Aguilar v Modesto San Pedro

Facts:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No.
82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and
was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to
quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. MeTC denied.
RTC: In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly
grounding its ruling on petitioners forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising
from the MeTCs order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC
effectively affirmed the MeTC.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision forfeiting
petitioners standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent
Ponce calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight
physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with
grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate
the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No.
82367 for the homicide and damage to property.
Issue: WON criminal cases against Ivler should be dismissed on the ground of DJ
Held: Yes
Ratio:
1. Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an
act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the
part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place. Simple imprudence consists in the lack of
precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not
immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. The penalty next higher in degree to those
provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot
to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the
penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2);
(2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9);
(3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition
of "reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasioffenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible," 16 unlike willful offenses
which punish the intentional criminal act
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence"
is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower
degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that
by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery,

malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as
a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere
question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in
negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to
reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of
Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually
committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be
fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For
each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the
negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for
reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the
willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter
could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case.
2. People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless
imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising
from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier.
Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court, that is,
whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for
the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court
unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would
be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty,
it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether
the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions
3. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling
under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies 46); and (2) when an offense is
a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to
benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum
of the penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but
"the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight x x x,"47 a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus,
Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences
Should Article 48s framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple
(non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried
separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging
all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the
scheme of penalties under Article 365? Jurisprudence adopts both approaches

Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field
demands choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a
single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light
felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article
365, discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple
consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13,
Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution
and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless
of their number and severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus
maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in
Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases
Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually
impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or
less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another.
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges
under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant
occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention
that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge
will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and
proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level court.
Go-Tan v Spouses Tan
Facts:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were
married.[3] Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle[4] and Kristen
Denise.[5] On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) [6] against Steven and her
parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She
alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and
economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)
[7]
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, [8] otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women
and Their Children Act of 2004.
On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance
of Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition,[10] contending
that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner,
they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262. RTC dismissed
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions of
Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on conspiracy under Article 8 of
the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had
community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial
support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly
abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically; that respondents should be
included as indispensable or necessary parties for complete resolution of the case.

On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since
Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the victim only by
marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that allegations on the
conspiracy of respondents require a factual determination which cannot be done by this
Court in a petition for review; that respondents cannot be characterized as indispensable or
necessary parties, since their presence in the case is not only unnecessary but altogether
illegal, considering the non-inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section 3 of R.A. No.
9262.
Issue: WON case against respondents can be dismissed
Held: No
Ratio:
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as any act
or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within
or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by
marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the
application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the
RPC, thus: SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal
Code and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the
future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this
Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis supplied)
With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be
applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that the
RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their
nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or
action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. [23] It must be further noted that Section 5
of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against women and their
children may be committed by an offender through another, thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts: (h) Engaging in
purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or
causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall
include, but not be limited to, the following acts
In addition, the protection order that may
preventing further acts of violence
against the

be issued for
woman or her

the purpose of
child may include

individuals other than the offending husband, thus: SEC. 8. Protection Orders.
x x x The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall include any, some or all
of the following reliefs:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally
or through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or
otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus: SEC.
4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and
safety of victims of violence against women and their children. (Emphasis supplied)