Spouses Sicad vs Court of Appeals

294 SCRA 183 Succession Donation Mortis Causa vs Donation Inter Vivos
In 1979, Aurora Montinola executed a deed entitled Deed of Donation Inter Vivos in
favor of her three grandchildren Catalino Valderrama, Judy Valderrama, and Jesus
Valderrama. The deed however provided that that the donation shall be effective only 10
years after Montinolas death. In 1980, the original title of the parcel of land subject of
the donation was cancelled and a new title was given to the Valderramas. Montinola
however retained the original title and she continued to perform acts of ownership over
the parcel of land.
In 1987, Montinola revoked the donation because of acts of ingratitude committed
against her by the Valderramas; that the Valderramas defamed her; that she overheard
the Valderramas plotting against her life. In 1990, she petitioned to have her title be
reinstated and her grandchildrens title be cancelled. She said that the donation is
actually a donation mortis causa and that the same is void because the formalities of a
will were not complied with. In the same year, she sold her property to spouses Ernesto
and Evelyn Sicad.
The Valderramas opposed the petition. In 1993, while the case was still pending,
Montinola died. The petition was continued by the spouses Sicad.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos is actually a donation mortis
causa.
HELD: Yes, the deed is a donation mortis causa. Montinola not only reserved for herself
all the fruits of the property allegedly conveyed, but what is even more important,
specially provided that without the knowledge and consent of the Montinola, the
donated properties could not be disposed of in any way, thereby denying to the
transferees the most essential attribute of ownership, the power to dispose of the
properties. A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds from the done
(in this case the Valderramas) the right to dispose of the donated property during the
donors lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa the right of
disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive. The donation is
therefore void because the formalities of a will, which is essentially a donation mortis
causa, were not complied with.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125888. August 13, 1998]
SPOUSES ERNESTO and EVELYN SICAD, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
CATALINO VALDERRAMA, JUDY CRISTINA M. VALDERRAMA and JESUS
ANTONIO VALDERRAMA, respondents.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
The issue raised in the appeal by certiorari at bar centers on the character of a deed
of donation executed by the late Aurora Virto Vda. De Montinola of the City of Iloilo as
either inter vivos or mortis causa. That deed, entitled DEED OF DONATION INTER
VIVOS,[1] was executed by Montinola on December 11, 1979. It named as donees her
grandchildren, namely: Catalino Valderrama, Judy Cristina M. Valderrama and Jesus
Antonio Valderrama; and treated of a parcel of land, Lot 3231 of the Cadastral Survey of
Panay, Capiz, covered by Transfer Certificate Title No. T-16105 in the name of
Montinola. The deed also contained the signatures of the donees in acknowledgment of
the acceptance of the donation.
Montinolas Secretary, Gloria Salvilla, afterwards presented the deed for recording in
the Property Registry, and the Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No. T-16105 (the
donors title) and, in it place, issued TCT No. T-16622 on February 7, 1980, in the names
of the donees.[2] Montinola however retained the owners duplicate copy of the new title
(No. T-16622), as well as the property itself, until she transferred the same ten (10)
years later, on July 10, 1990, to the spouses, Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad.
On March 12, 1987, Aurora Montinola drew up a deed of revocation of the donation,
and caused it to be annotated as an adverse claim on TCT No. T-16622 (issued, as
aforestated, in her grandchildrens names). Then on August 24, 1990, she filed a petition
with the Regional Trial Court in Roxas City for the cancellation of said TCT No. T-16622
and the reinstatement of TCT No. T-16105 (in her name), the case being docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 3311. Her petition was founded on the theory that the donation
to her three (3) grandchildren was one mortis causa which thus had to comply with the
[3]

formalities of a will; and since it had not, the donation was void and could not effectively
serve as basis for the cancellation of TCT No. T-16105 and the issuance in its place of
TCT No. T-16622.
The donees (Montinolas grandchildren) opposed the petition. In their opposition
dated August 29, 1990, they averred that the donation in their favor was one inter
vivos which, having fully complied with the requirements therefor set out in Article 729 of
the Civil Code, was perfectly valid and efficacious. They also expressed doubt about the
sincerity of their grandmothers intention to recover the donated property, since she had
not pursued the matter of its revocation after having it annotated as an adverse claim.
The case, originally treated as a special proceeding, was subsequently considered
by the lower Court as an ordinary civil action in view of the allegations and issues raised
in the pleadings. Pre-trial was had, followed by trial on the merits which was concluded
with the filing of the parties memoranda. The Trial Court then rendered judgment on
March 27, 1991, holding that the donation was indeed one inter vivos, and dismissing
Aurora Montinolas petition for lack of merit. [4] The matter of its revocation was not
passed upon.
Montinola elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, her appeal being docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 33202. She however died on March 10, 1993,[5] while appeal was
pending.
Shortly after Montinolas demise, a Manifestation and Motion dated March 31, 1993
was filed by Ernesto Sicad and Evelyn Bofill-Sicad, herein petitioners, [6] in which they (a)
alleged that they had become the owners of the property covered by TCT No. T-16622
in virtue of a deed of definite sale dated May 25, 1992 accomplished by Montinola in
their favor, which was confirmed by an affidavit dated November 26, 1997 also executed
by the latter, and (b) prayed that they be substituted as appellants and allowed to
prosecute the case in their own behalf.
Another motion was subsequently presented under date of April 7, 1993, this time
by the legal heirs of Aurora Montinola, namely: Ofelia M. de Leon, Estela M. Jaen and
Teresita M. Valderrma. They declared that they were not interested in pursuing the
case, and asked that the appeal be withdrawn. Montinolas counsel opposed the motion.
On June 21, 1993, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution: (a) ordering the
substitution of the persons above mentioned Ofelia M. de Leon, Estela M. Jaen and
Teresita M. Valderama as plaintiffs-appellant in place of the late Aurora Montinola, as
well as the joinder of the spouses Ernesto and Evelyn Bofill-Sicad as additional
appellants;[7] and (b) denying the motion for the withdrawal of the appeal.
On June 30, 1995, the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated its
Decision on the case affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court; [8] and on July

31, 1996, it denied the separate motions for reconsideration filed by Ofelia M. de Leon,
Estela M. Jaen, and Teresita M. Valderrama, on the one hand, and by the spouses,
Ernest and Evelyn Sicad, on the other.[9]
The Sicad Spouses have appealed to this Court; and here, they contend that the
following errors were committed by the Appellate Tribunal, to wit:
1) ** in ruling that the donation was inter vivos and in not giving due weight to the
revocation of the donation; and
2) ** in not ordering that the case be remanded for further reception of evidence. [10]
The Comment filed for private respondents (the donees) under date of December
19, 1996 deals with what they consider the principal issue in this case ** (i.e.) whether
the donation is mortis causa or inter vivos and set forth the argument that the donor
clearly intended to effect the immediate transfer of ownership to the donees, that the
prohibition in the deed of donation against selling the property within ten (10) years after
the death of the donor does not indicate that the donation is mortis causa, that the
donors alleged act of physically keeping the title does not suggest any intention to defer
the effectivity of the donation, that the payment of real property taxes is consistent with
the donors reservation of the right of usufruct, that the donors intent is not determined
by ** (her) self-serving post execution declarations, the donation was never effectively
revoked, and petitioners have waived their right to question the proceedings in the trial
court.[11]
The Reply of the Sicad Spouses dated March 14, 1997 reiterates their thesis that
the donation was mortis causa, that the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
deed, and the subsequent actions of the donor incontrovertibly signify the donors intent
to transfer the property only after her death, that the donor did not intend to give effect
to the donation, and that the procedure adopted by the Trial Court in the case was
fatally defective.[12] A Rejoinder dated April 3, 1997 was then submitted by the
Valderamas, traversing the assertions of the Reply.[13]
Considering the focus of the opposing parties, and their conflicting theories, on the
intention of Aurora Montinola in executing the document entitled Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos, it is needful to review the circumstances of the signing of that document by
Montinola, as ostensible donor, and her grandchildren, as ostensible donees.
The evidence establishes that on December 11, 1979, when the deed of donation
prepared by Montinols lawyer (Atty. Treas) was read and explained by the latter to the
parties.Montinola expressed her wish that the donation take effect only after ten (10)
years from her death, and that the deed include a prohibition on the sale of the poperty
for such period.Accordingly, a new proviso was inserted in the deed reading: however,
the donees shall not sell or encumber the properties herein donated within 10 years

after the death of the donor.[14]The actuality of the subsequent insertion of this new
proviso is apparent on the face of the instrument; the intercalation is easily perceived
and identified it was clearly typed on a different machine, and is crammed into the
space between the penultimate paragraph of the deed and that immediately preceding
it.[15]
Not only did Aurora Montinola ordered the insertion in the deed of that restrictive
proviso, but also, after recordation of the deed of donation, she never stopped treating
the property as her own. She continued, as explicitly authorized in the deed itself, to
possess he property, enjoy its fruits and otherwise exercise the rights of dominion,
paying the property taxes as they fell due all these she did until she transferred the
property to the Sicad Spouses on July 10, 1990. She did not give the new certificate of
title to the ostensible donees but retained too, until she delivered it to the Sicads on the
occasion of the sale of the property to them. In any event, the delivery of the title to the
donees would have served no useful purpose since, as just stated, they were prohibited
to effect any sale or encumbrance thereof for a period of ten (10) years after the
ostensible donors decease. And consistent with these acts denoting retention of
ownership of the property was Montinolas openly expressed view that the donation was
ineffectual and could not be given affect even after ten (10) years from her death. For
this view she sought to obtain judicial approval. She brought suit on August 24, 1990 to
cancel TCT no. T-16622 (issued to her grandchildren) premised precisely on the
invalidity of the donation for failure to comply with the requisites of testamentary
dispositions. Before that, she attempted to undo the conveyance to her grandchildren by
execution a deed of revocation of the donation on March 12, 1987, and causing
annotation thereof as an adverse claim on said TCT No. T-16622. She also exercised
indisputable acts of ownership over said property by executing, as just stated, deeds
intended to pass title over it to third parties petitioner herein. [16]
As already intimated, the real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its
language and the intention of the parties as demonstrated by the circumstances
attendant upon its execution. In this respect, case law has laid down significant
parameters. Thus, in a decision handed down in 1946, [17] this Court construed a deed
purporting to be a donation inter vivos to be in truth one mortis causa because it
stipulated (like the one now being inquired into) that all rents, proceeds, fruits, of the
donated properties shall remain for the exclusive benefit and disposal of the donor,
Margarita David, during her lifetime; and that, without the knowledge and consent of the
donor, the donated properties could not be disposed of in any way, whether by sale,
mortgage, barter, or in any other way possible. On these essential premises, the Court
said, such a donation must be deemed one mortis causa, because the combined effect
of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed of donation and of the
above-quoted clauses thereof ** (was that) the most essential elements of ownership
the right to dispose of the donated properties and the right to enjoy the products, profits,
possession remained with Margarita David during her lifetime, and would accrue to the
donees only after Margarita Davids death. So, too, in the case at bar, did these rights

remain with Aurora Montinola during her lifetime, and could not pass to the donees until
ten (10) years after her death.
In another case decided in 1954 involving similar issue, Bonsato v. Court of
Appeals,[18] this Court emphasized that the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis
causa, which it had taken into account in David v. Sison, were that the donor not only
reserved for herself all the fruits of the property allegedly conveyed, but what is even
more important, especially provided that without knowledge and consent of the donor,
the donated properties could not be disposed of in any way,; thereby denying to the
transferees the most essential attribute of ownership, the power to dispose of the
properties.
A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds form the donee that
right to dispose of the donated property during the donors lifetime is in truth one mortis
causa. In a donation mortis causa the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee
while the donor is still alive.[19]
In the instant case, nothing of any consequence was transferred by the deed of
donation in question to Montinolas grandchildren, the ostensible donees. They did not
get possession of the property donated. They did not acquire the right to the fruits
thereof, or any other right of dominion over the property. More importantly, they did not
acquire the right to dispose of the property this would accrue to them only after ten (10)
years from Montinolas death. Indeed, they never even laid hands on the certificate of
title to the same. They were therefore simply paper owners of the donated property. All
these circumstances, including, to repeat, the explicit provisions of the deed of donation
reserving the exercise of rights of ownership to the donee and prohibiting the sale or
encumbrance of the property until ten (10) years after her death ineluctably lead to the
conclusion that the donation in question was a donation mortis causa, contemplating a
transfer of ownership to the donees only after the donors demise.
The case of Alejandro v. Geraldez[20] cited by the Court of Appeals in support of its
challenged judgment is not quite relevant. For in the deed of donation there in issue,
there was a partial relinquishment of the right to dispose of the property, in the event
only that this became necessary to defray the expenses and support of the donors. That
limited right to dispose of the donated lots, said this Court, implies that ownership had
passed to ** (the donees) by means of the donation and **, therefore, the donation was
already effective during the donors lifetime. That is the characteristic of a donation inter
vivos. On the other hand, in the case at bar, the donees were expressly prohibited to
make any disposition of any nature or for any purpose whatever during the donors
lifetime, and until ten (10) years after her death a prohibition which, it may be added,
makes inapplicable the ruling in Castro v. Court of Appeals [21]where no such prohibition
was imposed, and the donor retained only the usufruct over the property.

The Valderramas argument that the donation is inter vivos in character and that the
prohibition against their disposition of the donated property is merely a condition which,
if violated, would give cause for its revocation, begs the question. It assumes that they
have the right to make a disposition of the property, which they do not. The argument
also makes no sense, because if they had the right to dispose of the property and did in
fact dispose of it to a third person, the revocation of the donation they speak of would be
of no utility or benefit to the donor, since such a revocation would not necessarily result
in the restoration of the donors ownership and enjoyment of the property.
It is also error to suppose that the donation under review should be deemed
one inter vivos simply because founded on considerations of love and affection. In
Alejandro v. Geraldez,supra,[22] this Court also observed that the fact that the donation is
given in consideration of love and affection ** is not a characteristic of donation inter
vivos (solely) because transfersmortis causa may also be made for the same
reason. Similarly, in Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, supra, this Court opined that the fact
that the conveyance was due to the affection of the donor to the donees and services
rendered by the latter,is of no particular significance in determining whether the deeds,
Exh. 1 and 2, constitute transfers inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have
identical motivation.[23]
Finally, it is germane to advert to the legal principle in Article 1378 of the Civil Code
to the effect that in the case of doubt relative to a gratuitous contract, the construction
must be that entailing the least transmission of rights and interests. [24]
The donation in question, though denominated inter vivos, is in truth one mortis
causa; it is void because the essential requisites for its validity have not been complied
with.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 33202
dated June 30, 1995 as well as the Resolution denying reconsideration thereof and the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Special Case No. 3311 are SET
ASIDE. The Deed of Donation Inter Vivos (Exh. A) executed by Aurora Virto Vda. De
Montinola on December 11, 1979 in favor of Catalino M. Valderrama, Judy Cristina M.
Valderrama and Jesus Antonio M. Valderrama is declared null and void. The Register of
Deed of Roxas City is directed to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16622, revive
and reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16105.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Kapunan, and Purisima, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
DANILO ALUAD, LEONORA ALUAD,
DIVINA ALUAD, PROSPERO ALUAD,
and CONNIE ALUAD,
Petitioners,

- versus -

ZENAIDO ALUAD,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 176943

Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 17, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioners mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by
the childless spouses Matilde Aluad (Matilde) and Crispin Aluad (Crispin).
Crispin was the owner of six lots identified as Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677, 680, and 682
of the Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin died, his wife Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself.[1]
On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a document entitled Deed of Donation of Real
Property Inter Vivos[2] (Deed of Donation) in favor of petitioners mother Maria [3] covering all the
six lots which Matilde inherited from her husband Crispin. The Deed of Donation provided:
That, for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR
[Matilde] for the DONEE [Maria], the latter being adopted and hav[ing] been
brought up by the former the DONOR, by these presents, transfer and convey, BY
WAY OF DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above-described, to
become effective upon the death of the DONOR , but in the
event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation
shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect; Provided,
however, that anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who
should survive, they could use[,] encumber or even dispose of any or even all of
the parcels of land herein donated.[4] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On September 30, 1986, Original Certificates of Title over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 were
issued in Matildes name.
On August 26, 1991, Matilde sold Lot No. 676 to respondent by a Deed of Absolute Sale
of Real Property.[5]
Subsequently or on January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last will and testament,
devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680 to Maria, and her remaining properties including Lot
No. 674 to respondent.
[6]

Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while Maria died on September 24 of the same year.[7]
On August 21, 1995, Marias heirs-herein petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Roxas City a Complaint,[8] for declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of
Lot Nos. 674 and 676, and damages against respondent, alleging:
That in 1978, plaintiff[s] possessed the two (2) parcels of land abovedescribed until January 1991 when defendant entered and possessed the two (2)

parcels of land claiming as the adopted son of Crispin Aluad who refused to give
back possession until Matilde Aluad died in [1994] and then retained the
possession thereof up to and until the present time, thus, depriving the plaintiffs of
the enjoyment of said parcels of land x x x;
That after the death of Matilde R. Aluad, the plaintiffs succeeded by
inheritance by right of representation from their deceased mother, Maria Aluad
who is the sole and only daughter of Matilde Aluad[.][9]

To the complaint respondent alleged in his Answer.[10]

That Lot 674 is owned by the defendant as this lot was adjudicated to him
in the Last Will and Testament of Matilde Aluad x x x while Lot 676 was
purchased by him from Matilde Aluad. These two lots are in his possession as true
owners thereof.[11] (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioners later filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint Already Filed to Conform
to Evidence[12] to which it annexed an Amended Complaint [13] which cited the donation of the six
lots via Deed of Donation in favor of their mother Maria. Branch 15 of the RTC granted the
motion and admitted the Amended Complaint.[14]
Respondent filed an Amended Answer[15] contending, inter alia, that the Deed of Donation
is forged and falsified and petitioners change of theory showed that said document was not
existing at the time they filed their complaint and was concocted by them after realizing that their
false claim that their mother was the only daughter of Matild[e] Aluad cannot in anyway be
established by them;[16] and that if ever said document does exist, the same was already revoked
by Matilde when [she] exercised all acts of dominion over said properties until she sold Lot 676
to defendant and until her death with respect to the other lots without any opposition from Maria
Aluad.[17]
The trial court, by Decision[18] of September 20, 1996, held that Matilde could not have
transmitted any right over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 to respondent, she having previously alienated
them to Maria via the Deed of Donation. Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1.

Declaring the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the subject Lots

Nos. 674 and 676, Pilar Cadastre;

2.

Ordering the defendant to deliver the possession of the subject lots to

the plaintiffs;

3.

Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs:

a.

Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorneys fees;

b.

Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), representing the income

from subject Lot 676, a year from 1991 up to the time said lot is
delivered to the plaintiffs, together with the interest thereof at the
legal rate until fully paid;

c.

Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), representing the income from

the subject Lot No. 674, a year from 1991 up to the time said lot is
delivered to the plaintiffs, plus legal interest thereof at the legal
rate until fully paid; and

d.

The costs of the suit.

Defendants counterclaim is ordered dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[19]

On petitioners motion, the trial court directed the issuance of a writ of execution pending
appeal. Possession of the subject lots appears to have in fact been taken by petitioners.
By Decision[21] of August 10, 2006, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts
decision, it holding that the Deed of Donation was actually a donation mortis causa, notinter
vivos, and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the formalities of a will. Thus, it found that
the Deed of Donation was witnessed by only two witnesses and had no attestation clause which
is not in accordance with Article 805 of the Civil Code, reading:
[20]

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at
the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testators name written by some
other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and
of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will shall, also sign, as aforesaid, each and every

page thereof, except the last on the left margin and all the pages shall be
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written, and the fact that that testator signed the will and every page thereof, or
caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed
the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator, and of one
another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it
shall be interpreted to them.
While the appellate court declared respondent as the rightful owner of Lot No. 676, it did
not so declare with respect to Lot No. 674, as Matildes last will and testament had not yet been
probated. Thus the Court of Appeals disposed:
WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition worthy of merit, the same is
hereby GRANTED and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City,
Branch 15, dated 20 September 1996, in Civil Case No. V-6686 for declaration of
ownership, recovery of ownership and possession, and damages
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
A new one is entered in its stead declaring defendant-appellant as the
lawful owner of Lot [No.] 676 of the Pilar Cadastre. Accordingly, plaintiffsappellees are directed to return the possession of the said lot to the defendantappellant.
Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees are ordered to pay P40,000.00 to defendantappellant as attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
Costs against plaintiffs-appellees.
SO ORDERED.[22] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

Their Motion for Reconsideration[23] having been denied,[24] petitioners filed the present
Petition for Review,[25] contending that the Court of Appeals erred
I
X X X WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE COURT BELOW
(RTC, Branch 15, Roxas City) HOLDING THAT THE DEED OF DONATION

INTER VIVOS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS MOTHER IS IN FACT A

DONATION MORTIS CAUSA.
II
X X X WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT IS THE RIGHTFUL OWNER
OF LOT NO. 676 AS LOT BUYER ON THE BASIS OF A DEED
OF SALE EXECUTED BY THE DONOR WHO HAD NO MORE RIGHT TO
SELL THE SAME.
III
X X X WHEN IT FAILED TO DECLARE PETITIONERS THE RIGHTFUL
OWNER OF LOT NO. 674 AFTER HAVING RULED WHEN IT HELD THAT
RESPONDENT CANNOT BE DECLARED OWNER THEREOF.
IV
X X X WHEN IT HELD THAT THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF EXECUTION
PENDING APPEAL IS IN VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH (a) SECTION 2,
RULE 39, OF THE RULES OF COURT (AND ORDERING PETITIONERS TO
RETURN POSSESSION OF LOT 676 TO RESPONDENT) AND ORDERING
PETITIONERS TO PAY ATTORNEYS FEES AND COST[S] OF SUIT.[26]
As did the appellate court, the Court finds the donation to petitioners mother one of mortis
causa, it having the following characteristics:
(1)

It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the

transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should
retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;

(2)

That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be

revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be
provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose
of the properties conveyed; and

(3)

That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.[27] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation to become effective upon the death of
the DONOR admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer
the ownership of the six lots to petitioners mother during her (Matildes) lifetime.[28]

The statement in the Deed of Donation reading anytime during the lifetime of the
DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of
any or even all the parcels of land herein donated [29] means that Matilde retained ownership of
the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose them. For the right to dispose of a thing without
other limitations than those established by law is an attribute of ownership. [30] The phrase in the
Deed of Donation or anyone of them who should survive is of course out of sync. For the Deed of
Donation clearly stated that it would take effect upon the death of the donor, hence, said phrase
could only have referred to the donor Matilde. Petitioners themselves concede that such phrase
does not refer to the donee, thus:
x x x [I]t is well to point out that the last provision (sentence) in the
disputed paragraph should only refer to Matilde Aluad, the donor, because she
was the only surviving spouse at the time the donation was executed on 14
November 1981, as her husband Crispin Aluad [] had long been dead as early as
1975.[31]
The trial court, in holding that the donation was inter vivos, reasoned:
x x x The donation in question is subject to a resolutory term or period
when the donor provides in the aforequoted provisions, but in the event that the
DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed
rescinded and [of] no further force and effect. When the donor provides that
should the DONEE xxx die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be
deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect the logical construction
thereof is that after the execution of the subject donation, the same became
effective immediately and shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force
and effect upon the arrival of a resolutory term or period, i.e., the death of the
donee which shall occur before that of the donor. Understandably, the arrival
of this resolutory term or period cannot rescind and render of no further force
and effect a donation which has never become effective, because, certainly
what donation is there to be rescinded and rendered of no further force and
effect upon the arrival of said resolutory term or period if there was no
donation which was already effective at the time when the donee died?
[32]
(Underscoring supplied)

A similar ratio in a case had been brushed aside by this Court, however, thus:
x x x [P]etitioners contend that the stipulation on rescission in case
petitioners [donee] die ahead of [donor] Cabatingan is a resolutory condition that
confirms the nature of the donation as inter vivos.

Petitioners arguments are bereft of merit.[33]

xxxx
x x x The herein subject deeds expressly provide that the donation shall be
rescinded in case [donees] the petitioners predecease [the donor] Conchita
Cabatingan. As stated in Reyes v. Mosqueda, one of the decisive characteristics of
a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor
should survive the donee. This is exactly what Cabatingan provided for in her
donations. If she really intended that the donation should take effect during her
lifetime and that the ownership of the properties donated to the donee or
independently of, and not by reason of her death, she would not have expressed
such proviso in the subject deeds.[34] (Underscoring supplied)

As the Court of Appeals observed, x x x [t]hat the donation is mortis causa is fortified by
Matildes acts of possession as she continued to pay the taxes for the said properties which
remained under her name; appropriated the produce; and applied for free patents for which OCTs
were issued under her name.[35]
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been
observed[36] but they were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses
following Article 805 of the Civil Code.[37]
Further, the witnesses did not even sign the attestation clause[38] the execution of which
clause is a requirement separate from the subscription of the will and the affixing of signatures on
the left-hand margins of the pages of the will. So the Court has emphasized:
x x x Article 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the
instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will from the requisite that the will
be attested and subscribed by [the instrumental witnesses]. The respective intents
behind these two classes of signature[s] are distinct from each other. The
signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among others, that
the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On
the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses
are referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed, the
attestation clause is separate and apart from the disposition of the will. An
unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if the
instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the
unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses
undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were
directed towards a wholly different avowal.

x x x It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required under
Article 805 to state the number of pages used upon which the will is written; the
fact that the testator had signed the will and every page thereof; and that they
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses have
stated these elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.
[39]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Furthermore, the witnesses did not acknowledge the will before the notary public,
[40]
which is not in accordance with the requirement of Article 806 of the Civil Code that every
will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.
More. The requirement that all the pages of the will must be numbered correlatively in
letters placed on the upper part of each page was not also followed.[41]
The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa, not having
followed the formalities of a will, it is void and transmitted no right to petitioners mother. But
even assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to
Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria.[42] Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No. 674
to respondent by her last will and testament, subject of course to the qualification that her
(Matildes) will must be probated. With respect to Lot No. 676, the same had, as mentioned
earlier, been sold by Matilde to respondent on August 26, 1991.
Petitioners nevertheless argue that assuming that the donation of Lot No. 674 in favor of
their mother is indeed mortis causa, hence, Matilde could devise it to respondent, the lot should
nevertheless have been awarded to them because they had acquired it by acquisitive prescription,
they having been in continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, open, and public possession of it in good
faith and in the concept of an owner since 1978.[43]
Petitioners failed to raise the issue of acquisitive prescription before the lower courts,
however, they having laid their claim on the basis of inheritance from their mother.As a general
rule, points of law, theories, and issues not brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal.[44] For a contrary rule would be unfair to the adverse party who
would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it could
have done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court.[45]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
MANUEL L. LEE, A.C. No. 5281
Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
February 12, 2008
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RE S O LUTI ON
CORONA, J.:
In a letter-complaint dated April 10, 2000, complainant Manuel L. Lee charged
respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago with violation of the Notarial Law and the ethics of the
legal profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament.
In his complaint, complainant averred that his father, the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr., never
executed the contested will. Furthermore, the spurious will contained the forged signatures of
Cayetano Noynay and Loreto Grajo, the purported witnesses to its execution.

In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim
Hock Lee, save for a parcel of land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, halfsiblings of complainant.
The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30,
1965.[1] Complainant, however, pointed out that the residence certificate[2] of the testator noted in
the acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5, 1962.[3] Furthermore, the signature of the
testator was not the same as his signature as donor in a deed of donation [4] (containing his
purported genuine signature). Complainant averred that the signatures of his deceased father in
the will and in the deed of donation were in any way (sic) entirely and diametrically opposed
from (sic) one another in all angle[s].[5]
Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates of the
purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had likewise been forged
and merely copied from their respective voters affidavits.
Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in the
archives division of the Records Management and Archives Office of the National Commission
for Culture and the Arts (NCCA). In this connection, the certification of the chief of the archives
division dated September 19, 1999 stated:
Doc. 14, Page No. 4, Book No. 1, Series of 1965 refers to an AFFIDAVIT
executed by BARTOLOME RAMIREZ on June 30, 1965 and is available in
this Office[s] files.[6]

Respondent in his comment dated July 6, 2001 claimed that the complaint against him
contained false allegations: (1) that complainant was a son of the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr. and
(2) that the will in question was fake and spurious. He alleged that complainant was not a
legitimate son of Vicente Lee, Sr. and the last will and testament was validly executed and

actually notarized by respondent per affidavit[7] of Gloria Nebato, common-law wife of Vicente
Lee, Sr. and corroborated by the joint affidavit[8] of the children of Vicente Lee, Sr., namely Elena
N. Lee and Vicente N. Lee, Jr. xxx.[9]
Respondent further stated that the complaint was filed simply to harass him because the
criminal case filed by complainant against him in the Office of the Ombudsman did not prosper.
Respondent did not dispute complainants contention that no copy of the will was on file
in the archives division of the NCCA. He claimed that no copy of the contested will could be
found there because none was filed.
Lastly, respondent pointed out that complainant had no valid cause of action against him
as he (complainant) did not first file an action for the declaration of nullity of the will and
demand his share in the inheritance.
In a resolution dated October 17, 2001, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[10]
In his report, the investigating commissioner found respondent guilty of violation of pertinent
provisions of the old Notarial Law as found in the Revised Administrative Code. The violation
constituted an infringement of legal ethics, particularly Canon 1 [11] and Rule 1.01[12] of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR).[13] Thus, the investigating commissioner of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the suspension of respondent for a period of three
months.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-285 dated May 26, 2006,
resolved:
[T]o ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as

Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on

record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents failure to
comply with the laws in the discharge of his function as a notary public, Atty.
Regino B. Tambago is hereby suspended from the practice of law for one year and
Respondents
notarial
commission
is Revoked
and
[14]
Disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years.

We affirm with modification.

A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to
control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death. [15] A will
may either be notarial or holographic.
The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution of wills.
The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.
[16]

A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed at the
end thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it should be attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.[17]
The will in question was attested by only two witnesses, Noynay and Grajo. On this
circumstance alone, the will must be considered void. [18] This is in consonance with the rule that
acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when
the law itself authorizes their validity.
The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public
by the testator and the witnesses.[19] The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact
that it was segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and embodied in a distinct
and separate provision.[20]

An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some
competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step
undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same is his or
her own free act and deed.[21] The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1)
to safeguard the testators wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is
administered in the manner that he intends it to be done.
A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this
particular requirement was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For one, there was
the conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses
Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the testators old residence
certificate in the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by
respondent invalidated the will.
As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to faithfully
observe the formalities of a will and those of notarization. As we held in Santiago v. Rafanan:[22]
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries
public. They are required to certify that the party to every document
acknowledged before him had presented the proper residence certificate (or
exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date
as part of such certification.

These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded, considering the degree of
importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents.[23] A notary public,
especially a lawyer,[24] is bound to strictly observe these elementary requirements.
The Notarial Law then in force required the exhibition of the residence certificate upon
notarization of a document or instrument:

Section 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of [cedula] residence tax.

Every contract, deed, or other document acknowledged before a notary public
shall have certified thereon that the parties thereto have presented their proper
[cedula] residence certificate or are exempt from the [cedula] residence tax, and
there shall be entered by the notary public as a part of such certificate the number,
place of issue, and date of each [cedula] residence certificate as aforesaid.[25]

The importance of such act was further reiterated by Section 6 of the Residence Tax
Act[26] which stated:
When a person liable to the taxes prescribed in this Act acknowledges any
document before a notary public xxx it shall be the duty of such person xxx with
whom such transaction is had or business done, to require the exhibition of the
residence certificate showing payment of the residence taxes by such person xxx.

In the issuance of a residence certificate, the law seeks to establish the true and correct
identity of the person to whom it is issued, as well as the payment of residence taxes for the
current year. By having allowed decedent to exhibit an expired residence certificate, respondent
failed to comply with the requirements of both the old Notarial Law and the Residence Tax Act.
As much could be said of his failure to demand the exhibition of the residence certificates of
Noynay and Grajo.

On the issue of whether respondent was under the legal obligation to furnish a copy of the
notarized will to the archives division, Article 806 provides:
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witness. The notary public shall not be required to retain a
copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of
Court. (emphasis supplied)

Respondents failure, inadvertent or not, to file in the archives division a copy of the notarized
will was therefore not a cause for disciplinary action.

Nevertheless, respondent should be faulted for having failed to make the necessary
entries pertaining to the will in his notarial register. The old Notarial Law required the entry of
the following matters in the notarial register, in chronological order:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him;

person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument;
witnesses, if any, to the signature;
date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument;
fees collected by him for his services as notary;
give each entry a consecutive number; and
if the instrument is a contract, a brief description of the substance of the
instrument.[27]

In an effort to prove that he had complied with the abovementioned rule, respondent
contended that he had crossed out a prior entry and entered instead the will of the decedent. As
proof, he presented a photocopy of his notarial register. To reinforce his claim, he presented a
photocopy of a certification[28] stating that the archives division had no copy of the affidavit of
Bartolome Ramirez.
A photocopy is a mere secondary evidence. It is not admissible unless it is shown that the
original is unavailable. The proponent must first prove the existence and cause of the
unavailability of the original,[29] otherwise, the evidence presented will not be admitted. Thus, the
photocopy of respondents notarial register was not admissible as evidence of the entry of the
execution of the will because it failed to comply with the requirements for the admissibility of
secondary evidence.
In the same vein, respondents attempt to controvert the certification dated September 21,
1999[30] must fail. Not only did he present a mere photocopy of the certification dated March 15,
2000;[31] its contents did not squarely prove the fact of entry of the contested will in his notarial
register.

Notaries public must observe with utmost care[32] and utmost fidelity the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties, otherwise, the confidence of the public in the
integrity of notarized deeds will be undermined.[33]
Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire will
invalid. This carelessness cannot be taken lightly in view of the importance and delicate nature of
a will, considering that the testator and the witnesses, as in this case, are no longer alive to
identify the instrument and to confirm its contents. [34] Accordingly, respondent must be held
accountable for his acts. The validity of the will was seriously compromised as a consequence of
his breach of duty.[35]
In this connection, Section 249 of the old Notarial Law provided:
Grounds for revocation of commission. The following derelictions of duty on the
part of a notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first instance,
be sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial
register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding cedula
certificates.[36]
These gross violations of the law also made respondent liable for violation of his oath as
a lawyer and constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court [37] and
Canon 1[38] and Rule 1.01[39] of the CPR.

The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.[40] For a lawyer is the servant

of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law
and the dispensation of justice.[41]
While the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the law is an obligation imposed on
every citizen, a lawyer assumes responsibilities well beyond the basic requirements of good
citizenship. As a servant of the law, a lawyer should moreover make himself an example for
others to emulate.[42] Being a lawyer, he is supposed to be a model in the community in so far as
respect for the law is concerned.[43]
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. [44] A breach of these
conditions justifies disciplinary action against the erring lawyer. A disciplinary sanction is
imposed on a lawyer upon a finding or acknowledgment that he has engaged in professional
misconduct.[45] These sanctions meted out to errant lawyers include disbarment, suspension and
reprimand.
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction. [46] We have held in a number
of cases that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution[47] and should not be
decreed if any punishment less severe such as reprimand, suspension, or fine will accomplish the
end desired.[48] The rule then is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct
that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.[49]
Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the performance of the elementary
duties of his office. Contrary to his claims that he exercised his duties as Notary Public with due
care and with due regard to the provision of existing law and had complied with the elementary
formalities in the performance of his duties xxx, we find that he acted very irresponsibly in
notarizing the will in question. Such recklessness warrants the less severe punishment of
suspension from the practice of law. It is, as well, a sufficient basis for the revocation of his
commission[50] and his perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public.[51]

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby found guilty of

professional misconduct. He violated (1) the Lawyers Oath; (2) Rule 138 of the Rules of Court;
(3) Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; (4) Art. 806 of the Civil
Code and (5) the provisions of the old Notarial Law.
Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year
and his notarial commission REVOKED. Because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness
expected

of

him

as

notary

public

and

as

an

officer

of

the

court,

he

is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the courts of the land, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, as well as made part of the personal
records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
PAZ SAMANIEGO-CELADA,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 145545

Present:

- versus -

LUCIA D. ABENA,
Respondent.

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:

June 30, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking
to reverse the Decision[1] dated October 13, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
41756, which affirmed the Decision[2] dated March 2, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 66, Makati City. The RTC had declared the last will and testament of Margarita S.
Mayores probated and designated respondent Lucia D. Abena as the executor of her will. It also
ordered the issuance of letters testamentary in favor of respondent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of decedent Margarita
S. Mayores (Margarita) while respondent was the decedents lifelong companion since 1929.
On April 27, 1987, Margarita died single and without any ascending nor descending heirs
as her parents, grandparents and siblings predeceased her. She was survived by her first cousins
Catalina Samaniego-Bombay, Manuelita Samaniego Sajonia, Feliza Samaniego, and petitioner.
Before her death, Margarita executed a Last Will and Testament [3] on February 2, 1987
where she bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of a real property located at Singalong
Manila, consisting of 209.8 square meters, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 1343 to respondent, Norma A. Pahingalo, and Florentino M. Abena in equal shares or one-

third portion each. She likewise bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of a real property
located at San Antonio Village, Makati, consisting of 225 square meters, and covered by TCT
No. 68920 to respondent, Isabelo M. Abena, and Amanda M. Abena in equal shares or one-third
portion each. Margarita also left all her personal properties to respondent whom she likewise
designated as sole executor of her will.
On August 11, 1987, petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration of the estate of
Margarita before the RTC of Makati. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. M-1531.
On October 27, 1987, respondent filed a petition for probate of the will of Margarita
before the RTC of Makati. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. M-1607 and consolidated with
SP Proc. No. M-1531.
On March 2, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the last will and testament of
Margarita probated and respondent as the executor of the will. The dispositive portion of the
decision states:
In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1)

declaring the will as probated;

2)

declaring Lucia Abena as the executor of the will who will serve as
such without a bond as stated in paragraph VI of the probated will;

3)

ordering the
Lucia Abena.

issuance

of

letters

testamentary

in

favor

of

So ordered.[4]
Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. But the Court of Appeals,
in a decision dated October 13, 2000, affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The dispositive portion of
the Court of Appeals decision states:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the appeal having no
merit in fact and in law, is hereby ORDERED DISMISSED and the appealed
Decision of the trial courtAFFIRMED IN TOTO, with cost to oppositorsappellants.
SO ORDERED.[5]

Hence, the instant petition citing the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A

REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT INVALIDATING THE WILL SINCE IT DID
NOT CONFORM TO THE FORMALITIES REQUIRED BY LAW;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ERROR IN
NOT INVALIDATING THE WILL BECAUSE IT WAS PROCURED
THROUGH UNDUE INFLUENCE AND PRESSURE[;] AND
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING PETITIONER, HER SIBLINGS AND COUSIN AS THE LEGAL
HEIRS OF MARGARITAS. MAYORES AND IN NOT ISSUING LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION TO HER.[6]
Briefly stated, the issues are (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring the
will invalid for failure to comply with the formalities required by law, (2) whether said court
erred in not declaring the will invalid because it was procured through undue influence and
pressure, and (3) whether it erred in not declaring petitioner and her siblings as the legal heirs of
Margarita, and in not issuing letters of administration to petitioner.
Petitioner, in her Memorandum,[7] argues that Margaritas will failed to comply with the
formalities required under Article 805[8] of the Civil Code because the will was not signed by the
testator in the presence of the instrumental witnesses and in the presence of one another. She also
argues that the signatures of the testator on pages A, B, and C of the will are not the same or
similar, indicating that they were not signed on the same day. She further argues that the will was
procured through undue influence and pressure because at the time of execution of the will,
Margarita was weak, sickly, jobless and entirely dependent upon respondent and her nephews for
support, and these alleged handicaps allegedly affected her freedom and willpower to decide on
her own. Petitioner thus concludes that Margaritas total dependence on respondent and her
nephews compelled her to sign the will. Petitioner likewise argues that the Court of Appeals
should have declared her and her siblings as the legal heirs of Margarita since they are her only
living collateral relatives in accordance with Articles 1009[9] and 1010[10] of the Civil Code.
Respondent, for her part, argues in her Memorandum [11] that the petition for review raises
questions of fact, not of law and as a rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and
conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court. She also points out that
although the Court of Appeals at the outset opined there was no compelling reason to review the
petition, the Court of Appeals proceeded to tackle the assigned errors and rule that the will was
validly executed, sustaining the findings of the trial court that the formalities required by law

were duly complied with. The Court of Appeals also concurred with the findings of the trial court
that the testator, Margarita, was of sound mind when she executed the will.
After careful consideration of the parties contentions, we rule in favor of respondent.
We find that the issues raised by petitioner concern pure questions of fact, which may not
be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The issues that petitioner is raising now i.e., whether or not the will was signed by the
testator in the presence of the witnesses and of one another, whether or not the signatures of the
witnesses on the pages of the will were signed on the same day, and whether or not undue
influence was exerted upon the testator which compelled her to sign the will, are all questions of
fact.
This Court does not resolve questions of fact in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1[12] of Rule 45 limits this Courts review to questions of
law only.
Well-settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. When supported by
substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on
the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the following
recognized exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[13]
We find that this case does not involve any of the abovementioned exceptions.
Nonetheless, a review of the findings of the RTC as upheld by the Court of Appeals,
reveal that petitioners arguments lack basis. The RTC correctly held:
With [regard] to the contention of the oppositors [Paz Samaniego-Celada,
et al.] that the testator [Margarita Mayores] was not mentally capable of making a
will at the time of the execution thereof, the same is without merit. The oppositors
failed to establish, by preponderance of evidence, said allegation and contradict
the presumption that the testator was of sound mind (See Article 800 of the Civil
Code). In fact, witness for the oppositors, Dr. Ramon Lamberte, who, in some
occasions, attended to the testator months before her death, testified that
Margarita Mayores could engage in a normal conversation and he even stated that
the illness of the testator does not warrant hospitalization. Not one of the
oppositors witnesses has mentioned any instance that they observed act/s of the
testator during her lifetime that could be construed as a manifestation of mental
incapacity. The testator may be admitted to be physically weak but it does not
necessarily follow that she was not of sound mind. [The] testimonies of contestant
witnesses are pure aforethought.
Anent the contestants submission that the will is fatally defective for the
reason that its attestation clause states that the will is composed of three (3) pages
while in truth and in fact, the will consists of two (2) pages only because the
attestation is not a part of the notarial will, the same is not accurate. While it is
true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court, after examining
the totality of the will, is of the considered opinion that error in the number of
pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate the
subject will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is consecutively lettered
with pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an
omission of some of the pages. The error must have been brought about by the
honest belief that the will is the whole instrument consisting of three (3) pages
inclusive of the attestation clause and the acknowledgement. The position of the
court is in consonance with the doctrine of liberal interpretation enunciated
in Article 809 of the Civil Code which reads:
In the absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue [and]
improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in
the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not
render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact

executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the

requirements of Article 805.
The court also rejects the contention of the oppositors that the signatures
of the testator were affixed on different occasions based on their observation that
the signature on the first page is allegedly different in size, texture and appearance
as compared with the signatures in the succeeding pages. After examination of the
signatures, the court does not share the same observation as the oppositors. The
picture (Exhibit H-3) shows that the testator was affixing her signature in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses and the notary. There is no evidence to
show that the first signature was procured earlier than February 2, 1987.
Finally, the court finds that no pressure nor undue influence was exerted
on the testator to execute the subject will. In fact, the picture reveals that the
testator was in a good mood and smiling with the other witnesses while executing
the subject will (See Exhibit H).
In fine, the court finds that the testator was mentally capable of making the
will at the time of its execution, that the notarial will presented to the court is the
same notarial will that was executed and that all the formal requirements (See
Article 805 of the Civil Code) in the execution of a will have been substantially
complied with in the subject notarial will.[14] (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, we find no reason to disturb the abovementioned findings of the RTC. Since,
petitioner and her siblings are not compulsory heirs of the decedent under Article 887 [15] of the
Civil Code and as the decedent validly disposed of her properties in a will duly executed and
probated, petitioner has no legal right to claim any part of the decedents estate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated October 13,
2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41756 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23678

June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court
of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by
the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1wph1.t
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate
children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A.
Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy,
who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and
Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he
directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his
distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a)
$240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate
children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each
and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his
seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry

A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis,
and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1wph1.t
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas,
U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on
September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests
therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E.
Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis
and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of
their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time
according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed
by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted
and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition"
wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the
delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00
each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor pursuant to the
"Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament divided the residuary estate
into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his
first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which
is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the
lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving
the executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying
upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this
case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on
June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which
law must apply Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of
renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963.

Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a
domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a
national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. 2 So that even
assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of
the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to
Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts
rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the
place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict
of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. 3 Appellants' position
is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even
mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of
the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of
the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the
order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity
of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code,
stating that
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not
correct. Precisely, Congressdeleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this
and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as
Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second

paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their
purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which
must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this
legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that
capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in
our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia,
the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to govern
his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended
Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's
intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this
Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the
effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not
with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard
to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said
national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas,
U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against
appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and
Castro, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Eighth Congress

Republic Act No. 7170

January 7, 1992

AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE LEGACY OR DONATION OF ALL OR PART OF A

HUMAN BODY AFTER DEATH FOR SPECIFIED PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled::
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Organ Donation Act of 1991".
Section 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act the following terms shall mean:
(a) "Organ Bank Storage Facility" - a facility licensed, accredited or approved
under the law for storage of human bodies or parts thereof.
(b) "Decedent" - a deceased individual, and includes a still-born infant or fetus.
(c) "Testator" - an individual who makes a legacy of all or part of his body.
(d) "Donor" - an individual authorized under this Act to donate all or part of the
body of a decedent.1awphilalf
(e) "Hospital" - a hospital licensed, accredited or approval under the law, and
includes, a hospital operated by the Government.
(f) "Part" - includes transplantable organs, tissues, eyes, bones, arteries, blood,
other fluids and other portions of the human body.
(g) "Person" - an individual, corporation, estate, trust, partnership, association,
the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or -controlled corporations; or any other legal entity.
(h) "Physician" or "Surgeon" - a physician or surgeon licensed or authorized to
practice medicine under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
(i) "Immediate Family" of the decedent - the persons enumerated in Section 4(a)
of this Act.
(j) "Death" - the irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions or
the irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain
stem. A person shall be medically and legally dead if either:1awphilalf

(1) In the opinion of the attending physician, based on the acceptable

standards of medical practice, there is an absence of natural respiratory
and cardiac functions and, attempts at resuscitation would not be
successful in restoring those functions. In this case, death shall be
deemed to have occurred at the time these functions ceased; or
(2) In the opinion of the consulting physician, concurred in by the attending
physician, that on the basis of acceptable standards of medical practice,
there is an irreversible cessation of all brain functions; and considering the
absence of such functions, further attempts at resuscitation or continued
supportive maintenance would not be successful in resorting such natural
functions. In this case, death shall be deemed to have occurred at the time
when these conditions first appeared.
The death of the person shall be determined in accordance with the acceptable
standards of medical practice and shall be diagnosed separately by the attending
physician and another consulting physician, both of whom must be appropriately
qualified and suitably experienced in the care of such parties. The death shall be
recorded in the patient's medical record.
Section 3. Person Who May Execute A Legacy. Any individual, at least eighteen
(18) years of age and of sound mind, may give by way of legacy, to take effect after his
death, all or part of his body for any purpose specified in Section 6 hereof.
Section 4. Person Who May Execute a Donation.
(a) Any of the following, person, in the order of property stated hereunder, in the
absence of actual notice of contrary intentions by the decedent or actual notice of
opposition by a member of the immediate family of the decedent, may donate all
or any part of the decedent's body for any purpose specified in Section 6 hereof:
(1) Spouse;
(2) Son or daughter of legal age;
(3) Either parent;
(4) Brother or sister of legal age; or
(5) Guardian over the person of the decedent at the time of his death.
(b) The persons authorized by sub-section (a) of this Section may make the
donation after or immediately before death.

Section 5. Examination of Human Body or Part Thereof . A legacy of donation of

all or part of a human body authorizes any examination necessary to assure medical
acceptability of the legacy or donation for the purpose(s) intended.
For purposes of this Act, an autopsy shall be conducted on the cadaver of accident,
trauma, or other medico-legal cases immediately after the pronouncement of death, to
determine qualified and healthy human organs for transplantation and/or in furtherance
of medical science.
Section 6. Persons Who May Become Legatees or Donees. The following persons
may become legatees or donees of human bodies or parts thereof for any of the
purposes stated hereunder:
(a) Any hospital, physician or surgeon - For medical or dental education,
research, advancement of medical or dental science, therapy or transplantation;
(b) Any accredited medical or dental school, college or university - For education,
research, advancement of medical or dental science, or therapy;
(c) Any organ bank storage facility - For medical or dental education, research,
therapy, or transplantation; and
(d) Any specified individual - For therapy or transplantation needed by him.
Section 7. Duty of Hospitals. A hospital authorized to receive organ donations or to
conduct transplantation shall train qualified personnel and their staff to handle the task
of introducing the organ donation program in a humane and delicate manner to the
relatives of the donor-decedent enumerated in Section 4 hereof. The hospital shall
accomplish the necessary form or document as proof of compliance with the above
requirement.
Section 8. Manner of Executing a Legacy.
(a) Legacy of all or part of the human body under Section 3 hereof may be made
by will. The legacy becomes effective upon the death of the testator without
waiting for probate of the will. If the will is not probated, or if it is declared invalid
for testamentary purposes, the legacy, to the extent that it was executed in good
faith, is nevertheless valid and effective.
(b) A legacy of all or part of the human body under Section 3 hereof may also be
made in any document other than a will. The legacy becomes effective upon
death of the testator and shall be respected by and binding upon his executor or
administrator, heirs, assigns, successors-in-interest and all members of the
family. The document, which may be a card or any paper designed to be carried
on a person, must be signed by the testator in the presence of two witnesses
who must sign the document in his presence. If the testator cannot sign, the

document may be signed for him at his discretion and in his presence, in the
presence of two witnesses who must, likewise, sign the document in the
presence of the testator. Delivery of the document of legacy during the testator's
lifetime is not necessary to make the legacy valid.
(c) The legacy may be made to a specified legatee or without specifying a
legatee. If the legacy is made to a specified legatee who is not available at the
time and place of the testator's death, the attending physician or surgeon, in the
absence of any expressed indication that the testator desired otherwise, may
accept the legacy as legatee. If the legacy does not specify a legatee, the legacy
may be accepted by the attending physician or surgeon as legatee upon or
following the testator's death. The physician who becomes a legatee under this
subsection shall not participate in the procedures for removing or transplanting a
part or parts of the body of the decedent.
(d) The testator may designate in his will, card or other document, the surgeon or
physician who will carry out the appropriate procedures. In the absence of a
designation, or if the designee is not available, the legatee or other persons
authorized to accept the legacy may authorize any surgeon or physician for the
purpose.
Section 9. Manner of Executing a Donation. Any donation by a person authorized
under subsection (a) of Section 4 hereof shall be sufficient if it complies with the
formalities of a donation of a movable property.
In the absence of any of the persons specified under Section 4 hereof and in the
absence of any document of organ donation, the physician in charge of the patient, the
head of the hospital or a designated officer of the hospital who has custody of the body
of the deceased classified as accident, trauma, or other medico-legal cases, may
authorize in a public document the removal from such body for the purpose of
transplantation of the organ to the body of a living person: Provided, That the physician,
head of hospital or officer designated by the hospital for this purpose has exerted
reasonable efforts, within forty-eight (48) hours, to locate the nearest relative listed in
Section 4 hereof or guardian of the decedent at the time of death.
In all donations, the death of a person from whose body an organ will be removed after
his death for the purpose of transplantation to a living person, shall be diagnosed
separately and certified by two (2) qualified physicians neither of whom should be:
(a) A member of the team of medical practitioners who will effect the removal of
the organ from the body; nor
(b) The physician attending to the receipt of the organ to be removed; nor
(c) The head of hospital or the designated officer authorizing the removal of the
organ.

Section 10. Person(s) Authorized to Remove Transplantable Organs. Only

authorized medical practitioners in a hospital shall remove and/or transplant any organ
which is authorized to be removed and/or transplanted pursuant to Section 5 hereof.
Section 11. Delivery of Document of Legacy or Donation. If the legacy or donation
is made to a specified legatee or donee, the will, card or other document, or an
executed copy thereof, may be delivered by the testator or donor, or is authorized
representative, to the legatee or donee to expedite the appropriate procedures
immediately after death. The will, card or other document, or an executed copy thereof,
may be deposited in any hospital or organ bank storage facility that accepts it for
safekeeping or for facilitation or procedures after death. On the request of any
interested party upon or after the testator's death, the person in possession shall
produce the document of legacy or donation for verification.
Section 12. Amendment or Revocation of Legacy or Donation.
a) If he will, card or other document, or an executed copy thereof, has been
delivered to a specific legatee or donee, the testator or donor may amend or
revoke the legacy or donation either by:
(1) The execution and delivery to the legatee or donee of a signed
statement to that effect; or
(2) An oral statement to that effect made in the presence of two other
persons and communicated to the legatee or donee; or
(3) A statement to that effect during a terminal illness or injury addressed
to an attending physician and communicated to the legatee or donee; or
(4) A signed card or document to that effect found on the person or effects
of the testator or donor.
(b) Any will, card or other document, or an executed copy thereof, which has not
been delivered to the legatee or donee may be revoked by the testator or donor
in the manner provided in subsection (a) of this Section or by destruction,
cancellation or mutilation of the document and all executed copies thereof.
Any legacy made by a will may also be amended or revoked in the manner
provided for amendment or revocation of wills, or as provided in subsection (a) of
this Section.
Section 13. Rights and Duties After Death.
(a) The legatee or donee may accept or reject the legacy or donation as the case
may be. If the legacy of donation is of a part of the body, the legatee or donee,
upon the death of the testator and prior to embalming, shall effect the removal of

the part, avoiding unnecessary mutilation. After removal of the part, custody of
the remainder of the body vests in the surviving spouse, next of kin or other
persons under obligation to dispose of the body of the decedent.
(b) Any person who acts in good faith in accordance with the terms of this Act
shall not be liable for damages in any civil action or subject to prosecution in any
criminal proceeding of this Act.
Section 14. International Sharing of Human Organs or Tissues. Sharing of human
organs or tissues shall be made only through exchange programs duly approved by the
Department of Health: Provided, That foreign organ or tissue bank storage facilities and
similar establishments grant reciprocal rights to their Philippine counterparts to draw
organs or tissues at any time.
Section 15. Information Drive. In order that the public will obtain the maximum
benefits from this Act, the Department of Health, in cooperation with institutions, such as
the National Kidney Institute, civic and non-government health organizations and other
health related agencies, involved in the donation and transplantation of human organs,
shall undertake a public information program.
The Secretary of Health shall endeavor to persuade all health professionals, both
government and private, to make an appeal for human organ donation.
Section 16. Rules and Regulations. The Secretary of Health, after consultation with
all health professionals, both government and private, and non-government health
organizations shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary or
proper to implement this Act.
Section 17. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, ordinances, rules and regulations,
executive or administrative orders, and other presidential issuance inconsistent with this
Act, are hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly.
Section 18. Separability Clause. The provisions of this Act are hereby deemed
separable. If any provision hereof should be declared invalid or unconstitutional, the
remaining provisions shall remain in full force and effect.
Section 19. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its
publication in the Official Gazette or at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: January 7, 1992