ARTURO TOLENTINO AND ARTURO MOJICA VS.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
SENATOR RALPH RECTO AND SENATOR GREGORIO HONASAN
Facts
Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines,
the Senate on February 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill the
vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on May
14, 2001. Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. The
resolution further provides that the Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of
votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which
ends on June 30, 2004.
On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13
candidates as the elected Senators, with the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired term of 6
years and the 13th Senator to serve the full term of 3 years of Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr.
Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th.
Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition
for prohibition, praying for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005.
Issue
Whether or not the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified:
(1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and
(2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645.
Decision
(1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers
some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the
statutory
provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the
election a nullity.
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of
the special election is whether want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of
voters as would change the result of special election. If the lack of official notice misled a
substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill
vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters would be void.
(2) There is no basis in the petitioners claim that the manner by which the COMELEC
conducted the special Senatorial election on May 14, 2001 is a nullity because the COMELEC
failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the
special election. No such requirement exists in our election laws. What is mandatory under
Section 2 of R.A. 6645 is that the COMELEC fix the date of election, if necessary, and state
among others, the office/s to be voted for.
Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special election on May

14, 2001 merely implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84.
Initially, the original draft of said resolution as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad made no
mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by former Senator Guingona would be filled.
However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco, the Senate agreed to amend the
resolution by providing as it now appears, that the senatorial cabdidate garnering the 13th
highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto
Giongona, Jr.

Avelino vs Cuenco (G.R. No. L-2821)

FACTS: The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked
the court to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent,
Mariano Cuenco. In a session of the Senate, Tanadas request to deliver a speech in
order to formulate charges against then Senate President Avelino was approved.
With the leadership of the Senate President followed by his supporters, they
deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. The SP
with his supporters employed delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn the session then
walked out. Only 12 Senators were left in the hall. The members of the senate left
continued the session and Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting President
of the Senate and was recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the case.
2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved.
HELD:
1. The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the subject matter is political
in nature and in doing so, the court will be against the doctrine of separation of
powers. To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the
separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs.
Quezon, 46 Phil. 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil.
1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own
president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the
judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the
electors of the suspended senators were alleged affected without any immediate
remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the selection of the
presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time
to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must
imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his
remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the Supreme Court.
2. It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all
the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation
that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations
in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator
Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most
injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office
being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the
senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being

amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with
thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the
divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the
said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all
their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.

In the instant controversy, the petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution has not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They
also invoke the Courts judicial power to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of respondents.

SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD vs. SEN.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, G.R. No.
134577, November 18, 1998 Case Digest
FACTS:
On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular session of
the 11th Congress. On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Senator
Francisco S. Tatad and Senator Marcelo B. Fernan were nominated for the position of
Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator Fernan was duly elected President of the
Senate.

The Court took jurisdiction over the petition stating that It is well within the power and
jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives.

Thereafter, Senator Tatad manifested, with the agreement of Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who
had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority while those who voted for him,
belonged to the minority. During the discussion, Senator Juan M. Flavier also manifested
that the senators belonging to the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP -- numbering 7, and, thus, also a
minority -- had chosen Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader. No consensus
was arrived at during the following days of session.

The Court, however, did not find any violation since all that the Charter says is that "[e]ach
House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The court held that,
the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this
Court.

On July 30, 1998, the majority leader, informed the body that he received a letter from the
7 members of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona
as minority leader. The Senated President then recognized Senator Guingona as minority
leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the Supreme Court a petition
for quo warranto alleging that Senator Guingona has been usurping, unlawfully holding
and exercising the position of Senate minorit leader, a position that, according to them,
rightfully belongs to Senator Tatad.
ISSUES:
Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of
Senate minority leader?
Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent
Guingona as the minority leader?
RULING:
First Issue: Court's Jurisdiction

Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution

Petitioners claim that there was a violation of the Constitution when the Senate President
recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader.

Notably, Rules I and II of the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of
majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for
such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders
thereof. However, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in
the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid
of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative
thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may
not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature.
Third Issue: Usurpation of Office
For a quo warranto prosper, the person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to
the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or
unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a
clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. The specific
norms or standards that may be used in determining who may lawfully occupy the
disputed position has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate
itself in which the power has been vested. Without any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it
be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingonas assumption and
exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave
abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority

leader.
Fourth Issue: Fernan's Recognition of Guingona
Supreme Court held that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as
Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. The latter
belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By
unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was
recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent
Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides
were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, the Court believed that the Senate President cannot be
accused of capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment or of an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility. Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws
or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded
or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts
done within their competence and authority.
The Petition is DISMISSED.

Astorga v. Villegas
Astorga v. Villegas, April 30, 1974
Original action in the Supreme Court. Mandamus, injunction and/or
prohibition with preliminary mandatory prohibitory injunction. Denied.
Facts: House Bill No. 9266 which was filed in the House of Representatives
passed on 3rd reading without amendments. It was sent to the Senate for
concurrence and it was referred to the appropriate Senate Committee,
which recommended approval with a minor amendment recommended by
Senator Roxas. (instead of the City Engineer it be the President Protempore
of the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the
latter's incapacity to act as Mayor). When the bill was discussed on the
Senate Floor, substantial amendments to Section 1 was introduced by
Senator Tolentino, which amendments were approved in toto by the Senate.
Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives that
the House Bill had been passed by the Senate by the Senate with
amendments. Attached was a certification of the amendment, which was
the one recommended by Senator Roxas, and not the Tolentino
amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. House
of Representatives signified their approval. The printed copies were then
certified and attested to by the Secretaries of Senate and House of
representatives and the Senate President. The bill with the Roxas

amendments were signed by the president of the Philippines and it was

subsequently named RA 4065.
It was later made public by Senator Tolentino that the enrolled copy of HB
9266 signed into law by the President was a wrong version of the bill
actually passed by the Senate and approved on the Senate Floor. Senate
President admitted the mistake in a letter to the President. As a result, the
president sent a message to the presiding officer of both houses that he
was officially withdrawing his signature from HB 9266.
Mayor of Manila issued circulars ordering the disregard of the provisions
of RA 4605. He also issued an order recalling 5 members of the city police
who had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor presumably under the authority
of RA 4065. Vice Mayor Astorga filed this petition with the court.
Respondents contend that RA 4065 never became law since it was not the
bill actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that
body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of
the issue.
Issues: 1. WON the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is
conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment. 2. WON RA 4065 can be
considered as valid in the absence of the attestation required
Held: 1. No. Senate President declared that his signature on the bill to be
invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his
signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been approved by
the Senate. This declaration should be accorded greater respect than the
attestation that it invalidated. Certification that was made by the presiding
officer is merely a mode of authentication. The essential thing is the
approval of congress and not the signature of the presiding officers.
Function of attestation is not approval because a bill is considered approved
after it has passed both houses. Constitution does not even provide that the
presiding officer should sign the bill before it is submitted to the president.
Rationale of the enrolled bill theory the signing by the speaker of the
House of Representatives and by the president of the Senate, in open
session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses,
through their presiding officers, to the president, that a bill, thus attested,
has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the
government, and it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him.
(Field vs. Clark) Enrolled bill theory based mainly on the respect due to
coequal and independent departments which requires the judicial
department to accept as having passed Congress, all bills authenticate in
the manner stated.

2. No. Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but
he argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting that
it to have been validly made, would only mean that there was no
attestation at all but would not affect the validity of the statute. The
argument of the petitioner would limit the court's inquiry to the presence or
absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity
of the statute. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and
consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is
there to determine within the bill had been duly enacted? In such case, the
entry in the journal should be consulted. The journal discloses that
substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and
approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent
to the president and signed by him. Bill was not duly enacted and therefore
did not become law.
U.S. V. PONS, G.R. NO. L-11530 AUGUST 12, 1916
FACTS:
The defendant appellant Juan Pons et.al were charged with the crime of illegal
importation of opium,
Pon's counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the special session of
the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; that Act No. 2381,
under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on
the 28th of February but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the same is null
and void. The validity of the Act is not otherwise questioned. As it is admitted that the
last day of the special session was, under the Governor-General's proclamation,
February 28 and that the appellant is charged with having violated the provisions of
Act No. 2381, the vital question is the date of adjournment of the Legislature, and this
reduces itself to two others, namely, (1) how that is to be proved, whether by the
legislative journals or extraneous evidence and (2) whether the court can take judicial
notice of the journals.
Passing over the question whether the printed Act (No. 2381), published by authority
of law, is conclusive evidence as to the date when it was passed, we will inquire
whether the courts may go behind the legislative journals for the purpose of
determining the date of adjournment when such journals are clear and explicit. From
the foregoing it is clear that this investigation belongs entirely to that branch of legal
science which embraces and illustrates the laws of evidence.
In the case from which this last quotation is taken, the court cited numerous decisions

of the various states in the American Union in support of the rule therein laid down,
and we have been unable to find a single case of a later date where the rule has been
in the least changed or modified when the legislative journals cover the point. As the
Constitution of the Philippine Government is modeled after those of the Federal
Government and the various states, we do not hesitate to follow the courts in that
country in the matter now before us. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at
12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err
in declining to go behind these journals.
Affirmed the decision.
____________________________________________________________________
MORALES V. SUBIDO, 27 SCRA 792
FACTS: At the behest of Senator Francisco Rodrigo, the phrase "has served as officer
in the Armed Forces" was inserted in the proposed measure.
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's
degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National
Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of
captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate
who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer of the
Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
It is to be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was in the nature of an addition to the
phrase "who has served the police department of a city for at least 8 years with the
rank of captain and/or higher," under which the petitioner herein, who is at least a high
school graduate (both parties agree that the petitioner finished the second year of the
law course) could possibly qualify. However, somewhere in the legislative process the
phrase ["who has served the police department of a city or"] was dropped and only the
Rodrigo amendment was retained.
The present insistence of the petitioner is that the version of the provision, as
amended at the behest of Sen. Rodrigo, was the version approved by the Senate on
third reading, and that when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only
change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase "or has served as chief
of police with exemplary record".
In support of this assertion, the petitioner submitted documents to prove his
contentions:
It would thus appear that the omission whether deliberate or unintended of the

phrase, "who has served the police department of a city or was made not at any stage
of the legislative proceedings but only in the course of the engrossment of the bill,
more specifically in the proofreading thereof; that the change was made not by
Congress but only by an employee thereof; and that what purportedly was a rewriting
to suit some stylistic preferences was in truth an alteration of meaning. It is for this
reason that the petitioner would have us look searchingly into the matter.
The petitioner wholly misconceives the function of the judiciary under our system of
government. As we observed explicitly in our decision, the enrolled Act in the office of
the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that section 10 is
exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of

Printing. We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The
respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that we act upon the
faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of
their respective departments. Otherwise we would be cast in the unenviable and
unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth
of law-making with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.
The investigation which the petitioner would like this Court to make can be better done
in Congress.
The motions for reconsideration are denied.