Wassmer vs.

Velez 12 SCRA 648

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
FACTS: In 1954, Beatriz Wassmer and Francisco Velez arranged their marriage to be held on September 4 of
the same year. The bride-to-be has been devoted with all the preparations for their wedding. However, two days
before their marriage, Paking left a note that they must postpone the marriage for his mother was against it. A
day before their wedding, Paking wrote again that the wedding shall push through. Worse, Paking did not show
up on their wedding day causing Wassmer to be publicly humiliated.
The breach of promise to marry made by Velez prompted Wassmer to file a civil suit against the former. Velez
never filed an answer, thus, awarding moral and exemplary damages to Wassmer. Velez appealed on the court
and stated that he failed to attend the wedding day because of fortuitous events. He also insisted that he cannot
be civilly liable for there is no law that acts upon the breach of promise to marry. He also contested the award of
moral and exemplary damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not moral or exemplary damages may be awarded in a breach of promise to marry suit.

HELD: A mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. Howver, Wassmer has already made
preparations for the wedding. Velezs failure to appear on the wedding day is contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy which is embodied on Article 21 of the Civil Code. Under the law, the injured party is entitled
to moral damages as well as to exemplary damages because Velezs acted in wanton, reckless and oppressive
manner (Article 2232) in breaching his promise to marry Wassmer.
APOLONIO TANJANCO VS. COURT OF APPEALS & ARACELI
FACTS:
Apolonio Tanjanco courted the plaintiff Araceli Santos BOTH BEING OF ADULT AGE: that the defendant
expressed and professed his undying love and affection for plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the
tender feelings: that in consideration of the defendants PROMISE OF MARRIAGE plaintiff consented and
acceded to defendants pleas for carnal knowledge(sexual intercourse) which later Araceli Santos conceived a
child. Apolonio REFUSED TO MARRY Araceli as promised and refrained from seeing the plaintiff which led
to her suffering from mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feeling, moral shock and social
humiliation. The plaintiff asked that the defendant recognize the child she was bearing; to pay her not less than
P430 a month for her support plus P100,000 in moral and exemplary damages plus 10,000 attorneys fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a breach of promise of marriage can bring any action for damages in court. Whether or not
seduction has been an element in the relationship between Apolonio and Arceli
RULING: NO case can be made since the plaintiff Araceli was a woman of adult age, maintained intimate
sexual relations with appellant with repeated acts of intercourse. Such is not compatible to the idea of seduction.
Plainly, there is voluntariness and mutual passion: for had the appellant been deceived she would not have again
yielded to his embraces much less for one year without exacting fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage
and she would have cut all relationship upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. One
cannot be held liable for a breach of promise to marry.

De Jesus vs Syquia
FACTS:
Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the
defendants brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age and an unmarried
scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber shop. He got
acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous relationship.As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby
boy was born on June 17, 1931.
In the early months of Antonias pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On February 1931, he even wrote
a letter to a rev father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be given to the child. Though
he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to eat on time for her and
juniors sake. The defendant ask his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at
St. Joseph Hospital in Manila.
After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila where they
lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed
and he was married with another woman at this time.
It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge of the arrangement
of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant to Antonia during her
pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.
2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status
of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this
case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco.
HELD:
The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other letters are sufficient to
connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is that the writing shall be
indubitable.
The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural
child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's resolution to admit the status.
Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia Loanco for
supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no
proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita
Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed to
Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per month. They likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court
who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of pension.

In re Santiago (1940)
Original Action in the Supreme Court. Malpractice.
Facts:
In this administrative case, the Solicitor General charged the respondent Atty. Roque Santiago with malpractice
and prayed that disciplinary action be taken against him.
The respondent gave legal advice to one Ernesto Baniquit who was living separately from his wife for some
nine consecutive years and seeking to contract a second marriage. The respondent assured Baniquit that he
could secure a separation from his wife and marry again. The lawyer prepared a document (Exhibit A) stating
that the contracting parties, husband and wife, were authorized to marry again and at the same time giving the
authorization to renounce or waive each members right against the party marrying.
The notary let the husband and wife execute and acknowledge the document and declared that they were again
single and as such could contract another marriage. Relying on this document, Baniquit contracted a second
marriage. The respondent, upon realizing his mistake, sent for the parties and let them sign the deed of
cancellation (Exhibit C) a month later but after the second marriage of Baniquit.
Issue:
1. Did the lawyer commit malpractice in his acts regarding the dispensation of such advice and preparation of
document?
2. Is the document regarding separation (Exhibit A) valid?
Held:
1. Yes. The advice given by the respondent and his preparation and acknowledgment by of the contract
constitute malpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice of law.
2. No. Marriage separation should have should be sanctioned in the proper court and before the separation (see
Selanova). Apart from this, the document subverts the vital foundation of the family, marriage, and is contrary
to law, morals and public policy.
Decision: Respondent suspended from practice of law for one year.
Dicta:
As a response to Baniquits question, Santiago remarked that he would tear the diploma off the wall if the
document did not turn out to be valid.
B.
Santiago was ignorant of the applicable provision of the law or carelessly negligent in giving legal advice.
C.
The admission to the practice of law dependent on a lawyers remaining as a fit-and-safe person to society.
Once he becomes unsafe or unfit to be entrusted with obligations, his professional privilege should be
terminated.
A.

SELANOVA VS MENDOZA
Facts:
Selanova charged Judge Mendoza with gross ignorance of the law for preparing and ratifying a document extra
judicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of the complainant and his wife. One condition of the liquidation
was that either spouse would withdraw the complaint for adultery or concubinage which each had filed against
the other and that they waived their right to prosecute each other for whatever acts of infidelity either one would
commit against the other. Respondent relied on Art 191 of the old Civil Code that states the husband and wife
may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval.
The judge ratified the document without judicial approval from CFI Negros where the couple was residing,
making it void assuming arguendo that Art. 191 is still in effect.

Issue:
WON the agreement separating the conjugal property and the spouses is void.
Held:
It is void. Under Art. 221 of the Civil Code, the following shall be void:
Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife; Every extrajudicial agreement during marriage,
for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community property between husband
and wife.
While adultery and concubinage are private crimes, they are crimes punishable by the RPC, and a contract
legalizing their commission is contrary to law, morals and public order, and as a consequence not judicially
recognizable.
A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of
the spouses and extrajudically dissolving the conjugal partnership. Notaries were severely censured by this
Court for notarizing documents which subvert the institutions of marriage and the family
To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family, the law considers as void "any contract for personal
separation between husband and wife" and "every extrajudicial agreement, during the marriage, for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership" (Art. 221, Civil Code). Before the new Civil Code, it was held that the
extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial sanction was void.
Jones v Hallahan (1973)
Facts:
Marjorie Jones and her partner are female appellants who tried to acquire a license to marry; this was denied to
them by the Jefferson Circuit Court. As a result, they appeal from this judgment at the Court Appeals.
The appellants, each of whom is a female person, seek review of a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court
which held that they were not entitled to have issued to them a license to marry each other. Appellants contend
that the failure of the clerk to issue the license deprived them of three basic constitutional rights, namely, the
right to marry; the right of association; and the right to free exercise of religion. They also contend that the
refusal subjects them to cruel and unusual punishment.
The sections of Kentucky statutes relating to marriage do not include a definition of that term. It must therefore
be defined according to common usage. The claim of religious freedom cannot be extended to make the
professed doctrines superior to the law of the land and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto
himself. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145. We do not consider the refusal to issue the license a
punishment.
In substance, the relationship proposed by the appellants does not authorize the issuance of a marriage license
because what they propose is not a marriage. Affirmed
Issue:
WON two persons of the same sex can enter marriage.

Held:
No, They cannot. Kentucky statutes do not have a definition of marriage. The Court of Apeals turned to
common usage of the term and found marriage to be defined the Websters New international Dictionary as:
A state of being married, or being united to a person of persons of the opposite sex as husband and wife ; also,
the mutual relation of husband and wife; wedlock; abstractly the institution whereby men and women are joined
in a special kind of social and legal dependence, for the purpose of founding and maintaining a family.
In the absence of a specific provision in Kentucky statutes that prohibited marriage between persons of the same
sex or whether they issue a license for same sex couples who want to get married, the Court of Appeals turned
to customs and concluded that marriage has been defined and understood through time as a union between a
man and a woman only.
As a result, appellants cannot avail for themselves of a license to marry because the status they are trying to
enter is a nullity.
Moreover, the right to marry of two persons of the same sex is not constitutionally guaranteed and cannot be
invoked in connection with religious freedom. The latter is concomitant with the constitution being superior to
professed doctrines and the prevention a citizen becoming a law unto himself.
Decision:
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
Dicta:
A. Even if the appellants concealed the fact that they were of the same sex and successfully given a license, the

resulting relationship (owing to the definition) would not be a marriage.

B. No constitutionality issue because there is no Consti sanction on the right of marriage between persons of the
same sex.
C. In essence, the relationship proposed by the appellants doesnt authorize issuance of marriage license
because what they propose is not a marriage.
D. Case of first impression in Kentucky- Baker vs. Nelson dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.
E. Refusal to issue a license not a punishment
F. Court of Appeals not presented with an authority to subvert a permanent union between a man and a woman.
Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health
Facts
In Mass., a gay and lesbian support organization (GLAD) sued the states Department of Health for their failure
to issue same-sex married couples a marriage license. GLAD sued under the equal protection clause. GLAD
also argued that there are many other benefits accompanying a marriage license, such as property rights and tax
benefits which same-sex couples unjustly cannot receive. The state of Mass. argued that there was a legitimate
governmental interest in discriminating on the basis of gender, in that the institution of marriage existed to
promote procreation; and because same-sex couples could not further than goal, the state had an interest in
disallowing their marital rights. The state also argued that there were parental benefits in promoting different
sex relationships. Finally, the state argued that there would be administrative inconvenience in suddenly
allowing same sex couples to marry.

Issue
Whether the denial of a marriage license to same sex couples violates the equal protection clause and/or the
Mass. state constitution.
Holding/Analysis
Yes, the law is invalid and same sex couples shall be allowed marital rights in the state of Mass. The court
wrote that the states arguments for denying marital rights to same sex couples did not supply enough
justification in terms of the governmental interest sought in their procurement. The court argued that modern
day technology and fertilization techniques nullified the procreation argument. Same sex couples, through
adoption of other fertilization methods could procreate.
Secondly, the court found no productive argument favoring the notion that same sex couples were inferior
parents to children. Finally, the court believed the state did not demonstrate adequate administrative difficulty
to fully deny a single class of citizens their basic marital rights. As such, the state failed to supply their
legitimate governmental interest burden.
Baker v. State of Vermont
Facts:

Plaintiffs are three same-sex couples who have lived together in committed relationships for periods
ranging from 4-25 years.
Two couples have raised children together.
Each couple applied for a marriage license and was denied as ineligible.
The brought suit, calling the constitutionality of the same-sex ban into question.
Trial court denied P's claim, ban constitutional.

Supreme Court of VT reversed, ban unconstitutional.

Issues:
May Vermont treat opposite-sex and same-sex couples differently for purposes of marriage?
Holding/Rule:
Vermont may not treat opposite-sex and same-sex couples differently for purposes of marriage.
Test to be applied
Who is being discriminated against? Who is being excluded?
Does the government have a substantial purpose or reason to draw such classification that includes some and
excludes others?
If so, does the law in question bear a reasonable and just relation to the government's purpose? Factors to
consider
The significance of the benefits and protections of the challenged law whether the omission of members of the
community from the benefits and protections of the challenged law promotes the government's stated goals,
Whether the classification is significantly under-inclusive or over-inclusive
The statute here excludes same-sex couples who wish to marry.
The governmental purpose to be served is in furthering the link between procreation and child rearing.
Allowing same-sex unions would diminish society's perception of the link between procreation and child
rearing. Would advance the notion that fathers or mothers are mere surplusage to the functions of procreation
and child rearing. While these are valid interests, these interests are not being furthered by the law in quesiton.
Opposite-sex couples marry and do/can not have children.

The Vermont legislature has acted affirmatively to remove legal barriers so that same-sex couples may legally
adopt and rear the children conceived through in-vitro and other such methods.
Thus, the marital exclusion treats persons who are similarly situated for purposes of the law, differently.
There is no rational basis to conclude that a same-sex couple's use of technology to have children would
undermine the bonds of parenthood or society's perception of it.
Additionally, the means (law) are not reasonably related to achieving the government's purpose.
The right to marry confers tons of rights on a couple.
These rights are of such significance that statutory exclusion must necessarily be grounded on public concerns
of sufficient weight that the justice of deprivation cannot seriously be questioned. That is not the case here.
History cannot be invoked to block same-sex marriage; recent legislation has given same-sex couples more and
more rights.
Dissent:
Not really a dissent, wants to go farther
This law is unconstitutional not only under Vermont law but also under the 14th Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. This is a straightforward case of sex discrimination
PEOPLE VS. SANTIAGO
FACTS:
On November 23, 1926, herein appellant Felipe Santiago raped Felicita Masilang, his wifes niece, in an
uninhabited place across a river in Gapan, Nueva Ecija. After the deed, he took her to the house of his brother,
Agaton Satiago, who in turn fetched a protestant minister who there and then officiated the ceremony of their
marriage. After having given money by Felipe, Felicita proceeded home to her father and told what had just
occurred.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage executed by the protestant minister is of legal effect.
HELD:
The marriage ceremony was a mere ruse by which the appellant hoped to escape from the criminal consequence
of his act. It shows that he had no bona fide intention of making her his wife and the ceremony cannot be
considered binding on her because of duress. The marriage was therefore void for lack of essential consent, and
it supplies no impediment to the prosecution of the wrongdoer.
EIGENMANN V GUERRA
MARRIAGE; VALIDITY; LICENSE WRONGFULLY OBTAINED DOES NOT INVALIDATE
MARRIAGE; REASON. - A marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was
wrongfully obtained. Lack of authority on the part of the subscribing officer would not render the marriage void
where the essential requirements for its validity were present. This irregularity is primarily the lookout of the
subscribing officer or his superior (San Gabriel, et al. vs. San Gabriel, Jr., CA-G.R. No. 23729-R, Nov. 27,
1959). This must be so, for the local civil registrar who issues the marriage license is not required to inquire into
the authority of the officer administering the oath, and neither is the person solemnizing the marriage required
to investigate as to whether or not a marriage license, which appears to have been issued by a competent
official, was legally obtained.

What the law declares as null and void are marriages solemnized without a marriage license
REPUBLIC VS. ALBIOS
FACTS:
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married, as evidenced by a Certificate of
Marriage. On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage
with Fringer, alleging that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife
because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their
essential marital obligations.
Fringer did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to
admit her pre-trial brief. After the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did
not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule.
The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The RTC opined that the parties married each other for
convenience only. Albios stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire
American citizenship and that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00. However,
she did not pay Fringer $2,000.00 because the latter never processed her petition for citizenship The OSG filed
an appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent
was lacking.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship void ab
initio on the ground of lack of consent?
HELD: The marriage between the parties is valid
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, established the principal test for
determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a Marriage is a sham if the bride
and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married. This standard was modified
with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the
couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration
laws of the United States. The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to
determining the intention of evading immigration laws. It must be noted, however, that this standard is used
purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a
marriage.
In the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, which declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the
husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided merely because the
marriage was entered into for a limited purpose. The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee, further
recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non-subsisting one.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A reely given consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,
intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be

capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of
their act.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and
intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as
nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious
purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to
fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was
necessary to accomplish their goal.
Petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.

NAVARRO VS DOMAGTOY
FACTS:
Complainant Mayor Rodolfo Navarro of Dapa, Surigao del Norte filed this case to the Supreme Court against
respondent Judge Henando Domagtoy of MCTC of Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte, for gross misconduct as
well as inefficiency and ignorance of the law.
First, on Sept. 24, 1994, Judge Domagtoy solemnized the marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja despite
his knowledge that Tagadan was merely separated from his wife. Second, her performed a marriage ceremony
between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario in October 1994 at respondent judges residence in Dapa,
SDN. As to the first, Domagtoy contended that he merely relied on the affidavit issued by the RTC Judge of
Bassey, Samar, which stated that Tagadan and his wife have not seen each other for almost seven
years. However, the certified true copy of the marriage contract between Tagadan and Borja showed that his
civil status was separated.
ISSUE:
(1)Whether or not a court may solemnize another marriage of a husband who was merely separated from his
wife for almost seven years. (2) Whether or not a Judge may solemnize a marriage at his residence.
HELD:
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides that a marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under
the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall
be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the declaration of presumptive
death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains to be married to Pearanda. Wittingly or unwittingly, it was
manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joind affidavit submitted by Tagadan. Such
neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous and therefore void marriage.

(2) Art. 7. A marriage may be solemnized by (1) any incumbent member of the judiciary within the
courts jurisdiction xxx . Article 8, however, states that marriages shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers
of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or
vice consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death
or in remote places in accordance with Art. 29 of the Family Code, or where both parties in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote
place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge is the authority of the
solemnizing officer. Under Art. 8, which is only a discretionary provision, refers only to the venue of the
marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the
preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdiction may officiate in marriages only within said areas and not
beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in
the formal requisite laid down in Article 3 which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative liability.Judge Domagtoy was suspended for six months for
demonstrating gross ignorance of the law.
Aranes vs Judge Occiano
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes charged respondent Judge Occiano with gross ignorance of the law. Occiano
is the presiding judge in Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, he solemnized the marriage of Aranes and
Dominador Orobia on February 17, 2000 at the couples residence in Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside
his territorial jurisdiction and without the requisite of marriage license. It appeared in the records that petitioner
and Orobia filed their application of marriage license on January 5, 2000 and was stamped that it will be issued
on January 17, 2000 but neither of them claimed it. In addition, no record also appeared with the Office of the
Civil Registrar General for the alleged marriage.
Before Judge Occiano started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents and first refused to conduct
the marriage and advised them to reset the date considering the absence of the marriage license. However, due
to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors and fear that the postponement of the wedding might
aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from stroke, he solemnized the marriage on the
assurance of the couple that they will provide the license that same afternoon. Occiano denies that he told the
couple that their marriage is valid.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and
conducting it outside his territorial jurisdiction.
HELD:
The court held that the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore
is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the
law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid
liability for violating the law on marriage.

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore
is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the
law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid
liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In
People vs. Lara,i[4] we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and
that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage.
Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to
solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of
petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
REPUBLIC VS. CA 236 SCRA 257
FACTS:
Respondent Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by a City
Court Judge of Pasig City and was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents.Defendant Cardenas
personally attended the procuring of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the
procurement of the marriage license.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's
parents. They decided to live together when Castro discovered she was pregnant. The cohabitation lasted only
for four months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. Desiring to follow her daughter in the U.S, Castro wanted
to put in order he marital status before leaving for the U.S. She then discovered that there was no marriage
license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage as certified by the Civil Registrar of Pasig,
Metro Manila.
Respondent then filed a petition with the RTC of Quezon City seeking for the judicial declaration of nullity of
her marriage claiming that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their
marriage.
The trial court denied the petition holding that the certification was inadequate to establish the alleged nonissuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the
"inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no
marriage license issued. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed.
ISSUE:
Is the marriage valid? Is there such a thing as a "secret marriage"?
HELD:
At the time of the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was
the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage license shall be solemnized without a marriage license
first issued by the local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a
license would render the marriage void ab initio.
It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The
subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" - a legally non-existent phrase but
ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of

either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas as
initially unknown to the parents of the former.
Moreno vs. Bernabe
Facts: Marilou Nama Moreno and Marcelo Moreno were married before the respondent Judge Jose Bernabe on
October 4, 1993 but did not process the papers for the marriage contract. The complainant at that time was
pregnant and begged to the judge to have her and her husband to be married by him. The complainant then filed
a complaint allegedly for deceiving her that the marriage is valid.
Issue: Whether or not that a Judge who held a wedding without issuing a marriage contract should be held liable
even if the complaint had expressly withdrawn by the complainant.
Ruling: Even with the withdrawal of the complainant against the respondent the Supreme Court insisted that it
should still be dealt with accordingly as the accused was a member of the judiciary and a conduct of a higher
level were expected.
The judge displayed ignorance of the law which is unacceptable for his position and is therefore
fined with 10, 000.00 pesos and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar act should be punished
severely.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of
marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it
declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab
initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages, and what we
are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their
criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that "[p]riests or ministers of any religious
denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be
punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law." This is of course, within the province of the
prosecutorial agencies of the Government.

PEOPLE VS. BORROMEO

Facts: On July 3, 1981, the four-year old niece of Susana and Elias sought help, as Susana was screaming
because Elias was killing her. Upon going back to the hut of the couple, Susanas lifeless body was found lying
next to her crying child while Elias was mumbling incoherently with a bolo in his hands.
The accused-appellant insists that he and Susana were not legally and validly married because there was no
marriage contract issued on their wedding day and after, therefore he should only be liable for homicide and not
parricide. However, in his testimony, he admitted that the victim was his wife and that they were married in a
chapel by a priest.
Issue: Does the non-execution of a marriage contract render a marriage void?

Held:
No. In the view of the law, a couple living together with the image of being married, are presumed married
unless proven otherwise. This is attributed to the common order of society. Furthermore, the validity of a
marriage resides on the fulfillment or presence of the requisites of the marriage which are: 1) legal capacity and
2) consent. The absence of the record of such marriage does not invalidate the same as long as the celebration
and all requisites are present.
Persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if
the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in constant violation of
decency and law. Also, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not
invalidate the said marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present, and
the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is not one of said requisites.

SEGUISABAL VS CABRERA
Facts:
Complainant charged Respondent for gross misconduct and gross Ignorance for solemnizing Jaime Sayson and
Marlyn Jagonoys marriage without the requisite marriage license and for failing to transmit a copy of the
signed married contract to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Toledo City within fifteen days from date
of Solemnization; proved by the marriage contract issued to the contracting parties.
On April 14, 1978, Jaime Sayson and a three months pregnant Marlyn Jagonoy, accompanied by the mother of
the former, the father of the latter, and several others, appeared before Respondent bringing a marriage contract
for them to be solemnized. Respondent allegedly asked them for their Marriage License, upon which they said
that the Local Civil Registrar could not issue the same because the one in charge was not in his office;
Respondent allegedly presumed papers were in order and so proceeded with the solemnization, but told them to
return in the afternoon with the Marriage License. The parties did not return in the afternoon and the papers
were allegedly lost and forgotten by Respondent.
On May 1979, Marlyn Jagonoy, now with child, appeared before Respondent and informed him that her
husband, a draftee in the Philippine Army, was killed in action against the Muslim rebels in Maguindanao. She
will be awarded the benefits by the army if and when she can prove she was actually married to him.
Respondent then searched for the papers and found them, and told the father of Marlyn to go to the Local Civil
Registrars Office to get the Marriage license, though the father returned saying that the couple lacked the
Family Planning Seminar required by law before the issuance of a Marriage License. Believing that it was no
longer necessary due to Jaime Saysons death, Respondent issued the Marriage Contract so that she may enjoy
the benefits accruing Jaime who died a heros death. Act was allegedly done in good faith by the Respondent
and in sympathy to the situation of Marlyn.
Respondent further averred that Complainant was ill motivated and filed this action out of spite because of
Respondent dismissing A previous case filed by complainant and that Complainant is the accused in a case
pending in Respondents Court.

Issue/Held:
Does Respondents alleged good faith exempt him from the liability of his actions? NO
Rationale:
Court ruled that without requiring the essential pre-requisite of a marriage license, respondent had undoubtedly
transgressed article 53(4) of the Civil Code. Respondent also failed to transmit a copy of the marriage contract
duly signed by him and the contracting parties to the Local Civil Registrar. Respondent was likewise remiss in
his duty under Article 68 of the Civil Code to transmit to the Local Civil Registrar of Toledo City within fifteen
(15) days from the date of solemnization of the marriage in question, a copy of the marriage contract duly
signed by him as the solemnizing officer and by the contracting parties.
The defense of good faith interposed by respondent is unavailing. As a judicial officer, he is expected to know
the law on the solemnization of marriages. His feeling of sympathy and fairness to the widow, Marlyn Jagonoy"
cannot serve as a license for him to deliberately transgress or dispense with legal requisites.
In view, however, of respondent's twenty-seven (27) years and seven (7) months of service in the Judiciary, and
considering that he has applied for retirement under Republic Act No. 5095 due to schemic heart ailment, we
have mitigated the corresponding administrative sanction.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Judge to be guilty of gross neglect of duty, he shall pay a fine equivalent to
three (3) months salary, the same to be deducted from his gratuity upon his retirement from the service.
Te v. Choa
Facts:
1. Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on 1988.They did not live together after
marriage although they would meet each other regularly.
2.1989, Liliana gave birth to a girl. Thereafter, Arthur stopped visiting her
3.1990 Arthur contracted a second marriage while marriage with Liliana was subsisting.
4. Liliana filed bigamy case against Arthur and subsequently an administrative case (revocation of engineering
license for grossly immoral act) against Arthur and Julieta Santella (2nd wife of Arthur)
5. Arthur petitioned for the nullity of his marriage with Liliana.
6. RTC and Board rendered decision while the petition for annulment of first marriage was pending.
Issue: Marriage annulment case had to be resolved first before criminal and administrative case be rendered
judgment?
Held: NO
1. Ruling (no judicial decree is necessary toestablish the invalidity of a marriage which is ab initio) was
overturned
2. Family Code Art. 40 is the prevailing rule: the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not
be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
3. Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a
judicial proceeding.
RD: Absence of Impediment.FC. Art. 5: any male or female of the age of 18yrs or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned under art. 37 & 38, may contract marriage.
Case: Since it was deemed that the marriage of Arthur and Liliana was valid,bigamous marriage between Arthur
and Julieta is void. (see. NCC Art. 80)

Martinez v. Tan, 12 Phil 731

FACTS: There was received in evidence at the trial what is called Rosalia Martinez and Angel Tan were
married before a justice of the peace in Leyte. They executed an expediente de matrimonio civil. It is written in
Spanish and consists, first, of a petition directed to the justice of the peace, dated on the 25th of September,
1907, signed both by Martinez and Tan, in which they state that they have mutually agreed to enter into a
contract of marriage before the justice of the peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the marriage. Marriage
was solemnized with two witnesses. The couple did not live together and when Martinez went home to Ormoc,
her relatives convinced her to file charges claiming that the marriage was not valid since she signed the
document in her own home thinking that it was a paper authorizing Tan to ask the consent of her parents to the
marriage.
ISSUE: WON the marriage is valid.

HELD: Yes. They were married since there was an expression of mutual consent and both of them appeared
before the justice of the peace. They both understood Spanish thus they knew the contents of the document they
were signing.
FACTS: Pltff. Rosalia Martinez commenced this action for the cancellation of the cert. of marriage and for
damages. Pltff. claimed that what took place before the justice of the peace did not constitute a legal marriage
under Gen. Orders No. 68, Sec. 6, "No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties
must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and
wife." CFI found for def.
HELD: The parties addressed a signed petition to the justice of the peace stating that they had agreed to marry,
and asking the justice of the peace to marry them. Before the justice of the peace, they stated under oath that
they ratified the contents of their petition and insisted on what they asked for. This statement was signed by
them, in the presence of witnesses that they produced. A certificate was then made out by the justice of the
peace, signed by him and the witnesses, stating the parties had been married by him. Both the parties knew the
contents of the document w/c they signed. Under the circumstances, what took place before the justice of the
peace amounted to a marriage.
Madridejo v. De Leon

FACTS: Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez were man and wife and had one child, Domingo de Leon. Eulogio
de Leon died in 1915. During her widowhood, Flaviana Perez lived with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. Pedro
Madridejo and Flaviana Perez had a child named Melecio Madridejo. On July 8, 1920, Flaviana Perez, being at
death's door, was married to Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor, 30 years of age, by virtue of articulo mortis, by the
parish priest of Siniloan. She died on the following day, leaving Domingo de Leon, her son in her first marriage,
and Melecio Madridejo, her son in her second husband. The parish priest failed to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the municipal secretary.

ISSUE: WON the marriage is valid

HELD:
Yes, the failure of the priest to send a copy of the marriage certificate does not affect the validity of their
marriage because it is only an irregularity of a formal requisite. Failure of the priest to send a copy of the
marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not
appearing that the essential requisites required by law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the
forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites.
Trinidad v. CA 289 SCRA 189
Facts:
Arturio Trinidad claims to be the son of Inocentes Trinidad, who together with Felix and Lourdes, his siblings,
are heirs to four parcels of land of their deceased father. He presented the following evidence.
a. testimony of Gerardo that Inocentes and his wife cohabited and had a child
b. testimony of Meren that she was present in the marriage of Inocentes
c. His own baptismal certificate (his birth certificate had been destroyed)
d. Family pictures and his own testimony that he lived with Lourdes, until he got married.
Lourdes, the aunt of Inocentes, presented the following evidence to refute Arturios claims:
a. testimony of Briones that Inocentes was never married
b. her own testimony that Inocentes died childless and she claimed that Arturio was simply a neighbor. She
denied knowledge of the pictures Arturio presented, where she is shown holding the baby of Arturio, together
with Arturio and his wife.
Issue
Whether or not evidence of the marriage of Inocentes and Arturios filiation are sufficient.
Whether or not the the above evidences are enough to prove that Arturio is the legitimate child of innocentes.
Held:
Yes. In the absence of a marriage certificate, any of the four can be sufficient proof of marriage: fact of
marriage ceremony, open cohabitation of the parties, birth certificate of the child, and other documents. Arturio
presented the first 3. For filiation, when the birth certificate cant be produced, other evidence like the baptismal
certificate, is admissible. Use of surname without objection is also presumptive evidence of legitimacy.

Yes. In the absence of a marriage certificate, any of the four can be sufficient proof of marriage:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Fact of marriage ceremony;

Open cohabitation of the parties;
Birth certificate of the child; and
Other documents.

Arturio presented the first 3. For filiation, when the birth certificate cant be produced, other evidence like the
baptismal certificate, is admissible. Use of surname without objection is also presumptive evidence of
legitimacy.

TOMASA VDA DE JACOB V CA

Nature of the Case: This is a Petition for Review assailing the decision of the CA denying petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration
Facts:
Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was
appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage
Contract between herself and the deceased.
Respondent Pedro Pilapil on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo, purportedly
supported by an Order issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition
for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil. Pedro sought to intervene during the
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Alfredo, claiming his share of the deceaseds estate as Alfredo's
adopted son and sole surviving heir. Pedro likewise questioned the validity of the marriage between Appellant
Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.

Appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana,
CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not however present the original copy of the Marriage
Contract stating that the original document was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera
for registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa presented as secondary evidence a reconstructed Marriage
Contract issued in 1978. Several irregularities on the reconstructed Marriage Contract were observed by the
court such as:
(1) no copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by the solemnizing officer;
(2) a mere thumbmark was purportedly placed by the late Alfredo Jacob on said
Reconstructed marriage contract on 16 September 1975 (date of the marriage), instead of his customary
signature as affixed in their Sworn Affidavit; However, on a Sworn Affidavit executed between appellant
Tomasa and Alfredo a day before the alleged date of marriage or on 15 September 1975 attesting that both of
them lived together as husband and wife for five (5) years, Alfredo [af]fixed his customary signature. Thus the
trial court concluded that the thumbmark was logically not genuine. In other words, not of Alfredo Jacobs;
(3) inconsistencies in the circumstances and personalities surrounding the lost Marriage Contract mentioned in
the affidavit executed by Msgr. Yllana and in the testimony admitted by the appellant; and
(4) appellant admitted that there was no record of the purported marriage entered in the book of records in San
Agustin Church where the marriage was allegedly solemnized.
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee Pilapil, sustaining his claim as the
legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract as
spurious and non-existent. The Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial court.
Issues:
1. WON the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was indeed
valid

Held:
Yes. The marriage between appellant and the deceased was valid. Pilapils claim that the marriage was void due
to absence of a marriage license was misplaced. An affidavit executed by the appellant and the late Dr. Jacob
that they lived together as husband and wife for at least five years exempted them from the marriage license
requirement (Article 76 of the Civil Code).
Also misplaced was Pilapils argument that the marriage was void because of the absence of a marriage contract
and the absence of entry of such in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar and in the National
Census and Statistics Office. A marriage contract is the best evidence of a marriage ceremony. However, the
contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other than the document itself, provided that the
offer or establishes its due execution and its subsequent loss or destruction. Accordingly, the fact of marriage
may be shown by extrinsic evidence other than the marriage contract. In the instant case, appellant provided
competent evidence to prove that a marriage ceremony was solemnized between her and the late Dr. Jacob.
Such evidence was supplied by appellant Tomasa, witness Adela Pilapil and the solemnizing officer Msgr.
Yllana through their sworn testimonies both in open court and in writing, and through the photographs taken
during the ceremony.
The absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and
in the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO) does not invalidate the marriage. It is primary duty of the
solemnizing officer, not the petitioner, to send a copy of the marriage certificate to these offices in order to be
duly recorded.
In the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife are presumed to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. As the fact
that Dr. Jacob and appellant Tomasa lived together as husband and wife was not disputed in this case, but was
in fact even accepted, it would follow that the presumption of marriage was not likewise rebutted.
The marriage between Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob and the deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby recognized
and declared VALID and the claimed adoption of Respondent Pedro Pilapil is DECLARED NONEXISTENT.