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One of the costliest operations of the war,[1] the casualties are estimated at being from 1,700,000 to 2,700,000 The second phase of the operation includes :
on both sides.[1] One of the most tragic events took place
Lower Dnieper Oensive 26 September 20 Deduring the establishment of so-called Bukryn lodgement
cember 1943
near the village of Malyi Bukryn (Myronivka Raion).
The Soviet writer and war veteran Viktor Astafyev in
his memoirs was recalling that 25,000 soldiers who enMelitopol Oensive 26 September 5 Novemtered the Dnieper from one side, would exit the river
ber 1943
on the other side in amounts of 5-6,000.[1] Due to great
Zaporizhia Oensive 1014 October 1943
losses, the Dnieper Airborne Assault became the last
Kremenchug-Pyatikhatki Oensive 15 Octomass airborne operation utilized by the Soviet Union dur[1]
ber 3 November 1943
ing the World War II.
Dnepropetrovsk Oensive 23 October 23
Some 2,438 soldiers were awarded the Hero of the Soviet
December 1943
Union which was more than had been awarded previously
Krivoi Rog Oensive 1421 November 1943
Phases
3
Kiev Strategic Oensive 313 November 1943
PLANNING
Strategic situation
3 Planning
Following the Battle of Kursk, the German High Command was no longer in a position to mount large-scale
oensives against the Red Army in the East. During
the long retreat after Kursk, the Wehrmacht 's Heer
and supporting Luftwae forces had managed to cross
the Dnieper river to the West and reestablished the defences along the Wotan fortied line. The crossing of Voronezh Front Nikolai Vatutin
the Dnieper was accomplished by thousands of German
soldiers in small rafts and boats while under continuous
air and ground attack by pursuing Soviet forces. German
losses in men and materil had been considerable, many
of the experienced units were weakened. This meant that
the Wehrmacht forces had to adopt an operational sustained defence against the Soviet Fronts. On occasions
Wehrmacht tactical counter-attacks did meet with considerable success, but this could not be translated into a
return of the strategic initiative lost at Kursk. While the
strength in personnel, materil and logistical support of
the Wehrmacht forces declined, that of the Red Army Steppe Front Ivan Konev
steadily increased, allowing the latter to create an ever
larger numerical superiority for further conducting oensives.
By mid-August, Adolf Hitler understood that the Soviet oensive could not be contained and he ordered
construction of a series of fortications to slow down
the Red Army's oensive capability, demanding that
the Wehrmacht defend the Wotan Line positions on the
Dnieper at all costs.
On the Soviet side, Joseph Stalin was determined to pursue the recovery of the occupied territories, started at the Southwestern Front Rodion Malinovsky
3.1
Soviet planning
3
6th Guards Army, led by Ivan Chistiakov
38th Army, led by Nikandr Chibisov / Kyrylo
Moskalenko (since October)
47th Army, led by Pavel Korzun / Pylyp
Zhmachenko (September - October) / Vitaliy
Polenov (since October)
27th Army, led by Sergei Tromenko
52nd Army, led by Konstantin Koroteev
3.1
Soviet planning
including small shing boats and improvised rafts of bar- 3.2.1 German organisation
rels and trees (like the one in the photograph). The preparation of the crossing equipment was further complicated
2nd Army - Walter Wei
by the German scorched earth strategy with the total destruction of all boats and raft building material in the area.
Luftotte 2 (selected units) - Wolfram Freiherr von
The crucial issue would obviously be heavy equipment.
Richthofen
Without it, the bridgeheads would not stand for long.
(in Ukraine) Army Group South - Erich von
Manstein
3.2
German planning
known as Eastern Wall, was issued on 11 August 1943 Three weeks after the start of the oensive, and despite
and began to be immediately executed.
heavy losses on the Soviet side, it became clear that the
Fortications were erected along the length of the Germans could not hope to contain the Soviet oensive in
Dnieper. However, there was no hope of completing such the at, open terrain of the steppes, where the Red Armys
an extensive defensive line in the short time available. numerical strength would prevail. Manstein asked for as
Therefore, the completion of the Eastern Wall was not many as 12 new divisions in the hope of containing the
uniform in its density and depth of fortications. Instead, Soviet oensive but German reserves were perilously
[5]
they were concentrated in areas where a Soviet assault- thin. Years later, Manstein wrote in his memoirs:
crossing were most likely to be attempted, such as near
Kremenchuk, Zaporizhia and Nikopol.
After analysing this situation, I concluded
Additionally, on 7 September 1943, the SS forces and
the Wehrmacht received orders to strip the areas they had
to abandon from anything that could be used by the Red
Army to slow it down, and to try to create supply shortages
for the Soviet forces by implementing a scorched earth
policy.
4.4
4.3
Decisive action
4.4
5
expected capacities), the master loading plan, ruined,
was abandoned. Many radios and supplies got left behind. In the best case, it would take three lifts to deliver
the two brigades. Units (still arriving by the over-taxed
rail system), were loaded piecemeal onto returned aircraft, which were slow to refuel owing to the less-thanexpected capacities of fuel trucks. Meanwhile, alreadyarrived troops changed planes, seeking earlier ights. Urgency and the fuel shortage prevented aerial assembly
aloft. Most aircraft, as soon as they were loaded and fueled, ew in single le, instead of line abreast, to the dropping points. Assault waves became as intermingled as the
units they carried.
As corps elements made their 170 to 220 km ights from
four of ve elds (one of which received no fuel), troops
(half of whom had never jumped, except from training
towers) got briefed on drop zones, assembly areas and
objectives only poorly understood by platoon commanders still studying new orders. Meanwhile, Soviet aerial
photography, suspended several days by bad weather,
had missed the strong reinforcement of the area, early
that afternoon. Non-combat cargo pilots ferrying 3rd
Brigade through drizzle expected no resistance beyond
river pickets but, instead, were met by anti-aircraft re
and starshells from the 19th Panzer Division (only coincidentally transiting the drop zone, and just one of six
divisions and other formations ordered, on the 21st, to
ll the gap in front of the 3rd Tank Army). Lead aircraft,
disgorging paratroopers over Dubari at 1930, came under
small arms, machine gun, and quad-20 anti-aircraft re
from the armored personnel carrier battalion (Pioneers)
of the 73rd Panzer Grenadier Regiment and elements of
the division sta of 19th Panzer Division. Some paratroops began returning re and throwing grenades even
before landing; trailing aircraft accelerated, climbed and
evaded, dropping wide. Through the night, some pilots
avoided starshell-lit drop points entirely, and 13 aircraft
returned to airelds without having dropped at all. Intending a 10 by 14 km drop over largely undefended terrain, the Soviets instead achieved a 30 by 90 km drop over
the fastest mobile elements of two German corps.
4.5
German troops soon launched heavy counterattacks on almost every bridgehead, hoping to annihilate them before
heavy equipment could be transported across the river.
For instance, the Borodaevsk lodgement, mentioned by
Marshal Konev in his memoirs, came under heavy armored attack and air assault. Bombers attacked both
the lodgement and the reinforcements crossing the river.
Konev complained at once about a lack of organization of
Soviet air support, set up air patrols to prevent bombers
from approaching the lodgements and ordered forward
more artillery to counter tank attacks from the opposite
shore. When Soviet aviation became more organized and
hundreds of guns and Katyusha rocket launchers began
ring, the situation started to improve and the bridgehead
was eventually preserved.
Such battles were commonplace on every lodgement. Although all the lodgements were held, losses were terrible
at the beginning of October, most divisions were at only
25 to 50% of their nominal strength.
7
issues.
Incidentally, between 28 November and 1 December
1943 the Teheran conference was held between Winston
Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Stalin. The Battle
of the Dnieper, along with other major oensives staged
in 1943, certainly gave Stalin a dominant position for negotiating with his Allies.
7 Casualties debate
The Wehrmacht delivers re across the Dnieper
ern shore in the southern part of the front. Therefore, a vigorous attack was staged on the KremenchukDnipropetrovsk line. Simultaneously, a major diversion
was conducted in the south to draw German forces away
both from the Lower Dnieper and from Kiev.
At the end of the oensive, Soviet forces controlled a
bridgehead 300 kilometers wide and up to 80 kilometers
deep in some places. In the south, the Crimea was now
cut o from the rest of the German forces. Any hope of
stopping the Red Army on the Dniepers east bank was
lost.
Criticisms
Stalins determination to recover Kiev before 7 November has raised quite a few criticisms among historians.
It is commonly accepted now that the bridgeheads on
the Lower Dnieper were deliberately left alone to draw
German forces from Kiev, resulting in heavy losses.
While this hypothesis could be true to some extent, one
must not forget that the action of establishing a bridgehead alone is dangerous enough and can (and usually
does) lead to heavy casualties.
Outcomes
Casualties during the Battle of the Dnieper are still a subject of heavy debate. Some sources give very low gures (200,000 to 300,000 total casualties), which is much
lower than for instance, the Battle of Kursk. However,
given the duration of the campaign and the huge area
involved, more than one historian argues that the losses
involved were huge, easily reaching or even surpassing
those at the Stalingrad, but going unnoticed because of
the large operational area (and of the aura of fame enveloping the latter). The death toll also depends on the
time frame considered. It also depends on whether the
toll of the Battle of Smolensk, which was fought to draw
German forces away from the area in which the Dnieper
battle would be held, is included in the total.
On the subject of Soviet casualties, Nikola Shefov in his
Russian ghts puts the gure of 373,000 killed in action
(KIA) and more than 1,500,000 total Soviet casualties.
British historian John Erickson, in his Barbarossa: The
Axis and the Allies, puts a gure of 173,201 Soviets KIA,
during a time frame from 26 September to 20 December
1943, therefore not taking into account the period from
24 August to 26 September. Glantz/House 'When Titans Clashed' put a gure of 428,000 total losses (103,000
KIA) during 26 August to 30 September (ChernigovPoltava Operation) and 754,000 total losses (173,000
KIA) during 26 September and 20 December.
Given the heavy German resistance even before the
Dnieper forced-crossing, this gure seems a low estimate (Soviet sources estimate casualties from the postKursk oensive alone at 250,000 killed, wounded and
captured), the gure of over 300,000 KIA could seem
correct, with the wounded in action number following the
3:1 empiric ratio.
Notes
References
David M. Glantz, Jonathan M. House, When Titans
Clashed:how the Red Army stopped Hitler, University Press of Kansas, 1995
Nikolai Shefov, Russian ghts, Lib. Military History, Moscow, 2002
History of Great Patriotic War, 1941 1945.
oscow, 1963
John Erickson, Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies,
Edinburgh University Press, 1994
Marshal Konev, Notes of a front commander', Science, Moscow, 1972.
Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, oscow, 1957.
REFERENCES
10
10.1
Text
10.2
Images
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File:Tolbuhin_fi.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c3/Tolbuhin_fi.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: warheroes.ru Original artist: Unknown
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10.3
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