1

G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellants.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and BENJAMIN SAMSON y
MAGDALENA were charged with the crime of MURDER in.
That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of the Municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping and assisting one another, with treachery and evident premeditation,
taking advantage of their superior strength, and with the decided purpose to kill, poured gasoline, a
combustible liquid to the body of Bayani Miranda and with the use of fire did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, burn the whole body of said Bayani Miranda which caused his subsequent
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the aforenamed Bayani Miranda.
That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and superior strength, and the means employed was to weaken the
defense; that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing
another wrong, that is the burning of the body of Bayani Miranda.
CONTRARY TO LAW (p. 1, Records).
Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After trial, the trial court rendered a
decision finding both accused guilty on the crime of murder but crediting in favor of the accused Pugay the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Pugay y Balcita and Benjamin Samson y Magdalena are
pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals by direct participation of the crime of murder
for the death of Bayani Miranda, and appreciating the aforestated mitigating circumstance in favor of
Pugay, he is sentenced to a prison term ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and Samson to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua together with the accessories of the law for both of them. The accused are solidarily held liable
to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P13,940.00 plus moral damages of P10,000.00 and
exemplary damages of P5,000.00.
Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be deducted from the principal penalty.
Cost against both accused.

SO ORDERED (p. 248, Records).

Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed the present appeal and assigned the following errors committed
by the court a quo:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING THE STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
IN ITS APPRECIATION OF FACTS DESPITE ITS ADMISSION THAT THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS WERE NOT ASSISTED BY A COUNSEL DURING THE CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUPPRESSION BY THE
PROSECUTION OF SOME EVIDENCE IS FATAL TO ITS CASE.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF
EDUARDO GABION WHO WAS ONE OF THE MANY SUSPECTS ARRESTED BY THE POLICE
(Accused-appellants' Brief, p. 48, Rollo).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda used to run errands for
Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of May 19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of
Rosario, Cavite. There were different kinds of ride and one was a ferris wheel.
Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic book with
his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived. These persons appeared to be
drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him.
They made the deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.
Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under
the engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents on the body of the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the
latter was already in the process of pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human
torch out of him.
The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the deceased. Some people around also
poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped the same with rags to extinguish the flame.
The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando Silangcruz and other police officers of the
Rosario Police Force arrived at the scene of the incident. Upon inquiring as to who were responsible for the dastardly act,
the persons around spontaneously pointed to Pugay and Samson as the authors thereof.
The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment. In the meantime, the police officers brought Gabion,
the two accused and five other persons to the Rosario municipal building for interrogation. Police officer Reynaldo
Canlas took the written statements of Gabion and the two accused, after which Gabion was released. The two accused
remained in custody.
After a careful review of the records, We find the grounds relied upon by the accused-appellants for the reversal of the
decision of the court a quo to be without merit.

It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident, accused-appellants gave their written statements to the
police. The accused Pugay admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that he poured a can of gasoline on the deceased
believing that the contents thereof was water and then the accused Samson set the deceased on fire. The accused Samson,
on the other hand, alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see the person who
set him on fire. Worthy of note is the fact that both statements did not impute any participation of eyewitness Gabion in
the commission of the offense.
While testifying on their defense, the accused-appellants repudiated their written statements alleging that they were
extracted by force. They claimed that the police maltreated them into admitting authorship of the crime. They also
engaged in a concerted effort to lay the blame on Gabion for the commission of the offense.
Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the accused-appellants were mentioned and discussed in the decision
of the court a quo, the contents thereof were not utilized as the sole basis for the findings of facts in the decision
rendered. The said court categorically stated that "even without Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is still Gabion's
straightforward, positive and convincing testimony which remains unaffected by the uncorroborated, self-serving and
unrealiable testimonies of Pugay and Samson" (p. 247, Records).
Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution suppressed the testimonies of other eyewitnesses to the incident.
They claim that despite the fact that there were other persons investigated by the police, only Gabion was presented as an
eyewitness during the trial of the case. They argue that the deliberate non- presentation of these persons raises the
presumption that their testimonies would be adverse to the prosecution.
There is no dispute that there were other persons who witnessed the commission of the crime. In fact there appears on
record (pp. 16-17, Records) the written statements of one Abelardo Reyes and one Monico Alimorong alleging the same
facts and imputing the respective acts of pouring of gasoline and setting the deceased on fire to the accused-appellants as
testified to by Gabion in open court. They were listed as prosecution witnesses in the information filed. Considering that
their testimonies would be merely corroborative, their non-presentation does not give rise to the presumption that
evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. This presumption does not apply to the suppression of
merely corroborative evidence (U.S. vs. Dinola, 37 Phil. 797).<re||an1w>Besides, the matter as to whom to utilize
as witness is for the prosecution to decide.
Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the eyewitness Gabion alleging that not only was the latter requested by
the mother of the deceased to testify for the prosecution in exchange for his absolution from liability but also because his
testimony that he was reading a comic book during an unusual event is contrary to human behavior and experience.
Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother of the deceased who asked him to testify and state the truth
about the incident. The mother of the deceased likewise testified that she never talked to Gabion and that she saw the
latter for the first time when the instant case was tried. Besides, the accused Pugay admitted that Gabion was his friend
and both Pugay and the other accused Samson testified that they had no previous misunderstanding with Gabion. Clearly,
Gabion had no reason to testify falsely against them.
In support of their claim that the testimony of Gabion to the effect that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on the deceased and
then Samson set him on fire is incredible, the accused-appellants quote Gabion's testimony on cross-examination that,
after telling Pugay not to pour gasoline on the deceased, he (Gabion) resumed reading comics; and that it was only when
the victim's body was on fire that he noticed a commotion.
However, explaining this testimony on re-direct examination, Gabion stated:

Q. Mr. Gabion, you told the Court on cross-examination that you were reading comics
when you saw Pugay poured gasoline unto Bayani Miranda and lighted by Samson. How
could you possibly see that incident while you were reading comics?
A. I put down the comics which I am reading and I saw what they were doing.
Q. According to you also before Bayani was poured with gasoline and lighted and burned
later you had a talk with Pugay, is that correct?
A. When he was pouring gasoline on Bayani Miranda I was trying to prevent him from
doing so.
Q. We want to clarify. According to you a while ago you had a talk with Pugay and as a
matter of fact, you told him not to pour gasoline. That is what I want to know from you, if
that is true?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Aside from Bayani being tickled with a stick on his ass, do you mean to say you come
to know that Pugay will pour gasoline unto him?
A. I do not know that would be that incident.
Q. Why did you as(k) Pugay in the first place not to pour gasoline before he did that
actually?
A. Because I pity Bayani, sir.
Q. When you saw Pugay tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass you tried according to you
to ask him not to and then later you said you asked not to pour gasoline. Did Pugay tell you
he was going to pour gasoline on Bayani?
A. I was not told, sir.
Q. Did you come to know..... how did you come to know he was going to pour gasoline
that is why you prevent him?
A. Because he was holding on a container of gasoline. I thought it was water but it was
gasoline.
Q. It is clear that while Pugay was tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass, he later got hold
of a can of gasoline, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when he pick up the can of gasoline, was that the time you told him not to pour
gasoline when he merely pick up the can of gasoline.

A. I saw him pouring the gasoline on the body of Joe.

Q. So, it is clear when you told Pugay not to pour gasoline he was already in the process of
pouring gasoline on the body of Bayani?
A. Yes, sir (Tsn, July 30, 1983, pp. 32-33).
It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, Gabion was reading a comic book; that Gabion stopped reading when
the group of Pugay started to make fun of the deceased; that Gabion saw Pugay get the can of gasoline from under the
engine of the ferris wheel; that it was while Pugay was in the process of pouring the gasoline on the body of the deceased
when Gabion warned him not to do so; and that Gabion later saw Samson set the deceased on fire.
However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and
intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before the commission of the crime. There was no animosity
between the deceased and the accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is
also clear that the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the respective
criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against the deceased is individual and
not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act committed by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386;
U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).
The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay. Having taken the can from under
the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew
that the can contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even
before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence
arising from any act that may be committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. We
agree with the Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence defined in
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468, 470, this Court ruled as
follows:
A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious,
careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for
such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except through
culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would
ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from four (4) months ofarresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. With respect to the
accused Samson, the Solicitor General in his brief contends that "his conviction of murder, is proper considering that his
act in setting the deceased on fire knowing that gasoline had just been poured on him is characterized by treachery as the
victim was left completely helpless to defend and protect himself against such an outrage" (p. 57, Rollo). We do not
agree.
There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some reason to kill the deceased before the
incident. On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing that his act was merely a part of their fun-making that
evening. For the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit employed means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make.

There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the body of the deceased was
gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were
otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set
the deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of
the victim would cause at the very least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised
Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held responsible
therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying circumstances, the accused Samson is only
guilty of the crime of homicide defined and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are
disposed to credit in his favor the ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed as there is evidence of a fact from which such conclusion can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion testified that
the accused Pugay and Samson were stunned when they noticed the deceased burning (Tsn, June 1, 1983, pp. 1617).<re||an1w>
The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from eight (8) years ofprision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
The lower court held the accused solidarily liable for P13,940.00, the amount spent by Miranda's parents for his
hospitalization, wake and interment. The indemnity for death is P30,000.00. Hence, the indemnity to the heirs of the
deceased Miranda is increased to P43,940.00.
Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the aforesaid amount plus the P10,000.00 as moral damages and
P5,000.00 as exemplary damages as found by the court a quo.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications above-indicated. Costs against the accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 102705 July 30, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DOROTEO MEJORADA y SILLAN, Accused-Appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Leonardo D. Suario for accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
On appeal is the 14 June 1991 decision 1of Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao del Sur in Criminal
Case No. 138 (88). The accused therein, now the appellant, was found guilty of the crime of rape and sentenced to suffer
the "penalty of reclusion perpetuaor imprisonment for life with the accessory penalties of the law." Fortunately for the
accused, however, the court a quo decided not to award damages to the offended party since there was "no showing that
filing and other fees have been paid."
It was on 11 October 1988 that the offended party, Mrs. Elizabeth B. Regino, filed a complaint against the accused with
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur. 2The latter was subsequently arrested after the court

conducted a preliminary examination. Finding that a prima facie case existed against him, the MTC transmitted the case
records to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Davao del Sur 3which, in turn, filed on 8 November 1988 with the RTC in
Digos an Information charging the accused with the crime of rape committed as follows:
That on or about October 7, 1988, in Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused aforenamed, being then armed with a knife, and after having forcibly dragged or pushed said
Elizabeth B. Regino from her house into a (sic) grassy ground, and by the use of force and intimidation, did then and
there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully have carnal knowledge of said Elizabeth B. Regino, against her will; to her
damage and prejudice.
Contrary to Law and with the aggravating circumstance of the crime being committed in disregard of the respect due the
offended party, she being a school teacher. 4
No bail was recommended for the accused's temporary liberty.
Trial on the merits ensued after the accused entered a not guilty plea during his arraignment on 12 December 1988. 5
Presented by the prosecution as its witnesses were Mrs. Elizabeth Regino, Lydia Duterte, Carlito Duterte, Vice Mayor
Proceso Guido and Dr. Lydia Ozoa of the Davao Medical Center. Mrs. Regino and her husband, Eduardo, then testified
as rebuttal witnesses.
On the other hand, the defense called on the accused himself, his wife Nilda and his daughter Nancy.
On 20 June 1991, the trial court promulgated the challenged decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the inevitable conclusion of this Court that the accused Doroteo Mejorada is
guilty of rape as charged beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, this Court hereby sentences him to suffer a penalty
of reclusion perpetua or imprisonment for life with the accessory penalties of the law. Since there is no showing that
filing and other fees have been paid, there is no award for civil damages. The kitchen knife used in the rape is
confiscated in favor of the State. The accused, however, is entitled to deduction in the number of days in the service of
his prison terms (sic).
SO ORDERED. 6
The inculpatory facts, as established by the prosecution's evidence, are summarized by the trial court as follows:
The prosecution's version may be narrated thus: Mrs. Elizabeth Regino, a public school teacher, then 25 years of age and
married, worked as school (sic) teacher at Sta. Cruz National High School, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, since 1986. She has
been married for four years and has three children.
In the evening of October 7, 1988, she was sleeping at their house together with Nancy Mejorada, the accused's daughter.
Her husband at that time was attending the nightly prayer for his dead grandmother. Their three children were brought by
her husband to the house of her mother-in-law, because she was making test questions in preparation for the third grading
period. That was also the reason why she requested Nancy to accompany her because she was alone in their house. At
about 11:40 in the evening, she noticed that somebody forcibly opened the door. The person came in and was moving
around. Their house is only half finished. So, the door was only tied with a rope. Believing that the person who went
inside was her husband, she stood up in order to switch on the light. Before she reached the light, she was hugged by the
person and a knife was pressed on her face. The accused pressed her downward and forced her in going out of their

house. She was brought at the back of their house, particularly at the grassy area. She was able to recognize the accused
when he was hit by the light in the chapel. She recognized the knife for the reason that she used to borrow the same with
(sic) her sister. When they were in the grassy area, she struggled more to completely recognize the person. She made a
sudden glance by swerving her face towards the left and she recognized him to be the accused, Doroteo Mejorada. She
pleaded not (sic) to harm her. The accused did not heed her pleas. He forcibly pushed her down and she was at the
kneeling position with her two hands as a support to her body. The accused bent his body towards her. She struggled. The
knife was touching her side. The accused kept on telling her not to shout or else he will kill her. She was at the kneeling
position when the accused removed her underwear downward up to her knee. He (the accused) pushed her down. He
succeeded. At that time the accused started to have sexual intercourse with her by trying to insert his penis in her organ.
She felt that it has penetrated. After the accused satisfied his lust, he withdrew, stood up and left her, leaving words
"ayaw tug-ani ang imong bana ha! Kon motug-an ka, patyon ta ka o kon dili ang imong bana akong patyon". (Don't tell
your husband, otherwise, I'll kill you or I'll kill your husband).
On October 9, 1988, she narrated the whole incident to Vice Mayor Guido in the presence of her husband. She did not
reveal the whole incident to her husband in their house because she was afraid that her husband might lose his control
and probably kill the accused. Vice Mayor Guido then summoned the accused. When the accused was already with them,
and was informed about her complaint, the accused asked forgiveness and appealed for settlement. Vice-Mayor Guido
prepared a written settlement. When the accused was about to sign, she shouted, because her conscience could not
tolerate being abused by the accused. Vice-Mayor Guido then decided to bring his matter to the police station for the
filing of the proper complaint, for the case cannot be settled. The accused was brought to the 46th IB's Station
Commander.
On October 10, 1988, she went to Dr. Lydia Ozoa for a medical examination. This was also corroborated by the
testimony of Dr. Ozoa. A medical certificate was then issued portion (sic) of which are quoted herein below:
(A) Physical Examinations:
1. Superficial, Wound 0.5 cm. Palmar Aspect of Right Ring Finger. Distal 3rd.
2. Superficial. Wound 0.25 cm. Proximal to Wound 1.
3. Superficial Wound 0.5 cm. Palmar Aspect of Left Thumb.
4. Superficial Wound 0.2 cm. at the Tip of left Middle Finger.
5. Superficial Wound 3 cm. Right Elbow.
(B) Vulva:
1. Old Median Periveal Laceration.
2. Caruncles Noted on the Hymen. In toitus is Parons Cervic is close, Non-tender Uterus is small, anteverted. No
Adnexal masser: Whitish discharges.
Sperm cell Determination: Presence of Sperm cells.

The same was properly explained and illustrated by Dr. Ozoa and (sic) further identified her signature in the said medical
certificate; She (Dr. Ozoa) asked the victim how she incurred these injuries and she informed her that she was raped and
that she resisted.
The testimony of the victim was also substantiated by Vice-Mayor Guido. The victim and her husband were in his house
on October 9, 1988 at about 7:30 to 8:00 o'clock in the morning. The victim narrated to him the incident. Thinking that
he could settle their conflict, being his neighbors, he requested the appearance of the accused Doroteo Mejorada. That
was that time when the accused asked for forgiveness to (sic) the complainant, claiming that he was drunk during that
incident.
Doroteo Duterte testified that on October 6, 1988 at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the accused borrowed his knife
because according to him (accused), he will use the knife in butchering the pig. He identified the knife (Exh. "A") used
by the accused in threatening the victim to be the same knife borrowed by the accused from him. 7
On the other hand, the accused's version of denial and alibi is condensed by the trial court in this wise:
Against this evidence of the prosecution, the accused relied mainly on denial and alibi. He flatly rejected the
complainant's allegations, claiming that on October 7, 1988 he was in the house of Carding Ayop, his companion,
working in the Franklin Baker, to help in the preparation for the barrio fiesta in Astorga. At 10:45 in the evening of the
same day, he went back to his house. He brought a little food for his family. After eating, he had a conversation with his
wife. He slept together with his wife. The wife of the accused also corroborated his testimony. Same is true with Nancy
Mejorada, the daughter of the accused. She declared that his (sic) father at that evening was in the house of Carding
Ayop. She was told by her mother to accompany Elizabeth in their house. When she was in the house of Elizabeth, they
had a conversation particularly on the fact that Elizabeth's husband left their conjugal home. At about midnight, when
she was about to sleep, she noticed that Elizabeth rose from their bed and went out. Thinking that Elizabeth will just
urinate outside, she continued sleeping.
After few (sic) minutes or an hour, Elizabeth woke her up and told her that she will accompany her to the place where
the vigil was being conducted. She was then requested to get a glass of water. After drinking, they proceeded to the place
of the vigil. On cross, she further testified that she did not notice of any wound on Elizabeth's hand's nor any dirt of (sic)
her duster.
The defense (sic) version was belied by the complainant and her husband Eduardo on rebuttal. 8
We find both summaries to be accurate and fully supported by the transcripts of the stenographic notes of the witnesses'
testimonies.
The trial court accorded full faith and credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly to the
declarations of the offended party; it concluded that Mrs. Regino harbored no ill-motives to falsely charge the accused
with the commission of rape. Moreover, the court found it difficult to believe that Mrs. Regino, a married woman, would
tell her husband that she had been raped by another married man, a neighbor at that, if there was no truth to it. It rejected
the accused's claim of denial and alibi in view of his having been positively identified.
Immediately after the promulgation of sentence, the accused filed a Notice of Appeal9which was given due course by the
RTC on the same date. 10
In the Appellant's Brief 11filed on 21 September 1992, the accused assigns this single error:

10

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF RAPE.
and, in support thereof, alleges that he is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of reasonable doubt because the
prosecution's evidence is not clear and convincing while Mrs. Regino's testimony is "too incredible," "unnatural" and
contrary to "common experience," and contains "deliberate and studied perjury" signifying falsehood. The accused then
cites the incredible and improbable declarations of the offended party together with the reasons for such a
characterization: (a) Mrs. Regino failed to attend the final night's prayer for her husband's deceased grandmother which
would have ended, as it usually does, at 9:00 o'clock because she had to finish preparing 400 test questions for the third
grading period in school; in fact, she even requested her husband to bring their children, including their two-month old
baby, to her mother-in-law; and yet, Mrs. Regino went to sleep at 10:00 o'clock that same evening; (b) the accused
entered her house to rape her knowing fully well that his twelve-year old daughter, Nancy Mejorada, was also there; the
accused was supposed to have even struggled with the offended party in the very room where Nancy was sleeping; (c)
she said that she thought it was her husband who entered the house that night; however, she also knew that the latter
would be staying in the wake of his late grandmother; it also seems that forcing the door open was not her husband's way
of entering their house; she likewise revealed that after discovering that the person who entered was not her husband, she
did not shout for help; (d) the accused was wearing only a pair of briefs despite the fact that the place of the incident was
surrounded by houses and had adequate lighting; moreover, employees of the Franklin Baker Company were reporting
for duty at midnight; (e) she did not even tell Nancy Mejorada about the rape upon returning to the house; nor did she
inform her husband later on that evening when she went to his grandmother's house and played "solitaire"; and (f) she
said that she was bending over, with her hands supporting her body and her face looking downward, as she was being
supposedly raped by the accused; despite such a position, she was unable to break free from him.
Insisting that his account is more credible, the accused conjures up a tale of infidelity on the part of Mrs. Regino. He
claims that the latter was having an illicit affair with another man at the time of the incident. In fact, he avers that the
stepped out of her house on the night in question to meet with the said man. Accused further states that he was framed by
this man who is very powerful; that in the evening of 7 October 1988, Mrs. Regino deliberately avoided going to the
wake of her husband's grandmother and even asked her husband to bring the children with him because she was going to
have a tryst with her paramour; and that in order to avoid suspicion, she requested Nancy's mother to allow Nancy to
accompany her.
The Appellee refutes the accused's contentions, explains the alleged improbable portions of the offended party's
testimony and urges us to affirm the accused's conviction for rape, with the modification that moral damages be awarded
in favor of the offended party despite the non-payment of filing and other fees.
The appeal is devoid of merit.
At the core of the controversy is the issue of the credibility of the witnesses. On such point, the trial court had this to say:
In the case at bar, the complainant's version is not bare. It is supported with (sic) witnesses, especially that of Dr. Lydia
Ozoa, who found several wounds and the presence of sperm cells. Besides, the weapon used in the intimidation was
produced . . . .
These evidences and the natural and straightforward testimony of the victim alone would be too difficult to ignore. It was
clear and free from any serious contradiction. It was ringing throughout with the bell of truth and it bears with (sic) the
stamp of absolute candor. Underiably, it was impeccable. Her mistakes are signs of a story that is free from rehearsals. 12

11

It is settled that appellate courts will generally respect the findings of the trial courts on the credibility of witnesses since
the latter are in a better position to weigh the conflicting testimonies, having heard such witnesses themselves and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying, unless it is found that the trial courts have plainly overlooked certain
facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 13We find no reason to depart from this
salutary rule as a careful examination of the records in this case reveals that the findings of the trial court are fully
supported by the evidence.
Be that as it may, we shall meet the points raised by the accused head-on. We find to be neither incredible nor improbable
the portions of the offended party's testimony which are assailed by the accused. Mrs. Regino's decision to stay home on
the night of 7 October 1988 was satisfactorily explained by her. She had just reported back to her teaching post at the Sta.
Cruz National High School after taking a maternity leave. As she was under pressure to catch up with her work in school,
particularly in her preparation of the test questions for the grading period, she returned even before her 60-day leave
period expired. Her staying home and failing to attend the wake of her husband's grandmother was prompted by nothing
more than her desire to finish the 400 test questions which she had to submit to her school principal the following
day. 14Such behavior should therefore be seen as a measure of her dedication and devotion to duty as a public school
teacher.
It is to be noted that the accused failed to present the principal, Mrs. Lourdes Bendigo, to rebut Mrs. Regino's claim
regarding the test questions to be submitted for checking, despite his counsel's manifestation that she would be so
summoned to testify.15Furthermore, the accused's own daughter, Nancy, declared that she saw the test questions in the
house of Mrs. Regino 16that night, thereby confirming the latter's testimony.
The accused's contention that he would not have been so minded to enter the offended party's house with rape in his heart
because he knew that his daughter Nancy was there, had in fact been rendered academic by his own admission, during
the confrontation at Vice Mayor Guido's house, that he committed the acts attributed to him; in fact, he even asked for
forgiveness from Mrs. Regino. 17Besides, no evidence was presented to show that the accused knew or was informed that
his daughter was to sleep with Mrs. Regino that night. It is to be remembered that permission on Nancy's behalf was
sought from her mother, and not from the accused who was then in barangay Astorga. And even if the accused was aware
of such an arrangement, it would not have really mattered as the presence of close relatives has not deterred men who
have descended to the level of beasts and forsaken the highest and noblest in their humanity. Indeed, we have affirmed
many a conviction involving men charged with raping their own flesh and blood.
Nor would it have been improbable for the accused to have been wearing only a pair of briefs at the time of the rape
because, as he claims, the place of the incident was well-lit and surrounded by houses, and there were employees of the
Franklin Baker Company reporting for duty at midnight. In the first place, the accused admitted that he was drunk. As
the Appellee correctly noted, a person who is drunk would be capable of doing things he would not normally do if he
were sober. Secondly, the accused's house is only 5-7 meters away from the house of the Reginos. Moreover, it was not
proven that he had walked to the latter's house with only his briefs on. Hence, it could very well be that the accused
removed his trousers just before entering Mrs. Regino's room. Lastly, the accused failed to present any witness to testify
that at the time of the incident, employees of the Franklin Baker Company were indeed reporting for work.
Mrs. Regino's initial presumption that the person who entered their house that night was her husband should not be
doubted. As was convincingly explained in the Appellee's Brief, her husband could have simply forgotten something that
he needed for the wake. Besides, the wake was held in a house just 100 to 110 meters away. 18It was because of this
initial belief that she did not immediately shout when the accused hugged her from behind. By the time she realized that
it was the accused who was behind her, however, she was already being tightly held by him and threatened with the knife
he was poking at her face. Being thus effectively intimidated and overwhelmed, she could not be expected to shout. If

12

Mrs. Regino failed to scream, it was precisely because she feared for her life. Under such circumstances, her failure to
shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make her submission to the criminal acts of the accused voluntary, since there
existed a continuing intimidation which cowed her and made her realize that crying out for help or offering a spirited
resistance would prove futile. It would likewise be "demanding too much from an ordinary mortal placed under such a
stressful psychological and emotional situation to require that she shout or ward off the impending evil." 19
Mrs. Regino also satisfactorily explained her failure to immediately inform both her husband and Nancy Mejorada about
the rape. The former had, at that time, already positively identified the malefactor - Nancy's own father - and was thus
understandably reluctant to disclose such a serious and delicate matter to the young girl. Mrs. Regino likewise declared
that her immediate concern then was to leave the house as soon as possible because of the accused's threats of death and
the fear that he might come back. 20Furthermore, when she and Nancy arrived at the house of her husband's grandmother,
her husband had just gone to sleep, and so she decided to wait until he woke up. In the meantime, however, she played
solitaire by herself to give an appearance of normalcy because, in her own words, "there were many people" and she was
ashamed to reveal the rape at that time. She added that as a teacher, she would be "put into shame." 21When her husband
finally woke up, she merely told him that somebody had entered their house. She revealed neither the rape nor the
malefactor's identity for fear that her husband "might lose his control and might kill" the accused. She said that she did
not want to be involved in two cases. 22
On re-direct examination, Mrs. Regino further explained her decision not to divulge everything to her husband
immediately and reveal instead the rape during the meeting at Vice Mayor Guido's residence, thus:
Atty. Almazan (continuing):
Q [w]hy did you not at first tell the whole incident to your husband?
A [i] did not tell/reveal to him completely because of some reasons. [f]irst, [i] am afraid he might not believe me.
[s]econd, [i] am afraid he might entertain doubts on his mind that the incident was voluntary on my part. [t]hird, [i] was
afraid of his (accused) threat that he will kill my husband, me, and my family, and [i] am afraid to tell the whole story
because of Sta. Cruz will know and it is shameful on my part as teacher (sic).
Q [w]hy did you decide to reveal the entire incident in the house of Vice Mayor Guido?
A [i] revealed it completely to him, ma'am, because [i) could not tolerate that [i] will hide something to (sic) my husband
especially that [i] was sexually abused. 23
Mrs. Regino's initial fears are not only consistent with the Filipina's traditional modesty and aversion for airing matters
affecting their honor - to the point that some would rather suffer in silence than admit the dishonor - they are also wellfounded in view of the accused's death threats.
Having been amply explained, the lapse of one and a half days from the time the rape was consummated until it was
finally revealed and reported to the authorities, is no longer significant. Delay in reporting the rape due to death threats is
justified, 24especially in this case where the malefactor is the offended party's neighbor. We have also ruled that a delay of
three days before complaining to the authorities due to embarrassment is justified, 25and that a lapse of thirty-five days
before the victim finally reported the sexual abuse done to her is not considered unreasonably long as to render the
victim's testimony doubtful, if the same is fully explained and is due to a fear of the malefactor or the shame and
dishonor that would follow its disclosure. 26

13

Accused's contention that rape is not possible or could not have been consummated in the manner described by Mrs.
Regino, that is, in a "dog-style" position, is without merit. As correctly pointed out by the Appellee, this Court, in People
vs. Saylan, 27sustained a conviction for rape where the accused used not only the "missionary position, i.e., male superior,
female inferior, but also "[T]he same position as dogs do" i.e., entry from behind." In the case at bar, Mrs. Regino even
asked if she could demonstrate in open court, during cross-examination, how the accused accomplished the sexual act,
including the positioning of his hands. The defense counsel, however, denied the request. 28The case of People v.
Bania, 29which was cited by the accused, is not applicable since the position of the offended party therein was different;
the latter was lying on her back with her panty rolled down to her knees. We declared in Bania that rape could not have
been committed because the accused therein was clutching a knife on one hand and was holding the offended party's
hands with the other.
The "other man" theory presented by the accused is nothing but a malicious imputation resorted to in a final attempt to
create doubt on the prosecution's version. We find it highly improbable that the offended party, a public school teacher
whose good reputation remains unsullied and who had just given birth to her third child, would carry on an immoral and
illicit relationship with another man whose identity was never even revealed by the accused. The alleged liaison is pure
concoction as no evidence in support thereof was offered. Moreover, defense witness Nancy Mejorada never mentioned
during her testimony that she saw the offended party meet anyone on the night of 7 October 1988.
Further reinforcing our belief in Mrs. Regino's story is the fact that she is a married public high school teacher with three
young children. Absent a most compelling reason or motive, it is inconceivable that she would allow the examination of
her private part, subject herself to the ordeal of a public trial, risk receiving the stigma and social humiliation which
accompany an admission of having been raped or openly and publicly lie or concoct a story which could very well send a
man - her neighbor, no less - to jail. 30The accused miserably failed to prove any ill-motive on the part of Mrs. Regino.
The court a quo correctly rejected the accused's claim of alibi. For this defense to have prospered, the latter should have
proven that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to have
been at the scene of the crime. 31The accused admitted that he had gotten back from Astorga and was already in his house
at around 10:45 p.m. in the evening of 7 October 1988 when the rape was committed. It bears stressing that his house is
just 5 to 7 meters away from the house of the Reginos. Furthermore, he was positively identified by Mrs. Regino, first
inside the house when his face was illuminated by the light coming from the chapel near her house, and then at the
grassy area behind her house when she suddenly swerved to the left to look at her assailant's face. 32Alibi cannot prevail
over the positive identification by credible witnesses that the accused perpetrated the crime. 33
It cannot likewise be doubted that in the commission of the rape, the accused used a deadly weapon - a circumstance
which, pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, raises the penalty to reclusion perpetua to death.
As indisputably shown by the evidence, the rape was consummated at the grassy portion behind the house of the
Reginos. It was here that Mrs. Regino was, through threats and intimidation, forcibly dragged against her will by the
accused. That the latter was moved by lewd designs is beyond doubt as he was wearing only his briefs at the time and
did, in fact, eventually consummate the crime of rape against Mrs. Regino. While it may appear that forcible abduction,
as defined and penalized under Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, was also committed, we are not about to convict
the accused for the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. First of all, although the information sufficiently
alleges the forcible taking of Mrs. Regino to the grassy ground, the same fails to allege "lewd designs." Secondly, it
appears that the accused's real intention was to rape Mrs. Regino in her room but that since his daughter was in the same
room as she, he decided to forcibly drag her instead to the rear of the house. Given such circumstances, the incidental
forcible abduction was absorbed in the crime of rape. We have held that rape may absorb forcible abduction if the main
objective was to rape the victim. 34

14

The trial court should have, however, appreciated against the accused the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and
ignominy 35which, though not alleged in the information, were duly proven without objection on the part of the accused.
At twenty minutes to midnight, the latter unleashed the fury of his criminal mind on a sleeping victim. He defiled the
sanctity of Mrs. Regino's home by forcibly opening its door. Wanting to force upon her his evil desires, he hugged her
and then pressed a knife to her face without any provocation on her part. He thereupon had sexual intercourse with her in
a "dog-style" position. While such a position has been resorted to by consenting adults, it adds ignominy when employed
in rape cases. 36
Such aggravating circumstances would have justified the imposition of the greater penalty of death pursuant to Article 63
of the Revised Penal Code. Considering, however, that the Constitution prohibits its imposition, 37the appropriate
imposable penalty would bereclusion perpetua, which the trial court correctly imposed, although it sought to define the
same as "imprisonment for life." The penalty of reclusion perpetua is not, of course, similar to or synonymous with "life
imprisonment." As this Court has repeatedly ruled in many cases, reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment are not
synonymous but distinct in nature, duration and accessory penalties. 38
However, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the trial court erred in not awarding civil damages to Mrs.
Regino for the alleged lack of payment of filing and other fees. There can be no question that rape necessarily entitles the
victim to moral damages as a result of the mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, moral shock
and social humiliation 39that accompany the crime. In fact, Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides that moral damages
may be recovered in cases of, inter alia, rape.
The non-payment of the filing and other fees should not have barred the trial court from awarding damages. In General
vs. Claravall, 40this Court, in clarifying further the issue of filing fees for the civil action deemed impliedly instituted
with the criminal case, ruled that:
In any event, the Court now makes that intent plainer, and in the interests of clarity and certainty, categorically declares
for the guidance of all concerned that when a civil action is deemed impliedly instituted
with the criminal in accordance with Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court - because the offended party has NOT
waived the civil action, or reserved the right to institute it separately, or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal
action - the rule is as follows:
1) when "the amount of damages other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information" filed in court, then "the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial;"
2) in any other case, however - i.e., when the amount of damages is not so alleged in the complaint or information filed
in court, the corresponding filing fees need not be paid and shall simply "constitute a first lien on the judgment, except in
an award for actual damages."
Conformably with the current policy of this Court, we hereby award Mrs. Regino moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00. 41Considering further the perversity with which the accused committed the crime - particularly by his having
violated the sanctity of her home and grievously defiled the institution of marriage by raping a married school teacher the imposition of exemplary damages by way of example, i.e., to deter others from committing similar acts, or correction
for the public good, 42herein fixed at P25,000.00, is in order.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING, subject to the modification above indicated, the appealed
decision of Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur in Criminal Case No. 138 (88). As modified, the

15

accused is further ordered to pay the offended party, Mrs. Elizabeth B. Regino, the sums of P50,000.00 in concept of
moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 121768. July 21, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DOMINGO CASTILLO, JR., accused-appellant.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
This is a case of parricide more tragic in that it involves the cold- blooded murder of a father by his only son.
On November 6, 1993 between the hours of 7:30 and 8:30 in the evening, the appellant DOMINGO CASTILLO,
JR., nicknamed Boyet, was in the D & G Restaurant in Norzagaray, Bulacan drinking beer with the victim, his father,
Domingo Castillo, Sr.[1] After some two hours of drinking, a group of noisy customers arrived. Wary of the trouble that
these customers may cause and aware of his sons propensity to get into fights, the victim urged the former to go home
with him.[2] The appellant and the victim then boarded a blue pick-up truck with plate number CBE 591. [3] The appellant
drove the vehicle in the direction of their home in Angat, Bulacan with the victim in the passengers seat. During the trip
home, an argument ensued between the appellant and the victim who were both a bit drunk already [4] because the former
kept insisting that he should or could go back to the restaurant while the latter prevented him from doing so. [5] Upon
nearing their house, the appellant abruptly stopped the pick-up and the victim alighted therefrom. [6] Holding a bottle of
beer in his right hand, the victim raised both of his hands, stood in front of the pick-up and said, sige kung gusto mo
sagasaan mo ako, hindi ka makakaalis (go ahead, run over me if you want to leave). [7] The appellant slowly drove the
pick-up forward threatening to run over the victim. At this juncture, the victim exclaimed, papatayin mo ba ako? (are you
going to kill me?).[8] After the victim uttered these words, the appellant backed-up almost hitting an owner type jeep
parked at the side of the road and on board which were four (4) people conversing with each other, including prosecution
eyewitness, Ma. Cecilia Mariano. Then at high speed, the appellant drove the pick-up forward hitting the victim in the
process. Not satisfied with what he had done, the appellant put the vehicle in reverse thereby running over the victim a
second time. The appellant then alighted from the vehicle and walked towards their house.[9]
At the precise moment of the perpetration of the crime, another witness, Arthur Agaran who worked at the recapping
shop of the victim was in the latters residence.[10] He was changing his clothes and preparing to work overtime in the
recapping shop located in the premises of the victims residence. [11] Agaran saw the pick-up truck being driven by the
appellant and noticed that it moved forward and backward four (4) times [12] about twenty (20) to thirty (30) meters from
the house.[13] When he and another worker went outside to find out what had happened, they saw the victims body
bloodied and sprawled on the ground.[14] They rushed the victim to the Dolorosa Hospital at Norzagaray, Bulacan where
the victim expired shortly thereafter.[15]
The appellant was not immediately prosecuted for the death of his father which he was able to pass off as an
accident. But when his older sister, Leslie C. Padilla, arrived from the United States to attend her fathers wake and
funeral, she made inquiries about the circumstances surrounding his death and was given different versions of the
incident, some of which insinuated that her father did not meet his demise accidentally. [16] Later, a suspicion of foul play

16

moved her to engage the services of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for a formal investigation into the matter.
[17]
The results thereof confirmed Padillas suspicion and led to the filing of an information for parricide against appellant.
[18]
After trial, Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of parricide and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the other heirs of the
victim TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P250,000.00) as actual damages.[19]
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
The prosecution has successfully established the elements of parricide: (1) the death of the deceased; (2) that he or
she was killed by the accused; and (3) that the deceased was a legitimate ascendant or descendant, or the legitimate
spouse of the accused.[20] The only question left to be answered by this Court is whether or not the parricide was
committed thru reckless imprudence as claimed by the appellant. The appellant does not dispute the fact that he had
indeed ran over his father with the pick-up truck he was driving on that fateful night in November, 1993. He claims,
however, that there was no intention on his part to kill his father, and that he had accidentally stepped on the gas pedal
forcefully, causing the vehicle to travel at a fast speed.[21]
The appellants asseveration is not worthy of credence. In convicting the appellant, the trial court relied heavily on
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Mariano and Agaran. We find no reason to do otherwise, applying the
fundamental rule in criminal cases that in the matter of credibility of witnesses, the appellate court gives great weight and
highest degree of respect to the findings of the trial court as they are in a better position to examine real evidence as well
as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. [22] The details of the incident as narrated by Mariano and Agaran bespeak of
a crime committed with full intent. And we have held that a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially
inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. [23] What qualifies an act as one of reckless or simple negligence or
imprudence is the lack of malice or criminal intent in the execution thereof.[24] Otherwise stated, in criminal negligence,
the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act done without
malice[25] but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence, and which has harmed society or an individual.[26]
On direct examination, Mariano testified as follows:
Q: While you were there infront (sic) of your house, do you recall of any unusual incident that happened?
A: Yes, sir there was.
Q: Tell us about that unusual incident?
A: While we were conversing at that time, all of a sudden there was a colored blue pick up (sic) that was
rushing towards our place in very fast speed (humaharurot).
Q: With whom were you conversing at that time?
A: My two (2) friends and one of my sister (sic), sir.
Q: What is the name of your sister?
A: Ma. Lucila G. Mariano, sir.
Q: From where did that pick up van come from (sic)?

17

A:It came from behind our back, sir.

xxxxxxxxx
Q: What happened after you saw that pick up (sic) colored blue speeding in that street?
A: All of a sudden it stopped, sir.
Q: In your sketch, will you please draw a square or a rectangular figure to indicate the position of that van when
it stopped?
AT THIS JUNCTURE, THE WITNESS IS INDICATING THE SAME.
Q: After that pick up (sic) stopped, what happened next?
A: It stopped there, sir.
Q: How about you, what did you do when the pick up stopped?
A: We were looking at it. We did not mind it.
Q: After that, did you notice anything unusual that happened around the premises.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Tell us about that unusual incident?
A: An old man alighted, sir.
Q: From where did that old man alight?
A: From the pick up (sic), sir.
COURT:
Q: The blue pick up (sic)?
A: Yes, your honor.
FISCAL:
Q: From what side of the pick up (sic) did he alight, from the left or from the right side?
A: From the right side, sir.
Q: After that old man had alighted, what happened?

18

A: I noticed that the pick up (sic) colored blue thru the headlight seems to be moving trying to intimidate the
old man then I heard the old man saying papatayin mo ba ako and at that time, he was holding a bottle of
beer, sir.
Q: In this sketch, will you please draw the position of that old man?
AT THIS JUNCTURE, THE WITNESS IS DOING THE SAME.
Q: After the old man uttered those words, what happened?
A: I just saw that the pick up made a back up (sic) almost hitting us, sir.
Q: Then, what did the driver of that pick up (sic) do afterwards after backing up rather?
A: All of a sudden, the pick up (sic) ran very fast and hit the old man, sir.
Q: You said that, that vehicle backed up and then it proceeded very fast hitting the old man in the process, is
that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q:Did the old man change his position after he uttered papatayin mo ba ako? up to the time that he was hit by
that pick up van?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you please indicate where the old man proceed (sic)?
AT THIS JUNCTURE, THE WITNESS IS DOING THE SAME.
Q: When you saw the old man hit by that pick up (sic), did you do anything?
A: I was just shocked, sir.
Q: And what happened to the pick up (sic) after it hit the old man?
A: After it hit the old man, I noticed that it moved backwards again and then the headlight was on at that time
and I saw the old man lying sprawled on the road, sir.
Q: And what did you do after you saw the old man lying sprawled on the street?
A: I just say (sic) to my companion, Hoy, nasagasaan yong matanda then all of us were shocked and we noticed
that the driver of that pick up (sic) was (sic) alighted, sir.
Q: Were you able to recognize the driver of that pick up who alighted from that vehicle?
A: I did not recognize, I just recall that he was wearing white shorts, sir.
xxxxxxxxx

19

Q: After that driver wearing white shorts alighted from that pick up (sic), where did he proceed?
A: He walked towards the town proper walking, sir.
Q: When you said that he walk (sic), are you saying that the driver left his vehicle in the middle of the street?
A: Yes, sir he left the pick up (sic).[27] (Underscoring supplied.)
The records are bereft of any evidence that the appellant had tried to avoid hitting the victim who positioned himself
in front of the pick-up. On the contrary, Marianos testimony is to the effect that prior to actually hitting the victim, the
appellant was intimidating him by moving the pick-up forward, thus prompting the victim to exclaim, papatayin mo ba
ako?. Worse, the appellant backed-up to gain momentum, then accelerated at a very fast speed knowing fully well that
the vehicle would definitely hit the victim who was still standing in front of the same.
The appellants actuations subsequent thereto also serve to refute his allegation that he did not intend to kill his
father. Surely, the appellant must have felt the impact upon hitting the victim. The normal reaction of any person who
had accidentally ran over another would be to immediately alight from the vehicle and render aid to the victim. But as if
to ensure the victims death, the appellant instead backed-up, thereby running over the victim again. This explains why, as
testified to by Agaran, he saw the imprint of tiremarks on the victims feet.[28] Even more indicative that this was a coldblooded killing and not an accident as appellant would have us believe is his deliberate failure to promptly summon help
for his father. Mariano categorically testified that after the appellant had ran over the victim, he alighted from the pick-up
and walked in the direction of the town. The appellants claim that he shouted for help and called the workers in the
recapping shop to bring his father to the hospital is obviously a fabrication. [29] Agaran recounted that after the incident,
the appellant walked towards their house and while passing in front of the recapping shop, merely looked at him and the
other workers thereat.[30] A man who had not intended to harm his own father would not walk but more likely run in
search of help. Aware of the fact that his fathers life is precariously hanging in the balance, the normal reaction of a child
is to waste no time in trying to save his life. The appellant, on the other hand, did not even lift a finger to help his own
father whose life he had so brutally taken away. It was Agaran and the other workers who, on their own accord, brought
the victim to the hospital. In the light of the foregoing circumstances, we therefore find it difficult to believe that the
appellant did not act with malice. Worth reiterating here is the rule that evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself- such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.[31]
Ironically, it is the appellants testimony that finally clinches his conviction. His testimony reveals that a certain
degree of enmity and resentment characterized his relationship with his parents. The appellant was the only son of well
to do parents. He had never held a days job in his entire life, and although already a family man himself, he continued to
rely solely on his parents support. That he was a little spoiled[32] is beyond doubt. The appellant admitted that during the
previous years, he and his parents had some differences.[33] As a matter of fact, several days prior to the incident, his
father who wanted him to look for a job had a heart to heart talk with him, and asked him, ganito ka na lang ba? (will you
never change?).[34] Finally, it was the appellant himself who told the court that the incident was preceded by an argument
between him and his father who was determined to prevent him from returning to the restaurant. [35] But what exactly
motivated the appellant to commit so heinous a crime continues to be beyond the comprehension of this court. There is,
however, no need to delve into the same as the facts proven during trial speak eloquently of the commission of a crime
and the identity of the author thereof.[36]

20

Anent the award of actual damages, we delete the same as none had been proven in court. The appellant should,
however, be made to pay the other heirs of the victim the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) by way
of moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide
is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
the other heirs of the victim the amount FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.