The junior partners of the superpowers had been freely manipulating their patrons

in the Korean War. How far do you agree?

Started in January 1950 and ended in July 1963, the Korean War is a war that
involved US, China and the North and South Koreans. While some argue that
throughout the war, the minor powers had been manipulated by the superpowers
freely, from the starting the war to bringing them into the war, these speculations
lacking severe factual grounding and therefore cannot be believed. The essay seeks
to argue that the superpowers had not been manipulated by the minor powers
becase they were the ones who had dominant control over the course of the war
and they were able to keep their clients state in check. Even though there were
attempts by the client states to manipulate their patrons, they were unsuccessful
and influence over the war, from the start to its end, still remain the hands of the
superpowers.
The US clearly was not manipulated by its client state, South Korea because it
managed to keep a firm control over it and it successfully restrained South Korea
from starting a war with the North. The US was worried that Sygnman Rhee, the
South Korea leader, might start a war with the north to reunify Korea so he made
necessary arrangements to withheld aid from him so that there was no way he
could start a way with the north. As opposed to the aid received by North Koreans
from the Soviets, South Korea was only able to offer token resistance to invasion
and could provide no plausible basis of allegations of being a threat to North Korea.
While North Koreans were given heavy weapons like 100 T-347 tanks, 100 Yak
fighters, 70bombers and heavy artillery, weapons given to the South Koreans were
mainly for self-defense purposes only. With only, 100,000rifles, 50million rounds of
small arms ammunition, 2000rocket launchers and a number of light artillery pieces
and mortars pride to the South Koreans, there was no way they could start a war
with the North. TH South Koreans had no tanks, no airplanes and no heavy naval
craft because the US deliberately made sure they did not leave any of these behind.
Furthermore, the South Korean armed forces total troop strength was limited to
65000 with 4000 maritime police and 45000 man police force. The forces were only
meant to deal with internal threats. Furthermore, in an event Sygnman Rhee could
not be kept in line, the US would still have Operation Everready as a backup, a plan
that is carefully developed for a complete takeover of the South Korean
government. Even though the Sygnman Rhee tried to sabotage the escape talks by
releasing 27000 prisoners of war held by him before the prisoners of war issue was
resolved, it was still clearer that the superpower was constantly in control of its
minor ally. Hence, it can be seen that South Korea did not manipulate its
superpower partner for much, if not all of the war.
On the part of the Soviets, Stalin obviously also was not manipulated by his client
state North Korea because he was holding all the powers in deciding whether the
war will start or not. While the plan of attack may have originated with Kim, it was
subjugated to the will of Stalin and he did not approved it until January 1950. Thus it
is insufficient to prove that the minor powers manipulated the major powers just
because Kim initiated the war. Despite the fact that Kim il Sung, the leader of North
Korea, on many occasions wanted to start with war with the South to reunify Korea,
it was not started until Kim received the permission from Stalin to start the war.
Stalin for fear of USSR might be implicated in a direct hot war with its archenemy

America, disallowed Kim to start the war because the risk of an American
intervention was too great. It was only until he was certain that American
intervention was unlike and there was no chance for it to escalate into a world war,
did he agree for the war to start. In early June 1950, when John Foster Dulles, a US
Special Envoy visited Seoul, Syngman Rhee requested for the US to commit to the
defense of the South Korea but was turned down outwardly. This gave Stalin the
credence that the American will likely not intervene because it corresponds with the
two early US defense perimeter declarations made General MacArthur and the SU
secretary of state, Dean Acheson on March 1949 and January 1950 respectively. In
both speeches, it was said that the US defense perimeter in the Pacific region only
ran long the islands of Philippines to the Mauritius. South Korea was continually
excluded. Moreover, the earlier founding of the atomic bomb in September 1949
raised standing of USSR to be on par with the US. In additions, the Soviet position
was also strengthened by the success of the CCP in defeating the KMT in the
Chinese Civil War in October 1949. Since it was only under all these conditions that
Stalins personal decision for the war lasted till 1953 despite Kims desire to end the
war in 1951 after both sides had reached a military stalemate also shows that Stalin
was nto manipulated by Kim. On a number of occasions from July 1951 onwards,
Kim asked Stalin to make peace with the US because North Korea was suffering
heavily under US bombardment. However, Stalin insisted on holding on the war
because it was to Soviets advantage that the Americans resources are draining as
they are tied down tot eh war and also, it would drain Americas fighting spirit. Thus
it can be seen that North Korea was merely a pawn in the greater game of
geopolitical chess played by the two superpowers and was in no positions to
manipulate its patron in this case.
While there is still evidence to suggest that South Koreans might have manipulated
their superpower partner into supporting them in the Korean War, this evidence
lacks severe factual groundings and thus they are incredible. For example, Gupta
suggests that the Korean War started as a result of a South Korean invasion of the
North and hence dragged US into the civil war. However, Guptas argument is not
convincing because he relied primarily on newspapers to substantiate his argument.
Notably, one of them constrained a South Korean commanders comment that they
had received orders to push Northwards and will soon occupy Haeju. Newspapers
are unreliable as sources of information because they might be politically motivated
and hence his words are not trustworthy. Similarly, Joyce and Gabriel Kolkos claimed
that Sygnman Rhee and General MacArthur conspired to make it seemed that South
Korea was on the verge of collapse and so brought about US intervention. Their
argument too was flawed because they did not offer any analysis that was based on
specific source materials but rather matched their methodology to fit their
preconceived notion. IF Stone also suggested that it is Rhee who deliberately
suppressed reports of North Korean military preparations to lure Pyongyang into
attacking South Korea so that the American would have choice but to intervene.
However, once again, there were unaddressed counterfactual loopholes in Stones
thesis and his argument consisted of exaggerations. Therefore, it cannot be taken
seriously as well.
However, North Korean initiative as indicated by Khrushccevs memorirs suggests
that the minor powers were not merely pushed around like pieces on chessboard. It
was Kim planned the Korean War and it was likely, as James Matray put it, that if

North Korea had not planned for the unification of the peninsular there would have
been no Korean War. Thus the fact that Korean was initiated by Kim may be
insufficient to prove that the minor power manipulated the major power, it is clear
case of the minor power not being manipulated by its major counterpart.
In conclusion, the clients states did not manipulate their patrons freely. Throughout
the war, the US was firmly in control over their client South Korea, keeping them in
check. Even for the side of the South Koreans, the army was led by General
MacArthur, an appointed US General. Moreover, the ability of the South Koreans to
get things into their own hands was limited by their military strength which was in
turn restrained by the US. On the other hand, Stalin was in control both over the
start of the war and the end of the war. Even though on both occasions, and for
many times, Kim tried to influence Stalins decision with his requests, they were of
minimal influence or not influence at all, hence, I retain my stand that the minor
had not been able to manipulate the superpowers freely in the Korean war.