The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. , No.

ISSN

October

DISCUSSIONS

BRANDOM ON PRACTICAL REASON

B H W
Robert Brandom claims that language expressing pro-attitudes makes explicit proprieties of practical
inference. This thesis is untenable, especially given certain premises which Brandom himself endorses. Pro-attitude vocabulary has the wrong grammatical structure; other parts of vocabulary do
the job he ascribes to pro-attitude vocabulary; the thesis introduces implausible dierences between
the inferential consequences of desires and intentions, and distorts the interpretation of conditional
statements. Rather, I suggest, logical vocabulary can make proprieties of practical inference explicit,
just as the inferentialist says it can for theoretical inference.

Robert Brandoms inferentialism, most centrally the thesis that the meaning of a
sentence is the norms of inference which apply to it, has generated profitable discussion of many old philosophical topics from a new angle. Most of this discussion
has centred on inferentialisms broad ramifications for theoretical reason, i.e.,
epistemology, alethic logic, the cognitive aspects of mind and the declarative aspects
of language. However, inferentialism has consequences for our understanding of
practical reason too, including the structure of practical reasoning, of the analysis
of desires and other pro-attitudes, and of broadly evaluative language like ought.1
In this paper I concentrate on Brandoms expressive theory of the language used to
express pro-attitudes. This theory can be shown to be untenable, given Brandoms
other and more central commitments.
I. BACKGROUND
Brandom integrates his views of practical subjects into his views on theoretical subjects. His account of practical reasoning is grafted onto an account of theoretical
reasoning, and the practical states of intention and desire are compared with the
cognitive state of belief. Accordingly, I shall sketch the philosophical tools with
which Brandom is working by the time he addresses practical issues.
I shall begin with the big picture. Trac in reasons (to begin with, this means
theoretical reasons) is thought of, in the first instance, as a social activity, a game, in
1 R. Brandom, Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment (Harvard
UP, , hereafter MIE), pp. .

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BRANDOM ON PRACTICAL REASON

a familiar philosophical use of that word. There are positions which a player can
occupy, and rules according to which the positions can change. Propositional
contents individuate the positions. To occupy a position is to take up a commitment.
The positions taken up in theoretical reasoning are doxastic commitments, which we can
identify as beliefs. Thus to believe that lemon juice is sour is, in the favoured idiom,
to take up a commitment to the propositional content Lemon juice is sour. The
rules of the game are rules of inference (more on these below), which specify new
positions (conclusions) available to those who occupy certain other positions (premises). For instance, one inferential rule says that if anything is sour, then it is acidic.
So one may infer from Lemon juice is sour to Lemon juice is acidic. That is an
example of coming to occupy a new position on the basis of an old one, according to
the rules of the game a basic inference.
The inferentialist apparatus takes on practical significance when practical commitments, which we can identify with intentions, are added to the doxastic sort. Like
doxastic commitments, practical commitments stand as premise and conclusion to
various other commitments, both doxastic and practical.
One final and very important tenet of inferentialism is an expressive theory of logic.
Because of his emphasis on inference, Brandom needs to oer some account of what
a good inference amounts to. There are, basically, two options. Perhaps the obvious
route is to say that the paradigm case of a good inference is a deductive inference,
and paradigm arguments are formally valid arguments. When speaking or writing,
however, we often abbreviate and condense our arguments into enthymematic
informal versions, like
The cherry trees are flowering
Therefore spring is here.
On this view, then, the correctness of an informal argument depends on (i) the
formal validity of the argument for which it is an enthymeme, and (ii) the truth of
the suppressed conditional premise. This basic position can be called formalism.
Formalism, Brandom writes, trades primitive goodnesses of inference for the
truth of conditionals (MIE, p. ). He endorses the reverse order of explanation. On
his view, the concept of good inference is basic, and fundamentally applies to the
move from The cherry trees are flowering to Spring is here. We can make explicit
our understanding of the correctness of this move by endorsing a special kind of
proposition, a conditional, which packages the premise and conclusion of a correct
informal argument into an if ... then ... statement. The conditional simply expresses, or makes explicit, the connection between premise and conclusion which
was implicit in the primitive, informal version of the argument (hence the label
expressivist: Brandom has no intention of reducing logical vocabulary to outbursts
of emotion). In his own words (p. ):
The point of introducing logical vocabulary is precisely to make it possible to trade
hitherto merely implicit inferential commitments for explicit assertional commitments
to conditionals. Formalism about inference ... understanding all proprieties of
inference as always already underwritten by logical form turns things on their heads.
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A great deal more might be said to explicate Brandoms position on this

contentious point (see MIE, pp. ), but this much suces for the exposition
and argument below.
II. BRANDOMS CENTRAL PREMISE
Next, Brandom presents us with a unique way of understanding practical arguments. Specifically, he oers an expressive theory (in the sense of making explicit,
not in the sense of non-cognitivist) of the language that expresses pro-attitudes.
He begins by presenting the reader with sample pieces of practical reasoning, each
of which moves from a single doxastic premise to a practical conclusion. Here
are two:
()

Only opening my umbrella will keep me dry

So I shall open my umbrella

()

I am a bank employee going to work

So I shall wear a necktie.2

(In Brandoms regimented usage, I shall ... signals that what is being expressed is a
practical commitment or intention, while Let me ... expresses desire or preference.
I want to ... is a description of a desire, not an expression of it. It lets desires figure
in practical arguments in quite dierent ways, for instance, Since I want to kill my
parents, I had better see a psychiatrist. For similar reasons Brandom prefers I shall
... to I intend to ... .)
There are two ways to treat these practical inferences, he notes, drawing on his
expressive theory of logic, just as there are two ways to treat any inferences not
formally valid. The formalist way is Davidsons. Davidson defines a primary
reason for an action as a combination of belief and pro-attitude, where the latter
includes inter alia desires, intentions and evaluations.3 For Davidson, inferences like
() and () are enthymemes of more complete inferences which include the premise
expressing the required pro-attitude. So, for instance, in order to make these
abbreviated practical inferences fully intelligible, we have to add premises of the
pro-attitude sort:
(a)
(b)

Let me stay dry

Bank employees are obliged (required) to wear neckties.

Only the fully explicit practical inferences, ()+(a), ()+(b), make for a completely
rational movement of thought.
In contrast, Brandom takes an informalist route to analysing these inferences.
He takes () and () to be correct inferences just as they stand. The role of proattitude vocabulary, such as that in (a) and (b), is to make explicit the primitive
2 The views laid out below can be found in MIE, pp. . The arguments () and () are
on p. .
3 D. Davidson, Actions, Reasons, and Causes, in his Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford
UP, ), pp. , at p. .

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BRANDOM ON PRACTICAL REASON

informal correctness of the inferences. The analogy with conditionals in theoretical

reasoning is direct:
The claims (a), (b) ... might, like p q, be understood rather as codifying material
practical inferential commitments. The pay-o from doing so would be making it
possible to understand the expressive role played by the broadly evaluative words
(such as prefer, obliged, and ought) used to express these pro-attitudes, in a way
analogous to the understanding suggested for conditionals (MIE, p. ).

This thesis about practical inference that the premises expressing pro-attitudes
play an expressive role, analogous to the role played by conditionals in theoretical
inference is the central pillar of Brandoms approach to practical reason. Among
other things, it entails an anti-Humean view of practical reasoning. According to
Brandom, ones reasons for acting, which are simply premises in reasoning that
concludes with a practical commitment, can be entirely cognitive states (doxastic
commitments), as they are in the inferences () and (). The practical premises (a)
and (b), so crucial on Humean approaches to practical reasoning, according to
Brandom simply make explicit the reason-giving force of the doxastic commitments.
Moreover, from this central thesis Brandom draws consequences for the philosophy
of mind in particular, for what a pro-attitude is and for the philosophy of
language, in analysing normative language like ought. Space prevents me from
spelling out the details. But none of these Brandomian developments is sound,
because the thesis on which they rest is unsound, particularly in the light of
Brandoms other commitments.

III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST BRANDOMS EXPRESSIVE THEORY

Given basic inferentialist commitments, in particular the expressive theory of logical
vocabulary, I shall argue that statements like Let me stay dry or I ought not to do
what will harm others pointlessly do not make explicit any kind of inferential
propriety, practical or otherwise. On the contrary, logical vocabulary has this function in the practical sphere, just as it does in the theoretical sphere.
. Grammar
The first problem with Brandoms thesis is a grammatical mismatch between his
broadly evaluative words and the expressive function they are supposed to serve.
Suppose inferentialisms expressive theory of logical vocabulary is more or less
correct. The connective if is grammatical only when combined with two full
sentences, as in If p, q or q if p. This two-sentence construction makes it plausible
that if has the expressive function which inferentialism alleges the two claims
which it connects are embedded right there in the conditional sentence.
The vocabulary which expresses pro-attitudes, however, lacks this feature.
Ought, for instance, is a monadic operator, not a dyadic one, and so it is unclear
how it can perform a job analogous to that of if. Expressions of desire are similarly
monadic: one says Let me , or I desire that p. So it does not seem that
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pro-attitude language relates two commitments of an agent, since it does not relate
two of anything.
. The continuing expressive function of logical vocabulary
Secondly, if pro-attitude language did for practical reasoning what if does for
theoretical reasoning, then presumably if would not do this job. In fact, however,
when we look carefully at the sample arguments Brandom oers, we see that
conditional constructions are both present and performing their characteristic
function.
One of Brandoms pro-attitude sentences can be rephrased as a (universally
quantified) conditional claim:
(b) (S)If S is a bank employee going to work, then S is obliged (required) to wear
a necktie.
This way of construing (b) makes good sense out of Brandoms sample argument ().
Given the premise I am a bank employee going to work, it follows by ordinary
logic that I am obliged to wear a necktie, and from there to I shall wear a necktie
is perhaps not such a great leap. We could even alter the pro-attitude premise to
Bank employees shall wear neckties, and think of it as the expression of an attitude
of obedience to an order from a capricious deity, or employer. More formally, the
new premise would be (S) If S is a bank employee going to work, then S must wear
a necktie no longer a conditional statement, but a conditional construction none the
less. Then the practical inference is even simpler. On either approach, however, it is
clearly the logical vocabulary of if which makes the inference explicit. The ought
or shall governs only the consequents of the conditionals.This contrasts with
(a)

Let me stay dry

which is an expression of desire or preference and cannot be rephrased as a conditional. Significantly, however, the premise of () can: Only opening my umbrella
will keep me dry is a way of saying If I am to stay dry, I must open my umbrella.
This suggests that not (a) but the premise of () is what makes explicit a propriety of
inference, and so links premise and conclusion. We should analyse the inference as
() Let me stay dry
So I shall open my umbrella
with
(a) Only opening my umbrella will keep me dry
serving as the explicitation of ()s primitively good informal inference.
Thus a close examination of Brandoms sample arguments uncovers conditional
premises in the arguments which do the work of making explicit more primitive,
informal practical inferences. In short, logical vocabulary does the same job practically as it does theoretically: it makes proprieties of inference explicit. A single
premise can both express a pro-attitude and have a conditional form, as the example
of (b) shows. It need not do so, however, as (a) demonstrates. Whether a premise
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BRANDOM ON PRACTICAL REASON

renders an inferential propriety explicit depends on whether it has a conditional

logical form and is independent of whether it expresses a pro-attitude.
. The inferential similarity of intention and desire
A further objection is suggested by the similar roles of desire and intention in
practical inference.
I have already christened the informal inference from Let me stay dry to I shall
open my umbrella (). Modifying it slightly, and changing the expression of desire
to one of intention, I shall christen the new informal inference (*):
(*)

I shall stay dry

So I shall open my umbrella.

To formalize the inferences, we can add (a). So now we have

(*)+(a) I shall stay dry
Only opening my umbrella will keep me dry
So I shall open my umbrella
which is very similar to
()+(a) Let me stay dry
Only opening my umbrella will keep me dry
So I shall open my umbrella.
And in general, wherever a desire-statement figures as a premise in a practical argument, an intention-statement will work as well. This should indicate that premises
expressing intentions and premises expressing desires do not dier much in their
inferential potential.
Yet Brandom treats the premises expressing intentions in a manner completely
dierent from the way in which he treats premises expressing desires. For he analyses the latter argument not as ()+(a) but as ()+(a). On his interpretation, the
inferential isomorphism between desire-statements and intention-statements is hard
to explain, for the symmetry between the two arguments is lost. Intention is a practical commitment, a position within the inferentialist game. Its conceptual connection to
the conclusion is presumably made explicit by the conditional premise Only opening my umbrella will keep me dry. On the other hand, a desire, according to the
ocial view, embodies a rule in the game. It renders explicit the connection between
the conclusion and the premise Only opening my umbrella will keep me dry.
So there is a sort of schizophrenia about the analysis of certain arguments, on
Brandoms view: when they have desires in the premises, the desire is the expressive
premise connecting the belief to the conclusion, as in (a), and the primitive informal
inference has a doxastic premise, as in (). On the other hand, when in a very similar
argument an intention with the same content is in the premises, the primitive inference
uses a practical premise made explicit by the conditional belief, as in (*) and (a).
Surely this is implausible. The two arguments at the beginning of this section,
()+(a) and (*)+(a), are so similar that they cannot reasonably be analysed into
forms as dierent as () and (*). Brandoms fundamental position in the practical
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realm is that intention should be treated as a basic practical commitment, and hence
not as making explicit anything more basic. This, combined with the arguments
adduced previously, suggests that in both the present cases it is the conditional
statement (a) which makes an informal practical inferential connection explicit.
. Two models for interpreting doxastic conditionals
The same schizophrenia shows up in the treatment of conditionals:
(a) Only opening my umbrella will keep me dry
is a doxastic commitment, in Brandoms terms, which is to say that it is suited to be
the content of a belief. As such, it can be used in purely theoretical reasoning: I
predict that I shall keep dry; only opening my umbrella will keep me dry; therefore
I predict that I shall open my umbrella. In this theoretical argument, according to
Brandom, this conditional plays the expressive role of making explicit the inferential
connection between its antecedent (I open my umbrella) and consequent (I stay dry).
But in some practical reasoning using the same conditional, Let me keep dry;
only opening my umbrella will keep me dry; therefore I shall open my umbrella, the
connection between opening ones umbrella and staying dry is surely just the same
in the practical as in the theoretical case. Brandoms analysis is completely dierent,
however. In the practical case, it is pro-attitude language, Let me stay dry, rather
than (a), which allegedly performs the expressive function. But what justification
could there be for this switch in the interpretation of the conditional premise, when
the conceptual connections at stake are so patently identical? Again by far the better
hypothesis is that the conditional premise performs the explicitating function, in
either theoretical or practical contexts, and whether it contains pro-attitude vocabulary or not.

IV. CONCLUSION
I have presented four separate arguments against Brandoms expressive theory of
pro-attitude language. Negatively, I conclude that the premises that express proattitudes do not make explicit practical inferential proprieties. Positively, the right
view for an inferentialist is that logical vocabulary does on the practical side just
what it does on the theoretical side. It is logical vocabulary, and more specifically the
conditional construction, which has the expressive function of making inferential
proprieties explicit in the practical as well as the theoretical sphere.
Where does this leave inferentialism with respect to that collection of topics we
might call practical reason? Brandoms own accounts are vitiated by the failure of
his expressive theory of pro-attitude language. But once that idea is abandoned, the
field for inferentialist understandings of practical reason is wide open.
Valparaiso University, Indiana

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