SIOCHI V.

GOZON
Facts:
This case involves a 30,000 sq.m. parcel of land. The
property is situated in Malabon, Metro Manila and is
registered
in
the
name
of
A l f r e d o G o z o n ( A l f r e d o ) , m a r r i e d t o
ElviraGozon(Elvira).

On 23 December 1991, Elvira filed with the RTC of

Cavite City a petition for legal separation against her
husband Alfredo. On Jan 2, 1992, Elvira filed a notice oflis
pendens, which was then annotatedonTCTno. 5357.
While the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo
and MarioSiochi(Mario) entered into an agreement to buy
and sell (agreement) involving the property for the price
ofP18 million.
However, despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo
failed to comply with the stipulations provided in the
agreement. After paying the P5 million earnest money as
partial payment of the purchase price, Mario took
possession of the property. On September 6, 1993, the
agreement was annotatedonTCT no. 5357.
Meanwhile, on 29 June 1994, the Cavite RTC rendered a
decision in the legal separation case, which granted the
same. The RTC ordered among others that, the conjugal
partnership of gains of the spouses is hereby declared
dissolved and liquidated. As regards the property, it held
that it is deemed conjugal property.
Alfredo executed a deed of donation over the property in
favor of their daughter, Winifred Gozon. Later on, Alfredo
through an SPA executed by his daughter Winifred, sold the
property to IDRI and the latter paid the purchase price in
full. A new TCT was issued by the Register of Deeds in
favor of IDRI.
Mario then filed with the Malabon RTC a complaint for
specific performance and damages, annulment of donation
and sale, with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction and/or temporary restraining order.
RTC: Malabon RTC upheld original agreement to buy and
sell between Mario and Alfredo and declared voidhe sale by
Alfredo and Winifred to Inter-Dimensional.

CA: Court of Appealssaid agreement between Mario and

Alfredo is void because (1) it was entered into without the
consent of Elvira, Alfredos wife; and, (2) Alfredos
undivided share has been forfeited in favour of Winifred by
the grant oflegal separationby the Cavite RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Alfredo may sell the conjugal property,
being the sole administrator of the same without obtaining
the consent of Elvira?
Held:
NO.
This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo
and Elvira. Since the disposition of the property occurred
after the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law
is the Family Code. Article 124 of the family code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the

husbands decision shall prevail, subject to the

recourse to the court by the wife for a proper
remedy, which must be availed of within five years
from the date of the contract implementing such
decision.

IN THE EVENT THAT ONE SPOUSE IS

INCAPACITATED OR OTHERWISE UNABLE TO
PARTICIPATE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
CONJUGAL PROPERTIES, THE OTHER SPOUSE MAY
ASSUME SOLE POWERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
THESE POWERS DO NOT INCLUDE THE POWERS OF
DISPOSITION OR ENCUMBRANCE WHICH MUST
HAVE THE AUTHORITY OF THE COURT OR THE
WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE OTHER SPOUSE. IN
THE ABSENCE OF SUCH AUTHORITY OR CONSENT,
THE DISPOSITION OR ENCUMBRANCE SHALL BE
VOID. HOWEVER, THE TRANSACTION SHALL BE
CONSTRUED AS A CONTINUING OFFER ON THE PART
OF THE CONSENTING SPOUSE AND THE THIRD
PERSON, AND MAY BE PERFECTED AS A BINDING
CONTRACT UPON THE ACCEPTANCE BY THE OTHER
SPOUSE OR AUTHORIZATION BY THE COURT BEFORE
THE OFFER IS WITHDRAWN BY EITHER OR BOTH
OFFERORS. (EMPHASIS SUPPLIED)
In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of
the property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo was
separated in fact, was unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal property. However, as sole
administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell the
property without the written consent of Elvira or the
authority of the court. Without such consent or authority,
the sale is void. The absence of the consent of one of the
spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion
of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who
contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively
participated in negotiating for the sale of the property,
that other spouses written consent to the sale is still
required by law for its validity. The Agreement entered
into by Alfredo and Mario was without the written consent
of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely void. As regards
Marios contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer
which may be perfected by Elviras acceptance before the
offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was
subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold
to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already
withdrawn.

However, we disagree with the finding of the Court

of Appeals that the one-half undivided share of Alfredo in
the property was already forfeited in favor of his daughter
Winifred, based on the ruling of theCaviteRTC in the legal
separation case. The Court of Appeals misconstrued the
ruling of the Cavite RTC that Alfredo, being the offending
spouse, is deprived of his share in the net profits and the
same is awarded to Winifred.

QUIAO V. QUIAO
G.R. No 176556, [July 04, 2012]
FACTS:
Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation
against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered
a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding
the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all
remaining properties shall be divided equally between the
spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children
and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.
Brigidos share, however, of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
commonchildren because Brigido is the offending spouse.
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal
within the period270 days later or after more than nine
months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner
filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the
RTC to define the term Net Profits Earned.
RTC held that the phrase NET PROFIT EARNED denotes
the remainder of the properties of the parties after
deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse
and the debts. It further held that after determining the
remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of
the common children because the offending spouse does
not have any right to any share of the net profits earned,
pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family
Code.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it
applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article
102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because
there is no other provision under the Family Code which
defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of
legal separation.
ISSUES:
1.Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or
Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is
applicable in this case. Art 129 will govern.
2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights
overof the properties in the conjugal partnership
NO.
3. Is the computation of net profits earned in the conjugal
partnership of gains the same with the computation of net
profits earned in the absolute community? NO.
RATIO:
1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the
promulgation of the current family code, the default rule is
that In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the
same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall
govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses
marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the
same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so
far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and
liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in
relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations
between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner
acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the
Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the
Civil Code, which provides: All property of the conjugal

partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband

and wife.
While one may not be deprived of his vested right, he may
lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is
founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to
due process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent
prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be
awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed
that the trial court divide the community assets between the
petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and
evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all
the community properties of the parties. Second, when the
decision for legal separation was promulgated, the petitioner
never questioned the trial courts ruling forfeiting what the
trial court termed as net profits, pursuant to Article 129(7)
of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being
deprived of his right to due process.
3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute
community, the husband and the wife become joint owners
of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each
spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during
the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the
Family Code) form the common mass of the couples
properties. And when the couples marriage or community is
dissolved, that common mass is divided between the
spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the
proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the
value each one may have originally owned.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable,
since it has been established that the spouses have no
separate properties, what will be divided equally between
them is simply the net profits. And since the legal
separationshare decision of Brigido states that thein the
net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still
be left with nothing.
On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of
conjugal partnership of gains under Article142 of the Civil
Code, the husband and the wife place in common fund the
fruits of their separate property and income from their work
or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the
marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits
obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage. From the foregoing provision, each of the couple
has his and her own property and debts. The law does not
intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or
properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a
complete separation of capitals.
In the instant case, since it was already established by the
trial court that the spouses have no separate properties,
there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed
properties above are considered part of the conjugal
partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the abovelisted properties should be divided equally between the
spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the
trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from
the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor
of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the
Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute
community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty
party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no
separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty
partys favor.

CORPUZ VS. STO. TOMAS & OSG

GR 186571
Facts

Corpuz was a former Filipino who acquired

Canadian citizenship through naturalization

He married Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City

Corpuz went to Canada for work and when he

returned to the Philippines he found out that his wife
was having an affair with another man

He filed a petition for divorce in Canada and the

same was granted

After two years from the effectivity of the divorce

decree, Corpuz found a new Filipina to love

Corpuz went to the Pasig Civil Registry Office and

registered the divorce decree on his and Sto. Tomas'
marriage certificate

Corpuz filed a petition for judicial recognition of

foreign divorce before the RTC

RTC denied his petition, it ruled that only the Filipino

spouse can avail of the remedy under Art. 26(2) of
the Family Code
Issue
W/N Art. 26(2) of the Family Code extends to aliens the right
to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a
foreign divorce decree
Ruling

The alien spouse can claim no right undert Art.

26(2) of the Family Code as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse

The legislative intent behind Art 26(2) is to avoid the

absurd situation whre the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse by clarifying his or her marital status, settling
the doubts created by the divorce decree

Art. 17 of the New Civil Code provides that the

policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign
country. The inclusion of Art. 26(2) of the Family
Code provides the direct exception to the rule and
serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the
marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her
alien spouse

An action based on Art. 26(2) is not limited to the

recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court
finds that the decree capacitated the aliens spouse
to remarry, the courts can declare the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another
marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can
make a similar declaration for the alien spouse
(other than that already established by the decree)
whose status and legal capacity are generally
governed by his national law
Remedy Available to Alien Spouse

The availability under Art 26(2) of the Family Code

to aliens does not necessarily strip the alien spouse
of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree

The foreign divorce decree itself, after its

authenticity and conformity with the alien's national
law have been duly proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence in favor
of the alien spouse, pursuant to Sec. 48, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of
foreign judgment (Please see pertinent provisions of

the Rules of Court, particularly Sec. 48, Rule 39 and

Sec. 24 Rule 132)
* Please take note: In this case, the SC considered the
recording of the divorce decree on Corpuz and Sto.
Tomas' marriage certificate as legally improper. No judicial
order yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree,
thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of
turn and without authority of law when it annotated the
Canadian divorce decree of Corpuz and Sto. Tomas'
marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign
decree presented by Corpuz (Please see Art. 407 of the
New Civil Code and the Law on Registry of Civil Status Act No. 3753)
*
MINORU FUJIKI vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY,
SHINICHI MAEKARA | G.R. No. 196049 | June 26, 2013
DOCTRINE:
A Petition for Recognition of a Foreign
Judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a
foreign judgment on a case which was already tried and
decided under foreign law. The recognition of the foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent
event that establishes a new status, right and fact that needs
to be reflected in the civil registry. Thus, upon recognition of
the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the
judgment serves as the basis for the correction or
cancellation of entry in the civil registry.
FACTS:

Fujiki is a Japanese national who married Marinay in

the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did
not sit well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could
not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Maekara.

Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008
without the first marriage being dissolved. Maekara
brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly
suffered physical abuse from Maekara.

She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki and

eventually, they were able to reestablish their
relationship.

In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a

family court in Japan which declared the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of
bigamy.

Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC for the Recognition of

Foreign Judgment, praying that: (1) the Japanese
Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be
declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to
direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the
Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara
and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the
National Statistics Office (NSO).

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) immediately dismissed

the petition, for gross violation of the provisions of the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC), that it is only "the husband or the
wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file
the petition to declare their marriage void, and not
Fujiki.

Fujiki sought for the reconsideration of the RTCs Order

on the ground that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated
ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and
annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign
judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact," and not a
civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection of
a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."

The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack

on the validity of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional
ground" to dismiss the petition.

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition, arguing

that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an
injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void.

ISSUES:
(1) Does A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC apply to petitions for
recognition of foreign judgment? NO
(2) May the husband or wife of a prior marriage file a
petition for the recognition of the foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her
spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy
YES
(3) Is the petition for the recognition of foreign judgment
with a prayer for the correction or cancellation of an
entry in the civil registry a collateral attack on the
validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara?
NO
RULING:
The rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC) is not applicable on Petitions for
Recognition of Foreign Judgment
The Rule on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status
of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country. The Court held that the rule in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy." To hold
that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for
recognition of foreign judgment would defeat the purpose of
recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive
litigation on claims and issues."

Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the

Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule
132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.
The husband of prior subsisting marriage has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage
The recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of
fact of the judgment and may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Under
Section 1, any person interested in any act, event, order
or decree concerning the civil status of persons which
has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified
petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located, may file a petition.
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy
because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay. The prior spouse has a personal and material
interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he
contracted and the property relations arising from it. He is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous
marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public
record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve his most
intimate human relation, but also to protect his property
interests that arise by operation of law the moment he
contracts marriage.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a
spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a
subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the
contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife"it refers to the
husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article
35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from
the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are
neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband
or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who
has the personality to file a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC. When the right of the spouse to protect his
marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party
and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.
A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not an
action to nullify a marriage

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment

relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties
is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to
prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of
Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court
judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody
of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a
foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be
made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the
Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the
seal of office.

The validity of marriage can be questioned only in a direct

action to nullify the marriage. A petition for correction or
cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute
for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is
necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. However, this
does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a
civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign
judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country.

There is no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a

fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared
void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised

A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify

a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize
the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a
case which was already tried and decided under foreign
law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply
in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a
bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
the foreign country.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are

incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was
decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the
"family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal
capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign
judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question
of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine
courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino
party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15
of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1)
whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an
overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether
any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to
repel the foreign judgment. If there is neither inconsistency
with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment,
Philippine courts should recognize the foreign judgment as
part of the comity of nations. Upon recognition of the foreign
judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment
serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry
in the civil registry.
The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a
new status, right and fact that needs to be reflected in the
civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency
between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign
judgment and the public records in the Philippines.
Republic of the Philippines vs Jose A. Dayot
GR No. 175581 March 28, 2008
Fact of the Case:
On November 24, 1986 Jose and Felisa Dayot were married
at the Pasay City Hall. In lieu of a marriage license, they
executed a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them are
legally capacitated and that they cohabited for atleast five
years when in fact they only barely known each other since
February 1986.
On 1993, Jose filed a complaint for
Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
contending that their marriage was sham, as to no ceremony
was celebrated between them; that he did not execute the
sworn statement that he and Felisa had cohabited for atleast
five years; and that his consent was secured through fraud.
His sister, however, testified as witness that Jose voluntarily
gave his consent during their marriage. The complaint was
dismissed on Regional Trial Court stating that Jose is
deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage
for lack of marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and
Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, and that it took
Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity;
The RTC ruled that Joses action had prescribe. It cited Art
87 of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for
annulment must be commenced by the injured party within
four years after the discovery of fraud. Jose appealed to the
Court of Appeals which rendered a decision declaring their
marriage void ab initio for absence of marriage license.
Felisa sought a petition for review praying that the Court of
Appeals Amended decision be reversed and set aside.
Issue:
(1) Whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital
cohabitation, where the parties have in truth

f a l l e n s h o r t o f t h e m i n i m u m fi v e - y e a r
requirement., effectively renders the marriage
voib an initio for lack of marriage.
(2) Whether or not the action for nullity prescribes
as the case here where Jose filed a complaint
after seven years from contracting marriage.
Held:
(1)Yes. The intendment of law or fact leans towards the
validity of marriage, will not salvage the parties marriage,
and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law.
The Court protects the fabric of the institution of marriage
and at the same time wary of deceptive schemes that violate
the legal measures set forth in the law. The case cannot fall
under irregularity of the marriage license, what happens
here is an absence of marriage license which makes their
marriage void for lack of one of the essential requirement of
a valid marriage.
(2) No. An action for nullity is imprescriptible. Jose and
Felisas marriage was celebrated san a marriage license.
The right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe.