How far do you agree that it was the capabilities of the nationalists that

determined the outcome of the decolonisation process in Southeast Asia?

After the Japanese defeat and surrender in August 1945, the
decolonisation process in Southeast Asia began. While the capabilities of
the nationalists did influence the colonial masters in deciding to grant
independence, the decolonisation process is largely a product of the
colonial masters decision to transfer power to the hands of the
nationalists in view of their own nationalist interests. Hence, this essay
seeks to argue that the capabilities of the nationalists, while significant,
did not determine the outcome of the decolonisation process as most of
the time, the power to decide, notwithstanding the war resided in the
hands of the colonial masters and their willingness to grant independence
is thus more essential for the decolonisation process to take place.
However, the colonial masters suffered varying degree of damages during
the world war two and the significance of the capabilities across southeast
asia in determining the outcome of the decolonisation process is thus also
not uniform. Still, on the whole, there is still a clear trend that the
willingness of the colonial masters in granting independence is more
significant.
The need for the Western colonial masters to prioritise their post-war
economic rehabilitation of the metropolitan countries served as a strong
disincentive for them to re-impose their control over the southeast Asian
colonies by force. Hence some of them, after overcoming their initial
reluctance, proved to be willing to accede to the nationalists demand for
independence when confronted with the possibility of sustained military
resistance by the nationalist movements. Perceived as the showpiece of
their existence and a colony rich in financial resources, the Dutch were
initially driven to retain control of Indonesia. However, opposed by the
strong anti-colonial lobby at the UN led by India and Australia with the
tacit support of the US, and eventually the US after they were convinced
that Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta were staunchly anti-communist, the
Dutch gave in at the threat of the US removing the Marshall aid which was
essential for their economic recovery, and became willing to grant
independence, even though the Dutch had already overcome the
challenges posed by the Bermuda Youths and Indonesia Republican Army
in the first and second Police Actions organised in July 1947 and December
1948 respectively. Likewise in Malaya after World War Two, the British
initially only planned to amalgamate the 3 separate Malaya and create a
centralised Malayan Union to coordinate Malayas post-war rehabilitation
and process towards elf-rule but there is no mention of independence.
However, when the Malayan Union sparked an unprecedented and strong
nationalistic Malay response and when the Malayan Emergency broke out
in June 1948, for the sake of restoring economic stability so as to protect
British investment in Malaya, the British started grooming moderate,
communal and anti-communist parties for future self-government.
Therefore, the underlying reason for the outcome of the decolonisation
process still lies with the willingness of the colonial masters to grant

independence which was shape primarily by their post-war aims, not the
capabilities of the nationalists.
Moreover, it was not always the case that the Western colonial powers
returned to the post-war Southeast Asia determined to re-establish long
term control over their colonies. Some of them were actually ready to
grant independence to their colonies, as long as it was not detrimental to
their national interests and they were convinced that their colonies were
sufficiently prepared for independence. For example, the British were
willing to grant Malaya independence after they were convinced that the
Malayan nationalists were able to secure broad-based nation-wide support
and that they were anti-communist. As such, after the united political front
formed by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) Malayan
Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) in
1954 won 51 out of 52 seats during the 1955 federal election which
proved to the British that they had the national support from a large
majority of the people and after the UMNO leaders such as Tunku Abdul
Rahman and MCA leaders such as Tan Cheng Lock proved to the British
their anti-communist credentials by taking an uncompromising stance
towards Chin Pengs communist demands during the December 1955
Baling Talks with the Malayan Communist Parties (MCP), Malaya was
granted independence on 31August 1957. Similarly in the Philippines, as
long as there was a popular government that was amenable to the US
interests in place to succeed power, the US was willing to grant
independence as promised in the 1934 Tydings-McDuffie Act. In April
1946, general election was held and Manuel Roxas and his Liberal Party
won the election, thus showing that Roxas had the support to run
independent philippines. On 4 July 1946, the Philippine was granted
independence. Therefore, for certain countries where independence was
achieved under relatively peaceful condition, it was a clear case of
transfer of power.
However, the Western colonial powers eventual agreement to concede
independence to their colonies in post-war Southeast Asia was generally
not a smooth process. The outcome involved a series of tough
negotiations that often required the nationalist leaders to compromise and
agree to certain conditions which subjected their independent countries to
varying degree of neo-colonialism, thus showing that independent
Philippines was only granted on the condition that the Filipinos would
ratify the unequal Bell Trade Act. The 1946 Bell Trade Acts entailed a
series of preferential tariffs which undermined the Philippines constitution,
thereby securing the US citizens and corporations with the same rights as
the Philippines to utilise and exploit the countrys natural resources.
Likewise in Vietnam, even after the Vietnamese nationalists defeated the
French in the first Indochina War which lasted from 1946 to 1954,
independence was only granted on the condition that it would be
temporarily divided at the 17th parallel until 1956 when nation-wide
elections to establish the Vietnam government would be held. Therefore
even when colonial masters finally agreed to grant independence, the

ability of the nationalists to meet up to the conditions set by the colonial

masters is still essential for independence to be achieved.
Furthermore, some Southeast Asian nationalist movements had to employ
revolutionary tactics, using their newly acquired military forces to force
the colonial powers to concede independence to their countries due to the
uncompromising hostility of returning Western colonial powers during the
post-war period. For example in Indonesia, Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta
had to use the Indonesian Republic Army to supress the Communist
uprisings at Madiun in September 1948 before their standing in the
estimation of the US would be dramatically raised. This is essential
because if they had not had such capabilities, the US would never have
seen them as a staunchly anti-communist Republican government who
could be their ally in brewing the global Cold War against USSR. This is
significant because US pressure on the Dutch is key in bringing about
independence for Indonesia. Similarly in Vietnam, the Vietminh had to
engage in tenacious guerrilla warfare from 1946 until 1954 when General
Vo Nguyen Giaps military tactics brought about the French defeat at the
Battle of Dien Bian Phu which lasted from March 1954 to May 1954. The
success of the Vietminh resulted in the loss of French will to continue
fighting and hence, a Geneva Accords in July 1954, France formally
granted independence to the Indochinese. Therefore, for certain countries,
independence was won by the military capabilities of the nationalist
despite the unwillingness of the colonial masters to grant independence.
In conclusion, no doubt the capabilities of the nationalists were significant
in influencing the decision of the colonial masters to grant independence,
the power to decide and bring about the decolonisation process
nevertheless resided in the hands of the colonial masters. Countries that
were obvious cases of transfer of power aside, the fact that decolonisation
was only possible in the context of colonial powers wanting to shift their
focus to economic rehabilitation speaks volume of the significance of the
colonial powers decision to grant independence over the capabilities of
the nationalist in bringing about the decolonisation process. Admittedly,
some of the countries won independence by their own capabilities, but
even for some of these countries, the colonial powers remained
nonetheless in clear superior position and independence was only
indirectly won. Eventually, decisions were still made by colonial powers
based on their own macro interest. The capabilities of the nationalists
were still subjected to the expectations of the colonial powers in granting
independence. Hence, the capabilities o the nationalist while significant
was still not the determining factor that brought about their outcome of
decolonisation process but the decisions of the colonial master to grant
independence is.