Western colonial powers set the tone in the decolonisation process of

Southeast Asia To what extent is this true of the period 1945-1975?

After the Japanese defeat and surrender in August 1945, the
decolonisation process in Southeast Asia began. While the decolonisation
process is largely a product of the colonial masters decision to transfer
power to the hands of the nationalists, capabilities of the nationalist and
key external development did influence the colonial masters to decide to
grant independence. This essay seeks to argue that western colonial
powers largely set the tone in the decolonisation process as the power to
decide, notwithstanding the war, resided in the hands of the colonial
masters and their willingness to grant independence, more often than not,
is affected more by each countrys arbitrary reasons to transfer power
than by the capabilities of the nationalists or key external development.
However, as the colonial masters suffered varying degree of damages
from World War Two, the level of dominance of their role in setting the
tone for the decolonisation process is thus also not uniform. Nevertheless,
overall, there is still a clear trend that the role of the colonial masters is
more significant.
Some of the colonial powers returned to the post-war Southeast Asia with
the independent inclination to grant independence to their colonies before
the nationalists ever needed to fight or negotiate for it as long as it does
not contradict their national interest and they were convinced that their
colonies were sufficiently prepared for it. For instance, the British were
willing to grant Malaya independence after they were convinced that the
Malayan nationalists were able to secure broad-based nation-wide support
and that they were anti-communist. As such, after the united political front
formed by thee United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), Malayan
Chinese Association (MCA) and Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) in 1954
won 51 out of 52 seats during the 1955 federal election which proved to
the British that they had the national support from a large majority of the
people and after the UMNO leaders such as Tunku Abdul Rahman and MCA
leaders such as Tan Cheng Lock proved to the British their anti-communist
credentials by taking an uncompromising stance towards Chin Pengs
communist demands during the December 1955 Baling Talks with the
Malayan Communist Party (MCP), Malayan was granted independence on
31 August 1957. Similarly in the Philippines, as long as there was a
popular government that was amenable to the US interest in place to
succeed power, the US was willing to grant independence as promised in
the 1934 Tydings McDuffie Act. In April 1946, general election was held
and Manuel Roxas his Liberal Party won the election, thus showing that
Roxas has the support to run independent Philippines. On 4July 1946,
Philippines was granted independence. Therefore, for countries where the
colonial government returned with anindependent predisposition to grant
independence, it was a clear case where the colonial masters set the tone
for decolonisation.

However, in some Southeast Asian countries, the nationalists used their

newly acquired military forces to launch revolutionary struggle in face of
the uncompromising hostility of the returning Western colonial powers in
the post-war period andleft the colonial powers with little options but to
concede independence. For example, in Vietnam, the Vietminh brought
the French to defeat during the Battle of DienBianPhu by engaging in
tenacious guerrilla warfare from 1946 to 1954 under General Vo Nguyen
Giaps military guidance. Though the French technically could have fought
on if it wanted just at a very heavy cost , the success of the Vietminh
dampened the morale of the French so much so that they no longer had
any will incontinuing to fight and hence, at the Geneva Accords in July
1954, France formally granted independence to the Indochinese. Similarly
in Indonesia, Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta left the Dutch with little
choice but to grant independence when they cause the Dutch government
to incur a heavy financial cost by tying down its military forceof 140000 in
a sustained guerrilla struggle during the second police action over a
prolongedperiod of time. Hence, for certain countries, nationalists played
a critical role in gaining independence despite the unwillingness of the
colonial masters to transfer power using their newfound capabilities.
Furthermore, in some countries, key external development was also a
strong disincentive for colonial masters to re-impose their control over
their Southeast Asian colonies by force, vis--vis their own independent
decision, as it came into conflict with their post-war aim of economic
rehabilitation. As such, unwilling as some might be initially,
eventually,they still acceded to the nationalist demand for independence
when confronted with the possibility of incurring high financial cost caused
bykey external development. Perceived as a showpiece of their existence
and a colony rich in financial resources, the Dutch were initially driven to
retain its control of Indonesia, However, opposed by the strong anticolonial lobby at the UN led by India and Australia with the tacit support of
the US, and eventually the US after they were convinced that Sukarno and
Mohammad Hatta were staunchly anti-communist, the Dutch gave in at
the US threat of removing the Marshall aid which was essential for their
economic recovery, and became willing to grant independence, even
though the Dutch had already overcome the challenges posed by the
Bermuda Youths and Indonesia Republican army in the first and second
police actions organised in July 1947 and December 1948 respectively.
Likewise in Malaya after World War 2, the British initially only planned to
amalgamate the 3 separate Malaya and create a centralised Malayan
Union to coordinate Malayas post-war economic rehabilitation and
process towards self-rule but there was no mention of independence.
However, inspired by the success of Mao Ze Dongs ongoing guerrilla
campaign in the Chinese Civil war which lasted from 1945 to 1949 and the
revolutionary mood conveyed during the Soviet-sponsored Southeast
Asian Youth Congress held in Calcutta in February 1948, the Malayan
Emergency broke out in June 1948. For the sake of restoring economic
stability so as to protect British investment in Malaya, the British started
grooming moderate, communal and anti-communist parties for self-

government. Thus, even though some colonial government were initially

unwilling to grant independence, key external development did effect a
change in their decision and therefore it is not entirely that the colonial
government set the tone for the decolonisation process.
In conclusion, the tone of decolonisation process is largely set by the
colonial powers even though the capabilities of the nationalists and key
external development did play a significant role in influencing the decision
of some colonial masters. Countries that were obvious cases of transfer of
power aside, even in countries where capabilities of the nationalists and
key external event had a larger role to play, the power to decide never left
the colonial masters and independence was only indirectly brought into
place by them. Admittedly, some of the nationalists together external
development drove the colonial governments into compelling quagmires
that left them with little choice, but worse comes to worse, there were still
solutions to the challenges posed and it was all up to the political resolve
of the colonial powers to retain their colonies. As such, the capabilities of
the nationalists and key external development, in some cases, did
diminish the ability of the colonial government to set the tone of the
decolonisation process, but the overarching trend is still that the colonial
powers set the tone.