PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

Rule 57-61

A.

Preliminary Attachment (Rule 57)

ALEJANDRO NG WEE vs TIANKANSEE

545 SCRA GR Nos. 171124
February 18, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner made several placements P210 Million with Wetsmont Invetsment Corporation
a domestic entity engaged in the business of an investment house. Petitioner receieved disturbing
news about WINCORP's financial condition prompting him to inquire about and investigate the
company's transaction with its borrowers. He discovered that WINCORP extended a loan to
POWER MERGE. This credit facility originated from another loan extended by WINCORP to
HOTTICK HOLDINGS. Hottick Virata (HOTTICK's President) assumed the obligation of
surety.Under the scheme of WINCORP & Virata, petitioner's money placements were transferred
without his knowledge and consent to the loan account of POWER MERGE thus agreement that
freed the latter from any liability. Through false representations to WINCORP and its officers ,
petitioner was enticed to roll over the same to Virata / POWER MERGE.
Petitioner files for damges with RTC. RTC ordered issuace of a writ of attachment
against the properties of the defendants. The writ was consequently issued on Nov. 6, 2000.
Respondent moved for the discharge of the writ of attachment arguing that attachment was
improperly issued and the bond furnished was inssuficient . RTC denied all the motions. On
September 14, 2005 , the appellate court rendered the assailed decision reversing and setting
aside the aforementioned orders of RTC and lifting the November 6, 2000 Writ of preliminary
Attachment to the extent that it concerned the respondent's properties. Petitoner moved for
reconsideration of the said ruling , but CA denied the same on its January 6, 2006.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appelas committed serious legal error in resolving favorably
the grounds alleged by the respondent in his petition and lifting the writ of preliminary
attachment ?

HELD:
No.A writ of attachment can only be granted on concrete and specific grounds and not on
general averment quoting prefunctorily the words of the rules. Connivance cannot also be based
on mere association but must be particularly alleged and established as a fact. Respondent further
contends that the trial court in resolving the Motion to dsicharge Attachment , need not actually
delve into thye merits of the case.The applicant must be able to demonstrate that the debtor has
intended to defraud the creditors.
Petitioner's affidavit is bereft of any factual statement that the respondent committed
fraud or how he connived with the otehr defendant to commit fraud in the transaction sued upon.
In application of writ under the same ground, compelling is the need to give a hint about what
constituted the fraud and how it was prepetrated becuase established rule that fruad can never be
presumed. Let it be stressd that the provisional remedy of wit of preliminary attachment is harsh
and rigoruous for it exposed the debtor to humiliation and annoyance.
The rule overning its issuance are, therefore strictly construed against the applicant, such
that if the requisited for its grant are not shown to be all present , the court shall refrain from
issuing it, for otherwise the court which issues its acs in excess of jurisdiction. Likwise should
not be abuse to cause unncessary prejudice. If is wrongfully issued on the basis of false or
inufficient allegations , it should at once be corrected.
Wherefore, premises considered the petition is denied . The September 14, 2005 decision and
January 6, 2006 Resolution of the CA are affirmed.

TORESS vs. SATSATIN

605 SCRA GR Nos. 166759
November 25, 2009
FACTS:
Respondent was authorized by petitioners, through an SPA, to negotiate the sale of the
latters property. The property was sold to Solar Resources. Respondent was suppose to remit
28M to petitioners but was only able to give 9M. A complaint for sum of money and damages
against respondent. On October 30, 2002, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance
of a Writ of Attachment. The RTC issued a Writ of Attachment dated November 15, 2002,
directing the sheriff to attach the estate, real or personal, of the respondents. On November 19,
2002, a copy of the writ of attachment was served upon the respondents. On the same date, the
sheriff levied the real and personal properties of the respondent, including household appliances,
cars, and a parcel of land located at Las Pias, Manila.On November 21, 2002, summons,

together with a copy of the complaint, was served upon the respondents.
Respondents filed their answer, they also filed a Motion to Discharge Writ of Attachment
on the ground that the writ of attachment was issued before the summons was received by the
respondents. The motion was denied. Aggrieved, respondents filed before the CA a Petition for
Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the writ of attachment should be discharged?
HELD:
Yes. This Court has long put to rest the issue of when jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant should be acquired in cases where a party resorts to provisional remedies. A party to a
suit may, at any time after filing the complaint, avail of the provisional remedies under the Rules
of Court. Specifically, Rule 57 on preliminary attachment speaks of the grant of the remedy "at
the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment." This phrase refers to
the date of the filing of the complaint, which is the moment that marks "the commencement of
the action." The reference plainly is to a time before summons is served on the defendant, or
even before summons issues.
In Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court clarified the actual time
when jurisdiction should be had.It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the
Court prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of defendant x x x issuance of
summons, order of attachment and writ of attachment x x x these do not and cannot bind and
affect the defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained by the
court, either by service
on him of summons or other coercive process or his voluntary submission to the courts
authority.
Hence, when the sheriff or other proper officer commences implementation of the writ of
attachment, it is essential that he serve on the defendant not only a copy of the applicants
affidavit and attachment bond, and of the order of attachment, as explicitly required by Section 5
of Rule 57, but
also the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy of the complaint x x x.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the grant of the provisional remedy
of attachment involves three stages: first, the court issues the order granting the application;
second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is

implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant
be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must have
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power
and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will
not bind the defendant.
Thus, it is indispensable not only for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, but also upon consideration of
fairness, to apprise the defendant of the complaint against him and the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment and the grounds therefor that prior or contemporaneously to the serving
of the writ of attachment, service of summons, together with a copy of the complaint, the
application for attachment, the applicants affidavit and bond, and the order must be served upon
him.
B.

Preliminary Injunction (Rule 58)

MICHAEL J. LAGROSAS vs.BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB (PHIL.)
565 SCRA G.R. No. 168637
September 12, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioner is an employee of respondent. He was terminated after accidentally hitting his
former girlfriend, who was his co-employee, when he saw her with Menguito following a district
meeting in Alabang Town Center.Petitioner filed a case for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter
declared that the dismissal was illegal. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision but it later
reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter after a motion for reconsideration. The arbiter issued
a writ of execution. Bristol-Myers moved to quash the writ of execution contending that it timely
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
The court gave due course to the petition of Bristol-Myers and issued a TRO enjoining
the enforcement of the writ of execution and notice of garnishment. Upon the expiration of TRO,
the appellate court issued a writ of preliminary injunction. Bristol-Myers moved to release the
TRO cash bond and injunction cash bond in view of the Decision dated January 28, 2005. The
motion was denied as premature since the decision is not yet final and executor due to Lagrosas
appeal to SC, and since the writ of preliminary injunction was issued pendent lite.
ISSUE:
Whether the cash bond for injunction should be released?
HELD:
Yes. By its Decision dated January 28, 2005, the appellate court disposed of the case by
granting Bristol-Myers petition and reinstating the Decision dated September 24, 2002 of the

NLRC which dismissed the complaint for dismissal. It also ordered the discharge of the TRO
cash bond and injunction cash bond. Thus, both conditions of the writ of preliminary injunction
were satisfied.
It is settled that the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or
continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly
studied and adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can
be heard fully.
A preliminary injunction may be granted only when, among other things, the applicant,
not explicitly exempted, files with the court where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond
executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that
the applicant will pay such party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the
injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was
not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be
issued.
Notably, the appellate court ruled that Lagrosas had no right to the monetary awards
granted by the labor arbiter and the NLRC, and that the implementation of the writ of execution
and notices of garnishment was properly enjoined. This in effect amounted to a finding that
Lagrosas did not sustain any damage by reason of the injunction. To reiterate, the injunction
bond is intended to protect Lagrosas against loss or damage by reason of the injunction only.
Contrary to Lagrosas claim, it is not a security for the judgment award by the labor arbiter.
NELSON JENOSA vs. DELARIARTE
630 SCRAG.R. No. 172138
September 8, 2010
FACTS:
Some students of the University, among them petitioners Nio Carlo Jenosa, Patrick
Canto, Cyndy Apalisok, Clint Eduard Vargas, and Nonell Gregory Duro (petitioner students),
were caught engaging in hazing outside the school premises. A meeting between school
authorities and the students parents was conducted. The parties agreed that, instead of the
possibility of being charged and found guilty of hazing, the students who participated in the
hazing incident as initiators, including petitioner students, would just transfer to another school,
while those who participated as neophytes would be suspended for one month. The parents of the
apprehended students, including petitioners, affixed their signatures to the minutes of the
meeting to signify their conformity. In view of the agreement, the University did not anymore
convene the Committee on Student Discipline (COSD) to investigate the hazing incident.The
parents of petitioner students (petitioner parents) sent a letter to the University President urging
him not to implement the 28 November 2002 agreement. According to petitioner parents, the
Principal, without convening the COSD, decided to order the immediate transfer of petitioner
students. Petitioners filed a complaint for injunction and damages assailing the Principals
decision to order the immediate transfer of petitioner students as a violation of their right to due
process because COSD was not convened. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
and directed respondents to admit petitioner students during the pendency of the case.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss. Respondents alleged that the trial court had no

jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and that petitioners were guilty of forum
shopping. Said motion was denied and respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioners
then wrote the DepEd and asked that it direct the University to release the report cards and other
credentials of petitioner students. The University replied that it could not release petitioner
students report cards due to their pending disciplinary case with the COSD. Petitioners filed
another complaint for mandatory injunction praying for the release of petitioner students report
cards and other credentials. The two cases were consolidated by the trial court.The trial court
issued a writ of preliminary injunction and directed the University to release petitioner students
report cards and other credentials. The MR filed by respondents was denied. A special civil
action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals by the respondents insisting that the trial court had
no jurisdiction over the subject matter. CA granted respondents petition and ordered the trial
court to dismiss the civil cases for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter because of
petitioners failure to exhaust administrative remedies or for being premature. According to the
Court of Appeals, petitioners should have waited for the action of the DepEd or of the University
President before resorting to judicial action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mandatory injunction should be granted.
HELD:
No. the Principal had the authority to order the immediate transfer of petitioner students
because of their agreement. Petitioner parents affixed their signatures to the minutes of the 28
November 2002 meeting and signified their conformity to transfer their children to another
school. Petitioners Socorro Canto and Nelia Duro even wrote a letter to inform the University
that they would transfer their children to another school and requested for the pertinent papers
needed for the transfer. In turn, the University did not anymore convene the COSD. The
University agreed that it would no longer conduct disciplinary proceedings and instead issue the
transfer credentials of petitioner students. Then petitioners reneged on their agreement without
any justifiable reason.
Since petitioners present complaint is one for injunction, and injunction is the strong
arm of equity, petitioners must come to court with clean hands. In University of the Philippines v.
Hon. Catungal, Jr., a case involving student misconduct, this Court ruled:
Since injunction is the strong arm of equity, he who must apply for it must come with
equity or with clean hands. This is so because among the maxims of equity are (1) he who
seeks equity must do equity, and (2) he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is also expressed in the principle
that he who has done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a litigant may be
denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable,
unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.
Here, petitioners, having reneged on their agreement without any justifiable reason, come to
court with unclean hands. This Court may deny a litigant relief if his conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest as to the controversy in issue.

SOLID BUILDERS INC., vs. CHINA BANK

695 SCRA GR. 179665

April 3, 2013
FACTS:
During the period from Sept. 4, 1992 to March 27, 1996, CBC granted several loans to
Solid builder, which amounted to 139, 999, 234.34 exclusive of interests nd pother chrages.To
secure loans , Medina foods Industries , Inc eecuted in CBC's favor several security agrrements
and contracts of real estate mortgage over parcels of land in the Loyola Grand Villas in Quezon
City and new Cubao Central in Cainta, Rizal . Subsquently proposed to CBC scheme through
with SBI would sell the mortgaged properties and shae the proceeds with CBC on a 50-50 basis
until such time that the whole obligation would be fully paid.SBI also proposed that there be
partial releases of the certifictes of title of the mortgaged propeties without the burden of
updating interests on all loans. There was a letter dated March 20, 2000 addressed to CBC, SBI
requested that restructuring of its loans , areduction of interests and penalties and the
implementation of a DACION en PAGO on New Cubao Central property .In response CBC sent
SBI letter stating that loans had been completely restructred effective March 1, 1999 and that the
amount P218, 540646.00. On the aspects of interests and chrges , CBC suggested the updating of
the obligation to avoid paying of interests and charges.Later on another letter was sent to SBI to
settle thier outstanding account.
Oct 5, 2000 claiming interests and charges imposed CBC were inquitious and unconscionable to
enjoin CBC initial foreclosure proceedings, SBI and MFII filed a complaint to "Compel
execution of contract and for performance and Damages , with prayer for Writ of preliminary
Injucntion and Ex parte TRO" in the RTC of Pasig.Court granted the issuance of writ of
Preliminary injucntion .CBC sought reconsideration but court denied it dated dec. 10, 2001.It
filed a "Motion to dissolve an Injuction order' but it was denied .Aggrived CBC Petition for
Certiorari. CA reversed and set aside orders of the Trial court adn dissolved the writ of
injucntion.SBI and MFII file MR but then CA in a resouliton denied on Sep. 18, 2007.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs hae the right to ask for an injuctive relief in order to rpevent
the defendants bank form taking over their properties.
HELD:
Petition denied. A writ of preliminary is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to
judgement of fianl order reuqiring a party , court, agency, or a person to refrain from particular
acts. It is preservative remedy to ensnure the protection of a party's substantive rights or interests
pending the final judgement in the principal action. A plea for injuctive relief lies upon the
existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be avoided otheriwse,
the outcome of a litigation would be useless as as a party applying for writ is concerned. At time

s referred to as a "STRONG ARM OF EQUITY", court consistently rules hat there is no power
the exercise of which is more delicate an which calls for greater circumspection that the
isusuance of Injucntion.It should only be extended "in cases of extreme injury" where courts of
law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate emedy for damage; It is the duty of the court to
determine whether the necessary requisites are present in the case before it. In this conncetion a
writ of preliminary injuction is issued to prserve the status quo ante upon applicants showing of
two important requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie and
(2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation
sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injury.
Here SBI and MFII basiclly claim a right to have thier mortgaged porpoerties shileded
from froeclosure by CBC on the ground that interest rate and enalty chrages imposed by CBC on
the loans availed by SBI are inquitious and unconscionable. For the court there was no clear right
that warrants the extraordinary protection of an ijnuctive wirt has been shown by SBI and MFII
to exist in thier favor, for the grant of writ of preliminary injcuntion has not been satisfied. In
the absence of any requisite, and where facts are shown to be wanting in bringing the matter
within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ of injunction must be struck down for
having been rendered in grave abuse of dsicretion. Hence, CA did not err when it granted the
petition of CBC for the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction.
The guidelines speak of strict exceptions and conditions. To reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals and reinstate the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court will be to allow
SBI and MFII to circumvent the guidelines and conditions provided by the En Banc Resolution
in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 dated February 20, 2007 and prevent CBC from foreclosing on the
mortgaged properties based simply on the allegation that the interest on the loan is
unconscionable. This Court will not permit such a situation. What cannot be done directly
cannot be done indirectly.
All told, the relevant circumstances in this case show that there was failure to satisfy the
requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The injunctive writ issued by the
trial court should therefore be lifted and dissolved. That was how the Court of Appeals decided.
That is how it should be.Wherefore, the petition was DENIED.
PLAZA vs. LUSTIVA
718 SCRA GR 172909
March 5, 2014

FACTS:
The CA ruled that among the Plaza siblings, Barbara was the owner of th subject of

agricultural land. Vidal Plaza's son and daughter-in-law ,the petitioners filed a complaint fo
injunction, damges with prayer for issuance for Preliminary Injunctin and TRO against
respondents and city of Butuan . They prayed that the respondents be enjoined from unlawfully
and illegally threatening to take possession of the subject property.Petitioner that acquired the
land from Virginia Tuazon , the sole bidder and winner in a tax deficiency sale conducted by the
City of Butuan Dec. 1996.Respondenr pointed out they were never delinquent in paying the land
taxes and were not aware that ths property had been offered for public auction. Tuazon being a
government is disqualified to bid in the public auction . Petitioner falsified the tax declaration
fraudulently redeemed the land from Tuazon .
RTC denied the prayer fo the writ of preliminary injunction and ordered the posssession
and occupation of the land be returned to the respondents . It found that the auction sale was
tainted with irregularity as the bidder was a governtment employee. The petitioners are buyer in
good faith for having falsified tthe tax declaration they redeemed the property with. RTC
dismissed the main action. CA affirmed's RTC's ruling (while certioari was pending , petioner
filed an action for specific perfomramnce against City of Butuan. According to petioner City of
Butuan must issue them a ceritficate of sale) and found guilty of forum shopping.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to a writ of preliminary injuction?
HELD:
No. Tuazon never obtained the ownership over the property, much less transmit any
proprietary rights to the petitioner clearly , petitioner failed to establish any clear and
unmistakable right enforceable by injunctive relied. The law authorizes the LGU to purchase the
auctioned property only where there is no bidder or the higest bid is isnufficient.
Petitioner failed to establish entitlement to the writ of preliminary injunction. A writ or
preliminary may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be ptotected
during the pendency of the principal action. Upon the dismissal of the main case by the RTC, the
question of issuance of writ of preliminary injunction has become moot and academic . A writ of
prleiminary injunction is a provisional remedy and it deemed to be lfuted upon the dismisaal of
the main case.
Court denied the petition for review on certiorari. The decision dated October 24, 2005 and the
resolution dated April 6, 2006 of the CA was affirmed.

C.

Receivership (Rue 59)

EVELINA CHAVEZ and AIDA CHAVEZ -DELES

vs. CA and ATTY. FIDELA VARGAS
610 SCRA GR. no. 174356

FACTS:
Respondent Vargas is the owner of a coconut lad and rice fields in Sorsgon. Chavez had
been staying on a remote portion of the land wiht her family , plating coconut and supervising he
harvest there. The parties agreed to divid ethe gorss sales of all the prpducts between themselves.
Since Vargas was busy with her law practice , Chavez took to hold in turst Vargas half of the
profits. However Chavez failed to remit Vargas her shares. Despite demands to turn ove rthe
administration of the property to Vargas, petitioner failed o do so. Vargas filed for recovery of
possession with prayer for immediate appointment receiver. Chavez claimed that the TC has no
jurisdiction since it was an agrarian dispute.Th CA granted Vargas' motion for appoinment of a
receiver of the land noting that there need to preserve the property and its fruits.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in granting the receivership .
HELD:
Yes. For one thing, a petition for receivership under Section 1(b), Rule 59 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure requires that the property or fund subject of the action is in danger of being
lost, removed, or materially injured, necessitating its protection or preservation. Its object is the
prevention of imminent danger to the property. If the action does not require such protection or
preservation, the remedy is not receivership.
Here Fidelas main gripe is that Evelina and Aida deprived her of her share of the lands
produce. She does not claim that the land or its productive capacity would disappear or be
wasted if not entrusted to a receiver. Nor does Fidela claim that the land has been materially
injured, necessitating its protection and preservation. Because receivership is a harsh remedy that
can be granted only in extreme situations,7 Fidela must prove a clear right to its issuance. But she
has not. Indeed, in none of the other cases she filed against Evelina and Aida has that remedy
been granted her.8
Besides, the RTC dismissed Fidelas action for lack of jurisdiction over the case, holding
that the issues it raised properly belong to the DARAB. The case before the CA is but an offshoot
of that RTC case. Given that the RTC has found that it had no jurisdiction over the case, it would
seem more prudent for the CA to first provisionally determine that the RTC had jurisdiction
before granting receivership which is but an incident of the main action.
Receivership is not action but an auxilliary remedy, a mere inicdient of the suit to help

achive its purpose. She does not claim that the land or its productive capacity would disppear or
be wasted if not entrusted to a receiver or that the land has been injured , necessating its
protection and preservation.
The Court granted the petition. The receivership is lifted.

ANA MARIA KORUGA vs.TEODORO ARCENAS, JR., et al.

610 SCRA G.R. No. 168332
June 19, 2009
TEODORO O. ARCENAS, JR., et al.
vs. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, Br
138, RTC Makati City, and ANA MARIA KORUGA
G.R. No. 169053
June 19, 2009
FACTS:
Two petitions that originated from a Complaint filed by Koruga before the RTC Makati
City against the Board of Directors of Banco Filipino and the Members of the Monetary Board of
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) for violation of the Corporation Code, for inspection of
records of a corporation by a stockholder, for receivership, and for the creation of a management
committee.Koruga, a minority stockholder of Banco Filipino filed a complaint with RTC
charging the defendants with violations of the Corporation Code-acts that violoate the
prohibition against self dealing. Koruga prayed for receivership. Arcenas filed an answer and
motion to dismiss raising amont others the RTC's lack of jurisdiction. The RTC denied Arcenas'
motion.On certiorari at the CA, Arcenas prayed for writ of Preliminary Injunction and TRO. It
was granted. Meanwhile the RTC issued a Notice of Pre-trial. Arcenas filed again manifestation
with the CA reiteration their application for Writ of Preliminary Injuction. Thus, the CA issued
the assailed resolution granting the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
ISSUE 1:
Whether Preliminary injunction should be anulled?
HELD :
The Petition in G.R. No. 168332 has become moot and academic. The writ of
preliminary injunction being questioned had effectively been dissolved by the CAs July 20, 2005
Decision. Accordingly, there is no necessity to restrain the implementation of the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the CA on April 18, 2005, since it no longer exists.However,
this Court finds that the CA erred in upholding the jurisdiction of, and remanding the case to, the
RTC
ISSUE 2:
Which body has jurisdiction over the complaint of Koruga?
HELD:

The BSP. It is clear that the cts complained of pertain to the conduct of Banco Filipino's
banking business. The New Central bank Act, vests in the BSP the supervision over oeprations
and activities of the banks. Consequently, it is is not the Inteim Rules of Intra-Corporate
Controversies, or Rule 59 of Civil Procedure an Receivership, that would apply tot his case, as
Koruga posits. Intead, Sec . 29 and 30 of the New Central Bank Act should be followed.
Finally there is one other reason why Koruga's complaint before RTC cannot prosper. Given her
admission-and same is likewise supported by evidence-that she is merely a minority stockholder
of Banco Filipino, she would not have standing to question the Monetary Board's action because
the NCB provides that the petition for certiorari may only be filed by the stockhoders or record
representing majority of the capital stock within 10 days from receipt of the board of directors of
the instituion of the order directing receivership, liquidation as conservatorship.
D.

Replevin (Rule 60)

SMART COMMUNICATIONS vs. REGINA ASTORGA

542 SCRA GR Nos. 148132, 151079, 151371
FACTS:
Astorga is employed by Smart as District sales manager and has a car plan, among others,
with the company. In 998 Smart launched an organizational realignment resulting to the
abolishment of Astorga's division. Despite thus , Astogra continued to report for work . Smart
issued a memo advising the termination of her employment on the ground of redundancy.
Astorga filed a complaint for illegal dsimissal. meanwhile Smart sent a letter to Astrga
demaning that she pay the current value or return the car given to her under the car plan.Astorga
failed to do either prompting amrt to file a suti of replevin with the RTC . Astorga moved to
dsimiss the replevin case on rounds of jurisdiction, litis pendentia, etc. RTC denied Astorga's
motion. CA reversed the TC ruling stating the case is intertwined with Astoga's dismissal case,
thus labor tribunal has jurisdcition.
ISSUE:
Was the CA correct in dismissing the case and Labor tribunal has jurisdiction and not the
RTC?
HELD:
No. The CA ratiocination the RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the suit and
acted well within its discretion in denying Astorga's motion to dsimiss.Samrt's demand for
paymentof the maket value of the car or in the alternative , the surrender of the car is not a labor ,
but a civil dispute.

It involves the relationship of the debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer
relations. As suc, the dispute is not intertwined with the issue in the replevin case because the
issue raised in each forum can be resolved independently of the other.
Indeed, out of concern for those lesser circumstanced in life, this Court has inclined
towards the worker and upheld his cause in most of his conflicts with his employer. This favored
treatment is consonant with the social justice policy of the Constitution. But while tilting the
scales of justice in favor of workers, the fundamental law also guarantees the right of the
employer to reasonable returns for his investment. 38 In this light, we must acknowledge the
prerogative of the employer to adopt such measures as will promote greater efficiency, reduce
overhead costs and enhance prospects of economic gains, albeit always within the framework of
existing laws. Accordingly, the Court sustained the reorganization and redundancy program
undertaken by SMART.
However, as aptly found by the CA, SMART failed to comply with the mandated one (1)
month notice prior to termination. Be that as it may, this procedural infirmity would not render
the termination of Astorgas employment illegal. The validity of termination can exist
independently of the procedural infirmity of the dismissal. In DAP Corporation v. CA, the Court
found the dismissal of the employees therein valid and for authorized cause even if the employer
failed to comply with the notice requirement under Article 283 of the Labor Code. This Court
upheld the dismissal, but held the employer liable for non-compliance with the procedural
requirements.

KENETH HAO vs ABE ANDRES

555 Scra A.M. No. P-07-2384
June 18, 2008

FACTS:
An administrative complaint for gross neglect of duty, grave abuse of authority
(oppression) and violation of RA No. 3019 filed by complainant Hao against respondent Andres,
Sheriff IV of RTC Davao City, Br 16.
Complainant Hao is one of the defendants in a civil case for replevin (Civil Case No. 31,
127-2005) entitled "Zenaida Silver, doing trade and business under the name and style ZHS
Commercial v. Loreto Hao, Atty. Amado Cantos, Kenneth Hao and John Does," pending before
the RTC Davao City. Judge Fuentes issued an Order of Seizure against 22 motor vehicles
allegedly owned by the complainant. On the strength of the said order, Andres was able to seize 9
of the subject motor vehicles.In his Affidavit-Complaint against Andres before the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA), Hao alleged that Andres gave undue advantage to Zenaida Silver in
the implementation of the order and that Andres seized the 9 motor vehicles in an oppressive
manner. Hao also averred that Andres was accompanied by unidentified armed personnel on
board a military vehicle which was excessive since there were no resistance from them. Hao also

discovered that the place where the seized motor vehicles were is actually owned by Silver. In
view of the approval of the complainants counter-replevin bond, Judge Carpio ordered Andres to
immediately cease and desist from further implementing the order of seizure, and to return the
seized motor vehicles including its accessories to their lawful owners.
However, 8 of the 9 seized motor vehicles were reported missing. In his report, Andres
stated that he was shocked to find that the motor vehicles were already missing. Andres claimed
the motor vehicles were still intact when he inspected it. Subsequently, Hao reported that 3 of the
carnapped vehicles were recovered by the police. He then accused Andres of conspiring and
conniving with Atty. Macadangdang (Silvers counsel) and the policemen in the carnapping of
the motor vehicles. Hao also accused Andres of concealing the depository receipts from them
and pointed out that the depository receipts show that Silver and Atty. Macadangdang were the
ones who chose the policemen who will guard the motor vehicles.In his Comment, Andres
vehemently denied violating Rep. Act No. 3019 and committing gross neglect of duty. Andres
denied implementing the Order of Seizure in an oppressive manner. He negated the speculations
that he was involved in the disappearance of the seized motor vehicles as he claims to be the one
who reported the incident to the court and the police. Andres insisted that the guarding of
properties under custodia legis by policemen is not prohibited, but is even adopted by the court.
Hence, he prays that he be held not liable for the loss of the vehicles and that he be relieved of
his duty to return the vehicles. The case was referred to Executive Judge Fuentes for
investigation, report and recommendation. In his Investigation Report, Judge Fuentes found
Andres guilty of serious negligence in the custody of the nine motor vehicles. He recommended
that Andres be suspended from office.The OCA disagreed with the observations of Judge
Fuentes. It recommended that Andres be held liable only for simple neglect of duty.
ISSUE:
Whether Andres should be liable for gross neglect of duty.
HELD:
Yes. Being officer of the court, Andres may be well defined with the steps provided in the
rules. First the rules provide that he must at least 5 days in order to give oppotunity to object.But
Andres delivered the seized vehicle to Silver same day they were serized. Andres claim that he
is not aware that Silver owned the compound where the vehicles were placed immaterial, the fact
remains that he delivered them to Silver prematurely.
Second, it must be stressed that from the moment an order of delivery in replevin is
executed by taking possession of the property specified therein, such property such custodia
legis.As legal custodian, it is Andres duty to safekeep the seized motor vehicles. Hence, where
he passed his duty to safeguard the motor vehicles to Silver, he committed a clear neglect of
duty.
NAVARRO vs. ESCOBIDO
606 SCRA GR. 153788
November 27, 2009

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 that seeks to set aside the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision2 dated October 16, 2001 and Resolution3 dated May 29, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP. No.
64701. These CA rulings affirmed the July 26, 20004 and March 7, 20015 orders of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, denying petitioner Roger V.
Navarros (Navarro) motion to dismiss.Navarro leased from Kargo Enterprises two motor
vehicles under 2 separate lease agreements. Navarro issued 6 post dated check as payment for the
rentals. But PBCOM dishonored the checks due to insufficientcy of funds.Despite demands ,
Navarro failed to either pay the balance and return the vehichles. Karen Go filed 2 complaints for
replevin for the seizure of the vehicles and or some sim of money.
RTCissued the writs for both cases , as a result of which , the sheriff seized the 2
vehicles.Navarro argued that the complaint has no cause of action against him and that Karen Go
is not a party interest. Navarro also maintains that the complaints were premature becuase no
pior demand was made on him to comply with provisions of the lease agreement.
ISSUE:
Is prior demand necessary in replevin?
HELD:
No. Navarro apparently likened a replevin action with an unlawful detainer. He is wrong.
Sec 2. of Rule 60. There is nothing in the provisions that requires the applicant to make a prior
demand on the possessor of the property before he can file an cation for wirt of replevin.Thus,
priod demand is not a condition precedent to an action for the writ of replevin.
For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and
bond, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules, which states:
Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond.
The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who
personally knows the facts:
(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing
it, or is entitled to the possession thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of
detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief;
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine
pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or
otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure
or custody; and
(d) The actual market value of the property.
The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the value of
the property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to the adverse
party if such return be adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he may
recover from the applicant in the action.

More importantly, Navarro is no longer in the position to cliam thata priod demand is
necessart, as he already admitted in his Answers that he had received the letters Karen Go sent
him, demanding the he either pay his unpaid obligations or return the leased moror vehicles.
Navarro's poition that a demand is necessart and has not been made is therefore totally
unmeritorious.
SPOUSES
DEO
AGNER
and
MARICON
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC.
697 SCRA G.R. No. 182963
June 3, 2013

AGNER

vs.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the April 30, 2007 Decision and May
19, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 86021, which affirmed the
August 11, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Manila City. On February 15,
2001, petitioners spouses Deo Agner and Maricon Agner executed a Promissory Note with
Chattel Mortgage in favor of Citimotors, Inc. The contract provides, among others, that: for
receiving the amount of Php834, 768.00, petitioners shall pay Php 17,391.00 every 15th day of
each succeeding month until fully paid; the loan is secured by a 2001 Mitsubishi Adventure
Super Sport; and an interest of 6% per month shall be imposed for failure to pay each installment
on or before the stated due date.
On the same day, Citimotors, Inc. assigned all its rights, title and interests in the
Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage to ABN AMRO Savings Bank, Inc. (ABN AMRO),
which, on May 31, 2002, likewise assigned the same to respondent BPI Family Savings Bank,
Inc. For failure to pay four successive installments from May 15, 2002 to August 15, 2002,
respondent, through counsel, sent to petitioners a demand letter dated August 29, 2002, declaring
the entire obligation as due and demandable and requiring to pay Php576,664.04, or surrender
the mortgaged vehicle immediately upon receiving the letter. As the demand was left unheeded,
respondent filed on October 4, 2002 an action for Replevin and Damages before the Manila
Regional Trial Court (RTC). A writ of replevin was issued. Despite this, the subject vehicle was
not seized. Trial on the merits ensued. On August 11, 2005, the Manila RTC Br. 33 ruled for the
respondent and ordered petitioners to jointly and severally pay the amount of Php576,664.04
plus interest at the rate of 72% per annum from August 20, 2002 until fully paid, and the costs of
suit.Petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), but the CA affirmed the
lower courts decision and, subsequently, denied the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not BPI's remedy of resorting to both actions of replevin and collection of of
sum of money is contrary to artcile 1489 of the Civil Code and jurisprudence?
HELD:
Contention is untenable. Compared with Elisco, the vehicle subject matter of the case
was never recovered and delivered to respondent despite the issuance of writ of replevin. As

there was no seizure that transpired , it cannot be said that petitioners were deprived of the use
and enjoyment of the mortgaged vehicle or that the respondent pursued, commenced or conluded
its actual foreclosure.
The trial court,therefore rightfully granted the alternative prayer for sum of money ,
which is equivalent to the remedy of "exacting the fulfillment of the obigation". Certainly there
is no double recovery or unjust enrichment to speak of . But interest reuced to 1% per month or
12% per annum.
E.

Support (Ruke 61)

LIM vs LIM
604 SCRA 691 G.R. No. 163209
October 30, 2009
FACTS:
Respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of petitioners.
Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III.
Cheryl, Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City,
together with Edwards ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano).
Edwards family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the
family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income.
Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her (then all
minors), after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife
of Chua Giak in what the trial court described "a very compromising situation." Cheryl, for
herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the
RTC for support. RTC rendered judgment ordering Edward and petitioners to "jointly"
provideP40,000 monthly support to respondents, with Edward shouldering P6,000 and
petitioners the balance of P34,000 subject to Chua Giaks subsidiary liability. CA:affirmed the
trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents.
HELD:
Yes, however only for support needed by the children, not by Cheryl .By statutory and
jurisprudential mandate , the liabilty of ascendants to provide legal support to th, not ifthey are
libale.eir descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as such, they limit their
petition to the narrow question when their liability is triggered not if they are liable.
However petitioners' partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as
this word commonly understood to refer to relatives , by blood of lower degree. As petitioner'

grandchildren by blood , only respndents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong
to this category. Indeed , Cheryl's right to receive support from the lim fmily extends only to her
husband Edward, arising from marital blood.