199. Babiera vs. Catotal, G.R. No.

138493, June 15, 2000

FACTS:
On September 20, 1996 Teofista Barbiera (TEOFISTA) was delivered by Flora Guinto in the
house of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera. Without their knowledge, Flora Guinto, the
housemaid of the spouses caused the registration/recording of the facts of Teofistas birth, by
simulating that she was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena, then
54 years old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging her signature.
Presentacion Catotal now asserts that she is the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio
Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa.
ISSUES:
Does respondent (Catotal) have standing to sue, given Article 171 of the Family Code which
states that the child's filiation can be impugned only by the father or, in special circumstances,
his heirs?
HELD:
Yes. Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." The interest of
respondent in the civil status of petitioner stems from an action for partition which the latter filed
against the former. The case concerned the properties inherited by respondent from her parents.
Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading
of this provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of
his wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring
of the mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to
petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child
of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present
action does not impugn petitioner's filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera,
because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place.
200. Tison vs. CA, G.R. No. 121027; July 31, 1997
FACTS:
Corazon Dezoller Tison and Rene Dezoller (petitioners) then filed an action for reconveyance
claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of a property by right of representation. During
the hearing, petitioners offered the following documentary evidence offered to prove their
filiation to their father and aunt, namely: a family picture, baptismal certificates, certificates of

destroyed records of birth of their father and aunt together with their death certificates,
certification of destroyed records of petitioners, and joint affidavits.
Private respondent responded by filing a demurrer to evidence which the CA granted.
ISSUE:
Is the question on legitimacy an issue that can be properly raised in the action for reconveyance
of herein questioned property?
HELD:
No. It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably
overlooked the universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. There is no presumption of
the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason
than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well settled is the rule
that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of Hermogenes
Dezoller cannot be properly controverted in the present action for reconveyance. This is aside, of
course, from the further consideration that private respondent is not the proper party to impugn
the legitimacy of herein petitioners. The presumption consequently continues to operate in favor
of petitioners unless and until it is rebutted.
Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved in this case, the burden of proof rests
not on herein petitioners who have the benefit of the presumption in their favor, but on private
respondent who is disputing the same. This fact alone should have been sufficient cause for the
trial court to exercise appropriate caution before acting, as it did, on the demurrer to evidence. It
would have delimited the issues for resolution, as well as the time and effort necessitated thereby.

201. Mariategui vs. CA, G.R. No. L-57062, January 24, 1992
FACTS:
Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages and died without a will. His descendants by his
first and second marriages (Petitioners) then executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby
they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163 of the Muntinglupa Estate. Aggrieved, Lupo's
children by his third marriage (Respondents) filed an amended complaint claiming that they were
deprived of their respective shares in the lots. They prayed, among others, that they be declared
as children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and an adjudication in their favor of their lawful shares
in the estate of the decedent.
ISSUES:

Did the private respondents, who belatedly filed the action for recognition, able to prove their
successional rights over said estate?
HELD:
Yes. Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be
established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.
Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth
certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence which tends to
disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two other
private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any of the
documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo
Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.
While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be inconsequential and lacking in substance as
to certain dates and names of relatives with whom their family resided, these are but minor
details. The nagging fact is that for a considerable length of time and despite the death of Felipa
in 1941, the private respondents and Lupo lived together until Lupo's death in 1953. It should be
noted that even the trial court mentioned in its decision the admission made in the affidavit of
Cresenciana Mariategui Abas, one of the petitioners herein, that " . . . Jacinto, Julian and Paulina
Mariategui
ay
pawang
mga
kapatid
ko
sa
ama . . ."
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents are
legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in
Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case. Corollarily,
prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for
partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or
impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition
does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532
[1982]).
202. Reyes vs. CA, 135 SCRA 439; G.R. No. L-39537; March 19, 1985
FACTS:
Irene Reyes then registered a document of self-adjudication claiming to be the illegitimate child
and sole heir of Francisco Delgado by virtue of which pieces of properties were acquired in her
favor. Respondents sought the reconveyance of the said properties and alleged that Irene Reyes
was never the illegitimate child of Francisco. The CA then ruled that although Irene Delgado was
the spurious daughter of Francisco Delgado, she nevertheless cannot inherit from the estate of

the deceased Francisco Delgado because she was not recognized either voluntarily or by court
action.
ISSUE:
Is there a need to be recognized voluntarily or by a court action in order for an illegitimate child
to inherit?
HELD:
Yes. Though the Civil Code is silent with respect to spurious children as to their recognition, this
Court, in applying the rules of recognition, applicable to natural children, to said spurious
children, declared in Clemea vs. Clemea, supra, that:
The considerations of fairness and justice that underlie the time limit fixed in Article 285 of the
Civil Code for actions seeking compulsory acknowledgment of natural children are fully
applicable, if not more, to actions to investigate and declare the paternity of illegitimate children
that are not natural. The motive that led the codifiers to restrict the period for bringing action for
compulsory recognition of natural children were stated by this Court in Serrano vs. Aragon, 22
Phil. 18, to be as follows:
... the writers of the code no doubt had in mind that there would arise instances
where certain illegitimate children, on account of the strong temptation due to the
large estates left by deceased persons, would attempt to establish that they were
natural children of such persons in order to get part of the property, and
furthermore, they considered that it is nothing but just and right that alleged
parents should have a personal opportunity to be heard. It was for these reasons
and others equally as well founded that Article 137 was enacted (p. 724).
There are two (2) general classifications of illegitimate children or those who are conceived and
born out of wedlock. They may be either natural (actually or by fiction) or spurious (the
incestuous, adulterous or illicit). Natural children are defined as those born outside of wedlock of
parents, who at the time of conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry each other (Article 269, New Civil Code). On the other hand, spurious children are those
born of parents, who at the time of their conception, are disqualified to marry each other on
account of certain impediment. Because of this basic distinction between these children, it is not
legally possible to classify unrecognized natural children under the class of spurious children.
Besides, commentators construe the phrase "illegitimate children other than natural" as excluding
from the grants of rights under Article 287 of the New Civil Code those children who are natural
child proper by birth and who have not secured voluntary or compulsory recognition They fag
within the scope of the definition of natural children enumerated in Article 269, New Civil Code.
Lastly, to follow petitioners' contention win not be in accordance with the consistent
pronouncements of this Court. It is an elementary and basic principle under the old and new
Civil Code, that an unrecognized natural child has no rights whatsoever against his parent or his

estate. His rights spring not from the filiation itself, but from the child's acknowledgment by the
natural parent.
203. Jison vs. CA, G.R. No. 124853, February 24, 1998
FACTS:
A case was filed by Monina Jison for recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco Jison who
is married to Lilia Lopez Jison. Monina alleged that she is the daughter of Francisco who
impregnated her mother Esperanza F. Amolar, who was then employed as the nanny of
francisco's daughter. She claims that she has openly and continuously possessed the status of an
illegitimate child of Francisco and that Francisco had also openly and continuously recognized
her as such.
The trial court categorized Moninas many evidences as hearsay evidence, incredulous evidence,
or self-serving evidence and ruled against Monina while the Court of Appeals decided in favor of
Monina and declared her to be the illegitimate daughter of Francisco.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the testimonies of Moninas witnesses were sufficient to
establish MONINA's filiation.
ISSUE:
Did Monina successfully establish her filiation under Article 172 par. 2 of the Family Code
(open and continuous possession of the status)?
HELD:
Yes. Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's, may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. The
Supreme Court sustained the findings of the CA that Monina was able to prove her illegitimate
filiation.
For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under Article 172 par. 2, a "high
standard of proof" is required. To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the
supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental
affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature
that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat
the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously.
By "continuous" is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not require any particular length
of time.
In deciding paternity suits, the issue of whether sexual intercourse actually occurred inevitably
redounds to the victim's or mother's word, as against the accused's or putative father's

protestations. In the instant case, MONINA's mother could no longer testify as to the fact of
intercourse, as she had already passed away. But the fact of Moninas birth and her parentage
may be established by evidence other than the testimony of her mother.
The testimonial evidence offered by MONINA, woven by her narration of circumstances and
events that occurred through the years, concerning her relationship with FRANCISCO, coupled
with the testimonies of her witnesses, overwhelmingly established that the following:
1) FRANCISCO is MONINA's father and she was conceived at the time when her
mother was in the employ of the former;
2) FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child through his overt acts and conduct
like sending her to school, paying for her tuition fees, school uniforms, books, board and
lodging at the Colegio del Sagrado de Jesus, defraying for her hospitalization expenses,
providing her with monthly allowance, paying for the funeral expenses of her mother,
acknowledging her paternal greetings and calling appellant his "Hija" or child, instructing
his office personnel to give appellant's monthly allowance, recommending her to use his
house in Bacolod and paying for her long distance telephone calls, having her spend her
long distance telephone calls, having her spend her vacation in his apartment in Manila
and also at his Forbes residence, allowing her to use his surname in her scholastic and
other records.
3) Such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested throughout the years
publicly, spontaneously, continuously and in an uninterrupted manner.
The totality of the evidence on record established Moninas filiation.
204. Mendoza vs. CA, 201 SCRA 675 , G.R. No. 86302; September 24, 1991
FACTS:
Teopista Toring Tufiacao (Respondent) claimed that she was in continuous possession of the
illegitimate status of a child by the direct acts of her father Casimiro Mendoza (Casimiro).
Casimiro however denied her claim and the trial court believed him and dismissed her complaint
for compulsory recognition. The Court of Appeals however reversed the judgment of the RTC
below.
ISSUE:
Was Teopista able to prove her continuous possession of her claimed status of an illegitimate
child of Casimiro Mendoza?
HELD:
No. To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is
necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not mean that

the concession of status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent
character while it continues. The possession of such status means that the father has treated the
child as his own, directly and not through others, spontaneously and without concealment though
without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate). There must be a showing of the permanent
intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear
manifestation of paternal affection and care.
With these guidelines in mind, we agree with the trial court that Teopista has not been in
continuous possession of the status of a recognized illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza,
under both Article 283 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code.
The plaintiff lived with her mother and not with the defendant although they were both residents
of Omapad, Mandaue City. It is true, as the respondent court observed, that this could have been
because defendant had a legitimate wife. However, it is not unusual for a father to take his
illegitimate child into his house to live with him and his legitimate wife, especially if the couple
is childless, as in this case. In fact, Vicente Toring, who also claimed to be an illegitimate child of
Casimiro, lived with the latter and his wife, apparently without objection from the latter. We also
note that Teopista did not use the surname of Casimiro although this is, of course, not decisive of
one's status. No less significantly, the regularity of defendant's act of giving money to the
plaintiff through Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza has not been sufficiently established.
The trial court correctly concluded that such instances were "off-and-on," not continuous and
intermittent. Indeed, the plaintiff s testimony on this point is tenuous as in one breath she said
that her mother solely spent for her education and in another that Casimiro helped in supporting
her.

205. Marcelo Lee vs. CA, G.R. No. 118387, October 7, 2001
FACTS:
Lee Tek Sheng have two (2) sets of children begotten of two (2) different mothers. One set, the
herein private respondents, are the children of Lee Tek Sheng with his lawful wife, Keh Shiok
Cheng. The other set, the petitioners herein, are allegedly children of Lee Tek Sheng and his
concubine, Tiu Chuan. During Lee Tek Shengs marriage with Keh Shiok Cheng however, he
made it appear in the birth records of his children with Tiu Chuan that they are also his children
with Keh Shiok Cheng. Thus, Respondents herein filed a petition for the cancellation and/or
correction of the false and erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth of petitioners by
deleting and/or canceling therein the name of "Keh Shiok Cheng" as their mother, and by
substituting the same with the name "Tiu Chuan", who is allegedly the petitioners' true birth
mother.
ISSUE:

Are the rules provided by Rule 108 on cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
inappropriate for impugning the legitimacy and filiation of the children?
HELD:
No. It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108
of the Revised Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. The
petitions filed by private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners' records of
birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for
Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth
records. Contrary to petitioners' contention that the petitions before the lower courts were
actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are
illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter's
children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok
Cheng and petitioners.
Further sanctioning private respondents' resort to Rule 108, the Court of Appeals adverted to our
ruling in the leading case of Republic vs. Valencia where we affirmed the decision of Branch XI
of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu City ordering the correction in the nationality
and civil status of petitioner's minor children as stated in their records of birth from "Chinese" to
"Filipino", and "legitimate" to "illegitimate", respectively. Although recognizing that the changes
or corrections sought to be effected are not mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous
nature, this Court, sitting en banc, held therein that even substantial errors in a civil register may
be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. In the said case, we also laid down the rule
that a proceeding for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the civil register under Rule 108
ceases to be summary in nature and takes on the characteristics of an appropriate adversary
proceeding when all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are complied with.
206. Liyao, Jr. vs. Tnahati Liyao, G.R. No. 138961, March 7, 2002
FACTS:
William Liyao, Jr (Petitioner), represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia then filed an
action for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of the late William Liyao against
Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao
(Respondents) to recognize and acknowledge William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the
deceased William Liyao and thus entitled to all successional rights the legitimate children of
William Yulo. The RTC ruled in favor of Petitioners but the CA reversed thus this petition.
ISSUE:
May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed
father, William Liyao?

HELD:
No. The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at
the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the
legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the
child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in
proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code.
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional
cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and
ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to
conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only
in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases,
none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory.
It is therefore clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad
litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner
William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper.