerkieg:

The Rise and Fall of Hitlers Tank Divisions. New
York City, New York: Carroll & Graf. ISBN 07867-1009-8.
Megargee, Georey P. (2000). Inside Hitlers High
Command. Lawrence, Kansas: Kansas University
Press. ISBN 0-7006-1015-4.
Reynolds, Michael (1997). Steel Inferno: I SS
Panzer Corps in Normandy. New York City, New
York: Sarpedon. ISBN 1-885119-44-5.
Sikes, James E. (29 April 1988). Kharkov and
Sinai A Study in Operational Transition. School of
Advanced Military Studies, US Command & General Sta College. p. 86.

9
Slaughterhouse: The Encyclopedia of the Eastern
Front. The Military Book Club. 2002. ISBN 07394-3128-5.
Thompson (Lt. Col.), Thomas A. (2000). Field
Marshal Erich von Manstein and the Operational Art
at the Battle of Kharkov. U.S. Army War College.
p. 15.
von Manstein, Erich (1982). Lost Victories: The
War Memoirs of Hitlers Most Brilliant General. St.
Paul, MN: Zenith Press. ISBN 0-7603-2054-3.
von Mellenthin, F. W. (1956). Panzer Battles. New
York City, New York: Ballantine Books. ISBN 0345-32158-8.

Further reading
Heiber, Helmut; David M. Glantz (2003). Hitler
and his Generals: Military Conferences 19421945.
New York City, New York: Enigma Books. ISBN
1-929631-09-X.
Restayn, Jean (15 January 2000). The Battle for
Kharkov, Winter 1942/1943. Canada: Fedorowicz.
p. 450. ISBN 978-0-921991-48-9.
Nipe, George (March 2002). Platz der Leibstandarte: A Photo Study of the SS-Panzer-GrenadierDivision Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler and the Battle for Kharkov JanuaryMarch 1943. Canada:
RZM Publishing. p. 250. ISBN 978-0-96575842-0.
Nipe, George (1 January 2000). Last Victory in
Russia: The SS-Panzerkorps and Mansteins Kharkov
Counteroensive FebruaryMarch 1943. Schiffer Publishing. p. 300. ISBN 978-0-7643-1186-4.
Mawdsley, Evan (2005). Thunder in the East: the
Nazi-Soviet War, 19411945. Hodder Arnold. p.
502. ISBN 0-340-80808-X.

External links

10

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