Operation Iskra

Volkhov Front.[9]

Operation Iskra (Russian: , operatsiya Iskra; English: Operation Spark) was a Soviet military operation during World War II, designed to break
the German Wehrmacht's Siege of Leningrad. Planning
for the operation began shortly after the failure of the
Sinyavino Oensive. The German defeat in the Battle of
Stalingrad in late 1942 had weakened the German front.
By January 1943, Soviet forces were planning or conducting oensive operations across the entire German-Soviet
front, especially in southern Russia, Iskra being the northern part of the wider Soviet 19421943 winter counter
oensive.[5]

Despite the failures of earlier operations, lifting the siege

of Leningrad was a very high priority, so new oensive
preparations began in November 1942.[10] In December,
the operation plan was approved by the Stavka and received the codename Iskra (Spark). The operation was
due to begin in January 1943.[11]

By January 1943, the situation looked very good for the

Soviet side. The German defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad
had weakened the German front. The Soviet forces were
planning or conducting oensive operations across the
entire front, especially in southwestern Russia. Amidst
The operation was conducted by the Red Army's these conditions, Operation Iskra was to become the rst
Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts, and the Baltic Fleet dur- of several oensive operations aimed at inicting a deciing January 1230, 1943 with the aim of creating a land sive defeat on the German Army Group North.[5]
connection to Leningrad. The Soviet forces linked up on
January 18, and by January 22, the front line was stabilised. The operation successfully opened a land corridor 810 kilometres (5.06.2 mi) wide to the city. A 2 Preparations
rail road was swiftly built through the corridor which allowed more supplies to reach the city than the Road of The area south of Lake Ladoga is heavily forested area
Life across the frozen surface of Lake Ladoga, signi- with many wetlands (especially peat deposits) closer to
cantly reducing the possibility of the capture of the city the lake. In addition the forest shielded both sides from
and a German-Finnish linkup.[6]
visual observation. Both of these factors greatly hindered
The success led to a much more ambitious oensive op- the mobility of artillery and vehicles in the area, providing
eration named Polyarnaya Zvezda (Polar Star) less than a considerable advantage to the defending forces. One of
two weeks later. That operation had the aim of decisively the key locations were the Sinyavino heights which were
defeating Army Group North, lifting the siege altogether, some 150 metres higher than the surrounding at terrain,
but it achieved only minimal progress.[7] Soviet forces which were one of the few dry and clear areas, and in admade several other attempts in 1943 to renew their of- dition provided good observation. Since the front line had
fensive and completely lift the siege, but made only mod- changed very little since the blockade was established, the
est gains in each one. The corridor remained in range of German forces had built a dense defensive network of
German artillery and the siege was only over on January strong points, interconnected by trenches and protected
by extensive obstacles and interlocking artillery and mor27, 1944.[8]
tar re.[12] The Neva River and marshes were partially
frozen in winter which allowed infantry to cross it, but
not heavy vehicles.[13]

Background

2.1 German preparations

The Siege of Leningrad started in early autumn 1941. By

September 8, 1941 German and Finnish forces had surrounded the city, cutting o all supply routes to Leningrad
and its suburbs. However, the original drive on the city
failed and the city was subjected to a siege. During 1942
several attempts were made to breach the blockade but
all failed. The last such attempt was the Sinyavino Offensive. After the defeat of the Sinyavino Oensive, the
front line returned to what it was before the oensive
and again 16 kilometres (9.9 mi) separated Leonid Govorov's Leningrad Front in the city and Kirill Meretskov's

The Germans were well aware that breaking the blockade was very important for the Soviet side. However,
due to the reverse at Stalingrad and the Soviet oensive at Velikiye Luki to the south of Leningrad, Army
Group North was ordered to go on the defensive and was
stripped of many troops. The 11th Army, which was to
lead the assault on Leningrad in September 1942, and
which had thwarted the last Soviet oensive, was transferred to Army Group Center in October. Nine other di1

2 PREPARATIONS
The orders from the Stavka were:
This meant recapturing the bottleneck and opening a
10 kilometres (6.2 mi) corridor to Leningrad. After that,
the two fronts were to rest for 10 days and resume the
oensive southward in further operations.[15]

German eld defences in January 1943

visions were also reassigned to other sectors.[14]

At the start of the Soviet oensive, the German 18th
Army, led by Georg Lindemann consisted of 26 divisions spread across a 450 kilometres (280 mi) wide front.
The army was stretched very thin and as a result had no
division-level reserves. Instead, each division had a tactical reserve of one or two battalions, and the army reserves
consisted of portions of the 96th Infantry Division and the
5th Mountain Division. The 1st Air Fleet provided the air
support for the army.[13]
Five divisions and part of another one were guarding the
narrow corridor which separated the Soviet Leningrad
and Volkhov Fronts. The corridor was only 16 kilometres
(9.9 mi) wide and was called the bottleneck. The German divisions were well fortied in this area, where the
front line had been virtually unchanged since September
1941, and hoping to repel the Soviet oensive.[10]

2.2

Soviet preparations

The biggest dierence from the earlier Sinyavino Oensive was the location of the main attack. In September
1942 the Soviet forces were attacking south of the town
of Siniavino, which allowed them to potentially encircle
several German divisions, but also left the army open to
anking attacks from the north, and it was this which ultimately caused the oensive to fail. In January 1943 the
oensive was conducted north of Siniavino, closer to the
Ladoga Lake shore, which removed the threat of anking attacks and increased the probability of success, but
forced the Soviets to abandon the idea of encircling most
of the German forces in the bottleneck.[15]
The oensive was to be conducted by Leningrad Fronts
67th Army and Volkhov Fronts 2nd Shock Army commanded by Major General M.P. Dukhanov and Lieutenant General V.Z. Romanovsky respectively. The 8th
Army, commanded by Lieutenant General F.N. Starikov,
was to conduct a limited oensive on the 2nd Shock
Armys ank and defend elsewhere.[16] 13th and 14th Air
Armies provided air support.
The two fronts spent December training and preparing for the oensive, and received signicant reinforcements. These included not just replenishment and additional rie divisions and brigades, but also signicant additional artillery and engineer units, which were vital for
breaching the heavy German defenses. Specialized winter units included three ski brigades and four aerosleigh
battalions.[17] To ensure the Soviet forces had air superiority, which they had lacked in the previous oensive,
the air strength in the area was increased to a total of over
800 planes, predominantly ghters. Large tank forces
could not operate well in the swampy terrain, so the tank
forces were used primarily as battalions reinforcing divisions or slightly larger brigades, which were to operate
independently.[18]
Originally the operation was due to begin on January 1,
but poor ice conditions on the Neva caused the oensive
to be delayed until January 1012.[17] A number of measures were taken to prevent the details of the operation
being revealed to the Germans. Only a limited number
of senior ocers were involved in the planning, all redeployments took place in bad weather or at night and simulated attack preparations were made elsewhere to confuse
the German side.[19]

Situation on front on January 11

The plan for Operation Iskra was approved in December.

On January 10, the Stavka sent Georgy Zhukov as its representative to coordinate the battle. The rie divisions
occupied their jumping-o positions on January 11, and
rst echelon tanks moved into their advanced positions
early on January 12.[20]

3.2

Soviet advance: January 1317

Battle

3.1

Start of the battle: January 12

3
8 and Kruglaya Grove the advance was 12 kilometres
(0.621.24 mi) deep, while even further south, the anking attacks by the 8th Army only managed to capture the
rst line of German trenches.[23]
The German side reacted by deploying their reserves to
the region throughout the night. One improvised battle group consisting of ve battalions from the 96th Infantry Division, supported by artillery and four Tiger
tanks moved to Gorodok No. 2 to reinforce the 170th Infantry Division to the west. Another similar battle group
using battalions from the 96th Infantry Division was sent
to Workers Settlement No. 1 to support the 227th Infantry Division.[24]

3.2 Soviet advance: January 1317

Soviet advance on January 12

The night before the start of the operations, the Soviet

night bombers attacked the German divisional headquarters and artillery positions to disrupt the German command and control. The bombers also attacked German
airelds and communication centres to disrupt the ow of
reinforcements.[21] Operation Iskra began at 9:30 on January 12, when the two Soviet fronts began their artillery
preparation, which lasted for 2 hours 20 minutes on the
western side and 1 hour 45 minutes on the eastern side
of the bottleneck. The Soviet attack started ve minutes
before the artillery preparation nished with a Katyusha
barrage, to fully exploit its eects.[22]
Soviet advance by January 18
The Leningrad Front forces achieved their greatest success between Shlisselburg and Gorodok 1. Here, the
Soviet 136th and 268th Rie Divisions with supporting
tanks and artillery captured a bridgehead approximately
5 kilometres (3.1 mi) wide and 3 kilometres (1.9 mi)
deep.[22] At 18:00 the sappers constructed bridges near
Mar'ino to allow second echelon troops to advance. However, attacks further south, near Gorodok only resulted in
the capture of the rst line of German trenches. The attack further north at Shlisselburg failed. By evening, the
Front command decided to exploit the formed bridgehead and troops attacking Shlisselburg across the Neva
were redeployed there and started attacking it from the
south.[23]

The next ve days saw very heavy ghting as the Soviets slowly advanced through heavy German defences and
repelled German counterattacks. On January 13, bad
weather prevented the Soviet side from employing their
air force. That day they gained almost no ground and
incurred heavy losses.[25] The German side, after their
counterattacks had failed to throw back the Soviet troops,
started further reinforcing the area by assembling battle
groups using portions of divisions from the quiet parts of
the front. These included battle groups from the 1st Infantry Division, the 61st Infantry Division, the 5th Mountain Division and the SS Police Division.[26]
On January 14 the weather improved enough to allow air
support again and the Soviet advance resumed, albeit at
a slow pace. To speed up the encirclement of the strong
point at Lipka, the Soviet side used the 12th Ski Brigade
which crossed the ice of the Ladoga Lake and attacked
the German rear lines. By the end of the day the German
forces in the Lipka and Shlisselburg areas were almost
completely cut o from the rest of the German forces.[27]

The Volkhov Front attack saw less success as the forces

of the 2nd Shock Army managed to envelop but not destroy the German strong points at Lipka and Workers
Settlement No. 8. The latter was an impressive defensive position with a garrison of 700 men and 16 bunkers.
Heavy anking re from these strong points prevented
any further advance, but the 2nd Shock Army penetrated
the German defenses 2 kilometres (1.2 mi) between these Throughout January 1517 the Soviet fronts fought topoints. Further south, between Workers Settlement No. wards each other, capturing the strong points at Workers

4 AFTERMATH

Settlements Nos. 3, 4, 7, 8, and most of Shlisselburg.

By the end of January 17 they were only 1.52 kilometres (0.931.24 mi) apart between Workers Settlements
Nos. 1 and 5.[28] On January 15, Govorov was promoted
to colonel general.[29]

3.3

Linkup and land corridor: January

1821

SS Police, 21st Infantry, and soon after the 11th Infantry

and 28th Mountain Divisions. The Soviet forces captured
Workers Settlement No. 6 but were unable to advance
any further.[7]

3.4 Front line stabilises, railway construction: January 2230

There were no changes in the front line after January 21 as
a result of Operation Iskra. The Soviet forces were unable
to advance any further, and instead started fortifying the
area to thwart any German attempt at re-establishing the
blockade. On January 22, work started on the rail line
linking Leningrad to the rest of the country through the
captured corridor. The plan from the GKO written on
January 18, ordered the construction to be nished in 20
days. The work was completed ahead of schedule and
trains began delivering supplies on February 6, 1943. The
operation ocially ended on January 30.[32]

4 Aftermath

Soviet advance by January 22

On January 18, at 9:30 the lead elements from the 67th

Army's 123rd Rie Division and 2nd Shock Army's
372nd Rie Division linked up near Workers Settlement
No. 1, thus technically breaking the blockade and marking an important date in the Siege of Leningrad. German
forces north of the settlement were cut o. Group Huhner, made up of two battle groups under the Lieutenant
General Huhner, commander of the 61st Infantry Division, was supposed to hold the corridor between Workers Settlements Nos. 1 and 5 but was no longer able to
do it. Later that day the Soviet forces captured Workers
Settlement No. 5 after repelling a strong German counterattack. The lead elements from the 67th Armys 136th
Rie Division and 2nd Shock Armys 18th Rie Division linked up to the north of the settlement at 11:45.[30]
Group Huhner became cut o too and was ordered to
break out through the forested area toward Siniavino before the main Soviet forces arrived and made a breakout impossible. Group Huhner abandoned its artillery
and heavy equipment[27] and ran the gauntlet of re before reaching Siniavino on January 1920. The breakout
was costly for both sides. By early afternoon, the Soviet forces cleared Shlisselburg and Lipka from German
forces and started liquidating the forces remaining in the
forests south of Lake Ladoga.[31]
During January 1921 the Soviet forces eliminated the
encircled German forces and tried to expand their offensive southward towards Siniavino. However, the 18th
Army signicantly reinforced its positions there with the

Operation Iskra was a strategic victory for the Soviet

forces. From a military perspective, the operation eliminated the possibility of the capture of the city and a
German-Finnish link up, as the Leningrad Front was
now very well supplied, reinforced and able to co-operate
more closely with the Volkhov Front. For the civilian
population, the operation meant that more food was able
to reach the city, as well as improved conditions and the
possibility of evacuating more civilians from the city.[7]
Breaking the blockade also had a signicant strategic effect, although it was overshadowed by the surrender of
the German 6th Army at Stalingrad only a few days later.
Notably, the rst Tiger tank captured by the Soviets was
taken during this battle. It was undamaged and evacuated
by the Soviet forces for evaluation.[33]
Also the victory led to promotions for Govorov, who was
promoted to colonel-general on January 15, and Zhukov,
who was promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union on
January 18. In addition Govorov and Meretskov were
awarded the Order of Suvorov 1st Class on January 28.
The 136th and 327th Rie divisions were awarded the
designation of 63rd and 64th Guards Rie Divisions,
while the 61st Tank Brigade was designated the 30th
Guards Tank Brigade.[3]
For the German side, the battle left the 18th Army very
stretched and exhausted. Lacking sucient reinforcements, the command of Army Group North made the
decision to shorten the front line by evacuating the Demyansk salient. The salient had been held throughout
1942, despite being encircled for a few months, as it
was an important strategic bridgehead. Together with the
Rzhev salient (which was also evacuated in spring 1943),
it could potentially be used to encircle a large number of

5
Soviet forces. However, in the situation that had devel- [23] Isayev p.455
oped, retaining it was no longer possible.[34]
Nevertheless despite these conditions, the Stavka knew
that Operation Iskra was incomplete, as the corridor it
had opened was narrow and was still in range of the German artillery, and the important heights and strong point
at Siniavino were still under German control. This led
Zhukov to plan a much more ambitious oensive operation named Polyarnaya Zvezda (Polar Star). The operation had the aim of decisively defeating Army Group
North, but faltered early on.[7] The Soviet forces carried
several other oensives in the area in 1943, slowly expanding the corridor, making other small gains before
nally capturing Siniavino in September.[35] However,
the city was still subjected to at least a partial siege as
well as air and artillery bombardment until January 1944,
when the Leningrad-Novgorod Oensive broke through
the German lines, lifting the siege completely.[36]

[24] Glantz p.277

[25] Isayev pp.456457
[26] Glantz p.280
[27] Isayev p.457
[28] Glantz pp.281282
[29] Kiselev p. 140
[30] Glantz p.282
[31] Glantz p.283
[32] Isayev p.461
[33] Panzerkampfwagen VI Tiger Ausf. E Sd. Kfz. 181
achtungpanzer.com
[34] Isayev p. 467

Notes

[1] Glantz pp. 262263

[35] Glantz p. 323

[36] Glantz p.303

[2] Isayev pp. 450451

[3] Glantz p. 285
[4] http://lib.ru/MEMUARY/1939-1945/KRIWOSHEEW/
poteri.txt
[5] Glantz p. 259
[6] Glantz pp. 284285
[7] Glantz p. 284
[8] Glantz p. 366
[9] Isayev p. 441
[10] Glantz p. 264

6 References
Glantz, David M. (2002). The Battle for Leningrad
19411944. Kansas University Press. ISBN 07006-1208-4.
(Isayev), (2006).
. ,
. (in Russian). . ,
. ISBN 5-699-11949-3.
(Kiselev), . . (1971).
. (in Russian). .

[11] Glantz p. 265

[12] Glantz pp.216217

7 Further reading

[13] Glantz p. 263

[14] Glantz p. 262
[15] Isayev p. 444
[16] Glantz p. 268
[17] Glantz p. 266
[18] Glantz pp. 269270
[19] Glantz p. 272
[20] Glantz p. 273
[21] Isayev p.454
[22] Glantz p.274

Glantz, David M. (2005). Leningrad: City Under

Siege 19411944. Grange Books. ISBN 1-84013798-3.
Haupt, Werner (1997). Army Group North. The
Wehrmacht in Russia 19411945. Schier Military
History, Atglen, Pennsylvania. ISBN 0-7643-01829.
Krivosheev, Grigoriy (2001). "
XX : :
" [Russia and the
USSR in the wars of the 20th century: Loss
of armed forces: Statistical study] (in Russian).
Google translation

7 FURTHER READING
Meretskov, Kirill (1971). (in
Russian) Serving the People. Imported Publications,
Incorporated, (English Translation). ISBN 0-82850494-6.
(Feyuninsky), . (1964).
(in Russian).
- .

Coordinates:
31.0670E

595400N 310401E / 59.9000N

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