Professional Documents
Culture Documents
GOVERNANCE AT
ARSENAL FOOTBALL
CLUB
Prepared by Corporate Governance Limited
for the Arsenal Supporters Trust
A review of
Corporate
Governance at
Arsenal Holdings plc
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Arsenal Supporters Trust has asked us to examine the way that the Arsenal Board is structured and run in
the context of modern corporate governance best practice. Discussions with the Trust identified the following
five key areas. Each is followed by a brief explanation of the underlying governance challenges.
Concern 1: Board Composition
An ageing Board, lacking in new blood and the breadth of professional skills required to run a modern, publicly
quoted football club with a first rate pedigree; no Directors have professional football experience.
Average age excluding Ivan Gazidis is 72.6 years, well in excess of accepted public company practice
Peter Hill-Wood & Kenneth Friar have been Board Members continuously for over 30 years, which is highly
unusual, although also reflects their life-long commitment to the club.
No member of the board has experience as a professional football coach, player or manager, despite that
being the Clubs main business.
No regular refreshing of the Board; no apparent succession plan
Concern 2: Conflicts of Interest
Only majority shareholders views are represented on the Board; obvious presence of potential major shareholder/
Director conflicts of interest
To our knowledge, there is no Relationship Agreement in place with major shareholders regarding potential
conflicts of interest. However, an authorisation process is covered in the Articles of Association
No commentary in 2012 Annual Report on how conflicts, or potential conflicts, are managed
Concern 3: Shareholder Accountability
Limited accountability to minority shareholders or fans. More effective 2-way dialogue required with them.
Chairman should be responsible for ensuring effective communication with shareholders
Non-Executive Directors should meet major shareholders: AST/Arsenal Fanshare and members effectively
comprise both the 4th largest shareholding in Arsenal Holdings plc and the lead representative role
No Senior Independent Director available to minority shareholders in the event that normal channels do not
function effectively
Despite regular meetings with the CEO, and despite representations made at the time of KSE UK Incs Offer
the Club, the majority shareholder has not met the AST (or any other supporters) since then
No apparent substantive dialogue with Arsenals second largest shareholder, Red & White Securities Ltd
2012 AGM proceedings imply a Board which is dismissive to minority shareholders
Good Corporate Governance and Investor Relations practice require transparency and proper dialogue with
shareholders, in turn generally reducing disquiet among shareholders/ fans
Concern 4: Power and Accountability of the Manager
Too many responsibilities and too much power is vested solely in the manager, reinforced by a lack of proper
decision-making processes and too few independent board members have professional football experience to assist
/ support the manager
No disclosure of Matters Reserved for the Board / Delegated Authority
No explanation of which matters are delegated to management; no formal identification of Group Executive
as referred to in 2012 Annual Report
No evidence of Non-Executive Directors scrutiny of whether management meet agreed goals and objectives
No disclosure of number of formal board or committee meetings, or attendance
Concern 5: Strategy
Major strategic decisions (eg focus on Financial Fair Play) do not appear to properly take into account the views of
all stakeholders, the company/ clubs short- and long-term interests, the appropriate balance of risks (including the
risk that FFP will not significantly change the landscape). Concentrated focus on FFP increases risks.
Shareholders are concerned that there is an excessive focus on a single self-sustainability/ FFP strategy,
which does not take into account shareholders non-financial objectives, ie football success
There should be a dialogue with shareholders based on the mutual understanding of objectives. The board as
a whole has responsibility for ensuring that this takes place
To be robust, this dialogue should include discussions about the alternatives to the Boards strategy,
including the merits of alternative capital structures, the likely results and the inherent risks
The elected strategy should be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of all
shareholders
Directors must also have regard to the impact of their actions on stakeholders including the community and
customers, and the likely consequences of any decision in the long term
1 -
INTRODUCTION
Background
A basic principle of the UK Corporate Governance Code makes clear that Boards of Directors are responsible for
the governance of their companies. The shareholders role in governance is to appoint the directors and the
auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance structure is in place.
The Arsenal Supporters Trust (AST) has asked Corporate Governance Ltd to examine concerns about the way
that Arsenal Holdings plc (the Club, Arsenal or the Company) is run, in the context of modern Corporate
Governance best practice.
We have reviewed the corporate governance of the Club, in conjunction with some key concerns expressed to us
by the AST. These concerns have been agreed with the AST Board and are not intended to be exhaustive. We
summarise them below. Each area is followed by analysis, expressed either in terms of the UK Corporate
Governance Code (UK Code) (which the Arsenal Board, according to the 2012 Annual Report, considers1 to be
the appropriate benchmark), or the requirements of the UK Companies Act 2006. Other corporate governance
best practice, such as the 2013 Quoted Companies Alliance Code specify a broadly similar approach, but are
generally less prescriptive and therefore a less useful benchmark.
In carrying out our review, our work has been based on published documentation and information provided by
AST. However, the absence of disclosure by Arsenal on certain key areas has restricted our ability to examine
governance practices in detail. The absence of this information in the public domain represents, in itself, a
contrast to best practice corporate governance.
About Corporate Governance Ltd / Conflicts Policy
CGL was established in 1990 and has considerable experience of working with and advising Boards on all
aspects of quoted company regulation and practice. CGL seeks to ensure that clients comply with statutory
requirements and best practice, thereby maximising trust and investor confidence within the quoted company
market.
CGL maintains absolute confidentiality over its clients affairs and treats every client independently. It is CGLs
standard practice to declare to clients all areas which it may consider to be a conflict of interest. CGL and AST
believe that CGL is entirely independent in the matters discussed herein. CGLs Directors are not members of, or
affiliated to, any UK or International football club.
Benchmarks
As a company listed on the ICAP Securities & Derivatives Exchanges (ISDX) Growth Market, Arsenal is only
required to comply with the ISDX Rules which have relatively light corporate governance provisions2. Arsenal
appears to comply with these rules. However, in its 2012 Annual Report, Arsenals directors acknowledge the
importance of the 2010 UK Corporate Governance Code and endeavour to comply with its requirements so far as
the directors consider is appropriate to a Group of the size and nature of Arsenal Holdings plc. For this reason,
the Code has been used as the main governance benchmark in this analysis.
We have not addressed aspects of Board Remuneration that may be more relevant in non-football companies.
Board remuneration does not appear to be a substantial concern of the AST and fans, particularly given the
relatively high levels of player salaries compared to Board members.
Being a football club, as well as being nearly 97% owned by two shareholders, does mean that certain rules may
be inappropriate or impractical. However, the Club is considered as setting a benchmark in football standards,
with a long tradition of respectable behaviour and leadership among its peers. Often termed the Bank of
England club of football, it would be reasonable to expect Arsenal to adhere to best practice in corporate
governance, as it does in other activities.
We consider that further areas of the Code could reasonably be adopted by Arsenal, particularly in the context of
a quoted (publicly-traded) company with a high public profile and a stock market value of around 1bn. While
strictly only a requirement under the Listing Rules (to which Arsenal is not subject), it would also be reasonable
to expect that a company adopting the Code voluntarily would disclose, within the spirit of the Code, those areas
with which it had chosen not to comply, and the reasons therefor. Taken together, we suggest that additional
disclosures and reasons for non-compliance would significantly enhance both the corporate governance at
Arsenal and its perception by shareholders and fans alike.
2 -
ARSENALS BOARD
There are no detailed biographies of the Board on Arsenals website or in its Annual Report. The following
information is extracted from publicly available information:
Peter Hill-Wood, 77, has been Chairman since 1982. He is a former vice Chairman of Hambros Bank and is the
third generation of his family to serve as Chairman of the Club. Most of his family shareholding was sold to
former vice-Chairman David Dein in the 1980s and 1990s, and the rest subsequently to KSE UK Inc (wholly
owned by fellow Director Stanley Kroenke).
Ken Friar, 78, is Acting Managing Director. He has served the Club in various capacities for over 60 years. He
was Company Secretary from 1973 and became Managing Director from 1983 to 2000. He stepped down from
this role to concentrate on the project of moving the Club from its previous stadium at Highbury to the Emirates
Stadium. He took up his current role in May 2008.
Ivan Gazidis, 48, is Chief Executive Officer. He is a lawyer who practiced in the USA and became, in 1994, a
founding member of the management team for Major League Soccer. He subsequently became Deputy
Commissioner. He joined Arsenal in 2009 and is a Law graduate from Oxford University, where he was twice
awarded a Football Blue.
Sir John Chips Keswick, 73, is a Non-Executive Director. He is a former Director of Hambros Bank, the Bank of
England and several listed UK companies. He is a graduate of the University of Aix-Marseilles.
Stanley Kroenke, 65, is a Non-Executive Director. He owns KSE UK Inc, which has been a shareholder in
Arsenal Holdings Plc since 2007, and now has a majority shareholding of 66.83%. Mr Kroenke also owns
Kroenke Sports Enterprises, which has interests in several US sports franchises and also owns the Pepsi Centre
in Denver and a regional television network.
Phillip Harris, Baron Harris of Peckham, 70, is Chairman of Carpetright plc and has over 40 years experience
in carpet retailing. He was appointed to the Arsenal Board as an independent Director in 2005. He was a nonexecutive Director of Great Universal Stores plc for 18 years to 2004 and was a Non-executive Director of
Matalan for 2 years until 2007.
3 -
reflect the nature of its supporter base, and corporate governance best practice, the Nomination Committee
should also consider the diversity of the board, including gender.
The near life-long commitment and loyalty to the Club of Mr Hill Wood and Mr Friar is not, in any way,
questioned by the AST. However, given their long tenure, it would be perceived as better practice for these two
Directors to stand for re-election every year at the Clubs AGM and also for Arsenal to explain the specific
rationale pertaining to the longstanding appointments.
The Code requires a Board to have plans to be in place for orderly succession 7, to maintain an appropriate
balance of skills and experience and ensure progressive refreshing of its composition. The first point is dealt
with later, but we note that, despite the relatively static nature of the Boards composition, there is no disclosure
of whether the Nomination Committee has plans for orderly succession or progressive refreshing8 of the board.
While we would not expect publicly traded companies to publish such plans in detail, it would be reasonable to
expect the Nomination Committee to expand the disclosures in the Report and Accounts on this area.
Composition / balance of skills
While the Board may well possess a broad and deep balance of the skills which it (or its Nomination Committee)
believes are required to successfully meet its strategic objectives, there is little biographical information in
Arsenals governance disclosures on its website, Annual Report, or AGM notice. This gives rise to reasonable
questions over the independence9 of Non-Executive Directors, the Boards performance evaluation10 processes,
and the Boards analysis of its performance, effectiveness or balance of skills11 which are not answered by the
Clubs own disclosures.
There is no disclosure as to which Directors are considered independent, nor reasons stated as to how
independence is determined. Instead, shareholders must rely on external 3rd party sources to determine such
matters. We note that no member of the Board appears to have on-pitch experience as a professional football
coach, player or manager, despite that being the Clubs main business. Shareholders might therefore question
the effectiveness of, and balance of skills on, the Board.
4 -
5 -
6 -
CONCERN 5: STRATEGY
Major strategic decisions (eg focus on Financial Fair Play) do not appear to properly take into account the views of
all stakeholders, the company/ clubs short- and long-term interests, the appropriate balance of risks (including the
risk that FFP will not significantly change the landscape). Concentrated focus on FFP increases risks.
A companys Board is entitled to determine its strategy. However, it is best practice to ensure that the elected
strategy is representative of shareholders views. This should be done through a dialogue with shareholders
based on the mutual understanding of objectives.32 It is the responsibility of the Board as a whole to ensure that
this takes place satisfactorily.33 A Board must weigh up the balance of risks and opportunities and determine the
strategy which best meets the objectives of the Company. Furthermore, Directors must have regard to the
impact of their actions on stakeholders, including the community and customers, and the likely consequences of
any decision in the long term. This requirement is enshrined in UK company law.34
We note there is concern from shareholders, including the second largest shareholder, Red & White Securities,
that35 Arsenals chosen strategy is leading to the loss of our best players [and causes] players themselves to
question their future it just does not allow [the] manager to fully realise his managerial talent and deliver success
for the fans who are paying the [UKs] highest [ticket] prices. They further state that success means winning
trophies.
The Directors of Red & White Securities also note that the Boards strategy has resulted in the Club having tight
finances. [Dealing] with the Clubs tight finances comes at the expense of performance of the pitch. They
continue by suggesting that winning trophies are key to the commercial success of the Club. Red & Whites
Directors further explain their solution as the stated policy for the major shareholders [is] to inject equity
into the Club to reduce the debt
While it is not our role to question the Boards strategy, the above views, combined with the views of the AST
and others, suggest that shareholders are concerned that there is an excessive focus on a single strategy of selfsustainability/ and focus on FFP, which does not adequately take into account shareholders views, ie nonfinancial objectives such as football success.
While Arsenals Board may have conducted detailed financial and strategic analysis and scenario planning
(including discussions regarding capital structure) before embarking on a particular strategy, it would be best
practice for a listed company to share a summary of such analysis with its major shareholders and engage in
discussion with them regarding this strategy, particularly where a major shareholder expresses dissatisfaction
with that strategy, or the level of disclosure of it.
Shareholders may reasonably challenge a Board if its chosen strategy appears to not be fully justified as being
the most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its [shareholders] as a whole
including the likely consequences of any decision in the long term. We also note that under the version of the
Code which becomes effective later this year, the Directors should state that they consider that the Annual
Report ... provides the information necessary for shareholders to assess the companys strategy 36.
Furthermore, we note that parts of the community and customers (in particular, fans and supporters groups
such as the AST) consider that the Clubs strategy carries significant risks. Absence of regular communication
with such groups leaves the Board open to challenge by those groups and to suggestions that it has not properly
considered the impact of its strategy on the community and customers, and the long-term consequences for the
company.
We note the disclosures on Strategy and Risk & Uncertainties in the Annual Report. However, in the context of
contrary opinion from the AST and fans, it would benefit the Companys relationships with its shareholders to
increase the level of disclosure in this area and evidence dialogue with all shareholders.
7 -
CONCLUSIONS
In our view, there is room for greater disclosure and transparency of Arsenals corporate governance practices,
considering the size and nature of Arsenal Holdings plc. Such an approach would strengthen and improve the
relationship that the Club has with its shareholders and fans alike, and support the discipline of being a listed
company. Properly executed, it should reduce shareholders and fans perception of poor governance at the
Club. In a modern environment, greater engagement and transparency is expected by shareholders and fans
alike, particularly for an organisation which seeks to set an example of behaviour to its competitors and the
public.
2. Disclosure
We recommend that Arsenal should consider improving its disclosure, both in the Report & Accounts, and on the
website, in the following areas:
- Greater disclosure on the composition, performance evaluation and policy for refreshing the board
- Further disclosure on, and explanation of, the Boards strategic decision-making.
- Explaining in detail how power is shared between the Board and its manager, and where
accountability ultimately lies for key decisions taken.
- The policy for managing conflicts of interest.
4. Shareholder Engagement
Shareholders have a right to be consulted in relation to the Companys strategy and governance. Increasing the
range of Directors who would be willing to meet with the Clubs 5-10 largest shareholders, over the long term
would be in line with standard practice and would not present a significant time burden on those Directors.
At Arsenals AGM, members rights to ask questions orally should be formally acknowledged by the Board and
there should be an open dialogue, with the objective of improving perception of the Boards transparency and
responsibility to all shareholders.
8 -
Footnotes
Source: Arsenal Holdings plc Annual Report 2012, page 34 The Directors acknowledge the importance of the 2010 UK Corporate
Governance Code and endeavour to comply with its requirements so far as the directors consider is appropriate to a Group of the size and
nature of Arsenal Holdings plc.
2 ISDX Growth Market Rules for Issuers October 2012. In the context of corporate governance, principally Rules 69 & 70, and Guidance
Note 70.1 which states that in complying with [these] rules, and more generally, an issuer should have due regard to the principles laid
down by the [UK Corporate Governance Code], insofar as appropriate in relation to the nature and size of the issuer.
3 Source: Various data sources including (i) MWM Consulting Executive Search Market Update 2012 (avg Chairman age 63); (ii) RTF
Navigator/ Daily Telegraph Executive Pay Report 2010 (avg FTSE-350 Director age 58); (iii) Grant Thornton Corporate Governance Review
2012 (avg Chairman 63 / FTSE-350 Non-Exec 58.7)
4
Source: Grant Thornton as above
5 UK Corporate Governance Code (Code) Provisions B.2.3 and B.7.1.
6 Annual Report 2012, page 34
7 Code Supporting Principle B.2
8 Code Supporting Principle B.2
9 Code Provisions B.1.1 / UK Companies Act 2006 section 173. In this, and other, references, there is no suggestion that the Directors do not
comply with their duties under the Companies Act 2006.
10 Code Main Principle B.6
11 Code Principles B.1 & B.6
12 UK Companies Act 2006 section 175. Section 177 may also apply
13 Articles 92/93 of Arsenal Holdings plc Articles of Association
14 Investor Relations Society Best Practice
15 Code Supporting Principle A.3
16 Code Provision E.1.1
17
Code Supporting Principle E.1
1
18
19
20
21
Letter from KSE, UK, Inc. to Arsenal Shareholders dated 6 May 2011, within the Offer Document for the Recommended Mandatory Cash
Offer by KSE, UK, Inc. for Arsenal Holdings plc.
22
Red & White Securities letter to Arsenal Board, dated 5 July 2012
23
36
UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) Provision C.1.1 to apply from 1 October 2013
9 -