Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, petitioner

vs Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., respondent

Ponente: Puno
Facts:
MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro
Manila. Bel-Air is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners
of Bel-Air Villagee in Makati City. Bel-Air is the registered owner of the Neptune Street, a
road inside Bel-Air Village.
December 30, 1995 Bel-Air received a notice from MMDA requesting Bel-Air to open
Neptune St. to public vehicular traffic. On the same day, MMDA apprised that the
perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be
demolished.
January 2, 1996, MMDA instituted a case for injunction against Bel-Air; and prayed for a
TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining Neptune St. and prohibiting the demolition of
the perimeter wall. Court issued a TRO the next day.
After due hearing, RTC denied the issuance of a preliminary injunction. MMDA question
the denial and appealed to the CA. CA conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune St.
then issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the MMDA proposed action.
On January 27, 1997, appellate court rendered a decision finding MMDA no authority to
order the opening of Neptune St. It held that the authority is in the City Council of Makati
by ordinance.
The motion for reconsideration is denied hence this recourse.
Issues: (1) MMDA has the authority to mandate the opening of Neptune St. to public
traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers? (2) Is passage of an ordinance a
condition precedent before the MMDA may order the opening of subdividion roads to
public traffic? (3) Is Bel-Air estopped from denying the authority of MMDA? (4)Was BelAir denied of due process despite the several meetings held between MMDA and BelAir? (5) Has Bel-Air come to court with unclean hands?
MMDA: it has the authority to open Neptune St. because it is an agent of the
Government endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro
Manila. From the premise of police powers, it follow then that it need not for an
ordinance to be enacted first.
**Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. Police power is lodged primarily in
the National Legislature, which the latter can delegate to the President and
administrative boards, LGU or other lawmaking bodies.

**LGU is a political subdivision for local affairs. Which has a legislative body empowered
to enact ordinances, approved resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare
of the province/city/municipality.
**Metro Manila is declared as a special development and administrative region in 1995.
And the administration of metro-wide basic services is under the MMDA.Which includes,
transport and traffice management. It should be noted that MMDA are limited to the
acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies and installation of a system and administration. MMDA
was not granted with legislative power.
Ruling:
(1) The basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice of
December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its president. The
notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune St.
(2) The MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is
the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No.
824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powers which
were not bestowed on the present MMDA.
(3) Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily
responsible for the governance of their respective political subdivisions. The MMA's
jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems involving basic services that
transcended local boundaries. It did not have legislative power.
Petition Denied.

Rodolfo Ganzon vs Court of Appeals

Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him
on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local
Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of
the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of
suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension
order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize
the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is

because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same.
What was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter ego,
can suspend and or remove local officials.
HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President
mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and
denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken
impression because legally, supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by
the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to
him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two
terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in
meaning and extent. In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power
or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter
fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by
law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of
set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But from this pronouncement
it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local
government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the
good of the public service so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending
Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day
suspension.

Humberto Basco vs Philippine Amusements and Gaming

Corporation
197 SCRA 52 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal
ProtectionClause

Municipal Corporation Local Autonomy Imperium in Imperio

In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was
created by Presidential Decree 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the
power to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. PAGCORs operation was a success hence in
1978, PD 1399 was passed which expanded PAGCORs power. In 1983, PAGCORs
charter was updated through PD 1869. PAGCORs charter provides that PAGCOR
shall regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existingfranchise or
permitted by law. Section 1 of PD 1869 provides:
Section 1.

Declaration of Policy.

It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to

centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing
franchises or permitted by law.
Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law creating
PAGCOR. They claim that PD 1869 is unconstitutional because a) it violates the equal
protection clause and b) it violates the local autonomy clause of the constitution.
Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause because it
legalizes PAGCOR-conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are
outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.
Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 forced cities
like Manila to waive its right to impose taxes and legal fees as far as PAGCOR is
concerned; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as
thefranchise holder from paying any tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as
well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local is
violative of the local autonomy principle.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the local autonomy clause.

HELD:
1. No. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of
the equal protection is not clearly explained in Bascos petition. The mere fact that some
gambling activities like cockfighting (PD 449) horse racing (RA 306 as amended by RA
983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by BP 42) are legalized
under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable
laws, PD. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.
Bascos posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause equal protection of
the laws. The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not
unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons
or things to be conformable to Article III, Sec 1 of the Constitution. The equal
protection clause does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of
individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate. The Constitution does not
require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though
they were the same.
2. No. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue
and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as
the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such
taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.
A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on
taxing powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to
such guidelines and limitation as Congress may provide.
Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to
impose taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It
should be stressed that municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress which
has the power to create and abolish municipal corporations due to its general
legislative powers. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local

governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain
matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original
charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government.
Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere
Local government.
This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National Government over local
governments.

Ismael Mathay, Jr. vs Court of Appeals

In November 1972, Presidential Decree No. 51 was signed into law. PD 51 created a
Civil Service Unit (CSU) office in cities. Pursuant to said law, then Quezon City mayor
Brigido Simon appointed officers in the QC-CSU. Meanwhile, an ordinance in QC was
passed providing, among others, that the personnel of the CSU shall be automatically
absorbed into the QC Department of Public Order and Safety (QC-DPOS). During the
term of the next mayor, Ismael Mathay, Jr., it was determined that PD 51 never became
a law because it was never published. Mathay then did not renew the contracts of the
QC-CSU personnel, at the same time, they were not reappointed to the QC-DPOS.
Mathay was then sued by the QC-CSU personnel before the Civil Service Commission
(CSC). Eventually, the CSC Commissioner ruled that based on the QC ordinance,
Mathay should reinstate the CSU-personnel to QC-DPOS.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the CSC Commissioner is correct.
HELD: No. The ordinance is invalid for when it provided for automatic absorption of the
QC-CSU personnel to the QC-DPOS, it divested the mayor the power to choose as to
who should fill said office. Just like in the national government, the local sanggunian can
only create an office, it cannot choose the personnel who should fill such office that is
a power vested in the local chief executive (mayor). This is also clearly provided for in
the Local Government Code. The power to appoint is vested in the local chief

executive. The power of the city council or sanggunian, on the other hand, is limited
to creating, consolidating and reorganizing city officers and positions supported by local
funds. The city council has no power to appoint. Had Congress intended to grant the
power to appoint to both the city council and the local chief executive, it would have said
so in no uncertain terms.
On the other hand, the CSC Commissioner cannot order the mayor to reinstate the QCCSU personnel to the QC-DPOS. Such would be an encroachment of the mayors right
to choose as to who should be appointed. Further, the CSU never came into existence
for it has no legal basis to speak of. It created no right hence the QC-CSU cannot
invoke any. It is axiomatic that the right to hold public office is not a natural right. The
right exists only by virtue of a law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it.