ETHICS & BEHAVIOR, 15(2), 139158

Copyright 2005, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Explaining Away Responsibility:

Effects of Scientific Explanation
on Perceived Culpability
John Monterosso
Department of XXXXXXX
University of California, Los Angeles

Edward B. Royzman
Department of XXXXXXX
University of Pennsylvania

Barry Schwartz
Department of XXXXXXX
Swarthmore College

College students and suburban residents completed questionnaires designed to examine the tendency of scientific explanations of undesirable behaviors to mitigate
perceived culpability. In vignettes relating behaviors to an explanatory antecedent,
we manipulated the uniformity of the behavior given the antecedent, the responsiveness of the behavior to deterrence, and the explanatory antecedent-type offered
physiological (e.g., a chemical imbalance) or experiential (e.g., abusive parents).
Physiological explanations had a greater tendency to exonerate actors than did experiential explanations. The effects of uniformity and deterrence were smaller, and the
latter had a significant effect on judgment only when physiological rather than experiential antecedents were specified. Physiologically explained behavior was more
likely to be characterized as automatic, and willpower and character were less
likely to be cited as relevant to the behavior. Physiological explanations of undesirable behavior may mitigate blame by inviting nonteleological causal attributions.
Keywords: person perception, volition, moral attribution, responsibility
Correspondence should be addressed to John Monterosso, University of California at Los Angeles,
760 Westwood Plaza, Rm C8532, Los Angeles, CA 90024. E-mail: jmont@ucla.edu

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When we have absolutely no understanding of the causes of an actionwhether vicious or virtuous or simply non-moralwe ascribe a greater element of freewill to it.
In the case of a crime, we are more urgent in demanding punishment for the act. In
the cases of no moral bearing, we recognize more individuality, originality, and independence in it. But if only one of the innumerable causes of the act is known to us, we
recognize a certain amount of necessity, and are less ready to exact punishment for
the crime.
Tolstoy, War and Peace

In the musical West Side Story, the character Action pleads Dear kindly Sergeant Krupke, you gotta understand, its just our bringin up-ke, that gets us out of
hand. Our mothers all are junkies. Our fathers all are drunks. Golly Moses,
natcherly were punks. Such an explanation of behavior (in this case particularly
suspect in its offering by the actor) may be differentiated from the greater part of
ordinary attributions in that its references are causal antecedents to the actors own
(delinquent) disposition. Heider (1958) characterized such attributions as the
stage at which [the individuals] own motives are not entirely ascribed to him but
are seen as having their source in the environment (p. 132). We refer to such explanations as predispositional attributions, because these attributions refer to
events (bad parenting in the previous example) that are causally antecedent to a
disposition responsible for the culpable act. Making such an attribution may in part
get the actor off the hook by convincing the observer that the actor was somehow
less an originator of the behavior than previously supposed. In the studies reported
here, we assess some aspects of this tendency. We are not currently concerned with
the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for predispositional attributions to
exonerate actors for undesirable behaviors. Our goal is instead to characterize this
tendency in ordinary person perception.
Of course, the potential sources of predispositional attributions are boundless.
Our focus in this study is on predispositional attributions based within the behavioral sciences. As the various behavioral sciences progress, they offer more (and
more precise) predispositional attributions for behavior, including for otherwise
blameworthy behavior. For example, through various scientific frameworks, violent behavior has been linked to hypoactivity in the prefrontal cortex (Raine,
1994), male infidelity linked to evolutionary history (Buss & Schmitt, 1993), and
countless undesirable traits linked at least inferentially to genetic variation
(Bouchard, 1990). To the extent that such science leads behavior to be judged involuntary, important social consequences would be expected. Generally, behaviors
that are judged involuntary are exempt from moral judgment (see Sabini & Silver,
1988, for review). The punishment administered and even the anger experienced in
response to a transgression are greatly reduced when the transgression is judged to
be involuntary (Monahan & Hood, 1976; Schultz, Schleifer, & Altman, 1981).

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141

Presumably not all predispositional explanations from the behavioral sciences

are equally effective at exonerating individuals for undesirable behavior. In this
analysis we consider three factors that might affect the impact of predispositional
attributions: (a) the uniformity of the behavior given the predispositional attribution, (b) the responsiveness of the behavior to deterrence, and (c) whether the antecedent cited is experiential or physiological.

UNIFORMITY
One view of the effect of predispositional attributions is that they demonstrate a
prior state of the world from which the behavior uniformly follows. For example, a genetic condition connected to violence may excuse an afflicted offender
by providing evidence that the behavior followed with some degree of necessity
from the physiological condition, and that less room, or perhaps no room, was
available to adopt an alternative course. Typically in the behavioral sciences, explanations identify causal antecedents that are less than certain in their connection to the explained behavior. Each explanation makes a probabilistic causal
claim, but the strength of the probabilistic connection can vary from one causal
account to another. Thus, one factor we consider is the effect of the uniformity
of behavior given the predispositional attribution. We refer to this as the evidence of uniformity factor.

DETERRENCE
The second factor we consider is the responsiveness of the behavior (given the
predispositional antecedent) to deterrence. We ordinarily expect behavior to be influenced by expected consequences. For consequentialist moral theories, this expectation provides the central justification for punishment. The tendency for
predispositional attributions to exonerate actors may then be mediated by the conception that the normal influence of expected consequences is no longer at work.
Consider a violent act that is explained by the existence of a neurophysiological
abnormality. If individuals with the abnormality go into violent rampages regardless of expected consequences, isolating them from the general population is
surely a good idea, but punishment beyond that would, we suspect, be viewed by
many as gratuitous. If, on the other hand, such individuals behaved violently only
when they thought they could get away with it, then motivation to see justice
served (i.e., punish harshly) may remain high. The tendency for predispositional
attributions to exonerate actors may then be related to the conceived effect of responsiveness to expected consequences on the predispositional antecedent. We refer to this as the deterrence factor.

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EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK
The third factor we consider is the explanatory framework (explanation type) invoked by the predispositional attribution. To be specific, we hypothesize that
within the behavioral sciences, physiological predispositional attributions have a
greater tendency to exonerate actors than do predispositional attributions related to
experience, even when controlling for the two factors previously discussed. This
conjecture is consistent with a pattern of data reported by Weiner, Perry, and
Magnussen (1988, Experiment 2). The researchers manipulated information about
the extent to which actors exercised control over the onset of three socially stigmatized behaviors/conditions: child abuse, drug addiction, and obesity. In the case of
drug addiction and obesity, onset uncontrollability (the equivalent of predispositional antecedent) was manipulated by providing participants with information that hinted at physiological origins (glandular dysfunction and chemical treatment) whereas in the case of child abuse, the information hinted at was adverse
experiential conditionsthe actors own experience as a victim of childhood
abuse (which led him to experience severe stress and near a nervous breakdown).
Although the two physiological onset-uncontrollable manipulations moderated
perceptions of causal responsibility and negative affect, the experiential onset-uncontrollable manipulation did not. We refer to this third factor as the explanatory
framework and throughout consider the distinction within the behavioral sciences
between antecedents that are experiential versus those that are physiological.
In this study, we examine the effects and interactions of these three factorsuniformity, responsiveness to deterrence, and explanation typeon the extent to which predispositional attributions exonerated actors for personally or socially undesirable behaviors.

STUDY 1A
In Study 1A, participants were presented with vignettes depicting personally or socially undesirable behavior, with predispositional attributions that varied in terms
of uniformity rate given the explanation (20%, 55%, 90%), responsiveness to deterrence given the explanation (deterrence rarely, sometimes, or usually effective),
and explanation type (physiological vs. experiential).
Method

Participants. One hundred and ninety six participants took part in Study 1A.
Ninety-six were undergraduates from a highly competitive university in the northeastern United States, and 100 were residents of a primarily White middle-income
suburb. We drew participants from these two pools because they were conveniently

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143

available to us, and the inclusion of both allowed some (albeit limited) investigation of the generality of observed effects across demographically different populations. The undergraduate sample was 60.2% female, and the suburban sample was
65.9% female. The mean age in the undergraduate sample was 19.48 2.53, and in
the suburban sample was 41.02 6.7. Undergraduates were compensated with
course extra credit. Suburban resident participants were obtained through a mail
drop-off of 400 questionnaires. Those who returned the survey were included in a
lottery for $100.

Design. The questionnaire (see Appendix) contained four vignettes, each depicting an individual who behaved either in a socially undesirable way (setting fire to
a building, killing a store clerk over a disagreement) or a personally undesirable way
(overeating, consistent failure to follow through on plans). At the end of each vignette, an explanation was provided, We varied explanation type (physiological or
experiential), uniformity of the behavior given all individuals for whom the explanatory antecedent was true (20%, 55%, 90%), and responsiveness to deterrence (rarely,
sometimes, or usually). A specific physiological and experiential explanation was
created for each scenario and stated in terms of scientific research. For example, in
the case of a man who killed a store clerk in an argument, the explanation cited was either an exceptionally high quantity of a particular neurotransmitter or a history of being severely abused as a child (see Appendix for questionnaire details).
The three independent variables were orthogonally manipulated, creating a total of 18 versions of each vignette. To minimize possible confounding effects related to particular combinations of presentation, each of the 18 versions of each vignette appeared in four different questionnaire combinations. Thus 64 different
versions of the questionnaire were distributed. Each participant received a single
version of each of the four vignettes. Participants were instructed to do their best to
treat the particular information as true when making their responses.
After each vignette, participants rated the degree to which the behavior was voluntary, the degree of sympathy they felt for the individual depicted, the blame mitigation appropriate given the explanation, how the individual should be treated (the
specifics of this varied across vignettes), and how likely it was that the participant
would have behaved similarly to the individual depicted, given the explanation. In
each case, responses were made on a 5-point scale. For each vignette, participants
who reported some degree of blame mitigation were also asked to indicate whether
that mitigation was because the explanation made the behavior highly motivated
and hard to resist doing, made the behavior automatic and uncontrollable, or
neither of the above.
Each vignette appeared on a separate page. As a manipulation check, after the
last vignette, participants reached a page that asked them, without turning back to
previous pages, to try to remember facts about the vignettes they had read. For each
vignette, they were given one multiple choice item asking them whether the behav-

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MONTEROSSO, ROYZMAN, SCHWARTZ

ior was described as rarely, sometimes, or usually deterred, and one item asking
them to indicate what percentage of individuals (for whom the predispositional attribution was true) behaved similarly to the individual depicted.

Statistical analysis. We analyzed each vignette separately. As such, independent variables were fully between-subjects factors. Effects that were present in
only one of the four analyses were ignored to avoid the otherwise inflated risk of
Type 1 error. To further limit the risk of Type 1 error, factor analysis was used to
create a single composite dependent variable for use in the primary analyses of
variance (ANOVA). Primary analyses for each vignette used ANOVA to model the
derived composite score as a function of the three independent variables (explanation type, uniformity, and responsiveness to deterrence) and their interaction.
These analyses were repeated two ways: (a) including main effect and interaction
terms for demographic variables and (b) including only responses from vignettes
in which participants correctly recalled the specified uniformity of the behavior
(within 10%) and the specified responsiveness to deterrence.
For the multiple choice question asking why the predispositional attribution
was mitigating, we used logistic regression (censoring out neither of the above
responses) to model responses with the three independent variables. In this analysis we included the composite score from the Likert-type scale items as a
covariate. Thus we tried to address the question of whether the independent variables affected choices on this question, controlling for their overall effect on
culpability.
Results

Manipulation check. Across vignettes, participants who had just completed

the questionnaire recalled the specified uniformity of the behavior (20%, 55%, or
90%) within 10% of the actual value on 70.79% of responses. On the multiple
choice item probing recall of specified response to deterrence (rarely, sometimes,
or usually), participants were accurate on 62.5% of responses. The student sample,
on average, was more accurate on uniformity recall items than the suburban population (students 75.8% accurate; suburbanites 65.3% accurate), F(1, 188) = 6.98, p
< .01, 2 = .04), although the groups did not differ significantly in accuracy on the
identification of specified deterrence information (students 65.3% accurate; suburbanites 59.4% accurate), F(1, 188) = 2.32, p = .13, 2 = .01). Overall, responses to
both items were correct in 42.4% of vignettes.
Primary analyses. The five Likert-type scale dependent variables (judgments of volition, blame mitigation, sympathy, treatment, and likelihood participant would behave similarly) were moderately to highly correlated, ranging from
r(193) = .42 to r(194) = 63. For each vignette, a factor analysis was performed

EXPLAINING AWAY RESPONSIBILITY

145

based on participants responses to the five scales. We used a principal components

analysis without rotation, and an Eigenvalue greater than 1.0 as a cutoff for factor
inclusion. For all four vignettes, a single-factor solution was reached that accounted for between 55.5% (overeater vignette) and 64.0% (murderer vignette) of
the variance. The regression single factor score for each set of judgments was computed and used as a summary variable. As previously described, to reduce the risk
of Type 1 error due to multiple comparisons, analyses were performed only on this
summary variable. Based on the component matrices of the factor analyses, we
adopted the label Culpability Composite for this score. Higher scores on the Culpability Composite indicate greater perceived voluntary control, less blame mitigation, less sympathy, less favorable treatment, and lower likelihood that participants believe they would behave similarly. Although the variables used in deriving
the Culpability Composite are not individually analyzed, they are presented in
summary form in Table 1.
For each of the four vignettes, an ANOVA was performed predicting the Culpability Composite score from the three manipulated independent variables, along
with their derivable interactions. As shown in Figure 1, explanation type was a
highly significant predictor of the Culpability Composite for all four vignettes:
Overeater, F(1, 175) = 23.8, p < .001, 2 = .12; Fire starter, F(1, 175) = 32.9, p <
.001, 2 = .16; Quitter, F(1, 176) = 20.8, p < .001, 2 = .11; Murderer F(1, 175) =
49.8, p < .001, 2 = .22; with lower culpability assigned to behaviors with physiological antecedents.
Higher uniformity of the behavior given the antecedent was significantly associated with lower Culpability Composites in the Quitter vignette, F(2, 176) = 4.14,
p < .05, 2 = .05; and the Murderer vignette, F(2, 175) = 6.95, p < .001, 2 = .07;
but not in the Overeater or Fire starter vignettes, F(2, 175) = 1.41, p = .25, 2 = .02;
and F(2, 175) = 1.20, p = .30, 2 = .02. Lower sensitivity to deterrence was associated with lower culpability composites in all four vignettes: Overeater, F(2, 175) =
6.76, p < .001, 2 = .07; Fire starter, F(2, 175) = 5.87, p =.003, 2 = .06; Quitter,
F(2, 176) = 4.29, p = .015, 2 = .05; Murderer F(2, 175) = 3.39, p = .036, 2 = .04.
A significant interaction between explanation type and responsiveness to deterrence was present in three of the vignettes: Overeater, F(2, 175) = 6.60, p = .002, 2
= .07; Quitter, F(2, 176) = 3.06, p = .049, 2 = .04; Murderer, F(2, 175) = 3.71, p =
.027, 2 = .04, and a trend was present in the fourth vignette: Fire starter, F(2, 175)
= 2.74, p = .067, 2 = .03. As can be seen in Figure 2, the nature of this interaction
was consistent across vignettes, with lower responsiveness to deterrence being associated with lower Culpability Composites only in vignettes in which a physiological predispositional attribution was given. No other interaction between the
three independent variables was significant (ps < .30).

Demographic variables. ANOVAs modeling the Culpability Composite

were repeated with gender, and group (suburban or undergraduate) included along

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TABLE 1
Mean and Standard Deviation of Responses
Sympathya

Voluntary

Overeater
Explanation type
Experiential
Physiological
Uniformity
10%
55%
90%
Deterrence sensitivity
Usually
Sometimes
Rarely
Fire starter
Explanation type
Experiential
Physiological
Uniformity
10%
55%
90%
Deterrence sensitivity
Usually
Sometimes
Rarely
Quitter
Explanation type

Treatmenta

Blame

Do Samea

SD

SD

SD

SD

SD

3.34
2.80

.93
1.01

3.05
2.81

.97
1.01

2.62
2.35

1.06
.97

3.03
2.89

1.06
1.13

3.20
3.10

1.03
1.01

3.05
3.16
3.05

.96
.96
1.10

3.01
2.88
2.93

.99
.91
1.09

2.61
2.46
2.40

.97
1.02
1.09

3.10
2.96
2.81

1.11
.98
1.19

3.35
2.94
3.17

.85
.94
1.24

3.22
3.04
3.01

.95
.95
1.09

2.92
3.14
2.78

1.03
.91
1.01

2.55
2.50
2.43

1.01
1.02
1.06

3.03
2.97
2.90

1.14
1.13
1.02

3.20
3.25
3.01

.95
.96
1.13

3.35
2.68

1.15
1.03

3.52
2.92

1.02
1.11

3.45
3.04

1.10
1.07

3.55
3.25

.90
.86

3.51
3.07

1.07
.96

3.09
3.00
2.87

1.17
1.02
1.18

3.18
3.22
3.18

1.14
1.04
1.15

3.16
3.33
3.21

1.13
1.01
1.14

3.27
3.37
3.41

.88
.83
.96

3.30
3.30
3.22

1.06
.98
1.06

3.18
2.98
2.77

1.17
1.08
1.12

3.22
3.20
3.15

1.04
1.19
1.11

3.25
3.34
3.08

1.09
1.08
1.13

3.45
3.48
3.23

.82
.81
1.03

3.18
3.26
3.08

1.17
1.00
.98

Experiential
Physiological
Uniformity
10%
55%
90%
Deterrence sensitivity
Usually
Sometimes
Rarely
Murderer
Explanation type
Experiential
Physiological
Uniformity
10%
55%
90%
Deterrence sensitivity
Usually
Sometimes
Rarely
aIndicates

3.40
2.90

1.00
1.02

3.26
2.99

.97
1.06

2.76
2.75

1.02
1.01

3.56
2.99

1.33
1.31

3.35
3.27

.99
.95

3.28
3.21
2.93

1.14
1.00
.97

3.24
3.16
2.95

1.05
1.05
.99

2.78
2.81
2.68

.97
1.03
1.05

3.34
3.22
3.20

1.33
1.44
1.28

3.33
3.31
3.29

.96
.98
.97

3.20
3.11
3.07

.92
1.08
1.12

3.22
3.02
3.10

.98
1.02
1.10

2.82
2.68
2.77

1.07
.98
1.00

3.37
3.05
3.34

1.23
1.36
1.45

3.20
3.26
3.35

.92
.95
1.03

3.62
2.93

1.01
1.06

3.71
3.10

1.09
1.10

3.78
3.43

1.06
.98

4.05
3.73

.86
.96

3.64
3.13

1.24
1.05

3.54
3.34
2.95

1.07
1.04
1.10

3.55
3.67
2.98

1.11
1.01
1.21

3.63
3.78
3.42

1.04
.99
1.07

3.93
4.07
3.66

.88
.89
.96

3.34
3.63
3.22

1.22
1.11
1.20

3.32
3.31
3.27

.96
1.18
1.14

3.45
3.54
3.31

1.08
1.19
1.14

3.55
3.77
3.55

1.02
1.00
1.08

3.89
3.95
3.88

.84
.97
.96

3.32
3.60
3.26

.96
1.25
1.22

variables that were reverse-scored (6response) so that lower numbers were always associated with less culpability.
Lower numbers indicate lower judged culpability: less voluntary control, more sympathy, less blame, better favored treatment, and greater judged likelihood
by the participants that they would do the same were the antecedent true of them.

147

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MONTEROSSO, ROYZMAN, SCHWARTZ

FIGURE 1 Plot depicts medians (center hash), interquartile range (box) and 95% range
(whiskers) for culpability composite scores, collapsing across all levels of responsiveness to deterrence and uniformity of behavior. The difference between physiological and experiential
PXXXX DXXXX AXXXXs is significant (p < .001) for all four vignettes.

with explanation type, uniformity, and sensitivity to deterrence as independent

variables. All derivable 2- and 3-way interactions were included in the analysis for
each of the four vignettes. Participant group was a significant predictor of Culpability in the Overeater vignette, F(2, 124) = 9.08, p = .003, 2 = .06) and
Fire-starter vignettes, F(1, 123) = 4.62, p = .034, 2 = .04. In both cases, Culpability Composite scores were higher among participants from the suburban sample.
Neither sex nor subject group interacted with the three independent variables
manipulated in the study. Thus the effect of demographic variables was ignored for
the remaining analyses and discussion of the study independent variables.

Analyses including only responses in which uniformity and deterrence

were accurately recalled. Both specified uniformity of the behavior given the
predispositional attribution and the specified responsiveness to deterrence were
successfully recalled on 42.4% of items. ANOVAs modeling Culpability Composite scores were repeated including just these items. Explanation type remained a
highly significant predictor of the Culpability Composite for all four vignettes:
Overeater, F(1, 69) = 17.6, p < .001, 2 = .20; Fire starter, F(1, 60) = 27.1, p < .001,
2 = .32; Quitter, F(1, 53) = 7.81, p < .01, 2 = .16; Murderer, F(1, 74) = 9.48, p <

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149

FIGURE 2 Plot depicts mean culpability scores by explanation type and responsiveness to
deterrence. For the Overeater, Quitter, and Murderer vignettes, the interaction between type and
responsiveness to deterrence was significant at p < .05.

.01, 2 = .11; with lower culpability assigned to behaviors with physiological antecedents. As with the overall sample, higher uniformity for the accurately recalled
items was significantly associated with lower Culpability Composites in the Quitter vignette, F(2, 53) = 5.08, p < .01, 2 = .16; and the Murderer vignette, F(2, 74) =
5.12, p < .01, 2 = .12; but not in the Overeater or Fire-starter vignettes, F(2, 69) =
.63, p = .54, 2 = .02; and F(2,60) = 2.55, p = .09, 2 = .08; respectively. Lower sensitivity to deterrence remained significantly associated with lower culpability
composites in the Overeater, F(2, 69) = 8.25, p <.001, 2 = .18; and Murder vignettes, F(2, 74) = 3.38, p < .05, 2 = .08; but did not remain significantly associated with lower Culpability Composites in the Fire-starter vignette, F(2, 60) =
2.45, p = .10, 2 = .08; or Quitter vignette, F(2, 53) = 1.28, p = .29, 2 = .05. Consistent with the total sample, a significant interaction between explanation type
and responsiveness to deterrence was present in two of the vignettes: Overeater,
F(2, 69) = 4.07, p = .02, 2 = .11; Quitter, F(2, 53) = 4.93, p = .01, 2 = .16; and
nearly significant in a third: Fire starter, F(2, 60) = 2.97, p = .06, 2 = .09. Although
significant in the overall sample in the Murderer vignette, this interaction was not
significant in the subsample, F(2, 74) = 1.81, p = .17, 2 = .05.

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MONTEROSSO, ROYZMAN, SCHWARTZ

Multiple choice responses. Analyses were performed on responses to the

multiple choice item asking participants to indicate why they thought the explanatory antecedent warranted mitigation (instructions directed participants to leave
the item blank if they did not think the circumstances made the individual at all less
to blame). This item was completed 79.9% of the time. The response automatic
was selected 21.1% of the time; strongly motivated, 53.5% of the time; and neither, 5.3% of the time. Only the responses in which one of the two specific alternatives automatic or strongly motivated were included in the analyses. Separate
step-wise logistic regressions were performed for each vignette modeling response
with each of the three independent variables. Because we were interested in qualitative effects of the independent variables, the Culpability Composite score is included as a covariate in the first block of the analysis, and the independent variables are included in the second block.
In three of the four vignettes, higher Culpability Composite scores are associated with greater likelihood of choosing the automatic response: Overeater,
Wald (1, 123) = 8.67 p = .003; Fire starter, Wald (1, 113) = 14.60, p = .001; Quitter,
Wald (1, 120) = 4.14, p = .042; Murderer, Wald (1, 104) = 1.44, p = .23. In two of
the four vignettes, explanation type was an additional significant predictor of response, with the automatic alternative chosen more often when given a physiological predispositional attribution: Overeater, Wald (1, 123) = .96, p = .303; Fire
starter, Wald (1, 113) = 10.04, p = .002; Quitter, Wald (1, 120) = 3.76, p = .048;
Murderer, Wald (1, 104) = 0.97, p = .33. Neither uniformity rate nor responsiveness to deterrence significantly predicted response in any of the four vignettes after
controlling for Culpability Composite (all ps > .10).
Discussion
Study 1A provides evidence that the tendency for predispositional attributions to
exonerate behavior is affected by explanation type and, to a lesser extent, by uniformity and sensitivity to deterrence. Observers judged actors as less responsible
for misdeeds explained physiologically than for those explained experientially.
This effect did not appear to be a product of presumptions made about the uniformity or responsiveness to deterrence of physiological versus experiential explanations, as this information was explicitly provided. Physiological explanations resulted in lower scores on a composite measure, indicating less judged volition,
greater sympathy, greater blame mitigation, more positive treatment, and a greater
expressed likelihood by the participants that they would also behave in the undesirable way if the antecedent were true of them. A manipulation check at the completion of the survey indicated that participants were reasonably accurate in their
memory of the specified uniformity and deterrence responsiveness information,
suggesting that it was generally attended to. Furthermore, the effect of the independent variables on responses was qualitatively similar when we analyzed only

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data from vignettes in which the information was correctly remembered. Finally,
participants were more likely to characterize the blame mitigation they indicated
as having been due to the behavior being automatic when the explanation was
physiological as opposed to experiential, and this was true even controlling for ratings of culpability.
Two aspects of the results suggest that explanation type had a qualitative as well
as a quantitative impact on predispositional attributions. The first is the interaction
observed between explanation type and deterrence sensitivity information. The
trend across vignettes was remarkably similar; only when participants were given
a physiological explanatory antecedent did the information that the behavior was
insensitive to deterrence diminish culpability. Thus, not only did experiential explanations produce less exoneration (a main effect), they also diminished the extent to which responsiveness to deterrence mattered.
Multiple choice responses provide a second suggestion that physiological and
experiential predispositional attributions had qualitatively different effects. When
participants did judge the antecedent to be mitigating of blame, they were more
likely to attribute their judgment to the actors behavior having been automatic
when the antecedent was physiological rather than experiential. Describing a behavior as automatic and therefore beyond control (as opposed to a strong impulse that is hard to resist) suggests a nonteleological conception of the behavior.
It may reflect that the explanatory antecedent was understood as causing the behavior in a way that was unrelated to motivation rather than working through motivation. Alternatively, participants may have simply interpreted the automatic alternative as reflecting quantitatively more exoneration and our attempt to control
for this by covarying for Culpability Composite was not fully successful.
We hypothesized that conceptions of willpower and character functioned to
preserve culpability when explanatory antecedents were experiential. Physiological antecedents may have served to invite a mechanistic attributional framework in
which notions of willpower and character were less comfortably applied. We explored this hypothesis in a follow-up study in which we conducted interviews to
probe participants understanding of the actors and the actions depicted in the vignettes, particularly with respect to the role of willpower and character. We hypothesized that participants would be less likely to consider willpower or character
as relevant when physiological predispositional attributions were given than when
experiential predispositional attributions were given.

STUDY 1B
In Study 1B, a structured interview allowed participants to clarify their views. We
were interested in better understanding qualitative aspects of how physiologically
and experientially explained behaviors are conceived. All vignettes implied that

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some individuals of whom the predispositional attribution was true did not behave
in the undesirable way. In follow-up interviews, the participants were questioned
about their understanding of those people. We hypothesized that the behavior of
people who did not behave undesirably despite the presence of the particular
predispositional attribution would less frequently be attributed to willpower or
character when the antecedent was physiological than when it was experiential.
Method

Participants. Approximately 3 months after the completion of Study 1A, 28

participants (of 50 solicited) agreed to a follow-up paid phone interview that was
recorded with their permission. The sample of participants obtained was predominantly female (85.7%) and predominantly suburban (78.6%) All but one participant had completed high school, and 67.9% had either completed at least a 2-year
college degree or were currently enrolled in college. Participants ranged in age
from 18 to 89 with a median age of 30.
Design of interview. Basic demographic information was collected at the
start of each interview. Next, an interviewer reread two of the four vignettes (one
with a physiological predispositional attribution and one with an experiential
predispositional attribution) that the participant had already read in Study 1A. Following each vignette, participants were again asked to rate the voluntariness of the
act. They were then given an opportunity to explain why they responded as they
did. After their response, it was pointed out to participants that the specified uniformity (20%, 55%, or 90%) with which the behavior was said to follow given the
antecedent implied that some portion of individuals for whom the antecedent was
true did not behave like the individual in the vignette. Participants were asked to respond freely as to what they thought was different about those individuals. Then
participants were given a multiple choice and asked to select which option best described what they thought was different about the individuals who did not behave
like the actor. The options were physically different, different life experiences,
or differences in willpower or character.
Results and Discussion
Ratings of volition in the phone interview were moderately consistent with their
earlier ratings, r(28) = 0.57, p < .01. In free response, when asked to justify ratings
of volition, the language used often suggested that participants understood physiologically explained behavior in a nonteleological manner:
If something is chemically wrong, in her brain that controls her, she cant control
that at all. Like, theres something inside her that, it controls her body.

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Well they said it was genetically so it [would] you know, be something she had in
her genes that she cant control it, even though she wants to.

In both excerpts, a distinction is made between the person and the body. The
chemical imbalance or gene is cast as the physical force controlling the body,
whereas shethe person with mental states and intentions, is described as separate (and powerless).
When asked to describe what was different about individuals for whom the antecedent was true but who had not behaved undesirably, most responses given experiential antecedents could generally be classified as relating to character or willpower. When the antecedent was physiological, participants had more difficulty
and less readily attributed the better behavior to character or willpower.
Interviewer: Twenty percent of the people with this chemical imbalance
behave in this way. That means that 80% do not. What do you
think is different about the 80%?
Participant: They have the same [imbalance], to the same degree?
Interviewer: Right.
Participant: Gee, I would say that it would be an unexplainable scientific
fluke.
In response to the multiple choice question regarding what was different about
individuals for whom the antecedent was true but who did not behave in the undesirable way, 81.3% of participants selected the differences in willpower or character alternative when the antecedent was experiential. This option was selected
in just 50% of cases in which the explanation was physiological, 2 = 4.85, p =
.026. One participant offered, I dont think it can be willpower or character if it is
a brain thing. For many participants, the provision of a physiological antecedent
changed how the behavior was understood. No evidence exists that experiential explanations had a similar effect.

GENERAL DISCUSSION
Three hypotheses were articulated in the introduction regarding what underlies the
tendency for scientific predispositional attributions to exonerate actors for undesirable behaviors. The evidence of necessity hypothesis held that exoneration is affected by the degree to which the behavior follows from the antecedent conditions.
The deterrence hypothesis held that exoneration is produced by providing evidence that a behavior will not be affected by expected consequences. And the ex-

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planatory framework hypothesis held that exoneration is mediated primarily by the

type of explanation provided, experiential explanations being less effective than
physiological explanations at exonerating actors. The studies reported here provide evidence most supportive of the third hypothesis. Directly manipulating the
uniformity and likelihood of deterrence of behavior had considerably less impact
than explanation type on judgments of culpability, and what impact deterrence had
interacted with explanation type. Exoneration did not occur primarily in proportion to the specified uniformity or inalienability of the behavior given the explanatory antecedent.
Taken together, the questionnaire and interview results suggest that the tendency for scientific predispositional attributions to exonerate actors for undesirable behaviors may be based on the tendency of explanations to invite an alternative to the teleological mode of understanding. This tendency is evident not only in
the greater degree of exoneration that physiological explanations produced, but
also in participants willingness to characterize physiological behaviors as automatic and outside the realm of willpower. By design, all vignettes depicted intentional behavior but where the intention itself was to some degree attributed to antecedent conditions beyond the individuals control. All the behaviors could readily
be understood as motivated. Nonetheless, physiological explanations seem to invite an alternative explanatory framework in which behavior could occur despite
rather than as a result of motivations and goals.
Dualism in Ordinary Person Perception
The notion of dualism holds that there are two realms, the physical and the mental.
Whatever the truth of the position, it may be an essential truth about ordinary person perception in Western culture. Within this tradition, mind (soul) and body are
two separate forces independently capable of bringing about behavior. Evidence
also exists that, under certain conditions, people have a tendency to view alternate
explanatory accounts of human action as undercutting each other even when such
accounts are not in direct competition. Kelley (1971a, 1971b) argued that human
causal schemata fall into two classes: the model of necessary causes applies when
all of a given set of factors under consideration need to be jointly present if the target behavior is to take place, and the model of multiple sufficient causes applies
when each of a given set of factors could bring about the target behavior independently of one another. According to Kelley (1971b), a major consequence of operating under the model of multiple sufficient causes is that evidence of causal efficacy
of one causal account may be seen as a justification to deny causal efficacy of other
accounts contained within the set.
For example, in one study, when participants learned that a student had an ulterior motive for taking a certain position in an essay written as part of a summer internship program, the participants virtually ignored the content of the essay in in-

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ferring the authors own stance on the issue (Fein, Hilton, & Miller, 1990). It is as if
a motivation to express ones true views and a motivation to make a good impressionneither of which entails a direct logical contradiction of the otherwere
cast as two mutually exclusive attributional suspects, with the result that granting
causal efficacy to one could be bought only at the cost of denying causal efficacy to
the other.
Put together, these three propositions(a) mind (soul) and body are two separate entities capable of independently affecting human behavior; (b) behavior is
voluntary and owned by the self only insofar as it flows from the mind or the
soul; and (c) alternative, independently plausible, and noncontradictory accounts
of human action can undercut each othermay elucidate why, in our vignettes,
when a physiological explanation was given, participants tended to view the body
as the cause of the behavior and motivations as less relevant, with the result that the
behavior was perceived as less voluntary. The situation our participants encountered was not unlike that envisioned by Kelley (1971a, 1971b) and instantiated by
Fein et al. (1990), except that in our vignettes the two factors comprising the explanatory set did not represent two different types of motivations but two different
categories of causal explanationthe physical and the mental. More generally, in
viewing mind and body as two mutually exclusive attributional suspects (as opposed to alternative levels of analysis), the stage is set so that advances in the physiological behavioral sciences progressively shrink what is left to attribute to the intentional agent.
This research focused on negative (blameworthy) actions. Future research
should address whether the availability of biological explanations will also undermine the praiseworthiness of positive acts. One preliminary study on this matter,
Monterosso and Royzman (XXX), suggested that responsibility for positive acts
may not be computed in the same way as responsibility for negative onesthat
knowing, for example, that a person is genetically inclined toward kindness does
not appear to make his or her actions less praiseworthy than when they are explained by environmental influences alone.
This study used brief and rather artificial vignettes. It has been conjectured, and
we agree, that adopting a nonteleological explanatory stance is uncommon in actual interpersonal interaction. The philosopher Peter Strawson (1962) wrote,
A sustained objectivity of interpersonal attitude, and the human isolation which that
would entail, does not seem to be something of which human beings would be capable, even if some general truth were a theoretical ground for it. (p. 64)

Suppressing the intentional framework of understanding with respect to our own

behavior or the behavior of others is probably somewhat akin to suppressing the
perception of depth in our visual experience. Doing so is at odds with the way we
are built to experience the world.

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If the tendency of predispositional attributions to exonerate behavior has limited applicability to the domain of direct interpersonal interaction, the major applications of this research are likely to be in domains where the level of direct interpersonal contact is low. One such domain is policy makingparticularly when it
relates to distributive justice. Judgments of volition have been shown here and
elsewhere to mediate beliefs about fairness. As a result, scientific exoneration may
affect public opinion about the distribution of limited resources. For instance, willingness to support health care (private or public) for conditions such as drug addiction, depression, or complications related to obesity may turn on beliefs regarding
the volitional status of these conditions. Someone who believes depression can be
overcome by strong will may be less inclined to share in the burden of paying for
depression care (Weiner, 1995). In turn, beliefs about the volitional status may be
affected by the explanations that the behavioral sciences use to explain these conditions. Thus, it may be with good reason that those interested in mustering public
support for funding psychiatric syndromes (e.g., addiction, ADHD, depression)
stress the somatic basis of these disorders (e.g., Leshner, 1997).
Finally, the data presented here were collected exclusively (or nearly exclusively) from American participants. Although the consistency across Ivy League
college students and lower middle-class suburban residents suggests some generality of the observed effects within Western culture, these data may not generalize
to non-Western cultures or even to non-American cultures.

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APPENDIX
Vignette Summaries
Explanation type, uniformity of behavior, and responsiveness to deterrence variations shown within braces.
Joe had a history of violent behavior. At age 30 he was arrested for second degree murder. He got into an argument with a store clerk. The argument escalated
and Joe assaulted the clerk. Witnesses reported that Joe repeatedly kicked the man
in the head after he had fallen to the ground. The clerk was dead when police arrived. Before his trial, neurologists and psychologists examined Joe. They learned
something potentially important about Joe. {Joe had been severely and brutally
abused as a child. For males with a history of the kind of extreme abuse Joe experienced, or Joe had five times the average amount of a particular chemical in his
brain. This condition has been observed in other individuals. For individuals with
this condition} extreme acts of violence are common, occurring in about {20%,
55%, or 90%} of such cases. The threat of severe punishment {rarely, sometimes,
or usually} reduces the rate of violence in such individuals.
Pam was the sort of person who never followed through on her plans. When
things got difficult or dull, Pam would move on to something else. This was not
only true of small day to day things, but big things as well, including her college
career, two small businesses she tried to start, and even her marriage. She knew this
was a big problem for her, but her efforts to change her behavior did not succeed.
Pams lack of focus may have been related to her {brain chemistry. She had unusually high levels of a particular neurotransmitter that has a significant impact on
peoples behavior, or upbringing. Pam was put up for adoption when she was born,
and although she eventually was placed in a stable home, during the first 7 years of
her life she went from one foster home to another, living with 10 different families
over that time. This experience in early childhood seems to have a significant impact on people.} The pattern of undisciplined and easily distractable behavior seen
in Pam is quite common, occurring in approximately {20%, 55%, or 90%} of such
cases. For such people, the threat of personal ruin {rarely, sometimes, or usually}
gets them to increase their focus on the important aspects of their life.

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Bob had a fascination with fire. After work one day, he was arrested for arson
and second degree murder. He had set fire to a small shack near his home. He had
not checked inside the shack, where there was someone sleeping. The person was
killed in the blaze. Before his trial, psychologists and neurologists examined Bob.
{Bob had been severely and brutally abused as a child. For males with a history of
the kind of extreme abuse Bob experienced, or Bob had five times the average
amount of a particular chemical in his brain. This condition has been observed in
other individuals. For individuals with this condition}similarly destructive behaviors are common, occurring in about {20%, 55%, or 90%} of all cases. The threat
of severe punishment {rarely, sometimes, or usually} reduces the rate of violence
in such individuals.
Anne was overweight, and by her own account, ate more than most people.
When she went in for a checkup, her doctor decided that she should see a weight
specialist. The specialist interviewed Anne about her history and eating, and ran
some physical tests. The specialist learned something potentially important about
Anne. Anne {had a genetic abnormality that has been linked to obesity, or had
been raised in a home where food was consistently used as a reward, and where
parents set an unhealthy example of binge eating.} Experts have shown that {20%,
55%, or 90%}of women for whom this is true are overweight. When there is the
threat of serious health consequences, these individuals {rarely, sometimes, or usually} modify their eating behaviors enough to lose the excess weight.
Survey Questions
1. To what extent would you say that {Joe, Pam, Bob, Anne} had voluntary
control over {his, her} behavior?
2. How sympathetic are you to {Joe, Pam, Bob, Anne}?
3. Given the specific facts about {Joe, Pam, Bob, Anne} is {he, she} less to
blame?
4. (If you circled 1 above [no blame mitigation], please skip this question).
What best completes this sentence: The reason {Joe, Pam, Bob, Anne} is
less to blame is that {his, her} (a) impulses to {behave violently, quit things
she starts, set fires, overeat} were unusually hard to control, (b) behavior
was automatic and beyond {his, her} control.
5. Questions differed for each vignette, always dealing with some way the actor should be treated: {How severe should Joes punishment be? If Pam
went back to college, should special allowances be made for her difficulty?
How severely should Bob be punished? If there was a treatment available
for Anne, how much should insurance pay?}
6. Try to put yourself in {Joe, Pam, Bob, Anne}s shoes. If all the same facts
were true of you, do you think you would have behaved the same way?