JESUS MA. CUI, ET AL.

, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. ANTONIO MA. CUI, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.
[G.R. No. L-7041. February 21, 1957.]
FACTS: Jesus and Antonio are the legitimate children of Don Mariano Cui and Doa Antonia Perales who
died intestate in1939. Jesus alleged that during the marriage of Don Mariano and Dona Antonia, their
parents acquired certain properties inthe City of Cebu, namely, Lots Nos. 2312, 2313 and 2319. Upon the
death of their mother, the properties were placed under the administration of their dad.that while the latter
was 84 years of age, Antonio by means of deceit, secured the transfer to themselves the said lotswithout
any pecuniary consideration; that in the deed of sale executed on March 8, 1946, Rosario Cui appeared
as one of the vendees, but on learning of this fact she subsequently renounced her rights under the sale
and returned her portion toDon Mariano Cui by executing a deed of resale in his favor on October 11,
1946; that defendants, fraudulently and with thedesire of enriching themselves unjustly at the expense
of their father, Don Mariano Cui, and of their brothers and co-heirs,secured a loan of P130,000 from the
Rehabilitation properties, and with the loan thus obtained, defendants constructedthereon an apartment
building of strong materials consisting of 14 doors, valued at approximately P130,000 and
another building on the same parcels of land, which buildings were leased to some Chinese commercial
firms a monthly rental of P7,600, which defendants have collected and will continue to collect to the
prejudice of the plaintiffs;Jesus alleged that the sale should be invalidated so far as the portion of the
property sold to Antonio Cui is concerned, for the reason that when that sale was effected, Antonio was
then acting as the agent or administrator of the properties of DonMariano Cui.Jesus lays stress on the
power of attorney Exhibit L which was executed by Don Mariano in favor of Antonio Cui on March 2,1946,
wherein the former has constituted the latter as his "true and lawful attorney" to perform in his name and
that of theintestate heirs of Doa Antonia Perales.
ISSUE
WON the sale of the property to Antonio was valid.
HELD
YES.While under article 1459 of the old Civil Code an agent or administrator is disqualified from
purchasing property in his handsfor sale or management, and, in this case, the property in question was
sold to Antonio Cui while he was already the agentor administrator of the properties of Don Mariano Cui,
we however believe that this question cannot now be raised or invoked.
The prohibition of the law is contained in article 1459 of the old Civil Code, but this prohibition has
already beenremoved.
Under the provisions of article 1491, section 2, of the new Civil Code, an agent may now buy property
placed inhis hands for sale or administration, provided that the principal gives his consent thereto. While
the new Code came intoeffect only on August 30, 1950, however, since this is a right that is declared for
the first time, the same may be givenretroactive effect if no vested or acquired right is impaired (Article
2253, new Civil Code). During the lifetime Don Mariano,and particularly on March 8, 1946, the herein
appellants could not claim any vested or acquired right in these properties, for,as heirs, the most they had
was a mere expentancy. We may, therefore, invoke now this practical and liberal provision of our new
Civil Code even if the sale had taken place before its effectivity

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
SILVERETRA ABABA, ET AL., claimants, JUAN LARRAZABAL, MARTA C. DE LARRAZABAL,
MAXIMO ABAROQUEZ and ANASTACIA CABIGAS, petitioners-appellants, ALBERTO FERNANDEZ,
adverse claimant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-26096 February 27, 1979

FACTS: The adverse claimant Atty. Fernandez was retained as counsel by petitioner (Abarquez) in a civil
a case for the annulment of a contract of sale with right of repurchase and for the recovery of the land
which was the subject matter thereof. Unable to compensate his lawyer whom he also retained for his
appeal, the petitioner executed a document whereby he obliged himself to give to his lawyer of
whatever he might recover from Lots 5600 and 5602 should the appeal prosper.
The real property sought to be recovered was actually the share of petitioner in Lots 5600 and
5602 which were part of the estate of his deceased parents and which were partitioned among the heirs,
which included petitioner and his sister.
The case having been resolved and title having been issued to petitioner, adverse claimant
waited for petitioner to comply with his obligation under the document executed by him by delivering the
portion of the said parcels of land. Petitioner refused to comply with his obligation and instead offered
to sell the whole parcels of land to spouses Larrazabal. Then, adverse claimant immediately took steps to
protect his interest by filing a motion to annotate his attorneys lien and by notifying the prospective
buyers of his claim over the portion of the parcels of land.
The motion was granted. The annotation of adverse claim appeared on the new transfer
certificate of title. This adverse claim became the subject of cancellation proceedings filed by petitionerspouses. The trial court resolved the case in favor of the adverse claimant. On appeal, petitioners
contended that a contract for a contingent fee violates Article 1491 because it involves an assignment of a
property subject of litigation.
ISSUE: WON the contract for a contingent fee as basis of the interest of Atty. Fernandez is prohibited by
Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
HELD: NO. The contention is without merit. Article 1491 prohibits only the sale or assignment between
the lawyer and his client of property which is the subject of litigation. For the prohibition to operate, the
sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving
the property.
Likewise, under American Law, the prohibition does not apply to cases where after completion of
litigation the lawyer accepts on account of his fee and interest in the assets realized by the litigation.
There is clear distinction between such cases and one in which the lawyer speculates on the outcome of
the matter in which he is employed.
Further, a contract for a contingent fee is not covered by Article 1491 because the transfer or
assignment of the property in litigation takes effect only after the finality of a favorable judgment. In the
instant case, the attorneys fees of Atty. Fernandez, consisting of of whatever the petitioner might
recover from his share in the lots in question is contingent upon the success of the appeal. Hence, the
payment of the attorneys fees, that is, the transfer or assignment of of the property in litigation will take
place only if the appeal prospers. Therefore, the transfer actually takes effect after the finality of a
favorable judgment rendered on appeal and not during the pendency of litigation involving the property in
question. Consequently, the contract for a contingent fee is not covered by Article 1491 of the Civil Code.

PAULINO VALENCIA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING, respondent.
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, ATTY. EDUARDO U. JOVELLANOS and ATTY. ARSENIO FER.
CABANTING,respondents.
A.M. Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543

April 26, 1991

FACTS: In 1933, complainant Paulino Valencia and his wife allegedly bought a parcel of land, where they
built their house, from a certain Serapia Raymundo, an heir of Pedro Raymundo the original owner.
However, they failed to register the sale or secure a transfer certificate of title in their names. A
conference was held in the house of Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos to settle the land dispute between Serapia
and the Valencia spouses. Serapia was willing to relinquish ownership if the Valencias could show
documents evidencing ownership. Paulino exhibited a deed of sale written in the Ilocano dialect.
However, Serapia claimed that the deed covered a different property. Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio
Fer. Cabanting, filed a complaint against Paulino for the recovery of possession with damages. The
Valencias engaged the services of Atty. Dionisio Antiniw. Atty. Antiniw advised them to present a notarized
deed of sale in lieu of the private document written in Ilocano. For this purpose, Paulino gave Atty. Antiniw
an amount of P200.00 to pay the person who would falsify the signature of the alleged vendor. A
"Compraventa Definitiva" as a result thereof.
The Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, rendered a decision in favor of Serapia. Paulino filed a Petition
for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction before the CA. While the petition was pending, the TC issued an
order of execution stating that "the decision in this case has already become final and executory".
On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of the litigated lot to Atty. Jovellanos and the
remaining portion she sold to her counsel, Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, on April 25, 1973. Paulino filed a
disbarment proceeding against Atty. Cabanting on the ground that said counsel allegedly violated Article
1491 of the New Civil Code as well as Article II of the Canons of Professional Ethics, prohibiting the
purchase of property under litigation by a counsel. The appellate court dismissed the petition of Paulino.
Constancia Valencia, daughter of Paulino, also filed a disbarment proceeding against Atty. Dionisio
Antiniw for his participation in the forgery and its subsequent introduction as evidence for his client; and
also, against Attys. Eduardo Jovellanos and Arsenio Cabanting for purchasing a litigated property
allegedly in violation of Article 1491 of the New Civil Code; and against the three lawyers, for allegedly
rigging the case against her parents.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in violation of Art. 1491 of the New
Civil Code.
Whether or not Attys. Antiniw and Jovellanos are guilty of malpractice in falsifying notarial documents.
Whether or not the three lawyers connived in rigging the case against spouses Valencia.

HELD:
Under Article 1491 of the New Civil Code: The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a
public of judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another: (5) . . . this prohibition
includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and
rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they make take part by virtue of their profession.
Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved. It is intended to curtail
any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client. Greed may get the better of the sentiments of loyalty
and disinterestedness. Any violation of this prohibition would constitute malpractice and is a ground for
suspension. Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while the litigation is
pending.
In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting purchased the lot after finality of
judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there
is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the
judicial action of the judge. Logic indicates, in certiorari proceedings, that the appellate court may either
grant or dismiss the petition. Hence, it is not safe to conclude, for purposes under Article 1491 that the
litigation has terminated when the judgment of the trial court become final while a certiorari connected
therewith is still in progress. Thus, purchase of the property by Atty. Cabanting in this case constitutes
malpractice in violation of Art. 1491 and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Clearly, this malpractice is a
ground for suspension. The sale in favor of Atty. Jovellanos does not constitute malpractice. There was no
attorney-client relationship between Serapia and Atty. Jovellanos, considering that the latter did not take
part as her counsel. The transaction is not covered by Art. 1491 nor by the Canons adverted to.
II
It is asserted by Paulino that Atty. Antiniw asked for and received the sum of P200.00 in consideration of
his executing the document "Compraventa Definitiva". This charge, Atty. Antiniw simply denied. It is
settled jurisprudence that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative testimony. When an
individual's integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he deny the charges against him; he
must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the
highest degree of morality and integrity which at all time is expected of him. There is a clear preponderant
evidence that Atty. Antiniw committed falsification of a deed of sale, and its subsequent introduction in
court prejudices his prime duty in the administration of justice as an officer of the court.
III
There is no evidence on record that the three lawyers involved in these administrative cases conspired in
executing the falsified "Compraventa Definitiva" and rigged the case against spouses Valencia.
Besides, the camaraderie among lawyers is not proof of conspiracy, but a sign of brotherhood among
them.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring: 1. Dionisio Antiniw DISBARRED from the practice
of law, and his name is ordered stricken off from the roll of attorneys; 2. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting
SUSPENDED; and 3. Admin case against Attorney Eduardo Jovellanos DISMISSED

REGALADO DAROY, complainant, vs. ATTY. ESTEBAN ABECIA, respondent.

[A.C. No. 3046. October 26, 1998]
FACTS: (1971) Atty. Abecia was the counsel of Daroy in an ejectment case in which they won. To satisfy
the judgement of damages, one of the properties of their opposition was sold by the sheriff at an auction
to Daroy as the highest bidder. (1984) Daroy filed a complaint against Atty. Abecia for falsification for
allagedly forging his signature in order to transfer title to said property first to Jose Gangay and
subsequently to Atty. Abcias wife, Nena Abecia.
He contended that he only knew of such transfer on that year. Moreover, he filed a disbarment proceeding
against Atty. Abecia for unethical conduct.
ISSUE: WON the transfer was valid. WON the transfer of the property to Atty. Abecia a violation of the
prohibition set forth in Art. 1491 of the NCC.
HELD: Evidence that Daroy has known of such transfer since 1971: 1. In the report of the sheriff who
placed them in the actual possession of the land he had acquired through action, the sheriff referred to
Nena Abecia as assignee of Daroy.
In a criminal action filed by the oppositors of Daroy in the ejectment case, Nena Abecia was impleaded
as co-defendant on her capacity as assignee of Daroy. All these fact were never rebutted by Daroy. The
parties were mistaken in thinking that respondent could not validly acquire the land. In Guevara v.
Calalang, on facts similar to those in this case, we held that the prohibition in Art. 1491 does not apply
to the sale of a parcel of land, acquired by a client to satisfy a judgment in his favor, to his
attorney as long as the property was not the subject of the litigation. For indeed, while judges,
prosecuting attorneys, and others connected with the administration of justice are prohibited from
acquiring property or rights in litigation or levied upon in execution, the prohibition with respect to
attorneys in the case extends only to property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
The point is, the parties in this case thought the transfer of the land to respondent Abecia was prohibited
and so they contrived a way whereby the land would be sold to Jose Gangay, whose wife Anita is the
sister of Mrs. Nena Abecia, and then Gangay would sell the land to Mrs. Abecia. As Jose Gangay stated
in his affidavit of March 6, 1985. The sale of the land to Gangay may be fictitious and, therefore, void, but
that complainant Regalado Daroy intended to convey the land ultimately to respondent Esteban Abecia
appears to be the case.