21 June, 2015

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1971: Defence of Kashmir Valley
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1971: Defence of Kashmir Valley
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1971: Defence of Kashmir Valley, 4.3 out of 5 based on 3 ratings
By
Maj Gen Sukhwant Singh
<http://www.indiandefencereview.com/author/majgensukhwantsingh/>
Issue
Book Excerpt: India\ s War since Independence
<http://www.indiandefencereview.com/idr-issues?issue_id=48> | Date : 18
Jun , 2015
Encouraged by the speedy progress of operations, DSouza was tempted to
induct another battalion, 3 Maratha, into the Kaiyan bowl. It arrived
there on 16 December, and by the time of the ceasefire had secured the
southern flank by capturing the Pathari heights. The operations in the
Lipa valley were undertaken throughout under the command of Headquarters
104 Infantry Brigade located in the Tangdhar valley on an entirely
different axis and across another pass at Nasta Chun.
The attack was halted, and the commander personally led a section charge

to get it going again, but was killed in the attempt. Soon thereafter
the leaderless soldiery were thrown back from the objective by a
spirited Pakistan counter-attack.
After the ceasefire, it was found that the Pakistanis had suffered 18
killed, with a possible 24 more whose bodies could not be found, and ten
prisoners, their losses thus totalling about 50. Only 12 rifles and two
automatics were captured along with a radio set. All the dead and the
prisoners belonged to the Tochi Scouts. From these statistics and
information available from Fazal Muqeems accounts, it appears that the
Lipa valley was held by no more than a couple of Scout companies. Akbar
Khan had taken the justifiable risk of denuding the Lipa area to muster
strength for his illfated attack in the Poonch sector. Knowing the
constraints on sustaining sizable Indian operations there over
precarious routes of maintenance across Tutmari Gali, it was unlikely
that DSouza could achieve worthwhile results.
Five months later, unknown to the higher command, a little Pakistani
pocket near Kaiyan village surfaced. This pocket, within DSouzas
knowledge and with the tacit consent of the Indian troops in the area,
continued to be maintained through a track along Jinjar Nala which the
Indians held on both sides. DSouza withheld this information as he felt
it might invite criticism of his conduct of operations, and he was
anyhow confident that the pocket existed only at his pleasure as he had
the capacity to eliminate it if it turned troublesome.
On the face of it, DSouzas performance appeared impressive on maps,
but his difficulties were progressively mounting on the ground,
especially with the snowfall and the increasing operational demands of
the troops manning the fresh conquests. Ground-based maintenance could
not cope with administrative requirements and increased reliance had to
be placed on the Indian helicopter fleet, which was diverted from other
important tasks to meet their pressing needs.
Along with the Lipa valley operations, an attack was launched on the
Shisha-Ladi feature, part of the extension of the Tithwal bulge, on the
night of 7/8 December. A post stands on the summit of this rocky
feature, jutting out of Ghasla Top. It was at first reported to be held
by a company of Tochi Scouts, and it was only after the assault on it
had begun that it was found to be held by regulars, one company of 2 FF
inducted after the capture of Ghasla Top and Ring Contour. The post was
discovered to have concrete fortifications, but information about the
location of bunkers and automatics was scanty. Supported by about five
fire units, 8 Rajputana Rifles assaulted the position from the west, a
very steep approach, with two companies and with two stops established
south and southwest of the objective. The Pakistani troops displayed
good fire discipline in that they did not open up till the assaulting
troops were within 75 yards.
DSouza withheld this information as he felt it might invite criticism of
his conduct of operations, and he was anyhow confident that the pocket
existed only at his pleasure as he had the capacity to eliminate it if
it turned troublesome.
Our shelling set alight the dry grass which grew profusely on the
feature, and the flames leaping skyward and smoke caused much confusion.
The artillery fire had by then lifted. The defending Pakistanis turned
the concentrated fire of automatic and other weapons on the attackers.
This hail of fire held up the assault and inflicted heavy casualties on
the troops exposed on the bare rocky hill. All efforts to get it going

again failed. Thereupon, the commanding officer launched his two reserve
companies from the north. Pressing home the attack with grim
determination, they gained a small lodgment in the enemy defences, but
like their predecessors could do no more. They were subjected to
defensive fire over our localities with a high-explosive air burst. As
day dawned, the troops in the open suffered more casualties. The attack
was called off very reluctantly at 1000 hours on 8 December. Losses
amounted to two JCOs and 35 other ranks killed, two officers, two JCOs
and 65 other ranks wounded, and one officer and three other ranks
missing or believed killed.
The next attack was on the Wanjal complex, east of Ghasla Top, and the
Shisha Ladi feature. Wanjal, an oblong 1,096 metres long, was known to
be held in four different localities in depth by about a platoom
strength each. 3 Bihar was relieved from the picquet line by 8 Rajputana
Rifles after the abortive attempt to capture Shisha Ladi and was given
the task of capturing the Wanjal complex. The battalion set about its
tasks methodically. Destruction of enemy bunkers was undertaken by the
direct fire of a section of mountain guns and by the precision shooting
of two medium guns, commencing in the first light of 14 December. In
addition, two fighter bombers carried out sorties against Brith Wari
Gali and Pakistani gun positions in the general area of Tilwara. Most of
the bunkers had been damaged before the attack went in on the night of
14/15 December.
The assault proceeded along the spur from the north over a narrow
frontage because of restricted space for development. Meanwhile, the
commando platoon had infiltrated, and finding one of the depth
localities on the complex vacant occupied it. That scaled the fate of
the Pakistanis holding the complex. The assaulting troops closed in soon
and captured the forward localities after a brief hand-to-hand fight.
The whole complex fell into the hands of 3 Bihar soon after and they
were well entrenched on the feature by first light on 15 December. The
Pakistani casualties were 18 dead, five wounded and one prisoner who
belonged to 16 POK, against four of our men killed and 29 wounded. The
complex was held by no more than a platoon plus of PoK troops. In this
attack, commando platoons from two other battalions played a significant
part in establishing roadblocks along the Pakistani routes of
maintenance and by raiding gun positions. This success to some extent
compensated for DSouzas earlier failure at Shisha Ladi.
But unknown to DSouza the Pakistanis had made considerable
encroachments between the Wankal complex and the Lipa valley in the
general area of Katran Ki Gali. The pluses and minuses of the extension
of the Tithwal bulge in the south were evening out concurrently.
Meanwhile, reports continued of BSF advances in the frozen lakes area of
Minimarg throughout the operations, and by the end of hostilities this
force claimed to dominate the line of the Kishanganga and the road and
track communications running along it.
When stock was taken of the territory lost and gained in the conflict at
the end of December 1971, 19 Infantry Division showed a spectacullar
gain of approximately 150 square kilometres of Pakistani-occupied
territory. Heavy snow covered the mountain heights, froze the lakes in
the Minimarg area, obliterated the memory of setbacks in battle, and
brought to the fore the showy sense of achievement. So impressed was the
hierarchy with DSouzas performance that he was one of the first
divisional commanders to be awarded a Param Vashist Seva Medal.But the
veil of illusion started gradually lifting with the melting snows and
the realities buried underneath began to emerge.the DSouza became

conscious of the little Pakistani pocket in the Kaiyan bowl. He tried to

negotiate with the Pakistanis on vacating the pocket, but without
result. He decided to eliminate it in early May, 1972, using force. For
this, he initially inducted one company of 2 Guards and attacked the
pocket, but without adequate artillery support. The attack failed as a
logical outcome of an ill-conceived plan.
Meanwhile, the Pakistani reserves transferred from opposite the Lipa
valley had returned and Tikka Khan, now at the helm of affairs and
seeking an opportunity to rehabilitate the image of the Pakistani Army
after the Bangladesh debacle, was prepared to hit back at the slightest
provocation. Jumping at the opportunity DSouzas move offered, he hit
the Indian forward positions in the Lipa valley and threw 9 Sikh back at
one blow.
Pakistani troops displayed good fire discipline in that they did not
open up till the assaulting troops were within 75 yards.
Because of the precarious and restricted flow of materials by man and
animal pack across Tutmari Gali, defended localities could not be fully
developed with minefield, wire, bunkers with overhead cover and so on,
and as such they had little defence potential against determined attacks
supported by a preponde rance of artillery which the Indians tried to
match with two medium guns, the only artillery which could be brought to
bear in the Lipa valley. The headlines in Indian newspapers the next day
announcing the reverses and the loud propaganda of Radio. Pakistan
embarrassed the Indian Government in general and the Army in particular.
The command and control of the Lipa valley operations, particularly at
the time of this reverse, was very peculiar. The brigade commander from
the Tithwal sector was moved in to conduct the operations. He was still
on the home side of Tutmari Gali when the Pakistanis attacked and could
do no more than get the reports of the reverse on the radio. His
headquarters in turn were handed over to DSouzas Colonel General Staff
as a temporary measure, while the brigadier in charge of the reserve
brigade, now without troops, was cooling his heels somewhere in the
Gulmarg sector. To stall further Pakistani advances, the remainder of 2
Guards was hurriedly inducted into the Kaiyan bowl and Headquarters
Reserve Brigade brought into command the sector.
As the snow melted and negotiations to delineate the line of control
proceeded between the Indian and Pakistani military teams the original
claims of physical domination in respect of 19 Infantry Division started
shrinking, especially in the Minimarg lake area. Proportionately, the
military reputation of DSouza started waning in the eyes of the
hierarchy. About the direction and the conduct of operations in the 19
Infantry Divisional sector it can now be said that there did not appear
to be any purpose behind them which could enhance the Indian offensive
or defensive capability in the future. The extension of the Tithwal
bulge and the annexation of a portion of the Lipa valley had not brought
any tactical advantage. Contrarily, both had proved an administrative
headache and a tactical embarrassment.
If the two tactical areas of Haji Pir Pass and the Bugina bulge had been
secured, this would have greatly enhanced the defence potential of
Kashmir Valley.
If the two tactical areas of Haji Pir Pass and the Bugina bulge had been
secured, this would have greatly enhanced the defence potential of
Kashmir Valley. As described earlier, Haji Pir connects the Kahuta bulge

with the Uri bulge and acted as a gateway for infiltrators into the
valley in the period preceding the 1965 conflict. Any Pakistani thrust
along the Haji Pir-Uri road also outflanks defences sited ahead of Uri.
To secure this flank, and also to block routes of infiltration, it was
imperative to secure the pass at the first opportunity. The Bugina bulge
provided Pakistan with a readymade bridgehead across the turbulent
Kishanganga to develop operations either to eliminate the Indian-held
Keran bulge or to outflank the Tithwal bulge by developing a thrust
towards the Lolab valley. On the other hand, its capture by the Indians
would have prevented the maintenance of Pakistani posts opposite the
northern gullies, as it would have take considerable time for Pakistan
to build an alternative route of maintenance.
These were two worthwhile objectives within DSouzas sector, and he had
one brigade group in reserve, the major portion of which (about two
battalions) remained unused right up to the ceasefire. DSouzas excuse
for this was that he was waiting for definite indications that Pakistan
7 Infantry Division had been committed elsewere before he drew on his
reserves. This was not a valid argument, especially after Pakistan had
shown its hand in the Poonch and Chhamb sectors. The reserve brigade
group could have been employed after 7 December to secure either of the
above objectives, but preferably the Bugina bulge, as Akbar Khan had
committed his reserves in the Poonch sector and could not switch them to
Bugina in a hurry. But he had the capability to do so towards Haji Pir
after recoiling from Poonch and working from interior lines.
Both objectives had reasonably good road systems, and it would have been
possible to support the operation administratively as well as from the
angle of fire support. One or two additional battalions could be
mustered from the holding force in dormant sectors to bolster the
invasion force. The tidy conduct of operations under integral
headquarters with adequate fire support would have yielded tactically
more profitable results. It would also have fulfilled the Chiefs
overall strategic plan for the coming war.
Book_India_wars_since
<http://www.lancerpublishers.com/catalog/product_info.php?products_id=707>
But this was not to be. DSouza was a typical infantry soldier whose
vision never travelled beyond the foresight of his rifle. Displaying
little or no imagination, he fumbled from one situation to another like
a trigger-happy cowboy with utter disregard of the war aims or security
of his command. Despite the successes obtained by the audacious
manoeuvre of tackling the prepared defencss from an unexpected direction
by infiltration or wide outflanking moves, DSouza launched frontal
attacks with disastrous results and erosion of morale. As a result, he
not only humbled himself eventually but embarrassed the nation. Despite
his pressing commitments in Poonch and Chhamb, the Corps Commander
should have directed DSouzas actions firmly as DSouza was obviously
incapable of thinking for himself.
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1971: Defence of Kashmir Valley, 4.3 out of 5 based on 3 ratings
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One thought on 1971: Defence of Kashmir Valley

1.
Sankar on June 21, 2015 at 7:55 am
<http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/1971-defence-of-kashmir-valle
y/#comment-521782>
said:
Not clear about some news paper reports I had read, that Pakistan
handed over to India some of the positions occupied by the Indian
Army in 1971 but had to withdraw from there in 1972 as there were
difficulty to keep up with support and supply due to remoteness and
rugged territory. If my recollection is correct, the General
Manekshaw made sure that the Pakis retreat from those posts (at
least two taken over by the Pakistanisin 1972) first before he
agreed to release the 90,000 Army personnel of Pakistan. Could you
please confirm this, General ?
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Leading From The Rear, or Leaderless?
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It is a commonly held perception that China deals pretty drastically

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followed in their footsteps, we would certainly run out of ammunition
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