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THIRD DIVISION

LOLITA D. ENRICO,

G.R. No. 173614

Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

versus -

Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and

HEIRS

OF

SPS.

EULOGIO

B.

REYES, JJ.

MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLIMEDINACELI,

REPRESENTED

VILMA M. ARTICULO,

BY
Promulgated:

Respondents.
September 28, 2007
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DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assails the
Order,[1] dated 3 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil
Case No. II-4057, granting reconsideration of its Order,[2] dated 11 October 2005, and reinstating
respondents Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad CatliMedinaceli (Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and

petitioner

Lolita

D.

Enrico. Substantially,

the

complaint

alleged, inter

alia, that

Eulogio

and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan.[3] They begot seven children, herein
respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd. [4] On 1
May 2004, Trinidad died.[5] On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor
of Lal-lo, Cagayan.[6]Six months later, or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed away.[7]
In impugning petitioners marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same was entered
into without the requisite marriage license. They argued that Article 34[8] of the Family Code, which
exempts a man and a woman who have been living together for at least five years without any legal
impediment from securing a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because
they could not have lived together under the circumstances required by said provision. Respondents
posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latters death, or on 1
May 2004, which was barely three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to
petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years. To further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack of marriage
ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its performance impossible.
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife under
one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the requirement of a
marriage license. From their union were born Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico, all surnamed
Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30 October 1991, respectively. She further contended that the
marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the
Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that
it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order,[9] granting the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of
cause of action. It cited A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,[10] dated 7 March 2003, promulgated by the Supreme
Court En Banc as basis. The RTC elucidated on its position in the following manner:
The Complaint should be dismissed.
1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the Supreme Court which
took effect on March 15, 2003 provides in Section 2, par. (a)[11] that a petition for
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or

the wife. The language of this rule is plain and simple which states that such a petition
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The rule is clear and unequivocal that
only the husband or the wife may file the petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a
Void Marriage. The reading of this Court is that the right to bring such petition is
exclusive and this right solely belongs to them. Consequently, the heirs of the deceased
spouse cannot substitute their late father in bringing the action to declare the marriage
null and void.[12] (Emphasis supplied.)
The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:
WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative defense in the
answer is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Complaint filed by the [respondents] is
hereby DISMISSED with costs de officio. [13]

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Following the filing by petitioner of her
Comment to the said motion, the RTC rendered an Order [14] dated 3 May 2006, reversing its Order
of 11 October 2005. Hence, the RTC reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed
Order ignored the ruling in Nial v. Bayadog,[15] which was on the authority for holding that the heirs of
a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the death of the latter. It
held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC, which provides that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, applies only where
both parties to a void marriage are still living.[16] Where one or both parties are deceased, the RTC
held that the heirs may file a petition to declare the marriage void. The RTC expounded on its stance,
thus:
The questioned Order disregarded the case of Nial vs. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (March
14, 2000) in which the Supreme Court, First Division, held that the heirs of a deceased
person may file a petition for the declaration of his marriage after his death. The Order
subject of this motion for reconsideration held that the case of Nial vs. Bayadog is now
superseded by the new Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriages (hereinafter
referred to as the Rule) because the Supreme Court has rejected the case of Nial vs.
Bayadog by approving the Rule on Nullity of Void Marriages. The Order further held that
it is only the husband or the wife who is (sic) the only parties allowed to file an action for

declaration of nullity of their marriage and such right is purely personal and is not
transmissible upon the death of the parties.
It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the case of Nial vs.
Bayadog and Section 2(a) of the Rule. In view of this, the Court shall try to reconcile the
case of Nial vs. Bayadog and the Rule. To reconcile, the Court will have to determine
[the] basic rights of the parties. The rights of the legitimate heirs of a person who
entered into a void marriage will be prejudiced particularly with respect to their
successional rights. During the lifetime of the parent[,] the heirs have only an inchoate
right over the property of the said parents. Hence, during the lifetime of the parent, it
would be proper that it should solely be the parent who should be allowed to file a
petition to declare his marriage void. However, upon the death of the parent his heirs
have already a vested right over whatever property left by the parent. Such vested right
should not be frustrated by any rules of procedure such as the Rule. Rules of Procedure
cannot repeal rights granted by substantive law. The heirs, then, have a legal standing
in Court.
If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage entered by their
parent, especially when the marriage is illegal and feloniously entered into, it will give
premium to such union because the guilty parties will seldom, if ever at all, ask for the
annulment of the marriage. Such void marriage will be given a semblance of validity if
the heirs will not be allowed to file the petition after the death of the parent.
For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the Rules on Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Marriage is applicable only when both parties to a (sic) void
marriage are still living. Upon the death of anyone of the guilty party to the void
marriage, his heirs may file a petition to declare the the (sic) marriage void, but the Rule
is not applicable as it was not filed b the husband or the wife. It shall be the ordinary rule
of civil procedure which shall be applicable.[17]

Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states:

In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for reconsideration dated October
31, 2005 and reinstate this case.[18]

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order; however, on 1
June 2006, the RTC denied the said motion on the ground that no new matter was raised therein. [19]
Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the sole
question of whether the case law as embodied in Nial, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of the
Supreme Court applies to the case at bar.
At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this Court, countenancing the
hierarchy of courts.
We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the concurrent jurisdiction with
the Court of Appeals and the RTCs (for writs enforceable within their respective regions), to issue
writs ofmandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the litigants are well advised against taking a direct
recourse to this Court.[20] Instead, they should initially seek the proper relief from the lower courts. As
a court of last resort, this Court should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the
first instance. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is concurrently within the competence of
the Court of Appeals or the RTC, litigants must observe the principle of hierarchy of
courts.[21] However, it cannot be gainsaid that this Court has the discretionary power to brush aside
procedural lapses if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant
the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction.[22] Moreover, notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant
Petition for its failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, this Court will proceed to
entertain the case grounded as it is on a pure question of law.
Petitioner

maintains

that

A.M.

No.

02-11-10-SC

governs

the

instant

case. A

contrario, respondents posit that it is Nial which is applicable, whereby the heirs of the deceased
person were granted the right to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his
death.
We grant the Petition.

In reinstating respondents Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the RTC acted with
grave abuse of discretion.
While it is true that Nial in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, we
cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court in Nial recognized that the applicable law to
determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code, which was the law in
effect at the time of their celebration. [23] What we have before us belongs to a different milieu, i.e., the
marriage sought to be declared void was entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code. As
can be gleaned from the facts, petitioners marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to wit:
Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of
the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis supplied.)

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage
extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took
effect on 3 August 1988.[24]
Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003, following its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the RTC, there is no need to
reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with the ruling in Nial, because they vary in scope
and application. As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family
Code of thePhilippines, and is prospective in its application. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was
celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it squarely falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which
provides:
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife. (n) (Emphasis supplied.)

There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non indiget. When the
language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage.
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the
following manner, viz:
1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of
voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions
cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the
State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable
marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be
filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is
of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or
intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and
hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in
the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage
and not to seek its dissolution.[25] (Emphasis supplied.)

Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo. Nonetheless, all is not
lost for respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can still protect
their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional
Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not
in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging the
validity of the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of the latter. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

CENON R. TEVES,

G.R. No. 188775

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO,
Chairperson,
BRION

- versus -

PERALTA*
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA,** JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Promulgated:


DANILO R. BONGALON,
Respondents.

August 24, 2011

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DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This Petition for Review seeks the reversal of the 21 January 2009 decision [1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31125 affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 20, Malolos City in Criminal Case No. 2070-M-2006. The RTC decision[2] found petitioner
Cenon R. Teves guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy penalized under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code.

THE FACTS

On 26 November 1992, a marriage was solemnized between Cenon Teves (Cenon) and Thelma
Jaime-Teves (Thelma) at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila. [3]

After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad. She would only come home to the Philippines for
vacations. While on a vacation in 2002, she was informed that her husband had contracted marriage
with a certain Edita Calderon (Edita). To verify the information, she went to the National Statistics
Office and secured a copy of the Certificate of Marriage[4] indicating that her husband and Edita
contracted marriage on 10 December 2001 at the Divine Trust Consulting Services, Malhacan,
Meycauayan, Bulacan.

On 13 February 2006, Danilo Bongalon, uncle of Thelma, filed before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Malolos City, Bulacan a complaint[5] accusing petitioner of committing bigamy.

Petitioner was charged on 8 June 2006 with bigamy defined and penalized under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, in an Information[6] which reads:

That on or about the 10th day of December, 2001 up to the present, in the municipality of
Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said Cenon R. Teves being previously united in lawful marriage on November
26, 1992 with Thelma B. Jaime and without the said marriage having legally dissolved, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with one
Edita T. Calderon, who knowing of the criminal design of accused Cenon R. Teves to
marry her and in concurrence thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously cooperate in the execution of the offense by marrying Cenon R. Teves,
knowing fully well of the existence of the marriage of the latter with Thelma B. Jaime.

During the pendency of the criminal case for bigamy, the Regional Trial Court , Branch 130, Caloocan
City, rendered a decision[7] dated 4 May 2006 declaring the marriage of petitioner and Thelma null
and void on the ground that Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital
obligations pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Said decision became final by virtue of a
Certification of Finality[8] issued on 27 June 2006.

On 15 August 2007, the trial court rendered its assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused


Cenon R. Teves, also known as Cenon Avelino R. Teves, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Bigamy penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as
charged in the Information dated June 8, 2006. Pursuant to the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.[9]

Refusing to accept such verdict, petitioner appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals
contending that the court a quo erred in not ruling that his criminal action or liability had already been
extinguished.He also claimed that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of Bigamy despite the
defective Information filed by the prosecution.[10]

On 21 January 2009, the CA promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision dated August 15, 2007 in
Criminal Case No. 2070-M-2006 is AFFIRMED in TOTO.[11]

On 11 February 2009, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. [12] This however,
was denied by the CA in a resolution issued on 2 July 2009.[13]
Hence, this petition.

Petitioner claims that since his previous marriage was declared null and void, there is in effect no
marriage at all, and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of. [14] He differentiates a previous valid or
voidable marriage from a marriage null and void ab initio, and posits that the former requires a judicial
dissolution before one can validly contract a second marriage but a void marriage, for the same
purpose, need not be judicially determined.

Petitioner further contends that the ruling of the Court in Mercado v. Tan[15] is inapplicable in his case
because in the Mercado case the prosecution for bigamy was initiated before the declaration of nullity
of marriage was filed. In petitioners case, the first marriage had already been legally dissolved at the
time the bigamy case was filed in court.
We find no reason to disturb the findings of the CA. There is nothing in the law that would sustain
petitioners contention.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code states:


The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.

The elements of this crime are as follows:

1.

That the offender has been legally married;

2.

That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code;

3.

That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

4.

That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.[16]

The instant case has all the elements of the crime of bigamy. Thus, the CA was correct in affirming
the conviction of petitioner.

Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26 November 1992 at the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Muntinlupa City. He contracted a second or subsequent marriage with Edita on 10 December 2001 in
Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the time of his second marriage with Edita, his marriage with Thelma was
legally subsisting. It is noted that the finality of the decision declaring the nullity of his first marriage
with Thelma was only on 27 June 2006 or about five (5) years after his second marriage to
Edita. Finally, the second or subsequent marriage of petitioner with Edita has all the essential
requisites for validity. Petitioner has in fact not disputed the validity of such subsequent marriage. [17]
It is evident therefore that petitioner has committed the crime charged. His contention that he cannot
be charged with bigamy in view of the declaration of nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit. The
Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of
the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. [18]

The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee which drafted what is
now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be
allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. [19]

In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of
the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with
bigamy.[20]

In numerous cases,[21] this Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required
before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous
marriage, reprehensible and immoral.

If petitioners contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade
prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and
hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against
him. We note that in petitioners case the complaint was filed before the first marriage was declared a
nullity. It was only the filing of the Information that was overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his
first marriage. Following petitioners argument, even assuming that a complaint has been instituted,
such as in this case, the offender can still escape liability provided that a decision nullifying his earlier
marriage precedes the filing of the Information in court. Such cannot be allowed. To do so would
make the crime of bigamy dependent upon the ability or inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor
to immediately act on complaints and eventually file Informations in court. Plainly, petitioners strained
reading of the law is against its simple letter.

Settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the
offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law, and that
the time of filing of the criminal complaint (or Information, in proper cases) is material only for
determining prescription.[22] The crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner on 10 December 2001

when he contracted a second marriage with Edita. The finality on 27 June 2006 of the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his previous marriage to Thelma cannot be made to retroact to the date of
the bigamous marriage.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED and the assailed Decision dated 21 January
2009 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC

March 4, 2003

RE: PROPOSED RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND


ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
RESOLUTION
Acting on the letter of the Chairman of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court
submitting for this Court's consideration and approval the Proposed Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the
same.
The Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation not later than March 7, 2003
March 4, 2003

Davide, C.J. Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna
Ynares-Santiago, on leave
Corona, on official leave
RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
Section 1. Scope - This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of te Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife. (n)

(b) Where to file. - The petition shal be filed in the Family Court.
(c) Imprecriptibility ofaction or defense. - An Action or defense for the declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage shall not prescribe.

(d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36 of Family Code shall specially allege te
complete facts showing the either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriages at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be
alleged.
Section 3. Petition for annulment of voidable marriages. -

(a) Who may file. - The following persons may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriage
based on any of the grounds under article 45 of the Family Code and within the period herein
indicated:

(1) The contracting party whose parent, or guardian, or person exercising substitute
parental authority did not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age
of twenty-one unless, after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely
cohabitated with the other as husband or wife; or the parent, guardian or person having
legal charge of the contracting party , at any time before such party has reached the
age of twenty-one;
(2) The sane spouse who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative,
guardian, or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of
either party; or by the insane spouse during the a lucid interval or after regaining sanity,
provided that the petitioner , after coming to reason, has not freely cohabited with the
other as husband or wife;
(3) The injured party whose consent was obtained by fraud, within five years after the
discovery of the fraud, provided that said party, with full knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud, has not freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife;
(4) The injured party whose consent was obtained by force, intimidation, or undue
influence, within five years from the time the force intimidation, or undue influence
disappeared or ceased, provided that the force, intimidation, or undue influence having
disappeared or ceased, said party has not thereafter freely cohabited with the other as
husband or wife;
(5) The injured party where the other spouse is physically incapable of consummating
the marriage with the other and such incapability continues and appears to be incurable,
within five years after the celebration of marriage; and
(6) Te injured party where the other party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible
disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable, within five years after the
celebration of marriage.

(b) Where to file. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court.
Section 4. Venue. - The Petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing. Or in

the case of non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the
petitioner.
Section 5. Contents and form of petition. - (1) The petition shall allege the complete facts constituting
the cause of action.
(2) It shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and specify the
regime governing their property relations, as well as the properties involved.
If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the
petitioner may apply for a provisional order for spousal support, the custody and support of
common children, visitation rights, administration of community or conjugal property, and other
matters similarly requiringurgent action.
(3) It must be verified and accompanied celebration of marriage. (b) Where to file.-The petition
shall be filed in the Family Court.
Section 4. Venue. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in
the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines at the election of the
petitioner.
Section 5. Contents and form of petition. - (1) The petition shall allege the complete facts constituting
the cause of action.
(2) it shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and specify the
regime governing their property relations, as well as the properties involved.
If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the
petitioner may apply for a provisional order for spousal support, custody and support of
common children, visitation rights, administration of community or conjugal property, and other
matters similarly requiring urgent action.
(3) it must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. The
verification and certification must be signed personally by me petitioner. No petition may be
filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.

If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against forum
shopping shall be authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or
legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular agent in said country.
(4) it shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of
the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from
the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.
Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition.
Section 6. Summons. - The service of summons shall be governed by Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
and by the following rules:
(1) Where the respondent cannot be located at his given address or his whereabouts are
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service of summons may, by leave of
court, be effected upon him by publication once a week for two consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines and in such places as the court may order
In addition, a copy of the summons shall be served on the respondent at his last known
address by registered mail or any other means the court may deem sufficient.
(2) The summons to be published shall be contained in an order of the court with the following
data: (a) title of the case; (b) docket number; (c) nature of the petition; (d) principal grounds of
the petition and the reliefs prayed for; and (e) a directive for the respondent to answer within
thirty days from the last issue of publication.
Section 7. Motion to dismiss. - No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed except on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties; provided, however, that any
other ground that might warrant a dismissal of the case may be raised as an affirmative defense in an
answer.
Section 8. Answer. - (1) The respondent shall file his answer within fifteen days from service of
summons, or within thirty days from the last issue of publication in case of service of summons by
publication. The answer must be verified by the respondent himself and not by counsel or attorney-infact.
(2) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court shall not declare him or her in default.

(3) Where no answer is filed or if the answer does not tender an issue, the court shall order the
public prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists between the parties.
Section 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor. - (1) Within one month after receipt of the court
order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to
the court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their
respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the on the finding of
collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of a report The court shall set the report for
hearing and If convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for pretrial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.
Section 10. Social worker. - The court may require a social worker to conduct a case study and
submit the corresponding report at least three days before the pre-trial. The court may also require a
case study at any stage of the case whenever necessary.
Section 11. Pre-trial. -

(1) Pre-trial mandatory. - A pre-trial is mandatory. On motion or motu proprio, the court shall
set the pre-trial after the last pleading has been served and filed, or upon receipt of the report
of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties.

(2) Notice of pre-trial. - (a) The notice of pre-trial shall contain:


(1) the date of pre-trial conference; and
(2) an order directing the parties to file and serve their respective pre-trial briefs
in such manner as shall ensure the receipt thereof by the adverse party at least
three days before the date of pre-trial.
(b) The notice shall be served separately on the parties and their respective counsels as
well as on the public prosecutor. It shall be their duty to appear personally at the pretrial.

(c) Notice of pre-trial shall be sent to the respondent even if he fails to file an answer. In
case of summons by publication and the respondent failed to file his answer, notice of
pre-trial shall be sent to respondent at his last known address.
Section 12. Contents of pre-trial brief. - The pre-trial brief shall contain the following:
(a) A statement of the willingness of the parties to enter into agreements as may be allowed by
law, indicating the desired terms thereof;
(b) A concise statement of their respective claims together with the applicable laws and
authorities;
(c) Admitted facts and proposed stipulations of facts, as well as the disputed factual and legal
issues;
(d) All the evidence to be presented, including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or
describing the nature and purpose thereof;
(e) The number and names of the witnesses and their respective affidavits; and
(f) Such other matters as the court may require.
Failure to file the pre-trial brief or to comply with its required contents shall have the same
effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial under the succeeding paragraphs.
Section 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - {a) If the petitioner fails to appear personally,
the case shall be dismissed unless his counsel or a duly authorized representative appears in court
and proves a valid excuse for the non-appearance of the petitioner.
(b) If the respondent has filed his answer but fails to appear, the court shall proceed with the
pre-trial and require the public prosecutor to investigate the non-appearance of the respondent
and submit within fifteen days thereafter a report to the court stating whether his nonappearance is due to any collusion between the parties. If there Is no collusion, the court shall
require the public prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent
suppression or fabrication of evidence.
Section 14. Pre-trial conference. -At the pre-trial conference, the court:

(a) May refer the issues to a mediator who shall assist the parties in reaching an agreement on
matters not prohibited by law.
The mediator shall render a report within one month from referral which, for good
reasons, the court may extend for a period not exceeding one month.
(b) In case mediation is not availed of or where it fails, the court shall proceed with the pre-trial
conference, on which occasion it shall consider the advisability of receiving expert testimony
and such other makers as may aid in the prompt disposition of the petition.
Section 15. Pre-trial order. - {a) The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon termination
of the pre-trial, the court shall Issue a pre-trial order which shall recite in detail the matters taken up In
the conference, the action taken thereon, the amendments allowed on the pleadings, and except as
to the ground of declaration of nullity or annulment, the agreements or admissions made by the
parties on any of the matters considered, including any provisional order that may be necessary or
agreed upon by the parties.
(b) Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall contain a recital of the following;
(1) Facts undisputed, admitted, and those which need not be proved subject to Section
16 of this Rule;
(2) Factual and legal issues to be litigated;
(3) Evidence, including objects and documents, that have been marked and will be
presented;
(4) Names of witnesses who will be presented and their testimonies in the form of
affidavits; and
(5) Schedule of the presentation of evidence.
(c) The pre-trial order shall also contain a directive to the public prosecutor to appear for the
State and take steps to prevent collusion between the parties at any stage of the proceedings
and fabrication or suppression of evidence during the trial on the merits.
(d) The parlies shall not be allowed to raise issues or present witnesses and evidence other
than those stated in the pre-trial order.

The order shall control the trial of the case, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest
injustice.
(e) The parties shall have five days from receipt of the pre-trial order to propose corrections or
modifications.
Section 16. Prohibited compromise. - The court-shall not allow compromise on prohibited matters,
such as the following:
(a) The civil status of persons;
(b) The validity of a marriage or of a legal separation;
(c) Any ground for legal separation;
(d) Future support;
(e) The jurisdiction of courts; and
(f) Future legitime.
Section 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No
delegation of the reception of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters
involving property relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved.
No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be
allowed.
(3) The court may order the exclusion from the courtroom of all persons, including members of
the press, who do not have a direct interest in the case. Such an order may be made if the
court determines on the record that requiring a party to testify in open court would not enhance
the ascertainment of truth; would cause to the party psychological harm or inability to
effectively communicate due to embarrassment, fear, or timidity; would violate the right of a
party to privacy; or would be offensive to decency or public morals.

(4) No copy shall be taken nor any examination or perusal of the records of the case or parts
thereof be made by any person other than a party or counsel of a party, except by order of the
court.
Section 18. Memoranda. - The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation
with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda support of their claims
within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor
General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other
pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein
provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.
Section 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein
that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after
compliance with Article 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation,
Partition and Distribution of Properties.
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with
copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by
publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published
once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties.
Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal Is filed
by any of the parties the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
(4) Upon the finality of the decision, the court shall forthwith issue the corresponding decree if
the parties have no properties.
If the parties have properties, the court shall observe the procedure prescribed in Section 21 of
this Rule.
The entry of judgment shall be registered in the Civil Registry where the marriage was recorded
and In the Civil Registry where the Family Court'granting the petition for declaration of absolute nullity
or annulment of marriage is located.
Section 20. Appeal. -

(1) Pre-condition. - No appeal from the decision shall be allowed unless the appellant has filed
a motion for reconsideration or new trial within fifteen days from notice of judgment.

(2) Notice of appeal. - An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the
decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the
adverse parties.
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and delivery of

their presumptive iegltimes. - Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal,
upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on
motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses, including custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive
legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
Section 22. Issuance of Decree of Declaration of Absolute Nullity or Annulment of Marriage." (a) The
court shall issue the Decree after;
(1) Registration of the entry of judgment granting the petition for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage in the Civil Registry where the marriage was celebrated and in
the Civil Registry of the place where the Family Court is located;
(2) Registration of the approved partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, in the proper Register of Deeds where the real properties are located; and
(3) The delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes in cash, property, or sound
securities.
(b) The court shall quote in the Decree the dispositive portion of the judgment entered and
attach to the Decree the approved deed of partition.
Except in the case of children under Articles 36 and 53 of the Family Code, the court shall
order the Local Civil Registrar to issue an amended birth certificate indicating the new civil status of
the children affected.

Section 23. Registration and publication of the decree; decree as best evidence. - (a) The prevailing
party shall cause the registration of the Decree in the Civil Registry where the marriage was
registered, the Civil Registry of the place where the Family Court is situated, and in the National
Census and Statistics Office. He shall report td the court compliance with this requirement within thirty
days from receipt of the copy of the Decree.
(b) In case service of summons was made by publication, the parties shall cause the
publication of the Decree once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(c) The registered Decree shall be the best evidence to prove the declaration of absolute nullity
or annulment of marriage and shall serve as notice to third persons concerning the properties
of petitioner and respondent as well as the properties or presumptive legitimes delivered to
their common children.
Section 24. Effect of death of a party; duty of the Family Court or Appellate Court. - (a) In case a party
dies at any stage of the proceedings before the entry of judgment, the court shall order the case
closed and terminated, without prejudice to the settlement of the estate in proper proceedings in the
regular courts.
(b) If the party dies after the entry of judgment of nullity or annulment, the judgment shall be
binding upon the parties and their successors in interest in the settlement of the estate in the
regular courts.
Section 25. Effectlvity. - This Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7, 2003.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 167684

July 31, 2006

JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,


vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.
In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19
May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N.
Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the
Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain
Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father of
Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the
Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to
Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no
marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were
married civilly on 19 May 1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 1969 5 at the Most
Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry of
Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license
after having been married to her for 25 years.
The trial court made the following findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969, he and defendant
[Carmelita] appeared before a certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the
city hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A certain
Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an aide of defendant's father accompanied
them, and who, together with another person, stood as witness to the civil wedding. That
although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969
was indicated in the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he never applied for any
marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose
M. Abola, with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E")
was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage

license no. 2770792 was ever issued by said office." On May 31, 1969, he and defendant were
again wed, this time in church rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most Holy
Redeemer Parish Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they executed another marriage
contract (Exh. "F") with the same marriage license no. 2770792 used and indicated.
Preparations and expenses for the church wedding and reception were jointly shared by his
and defendant's parents. After the church wedding, he and defendant resided in his house at
Brixton Hills until their first son, Jose Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his parents
continued to support him financially, he and defendant lived in Spain for some time, for his
medical studies. Eventually, their marital relationship turned bad because it became difficult for
him to be married he being a medical student at that time. They started living apart in 1976, but
they underwent family counseling before they eventually separated in 1978. It was during this
time when defendant's second son was born whose paternity plaintiff questioned. Plaintiff
obtained a divorce decree against defendant in the United States in 1981 and later secured a
judicial separation of their conjugal partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested that when his service was
engaged by plaintiff, and after the latter narrated to him the circumstances of his marriage, he
made inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan where the supposed marriage
license was obtained and with the Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the
religious wedding ceremony was celebrated. His request letters dated March 3, 1994 (Exh.
"J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were
all sent to and received by the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in reply thereto, issued
Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and September
20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office."
Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church issued him a certified copy of the
marriage contract of plaintiff and defendant (Exh. "F") and a Certificate of Marriage dated April
11, 1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it noted that it was a "purely religious ceremony, having been
civilly married on May 19, 1969 at the City Hall, Manila, under Marriage License No. 2770792
issued at San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969."
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the
Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael
Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to locate the book
wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).

Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a steady romantic
relationship after they met and were introduced to each other in October 1968. A model, she
was compelled by her family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff who
was afraid to lose her, asked her to run away with him to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff,
she turned back on her family and decided to follow plaintiff in Baguio. When they came back
to Manila, she and plaintiff proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton Hills where plaintiff's
mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to worry. Her parents were hostile when they learned of the
elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla convinced them that she will take care of everything, and promised
to support plaintiff and defendant. As plaintiff was still fearful he may lose her, he asked her to
marry him in civil rites, without the knowledge of her family, more so her father (TSN, 5-28-98,
p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before a minister and where she was made to sign documents. After
the civil wedding, they had lunch and later each went home separately. On May 31, 1969, they
had the church wedding, which the Sevilla family alone prepared and arranged, since
defendant's mother just came from hospital. Her family did not participate in the wedding
preparations. Defendant further stated that there was no sexual consummation during their
honeymoon and that it was after two months when they finally had sex. She learned from Dr.
Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one of their wedding sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing
psychiatric therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic problem
compounded by his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has unusual sexual behavior by his
obsession over her knees of which he would take endless pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff
preferred to have sex with her in between the knees which she called "intrafemural sex," while
real sex between them was far and between like 8 months, hence, abnormal. During their
marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird sexual behavior which defendant attributed to plaintiff's drug
addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who breaks
things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like amphetamines, benzedrine and the like,
"speed" drugs that kept him from sleep and then would take barbiturates or downers, like
"mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff away from drugs but failed as it has
become a habit to him. They had no fixed home since they often moved and partly lived in
Spain for about four and a half years, and during all those times, her mother-in-law would send
some financial support on and off, while defendant worked as an English teacher. Plaintiff, who
was supposed to be studying, did nothing. Their marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff
physically and verbally abused her, and this led to a break up in their marriage. Later, she
learned that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States.

Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of the civil wedding of his
daughter with the plaintiff; that his daughter and grandson came to stay with him after they
returned home from Spain and have lived with him and his wife ever since. His grandsons
practically grew up under his care and guidance, and he has supported his daughter's
expenses for medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and corroborated that it was plaintiff's
family that attended to all the preparations and arrangements for the church wedding of her
sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the couple wed in civil rites some time prior to
the church wedding. She also stated that she and her parents were still civil with the plaintiff
inspite of the marital differences between plaintiff and defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that because of irreconcilable
differences with defendant and in order for them to live their own lives, they agreed to divorce
each other; that when he applied for and obtained a divorce decree in the United States on
June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it was with the knowledge and consent of defendant who in fact
authorized a certain Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21). During his
adverse testimony, plaintiff identified a recent certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE")
issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that the marriage license no. 2770792, the
same marriage license appearing in the marriage contract (Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus
appears to be fictitious.6
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of the parties, the trial
court made the following justifications:
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage, the lack or absence
of a license renders the marriage void ab initio. It was shown under the various certifications
(Exhs. "I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of San Juan, and the more recent one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no
marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office, hence, the marriage license no.
2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on
May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious. Such a certification enjoys probative value under the
rules on evidence, particularly Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, x x x.
xxxx

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and
Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May
19, 1969 as well as their contract of marriage solemnized under religious rites by Rev. Juan B.
Velasco at the Holy Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the
requisite marriage license. Let the marriage contract of the parties under Registry No. 601 (e69) of the registry book of the Local Civil Registry of Manila be cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in
accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the
Office of the Solicitor General for its record and information.7
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December 2004, the
Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court explained
that: "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of

irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome
by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is
rebutted, it becomes conclusive."
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan
testified that they "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is

registered," for the reason that "the employee handling is already retired." With said testimony
We cannot therefore just presume that the marriage license specified in the parties' marriage
contract was not issued for in the end the failure of the office of the local civil registrar of San
Juan to produce a copy of the marriage license was attributable not to the fact that no such
marriage license was issued but rather, because it "failed to locate the book wherein marriage
license no. 2770792 is registered." Simply put, if the pertinent book were available for scrutiny,
there is a strong possibility that it would have contained an entry on marriage license no.
2720792.
xxxx
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the basis of a mere
perception of plaintiff that his union with defendant is defective with respect to an essential

requisite of a marriage contract, a perception that ultimately was not substantiated with facts
on record.8
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in
a Resolution dated 6 April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
He raises the following issues for Resolution.
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties
herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the presumption of
regularity of officials acts, particularly the issuance of a marriage license, arising solely from
the contents of the marriage contracts in question which show on their face that a marriage
license was purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, and
3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity of a
marriage arising from the admitted "fact of marriage."9
At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the certifications from the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the
marriage contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and
void ab initio.
We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the time of the marriage of the
parties are Articles 53,10 5811 and 80.12
Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of
marriage. The marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.
At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one involving a marriage that is null and
void on the ground of absence of a marriage license based on the certifications issued by the Local
Civil Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case of Cario v. Cario13:

[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record
of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a
certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any
circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil
registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of
all date relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has
been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage
is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in
default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the
absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But
petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that
will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one
of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar
should be read in line with the decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 where it
was held that:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor
was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public
officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required
to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date
the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the
document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite
diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in
Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. a written statement signed by an officer having the custody
of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified
tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above
provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or
entry.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan
in connection with Marriage License No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing requirements and
deserved to be accorded probative value.
The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated 11
March 1994. It reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards (sic)
to Marriage License Number 2880792,16 we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above
problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
March 11, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were ever issued by this Office with
regards to Marriage License Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said
number.

Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above
problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
September 20, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage License Application
was filed and no Marriage License No. 2770792 allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by
this Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA CARDENAS-SEVILLA.
This is to further certify that the said application and license do not exist in our Local Civil
Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be fictitious.
This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested party for whatever legal
intent it may serve.
San Juan, Metro Manila
July 25, 2000
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and understand our loaded work
cannot give you our full force locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from the said
statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and
determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise, both
certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not such license was issued.

This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to
the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the
said person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of
the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be secured. This belies the
claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been exerted.
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this Court among other
things the register of application of/or (sic) for marriage licenses received by the Office of the
:Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did
you bring with you those records?
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for subpoena?
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .
Q Did you bring that with you?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage applications that your
office maintains as required by the manual of the office of the Local Civil Registrar?
COURT
May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.
xxxx
COURT

Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license 2880792 is the number
issued by their office while with respect to license no. 2770792 the office of the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan is very definite about it it was never issued. Then ask him
how about no. 2880792 if the same was ever issued by their office. Did you ask this
2887092, but you could not find the record? But for the moment you cannot locate the
books? Which is which now, was this issued or not?
A The employee handling it is already retired, sir. 19
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to
locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of
regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is
effectively rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed is among the disputable presumptions.
In one case, it was held:
A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may be accepted
and acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or
one which may be overcome by other evidence. One such disputable/rebuttable presumption
is that an official act or duty has been regularly performed. x x x.21
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty.22
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome by
other evidence as in the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the
tenor of the first and second certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License
No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be
found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily
accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.

Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. 23 The courts look upon this presumption with great
favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight. 24
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 25
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several years
producing two offsprings,26 now adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the
petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in 1991. 27 We
are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom
and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy. 28
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution.
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in
which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and
happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their
preservation is not the concern of the family members alone. 29
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence

of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out
as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption
established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro

matrimonio Always presume marriage."30


This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and
a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.31

By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his emotion or deepest
sentiments. As we have said in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are situations like
this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 20 December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated
in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the
Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void
based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in
the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in
applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled exaggerated to be
sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure

in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down
specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991
decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of
respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a
verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition
alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in
Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs
of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time
with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for
aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in
frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in
Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the
couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March
1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a
few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that
Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself
as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage
declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from
the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live
together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels
were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after
their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and
(3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:

1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St.
Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on
July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr.
Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also
submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he
appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of
petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the
present recourse.

The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the
Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the
appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which
is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial court's
findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting
personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter
referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and
family rights. . . ." It concluded that:

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad


range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he
or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse,
as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal
objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to
cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then
there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing
and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the
findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the
parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature
which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."

The Court's Ruling


The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that
(t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice
Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect
spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences"

and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to


prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical)
illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along
with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric
disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your
findings that it is better for the Court to annul ( sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically
unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to
prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on
Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of
expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's
temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.

During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-

vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the
difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite
two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo
C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to
thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral
argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance
of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to
be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
thepermanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical.
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence
may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise
of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses
of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear
that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code
of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.

14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great

persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law
on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such
ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.


Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.
RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique,
Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker,
invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared
presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void. 1
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique
who had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first,
that Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead," 2 and
second, Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a "cunning
attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage. 3
During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet
Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that
chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6)
months until they returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980
after his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in
San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another
employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime

in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him
that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left
Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately asked permission to leave his ship to return home.
He arrived in Antique in November 1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in
England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No.
38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica
first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too
had no news of Janet Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet Monica
Parker despite his lack of knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that his wife continued
to refuse to give him such information even after they were married. He also testified that he did not
report the matter of Janet Monica's disappearance to the Philippine government authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She testified that her
daughter-in-law Janet Monica had expressed a desire to return to England even before she had given
birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7 December 1982. When asked why her daughter-in-law might have wished
to leave Antique, respondent's mother replied that Janet Monica never got used to the rural way of life
in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that she had tried to dissuade Janet Monica from
leaving as she had given birth to her son just fifteen days before, but when she (Alicia) failed to do so,
she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left on 22 December 1982 for
England. She further claimed that she had no information as to the missing person's present
whereabouts.
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12 October 1988 the dispositive portion
of which reads:
Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, July
17, 1987) this Court hereby declares as presumptively dead Janet Monica Parker
Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance. 4

The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet
Monica Parker presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed
a well founded belief for such declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently
established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Court on a Petition for Review where
the following allegations are made:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that there existed a
well-founded belief on the part of Nolasco that Janet Monica Parker was already dead;
and
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Court's declaration that the petition
was a proper case of the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41, Family
Code. 5
The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is "[w]hether or not Nolasco has a wellfounded belief that his wife is already dead." 6
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code which
provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse

present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis supplied).

When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code, which it superseded, 7 the
following crucial differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise
has been shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive
death to enable the spouse present to remarry. 8 Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a
stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there
be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be

dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of
the Civil Code. 9 The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the
absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under
the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.

10

Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these requirements. 11
Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that respondent failed to prove that he
had complied with the third requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the absent
spouse is already dead.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such
diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.

United States v. Biasbas, 12 is instructive as to degree of diligence required in searching for a missing
spouse. In that case, defendant Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up
the defense of a good faith belief that his first wife had already died. The Court held that defendant
had not exercised due diligence to ascertain the whereabouts of his first wife, noting that:

While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning the whereabouts of
his wife, he fails to state of whom he made such inquiries. He did not even write to the
parents of his first wife, who lived in the Province of Pampanga, for the purpose of
securing information concerning her whereabouts. He admits that he had a suspicion
only that his first wife was dead. He admits that the only basis of his suspicion was the
fact that she had been absent. . . . 13
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his
attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a
reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique
after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the
British Embassy, 14 he secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many
millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you exert efforts to inquire
the whereabouts of your wife?
A Yes, Sir.
Court:
How did you do that?
A I secured another contract with the ship and we had a trip to London

and I went to London to look for her I could not find her (sic). 15 (Emphasis
supplied)
Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this casts
doubt on his supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. The Court of Appeal's justification of the
mistake, to wit:
. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the geographical difference
between London and Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio the two places could
mean one place in England, the port where his ship docked and where he found
Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they leave home to visit relatives in Pasay
City, Kalookan City, or Paraaque, would announce to friends and relatives, "We're

going to Manila." This apparent error in naming of places of destination does not appear
to be fatal. 16
is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one hand, and
London and Liverpool, on the other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around three
hundred fifty (350) kilometers apart. We do not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or
London with a simple hope of somehow bumping into one particular person there which is in effect
what Nolasco says he did can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her
personal background even after she had married respondent

17

too convenient an excuse to justify his

failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to
his wife which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these
returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from
their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his
testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during
trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case,
admissibility is not synonymous with credibility. 18 As noted before, there are serious doubts to
respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said testimony merely tended to
show that the missing spouse had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and
not that she was dead.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter sometime in January 1983,
he cut short his employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique. However, he did not explain the
delay of nine (9) months from January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his captain, to
November 1983 when be finally reached San Jose. Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet
Monica Parker without inquiring about her parents and their place of residence.

19

Also, respondent

failed to explain why he did not even try to get the help of the police or other authorities in London
and Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and
respondent's subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica
was dead a well-founded one.
In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, 20 the Court stressed that:

. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply
interested. It is a relationship for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter

period by virtue of any contract they make. . . . . 21 (Emphasis supplied)


By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one
of them leave the conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on
marriage. The Court notes that respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled before the trial
court in the same proceeding.
In In Re Szatraw, 22 the Court warned against such collusion between the parties when they find it
impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means.
While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care,
still the requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements
of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be denied. The law does
not view marriage like an ordinary contract. Article 1 of the Family Code emphasizes that.
. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family
life. It is the foundation of the familyand an inviolable social institution whose nature,

consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied)
In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court stressed strongly the need to protect.
. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which
the State bas the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most
fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the
following basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. . . .
The same sentiment bas been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines in Article
149:

The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution
which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations
are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of
the family shall be recognized or given effect. 24
In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his
absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica
Parker presumptively dead.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 1990, affirming the trial
court's decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and both
Decisions are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent.

Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.


Gutierrez, Jr. J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995


LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family
Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings
into fore the above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the
court a quo 1 and the Court of Appeal, 2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his
attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army,
first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September
1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City,
followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the
J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was
christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen,
Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family
affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when
and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would
express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's
pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up
Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration
of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States,
where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with,
Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros
Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code"

(docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and
denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible
and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out
by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by
the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit
evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. 3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court. 4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which
requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for
more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to
enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does
not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more
or less, is psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the
sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide
an insight on the import of the provision.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx

Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes
suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa
preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes
proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however,
pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in
the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage
voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious
than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and
void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be
modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental
faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental
incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or
nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of
consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable marriages, while
subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very essence of marital
obligations.

Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be
deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain
the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence.
Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically
impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is
called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the
Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which
describes a ground for voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added
that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no
voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they should
make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab

initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there
are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or
incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or
mentally incapacitated" in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does
not know all the consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these completely,
he might not have consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for
voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the

consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating
the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean
Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of
defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent
and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there
is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason
that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He
emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has
nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not
consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really
removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in
general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of
consent since there is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping together of the
validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are
completely different from each other, because they require a different capacity, which is
eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however,
felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be
classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should be
convalidated but there should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect
has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has
been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the
action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one
might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no
longer true that he has no concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In
response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should
not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been cured.

Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree.
Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this
matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a
defect in the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of marriage, and
therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity,
there are also momentary periods when there is an understanding of the consequences
of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological
incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted at the time when there is
understanding of the consequences of marriage. 5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the
grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the
impotence that in some instances the impotence is only temporary and only with respect
to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice
Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a different meaning in law and in
medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that
at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so
that later on if already he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage
is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological
incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the
celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later
becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the
marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured.
Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him
to remarry. 6

xxx xxx xxx


Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the beginning
even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other
hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes
manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create the
manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other
provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are
lesser in degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental
and physical incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not a
species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9,
1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological
or mental impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are
moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He
said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological
or mental incapacity to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it
from vice of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of
understanding of the essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to
go into the classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate
on it and that this is precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.

At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of
marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with
Canon Law because it is a new ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in
Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that
marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the ground of psychological
incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or
prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the
problem of church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On
the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of
cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were
for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within
which the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The
Committee approved the suggestion. 7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the
provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some
resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee,
has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13
June 1994); thus: 8

The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the
giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, 9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila
matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential

obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)


Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or
secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment,
nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation
or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties,

10

giving an account on how the third paragraph of

Canon 1095 has been framed, states:


The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator
intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because
of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon
297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:

. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . .


(cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope ( cf. SCH/1982,
canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term
anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the
conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological
disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary
obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since
psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier
Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality
can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This
particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render what is due by the

contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding


contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit
oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the
community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education
of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The

mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort,
obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological
disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address
to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this
incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological

defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving
consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of
the possibility of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of
the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it
must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases
of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the
Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for
Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently
of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes
a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of
unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction,
habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may
have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case,
be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in
psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that
innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the
Family Code, is that
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and
the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved,
even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide
all the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997


CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:


Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled
waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of
the unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?

This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29,
1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14,
1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of
Appeals 1 its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . .
Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they
went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married
life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were
supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant
just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was
no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened on the
second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during
their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with
her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to
join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no
sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk
during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept
together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But
during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that
she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.

Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio
Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin,
while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no
medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was
also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the
doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his
penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes
the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a
Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly
maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by
reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz:
(1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and
psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any
differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if
either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured. He
further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical
technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on
March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according
to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she
always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his
hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did
not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.

There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against
him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry
of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young
and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr.
Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof,
Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no
evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has
an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5)
centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr.
Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full
length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is
capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties
and that the evidence is not fabricated." 2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by
the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the
Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera.
Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City.
Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:

I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between
the parties without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a
psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex
with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court
without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the
burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to
prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's
conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate
marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial
court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial
is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of
marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. 3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.

The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to
prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a
judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and
was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she
thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be came
incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988,
until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code
provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment
without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This
only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his
wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only
telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva
Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of
facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a
basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial
evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after
almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical
disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly
indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates
an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019,
January 4, 1995). 4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the
petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity
of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the
alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may

not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might have been other reasons,

i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, why private respondent would
not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10
months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who
between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact
remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to
declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the
question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is
suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private
respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical
disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or
asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual
intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to
find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his
doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of
erection. 5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical
disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity. 6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

As aptly stated by the respondent court,


An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not
want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent,
but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March
15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings,
he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven though she balked
(Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it
were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to
court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife
whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy.
Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would
expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were
not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness
or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which
can be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the
admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife
whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable resistance
to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality
disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants
within the contemplation of the Family Code. 7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs.
Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an
island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so
because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order,
it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
ensures the continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is a
shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a
long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two
consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped
in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated
in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the
Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void
based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in
the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in
applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled exaggerated to be
sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure
in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down
specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991
decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of
respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a
verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition
alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in
Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs
of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time
with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for
aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in
frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in
Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the
couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March
1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a
few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that
Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself
as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage

declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from
the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live
together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels
were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after
their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and
(3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St.
Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on
July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr.
Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also
submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he
appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of
petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the
present recourse.

The Issue

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the
Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the
appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which
is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial court's
findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting
personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter
referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and
family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad
range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he
or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse,
as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal
objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to
cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then
there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing
and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the
findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the
parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature
which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."

The Court's Ruling


The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that

(t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice
Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect
spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences"
and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical)
illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along
with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric
disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your
findings that it is better for the Court to annul ( sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically
unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?


A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to
prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on
Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of
expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's
temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-

vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the
difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite
two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo
C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to
thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral
argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance
of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to
be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
thepermanence, inviolability and solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical.
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence
may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise
of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses
of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in

regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear
that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code
of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.

14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law
on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such
ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.

THIRD DIVISION
NOEL B. BACCAY,

G.R. No. 173138

Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J.,Chairperson,
BRION,
- versus -

BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:

MARIBEL C. BACCAY and REPUBLIC


OF THEPHILIPPINES,

December 1, 2010

Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, assails the Decision[1] dated August 26, 2005 and Resolution[2] dated June 13, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74581. The CA reversed the February 5, 2002
Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 38, which declared the marriage of

petitioner Noel B. Baccay (Noel) and Maribel Calderon-Baccay (Maribel) void on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36[4] of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The undisputed factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Noel and Maribel were schoolmates at the Mapua Institute of Technology where both took up
Electronics and Communications Engineering. Sometime in 1990, they were introduced by a mutual
friend and became close to one another. Noel courted Maribel, but it was only after years of
continuous pursuit that Maribel accepted Noels proposal and the two became sweethearts. Noel
considered Maribel as the snobbish and hard-to-get type, which traits he found attractive. [5]
Noels family was aware of their relationship for he used to bring Maribel to their house. Noel
observed that Maribel was inordinately shy when around his family so to bring her closer to them, he
always invited Maribel to attend family gatherings and other festive occasions like birthdays,
Christmas, and fiesta celebrations. Maribel, however, would try to avoid Noels invitations and
whenever she attended those occasions with Noels family, he observed that Maribel was invariably
aloof or snobbish. Not once did she try to get close to any of his family members. Noel would talk to
Maribel about her attitude towards his family and she would promise to change, but she never did.
Around 1997, Noel decided to break up with Maribel because he was already involved with
another woman. He tried to break up with Maribel, but Maribel refused and offered to accept Noels
relationship with the other woman so long as they would not sever their ties. To give Maribel some
time to get over their relationship, they still continued to see each other albeit on a friendly basis.
Despite their efforts to keep their meetings strictly friendly, however, Noel and Maribel had
several romantic moments together. Noel took these episodes of sexual contact casually since
Maribel never demanded anything from him except his company. Then, sometime in November 1998,
Maribel informed Noel that she was pregnant with his child. Upon advice of his mother, Noel
grudgingly agreed to marry Maribel. Noel and Maribel were immediately wed on November 23,
1998 before Judge Gregorio Dayrit, the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City.
After the marriage ceremony, Noel and Maribel agreed to live with Noels family in their house
at Rosal, Pag-asa, Quezon City. During all the time she lived with Noels family, Maribel remained
aloof and did not go out of her way to endear herself to them. She would just come and go from the

house as she pleased. Maribel never contributed to the familys coffer leaving Noel to shoulder all
expenses for their support. Also, she refused to have any sexual contact with Noel.
Surprisingly, despite Maribels claim of being pregnant, Noel never observed any symptoms of
pregnancy in her. He asked Maribels office mates whether she manifested any signs of pregnancy
and they confirmed that she showed no such signs. Then, sometime in January 1999, Maribel did not
go home for a day, and when she came home she announced to Noel and his family that she had a
miscarriage and was confined at the Chinese General Hospital where her sister worked as a nurse.
Noel confronted her about her alleged miscarriage sometime in February 1999. The discussion
escalated into an intense quarrel which woke up the whole household. Noels mother tried to intervene
but Maribel shouted Putang ina nyo, wag kayo makialam at her. Because of this, Noels mother asked
them to leave her house. Around 2:30 a.m., Maribel called her parents and asked them to pick her up.
Maribel left Noels house and did not come back anymore. Noel tried to communicate with Maribel but
when he went to see her at her house nobody wanted to talk to him and she rejected his phone
calls.[6]
On September 11, 2000 or after less than two years of marriage, Noel filed a petition[7] for
declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of Manila. Despite summons, Maribel did not
participate in the proceedings. The trial proceeded after the public prosecutor manifested that no
collusion existed between the parties. Despite a directive from the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) also did not submit a certification manifesting its agreement or opposition to the
case.[8]
On February 5, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Noel. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of the parties
hereto celebrated on November 23, 1998 at the sala of Judge Gregorio Dayrit of the
Metropolitan Trial Court in Quezon City as NULL and VOID.
The Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Chief of the National Statistics
Office are hereby directed to record and enter this decree into the marriage records of
the parties in their respective marriage registers.

The absolute community property of the parties is hereby dissolved and,


henceforth, they shall be governed by the property regime of complete separation of
property.
With costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The RTC found that Maribel failed to perform the essential marital obligations of marriage, and
such failure was due to a personality disorder called Narcissistic Personality Disorder characterized
by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability as determined by a clinical psychologist. The RTC
cited the findings of Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist presented as witness by Noel, that Maribel
was a very insecure person. She entered into the marriage not because of emotional desire for
marriage but to prove something, and her attitude was exploitative particularly in terms of financial
rewards. She was emotionally immature, and viewed marriage as a piece of paper and that she can
easily get rid of her husband without any provocation.[10]
On appeal by the OSG, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila Branch 38 declaring as null and void the marriage between petitioner-appellee
and respondent is hereby REVERSED. Accordingly, the instant Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[11]
The appellate court held that Noel failed to establish that Maribels supposed Narcissistic
Personality Disorder was the psychological incapacity contemplated by law and that it was permanent
and incurable. Maribels attitudes were merely mild peculiarities in character or signs of ill-will and
refusal or neglect to perform marital obligations which did not amount to psychological incapacity,
said the appellate court. The CA noted that Maribel may have failed or refused to perform her marital
obligations but such did not indicate incapacity. The CA stressed that the law requires nothing short
of mental illness sufficient to render a person incapable of knowing the essential marital
obligations.[12]

The CA further held that Maribels refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel did not
constitute a ground to find her psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family Code. As
Noel admitted, he had numerous sexual relations with Maribel before their marriage. Maribel
therefore cannot be said to be incapacitated to perform this particular obligation and that such
incapacity existed at the time of marriage.[13]
Incidentally, the CA held that the OSG erred in saying that what Noel should have filed was an
action to annul the marriage under Article 45 (3)[14] of the Family Code. According to the CA, Article 45
(3) involving consent to marriage vitiated by fraud is limited to the instances enumerated under Article
46[15] of the Family Code. Maribels misrepresentation that she was pregnant to induce Noel to marry
her was not the fraud contemplated under Article 45 (3) as it was not among the instances enumerated
under Article 46.[16]
On June 13, 2006, the CA denied Noels motion for reconsideration. It held that Maribels
personality disorder is not the psychological incapacity contemplated by law. Her refusal to perform
the essential marital obligations may be attributed merely to her stubborn refusal to do so. Also, the
manifestations of the Narcissistic Personality Disorder had no connection with Maribels failure to
perform her marital obligations. Noel having failed to prove Maribels alleged psychological incapacity,
any doubts should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity.[17]
Hence, the present petition raising the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE CASE OF CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF
APPEALS DOES NOT FIND APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT IS NOT SUFFERING
FROM NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER; AND THAT HER FAILURE TO
PERFORM HER ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.[18]
The issue to be resolved is whether the marriage between the parties is null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code.

Petitioner Noel contends that the CA failed to consider Maribels refusal to procreate as
psychological incapacity. Insofar as he was concerned, the last time he had sexual intercourse with
Maribel was before the marriage when she was drunk. They never had any sexual intimacy during
their marriage. Noel claims that if a spouse senselessly and constantly refuses to perform his or her
marital obligations, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity rather
than to stubborn refusal. He insists that the CA should not have considered the pre-marital sexual
encounters between him and Maribel in finding that the latter was not psychologically incapacitated to
procreate through marital sexual cooperation. He argues that making love for procreation and
consummation of the marriage for the start of family life is different from plain, simple and casual
sex. He further stresses that Maribel railroaded him into marrying her by seducing him and later
claiming that she was pregnant with his child. But after their marriage, Maribel refused to
consummate their marriage as she would not be sexually intimate with him.[19]
Noel further claims that there were other indicia of Maribels psychological incapacity and that
she consistently exhibited several traits typical of a person suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder before and during their marriage. He points out that Maribel would only mingle with a few
individuals and never with Noels family even if they lived under one (1) roof. Maribel was also arrogant
and haughty. She was rude and disrespectful to his mother and was also interpersonally exploitative as
shown by her misrepresentation of pregnancy to force Noel to marry her. After marriage, Maribel never
showed respect and love to Noel and his family. She displayed indifference to his emotional and sexual
needs, but before the marriage she would display unfounded jealousy when Noel was visited by his
friends. This same jealousy motivated her to deceive him into marrying her.
Lastly, he points out that Maribels psychological incapacity was proven to be permanent and
incurable with the root cause existing before the marriage. The psychologist testified that persons
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder were unmotivated to participate in therapy session
and would reject any form of psychological help rendering their condition long lasting if not incurable.
Such persons would not admit that their behavioral manifestations connote pathology or abnormality.
The psychologist added that Maribels psychological incapacity was deeply rooted within her adaptive
system since early childhood and manifested during adult life. Maribel was closely attached to her
parents and mingled with only a few close individuals. Her close attachment to her parents and their
over-protection of her turned her into a self-centered, self-absorbed individual who was insensitive to
the needs of others. She developed the tendency not to accept rejection or failure. [20]

On the other hand, the OSG maintains that Maribels refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel
did not constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code as her traits were merely
mild peculiarities in her character or signs of ill-will and refusal or neglect to perform her marital
obligations. The psychologist even admitted that Maribel was capable of entering into marriage except
that it would be difficult for her to sustain one. Also, it was established that Noel and Maribel had sexual
relations prior to their marriage. The OSG further pointed out that the psychologist was vague as to how
Maribels refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel constituted Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
The petition lacks merit.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
The Court held in Santos v. Court of Appeals[21] that the phrase psychological incapacity is not
meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68[22] of
theFamily Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
In Republic of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,[23] the Court laid down the guidelines in resolving
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation
of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from

dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected
by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.

Thus, mild characteriological

peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted


as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. x x x.
xxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. (Emphasis
ours.)
In this case, the totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient to sustain a finding that
Maribel was psychologically incapacitated. Noels evidence merely established that Maribel refused to
have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him after their quarrel when he
confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and

incurability. As correctly observed by the CA, the report of the psychologist, who concluded that Maribel
was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder traceable to her experiences during childhood, did
not establish how the personality disorder incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the essential
obligations of the marriage. Indeed, the same psychologist even testified that Maribel was capable of
entering into a marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain one.[24] Mere difficulty, it must be
stressed, is not the incapacity contemplated by law.
The Court emphasizes that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that private
respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such psychological disorder renders
her truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage.[25] Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
difficulty, a refusal, or a neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory
marriage is not a null and void marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:[26]
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. x x x.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 74581 is AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR yALUNAN,

G.R. No. 170729

Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
-

versus -

BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:

ERLINDA AMPARO-AGRAVIADOR

December 8, 2010

and REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. -- x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

BRION, J.:

Enrique Agraviador y Alunan (petitioner) challenges through his petition for review on certiorari[1] the
decision dated May 31, 2005[2] and the resolution dated December 6, 2005[3] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75207.The challenged decision reversed the resolution[4] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 276, Muntinlupa City, declaring the marriage of the petitioner and Erlinda
Amparo-Agraviador (respondent) null and void on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity.
The assailed resolution, on the other hand, denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Antecedent Facts

The petitioner first met the respondent in 1971 at a beerhouse where the latter worked. The
petitioner, at that time, was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau of Customs, while the
respondent was a 17-year old waitress. Their meeting led to a courtship, and they eventually became
sweethearts. They often spent nights together at the respondents rented room, and soon entered into
a common-law relationship.
On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent contracted marriage in a ceremony
officiated by Reverend Juanito Reyes at a church in Tondo, Manila. The petitioners family was
apprehensive about this marriage because of the nature of the respondents work and because she
came from a broken family. Out of their union, the petitioner and the respondent begot four (4)
children, namely: Erisque, Emmanuel, Evelyn, and Eymarey.
On March 1, 2001, the petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with the respondent, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. [5] The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 01-081. He alleged that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated
to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as she was carefree and irresponsible, and refused
to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their house for long periods of
time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not take care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order
to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family name Agraviador in her activities.
The petitioner likewise claimed that the respondent refused to have sex with him since 1993
because she became very close to a male tenant in their house. In fact, he discovered their love
notes to each other, and caught them inside his room several times.
The respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the root cause of her
psychological incapacity was not medically identified and alleged in the petition. [6] The RTC denied
this motion in its order dated July 2, 2001.[7]
In her answer,[8] the respondent denied that she engaged in extramarital affairs and maintained
that it was the petitioner who refused to have sex with her. She claimed that the petitioner wanted to
have their marriage annulled because he wanted to marry their former household helper, Gilda
Camarin. She added that she was the one who took care of their son at the hospital before he died.

The RTC ordered the city prosecutor and/or the Solicitor General to investigate if collusion
existed between the parties.[9] The RTC, in its Order of November 20, 2001, allowed the petitioner to
present his evidence ex parte.[10] The petitioner, thus, presented testimonial and documentary
evidence to substantiate his claims.
In his testimony, the petitioner confirmed what he stated in his petition, i.e., that the respondent
was carefree, irresponsible, immature, and whimsical; stubbornly did what she wanted; did not stay
long in the conjugal dwelling; refused to do household chores; refused to take care of him and their
children; and consulted a witch doctor in order to bring bad luck upon him.
The petitioner further confirmed that the respondent abandoned their sick child, which led to
the latters death. The petitioner further stated that the respondent became very close to a male
border of their house; he discovered their love notes to each other, and caught them inside his room
several times.
The petitioner declared that he filed the petition for nullity because the respondent refused to
change; he loves his children and does not want their children to be affected by their mothers
conduct. He intimated that he might remarry if it would benefit their children.
Aside from his testimony, the petitioner also presented a certified true copy of their marriage
contract (Exh. B)[11] and the psychiatric evaluation report (Exh. A)[12] of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac.
In his Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac made the following findings:
REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the information gathered from Enrique, his son and their helper, the
psychological report and the mental status examination, Enrique is found to be
psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage. He coped
with Erlindas selfish and irresponsible behavior as he dutifully performed what
she failed to do for the family. He patiently tried to understand her and exerted
every effort to make her realize the harm caused by her neglect to the family.
Throughout their marriage, he provided emotional and material support for the

family. He engaged in other business endeavors aside from his employment as


he maintained to be financially productive.
The same data revealed that Erlinda failed to fulfill the essential obligations of
marriage. She manifested inflexible maladaptive behavior even at the time before
their marriage. She is known to be stubborn and uncaring who did things her way
without regard to the feelings of others. She is an irresponsible individual who
selfishly ignored and neglected her role as daughter to her parents as wife to
Enrique and mother to their children. Before the marriage at a young age of 17,
Erlinda defied her parents as she lived alone, rented a room for herself and
allowed Enrique to sleep with her. She did not care about the needs of Enrique
before and after marriage and she maintained to be so with her children. She
abandoned and relegated her duty to her family to their helper. She never stayed
long in their house despite pleadings from her children and Enrique. Her
irresponsible, uncaring behavior even led to the death of one of their children.
Likewise, she does not show concern and ignores a daughter who is presently
manifesting behavioral problem. She kept secrets as she never allowed her
husband and children know where she stays when shes not at work. She falsified
documents as she hid her marital status when she used her maiden surname in
her present employment. She is having illicit affairs and is reported to be
presently having an affair with a lesbian. Her desire to bring bad fate and death
to Enrique through her consultation with a mangkukulam point out her lack of
care, love, and respect to Enrique.
Erlindas lack of motivation and insight greatly affected her capacity to render
love, respect and support to her family.
The above data shows that Erlinda is suffering from a Personality Disorder
(Mixed Personality Disorder). She has been having this disorder since her
adolescence. There is no definite treatment for this disorder. She is deemed
psychologically incapacitated to perform the obligations of marriage.
In fairness to Erlinda, she is recommended to undergo the same examination as
Enrique underwent.[13]

The RTC Ruling

The RTC nullified the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent in its decision of April 26,
2002. It saw merit in the petitioners testimony and Dr. Patacs psychiatric evaluation report, and
concluded that:
Without contradiction the recitation by Petitioner and the findings of the doctor
show that Respondent is indeed suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder that render
her incapable of complying with her marital obligations. Respondents refusal to commit
herself to the marriage, her tendencies to avoid a close relationship with Petitioner,
preferring to be with her lover and finally abandoning their home for a lesbian, a
disregard of social norm, show that she was never prepared for marital commitment in
the first place. This incapacity is deeply rooted from her family upbringing with no hope
for a cure. Therefore, for the good of society and of the parties themselves, it is best
that this marriage between ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR Y ALUNAN and ERLINDA
AMPARO AGRAVIADOR be annulled as if it never took place at all. The Civil Registrar
of the City of Manila and the General Civil Registrar, National Census and Statistics
Office, East Avenue,Quezon City, are hereby requested to make the necessary
correction of the civil record of the marriage between the parties and on their respective
civil status.
The children ERISQUE AGRAVIADOR, EMMANUEL AGRAVIADOR, EVELYN
AGRAVIADOR and EYMAREY AGRAVIADOR will however remain as their legitimate
children.
It is SO ORDERED.[14]
The CA Decision

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the RTC
decision to the CA. The CA, in its decision [15] dated May 31, 2005, reversed and set aside the RTC
resolution, and dismissed the petition.
The CA held that Dr. Patacs psychiatric evaluation report failed to establish that the respondents
personality disorder was serious, grave and permanent; it likewise did not mention the root cause of
her incapacity. The CA further ruled that Dr. Patac had no basis in concluding that the respondents
disorder had no definite treatment because he did not subject her to a mental assessment.
The CA added that the psychiatric remarks in the Report were nothing but a showcase of
respondents character flaws and liabilities. There was no proof of a natal or supervening factor that
effectively incapacitated the respondent from accepting and complying with the essential obligations
of marriage. If at all, these character flaws may only give rise to a legal separation suit.
The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution
of December 6, 2005.[16]
The Petition and Issues
The petitioner now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal of the CA
ruling, based on the following arguments:
I.

THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY [HIM] WAS MORE THAN


SUBSTANTIAL TO ESTABLISH THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
OF THE RESPONDENT[;]

II.

THE GUIDELINES SET FORTH IN REPUBLIC V. MOLINA [HAD


BEEN] SATISIFIED[;]

III.

THE ADMISSIBILITY XXX OF THE PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION


REPORT XXX STILL STANDS FOR NOT HAVING BEEN CONTESTED
XXX BY THE STATE AND/THE RESPONDENT[; and]

IV.

THE DEGREE OF PROOF REQUIRED IN CIVIL CASES HAD BEEN


SATISIFIED[.]

The issue in this case essentially boils down to whether there is basis to nullify the petitioners

marriage to the respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the essential
marital obligations.

The Courts Ruling


We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit, and hold that no sufficient basis exists to annul the
marriage, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.

The totality of evidence presented


failed to establish the respondents
psychological incapacity
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which
provides that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." It introduced
the concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage, although this concept
eludes exact definition.
The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
was that it did not involve a species of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both
members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, conceded that the spouse
may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was, nonetheless, incapable of fulfilling
such rights and obligations. Dr. Arturo Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his
commentaries on the Family Code that this psychological incapacity to comply with the essential
marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage. [17]
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[18] the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital

covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." [19] It
must be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code in Republic v. Court of Appeals[20] (the Molina case) where we said:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of
the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected
by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that
the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties

exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore,
such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos. A later case, Marcos

v. Marcos,[21] further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse
should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer
necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of
evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability can be duly established.
A later case, Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,[22] declared that it may have been inappropriate for the Court to
impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. We
stated

that

instead

of

serving

as

guideline, Molina unintentionally

became

straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which
is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with respect to
psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on "all fours" with another. Ngo Te, therefore,
put into question the applicability of time-tested guidelines set forth in Molina.

Ting v. Velez-Ting[23] and the fairly recent case of Suazo v. Suazo[24] squarely met the issue and laid
to rest any question regarding the applicability of Molina. In these cases, we clarified that Ngo Te did
not

abandon Molina;

far

from

abandoning

Molina,

it

simply

suggested

the

relaxation of its stringent requirements. We also explained in Suazo that Ngo Te merely stands for a
more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on
psychological incapacity.
Under these established guidelines, we find the totality of the petitioners evidence insufficient
to prove the respondents psychological incapacity.

a.

Petitioners court testimony

For clarity, we reproduce the pertinent portions of the petitioners testimony that essentially
confirmed what the petition alleged:

Q: Out of your marriage with the said respondent, were you blessed with
children, and how many?
A: Yes, sir, we were blessed with four (4), two (2) boys and two (2) girls.
Q: Where are they now?
A: All grown up with the exception of one who died of pneumonia due to the
neglect and fault of my said wife who abandone[d] him at the time of his
illness.
Q: Is that the reason why you file[d] the instant petition, Mr. Witness?
A: It is only one of the several reasons, Sir.
Q: Can you cite these reasons, you mentioned?
A: She appears to be carefree, irresponsible, immature, whimsical and used to
impose what she wanted to get, she refused to do household chores, like
cooking, caring for the husband and children, used to stay from the
conjugal dwelling, initially for weeks, then for months and lately fully
abandoned the family house and stay with a lesbian. [sic]
At first, I discovered a love note while being so secretive and used to be very
close to a male renter in the ground floor of their house and caught them
several times alone in his room, thus explaining the reason why she
refused to have sex since 1993, up to and until the present time.
Lately, we discovered that she used to consult a cult mangkukulam to bring bad
fate against the family and death for me.
Q: By the way did you give her the chance to change?
A: I gave her but she refused to reform.

xxxx
Q: Can you not give a last chance for you to save your marriage?
A: I think I cannot since she does not accept her fault and she does not want to
change for the sake of our family.[25]
These exchanges during trial significantly constituted the totality of the petitioners testimony on
the respondents supposed psychological or mental malady. We glean from these exchanges the
petitioners theory that the respondents psychological incapacity is premised on her refusal or
unwillingness to perform certain marital obligations, and a number of unpleasant personality traits
such as immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness.
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law
requires, and should be distinguished from the difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect, in the
performance of some marital obligations that characterize some marriages. [26] The intent of the law
has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders existing at the time of the marriage clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.[27] The psychological illness that must have afflicted a
party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one
of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to
assume.[28]
In the present case, the petitioners testimony failed to establish that the respondents condition
is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating
psychological condition that makes her completely unable to discharge the essential marital
obligations. If at all, the petitioner merely showed that the respondent had some personality defects
that showed their manifestationduring the marriage; his testimony sorely lacked details necessary to
establish that the respondents defects existed at the inception of the marriage. In addition, the
petitioner failed to discuss the gravity of the respondents condition; neither did he mention that the
respondents malady was incurable, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the respondents
means to undertake. The petitioners declarations that the respondent does not accept her fault, does
not want to change, and refused to reform are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental
defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code.

In a similar case, Bier v. Bier,[29] we ruled that it was not enough that the respondent, alleged to
be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was
unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse
integral element in the respondent's personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from
complying with his essential marital obligations had to be shown.

b.

Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report

The Court finds that Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report fell short in proving that the
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital duties. We emphasize
that Dr. Patac did not personally evaluate and examine the respondent; he, in fact, recommended at
the end of his Report for the respondent to undergo the same examination [that the petitioner]
underwent.[30] Dr.

Patac

relied

only

on

the

information

fed

by

the petitioner, the parties

second child, Emmanuel, and household helper. Sarah. Largely, the doctor relied on the information
provided by the petitioner. Thus, while his Report can be used as a fair gauge to assess the
petitioners own psychological condition (as he was, in fact, declared by Dr. Patac to be
psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage), the same statement cannot be
made with respect to the respondents condition. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy
the required depth and comprehensiveness of the examination required to evaluate a party alleged to
be suffering from a psychological disorder.[31]
We do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated is mandatory. We have confirmed in Marcos v. Marcos that the person sought to be
declared psychologically incapacitated must be personally examined by a psychologist as a
condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration.[32] If a psychological disorder can be proven by
independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given
credit.[33] No such independent evidence appears on record, however, to have been gathered in this
case.
In his Report, Dr. Patac attempted to establish the juridical antecedence of the respondents
condition by stating that the respondent manifested inflexible maladaptive behavior before marriage,
pointing out how the respondent behaved before the marriage the respondent defied her parents and
lived alone; rented a room for herself; and allowed the petitioner to sleep with her. These perceived
behavioral flaws, to our mind, are insufficient to establish that the incapacity was rooted in the history

of the respondent antedating the marriage. Dr. Patac failed to elucidate on the circumstances that led
the respondent to act the way she did, for example, why she defied her parents and decided to live
alone; why she neglected her obligations as a daughter; and why she often slept with the petitioner.
This is an area where independent evidence, such as information from a person intimately related to
the respondent, could prove useful. As earlier stated, no such independent evidence was gathered in
this case. In the absence of such evidence, it is not surprising why the Psychiatric Report Evaluation
failed to explain how and why the respondents so-called inflexible maladaptive behavior was already
present at the time of the marriage.
Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to prove the gravity or seriousness of
the respondents condition. He simply made an enumeration of the respondents purported behavioral
defects (as related to him by third persons), and on this basis characterized the respondent to be
suffering from mixed personality disorder. In the Background History portion of his Psychiatric
Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac mentioned that the respondent employed one of her siblings to do the
household chores; did not help in augmenting the familys earnings; belittled the petitioners income;
continued her studies despite the petitioners disapproval; seldom stayed at home; became close to a
male border; had an affair with a lesbian; did not disclose the actual date of her departure to Taiwan;
threatened

to

poison

the

petitioner

and

their

children; neglected and ignored their children; used her maiden name at work; and consulted a witch
doctor to bring bad fate to the petitioner. Except for the isolated and unfounded statement that
Erlindas

lack

of

motivation and insight greatly affected her

capacity

to

render

love,

respect and support to the family,[34] there was no other statement regarding the degree of severity of
the respondents condition, why and to what extent the disorder is grave, and how it incapacitated her
to comply with the duties required in marriage. There was likewise no showing of a supervening
disabling factor or debilitating psychological condition that effectively incapacitated the respondent
from complying with the essential marital obligations. At any rate, the personality flaws mentioned
above, even if true, could only amount to insensitivity, sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity, and
irresponsibility, which do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code.
Interestingly, Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report highlighted only the respondents
negative behavioral traits without balancing them with her other qualities. The allegations of infidelity
and insinuations of promiscuity, as well as the claim that the respondent refused to engage in sexual
intercourse since 1993, of course, came from the petitioner, but these claims were not proven. Even

assuming ex gratia argumenti that these accusations were true, the Psychiatric Evaluation Report did
not indicate that unfaithfulness or promiscuousness were traits that antedated or existed at the time of
marriage. Likewise, the accusation that the respondent abandoned her sick child which eventually led
to the latters death appears to be an exaggerated claim in the absence of any specifics and
corroboration. On the other hand, the petitioners own questionable traits his flirtatious nature before
marriage and his admission that he inflicted physical harm on the respondent every time he got
jealous were not pursued. From this perspective, the Psychiatric Evaluation Report appears to be no
more than a one-sided diagnosis against the respondent that we cannot consider a reliable basis to
conclusively establish the root cause and the degree of seriousness of her condition.
The Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to adequately explain how Dr. Patac came to
the conclusion that the respondents personality disorder had no definite treatment. It did not discuss
the concept of mixed personality disorder, i.e., its classification, cause, symptoms, and cure, and
failed to show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited this disorder in order to create a
necessary inference that the respondents condition had no definite treatment or is incurable. A glaring
deficiency, to our mind, is the Psychiatric Evaluation Reports failure to support its findings and
conclusions with any factual basis. It simply enumerated the respondents perceived behavioral
defects, and then associated these traits with mixed personality disorder. We find it unfortunate that
Dr. Patac himself was not called on the witness stand to expound on the findings and conclusions he
made in his Psychiatric Evaluation Report. It would have aided petitioners cause had he called Dr.
Patac to testify.
Admittedly, the

standards

used

by

the

Court

in

assessing

the

sufficiency

of psychological evaluation reports may be deemed very strict, but these are proper, in view of the principle that
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital
vinculum.[35] Marriage, an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim
of the parties, especially where the prices of evidence presented are grossly deficient to show the
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the condition of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated to assume and perform the essential marital duties.
The petitioners marriage to the respondent may have failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation The remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. We stress that Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates downright incapacity or
inability to assume and fulfill the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much

less,

ill

will,

on

the

part

of

the

errant

spouse. It

is

not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce
manifest themselves. The State, fortunately or unfortunately, has not seen it fit to decree that divorce
should be available in this country. Neither should an Article 36 declaration of nullity be equated with
legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical
violence,

moral

pressure,

moral

corruption,

civil

interdiction,

drug

addiction,

sexual

infidelity, abandonment, and the like.[36] Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the
parties or one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing at the time the marriage
was celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of marital life (and thus could not then have validly
entered into a marriage), then we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Decision
and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2005 and December 6, 2005, respectively,
in CA-G.R. CV No. 75207. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA,

G.R. No. 167459

Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,
- versus -

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.

Promulgated:
BONA J. ALANO and REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES,
January 26, 2011
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set
aside the Decision[1] dated October 11, 2004 as well as the Resolution[2] dated March 10, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65120, which reversed and set aside the Decision[3] dated
January 11, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 in Civil Case No. 97-2903. In
the said January 11, 1999 Decision, the trial court granted petitioner Jose Reynaldo Ochosas (Jose)

petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage between him and private respondent Bona J. Alano
(Bona).

The relevant facts of this case, as outlined by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

It appears that Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he was a young lieutenant in
the AFP while the latter was a seventeen-year-old first year college drop-out. They had
a whirlwind romance that culminated into sexual intimacy and eventual marriage on 27
October 1973 before the Honorable Judge Cesar S. Principe in Basilan. The couple did
not acquire any property. Neither did they incur any debts. Their union produced no
offspring. In 1976, however, they found an abandoned and neglected one-year-old baby
girl whom they later registered as their daughter, naming her Ramona Celeste Alano
Ochosa.

During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the Philippine
archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit with him in his posts,
preferring to stay in her hometown of Basilan. Neither did Bona visit him in his areas of
assignment, except in one (1) occasion when Bona stayed with him for four (4) days.

Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion Commander of the


Security Escort Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were given living quarters at
Fort Bonifacio, Makati City where they resided with their military aides.

In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in the failed
coup detat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame.

It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse. Even at the onset of their
marriage when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country, she had illicit
relations with other men. Bona apparently did not change her ways when they lived
together at Fort Bonifacio; she entertained male visitors in her bedroom whenever Jose
was out of their living quarters. On one occasion, Bona was caught by Demetrio Bajet y
Lita, a security aide, having sex with Joses driver, Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of Bonas
sexual infidelity circulated in the military community. When Jose could no longer bear
these rumors, he got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona.

During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal Gagarin
who also made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away from their living
quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went to Basilan.

In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is currently
supporting the needs of Ramona.

Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, docketed as Civil Case
No. 97-2903 with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, seeking to nullify his marriage to
Bona on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential
obligations of marriage.

Summons with a copy of the petition and its annexes were duly served upon
Bona who failed to file any responsive pleading during the reglementary period.

Pursuant to the order of the trial court, the Public Prosecutor conducted an
investigation to determine whether there was collusion between the parties. Said
prosecutor submitted a report that she issued a subpoena to both parties but only Jose
appeared; hence, it can not be reasonably determined whether or not there was
collusion between them.

Trial on the merits of the case ensued. Petitioner along with his two military
aides, Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal and Demetrio Bajet y Lita, testified about
respondents marital infidelity during the marriage.

The fourth and final witness was Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, who
testified that after conducting several tests, she reached the conclusion that respondent
was suffering from histrionic personality disorder which she described as follows:

Her personality is that she has an excessive emotion and attention


seeking behavior. So therefore they dont develop sympathy in feelings
and they have difficulty in maintaining emotional intimacy. In the case of
Mr. Ochosa he has been a military man. It is his duty to be transferred in
different areas in the Philippines. And while he is being transferred from
one place to another because of his assignments as a military man, Mrs.
Bona Alano refused to follow him in all his assignments. There were only
few occasions in which she followed him. And during those times that they
were not living together, because of the assignments of Mr. Ochosa she
developed extra marital affair with other man of which she denied in the
beginning but in the latter part of their relationship she admitted it to Mr.
Ochosa that she had relationship with respondents driver. I believe with
this extra marital affair that is her way of seeking attention and seeking

emotions from other person and not from the husband. And of course, this
is not fulfilling the basic responsibility in a marriage.

According to Rondain, respondents psychological disorder was traceable to her


family history, having for a father a gambler and a womanizer and a mother who was a
battered wife. There was no possibility of a cure since respondent does not have an
insight of what is happening to her and refused to acknowledge the reality.

With the conclusion of the witnesses testimonies, petitioner formally offered his
evidence and rested his case.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submitted its opposition to the petition
on the ground that the factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can
come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage (Santos v. CA, 240
SCRA 20 [1995]).

In a Decision dated 11 January 1999, the trial court granted the petition and
nullified the parties marriage on the following findings, viz:

xxxx

Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides as follows:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time


of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.

Such a ground to be invalidative (sic) of marriage, the degree of


incapacity must exhibit GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE and INCURABILITY.

From the evidence presented, the Court finds that the psychological
incapacity of the respondent exhibited GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE and
INCURABILITY.

It is grave because the respondent did not carry out the normal and
ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average couple
existing under everyday circumstances of life and work. The gravity was
manifested in respondents infidelity as testified to by the petitioner and his
witnesses.

The psychological incapacity of the respondent could be traced


back to respondents history as testified to by the expert witness when she
said that respondents bad experience during her childhood resulted in her
difficulty in achieving emotional intimacy, hence, her continuous illicit
relations with several men before and during the marriage.

Considering that persons suffering from this kind of personality


disorder have no insight of their condition, they will not submit to treatment
at all. As in the case at bar, respondents psychological incapacity clinically
identified

as

Histrionic

Personality

Disorder

will

remain

incurable.[4] (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the dispositive portion of the trial court Decision dated January 11, 1999 read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING


the marriage of JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA and BONA J. ALANO on October 27,
1973 at Basilan City VOID AB INITIO on ground of psychological incapacity of the
respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code as amended with all the effects and
consequences provided for by all applicable provisions of existing pertinent laws.

After this Decision becomes final, let copies thereof be sent to the Local Civil
Registrar of Basilan City who is directed to cancel the said marriage from its Civil
Registry, and the Local Civil Registrar of Makati City for its information and guidance. [5]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the said ruling to the Court of Appeals
which sided with the OSGs contention that the trial court erred in granting the petition despite Joses
abject failure to discharge the burden of proving the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife,
Bona, to comply with the essential marital obligations.

Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court Decision in its assailed
Decision dated October 11, 2004, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, the appealed Decision dated 11


January 1999 in Civil Case No. 97-2903 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, Branch 140, is accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another is entered
DISMISSING the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.[6]

Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied by the Court of Appeals for lack of
merit in its assailed Resolution dated March 10, 2005.

Hence, this Petition.

The only issue before this Court is whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

The petition is without merit.

The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which Jose filed in the trial court hinges on Article 36
of the Family Code, to wit:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of

marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

In the landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals,[7] we observed that psychological


incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and it must be incurable
or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

Soon after, incorporating the three basic requirements of psychological incapacity as


mandated in Santos, we laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina[8] the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code:

(1)

The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the

plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation
of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected
by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2)

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically

or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and
(d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3)

The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the

celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when
the parties exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto.

(4)

Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in


regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.

(5)

Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the

party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological


peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outburst cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6)

The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Article

68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.

(7)

Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal

of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family
Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are


unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature.

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is


to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands
to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to
our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and


purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other
shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of
protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of
the nation.

(8)

The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the

Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[9] (Citations
omitted.)

In Marcos v. Marcos,[10] we previously held that the foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause
may bemedically or clinically identified. What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the partys psychological condition. For, indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination
of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

It is also established in jurisprudence that from these requirements arise the concept that
Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that there
never was any marriage in the first place because the affliction already then existing was so grave
and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had assumed. [11]

A little over a decade since the promulgation of the Molina guidelines, we made a critical
assessment of the same in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,[12] to wit:

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of
rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity.
Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the
dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of Article 36
as the most liberal divorce procedure in the world. The unintended consequences
of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior,
moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little
by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what
was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into
and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina,
has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and
the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the

Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said
individuals.[13]

However, our critique did not mean that we had declared an abandonment of
the Molina doctrine. On the contrary, we simply declared and, thus, clarified in the same Te case that
there is a need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. Furthermore, we reiterated in the same case the
principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. [14]
In the case at bar, the trial court granted the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on
the basis of Dr. Elizabeth Rondains testimony[15] and her psychiatric evaluation report[16] as well as
the individual testimonies of Jose[17] and his military aides - Mrs. Gertrudes Himpayan
Padernal[18] and Corporal Demetrio Bajet.[19]

We are sufficiently convinced, after a careful perusal of the evidence presented in this case,
that Bona had been, on several occasions with several other men, sexually disloyal to her spouse,
Jose.Likewise, we are persuaded that Bona had indeed abandoned Jose. However, we cannot apply
the same conviction to Joses thesis that the totality of Bonas acts constituted psychological incapacity
as determined by Article 36 of the Family Code. There is inadequate credible evidence that her
defects were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage. In other words, her alleged
psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential requisite of juridical antecedence.

With regard to Bonas sexual promiscuity prior to her marriage to Jose, we have only the
uncorroborated testimony of Jose made in open court to support this allegation. To quote the
pertinent portion of the transcript:

Q: So, what was the reason why you have broken with your wife after several years -

A: Well, I finally broke up with my wife because I can no longer bear the torture because
of the gossips that she had an affair with other men, and finally, when I have a
chance to confront her she admitted that she had an affair with other men.

Q: With other men. And, of course this her life with other men of course before the
marriage you have already known

A: Yes, your honor.

Q: So, that this gossips because you said that you thought that this affair would go to
end after your marriage?

A: Yes, I was thinking about that.

Q: So, that after several years she will not change so thats why you cant bear it
anymore?

A: Yes, maam.[20]

Dr. Rondains testimony and psychiatric evaluation report do not provide evidentiary support to
cure the doubtful veracity of Joses one-sided assertion. Even if we take into account the psychiatrists
conclusion that Bona harbors a Histrionic Personality Disorder that existed prior to her marriage with
Jose and this mental condition purportedly made her helplessly prone to promiscuity and sexual
infidelity, the same cannot be taken as credible proof of antecedence since the method by which such
an inference was reached leaves much to be desired in terms of meeting the standard of evidence
required in determining psychological incapacity.

The psychiatrists findings on Bonas personality profile did not emanate from a personal
interview with the subject herself as admitted by Dr. Rondain in court, as follows:

Q: How about, you mentioned that the petitioner came for psychological test, how about
the respondent, did she come for interview and test?

A: No, maam.

Q: Did you try to take her for such?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: And what did she tell you, did she come for an interview?

A: There was no response, maam.[21]

As a consequence thereof, Dr. Rondain merely relied on her interview with Jose and his
witness, Mrs. Padernal, as well as the court record of the testimonies of other witnesses, to wit:

Q: And you said you did interviews. Who did the interview?

A: I interviewed Mr. Ochosa and their witness Padernal, maam.

Q: When you say Padernal are you referring to Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal who
testified in this court?

A: Yes, maam.

xxxx

Q: Other than the interviews what else did you do in order to evaluate members of the
parties?

A: I also interviewed (sic) the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies of other
witnesses, maam.

xxxx

Q: Was there also a psychological test conducted on the respondent?

A: Yes, your honor.

Q: It was on the basis of the psychological test in which you based your evaluation
report?

A: It was based on the psychological test conducted and clinical interview with the other
witnesses, your Honor.[22]

Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated Bonas psychological condition indirectly from the information
gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses. This factual circumstance evokes the possibility that the
information fed to the psychiatrist is tainted with bias for Joses cause, in the absence of sufficient
corroboration.

Even if we give the benefit of the doubt to the testimonies at issue since the trial court judge
had found them to be credible enough after personally witnessing Jose and the witnesses testify in
court, we cannot lower the evidentiary benchmark with regard to information on Bonas pre-marital
history which is crucial to the issue of antecedence in this case because we have only the word of
Jose to rely on. In fact, Bonas dysfunctional family portrait which brought about her Histrionic
Personality Disorder as painted by Dr. Rondain was based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge
of Jose, the spouse who has the most to gain if his wife is found to be indeed psychologically
incapacitated. No other witness testified to Bonas family history or her behavior prior to or at the
beginning of the marriage. Both Mrs. Padernal and Corporal Bajet came to know Bona only during

their employment in petitioners household during the marriage. It is undisputed that Jose and Bona
were married in 1973 while Mrs. Padernal and Corporal Bajet started to live with petitioners family
only in 1980 and 1986, respectively.

We have previously held that, in employing a rigid and stringent level of evidentiary scrutiny to
cases like this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of examination is not a
mandatory requirement. While such examination is desirable, we recognize that it may not be
practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged relations between the parties. For a
determination though of a partys complete personality profile, information coming from persons with
personal knowledge of the juridical antecedents may be helpful. This is an approach in the application
of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the credibility
gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion based entirely on doubtful sources of information. [23]

However, we have also ruled in past decisions that to make conclusions and generalizations
on a spouses psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side, similar to what
we have pointed out in the case at bar, is, to the Courts mind, not different from admitting hearsay
evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence. [24]

Anent the accusation that, even at the inception of their marriage, Bona did not wish to be with
Jose as a further manifestation of her psychological incapacity, we need only to look at the
testimonial records of Jose and his witnesses to be convinced otherwise, to wit:

JOSE OCHOSAS TESTIMONY:

Q: How long did you stay with your wife?

A: We were married in 1973 and we separated in 1988 but in all those years there were
only few occasions that we were staying together because most of the time Im in
the field.

Q: Now, you said most of the time you were in the field, did you not your wife come with
you in any of your assignments?

A: Never, but sometimes she really visited me and stayed for one (1) day and then

Q: And, where did your wife stayed when she leaves you?

A: She was staying with her mother in Basilan.

Q: Where were you assigned most of the time?

A: I was assigned in Davao, Zamboanga, Cotabato, Basilan.

Q: And, of course she would come to your place every now and then because it is not
very far

A: No, maam, once in a while only.

Q: Did you not go home to your conjugal home?

A: I have a chanced also to go home because we were allowed to at least three (3)
days every other month.

Q: So, if you start from the marriage up to 1988 so that is 16 years you were supposed
to have been living together?

A: No, actually in 19 middle of 1987 because in 1987 I was in x x x.[25]

GERTRUDES PADERNALS TESTIMONY:

Q: Now, do you know when they lived together as husband and wife?

A: 1979.

Q: And you said that you have known the petitioner and the respondent in this case
because in fact, you lived with them together in the same quarters. Does the
quarters have different rooms?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: But very near each other?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: You know them because of the proximity of the quarters?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: It was only during this 1980 to 1983, three (3) years that you lived together that you
have a chance to be with the spouses?

xxxx

A: Since 1980 to 1983 we lived together in the same house.

xxxx

Q: Now, Madam Witness, after 1983, where did you reside together with your husband?

A: In Cagayan de Oro and in 1986 we came back to Manila, in Fort Bonifacio.

Q: You mean, in the same house where petitioner and the respondent lived together?

A: Yes. Maam.

Q: How long did you live in the house where the petitioner and the respondent stay?

A: Twelve years now since 1983 to 1995.

Q: Where was the petitioner working at that time, from 1982 to 1995?

A: He is a soldier, a Colonel.

Q: Do you know where he was assigned during this time?

A: Yes, maam, G-3.

Q: May we know where this G-3 is?

A: Fort Bonifacio, maam.

Q: What about the wife, where does she stay?

A: At Fort Bonifacio, in their house.[26]

DR. ELIZABETH E. RONDAINS TESTIMONY:

Q: Now, they got married in 1973, am I correct?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: But the matter of the work or assignment of the petitioner, he was assigned in
different Provinces or Barangays in the Philippines?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: Now, when the wife or the respondent in this case did not go with the husband in
different places of his assignment did you ask her why what was the reason why
she did not like to go those places?

A: She just did not want to. The wife did not go with him because by transferring from
one place to another, she just dont want to go, she just wanted to stay in Basilan
where her hometown is, maam.

Q: Did the petitioner herein tell you why the respondent dont want to go with him?

A: Yes, I asked, the answer of the petitioner was she simply did not want to go with him
because she did not want him to be appointed to far away places.

Q: And would it be that since she did not like to go with the husband in some far away
different assignments she also assumed that the assignments were in this war
regions they were always fighting considering the place in Basilan they were in
fighting atmosphere?

A: It is possible but he was transferred to Manila and she also refused to stay in Manila,
maam.

Q: When was that that she refused to come to Manila?

A: I think, sometime in 1983, maam. She did not follow immediately. She stayed with
him only for four (4) months, maam.

Q: Now, do you know if the petitioner and the respondent were living together as
husband and wife for this period of time during the relationship?

A: Yes, maam. After their marriage I believe their relationship was good for a few
months until he was transferred to Julu. I believe during that time when they were
together the husband was giving an attention to her. The husband was always
there and when the husband transferred to Basilan, the attention was not there
anymore, maam.[27]

It is apparent from the above-cited testimonies that Bona, contrary to Joses assertion, had no
manifest desire to abandon Jose at the beginning of their marriage and was, in fact, living with him for
the most part of their relationship from 1973 up to the time when Jose drove her away from their
conjugal home in 1988. On the contrary, the record shows that it was Jose who was constantly away
from Bona by reason of his military duties and his later incarceration. A reasonable explanation for
Bonas refusal to accompany Jose in his military assignments in other parts of Mindanao may be
simply that those locations were known conflict areas in the seventies. Any doubt as to Bonas desire
to live with Jose would later be erased by the fact that Bona lived with Jose in their conjugal home in
Fort Bonifacio during the following decade.

In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bonas alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual
infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time after her marriage to
Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage.

We have stressed time and again that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under
Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code. [28]

While we are not insensitive to petitioners suffering in view of the truly appalling and shocking
behavior of his wife, still, we are bound by judicial precedents regarding the evidentiary requirements
in psychological incapacity cases that must be applied to the present case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 168335

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,


BRION,
BERSAMIN,
*ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR. and


- versus -

*SERENO,

JJ.

Promulgated:

June 6, 2011

NESTOR GALANG,
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We

resolve

the

the Philippines (petitioner),

Petition

for

challenging

Review
the

on Certiorari[1] filed

by

decision[2] dated November

the
25,

Republic
2004 and

of
the

resolution[3] dated May 9, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70004. The
challenged

decision

affirmed the

decision[4] of

the Regional Trial

Court

(RTC),

Branch

62, Angeles City, declaring the marriage of Nestor Galang (respondent) and Juvy Salazar null and
void on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity. The assailed resolution denied the
petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Antecedent Facts

On March 9, 1994, the respondent and Juvy contracted marriage in Pampanga. They resided in the
house of the respondents father in San Francisco, Mabalacat, Pampanga. The respondent worked as
an artist-illustrator at the Clark Development Corporation, earning P8,500.00 monthly. Juvy, on the
other hand, stayed at home as a housewife. They have one child, Christopher.

On August 4, 1999, the respondent filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Juvy, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 9494. He alleged that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential
obligations of marriage, as she was a kleptomaniac and a swindler. He claimed that Juvy stole his
ATM card and his parents money, and often asked money from their friends and relatives on the
pretext that Christopher was confined in a hospital. According to the respondent, Juvy suffers from
mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care, love and affection

[towards him and their] child. He posited that Juvys incapacity was extremely serious and appears to
be incurable.[5]

The RTC ordered the city prosecutor to investigate if collusion existed between the
parties. Prosecutor Angelito I. Balderama formally manifested, on October 18, 1999, that he found no
evidence of collusion between the parties. The RTC set the case for trial in its Order of October 20,
1999. The respondent presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate his
allegations.

In his testimony, the respondent alleged that he was the one who prepared their breakfast because
Juvy did not want to wake up early; Juvy often left their child to their neighbors care; and Christopher
almost got lost in the market when Juvy brought him there. [6]

The respondent further

stated

that

Juvy

squandered

the P15,000.00

he entrusted to her.

He added that Juvy stole his ATM card and falsified his signature to encash the check representing
his

(the

respondents)

fathers

pension.

He,

likewise,

stated

that

he

caught

Juvy

playing mahjong and kuwaho three (3) times. Finally, he testified that Juvy borrowed money from
their relatives on the pretense that their son was confined in a hospital. [7]

Aside from his testimony, the respondent also presented Anna Liza S. Guiang, a psychologist, who
testified that she conducted a psychological test on the respondent. According to her, she wrote Juvy
a letter requesting for an interview, but the latter did not respond. [8] In her Psychological Report, the
psychologist made the following findings:

Psychological Test conducted on client Nestor Galang resembles an emotionallymatured individual. He is well-adjusted to the problem he meets, and enable to throw-off
major irritations but manifest[s] a very low frustration tolerance which means he has a

little ability to endure anxiety and the client manifests suppressed feelings and emotions
which resulted to unbearable emotional pain, depression and lack of self-esteem and
gained emotional tensions caused by his wifes behavior.

The incapacity of the defendant is manifested [in] such a manner that the
defendant-wife: (1) being very irresponsible and very lazy and doesnt manifest any
sense of responsibility; (2) her involvement in gambling activities such as mahjong and
kuwaho; (3) being an estafador which exhibits her behavioral and personality disorders;
(4) her neglect and show no care attitude towards her husband and child; (5) her
immature and rigid behavior; (6) her lack of initiative to change and above all, the fact
that she is unable to perform her marital obligations as a loving, responsible and caring
wife to her family. There are just few reasons to believe that the defendant is suffering
from incapacitated mind and such incapacity appears to be incorrigible.

xxx

The following incidents are the reasons why the couple separated:

1.

After the marriage took place, the incapacity of the defendant was
manifested on such occasions wherein the plaintiff was the one who prepared
his breakfast, because the defendant doesnt want to wake up early; this
became the daily routine of the plaintiff before reporting to work;

2.

After reporting from work, the defendant was often out gambling, as usual,
the plaintiff was the one cooking for supper while the defendant was very
busy with her gambling activities and never attended to her husbands needs;

3.

There was an occasion wherein their son was lost in the public market
because of the irresponsible attitude of the defendant;

4.

That the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders, there
was an occasion wherein the defendant [would] steal money from the plaintiff
and use them for gambling;

5.

Defendant, being an estafador had been manifested after their marriage


took

place,

wherein

the

defendant

would

that people [would] feel pity on her and give her

come
money.

with

stories

Through

so
false

pretenses she [would] be able to deceive and take money from neighbors,
relatives and other people.

6.

That the plaintiff convinced the defendant to stop her unhealthy lifestyle
(gambling), but the defendant never listened to his advices;

7.

That the plaintiff was the one who [was] taking care of their son, when the
plaintiff will leave for work, the defendant [would] entrust their son to their
neighbor and go [to] some place. This act reflects the incapacity of the
defendant by being an irresponsible mother;

8.

That the defendant took their son and left their conjugal home that resulted
into the couples separation.

Psychological findings tend to confirm that the defendant suffers from personality
and behavioral disorders. These disorders are manifested through her grave
dependency on gambling and stealing money. She doesnt manifest any sense of
responsibility and loyalty and these disorders appear to be incorrigible.

The plaintiff tried to forget and forgive her about the incidents and start a new life
again and hoping she would change. Tried to get attention back by showing her with
special

care,

treating

her

to

places

for

weekend

vacation, cook[ing]her favorite food, but the defendant didnt care to change, she did not
prepare meals, wash clothes nor clean up. She neglected her duties and failed to
perform the basic obligations as a wife.

So in the view of the above-mentioned psychological findings, it is my humble


opinion that there is sufficient reason to believe that the defendant wife is
psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties as a wife and mother to their
only son.[9]

The RTC Ruling

The RTC nullified the parties marriage in its decision of January 22, 2001. The trial court saw
merit in the testimonies of the respondent and the psychologist, and concluded that:

After a careful perusal of the evidence in the instant case and there being no
controverting evidence, this Court is convinced that as held in Santos case, the
psychological incapacity of respondent to comply with the essential marital obligations

of his marriage with petitioner, which Dr. Gerardo Veloso said can be characterized by
(a) gravity because the subject cannot carry out the normal and ordinary duties of
marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing under ordinary
circumstances of life and work; (b) antecedence, because the root cause of the trouble
can be traced to the history of the subject before marriage although its overt
manifestations appear over after the wedding; and (c) incurability, if treatments required
exceed the ordinary means or subject, or involve time and expense beyond the reach of
the subject are all obtaining in this case.

xxxx

WHEREFORE,

premises

considered,

the

instant

petition

is

granted

and the marriage between petitioner and defendant is hereby declared null and void
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.[10]

The CA Decision

The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The
CA, in its decision dated November 25, 2004, affirmed the RTC decision in toto.

The CA held that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations. It explained that Juvys indolence and lack of sense of responsibility, coupled with her acts
of gambling and swindling, undermined her capacity to comply with her marital obligations. In
addition, the psychologist characterized Juvys condition to be permanent, incurable and existing at
the time of the celebration of her marriage with the respondent.[11]

The petitioner moved to reconsider this Decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution
dated May 9, 2005.[12]

The Petition and the Issues

The petitioner claims in the present petition that the totality of the evidence presented by the
respondent was insufficient to establish Juvys psychological incapacity to perform her essential
marital obligations. The petitioner additionally argues that the respondent failed to show the juridical
antecedence, gravity, and incurability of Juvys condition. [13] The respondent took the exact opposite
view.

The issue boils down to whether there is basis to nullify the respondents marriage to Juvy on the
ground that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, Juvy suffered from psychological incapacity
that prevented her from complying with her essential marital obligations.

The Courts Ruling

After due consideration, we resolve to grant the

petition,

and

hold

that no sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under
the terms of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Article 36 of the Family Code


and Related Jurisprudence
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time

of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.[14]

In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[15] the Court first declared that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The
defect should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage. It must be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.[16] We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36
of the Family Code in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano

Molina, whose salient points are footnoted below.[17] These guidelines incorporate the basic
requirements we established in Santos.[18]
In Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson G. Marcos,[19] we further clarified that it is not absolutely necessary to
introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of

evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability can be duly established. Thereafter, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages) [20] which
provided that the complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be
alleged.

Our 2009 ruling in Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te[21] placed some
cloud in the continued applicability of the time-tested Molina[22] guidelines. We stated in this case that
instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket; it forced all cases
involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it. This is contrary to the intention of the
law, since no psychological incapacity case can be considered as completely on "all fours" with
another.

Benjamin G. Ting v. Carmen M. Velez-Ting[23] and Jocelyn M. Suazo v. Angelito


Suazo,[24] however, laid to rest any question regarding the continued applicability of Molina.[25] In
these

cases,

we

clarified

that Ngo Te[26] did

not

abandon Molina.[27] Far

from

abandoning Molina,[28] Ngo Te[29] simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements. We

also explained that Suazo[30] that Ngo Te[31] merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity. [32]

The Present Case

In the present case and using the above guidelines, we find the totality of the respondents
evidence the testimonies of the respondent and the psychologist, and the latters psychological report
and evaluation insufficient to prove Juvys psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code.

a.

The respondents testimony

The respondents testimony merely showed that Juvy: (a) refused to wake up early to prepare
breakfast; (b) left their child to the care of their neighbors when she went out of the house; (c)
squandered a huge amount of the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her; (d) stole the
respondents ATM card and attempted to withdraw the money deposited in his account; (e) falsified
the respondents signature in order to encash a check; (f) made up false stories in order to borrow
money from their relatives; and (g) indulged in gambling.

These acts, to our mind, do not per se rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law
requires. We stress that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. In Republic of the Philippines v. Norma

Cuison-Melgar,

et

al.,[33] we ruled that it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to

meet

his

responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he or she must be shown to
be incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not physical, illness. In other words, proof
of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage had to be shown.[34] A cause has to be shown and linked with
the manifestations of the psychological incapacity.

The respondents testimony failed to show that Juvys condition is a manifestation of a


disordered personality rooted in some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that
rendered her unableto discharge her essential marital obligation. In this light, the acts attributed to
Juvy only showed indications of immaturity and lack of sense of responsibility, resulting in nothing
more than the difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations. In Ricardo B.

Toring v. Teresita M. Toring,[35] we emphasized that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or


perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like do not by themselves warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity, as these may only be due to a person's difficulty, refusal or
neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness that
Article 36 of the Family Code addresses.

In like manner, Juvys acts of falsifying the respondents signature to encash a check, of
stealing the respondents ATM, and of squandering a huge portion of the P15,000.00 that the
respondent entrusted to her, while no doubt reprehensible, cannot automatically be equated with a
psychological disorder, especially when the evidence shows that these were mere isolated incidents
and not recurring acts. Neither can Juvys penchant for playing mahjong and kuwaho for money, nor
her act of soliciting money from relatives on the pretext that her child was sick, warrant a conclusion
that she suffered from a mental malady at the time of the celebration of marriage that rendered her
incapable of fulfilling her marital duties and obligations. The respondent, in fact, admitted that Juvy
engaged in these behaviors (gambling and what the respondent refers to as swindling) only two (2)
years after their marriage, and after he let her handle his salary and manage their finances. The
evidence also shows that Juvy even tried to augment the familys income during the early stages of
their marriage by putting up a sari-sari store and by working as a manicurist.

b.

The Psychologists Report

The submitted psychological report hardly helps the respondents cause, as it glaringly failed to
establish that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital duties at the
material time required by Article 36 of the Family Code.

To begin with, the psychologist admitted in her report that she derived her conclusions
exclusively from the information given her by the respondent. Expectedly, the respondents description
of Juvy would contain a considerable degree of bias; thus, a psychological evaluation based on this
one-sided description alone can hardly be considered as credible or sufficient. We are of course
aware of our pronouncement in Marcos[36] that the person sought to be declared psychologically
incapacitated need not be examined by the psychologist as a condition precedent to arrive at a
conclusion. If the incapacity can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such
independent proof cannot be admitted to support a conclusion of psychological incapacity,
independently of a psychologists examination and report. In this case, however, no such independent
evidence has ever been gathered and adduced. To be sure, evidence from independent sources who
intimately knew Juvy before and after the celebration of her marriage would have made a lot of
difference and could have added weight to the psychologists report.

Separately from the lack of the requisite factual basis, the psychologists report simply stressed
Juvys negative traits which she considered manifestations of Juvys psychological incapacity (e.g.,
laziness, immaturity and irresponsibility; her involvement in swindling and gambling activities; and her
lack of initiative to change), and declared that psychological findings tend to confirm that the
defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders x x x she doesnt manifest any sense of
responsibility and loyalty, and these disorders appear to be incorrigible. [37] In the end, the
psychologist opined without stating the psychological basis for her conclusion that there is sufficient
reason to believe that the defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties
as a wife and mother to their only son. [38]

We find this kind of conclusion and report grossly inadequate. First, we note that the
psychologist

did

not

even

identify

the

types

of

psychological

tests which she administered on the respondent and theroot cause of Juvys psychological condition.
We also stress that the acts alleged to have been committed by Juvy all occurred during the
marriage;

there was no showing that any mental disorder

existed

at

the

inception

of

the

marriage. Second, the report failed to prove the gravity or severity of Juvys alleged condition,
specifically, why and to what extent the disorder is serious, and how it incapacitated her to comply
with her marital duties. Significantly, the report did not even categorically state the particular type of

personality disorder found. Finally, the report failed to establish the incurability of Juvys condition. The
reports pronouncements that Juvy lacks the initiative to change and that her mental incapacity
appears incorrigible[39] are insufficient to prove that her mental condition could not be treated, or if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond her means to undertake.

c. The Psychologists Testimony

The psychologists court testimony fared no better in proving the juridical antecedence, gravity
or incurability of Juvys alleged psychological defect as she merely reiterated what she wrote in her
report i.e., that Juvy was lazy and irresponsible; played mahjong and kuhawo for money; stole money
from the respondent; deceived people to borrow cash; and neglected her child without linking these to
an underlying psychological cause. Again, these allegations, even if true, all occurred during the

marriage. The testimony was totally devoid of any information or insight into Juvys early life and
associations, how she acted before and at the time of the marriage, and how the symptoms of a
disordered personality developed. Simply put, the psychologist failed to trace the history of Juvys
psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.

She, likewise, failed to successfully prove the elements of gravity and incurability. In these
respects, she merely stated that despite the respondents efforts to show love and affection, Juvy
was hesitant to change. From this premise, she jumped to the conclusion that Juvy appeared to be

incurable or

incorrigible,

and

would

be very

hard

to

cure.

These

unfounded

conclusions cannot be equated with gravity or incurability that Article 36 of the Family Code requires.
To be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to change is
another. To hark back to what we earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers only to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.[40]

The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social
institution, and marriage is the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected
by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. [41] Unless the
evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of them, could not have
validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the
time it was celebrated, we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie. [42]

WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the
Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated November 25, 2004 and May 9, 2005,
respectively,

in

CA-G.R.

CV

No.

70004.

Accordingly,

we DISMISS respondent

Nestor

Galangs petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Juvy Salazar under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Costs against respondent Nestor Galang.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

MYRNA P. ANTONE,

G.R. No. 183824

Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA,C.J.,
-versus-

Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,*
DEL CASTILLO, and
ABAD,**
PEREZ, JJ.

LEO R. BERONILLA,
Respondent.

Promulgated:
December 8, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
nullify and set aside the issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 102834, to wit: (a) the
Resolution[1] dated 29 April 2008 dismissing the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which assailed
the trial courts Orders[2] dated 20 September 2007 and 6 December 2007 in Criminal Case No. 070907-CFM for Bigamy; and (b) the Resolution[3] dated 18 July 2008 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the first resolution.
The trial court quashed the Information on the ground that the elements of Bigamy were
rendered incomplete after herein respondent presented documents to prove a fact, which the court
believed would negate the allegation in the Information that there was a first valid marriage. The

evidence presented showed that respondent later obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of the first
union following the celebration of a subsequent marriage.

The Antecedents
On 12 March 2007, herein petitioner Myrna P. Antone executed an Affidavit-Complaint[4] for
Bigamy against Leo R. Beronilla before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. She alleged
that her marriage with respondent in 1978 had not yet been legally dissolved when the latter
contracted a second marriage with one Cecile Maguillo in 1991.
On 21 June 2007, the prosecution filed the corresponding Information [5] before the Regional
Trial Court, Pasay City. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM and raffled to
Branch 115.
Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, herein respondent moved to quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.[6] He informed the court
that his marriage with petitioner was declared null and void by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16,
Naval, Biliran on 26 April 2007;[7] that the decision became final and executory on 15 May
200[7];[8] and that such decree has already been registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar on 12
June 2007.[9] He argued that since the marriage had been declared null and void from the beginning,
there was actually no first marriage to speak of. Absent a first valid marriage, the facts alleged in the
Information do not constitute the crime of bigamy. [10]
In its comment/opposition to the motion,[11] the prosecution, through herein petitioner,
maintained that the respondent committed an act which has all the essential requisites of
bigamy. The prosecution pointed out that the marriage of petitioner and respondent on 18 November
1978 has not yet been severed when he contracted a second marriage on 16 February 1991, for
which reason, bigamy has already been committed before the court declared the first marriage null
and void on 27 April 2007.[12] The prosecution also invoked the rulings of the Supreme Court holding
that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information, and that
facts contrary thereto are matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of
evidence.[13]

After a hearing on the motion,[14] the court quashed the Information.[15] Applying Morigo v.

People,[16] it ruled:
Hence, contrary to what was stated in the Information, accused Beronilla was
actually never legally married to Myrna Antone. On this score alone, the first element
appears to be missing. Furthermore, the statement in the definition of Bigamy which reads
before the first marriage has been legally dissolved clearly contemplates that the first
marriage must at least be annullable or voidable but definitely not void, as in this case. xxx
[I]n a similar case, [the Supreme Court] had the occasion to state:
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must
have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner
was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak
of.Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab

initio, the two were never married from the beginning. xxx The existence and
the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of
bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained
where there is no first marriage to speak of. xxx[17]
The prosecution, through herein petitioner, moved for reconsideration of the said Order[18] on
the ground, among others, that the facts and the attending circumstances in Morigo are not on all
fours with the case at bar. It likewise pointed out that, in Mercado v. Tan,[19] this Court has already
settled that (a) declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a
cause of action or a ground for defense.[20]
In its Order of 6 December 2007,[21] the court denied the motion for reconsideration stating
that Mercado has already been superseded by Morigo.
In the interim, in a Petition for Relief from Judgment [22] before the Regional Trial Court of
Naval, Biliran, petitioner questioned the validity of the proceedings in the petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage in Civil Case No. B-1290 on 5 October 2007. On 24 March 2008, the court set
aside its Decision of 26 April 2007 declaring the marriage of petitioner with respondent null and void,
and required herein petitioner (respondent in Civil Case No. B-1290) to file her answer to the
complaint.[23] On 21 July 2008, the court DISMISSED the petition for nullity of marriage for failure of
herein respondent (plaintiff in Civil Case No. B-1290) to submit his pre-trial brief.[24] Respondent,

however, challenged the orders issued by the court before the Court of Appeals. [25] The matter is still
pending resolution thereat.[26]
Meanwhile, in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed on 26 March
2008 before the Court of Appeals,[27] herein petitioner alleged that the Pasay City trial court acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it dismissed the case of bigamy and denied her motion for reconsideration.
In its Resolution of 29 April 2008, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition stating that:
The present petition xxx is fatally infirm in form and substance for the following
reasons:
1. The verification is defective as it does not include the assurance that the allegations in
the petition are based on authentic records.
2. Since the petition assails the trial courts dismissal of the criminal information for bigamy
filed against private respondent Leo Beronilla, the petition, if at all warranted, should be
filed in behalf of the People of the Philippines by the Office of the Solicitor General, being
its statutory counsel in all appealed criminal cases.
3. There is a violation of the rule on double jeopardy as the dismissal of the subject
criminal case is tantamount to an acquittal based on the trial courts finding that the first
essential element of bigamy, which is a first valid marriage contracted by private
respondent is wanting. There is no clear showing in the petition that the dismissal was
tainted with arbitrariness which violated petitioners right to due process. Notably, petitioner
filed her comment/opposition to private respondents motion to quash before the trial court
issued its Order dated September 20, 2007 dismissing the information. Hence, if there is
no denial of due process, there can be no grave abuse of discretion that would merit the
application of the exception to the double jeopardy rule. [28]
On 18 July 2008, the Court of Appeals denied respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforequoted Resolution for lack of merit. [29]
Hence, this petition.[30]

Our Ruling
I
We are convinced that this petition should be given due course despite the defect in the pleading and
the question of legal standing to bring the action.
The Rules of Court provides that a pleading required to be verified which lacks a proper verification
shall be treated as unsigned pleading.[31]
This, notwithstanding, we have, in a number of cases, opted to relax the rule in order that the

ends of justice may be served.[32] The defect being merely formal and not jurisdictional, we ruled that
the court may nevertheless order the correction of the pleading, or even act on the pleading if the
attending circumstances are such that xxx strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in
order that the ends of justice xxx may be served. [33] At any rate, a pleading is required to be verified
only to ensure that it was prepared in good faith, and that the allegations were true and correct and
not based on mere speculations.[34]
There is likewise no dispute that it is the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which has the
authority to represent the government in a judicial proceeding before the Court of Appeals. The
Administrative Code specifically defined its powers and functions to read, among others:
Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. - The Office of the Solicitor General shall
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
services of lawyers. xxx It shall have the following specific powers and functions:

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its
officers in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and all other courts or
tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. [35]
As an exception to this rule, the Solicitor General is allowed to:

(8) Deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies and


offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear or represent the Government in cases
involving their respective offices, brought before the courts and exercise supervision
and control over such legal officers with respect to such cases. [36]
Thus, in Republic v. Partisala,[37] we held that the summary dismissal of an action in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines, when not initiated by the Solicitor General, is in order. [38] Not even
the appearance of the conformity of the public prosecutor in a petition for certiorari would suffice
because the authority of the City Prosecutor or his assistant to represent the People of the Philippines
is limited to the proceedings in the trial court. [39]
We took exceptions, however, and gave due course to a number of actions even when the
respective interests of the government were not properly represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General.
In Labaro v. Panay,[40] this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by any
order or ruling of the trial judge in a criminal case, the OSG, and not the prosecutor, must
be the one to question the order or ruling before us. [41] xxx
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the
plaintiff People of the Philippines, we opted not to dismiss the petition on this technical
ground. Instead, we required the OSG to comment on the petition, as we had done before
in some cases.[42] In light of its Comment, we rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted
as its own the instant petition for the People of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative,

Inc.,[43] without requiring the Office of the Solicitor General to file a comment on the petition, this Court
determined the merits of the case involving a novel issue on the nature and scope of jurisdiction of
the Cooperative Development Authority to settle cooperative disputes as well as the battle between
two (2) factions concerning the management of the Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
Cooperative, Inc. (DARBCI) that inevitably threatens the very existence of one of the countrys major
cooperatives.[44]

And, lest we defeat the ends of justice, we opt to look into the merit of the instant petition even
absent the imprimatur of the Solicitor General. After all, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance,
for justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. [45] To borrow the words of then Justice Minita
V. Chico-Nazario in another case where the dismissal of a criminal case pending with the trial court
was sought:
[T]he task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to preserve our democratic
society under the rule of law, ensuring that all those who [come or are brought to court]
are afforded a fair opportunity to present their side[s]. xxx The State, like any other
litigant, is entitled to its day in court, and to a reasonable opportunity to present its
case.[46]
II
We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that the filing of this petition is in violation of the
respondents right against double jeopardy on the theory that he has already been practically
acquitted when the trial court quashed the Information.
Well settled is the rule that for jeopardy to attach, the following requisites must concur:
(1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed before a court of competent
jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is
convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his
express consent.[47]
The third and fourth requisites are clearly wanting in the instant case as (a) respondent has not yet
entered his plea to the charge when he filed the Motion to Quash the Information, and (2) the case
was dismissed not merely with his consent but, in fact, at his instance. [48]
We reiterate, time and again, that jeopardy does not attach in favor of the accused on account
of an order sustaining a motion to quash.[49] More specifically, the granting of a motion to quash
anchored on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense is not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense.[50] Thus:

It will be noted that the order sustaining the motion to quash the complaint against
petitioner was based on Subsection (a) of Section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court that
the facts charged in the complaint do not constitute an offense. If this is so then the
dismissal of said complaint will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense,
for it is provided in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court [now Section 6 of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure] that an order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on the grounds
specified in Section 2, Subsection[s] (f) and (h) of this rule [now substantially reproduced
in Section 3, Subsections (g) and (i) of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure] xxx. [51]
III
We now determine the merit of the petition did the trial court act without or in excess of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion when it sustained respondents motion to quash on the basis of a fact
contrary to those alleged in the information?
Petitioner maintains that the trial court did so because the motion was a hypothetical
admission of the facts alleged in the information and any evidence contrary thereto can only be
presented as a matter of defense during trial.
Consistent with existing jurisprudence, we agree with the petitioner.
We define a motion to quash an Information as
the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or Information
filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are
apparent in the face of the Information.[52]
This motion is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the Information, [53] for which reason,
the court cannot consider allegations contrary to those appearing on the face of the information. [54]
As further elucidated in Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals:[55]
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to
constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss/quash on the ground that it
charges no offense may be properly sustained. The fundamental test in considering a

motion to quash on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will
establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law.
Contrary to the petitioners contention, a reading of the information will disclose that the
essential elements of the offense charged are sufficiently alleged. It is not proper
therefore to resolve the charges at the very outset, in a preliminary hearing only and
without the benefit of a full-blown trial. The issues require a fuller examination. Given the
circumstances of this case, we feel it would be unfair to shut off the prosecution at this
stage of the proceedings and to dismiss the informations on the basis only of the
petitioners evidence, such as [this].[56]
As in the recent case of Los Baos v. Pedro,[57] where we found no merit in respondents
allegation that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because the Information duly charged a
specific offense and provide[d] the details on how the offense was committed, [58] we see no apparent
defect in the allegations in the Information in the case at bar. Clearly, the facts alleged in its
accusatory portion, which reads:
That on or about the 16th day of February, 1991, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, LEO R.
BERONILLA, having been united in a lawful marriage with one MYRNA A. BERONILLA,
which marriage is still in force and subsisting and without having been legally dissolved,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with
one Cecile Maguillo, which subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential
requisites for validity.[59]
sufficiently constitute an offense. It contained all the elements of the crime of Bigamy under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code hereunder enumerated:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.[60]

The documents showing that: (1) the court has decreed that the marriage of petitioner and
respondent is null and void from the beginning; and (2) such judgment has already become final and
executory and duly registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar of Naval, Biliran are pieces of
evidence that seek to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the Information that a first valid
marriage was subsisting at the time the respondent contracted a subsequent marriage. This should
not have been considered at all because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash.
Neither do we find a justifiable reason for sustaining the motion to quash even after taking into
consideration the established exceptions to the rule earlier recognized by this Court, among others:
(1) when the new allegations are admitted by the prosecution; [61] (2) when the Rules so permit, such
as upon the grounds of extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy; [62] and (3) when facts have
been established by evidence presented by both parties which destroyed the prima facie truth of the
allegations in the information during the hearing on a motion to quash based on the ground that the

facts charged do not constitute an offense, and it would be pure technicality for the court to close its
eyes to said facts and still give due course to the prosecution of the case already shown to be weak
even to support possible conviction xxx.[63]
For of what significance would the document showing the belated dissolution of the first
marriage offer? Would it serve to prevent the impracticability of proceeding with the trial in
accordance with People v. dela Rosa thereby warranting the non-observance of the settled rule that a
motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information? We quote:
[W]here in the hearing on a motion to quash predicated on the ground that the
allegations of the information do not charge an offense, facts have been brought out by
evidence presented by both parties which destroy the prima facie truth accorded to the
allegations of the information on the hypothetical admission thereof, as is implicit in the
nature of the ground of the motion to quash, it would be pure technicality for the court to
close its eyes to said facts and still give due course to the prosecution of the case
already shown to be weak even to support possible conviction, and hold the accused to
what would clearly appear to be a merely vexatious and expensive trial, on her part, and
a wasteful expense of precious time on the part of the court, as well as of the
prosecution.[64] (Emphasis supplied.)
We find that there is none.

With the submission of the documents showing that the court has declared the first marriage
void ab initio, respondent heavily relied on the rulings[65] in People v. Mendoza and Morigo declaring
that: (a) a case for bigamy based on a void ab initio marriage will not prosper because there is no
need for a judicial decree to establish that a void ab initio marriage is invalid;[66] and (b) a marriage
declared void ab initio has retroactive legal effect such that there would be no first valid marriage to
speak of after all, which renders the elements of bigamy incomplete.[67]
Both principles, however, run contrary to the new provision of the Family Code, which was
promulgated by the late President Corazon C. Aquino in 1987, a few years before respondents
subsequent marriage was celebrated in 1991.
The specific provision, which reads:
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.
was exhaustively discussed in Mercado,[68] where this Court settled the conflicting jurisprudence on
the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage. After establishing that Article 40
is a new provision expressly requiring a judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage and
examining a long line of cases,[69] this Court, concluded, in essence, that under the Family Code a
subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case
because, by then, the crime had already been consummated. Otherwise stated, this Court declared
that a person, who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous one, is guilty of bigamy.[70]
Notably, Morigo, was indeed promulgated years after Mercado. Nevertheless, we cannot
uphold the Order dated 6 December 2007 of the trial court, which maintained that Morigo has already
supersededMercado. In fact, in Morigo, this Court clearly distinguished the two (2) cases from one
another, and explained:
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v.
Tan. In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise
obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. xxx

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually
solemnized xxx. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired,
although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a
duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a
marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract
bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of
nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid
marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a
judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage. [71]
The application of Mercado to the cases following Morigo even reinforces the position of this
Court to give full meaning to Article 40 of the Family Code. Thus, in 2004, this Court ruled in Tenebro

v. Court of Appeals:[72]
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as
the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, xxx said marriage is not without legal
effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is therefore a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still
produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal
liability for bigamy. xxx.[73] (Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, in Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and Amelia

Serafico,[74] this Court pronounced:


In a catena of cases,[75] the Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of
nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral. xxx
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent
only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of
establishing that the facts alleged

in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an

offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such defense be interposed by the respondent in
his motion to quash by way of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in
the information are matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence.
All considered, we find that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when, in so
quashing the Information in Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM, it considered an evidence introduced to
prove a fact not alleged thereat disregarding the settled rules that a motion to quash is a hypothetical
admission of the facts stated in the information; and that facts not alleged thereat may be appreciated
only under exceptional circumstances, none of which is obtaining in the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated 20 September 2007 and 6 December 2007 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 115, Pasay City as well as the Resolutions dated 29 April 2008 and 18 July 2008
of the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM is REMANDED to
the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR.,

G.R. No. 191425

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,


BRION,
- versus -

PERALTA,*

PEREZ, and
MENDOZA,** JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Promulgated:

Respondent.

September 7, 2011
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

G.R. No. 191425 is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on 30 September 2009
as well as the Resolution3 promulgated on 23 February 2010 by the Court of Appeals (appellate
court) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538. The appellate court affirmed the 19 November 2007 Decision 4 of
Branch 215 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (trial court) in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031.
The trial court found accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) guilty of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment. Co-accused
Rowena Geraldino (Geraldino) was acquitted for the prosecutions failure to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

The Facts
The appellate court recited the facts as follows:
On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond Jonathan B. Lledo filed an
Information against Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) and Rowena P. Geraldino (Geraldino) for the
crime of Bigamy. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 8th day of December 2001 in Quezon City, Philippines, the abovenamed accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., being then legally married to one JESUSA PINAT
NOLLORA, and as said marriage has not been legally dissolved and still subsisting, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a subsequent or second marriage with her [sic] coaccused ROWENA P. GERALDINO, who knowingly consented and agreed to be married to her coaccused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. knowing him to be a married man, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA.

Upon his arraignment on April 18, 2005, accused Nollora assisted by counsel, refused to enter his
plea. Hence, a plea of not guilty was entered by the Court for him. Accused Geraldino, on the other
hand, entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on June 14, 2005. On even date, pre-trial
conference was held and both the prosecution and defense entered the following stipulation of facts:
1. the validity of the first marriage between Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
and Jesusa Pinat Nollora solemnized on April 6, 1999 at Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte;
2. that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted the second marriage with Rowena
P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 in Quezon City;
3. that in the Counter-Affidavit of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., he admitted that he contracted
the second marriage to Rowena P. Geraldino;
4. that Rowena P. Geraldino attached to her Counter-Affidavit the Certificate of
Marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. dated December 8, 2001;

5. the fact of marriage of Rowena P. Geraldino with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. as admitted in
her Counter-Affidavit.
The only issue thus proffered by the prosecution for the RTCs resolution is whether or not the second
marriage is bigamous. Afterwards, pre-trial conference was terminated and the case was set for initial
hearing. Thereafter, trial ensued.

Evidence for the Prosecution


As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the respective testimonies of prosecution witnesses were
as follows:
xxx (W)itness Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx testified that she and
accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. met in Saudi Arabia while she was working there as a
Staff Midwife in King Abdulah Naval Base Hospital. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. courted her
and on April 6, 1999, they got married at the [IE]MELIF Chruch [sic] in Sapang Palay,
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan (Exhibit A). While working in said hospital, she heard
rumors that her husband has another wife and because of anxiety and emotional stress,
she left Saudi Arabia and returned to the Philippines (TSN, October 4, 2005, page 10).
Upon arrival in the Philippines, the private complainant learned that
indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a second marriage with co-accused Rowena
P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 (Exhibit B) when she secured a certification as to
the civil status of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Exhibit C) from the National Statistics Office
(NSO) sometime in November 2003.

Upon learning this information, the private complainant confronted Rowena


P. Geraldino at the latters workplace in CBW, FTI, Taguig and asked her if she knew of
the first marriage between complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to which Rowena
P. Geraldino allegedly affirmed and despite this knowledge, she allegedly still
married Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him so much and because they were
neighbors and childhood friends. Private complainant also knew that Rowena
P. Geraldino knew of her marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because when she
(private complainant) was brought by Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. at the latters residence
in Taguig, Metro Manila and introduced her toAtilano O. Nollora, Jr.s parents, Rowena

P. Geraldino was there in the house together with a friend and she heard everything
that they were talking about.
Because of this case, private complainant was not able to return to Saudi Arabia to work
as a Staff Midwife thereby losing income opportunity in the amount of P34,000.00 a
month, more or less. When asked about the moral damages she suffered, she declared
that what happened to her was a tragedy and she had entertained [thoughts] of
committing suicide. She added that because of what happened to her, her mother died
and she almost got raped when Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. left her alone in their residence in
Saudi Arabia. However, she declared that money is not enough to assuage her
sufferings. Instead, she just asked for the return of her money in the amount
of P50,000.00 (TSN, July 26, 2005, pages 4-14).
Prosecution witness Ruth Santos testified that she knew of the marriage between the
private complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because she was one of the sponsors in
said wedding. Sometime in November 2003, she was asked by the private complainant
to accompany the latter to the workplace of Rowena P. Geraldino in
FTI, Taguig, Metro Manila. She declared that the private complainant and Rowena
P. Geraldino had a confrontation and she heard that Rowena P. Geraldino admitted that
she (Rowena) knew of the first marriage of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and the private
complainant but she still went on to marry Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him
very much (TSN, October 24, 2005, pages 3-5).

Evidence for the Defense


The defenses version of facts, as summarized in the herein assailed Decision, is as follows:
Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two (2) marriages, the first
with private complainant Jesusa Pinat and the second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He,
however, claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even
before he contracted the first marriage with the private complainant. As a
[M]uslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry four (4) wives as allowed under the
Muslim or Islam belief.

To prove that he is a Muslim convert even prior to his marriage to the private
complainant, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. presented a Certificate of Conversion dated August
2, 2004 issued by one Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueo and approved by oneKhad Ibrahim
A. Alyamin wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. allegedly converted as a
Muslim since January 19, 1992 (Exhibit 2, 3 and 4). Aside from said certificate, he also
presented a Pledge of Conversion dated January 10, 1992 issued by the
same Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueo and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin (Exhibit
7).
He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a Muslim convert prior to their
marriage because she [sic] told this fact when he was courting her in Saudi Arabia and
the reason why said private complainant filed the instant case was due to hatred having
learned of his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino. She [sic] further testified that
Rowena P. Geraldino was not aware of his first marriage with the private complainant
and he did not tell her this fact because Rowena P. Geraldino is a Catholic and he does
not want to lose her if she learns of his first marriage.
He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is indicated that he was
a Catholic Pentecostal but that he was not aware why it was placed as such on said
contract. In his Marriage Contract with Rowena P. Geraldino, the religion Catholic was
also indicated because he was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim since the society
does not approve of marrying a Muslim. He also indicated that he was single despite his
first marriage to keep said first marriage a secret (TSN, January 30, 2006, pages 2-13).
Defense witness Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueo testified that he is the founder and
president of Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of the Philippines and as
such president, he has the power and authority to convert any applicant to the Muslim
religion. He alleged that sometime in 1992, he met accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
in Mabini (Manila) who was then going abroad. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. applied to become
a Muslim (Exhibit 14) and after receiving the application, said accused was
indoctrinated regarding his obligations as a Muslim. On January 10,
1992, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. embraced the Muslim faith. He was then directed to report
every Sunday to monitor his development.

In the year 2004, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. visited him and asked for a certification
because of the filing of the instant case. On October 2, 2004, he issued a Certificate of
Conversion wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is a Muslim convert since
January 10, 1992. Apart from the above-mentioned document, their Imam also issued a
Pledge of Conversion (Exhibit 7). He declared that a Muslim convert could marry more
than one according to the Holy Koran. However, before marrying his second, third and
fourth wives, it is required that the consent of the first Muslim wife be secured. Thus, if
the first wife is not a Muslim, there is no necessity to secure her consent (TSN, October
9, 2006, pages 2-12).
During his cross-examinations, he declared that if a Muslim convert gets married not in
accordance with the Muslim faith, the same is contrary to the teachings of the Muslim
faith. A Muslim also can marry up to four times but he should be able to treat them
equally. He claimed that he was not aware of the first marriage but was aware of the
second. Since his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino was not in accordance
with the Muslim faith, he advised Atilano O.Nollora, Jr. to re-marry Rowena
P. Geraldino in accordance with Muslim marriage celebration, otherwise, he will not be
considered as a true Muslim (TSN, June 25, 2007, pages 3-7).
Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a victim in this incident of
bigamous marriage. She claimed that she does not know the private
complainant Jesusa Pinat Nollora and only came to know her when this case was filed.
She insists that she is the one lawfully married to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., having been
married to the latter since December 8, 2001. Upon learning that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
contracted a first marriage with the private complainant, she confronted the former who
admitted the said marriage. Prior to their marriage, she asked Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. if
he was single and the latter responded that he was single. She also knew that her
husband was a Catholic prior to their marriage but after she learned of the first marriage
of her husband, she learned that he is a Muslim convert. She also claimed that after
learning that her husband was a Muslim convert, she and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., also
got married in accordance with the Muslim rites. She also belied the allegations of the
private complainant that she was sought by the private complainant and that they had a
confrontation where she admitted that she knew that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. was married

to the private complainant and despite this knowledge, she went on to marry him
because she loved him very much. She insisted that she only came to know the private
complainant when she (private complainant) filed this case (TSN, August 14, 2007,
pages 2-8).5
The Trial Courts Ruling
In its Decision6 dated 19 November 2007, the trial court convicted Nollora and acquitted Geraldino.
The trial court stated that there are only two exceptions to prosecution for bigamy: Article 41 7 of the
Family Code, or Executive Order No. 209, and Article 1808 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The trial court also cited Article 27 of the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, which provides the qualifications for allowing Muslim men to
have more than one wife: [N]o Muslim male can have more than one wife unless he can deal with
them in equal companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and only in exceptional
cases.
In convicting Nollora, the trial courts Decision further stated thus:
The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general rule and polygamy is allowed only to meet
urgent needs. Only with the permission of the court can a Muslim be permitted to have a second wife
subject to certain requirements. This is because having plurality of wives is merely tolerated, not
encouraged, under certain circumstances (Muslim Law on Personal Status in the Philippines
by Amer M. Bara-acal and Abdulmajid J. Astir, 1998 First Edition, Pages 64-65). Arbitration is
necessary. Any Muslim husband desiring to contract subsequent marriages, before so doing, shall
notify the Sharia Circuit Court of the place where his family resides. The clerk of court shall serve a
copy thereof to the wife or wives. Should any of them objects [sic]; an Agama Arbitration Council shall
be constituted. If said council fails to secure the wifes consent to the proposed marriage, the Court
shall, subject to Article 27, decide whether on [sic] not to sustain her objection (Art. 162, Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines).
Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino, did not
comply with the above-mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did not even declare that he was a
Muslim convert in both marriages, indicating his criminal intent. In his converting to the Muslim faith,
said accused entertained the mistaken belief that he can just marry anybody again after marrying the
private complainant. What is clear, therefore, is [that] a Muslim is not given an unbridled right to just

marry anybody the second, third or fourth time. There are requirements that the Sharia law imposes,
that is, he should have notified the Sharia Court where his family resides so that copy of said notice
should be furnished to the first wife. The argument that notice to the first wife is not required since she
is not a Muslim is of no moment. This obligation to notify the said court rests upon
accused Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is not for him to interpret the Sharia law. It is the Sharia Court that has
this authority.
In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the accused recelebrated their marriage in
accordance with the Muslim rites. However, this can no longer cure the criminal liability that has
already been violated.
The Court, however, finds criminal liability on the person of accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., only. There
is no sufficient evidence that would pin accused Rowena P. Geraldino down. The evidence presented
by the prosecution against her is the allegation that she knew of the first marriage between private
complainant and Atilano Nollora, Jr., is insufficient[,] being open to several interpretations. Private
complainant alleged that when she was brought by Atilano Nollora, Jr., to the latters house in Taguig,
Metro Manila, Rowena P. Geraldino was there standing near the door and heard their conversation.
From this incident, private complainant concluded that said Rowena P. Geraldino was aware that she
and Atilano Nollora, Jr., were married. This conclusion is obviously misplaced since it could not be
reasonably presumed that Rowena P. Geraldino understands what was going on between her
and Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is axiomatic that (E)very circumstance favoringaccuseds innocence must be

taken into account, proof against him must survive the test of reason and the strongest suspicion
must not be permitted to sway judgment (People vs. Austria, 195 SCRA 700). This Court, therefore,
has to acquit Rowena P. Geraldino for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
a) Finding accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. This court hereby renders judgment
imposing upon him a prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law.

b) Acquitting accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO of the crime of Bigamy for failure of the prosecution
to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Costs against accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.9
Nollora filed a notice of appeal and moved for the allowance of his temporary liberty under the same
bail bond pending appeal. The trial court granted Nolloras motion.
Nollora filed a brief with the appellate court and assigned only one error of the trial court:
The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged despite the
prosecutions failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 10
The Appellate Courts Ruling
On 30 September 2009, the appellate court dismissed Nolloras appeal and affirmed the trial courts
decision.11
The appellate court rejected Nolloras defense that his second marriage to Geraldino was in lawful
exercise of his Islamic religion and was allowed by the Quran. The appellate court
denied Nolloras invocation of his religious beliefs and practices to the prejudice of the non-Muslim
women who married him pursuant to Philippine civil laws. Nolloras two marriages were not conducted
in accordance with the Code of Muslim PersonalLaws, hence the Family Code of the Philippines
should apply. Nolloras claim of religious freedom will not immobilize the State and render it impotent
in protecting the general welfare.
In a Resolution12 dated 23 February 2010, the appellate court denied Nolloras motion for
reconsideration. The allegations in the motion for reconsideration were a mere rehash
of Nolloras earlier arguments, and there was no reason for the appellate court to modify its 30
September 2009 Decision.
Nollora filed the present petition for review before this Court on 6 April 2010.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.
The Courts Ruling
Nolloras petition has no merit. We affirm the rulings of the appellate court and of the trial court.

Elements of Bigamy
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent

spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.13
The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally
married to Pinat;14 (2) Nollora and Pinats marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of
the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of his second marriage to Geraldino; 15 and
(4) Nollora and Geraldinos marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for the lack of
capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage.16
The marriage certificate17 of Nollora and Pinats marriage states that Nollora and Pinat were married
at Sapang Palay IEMELIF Church, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan on 6 April 1999. Rev.
Jonathan De Mesa, Minister of the IEMELIF Church officiated the ceremony. The marriage
certificate18 of Nollora and Geraldinos marriage states that Nollora and Geraldino were married at
Maxs Restaurant, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, Metro Manila on 8 December 2001.
Rev. Honorato D. Santos officiated the ceremony.

A certification dated 4 November 2003 from the Office of the Civil Registrar General reads:
We certify that ATILANO JR O. NOLLORA who is alleged to have been born on February 22, 1968
from ATILANO M. NOLLORA SR and FLAVIANA OCLARIT, appears in our National Indices of
Marriage for Groom for the years 1973 to 2002 with the following information:
Date of Marriage

Place of Marriage

a) April 06, 1999

b) SAN JOSE DEL MONTE,


BULACAN

a) December 08, 2001

b) QUEZON CITY, METRO


MANILA (2nd District)19

Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense. He
alleged that his religion allows him to marry more than once. Granting arguendo that Nollora is indeed
of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both marriages, 20 Nollora cannot deny that both marriage
ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, or
Presidential Decree No. 1083. The applicable Articles in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws read:
Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil institution. Its nature, consequences
and incidents are governed by this Code and the Sharia and not subject to stipulation, except that the
marriage settlements to a certain extent fix the property relations of the spouses.
Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall be perfected unless the following essential
requisites are complied with:
(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;
(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two competent persons after the
proper guardian in marriage (wali) has given his consent; and
(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent persons.
Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim male at least fifteen years of age and any
Muslim female of the age of puberty or upwards and not suffering from any impediment under the

provisions of this Code may contract marriage. A female is presumed to have attained puberty upon
reaching the age of fifteen.
x x x.
Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of marriage ceremony is required but the ijab and
the qabul in marriage shall be declared publicly in the presence of the person solemnizing the
marriage and the two competent witnesses. The declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in
triplicate, signed or marked by the contracting parties and said witnesses, and attested by the person
solemnizing the marriage. One copy shall be given to the contracting parties and another sent to the
Circuit Registrar by the solemnizing officer who shall keep the third.
Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. - Marriage maybe solemnized:
(a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded;
(b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person who is competent under Muslim law to
solemnize marriage; or
(c) By the judge of the Sharia District Court or Sharia Circuit Court or any person designated by the
judge, should the proper wali refuse without justifiable reason, to authorize the solemnization.
Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall be solemnized publicly in any mosque, office of
the Sharia judge, office of the Circuit Registrar, residence of the bride or her wali, or at any other
suitable place agreed upon by the parties.
Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or value of dower may be fixed by the contracting
parties (mahr-musamma) before, during or after the celebration of marriage. If the amount or the
value thereof has not been so fixed, a proper dower ( mahr-mithl) shall, upon petition of the wife, be
determined by the court according to the social standing of the parties.
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that [i]n case of a marriage between
a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the [Family
Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall
apply. Nolloras religious affiliation is not an issue here. Neither is the claim that Nolloras marriages
were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot
claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy. 21

Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Geraldino that his civil status is single. Moreover, both
of Nolloras marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the
declaration of ones religion in the marriage certificate is not an essential requirement for marriage,
such omissions are sufficient proofs of Nolloras liability for bigamy. Nolloras false declaration about
his civil status is thus further compounded by these omissions.
[ATTY. CALDINO:]
Q: In your marriage contract, Mr. Witness, with Jesusa Pinat, you indicated here as your religion,
Catholic Pentecostal, and you were saying that since January 10, 1992, you are already a
[M]uslim convert. . . you said, Mr. Witness, that you are already a [M]uslim convert since January 10,
1992. However, in your marriage contract with Jesusa Pinat, there is no indication here that you have
indicated your religion. Will you please go over your marriage contract?
[NOLLORA:]
A: When we got married, they just placed there Catholic but I didnt know why they did not place any
Catholic there.
xxx
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, I would like to call your attention with respect to your marriage contract with
your co-accused in this case, Rowena Geraldino, x x x will you please tell us, Mr. Witness,
considering that you said that you are already a [M]uslim convert on January 10, 1992, why in the
marriage contract with Rowena Geraldino, you indicated there your religion as Catholic, Mr. Witness?
A: Since I was a former Catholic and since I was then keeping, I was keeping it as a secret my being
my Balik-Islam, thats why I placed there Catholic since I know that the society doesnt approve a
Catholic to marry another, thats why I placed there Catholic as my religion, sir.

Q: How about under the column, civil status, why did you indicate there that youre single, Mr.
Witness?

A: I also kept it as a secret that I was married, earlier married. 22 (Emphasis supplied)
xxx
[PROSECUTOR TAYLOR:]
Q: Would you die for your new religion, Mr. Nollora?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: If you would die for your new religion, why did you allow that your faith be indicated as Catholic
when in fact you were already as you alleged [M]uslim to be put in your marriage contract?
xxx
[A:] I dont think there is anything wrong with it, I just signed it so we can get married under the
Catholic rights [sic] because after that we even got married under the [M]uslim rights [sic], your
Honor.
xxx
Q: Under your Muslim faith, if you marry a second wife, are you required under your faith to secure
the permission of your first wife to get married?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Did you secure that permission from your first wife, Jesusa Nollora?
A: I was not able to ask any permission from her because she was very mad at me, at the start, she
was always very mad, maam.23
In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts doubt on the validity of his marriage
to Geraldino. Nollora may not impugn his marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate himself from
criminal liability; otherwise, we would be opening the doors to allowing the solemnization of multiple
flawed marriage ceremonies. As we stated in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:24
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio,
may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability
for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory,

and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and
to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of
hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
31538 promulgated on 30 September 2009 and the Resolution promulgated on 23 February 2010
are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Bigamy in
Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment with a term of
two years, four months and one day of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and one day
of prision mayor as maximum of his indeterminate sentence, as well as the accessory penalties
provided by law.
Costs against petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS,


Petitioner,

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and

G.R. No. 193902

SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR.,


Respondents.

G.R. No. 193908

x--------------------------------------------------x

ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS,


Petitioner,

- versus -

SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR.,

G.R. No. 194075

Present:

Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------x
SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR.,
Petitioner,

CARPIO, J.,

Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

- versus -

Promulgated:

June 1, 2011

ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS,


Respondent.

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

These are three (3) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated July 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
03525-MIN, dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Atty. Marietta D. Zamoranos
(Zamoranos) in G.R. No. 193902, thus, affirming the Order [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 6, Lanao del Norte, in Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy filed by petitioner Samson R.
Pacasum, Sr. in G.R. No. 194075.

Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.

On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior
thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam on April 28, 1982.
Subsequently, on July 30, 1982, the two wed again, this time, in civil rites before Judge Perfecto
Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City.

A little after a year, on December 18, 1983, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce
by talaq. The

dissolution

of

their

marriage

was

confirmed by the Sharia Circuit District Court, 1st Circuit, 3rdDistrict, Isabela, Basilan, which issued a
Decree of Divorce on June 18, 1992, as follows:
DECREE OF DIVORCE
This is a case for divorce filed by the herein complainant Marietta (Mariam) D.
Zamoranos de Guzman against her husband, the herein respondent, on the ground that
the wife, herein complainant, was previously given by her husband the authority to
exercise Talaq, as provided for and, in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1083,
otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
When this case was called for hearing[,] both parties appeared and herein respondent,
Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman[,] interposes no objection to confirm their divorce, which
they have freely entered into on December 18, 1983.
This Court, after evaluating the testimonies of the herein parties is fully convinced that
both the complainant and the respondent have been duly converted to the faith of Islam
prior to their Muslim wedding and finding that there is no more possibility of
reconciliation by and between them, hereby issues this decree of divorce.
WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to the provisions of the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, this petition is hereby granted. Consequently,
the marriage between Marietta (Mariam) D. Zamoranos de Guzman and Jesus
(Mohamad) de Guzman is hereby confirmed dissolved.

Issued this 18th day of June, 1992, at Isabela, Basilan Province, Philippines.
(signed)
HON. KAUDRI L. JAINUL
Presiding Judge[3]

Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew on December 20, 1989. As she had
previously done in her first nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum),
her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where she worked, under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del
Norte. Thereafter, on December 28, 1992, in order to strengthen the ties of their marriage,
Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony before Judge Valerio
Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However, unlike in Zamoranos first marriage to De Guzman, the
union between her and Pacasum was blessed with progeny, namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and
Sam Joon.

Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour
and, in 1998, the two were de facto separated. The volatile relationship of Zamoranos and Pacasum
escalated into a bitter battle for custody of their minor children. Eventually, on October 18, 1999,
Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a compromise agreement which vested primary custody of the
children in the former, with the latter retaining visitorial rights thereto.

As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases against
Zamoranos, to wit:

1. Petition for Annulment of Marriage filed on March 31, 2003 before the RTC, Branch
2, Iligan City, docketed as Civil Case No. 6249. Subsequently, on May 31, 2004, Pacasum amended
the petition into one for Declaration of a Void Marriage, alleging, among other things, that: (a)

Zamoranos, at the time of her marriage to Pacasum, was already previously married to De Guzman
on July 30, 1982; (b) Zamoranos first marriage, solemnized before the RTC, Quezon City, presided
over by Judge Laguio, subsisted at the time of the celebration of Zamoranos and Pacasums
marriage; (c) Zamoranos and Pacasums marriage was bigamous and void ab initio; and (d) thus,
Zamoranos, as the guilty spouse, should forfeit: (i) custody of her minor children to their father, who
should have sole and exclusive custody; (ii) her share in the community property in favor of the
children; and (iii) her inheritance from Pacasum by testate or intestate succession.

2. Criminal complaint for Bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), filed on
October 25, 2004.

3. Separate administrative cases for Zamoranos dismissal from service and disbarment before
the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Bureau of Finance
Revenue Integrity Protection Service, respectively. Parenthetically, the administrative cases were
dismissed in due course. However, as of the date of the assailed CA Decision, Pacasums appeal
from the CSCs dismissal of the administrative case was still pending resolution.

Quite ironically, soon after amending his petition in Civil Case No. 6249, Pacasum contracted a
second marriage with Catherine Ang Dignos on July 18, 2004. [4]

Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City Prosecutor, through Prosecutor
Leonor Quiones, issued a resolution dated February 2, 2005, finding prima facie evidence to hold
Zamoranos liable for Bigamy.[5] Consequently, on February 22, 2006, an Information for Bigamy was
filed against Zamoranos before the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 0612305.[6]

Zamoranos filed a motion for reconsideration of the City Prosecutors February 2, 2005
resolution. As a result, the proceedings before the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, were temporarily
suspended. On April 29, 2005, the City Prosecutor of Ozamis City, the acting City Prosecutor of Iligan

City at the time, issued a resolution granting Zamoranos motion for reconsideration and dismissing
the charge of Bigamy against Zamoranos.[7]

Not unexpectedly, Pacasum moved for reconsideration of the April 29, 2005 resolution of the
City Prosecutor, which was denied in a resolution dated August 15, 2005. [8] Posthaste, Pacasum filed
a Petition for Review before the Office of the Secretary of Justice, assailing the dismissal of his
criminal complaint for Bigamy against Zamoranos.[9]

In yet another turn of events, the Secretary of Justice, on February 7, 2006, issued a resolution
granting Pacasums Petition for Review and reversed the February 2, 2005 and April 29, 2005
resolutions of the City Prosecutor. [10] Zamoranos immediately filed an Omnibus Motion and
Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1) for Reconsideration; (2) to Hold in Abeyance Filing of
the Instant Case; and (3) to Hold in Abeyance or Quash Warrant of Arrest, respectively dated
February 20, 2006 and February 24, 2006, before the Secretary of Justice. [11] Unfortunately for
Zamoranos, her twin motions were denied by the Secretary of Justice in a resolution dated May 17,
2006.[12]

Zamoranos second motion for reconsideration, as with her previous motions, was likewise
denied.

On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage, docketed as Civil Case
No. 6249, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, rendered a decision in favor of Zamoranos, dismissing the
petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, found that Zamoranos and
De Guzman are Muslims, and were such at the time of their marriage, whose marital relationship was
governed by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines:

From the foregoing uncontroverted facts, the Court finds that the allegation of
[Pacasum] to the effect that his marriage with [Zamoranos] on December 28, 1992 is a

bigamous marriage due to the alleged subsisting previous marriage between


[Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman is misplaced. The previous marriage between
Jesus de Guzman and [Zamoranos] has long been terminated [and] has gone with the
wind. The fact that divorce by Talaq was entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first
husband in accordance with PD 1083, x x x their marriage is dissolved and
consequently thereof, [Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman can re-marry. Moreover, the
second marriage entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first husband Jesus de Guzman
under the Family Code on July 30, 1982 is merely ceremonial, being unnecessary, it
does not modify/alter or change the validity of the first marriage entered into by them
under PD 1083.

Likewise, in the case of [Pacasum] and [Zamoranos], their second marriage on


December 28, 1992 under the Family Code does not in any way modify, alter or change
the validity of the first marriage on December 20, 1989 entered into by [Pacasum] and
[Zamoranos] under PD 1083, as amended. In fact, according to Ghazali, one of the
renowned Muslim author and jurist in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence and concurred in
by retired Justice Ra[s]ul of the Court of Appeals and also a Professor on Islamic Law
and Jurisprudence, in the case of combined marriage[s], the first marriage is to be
considered valid and effective as between the parties while the second marriage is
merely ceremonial, being a surplusage and unnecessary. Therefore, the divorce
by Talaq dissolved the marriage between [Zamoranos] and her first husband[,de
Guzman,] being governed by PD 1083, x x x.

Article 13, Chapter I, Title II of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, provides x x x:

Application

The provisions of this title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein
both parties are Muslims[,] or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and
the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in
any part of the Philippines.

Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of [Zamoranos] and her first
husband, Jesus de Guzman[,] shall be governed by the Muslim Code and divorce
proceedings shall be properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sharia
Circuit Court.

Art. 155, Chapter 2, Title II, Book 4 of the Muslim code, provides x x x:
Jurisdiction The Sharia Circuit Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
xxxx
2. All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are Muslims or
have been married in accordance with Article 13 involving disputes
relating to:
a)

Marriage;
b)

Divorce recognized under this Code;

xxxx
The above provision of law clearly shows no concurrent jurisdiction with any civil
courts or other courts of law. And any divorce proceeding undertaken before
the Shari[a]
proceedings.

Court

is

valid,

recognized,

binding

and

sufficient

divorce

Moreover, the instant case is one of the several cases filed by [Pacasum] against
[Zamoranos] such as complaints for disbarment, for immorality, for bigamy and
misconduct before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and in the Civil Service
Commission which were all similar or [based on] the same set of facts. A pure and
simple harassment.
In the light of the foregoing findings, the Court is of the considered view and so hold
that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the above-entitled case for
annulment of marriage entered into under PD 1083, x x x. It is the Sharia Circuit Court
that has the exclusive original jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the affirmative defenses which are in the nature
of motion to dismiss is hereby granted.
The above-entitled case is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.[13]
On separate appeals, the CA and the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No.
6249 by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City. On April 3, 2009, the denial by the Supreme Court of
Pacasums appeal became final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgments.[14]
In the meantime, on August 7, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, upon motion of Pacasum, issued
an Order reinstating Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy against Zamoranos.[15]
Not surprisingly, Zamoranos filed a Motion to Quash the Information, arguing that the RTC, Branch
6, Iligan City, had no jurisdiction over her person and over the offense charged. Zamoranos
asseverated, in the main, that the decision of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, in Civil Case No. 6249
categorically declared her and Pacasum as Muslims, resulting in the mootness of Criminal Case No.
06-12305 and the inapplicability of the RPC provision on Bigamy to her marriage to Pacasum. In all,
Zamoranos claimed that Criminal Case No. 06-12305 ought to be dismissed.[16]

On December 21, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, denied Zamoranos Motion to Quash the
Information. Zamoranos motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied.[17]
Undaunted, Zamoranos filed a petition for certiorari for the nullification and reversal of the December
21, 2009 Order of the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City. As previously adverted to, the CA dismissed
Zamoranos petition. The CA dwelt on the propriety of a petition for certiorari to assail the denial of a
Motion to Quash the Information:
A petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion is an extraordinary remedy.
As such, it is confined to extraordinary cases wherein the action of the inferior court is
wholly void. The aim of certiorari is to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its
jurisdiction. Hence, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to a court on the basis
alone of an alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. To prosper, a petition
for certiorari must clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority
to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
Simply put, in a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the appellate court is narrow in
scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and
resolve questions or issues beyond its competence, such as an error of judgment which
is defined as one in which the court or quasi-judicial body may commit in the exercise of
its jurisdiction; as opposed to an error of jurisdiction where the acts complained of were
issued without or in excess of jurisdiction.
xxxx
In the present case, [w]e have circumspectly examined [Zamoranos] Motion to Quash
Information and the action taken by the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City] in respect thereto,
and [w]e found nothing that may constitute as grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City]. The Order dated December 21, 2009, which first
denied [Zamoranos] [M]otion to [Q]uash Information meticulously explained the factual
and legal basis for the denial of the issues raised by [Zamoranos] in said motion. We
find the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan Citys] stance in upholding the sufficiency of the
Information for bigamy and taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 06-12305 to be well
within the bounds of its jurisdiction. Even assuming arguendo that the denial of

petitioners motion to quash is erroneous, such error was, at worst, an error of judgment
and not of jurisdiction.[18]
Interestingly, even Pacasum was not satisfied with the CAs dismissal of Zamoranos
petition for certiorari. Hence, these separate appeals by Zamoranos and Pacasum.
We note that Zamoranos is petitioner in two separate cases, filed by her two counsels, docketed as
G.R. Nos. 193902 and 193908, respectively, which assail the same CA Decision. However, upon
motion of counsel for Zamoranos, to obviate confusion and superfluity, we have allowed Zamoranos
to withdraw her petition in G.R. No. 193908 and for her earlier petition in G.R. No. 193902 to remain.
Zamoranos posits that it was grievous error for the CA to ignore the conclusions made by the
RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, and affirmed by the CA and this Court, to wit:
1. Zamoranos is a Muslim and was validly married to another Muslim, De Guzman, under
Islamic rites;
2. Zamoranos and De Guzmans marriage ceremony under civil rites before Judge Laguio did
not remove their marriage from the ambit of P.D. No. 1083;
3. Corollary to paragraph 1, Zamoranos divorce by talaq to De Guzman severed their marriage
ties;
4. Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of [Zamoranos] and her first
husband, Jesus de Guzman[, are] governed by the Muslim Code and [the] divorce proceedings
properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sharia Circuit Court.
5. Zamoranos remarried Pacasum, another Muslim, under Islamic rites; and
6. On the whole, regular courts, in particular, RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, have no jurisdiction to
hear and decide the case for declaration of nullity of marriage entered into under P.D. No. 1083
because it is the Sharia Circuit Court that has original jurisdiction over the subject matter.
For his part, Pacasum, although he agrees with the dismissal of Zamoranos petition, raises a
quarrel with the aforementioned conclusions of the CA. Pacasum vehemently denies that Zamoranos
is a Muslim, who was previously married and divorced under Islamic rites, and who entered into a
second marriage with him, likewise under Islamic rites.

We impale the foregoing issues into the following:


1. Whether the CA correctly dismissed Zamoranos petition for certiorari; and
2. Whether the RTCs, Branch 2, Iligan City and the CAs separate factual findings that
Zamoranos is a Muslim are correct.
As a rule, certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercises judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal,
or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [19]
The writ of certiorari serves to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to
prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courtsacts which courts have no power or
authority in law to perform.[20]
The denial of a motion to quash, as in the case at bar, is not appealable. It is an interlocutory
order which cannot be the subject of an appeal. [21]
Moreover, it is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper
remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The established rule is that, when
such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or
prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed
down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law. [22]
However, on a number of occasions, we have recognized that in certain situations, certiorari is
considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order, specifically the denial of a motion
to quash. We have recognized the propriety of the following exceptions: (a) when the court issued the
order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the interlocutory
order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious
relief; (c) in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice;[23] (d) to promote public welfare
and public policy;[24] and (e) when the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential
to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof. [25] The first four of the foregoing exceptions
occur in this instance.
Contrary to the asseverations of the CA, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, committed an error of
jurisdiction, not simply an error of judgment, in denying Zamoranos motion to quash.

First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by Zamoranos on the conclusiveness of


judgment made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which heard the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed by Pacasum on the ground that his marriage to Zamoranos was a bigamous marriage.
In that case, the decision of which is already final and executory, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City,
dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter by the regular civil courts. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, declared that it was the Sharia
Circuit Court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof.
Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the principle of res judicata. The
provision reads:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to
the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in
respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his
relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the
thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person;
however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima

facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate.


The requisites for res judicata or bar by prior judgment are:
(1) The former judgment or order must be final;
(2) It must be a judgment on the merits;
(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
and
(4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause
of action.[26]

The second and fourth elements of res judicata are not present in this case. Suffice it to state that the
judgment rendered by RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, was not a judgment on the merits. The lower court
simply dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage since it found that the Sharia Circuit
Court had jurisdiction to hear the dissolution of the marriage of Muslims who wed under Islamic rites.
Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the case for Bigamy, should have taken
cognizance of the categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, that Zamoranos is a
Muslim, whose first marriage to another Muslim, De Guzman, was valid and recognized under Islamic
law. In fact, the same court further declared that Zamoranos divorce from De Guzman validly severed
their marriage ties. Apart from that, Zamoranos presented the following evidence:
1. Affidavit of Confirmation[27] executed by the Ustadz, Abdullah Ha-Ja-Utto, who solemnized the
marriage of Zamoranos and De Guzman under Islamic rites, declaring under oath that:
1. I am an Ustadz, in accordance with the Muslim laws and as such, authorized to solemnize the
marriages among Muslims;
2. On May 3, 1982, after I was shown the documents attesting that both parties
are believers of Islam, I solemnized the marriage of Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman
and Marietta (Mariam) Zamoranos in accordance with Muslim Personal Laws in Isabela,
Basilan;
3. Sometime in 1992[,] Mr. Mohamad de Guzman and his former wife, Mariam
Zamoranos came to see me and asked my assistance to have their marriage and the
subsequent Talaq by the wife, which divorce became irrevocable pursuant to the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1083; registered [by] the Sharia Circuit Court in
the province of Basilan; and, after I was convinced that their divorce was in order, I
accompanied them to the [C]lerk of [C]ourt of the Sharia Circuit Court;
4. Satisfied that their marriage and the subsequent divorce were in accordance
with Muslim personal laws, the Clerk of Court registered their documents;

5. In June of 1993, the old Capitol building, where the Sharia Circuit Court was
housed, was razed to the ground; and, I found out later that all the records, effects and
office equipments of the Sharia Circuit Court were totally lost [in] the fire;
6. This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above
statements of fact; and
7. This is issued upon the request of Mr. De Guzman for whatever legal
purposes it may serve.
2. Certification[28] issued by Judge Kaudri L. Jainul (Judge Jainul), which confirmed the divorce
agreement between Zamoranos and De Guzman.
3. Affidavit[29] executed by Judge Uyag P. Usman (Judge Usman), former Clerk of Court of Judge
Jainul at the time of the confirmation of Zamoranos and De Guzmans divorce agreement by the latter.
Judge Usmans affidavit reads, in pertinent part:
1.

I am the presiding Judge of the Sharias Circuit Court in the City of Pagadian;

2.

The first time that a Sharias Circuit court was established in the Island Province of

Basilan was in 1985, with the Honorable Kaudri L. Jainul, as the Presiding Judge, while
I was then the First Clerk of Court of the Basilan Sharias Circuit Court;
3.

The Sharias Circuit Council in the Island Province of Basilan was housed at the

old Capitol Building, in the City of Isabela, Basilan, Philippines;


4.

As the Clerk of Court of the Sharias Circuit Court since 1985, I can recall that in

1992, Mr. Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman, who is a province mate of mine in Basilan,
and his former wife, Marietta (Mariam) Zamoranos, jointly asked for the confirmation of
their Talaq, by the wife; which divorce became irrevocable pursuant to the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1083;
5.

In June of 1993, all the records of the Sharias Circuit Court were lost by reason of

the fire that gutted down the old Capitol Building in the City of Isabela;

6.

This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above statements
of fact.

From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of whom are officers of
the court, it is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another Muslim, De Guzman,
under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and incidents of such marriage are
governed by P.D. No. 1083.
True, the Sharia Circuit Court is not vested with jurisdiction over offenses penalized under the
RPC. Certainly, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is correct when it declared that:
The Regional Trial Courts are vested the exclusive and original jurisdiction in all
criminal cases not within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body.
[Sec. 20 (b), BP Blg. 129] The Code of Muslim Personal Laws (PD 1083) created
the Sharia District Courts and Sharia Circuit Courts with limited jurisdiction. Neither
court was vested jurisdiction over criminal prosecution of violations of the Revised Penal
Code. There is nothing in PD 1083 that divested the Regional Trial Courts of its
jurisdiction to try and decide cases of bigamy. Hence, this Court has jurisdiction over
this case.[30]
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must
have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of
Bigamy hinges on Pacasums claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage
to De Guzman was governed by civil law. This is obviously far from the truth, and the
fact of Zamoranos Muslim status should have been apparent to both lower courts, the
RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.
The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a second marriage
while a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least, the RTC, Branch
6, IliganCity, should have suspended the proceedings until Pacasum had litigated the validity of

Zamoranos and De Guzmans marriage before the Sharia Circuit Court and had successfully shown
that it had not been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered into by Zamoranos and De
Guzman.
Zamoranos was correct in filing the petition for certiorari before the CA when her liberty was already
in jeopardy with the continuation of the criminal proceedings against her.
In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to promote the advancement and effective participation of the
National Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the State shall consider their customs, traditions, beliefs
and interests in the formulation and implementation of its policies.
Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts have jurisdiction over the
offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws and the equal
recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim Filipinos.
Article 3, Title II, Book One of P.D. No. 1083 provides:

TITLE II.
CONSTRUCTION OF CODE AND DEFINITION OF TERMS
Article 3. Conflict of provisions.

(1) In case of conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of general
application, the former shall prevail.

(2) Should the conflict be between any provision of this Code and special laws or laws
of local application, the latter shall be liberally construed in order to carry out the former.

(3) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to Muslims and nothing herein
shall be construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim.

In Justice Jainal Rasul and Dr. Ibrahim Ghazalis Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Muslim
Code of the Philippines, the two experts on the subject matter of Muslim personal laws expound
thereon:

The first provision refers to a situation where in case of conflict between any provision of
this Code and laws of general application, this Code shall prevail. For example, there is
conflict between the provision on bigamy under the Revised Penal Code which is a law
of general application and Article 27 of this Code, on subsequent marriage, the latter
shall prevail, in the sense that as long as the subsequent marriage is solemnized in
accordance with the Muslim Code, the provision of the Revised Penal Code on bigamy
will not apply. The second provision refers to a conflict between the provision of this
Code which is a special law and another special law or laws of local application. The
latter should be liberally construed to carry out the provision of the Muslim Code.[31]

On Marriage, Divorce, and Subsequent Marriages, P.D. No. 1083 provides:

TITLE II. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

Chapter One
APPLICABILITY CLAUSE

Article 13. Application.

(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both
parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of thePhilippines.

(2) In case of marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in


accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply.

xxxx
Chapter Two
MARRIAGE (NIKAH)

Section 1. Requisites of Marriage.

xxxx

Section 3. Subsequent Marriages

xxxx

Article 29. By divorcee.

(1) No woman shall contract a subsequent marriage unless she has observed an
idda of three monthly courses counted from the date of divorce. However, if she is
pregnant at the time of the divorce, she may remarry only after delivery.

xxxx
Chapter Three
DIVORCE (TALAQ)

Section 1. Nature and Form

Article 45. Definition and forms. Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage
bond in accordance with this Code to be granted only after the exhaustion of all possible
means of reconciliation between the spouses. It may be effected by:

(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);

xxxx

Article 46. Divorce by talaq.

(1) A divorce by talaq may be effected by the husband in a single repudiation of


his wife during her non-menstrual period (tuhr) within which he has totally abstained

from carnal relation with her. Any number of repudiations made during one tular shall
constitute only one repudiation and shall become irrevocable after the expiration of the
prescribed idda.

(2) A husband who repudiates his wife, either for the first or second time, shall
have the right to take her back (ruju) within the prescribed idda by resumption of
cohabitation without need of a new contract of marriage. Should he fail to do so, the
repudiation shall become irrevocable (talaq bain sugra).

xxxx

Article 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq; or faskh. A talaq or faskh, as soon as it


becomes irrevocable, shall have the following effects:

(a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract
another marriage in accordance with this Code;

(b) The spouses shall lose their mutual rights of inheritance;

(c) The custody of children shall be determined in accordance with Article


78 of this Code;

(d) The wife shall be entitled to recover from the husband her whole dower
in case the talaq has been effected after the consummation of the marriage, or
one-half thereof if effected before its consummation;

(e) The husband shall not be discharged from his obligation to give
support in accordance with Article 67; and

(f) The conjugal partnership if stipulated in the marriage settlements, shall


be dissolved and liquidated.

For our edification, we refer once again to Justice Rasul and Dr. Ghazalis Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of the Philippines:

If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or Muslim law
is complied with. If together with it or in addition to it, the marriage is likewise
solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines, in a so-called
combined Muslim-Civil marriage rites whichever comes first is the validating rite and the
second rite is merely ceremonial one. But, in this case, as long as both parties are
Muslims, this Muslim Code will apply. In effect, two situations will arise, in the
application of this Muslim Code or Muslim law, that is, when both parties are Muslims
and when the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with
Muslim Code or Muslim law. A third situation occur[s] when the Civil Code of
the Philippines will govern the marriage and divorce of the parties, if the male party is a
Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code.[32]

Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one of the effects of
irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial bond, entitling
one to remarry.[33]

It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by


an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Sharia Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was valid,
and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is
without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 193902 is GRANTED. The petition in G.R. No. 194075
is DENIED. The

Decision

of

the

Court

of

Appeals

in

CA-G.R.

SP

No.

03525-MIN

is REVERSED andSET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case
No. 06-12305 for Bigamy is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 169766

March 30, 2011

ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner,


vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD A.
TAMANO,Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of subsequent marriage
laws, no vested rights shall be impaired that pertain to the protection of the legitimate union of a
married couple.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution 2 dated September 13, 2005,
which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring
petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llaves (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano)
as void ab initio.
Factual Antecedents
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice initially under the Islamic
laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City3 and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony
officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993.4 In their marriage contracts,
Sen. Tamanos civil status was indicated as divorced.
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamanos wife, and
upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son
Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamanos
legitimate children with Zorayda,5filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of
nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint 6 alleged,
inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage
remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993. The complaint likewise averred that:
11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been celebrated under
the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law. Based on Article 35 (4) of the Family
Code, the subsequent marriage entered into by deceased Mamintal with Defendant Llave is
void ab initio because he contracted the same while his prior marriage to Complainant Zorayda
was still subsisting, and his status being declared as "divorced" has no factual or legal basis,
because the deceased never divorced Complainant Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could not
have validly done so because divorce is not allowed under the New Civil Code;

11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced Complainant Zorayda by
invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws,
for the simple reason that the marriage of the deceased with Complainant Zorayda was never
deemed, legally and factually, to have been one contracted under Muslim law as provided
under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they (deceased and Complainant Zorayda) did not
register their mutual desire to be thus covered by this law; 7
Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then asked from the court for an
extension of 30 days to file her answer to be counted from January 4, 1995, 8 and again, another 15
days9 or until February 18, 1995, both of which the court granted. 10
Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss 11 on February 20, 1995
where she declared that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were married under the
Muslim rites, as had been averred in the latters disbarment complaint against Sen.
Tamano.12 Estrellita argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because
under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines
(Muslim Code), questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of sharia courts.
The trial court denied Estrellitas motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for declaration of
nullity.13Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995 a certiorari petition with this Court questioning the
denial of her Motion to Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we referred the petition to the CA14 which
was docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to try the case since there can be
no default in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage even if the respondent failed to file an answer.
Estrellita was allowed to participate in the trial while her opposing parties presented their evidence.
When it was Estrellitas turn to adduce evidence, the hearings set for such purpose15 were postponed
mostly at her instance until the trial court, on March 22, 1996, suspended the proceedings 16 in view of
the CAs temporary restraining order issued on February 29, 1996, enjoining it from hearing the
case.17
Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its Decision dated
September 30, 1996.18Estrellita then elevated the appellate courts judgment to this Court by way of a
petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 126603. 19

Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita to present her
evidence on June 26, 1997.20 As Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the hearing was reset to July
9, 1997.21 The day before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita again asked for a postponement. 22
Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the case
for decision,23reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying the case. Estrellita opposed, on the
ground that she has not yet filed her answer as she still awaits the outcome of G.R. No. 126603. 24
On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon City, 25 stating as one of the
reasons that as sharia courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction in cases of
marriages celebrated under both the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a court of general
jurisdiction, is not precluded from assuming jurisdiction over such cases. In our Resolution dated
August 24, 1998,26 we denied Estrellitas motion for reconsideration27 with finality.
A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC rendered the aforementioned
judgment declaring Estrellitas marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio. 28
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were never severed, declared
Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio for being bigamous under Article 35
of the Family Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. 29 The
court said:
A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows that the second marriage of the
late Senator with [Estrellita] was entered into during the subsistence of his first marriage with
[Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent marriage void from the very beginning. The fact that the late
Senator declared his civil status as "divorced" will not in any way affect the void character of the
second marriage because, in this jurisdiction, divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is not an
acceptable method of terminating the effects of a previous marriage, especially, where the
subsequent marriage was solemnized under the Civil Code or Family Code. 30
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be heard as

the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the Decision of the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 126603. She claimed that the RTC should have required her to file her answer after
the denial of her motion to dismiss. She maintained that Sen. Tamano is capacitated to marry her as
his marriage and subsequent divorce with Zorayda is governed by the Muslim Code. Lastly, she
highlighted Zoraydas lack of legal standing to question the validity of her marriage to the deceased.
In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004, 32 the CA held that Estrellita can no
longer be allowed to file her answer as she was given ample opportunity to be heard but simply
ignored it by asking for numerous postponements. She never filed her answer despite the lapse of
around 60 days, a period longer than what was prescribed by the rules. It also ruled that Estrellita
cannot rely on her pending petition for certiorari with the higher courts since, as an independent and
original action, it does not interrupt the proceedings in the trial court.
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellitas marriage to Sen. Tamano is
void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is
governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide for an absolute divorce. It noted that their first
nuptial celebration was under civil rites, while the subsequent Muslim celebration was only
ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to the CA, had the legal standing to file the action as she is Sen.
Tamanos wife and, hence, the injured party in the senators subsequent bigamous marriage with
Estrellita.
In its September 13, 2005 Resolution, 33 the CA denied Estrellitas Motion for
Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where it debunked the additional errors
she raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of the public prosecutors report on the existence
of collusion in violation of both Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court 34 and Article 48 of the
Family Code35 will not invalidate the trial courts judgment as the proceedings between the parties
had been adversarial, negating the existence of collusion. Assuming that the issues have not been
joined before the RTC, the same is attributable to Estrellitas refusal to file an answer. Lastly, the CA
disregarded Estrellitas allegation that the trial court erroneously rendered its judgment way prior to
our remand to the RTC of the records of the case ratiocinating that G.R. No. 126603 pertains to the
issue on the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and not to the issue of the validity of Estrellitas marriage
to Sen. Tamano.
The Parties Respective Arguments

Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now argues that the CA erred in
upholding the RTC judgment as the latter was prematurely issued, depriving her of the opportunity to
file an answer and to present her evidence to dispute the allegations against the validity of her
marriage. She claims that Judge Macias v. Macias36 laid down the rule that the filing of a motion to
dismiss instead of an answer suspends the period to file an answer and, consequently, the trial court
is obliged to suspend proceedings while her motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
has not yet been resolved with finality. She maintains that she merely participated in the RTC
hearings because of the trial courts assurance that the proceedings will be without prejudice to
whatever action the High Court will take on her petition questioning the RTCs jurisdiction and yet, the
RTC violated this commitment as it rendered an adverse judgment on August 18, 1998, months
before the records of G.R. No. 126603 were remanded to the CA on November 11, 1998. 37 She also
questions the lack of a report of the public prosecutor anent a finding of whether there was collusion,
this being a prerequisite before further proceeding could be held when a party has failed to file an
answer in a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late senator is valid as the latter was
already divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he married her. She asserts that such law
automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without need of registering their
consent to be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized under
Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano married all his wives under Muslim rites, as attested
to by the affidavits of the siblings of the deceased. 38
Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to file suit because only the
husband or the wife can file a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Supreme
Court Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.39
Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the CAs reasoning and stresses
that Estrellita was never deprived of her right to be heard; and, that filing an original action for
certiorari does not stay the proceedings of the main action before the RTC.
As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is collusion, the Sol Gen says
that this is no longer essential considering the vigorous opposition of Estrellita in the suit that
obviously shows the lack of collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private respondents legal standing
to challenge the validity of Estrellitas purported marriage with Sen. Tamano, reasoning that any

proper interested party may attack directly or collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda and Adib have
such right to file the action as they are the ones prejudiced by the marital union.
Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.
Issues
The issues that must be resolved are the following:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial courts judgment, even though the latter was
rendered prematurely because: a) the judgment was rendered without waiting for the Supreme
Courts final resolution of her certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b) she has not yet filed
her answer and thus was denied due process; and c) the public prosecutor did not even
conduct an investigation whether there was collusion;
2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous; and
3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellitas marriage declared
void ab initio.
Our Ruling
Estrellitas refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to answer; and her pending
petition for certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss before the
higher courts does not at all suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit before the RTC of
Quezon City.
Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to due process. She was never
declared in default, and she even actively participated in the trial to defend her interest.
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias40 to justify the suspension of the period to file an answer
and of the proceedings in the trial court until her petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the
denial of her Motion to Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In said case, we affirmed the
following reasoning of the CA which, apparently, is Estrellitas basis for her argument, to wit:
However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a Motion to Dismiss, instead of filing an Answer to the
complaint. The filing of said motion suspended the period for her to file her Answer to the complaint.
Until said motion is resolved by the Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the Respondent Court

to suspend the hearings of the case on the merits. The Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued
its Order denying the Motion to Dismiss of the Petitioner. Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure [now Section 4], the Petitioner had the balance of the period provided for in
Rule 11 of the said Rules but in no case less than five (5) days computed from service on her of the
aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court within which to file her Answer to the complaint: x x
x41 (Emphasis supplied.)
Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein is that the trial court is
mandated to suspend trial until it finally resolves the motion to dismiss that is filed before it. Nothing in
the above excerpt states that the trial court should suspend its proceedings should the issue of the
propriety or impropriety of the motion to dismiss be raised before the appellate courts. In Macias, the
trial court failed to observe due process in the course of the proceeding of the case because after it
denied the wifes motion to dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow the husband to present
evidence ex parte and resolved the case with undue haste even when, under the rules of procedure,
the wife still had time to file an answer. In the instant case, Estrellita had no time left for filing an
answer, as she filed the motion to dismiss beyond the extended period earlier granted by the trial
court after she filed motions for extension of time to file an answer.
Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment, as it should have waited first for
the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently, before this Court. However,
in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ruled that the pendency of a petition for certiorari does not
suspend the proceedings before the trial court. "An application for certiorari is an independent action
which is not part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment
complained of."42 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating that "[t]he petition shall not
interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case." 43 In
fact, the trial court respected the CAs temporary restraining order and only after the CA rendered
judgment did the RTC again require Estrellita to present her evidence.
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we never issued any order
precluding the trial court from proceeding with the principal action. With her numerous requests for
postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in refusing to file an answer or to present her evidence
when it was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial court should wait first for our decision in G.R. No.
126603. Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to present her evidence were attributable only to
herself and she should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the

other party. Sans her answer, the trial court correctly proceeded with the trial and rendered its
Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have waived her right to present her side of the story. Neither
should the lower court wait for the decision in G.R. No. 126603 to become final and executory, nor
should it wait for its records to be remanded back to it because G.R. No. 126603 involves strictly the
propriety of the Motion to Dismiss and not the issue of validity of marriage.
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as
to the non-existence of collusion.
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 0211-10-SC)44 also requries the participation of the public prosecutor in cases involving void marriages.
It specifically mandates the prosecutor to submit his investigation report to determine whether there is
collusion between the parties:
Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor. (1) Within one month after receipt of the court order
mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the
court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their
respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in his
report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of collusion within ten
days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the report for hearing and if
convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for pretrial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.
Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public prosecutor to submit the required
report,45 which we find to have been sufficiently complied with by Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo
T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated March 30, 1995, 46 wherein he attested that there could be no
collusion between the parties and no fabrication of evidence because Estrellita is not the spouse of
any of the private respondents.
Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even assuming that there is a lack of
report of collusion or a lack of participation by the public prosecutor, just as we held in Tuason v.

Court of Appeals,47 the lack of participation of a fiscal does not invalidate the proceedings in the trial
court:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation
proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment
proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation
by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these
circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of
collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial
court.48
The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never
invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under
civil and Muslim rites.49 The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and
non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can
exist at any given time.50 Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized
except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 39451 which was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way
of divorce under PD 1083,52 the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot
benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage and divorce
wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But we already
ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties
were married both in civil and Muslim rites."53
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively
override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and
Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the prospective application of its provisions unless
otherwise provided:
Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be
governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution, and nothing herein except as otherwise

specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired or
liability incurred thereby.
It has been held that:
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate prospectively, unless
the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied;
accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186
aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions applied
prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the
Civil Code in respect of civil acts that took place before the Muslim Codes enactment. 54
An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2) which states:
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in accordance with nonMuslim law shall be considered as one contracted under Muslim law provided the spouses register
their mutual desire to this effect.
Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be considered as one
contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen.
Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both civil
and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status
since this was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen. Tamanos prior
marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly
adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the declaration of nullity of
marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband or the wife the filing of a petition for
nullity is prospective in application and does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground
is a bigamous subsequent marriage.
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines, 55 Estrellita relies on A.M. No. 02-11-10SC which took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under Section 2(a) 56 thereof, only the husband
or the wife, to the exclusion of others, may file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity, therefore
only she and Sen. Tamano may directly attack the validity of their own marriage.

Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy.
In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the petition to the exclusion
of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following
manner, viz:
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a
legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death
of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon
the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in
the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to
seek its dissolution.57
Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the
"aggrieved or injured spouse." If Estrellitas interpretation is employed, the prior spouse is unjustly
precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule contemplated.
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during
the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already
vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not
be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such
circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting
previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder

of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the
Constitution.
Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from impugning the subsequent
marriage.1wphi1 But in the case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to file an
action for nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs marriages celebrated under the Family
Code, such is prospective in application and does not apply to cases already commenced before
March 15, 2003.58
Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellitas marriage in November 1994.
While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which
no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of
the parties to the marriage.59 Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the
children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real
party in interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since both of them stand to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit.60
Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be interpreted in a way
that would preserve their respective rights which include striking down bigamous marriages. We thus
find the CA Decision correctly rendered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its subsequent Resolution issued on September 13,
2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

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