1. Lilius vs.

Manila Railroad
59 Phil. 758 (G.R. No. L-39587, March 24, 1934)
FACTS: Lilius was driving with his wife and daughter for sightseeing in Pagsanjan Laguna. It
was his first time in the area and he was entirely unacquainted with the conditions of the road
and had no knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing. Before reaching the crossing in
question, there was nothing to indicate its existence and, it was impossible to see an
approaching train. At about seven or eight meters from the crossing the plaintiff saw an
autotruck parked on the left side of the road. Several people, who seemed to have alighted from
the said truck, were walking on the opposite side. He slowed down and sounded his horn for the
people to get out of the way. With his attention thus occupied, he did not see the crossing but he
heard two short whistles. Immediately afterwards, he saw a huge black mass fling itself upon
him, which turned out to be locomotive No. 713 of the MRCs train. The locomotive struck the
plaintiffs car right in the center. The 3 victims were injured and were hospitalized.
Lilus filed a case against MRC in the CFI. Answering the complaint, it denies each and every
allegation thereof and, by way of special defense, alleges that the Lilius, with the cooperation of
his wife and coplaintiff, negligently and recklessly drove his car, and prays that it be absolved
from
the
complaint.
The CFI decided in favor of Lilius. The two parties appealed said decision, each assigning
errors
on
said
judgement.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Road Company is guilty of negligence and civilly liable.
RULING:
The court is of the opinion that the accident was due to negligence on the part of the defendantappellant company, for not having had on that occasion any semaphore at the crossing at
Dayap, to serve as a warning to passers-by of its existence in order that they might take the
necessary precautions before crossing the railroad; and, on the part of its employees the
flagman and switchman, for not having remained at his post at the crossing in question to warn
passers-by of the approaching train; the stationmaster, for failure to send the said flagman and
switchman to his post on time; and the engineer, for not having taken the necessary precautions
to avoid an accident, in view of the absence of said flagman and switchman, by slackening his
speed and continuously ringing the bell and blowing the whistle before arriving at the crossing.
Although it is probable that the defendant-appellant entity employed the diligence of a good
father of a family in selecting its aforesaid employees, however, it did not employ such diligence
in supervising their work and the discharge of their duties because, otherwise, it would have had
a semaphore or sign at the crossing and, on previous occasions as well as on the night in
question, the flagman and switchman would have always been at his post at the crossing upon
the
arrival
of
a
train.
The diligence of a good father of a family, which the law requires in order to avoid damage, is
not confined to the careful and prudent selection of subordinates or employees but includes
inspection of their work and supervision of the discharge of their duties.
2. Corliss vs. Manila Railroad
27 SCRA 674
FACTS: Plaintiffs husband was driving a jeep close to midnight at the railroad crossing in
Balobago, Angeles, Pampanga on February 21, 1957. Defendants train was passing by and
blew its siren. Plaintiffs husband slowed down his jeep but did not make a full stop. The jeep
collided with the locomotive engine of the train. Plaintiffs husband was injured and died as a
result of such injuries. Plaintiff brought an action for damages for the death of her husband.
ISSUE: WON the plaintiff can recover damages.
RULING:

NO. A person in control of an automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a regular road
crossing, and who does not exercise that precaution and that control over it as to be able to stop
the same almost immediately upon the appearance of a train, is guilty of criminal negligence,
providing a collision occurs and injury results. The accident was caused by the negligence of
plaintiffs husband and she was not allowed to recover.
3. Phoenix vs. IAC
G.R. No. 65295, 3/10/1987
- basis for saying that there is doubt in the application of the Last Clear Chance Doctrine
because of Art. 2179. However, the statements made on the Last Clear Chance Doctrine were
merely obiter
FACTS: Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails and dinner-meeting when he collided
with the dumptruck of Phoenix which was parked askew at the side of the road. Thus, Dionisio
filed an action for damages against Phoenix. Phoenix invoked the Last Clear Chance Doctrine:
Dionisio had the Last Clear Chance of avoiding the accident and so Dionisio, having failed to
take the last clear chance, must bear his own injuries alone
ISSUE: (1) Is the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applicable in the case at bar?
(2) Is Phoenix liable for the damage incurred by Dionisio notwithstanding the allegations
that the latter had no curfew pass and thus drove speedily with his headlights off?
RULING:
(1) NO. The Last Clear Chance doctrine of the Common Law was imported into our jurisdiction
by Picart vs. Smith but it is still a matter of debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its
way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. The doctrine was applied by Common Law because
they had a rule that contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a negligent plaintiff.
BUT in the Philippines we have Article 2179 of the Civil Code which rejects the Common Law
doctrine of contributory negligence. Thus, the court in this case stated that it does not believe
so that the general concept of Last Clear Chance has been utilized in our jurisdiction. Article
2179 on contributory negligence is not an exercise in chronology or physics but what is
important is the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the
risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. To say that Phoenix should
be absolved from liability would come close to wiping out the fundamental law that a man must
respond for the foreseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission.
-LCCD was not applied because the court thinks that it is not applicable in our
jurisdiction
(2) YES. The collision between the dump truck and Dionisio's car in all probability would not
have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or
reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of
injury for anyone driving down Gen. Luna St. and for having so created this risk, the truck driver
must be held responsible. Dionisio's negligence was only contributory, that the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury remained the truck driver's lack of due care. Petitioner Carbonel's
proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of his employer Phoenix in
supervising its employees properly and adequately.
In the interest of substantial justice, damages will be allocated on a 20-80% ratio with Dionisio
shouldering 20% and the balance of 80% to be solidarily borne by Carbonel and Phoenix to the
former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees shall be borne exclusively by
petitioners subject to reimbursement from Carbonel.
4. Gan vs. CA
165 SCRA 378 (G.R. No. L-44264, 9/19/1988)
FACTS:
* July 4, 1972: Hedy Gan was driving a Toyota Crown Sedan along North Bay Blvd., Tondo,
Manila.
* While driving two vehicles, a truck and a jeepney, are parked at the right side of the road.

* While driving, there was a vehicle coming from the opposite direction and another one who
overtakes the first vehicle.
* To avoid a head-on collision, Gan swerved to the right and as a consequence: (1) the front
bumper of the Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man who was pinned against the rear of the
parked jeepney and the jeepney moved forward hitting the truck (pedestrian declared DOA by
Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital); (2) Sedan was damaged on its front; (3) the jeep suffered
damages; (4) the truck sustained scratches.
* Gan was convicted of Homicide thru reckless imprudence.
* On appeal, the conviction was overturned to Homicide thru Simple Impudence.
* Petitioner now appeals said ruling.

ISSUE: WON Gan is criminally liable?

RULING: NO.
Test for determining negligence:
* Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed
foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be
pursued?
* If so, the law imposes the duty on the doer to take precaution against its mischievous
results and the failure to do so constitutes negligence.
HOWEVER, a corollary rule must be understood, that is the "Emergency Rule" which provides
that:
One who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time
to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been
a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence.
It presupposes sufficient time to analyze the situation and to ponder on which of the
different courses of action would result to the least possible harm to herself and to others.
The CA, in its decision, said that Gan should have stepped on the brakes when she knew the
car going in the opposite direction. And that she should not only have swerved the car she was
driving to the right but should have also tried to stop or lessen her speed so that she would not
bump into the pedestrian.
The SC held that the appellate court is asking too much from a mere mortal like the petitioner
who in the blink of an eye had to exercise her best judgment to extricate herself from a difficult
and dangerous situation caused by the driver of the overtaking vehicle.
The danger confronting Gan was real and imminent, threatening her vey existence.
She had no opportunity for rational thinking but only enough time to head the very
powerful instinct of self-preservation.
GAN is acquitted.
5. Picart vs. Smith
37 Phil. 809, 3/15/1918
FACTS:
* Amando Picart seeks to recover from defendant Frank Smith the sum of 31,100 as damages
alleged to have been caused by an automobile driven by Smith. The incident happened on Dec.
12, 1912, at the Carlatan Bridge, San Fernando, La Union.
* Picart was riding on his pony over the bridge. Before getting half way across, Smith
approached from the opposite direction driving his vehicle at 10 to 12 miles/hr.
* Smith blew his horn to give warning as he observed that the man was not observing rules of
the road. Smith continued his course and made two more blasts.
* Picart was perturbed by the rapidity of the approach that he pulled his pony to the right side of
the railing.
* As the automobile approached, Smith guided the automobile to its left, that being the proper
side of the road for the machine.

* Smith noticed that the pony was not frightened so he continued without diminution of speed.
* When he learned that there was no possibility for the pony to go on the other side, Smith drove
his car to the right to avoid hitting the pony, but in so doing the vehicle passed in a close
proximity to the horse that it became frightened and turned its belly across the bridge with its
head towards the railing. The horse was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of
the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its driver was thrown off with some violence.
* It showed that the free space where the pony stood between the automobile and the railing
was probably less than one half meters.
* The horse died and Picart received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and
required medical attention for several days.
ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence that gives rise to civil obligation to repair the
damage done to Picart and his pony.
RULING: YES. The court ruled that Smith is liable to pay Picart the amount of 200. The sum
is computed to include the value of the horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or
damage occasioned to articles of his apparel.
* In the nature of things, this change in situation occurred while the automobile was still
some distance away. From this moment it was no longer possible for Picart to escape being run
down by going to a place for greater safety.
* The control of the situation had then passed entirely to Smith, and it was his duty to
bring his car to an immediate stop or seeing no other persons on the bridge, to take the other
side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid collision. There was an appreciable
risk that a horse not acquainted with vehicles would react that way.
* The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used under the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence.
* The law in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary
conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman Law. the existence of negligence in a given
case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before
him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy or negligent in a man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
* A prudent man, placed in the position of Smith in the Court's opinion would have
recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk and would therefore
have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as a reasonable consequence.
6. Bustamante et al. vs. CA
G.R. No. 89880, 2/6/1991
FACTS:

April 20, 1983 6:30 am: a collision occurred between a 1947 model gravel and sand

truck driven by Montesiano and owned by Del Pilar and a Mazda passenger
bus driven Susulin along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite.
Front left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side

wall of the passenger bus, ripping off the wall from the driver's seat to the last rear seat.
Several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a result of the

injuries they sustained.

The bus was registered in the name of Novelo but was owned and/or operated

as a passenger bus jointly by Magtibay and Serrado.

Before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger bus were approaching each
other, coming from the opposite directions of the highway. While the truck was still about 30
meters away, Susulin, the bus driver, saw the front wheels of the vehicle wiggling. He also
observed that the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding this circumstance due to
his belief that the driver of the truck was merely joking, Susulin shifted from fourth to third
gear in order to give more power and speed to the bus, which was ascending the inclined

part of the road, in order to overtake or pass a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a
person along the shoulder of the highway.
RTC: liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary
CA: owner and driver of the sand and gravel truck appealed was granted

ISSUE: W/N the last clear chance can apply making the bus negligent in failing to avoid the
collision and his act in proceeding to overtake the hand tractor was the proximate cause of the
collision making him solely liable.

RULING:
NO. Petition is granted. CA reversed.

The doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have

placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to
recovery.
A person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident,

notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the
opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.
The principle of last clear chance applies in a suit between the owners and

drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility
from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt
the negligent driver and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of
negligence.
Since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding
vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners
and drivers of the colliding vehicles the court erred in absolving the owner and driver of the
cargo truck from liability.