Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUMMARY
Introduction
The aim of this year's Report is to evaluate the state of human development at
the dawn of the new century and to show how the options for advancing in this
development depend, to a large extent, on the political capabilities of Bolivian
society and the nations actors of development.
This analysis is based on two approaches in the Report. First, the current state
and socioeconomic perspectives of human development are evaluated. The
Report shows unequal rates of progress in the areas of social development and
economic growth, and discusses the difficulties currently faced by the country in
the effort to make coordinated progress in these two areas. Second, the Report
evaluates the political capabilities of some of the country's principal actors,
including state institutions and the party system, the mass media, political and
social leaders, the poor, and public opinion in general. The first approach is
based on a statistical analysis of census data and secondary data, while the
second is based on interviews, focal groups, and a national survey. These two
approaches culminate in possible scenarios of the future of development and
democracy in Bolivia.
During the past two decades, the country has made progress in several areas of
human development and political democracy. Despite all of its shortcomings,
Bolivias democracy is, perhaps, one of the least fragile in the region. However,
there still remain important obstacles to overcome. According to the Report,
these obstacles to human development represent a critical juncture and time
of change, both in the direction of development and the type of democracy,
and also require an effort to achieve coordination between the two. Bolivia
has begun a time a complex change in the structural tendencies that began
during the 1980s with the democratic and market economy reforms. This critical
juncture makes the idea of continuity without change an unsustainable one.
The Report argues that the present crisis reveals the high levels of
interdependence between the economy and politics on the local, national and
global levels. Moreover, the information provided by social actors suggests that
political trust and the dignity of the citizens are currently weak areas that
need to be strengthened in order to reorient the economy in a way that
promotes human development in the country. Restoring this trust and dignity
is a necessary condition for politics to gain constructive capability in other
words, the capability to legitimize and energize a development model capable of
combining participation in global markets with internal economic growth.
Conclusions
1. Current State of Human Development
Despite improvements in health and education indicators, Bolivia still lags
far behind other countries in Latin America. Furthermore, lackluster
growth in per capita GDP as well as unequal distribution have led to a
pattern of unequal human development.
During the past two decades, there have been important improvements in
education levels of the population, the reduction of illiteracy and access to
certain social services (although this access is unequal). Despite these
important advances, Bolivia still lags behind average levels for Latin America
in many respects. There are particularly large gaps in areas such as life
expectancy and infant mortality.
However, the limited growth in per capita GDP, as well as its unequal
distribution, presently put a ceiling on human development in the country.
While Bolivia did begin to show positive rates of economic growth starting in
the late 1980s, these advances did not translate into significant reductions in
poverty, and appear to be extremely fragile in terms of their continuity. This is
demonstrated by the current economic crisis. Furthermore, poverty is
perpetuated by a pattern of modernization in which the majority of the
population works in sectors that are low in productivity and high in
vulnerability, as well as by economic gaps among different regions and
between rural and urban areas.
that would guide the efforts of the Bolivian government in facing the serious
problems of poverty and inequality that existed in the country. In 1993, with
the creation of the Ministry of Human Development, the effort was
strengthened. Despite these changes, however, social policy still does not
have a framework of agreements and basic tools that could be considered
state policy that is free from influence during changes of administration. The
Bolivian Poverty Reduction Strategy currently faces the challenge of being an
antecedent for this kind of policy. Moreover, despite the efforts and progress
made in the different National Dialogues since 1997, the social and political
agreements on basic principles that should guide poverty reduction policies
are limited. They need to be transformed into state policies that will be
sustainable in the long-term. It is also necessary to link these policies and
strategies of economic development.
It is also very possible that the gains in human development indicators can
be seen as being negatively influenced by the difficulty in decreasing
Bolivians levels of income poverty. In other words, there could be important
ceilings on the improvement of social indicators that are based only on the
provision of public services, as efficient as they may be, due to two factors: 1)
the importance of the income levels of households as a determinant in the
improvement of education and health indicators, and 2) the difficulty in
sustaining levels of social spending. This is presently financed in large part
by foreign aid. Without greater economic growth in the future, these levels of
social spending also are unsustainable in the long term.
Two major tendencies explain the current context of crisis. First, there is an
inherent contradiction in the economic model resulting from the New
Economic Policy (NEP). It has not only failed to modify the structure of the
sectors of growth, but also, has tended to weaken the sectors that
traditionally have contributed most to growth. Second, the period of economic
reforms has ended. These reforms brought with them an intense attraction of
foreign direct investment, mainly to the hydrocarbon sector. This raised
hopeful prospects regarding the new, strategic role of the country as an
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energy center.
In this context of structural crisis, two scenarios seem plausible. The first
suggests that a new type of economic growth will finally emerge, as a
corollary of the structural adjustment policies. This growth would be sparked
largely by the economic boom of transnational corporations and also would
take place in the modern export sectors of agriculture and manufacturing.
This would only take place to the extent that these sectors are capable of
modernizing their productive apparatus and attracting FDI. This scenario with
this new type of growth would have little ability to create employment, further
exacerbating the unequal distribution of income. It also would have little
ability to result in important reductions in poverty or in sustained material
improvements in human development.
The second scenario requires that the state be capable of intervening in the
economy by means of a system of incentives that favor earnings productivity
in the traditional sectors of the economy, and that it respect the basic model
implemented by the NEP. It also requires that the new, dynamic sectors
attract important levels of FDI and generate foreign exchange and greater
fiscal resources. It therefore requires taking advantage of the potential of the
hydrocarbon sector to promote a systemic pattern of competitiveness. In this
new context, a socially inclusive economic development would be conceived
as part of a territorial and integral vision. It would become the decisive
element in sparking economic activity, improving income distribution and
increasing developments material impact on poverty reduction. This would
lead to sustainable improvements in levels of human development.
The state transformations that began during the crisis of the mid-1980s (such
as the constitutional reform, administrative decentralization known as
Popular Participation and profound transformation of the judicial system)
have led to important progress in institutional and economic areas. However,
they are insufficient in the task of outlining a new state order founded on
legitimacy and efficiency, capable of responding to the challenges of
globalization. They also fail to manage these challenges with an economic
model that promotes human development.
The challenge at this critical moment is to shift the reforms in the direction of
the construction of a new state order that broadens and promotes spaces of
representation and citizen participation and deliberation, and that serves as a
link between political democracy and inclusive development. This type of shift
in the reforms likely would allow for the increase of trust of various sectors of
civil society in political institutions. It also would increase trust that would be
fundamental in allowing the state to fulfill its role as the promoter of a shift in
economic development.
Meanwhile, the media industry in Bolivia has followed the world trend of
privatization, concentration, and an increased role of transnational
corporations. In its institutional aspects, social communication has
incorporated new guidelines for the relationship between journalists and
politicians, as well as between business leaders and political actors. One
of the problems that the Report has pointed out in this regard is that the
personalization of political representation has been modified due to the
leading role of the media. The rhetoric of public discourse also has been
modified, inhibiting public debate on political and electoral issues and on
the treatment of issues of general interest. Meanwhile, the impact of the
media on politics has increased. This is because the mass media have
become actors that define the agenda of topics of public debate, and
some members of the press have become opinion leaders and even
candidates. In addition, it is in the media that the credibility of political
facts is constructed.
The paradox lies in the fact that on the one hand the media answer to the
demands of the market, to the restructuring process of the media
landscape, and to political interests. On the other hand, the media favor
control over governmental acts and strengthen the autonomy of civil
society through the creation of multiple public spheres and the formation
of citizen opinion on political issues. This is a cultural complexity that
needs to be grappled with.
Despite the risks that come with the privatization and concentration of the
media, competition allows for the diversification of voices in the public
spaces of the media. Part of this landscape is the existence of local radio
and television stations, which represent suitable spaces for forging
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Given the ambivalent relationship between the nature of the media and
the expansion of deliberative democracy, it is necessary to achieve
greater synergy between the two. The work of the media is fundamental in
the public sphere. Therefore the media, especially television, need to go
beyond merely informing, entertaining and educating. They need to reflect
the ethno-cultural diversity of society and become a meeting place for
diverse groups with the goal of forging a community with a sense of
belonging and a shared destiny. This need is similar to the demands that
aim to diversify the system of political representation by means of broader
party representation. As long as the diversity of social actors fails to be
represented in the political system and in the media, the participation of
these actors in the political arena will assume characteristics of refutation
of the democratic system. This also will eliminate the possibility of the
construction of a public will that is based on the recognition of the other
a necessary condition of deliberative democracy. However, this should not
be misunderstood as the mere strengthening of social participation, but
rather, as the strengthening of the party system and of the institutional
regime. In reality, the potential of a genuine renovation of Bolivian
democracy rests upon the synergy of these elements.
Bolivian social and political leaders sense that the process of reforms
initiated in 1982 has reached its limits and also has begun to change. They
state that situation is related to the crisis of trust among parties, and between
parties and society. It also is related to the poor results of economic policies
and their social impact. Some leaders acknowledge certain political, social
and cultural progress in these different processes in certain periods.
However, they also warn of the reforms pending debts and limitations
regarding institutional development, justice, social integration and, especially,
the incapacity of the state in inspiring society with a vision of the future.
Faced with the dialectic between continuity and change, the party leaders,
despite distinct interests and nuances, feel that a transformation with the
framework of the model is possible. Meanwhile, social leaders tend to
support more radical criticisms of this model. Given the sharp differences in
the visions of change, the economic crisis, the lack of trust, and responses to
protest, and given the differences in proposals for the political and economic
future of the country, any politically solid solution requires agreements. These
agreements should revolve around concrete results and should include
participatory processes and social oversight that is broad, transparent and
public. Moreover, if the country wishes to make progress, it needs to unblock
special interests and propose shared goals of national interest.
The political leaders of the three majority parties agree that the crisis can be
resolved through changes in the party system. Leaders of minority parties,
meanwhile, show greater openness to the social sector, and even postulate
socio-political governability pacts. Social leaders share this last point,
although the most radicalized of them do not consider such pacts to be
possible.
but also, to insert the main issues of one side into the considerations of the
other. All the while it is important not to forget that the ultimate aim of
economic development is to develop the capabilities of people, communities
and societies.
The risk of these outlooks for the future of democracy is that they could turn
into exclusive movements from below in which identitary self-affirmation
takes the form of violent negation of others. The political, economic, social
and cultural exclusion to which these actors are endemically subjected could
thus internalize itself reactively, converting itself into a hard confrontation
between these groups and the state and the rest of society.
Human development not only aspires to reducing poverty levels, but also
aims to promote the important role of the poor themselves in the processes
that enable them to develop their capabilities and choices for carrying out
their life plans. Overcoming poverty is not only a question of economic or
productive resources; it is also a question of cultural respect and of the
authentic exercise of citizenship. Poor for the poor of Bolivia does not only
mean lacking resources, but also not having a community. It could be said
that the poor in Bolivian democracy are those that do not have citizenship.
For this reason, it is necessary to take into account the common perspectives
of the poor, to understand their perceptions and outlooks and how they
evaluate the institutional and social factors that have an impact on their
situation. This is especially necessary at the local and sectoral levels, since it
is here that the main limitations to democracy and development in Bolivia
reside. There are numerous testimonies that the Report collected regarding
this topic.
From there own perspective, the poor intensely feel and live a process of
political, economic and social deterioration. They react in distinct ways,
varying from fatalism or individualism to a willingness to participate and
deliberate. There is a clear demand among the citizens that speaks above all
to a quest for dignity. The poor want to be respected in all aspects of their
daily life. The demand for dignity, therefore, is both a condition of citizenship
and a task for politics. Only an active citizenship, promoted by the demand
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for dignity, will allow the excluded sectors to become central actors of human
development. Citizenship will allow them to define policies and strategies,
and, above all, to recuperate the dignity of those from whom it was robbed.
Regarding the state, the opinions expressed by the poor can be divided into
those that value and acknowledge the efforts to broaden social services that
have been made in recent years, and those that emphasize the exclusive
nature of many of these efforts. However, even in the cases where there is a
positive perception, there is a strong emphasis on demands for action that
will resolve the productive and economic problems that these families are
facing. There also is criticism of the type of projects promoted by authorities,
in that they do not meet the expectations of the population.
Regarding the demand for dignity, the feeling of a lack of respect from public
officials in daily life is common among the poor. There is a clear sense of
frustration towards systems of representation. This explains the constant
demand that leaders emerge directly from the community. In the case of
women, this lack of dignity is seen as an imbalance between their high level
of responsibility in the basic reproduction of society, and their low level of
representation and influence in public policy. In general, they feel that their
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dignity is stepped on twice: when they are humiliated in their protests, and in
the sharp inequalities in power relations at all levels.
The work with the focus groups has revealed four distinct categories seen as
options by the poor. The first is the statist option, in other words, the idea that
the state and the new state technocracy should solve the problems, while the
poor see themselves as passive beneficiaries. The second is the fatalist
option, which is expressed in a renunciation of both collective action and the
state solution. This can take the form of religious resignation, closed refuge
in the community, and the absence of a vision of the future. The third is the
individualist option, which does not call for the intervention of the state to
solve problems and relies on the high capability of individual action, without
taking into account collective projects. The forth is the communitarianist
option, which demands a high capability of collective action with intense
participation of the community.
However, the heterogeneity of the country in socioeconomic and sociocultural terms, as well as the results of the survey indicate that, while
these capabilities are very important, they are distributed unevenly. This
distribution varies according to socioeconomic and socio-cultural groups,
different areas and regions, and different generations. Some of these
capabilities even mutually exclude each other.
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II. Looking Toward the Future from the Perspective of the Present Critical
Juncture
The complex situation of the critical juncture facing Bolivia requires complex
responses. These responses will need to be based on an increase in the
reflective capabilities of the society, of its leaders and of its technical experts.
This reflective capability represents a permanent process of collective learning
by which the country enriches itself with visions of the future and paths to be
taken for converting these visions into reality. The last chapter of the Report
details four possible future scenarios based on socioeconomic and political
variables. The first scenario is that of chaos, and is characterized by extreme
fragmentation of conflicts. The second scenario is that of inertia; its basic
characteristic is relative continuity of the current situation. The third scenario is
that of limited reform; its fundamental characteristic is partial modernization of
politics and the economy. The fourth scenario is that of broad reform; its basic
characteristic is socially inclusive development based on deliberative
democracy.
The appendix at the end of this summary shows these scenarios in matrix form.
In the text that follows, an outline of policy suggestions for the fourth scenario is
developed, since the necessity for opening up deliberative spaces to all of
Bolivian society has been emphasized throughout the Report. In this
perspective, deliberation is presented as the means of bringing together
democratic citizenship with reflective learning. It is precisely here that
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The above also supports the argument that there exists a challenge that is
both ethical and practical. It requires the creation of a new development
ethic that is founded on the concept of the common good. It is
fundamental that Bolivians ask themselves what type of society would be
acceptable and possible the society in which they wish to live and raise
their children. They must ask themselves what would be the basic structure of
the moral and ethical order that society can propose and accept for itself,
without blindly subscribing to the standard model of growth and
macroeconomic stability. In this sense, deliberation can serve as a
magnificent resource that allows society to discuss possibilities and
directions of change. From this perspective, it is elemental to take on with
greater responsibility two demands expressed by all Bolivians: demands for
dignity and for trust, which must be reinstated in order to promote
political capabilities, but, at the same tame, must be reinstated in a
dynamic way so as to broaden deliberative spaces. Dignity fosters selfconfidence and is a requirement for trust in others. Thus, acknowledging
peoples dignity and rebuilding trust in society are fundamental conditions for
promoting human development.
The points mentioned above must be translated into concrete policies that
have as their final goal guaranteeing dignity. They also must be translated
into political imagination for conceiving virtuous dynamics in which citizen
dignity, institutional legitimacy and the distribution of opportunities of
development foster each other mutually.
How does one go about cultivating and harvesting trust in the above-defined
terms? Here political imagination is necessary. First, the education system
and the media can promote programs and campaigns that revolve around
trust. Second, trust can be stimulated by informal education programs,
community development and job training. Third, the example that social and
political leaders can provide is a key element. They can show that their
efforts are dedicated to the representation of social groups much more so
than to ingrained corrupt practices. Fourth, trust is built in the fulfillment of
productive agreements among different agents. Finally, people are infused
with trust when they are given responsibilities in various aspects of
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community life.
The state, which works for the public, would need to redouble its efforts to
foster capabilities to take action among the actors of development, and to
participate in agreements that result from deliberative processes.
From this perspective, the state must, as a result of pacts, devise policies for
at least the medium term. This is especially necessary during the present
critical juncture and state of change. The 2000 Report found a national
consensus on the need to resolve issues of pending modernization by means
of the building of strong and legitimate institutions. Another consensus
pertained to the need to radically decrease poverty. And a third was the need
to achieve a solid infrastructure for economic development.
At the same time, in order to promote these policies, the state should
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In this sense, the local level also has special importance in present
processes of globalization, especially to the extent that territorial issues are
the hinge connecting local-national networks and the virtual networks of the
network society.
In this context the state can try to broaden its role in globalization,
despite recent tendencies toward a loss of sovereignty. In this way,
solid social cohesion, promoted by policies directed toward socially
inclusive development, may be the best resource for the state to act in a
changing, uncertain world. That being said, studies on the role of the state
in globalization are still in their early phases in Bolivia.
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Political leaders are conscious of the need to strengthen social reforms for
the sake of development. Moreover, political leaders are concerned with
satisfying the minimum needs of employment and welfare that the people
demand, as well as improving levels of social participation and influencing
the results of development. However, the spaces of communication and
dialogue are weak, injured, sometimes forced and, above all, temporary in
nature. The state and civil society should strengthen a policy of agreements
and results with the goal of inclusive modernization, the development of
social capital, and the expansion of the institutional culture. This should be
done mainly at the local and sectoral levels.
In this area, there is not only a role for the political agenda. It also will be
useful to promote debates among intellectuals, artists and academics, and to
tie them to the social movements and civil societys demands. There is no
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SUMMARY OF SCENARIOS
FRAGMENTATION AND CONFLICT
THE STATE
POLITICS
SOCIETY
SOCIOECONOMIC
PANORAMA
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LEADERSHIP
COORDINATION OF
LEADERS
POLITICAL
CAPABILITIES OF
SOCIETY
CONDITIONS OF
STABILITY OF THE
SCENARIO
POLITICAL
CAPABILITIES OF
THE POOR
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