G.

ELECTION OFFENSES
Prosecution of Election Offenses
Section 1. Authority of the Commission to Prosecute
Election Offenses. - The Commission shall have the
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all
election offenses punishable under the election laws and to
prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by
law.
Sec. 2. Continuing Delegation of Authority to Other
Prosecution Arms of the Government. - The Chief State
Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their
respective assistants are hereby given continuing authority,
as deputies of the Commission, to conduct preliminary
investigation of complaints involving election offenses under
the election laws which may be filed directly with them, or
which may be indorsed to them by the Commission or its duly
authorized representatives and to prosecute the same. Such
authority may be revoked or withdrawn any time by the
Commission whenever in its judgment such revocation or
withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the
Commission, promote the common good, or when it believes
that successful prosecution of the case can be done by the
Commission.
Sec. 3. Initiation of Complaint. - Initiation of complaint for
election offenses may be done motu proprio by the
Commission, or upon written complaint by any citizen of the
Philippines, candidate, registered political party, coalition of
political parties or organizations under the partylist system or
any accredited citizens arms of the Commission.
Sec. 4. Form of Complaint and Where to File. a. When not initiated motu proprio by the Commission,
the complaint must be verified and supported by
affidavits and/or any other evidence. Motu proprio
complaints may be signed by the Chairman of the
Commission, or the Director of the Law Department
upon direction of the Chairman, and need not be
verified;
b.

The complaint shall be filed with the Law Department

of the Commission; or with the offices of the Election
Registrars, Provincial Election Supervisors or Regional
Election Directors, or the State Prosecutor, Provincial
Fiscal or City Fiscal. If filed with any of the latter three
(3) officials, investigation thereof may be delegated
to any of their assistants.

c.

If filed with the Regional Election Directors or

Provincial Election Supervisors, said officials shall
immediately furnish the Director of the Law
Department a copy of the complaint and the
supporting documents, and inform the latter of the
action taken thereon.

Sec. 5. Referral for Preliminary Investigation. - if the

complaint is initiated motu proprio by the Commission, or is
filed with the Commission by any aggrieved party, it shall be
referred to the Law Department for investigation. Upon
direction of the Chairman of the Commission, the preliminary
investigation may be delegated to any lawyer of said
Department, or to any of the Regional Election Directors or
Provincial Election Supervisors, or any lawyer of the
Commission.
Sec. 6. Conduct of Preliminary Investigation. a. If on the basis of the complaint, affidavits and the
supporting evidence, the investigating officer finds
no ground to continue with the inquiry, he shall
recommend the dismissal of the complaint and shall
follow the procedure prescribed in Section 8(c) of this
Rule. Otherwise, he shall issue a subpoena to the
respondent, attaching thereto a copy of the
complaint, affidavits and other supporting documents

giving said respondent

within which to submit
supporting documents.
the right to examine all
the complainant.

ten (10) days from receipt

counter-affidavits and other
The respondent shall have
other evidence submitted by

b.

Such counter-affidavits and other supporting

evidence submitted by the respondent shall be
furnished by him to the complainant.

c.

If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if

subpoenaed, doe not submit counter-affidavits within
the ten day period, the investigating officer shall
base his resolution on the evidence presented by the
complainant.

d.

If the investigating officer believes that there are

matters to be clarified, he may set a hearing to
propound clarificatory questions to the parties or
their witnesses, during which the parties shall be
afforded an opportunity to be present but without the
right to examine or cross-examine. If the parties so
desire, they may submit questions to the
investigating officer which the latter may propound
to the parties or witnesses concerned.

e.

Thereafter, the investigation shall be deemed

concluded, and the investigating officer shall resolve
the case within ten (10) days therefrom. Upon the
evidence thus adduced, the investigating officer shall
determine whether or not there is sufficient ground
to hold the respondent for trial.

Sec. 7. Presumption of Existence of Probable Cause. - A

complaint initiated motu propio by the Commission is
presumed to be based on sufficient probable cause and the
investigating officer must forthwith issue the subpoena
mentioned in the immediately preceding section.
Sec. 8. Duty of Investigating Officer. - The preliminary
investigation must be terminated within twenty (20) days
after receipt of the counter-affidavits and other evidence of
the respondents, and resolution thereof shall be made within
five (5) days thereafter.
a. If the investigating officer finds no cause to hold the
respondent for trial, he shall recommend dismissal of
the complaint.
b.

If the investigating officer finds cause to hold the

respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution,
and the corresponding information wherein he shall
certify under oath that he has examined the
complainant and his witnesses, that there is
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused was informed of the
complaint and of the evidence submitted against him
and that he was given an opportunity to submit
controverting evidence.

c.

In either case, the investigating officer shall, within

five
(5)
days
from
the
rendition
of
his
recommendation, forward the records of the case to:
1. The Director of the Law Department of the
Commission in cases investigated by any of
the Commission lawyers or filed personnel,
and
2.

The State Prosecutor, Provincial Fiscal or

City Fiscal, as the case may be, pursuant to

the continuing authority provided for in

Section 2 of this Rule.
Sec. 9. Duty of the Law Department, State Prosecutor,
Provincial or City Fiscal Upon Receipt of Records.
a. Within ten (10) days from receipt of the records
stated in paragraph (c) of the immediately preceding
section, the State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal
shall take appropriate action thereon, immediately
informing the parties of said action.
b.

In cases investigated by the lawyers or the field

personnel of the Commission, the Director of the Law
Department shall review and evaluate the
recommendation of said legal officer, prepare a
report and make a recommendation to the
Commission affirming, modifying or reversing the
same shall be included in the agenda of the
succeeding meeting en banc of the Commission. If
the Commission approves the filing of an information
in court against the respondent/s, the Director of the
Law Department shall prepare and sign the
information for immediate filing with the appropriate
court.

c.

In all other cases, if the recommendation to dismiss

or the resolution to file the case in court is approved
by State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal, they
shall likewise approve the Information prepared and
immediately cause its filing with the proper court.

d.

If the recommendation to dismiss is reversed on the

ground that a probable cause exists, the State
Prosecutor, or the Provincial or City Fiscal, may, by
himself prepare and file the corresponding
information against the respondent or direct any of
his assistants to do so without conducting another
preliminary investigation.

Sec. 10. Appeals from the Action of the State

Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal. - Appeals from the
resolution of the State Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Fiscal
on the recommendation or resolution of investigating officers
may be made only to the Commission within ten (10) days
from receipt of the resolution of said officials, provided,
however that this shall not divest the Commission of its power
to motu proprio review, revise, modify or reverse the
resolution of the chief state prosecutor and/or provincial/city
prosecutors. The decision of the Commission on said appeals
shall be immediately executory and final.
Sec. 11. Duty of State Prosecutor, Provincial or City
Fiscal to Render Reports. - The State Prosecutor, Provincial
or City Fiscal shall, within five (5) days from the rendition of
their resolution on recommendation or resolution of
investigating officers, make a written report thereof to the
Commission. They shall likewise submit a monthly report on
the status of cases filed with and/or prosecuted by them or
any of their assistants pursuant to the authority granted them
under Section 2 of this Rule.
Sec. 12. Private Prosecutor. - The appearance of a private
prosecutor shall be allowed in cases where private rights
involving recovery of civil liability are involved.
ALFREDO
GUIEB, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LUIS M. FONTANILLA, in his capacity as the
Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 42, Dagupan City,
and MANUEL ASUNCION, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Revealed in this case is the parties' and the lower court

judges' unfamiliarity with or ignorance of the constitutional
provision on the appellate jurisdiction of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in election contests involving elective
barangay officials and of the decision of this Court declaring
unconstitutional a provision of law vesting upon Regional Trial
Courts appellate jurisdiction over the said cases.
We find it unnecessary to resolve the issue raised by the
petitioner, viz., whether or not a vote for a candidate for an
office to which he did not seek to be elected is valid. We shall,
instead, deal with the validity of the challenged decision.
The antecedents are uncomplicated and uncontroverted.
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates for
the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Nilombot, Sta.
Barbara, Pangasinan, in the barangay election of 9 May 1994.
After the canvass of votes in the said barangay, the former
was proclaimed as the winning candidate. The latter then
seasonably filed an election protest with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan.
On 27 May 1994, the MTC, per Judge Lilia C. Espaol, rendered
a decision confirming the proclamation of the petitioner and
dismissing the protest of the private respondent. 1
The private respondent appealed the decision to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City. The case was assigned to
Branch 42 thereof.
In its decision 2 of 31 August 1994, the RTC, per respondent
Judge Luis M. Fontanilla, reversed the decision of the MTC,
annulled the proclamation of the petitioner, and declared the
private respondent as the winning candidate with a plurality
of four votes over the petitioner.
After the petitioner's motion for reconsideration 3 of the
decision was denied 4 on 25 November 1994, the private
respondent immediately filed a motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution.
In its order of 8 December 1994, 5 the RTC declared that the
motion should be properly filed with the court of origin and
that the decision of 31 August 1994 had already become final;
it then ordered the remand of the records of the case to the
MTC of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, for proper disposition.
On 12 December 1994, the petitioner filed with this Court a
motion for extension of time to file a petition for review
on certiorari. On 29 December 1994, he sent by registered
mail his petition, which this Court received only on 25 January
1995. It turned out, however, that his motion for extension of
time to file a petition had already been denied on 4 January
1995 for his failure to submit an affidavit of service of that
motion. On 8 February 1995, he filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the denial.
Meanwhile, on 20 December 1994, the private respondent
filed with the MTC a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution. 6
In its order of 19 January 1995, the MTC deferred action on the
said motion and required the petitioner's counsel to inform
the court of the status of his petition with this Court. 7 For
failure of the petitioner's counsel to comply with the said
order, the court issued an order on 7 February 1995 8 granting
the issuance of a writ of execution. On 13 February 1995,
however, the court received the said counsel's Compliance
dated 9 February 1995 9 wherein he informed the court of the
petitioner's motion to reconsider this Court's resolution
denying the motion for extension of time to file his petition.
In the resolution of 8 February 1995, this Court required the
respondent to comment on the petition.
On 16 February 1995, the petitioner filed with the MTC an
Urgent Motion to Stay and/or Suspend Execution. 10 This
motion
was,
however,
denied 11 on the ground that the writ, having been handcarried by the private respondent to the office of the sheriff,

must have already been implemented and, therefore, the

motion to stay or suspend the same has become moot and
academic.
On 20 March 1995, the sheriff returned the writ of execution
with the information that in the presence of a
barangaykagawad and barangay residents, he enforced the
writ and proclaimed the private respondent as Punong
Barangayof Barangay Nilombot, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan. 12
In view of the issue involved, we resolved to give due course
to the petition.
The RTC had absolutely no jurisdiction over the appeal
interposed by the private respondent from the decision of the
MTC.
Under paragraph (2), Section 2, subdivision C, Article IX of the
Constitution, 13 it is the COMELEC, and not the Regional Trial
Courts, that has exclusive jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective barangay officials decided by courts of
limited jurisdiction, which are the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal
Trial
Courts
and
Municipal
Circuit
Trial
Courts. 14 InFlores vs. Commission on Elections, 15 this Court
struck out as unconstitutional that portion of Section 9 of R.A.
No. 6679 vesting upon the Regional Trial Courts appellate
jurisdiction over such cases.
The private respondent should have appealed the decision of
the MTC to the COMELEC; the MTC should not have given due
course to the appeal; and the RTC should have dismissed
outright the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
In accepting the appeal and deciding the case on its merits,
the respondent judge manifested either ignorance or palpable
disregard of the aforesaid constitutional provision and
decision. It must be noted that a judge is presumed to know
the constitutional limits of the authority or jurisdiction of his
court. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with the laws; it is imperative that he be
conversant with basic legal principles. 16 Canon 4 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that a judge should be
"studious of the principles of the law." Thus, if the respondent
judge were only aware of the aforementioned constitutional
provision and decision, he would have cut short the journey of
a very simple case and put an end to the litigation. What this
Court stated in Aducayen vs. Flores 17 deserves reiteration:
Nor is this all that has to be said. There is need, it
does seem, to caution anew judges of inferior courts,
which according to the Constitution refer to all those
outside this Tribunal, to exercise greater care in the
discharge of their judicial functions. They are called
upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules.
Moreover, while it becomes hourly difficult to keep
abreast of our ever-increasing decisions, a modicum
of effort should be exerted by them not to lag too far
behind. Nor is it too much to expect that they betray
awareness of well-settled and authoritative doctrines.
If such were the case, then resort to us would be less
frequent. That way our time could be devoted to
questions of greater significance. Not only that, there
would be on the part of party litigants less expense
and greater faith in the administration of justice, if
there be a belief on their part that the occupants of
the bench cannot justly be accused of an apparent
deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. Such an
indictment unfortunately cannot just be dismissed as
a manifestation of chronic fault-finding. The situation
thus calls for a more conscientious and diligent
approach to the discharge of judicial functions to
avoid the imputation that there is on the part of a
number of judges less than full and adequate
comprehension of the law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged
decision of 31 August 1994 of Branch 42 of the Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City and its order of 25 November 1994

denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration are hereby

SET ASIDE and ANNULLED for lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the said court to entertain and decide the appeal. The
decision of 27 May 1994 of the Municipal Trial Court of Sta.
Barbara, Pangasinan, is hereby declared final for failure of the
private respondent to appeal the same before the proper
forum, and the writ of execution to enforce the decision of the
Regional Trial Court is hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED.
Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
PEDRO C. CALUCAG, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 04, TUGUEGARAO, CAGAYAN
and CESAR CARBONEL, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court questioning the dismissal of
petitioner's appeal before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) on the ground of prescription of time for filing an
appeal.
Petitioner Pedro Calucag and private respondent Cesar
Carbonell were both candidates for Barangay Captain in
Barangay Caritan Centro, Tuguegarao, Cagayan during the
May 9, 1994 elections. Petitioner garnered 478 votes while
private respondent obtained 477 votes or a difference of one
vote.
Private respondent filed an election protest with the
Municipal Trial Court, Branch 4 of Tuguegarao, Cagayan
praying for the judicial recount of the ballots cast and the
annulment of the proclamation of petitioner. As agreed upon
by the parties, a recount/revision of the votes/ballots was
made. As a result, private respondent obtained 491 votes as
against petitioner's 489 votes. On May 31, 1994, the MTC
promulgated a decision in open court declaring the former as
the duly elected Barangay Captain of Caritan Centro,
Tuguegarao.[1] Petitioner appealed this ruling to the Regional
Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, Branch 3 which appeal
was opposed by private respondent in a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the proper forum being the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC).[2] On July 18, 1994, the
RTC issued an Order dismissing the appeal based on such
ground.[3] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal which was also seasonably denied. [4]
On appeal, the COMELEC likewise dismissed petitioner's
case for lack of appellate jurisdiction in its order dated August
12, 1994, which provided, inter alia:
"Guided by the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the
case of Flores vs. COMELEC (GR No. 89604, April 20, 1990),
We have disregarded the detour of the appeal to the Regional
Trial Court and considered this appeal direct to the
Commission from the Municipal Trial Court of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, however, unlike in Flores case, this appeal was not
perfected as it is wanting on the required payment of appeal
fees on time, hence the appellate jurisdiction of this
Commission does not attach.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission (First Division) hereby
DISMISSES the instant appeal for lack of appellate
jurisdiction."[5] (Underscoring supplied)
A motion for reconsideration of said order was filed, but this
was also denied by the Commission en banc which found the
motion to be devoid of merit, not because of non-payment of
appeal fees on proper time but because the same was filed
out of time.[6]
Hence, this petition.
The main issue which must be addressed herein is
whether the COMELEC has exclusive appellate jurisdiction

over election contests involving elective barangay officials

decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
It is high time that this question be settled definitively to
obviate situations similar to the one at bar.
The Court has categorically pronounced in Flores vs.
Commission on Elections that Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679,
insofar as it provides that the decision of the Municipal or
Metropolitan Trial Court in a barangay election case should be
appealed
to
the
Regional
Trial
Court, is
unconstitutional. Said pronouncement is hereby reiterated
here. The section is in direct contravention of Article IX-C,
Section 2(2) of the Constitution, providing that the COMELEC
shall:
"(e)xercise exclusive original
jurisdiction
over
all
contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by trial
courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction."
Petitioner wishes this Court to entertain his case and rule
as it did in Flores. This, however, cannot be done anymore
even if the facts of this case were on all fours
with Flores because in said case, the petitioner, Roque Flores,
was proclaimed Punong Barangay in accordance with Section
5 of R.A. No. 6679[7] after having received the highest number
of votes for Kagawad in the March 28, 1989, elections. The
private respondent, Nobelito Rapisora, filed an election
protest with the MTC of Tayum, Abra which sustained his
arguments and installed him in place of Flores as Punong
Barangay. The latter appealed to the RTC of Abra, which
affirmed in toto the challenged decision. Thereafter, Flores
went to the COMELEC which dismissed his appeal on the
ground that it has no power to review the decision of the RTC.
Said ruling was based on Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679 [8] which
states that decisions of RTC's in electoral contests brought to
it on appeal from the MTC regarding questions of fact shall be
final and unappealable. In resolving the petition for certiorari,
the Court supported the dismissal of the appeal, not on the
basis of said provision but on Constitutional grounds. Section
9 of R.A. No. 6679 was declared unconstitutional even if it was
not squarely and properly challenged by Flores. Despite the
non-compliance by Flores with the requisites of a judicial
inquiry into a constitutional question,[9] the Court felt that it
was fruitless to wait for the issue to be raised anew, perhaps
in the next barangay elections, before being resolved.
Technical obstacles were disregarded so that the defect in R.A.
No. 6679 may be brought to the attention of Congress and the
same be corrected.
At the time Flores was resolved, there was as yet no
pronouncement on the constitutionality of said Section 9 of
R.A. No. 6679, such that the Court held that Flores had a right
to rely on its presumed validity. He merely relied on said law
when he appealed the decision of the MTC to the RTC. His
subsequent appeal to the COMELEC was, therefore,
considered to have been made directly from the MTC, thereby
disregarding the detour to the RTC.
It follows that after the promulgation of Flores, the same
arguments propounded therein by the petitioner may no
longer be employed. Article 8 of the Civil Code states that
"(j)udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
constitution shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines." Said pronouncement of the Court, having formed
part of the law of the land, ignorance thereof can no longer be
countenanced. Therefore, the COMELEC is the proper
appellate court clothed with jurisdiction to hear the appeal,
which appeal must be filed within five days after the
promulgation of the MTC's decision.[10] The erroneous filing of
the appeal with the RTC did not toll the running of the
prescriptive period. Petitioner filed his notice of appeal only on
August 12, 1994, or one month and twenty six days from the
time he received a copy of the MTC's decision on June 16,

1994. The five-day period, having expired without the

aggrieved party filing the appropriate appeal before the
COMELEC, the statutory privilege of petitioner to appeal is
deemed waived and the appealed decision has become final
and executory.
Petitioner's contention that the COMELEC erred in
disallowing the case based on sheer technicalities is likewise
unmeritorious. The COMELEC dismissed petitioner's appeal for
lack of appellate jurisdiction, based on his failure to perfect
his appeal on time. That this is NOT A TECHNICALITY is
correctly pointed out in the questioned order citing various
jurisprudence. Granting that petitioner paid the appeal fees
on time, he chose the wrong forum; the payment, therefor,
having been done after the lapse of the reglementary period
to appeal. In support of his arguments petitioner cites the
case of Roleto Pahilan vs. Rudy Tabalba,[11] wherein the Court
proceeded to rule on the election protest brought to it which
was dismissed in the trial court due to incomplete payment of
docket fees. The Court stated that the trial court had "no basis
for the dismissal of petitioner's protest for the simple reason
that an election contest is not an ordinary civil
action. Consequently, the rules governing ordinary civil
actions are not necessarily binding on special actions like an
election contest wherein public interest will be adversely
affected. x x x. The rules which apply to ordinary civil actions
may not necessarily serve the purpose of election cases,
especially if we consider the fact that election laws are to be
accorded utmost liberality in their interpretation and
application bearing in mind always that the will of the people
must be upheld. Ordinary civil actions would generally involve
private interests while all election cases are, at all times,
invested with public interest which cannot be defeated by
mere procedural and technical infirmities." The Court,
however, in Rodillas vs. COMELEC[12] categorically made a
pronouncement that "the requirement of an appeal fee is by
no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an
essential requirement without which the decision to be
appealed from would become final and executory as if no
appeal was filed at all. The right to appeal is a mere
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the
manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the
provision of the law."
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order of the
Commission
on
Elections en banc dated
February
1,
1996, DISMISSING the instant case for lack of appellate
jurisdiction, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS, petitioner,
vs. HON. TOMAS B. NOYNAY, Acting Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Allen,
Northern Samar, and DIOSDADA F. AMOR,
ESBEL
CHUA,
and
RUBEN
MAGLUYOAN, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The pivotal issue raised in this special civil action
for certiorari with mandamus is whether R.A. No. 7691[1] has
divested Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over election
offenses, which are punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding six (6) years.
The antecedents are not disputed.
In its Minute Resolution No. 96-3076 of 29 October 1996,
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to file an
information for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus
Election Code against private respondents Diosdada Amor, a
public school principal, and Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan,
both public school teachers, for having engaged in partisan
political activities. The COMELEC authorized its Regional
Director in Region VIII to handle the prosecution of the cases.

Forthwith, nine informations for violation of Section

261(i) of the Omnibus Election were filed with Branch 23 of
the Regional Trial Court of Allen, Northern Samar, and
docketed therein as follows:
a) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442, against
private respondents Diosdada Amor, Esbel
Chua, and Ruben Magluyoan.
b) Criminal Case No. A-1443, against private
respondents
Esbel
Chua
and
Ruben
Magluyoan.
c) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1444 and A-1445, against
private respondent Esbel Chua only;
d) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1446 to A-1449, against
private respondent Diosdada Amor only.
[2]

In an Order issued on 25 August 1997, respondent

Judge Tomas B. Noynay, as presiding judge of Branch
23, motu proprio ordered the records of the cases to be
withdrawn and directed the COMELEC Law Department to file
the cases with the appropriate Municipal Trial Court on the
ground that pursuant to Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as
amended by R.A. No. 7691,[3] the Regional Trial Court has no
jurisdiction over the cases since the maximum imposable
penalty in each of the cases does not exceed six years of
imprisonment. Pertinent portions of the Order read as follows:
[I]t is worth pointing out that all the accused are uniformly
charged for [sic] Violation of Sec. 261(i) of the Omnibus
Election Code, which under Sec. 264 of the same Code carries
a penalty of not less than one (1) year but not more than six
(6) years of imprisonment and not subject to Probation plus
disqualification to hold public office or deprivation of the right
of suffrage.
Sec. 31 [sic] of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P.)
Blg. 129 as Amended by Rep. Act. 6691 [sic] (Expanded
Jurisdiction) states: Sec. 32. Jurisdiction Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in
Criminal Cases Except [in] cases falling within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and the
Sandiganbayan, the Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial
Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations
of city or municipal ordinance committed
within their respective territorial jurisdiction;
and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with an imprisonment of not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount or fine and regardless of other
imposable accessory and other penalties
including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective
of time [sic], nature, value and amount
thereof, Provided, However, that in offenses
including damages to property through
criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction thereof.
In light of the foregoing, this Court has therefore, no
jurisdiction over the cases filed considering that the maximum
penalty imposable did not exceed six (6) years.
The two motions[4] for reconsideration separately filed by
the COMELEC Regional Director of Region VIII and by the
COMELEC itself through its Legal Department having been
denied by the public respondent in the Order of 17 October
1997,[5] the petitioner filed this special civil action. It contends
that public respondent has erroneously misconstrued the
provisions of Rep. Act No. 7691 in arguing that the Municipal
Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide
election offenses because pursuant to Section 268 of the
Omnibus Election Code and this Courts ruling in Alberto

[sic] vs. Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., Regional Trial Courts have the
exclusive original jurisdiction over election offenses.
On 17 February 1998, we required the respondents and
the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on the petition.
In its Manifestation of 5 March 1998, the Office of the
Solicitor General informs us that it is adopting the instant
petition on the ground that the challenged orders of public
respondent are clearly not in accordance with existing laws
and jurisprudence.
In his Manifestation of 12 March 1998, public respondent
avers that it is the duty of counsel for private respondents
interested in sustaining the challenged orders to appear for
and defend him.
In their Comment, private respondents maintain that
R.A. No. 7691 has divested the Regional Trial Courts of
jurisdiction over offenses where the imposable penalty is not
more than 6 years of imprisonment; moreover, R.A. 7691
expressly provides that all laws, decrees, and orders
inconsistent with its provisions are deemed repealed or
modified accordingly. They then conclude that since the
election offense in question is punishable with imprisonment
of not more than 6 years, it is cognizable by Municipal Trial
Courts.
We resolved to give due course to the petition.
Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code,
Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to try
and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of
the Code except those relating to the offense of failure to
register or failure to vote.[6] It reads as follows:
SEC. 268. Jurisdiction of courts. - The regional trial court shall
have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any
criminal action or proceedings for violation of this Code,
except those relating to the offense of failure to register or
failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the
metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the
courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases.
Among the offenses punished under the Election Code
are those enumerated in Section 261 thereof. The offense
allegedly committed by private respondents is covered by
paragraph (i) of said Section, thus:
SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an
election offense:
(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. Any officer or
employee in the civil service, except those holding political
offices; any officer, employee, or member of the Armed Forces
ofthe Philippines, or any police forces, special forces, home
defense forces, barangay self-defense units and all other paramilitary units that now exist or which may hereafter be
organized who, directly or indirectly, intervenes in any
election campaign or engages in any partisan political activity,
except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace
officer.
Under Section 264 of the Code the penalty for an
election offense under the Code, except that of failure to
register or failure to vote, is imprisonment of not less than one
year but not more than six years and the offender shall not be
subject to probation and shall suffer disqualification to hold
public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage.
Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by Section 2 of
R.A. No. 7691, provides as follows:
SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal
Cases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court and of the Sandiganbayan,
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or

municipal ordinances committed within their respective
territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable
with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of
the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising
from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof.
We have explicitly ruled in Morales v. Court of
Appeals[7] that by virtue of the exception provided for in the
opening sentence of Section 32, the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts does not cover those
criminal cases which by specific provisions of law fall within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and
of the Sandiganbayan, regardless of the penalty prescribed
therefor. Otherwise stated, even if those excepted cases are
punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years
(i.e., prision correccional, arresto mayor, or arresto menor),
jurisdiction thereon is retained by the Regional Trial Courts or
the Sandiganbayan, as the case may be.
Among the examples cited in Morales as falling within
the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section
32 are cases under (1) Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129; (2) Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; (3) the Decree
on Intellectual Property;[8] and (4) the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972,[9] as amended.
Undoubtedly, pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus
Election Code, election offenses also fall within the exception.
As we stated in Morales, jurisdiction is conferred by the
Constitution or by Congress. Outside the cases enumerated in
Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, Congress has
the plenary power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of various courts. Congress may thus provide by
law that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard
and determined by one court. Such law would be a special law
and must be construed as an exception to the general law on
jurisdiction of courts, namely, the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. R.A.
No. 7691 can by no means be considered as a special law on
jurisdiction; it is merely an amendatory law intended to
amend specific sections of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980. Hence, R.A. No. 7691 does not have the effect of
repealing laws vesting upon Regional Trial Courts or the
Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and
decide the cases therein specified. That Congress never
intended that R.A. No. 7691 should repeal such special
provisions is indubitably evident from the fact that it did not
touch at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg.
129 providing for the exception.
It is obvious that respondent judge did not read at all the
opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended. It is thus an opportune time, as any, to remind him,
as well as other judges, of his duty to be studious of the
principles of law,[10] to administer his office with due regard to
the integrity of the system of the law itself, [11] to be faithful to
the law, and to maintain professional competence. [12]
Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Jose P. Balbuena, Director IV
of petitioners Law Department, must also be admonished for
his utter carelessness in his reference to the case against
Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr. In the motion for Reconsideration [13] he
filed with the court below, Atty. Balbuena stated:
As a matter of fact, the issue on whether the Regional Trial
Court has exclusive jurisdiction over election offenses is
already a settled issue in the case of Alberto Naldeza vsJudge Juan Lavilles, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-94-1009, March 5,
1996, where the Supreme Court succinctly held:

A review of the pertinent provision of law would show that

pursuant to Sec. 265 and 267 of the Omnibus Election Code,
the COMELEC, has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under the
Code and the RTC shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction
to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for
violation of the same. The Metropolitan, or MTC, by way of
exception exercises jurisdiction only on offenses relating to
failure to register or to vote. Noting that these provisions
stand together with the provisions that any election offense
under the code shall be punishable with imprisonment of one
(1) year to six (6) years and shall not be subject to probation
(Sec. 263, Omnibus Election Code), we submit that it is the
special intention of the Code to vest upon the RTC jurisdiction
over election cases as a matter of exception to the general
provisions on jurisdiction over criminal cases found under B.P.
129 by RA 7691 does not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over
criminal
election
offenses
despite
its
expanded
jurisdiction. (Underscoring ours)
Also, in this petition, Atty. Balbuena states:
16. This Honorable Supreme Court, in the case of Alberto -vsJudge Juan Lavilles, Jr., 245 SCRA 286 involving the same
issue of jurisdiction between the lower courts and Regional
Trial Court on election offenses, has ruled, thus:
With respect to the other charges, a review of the Pertinent
Provision of Law would show that pursuant to Section 265 and
267 of the Omnibus Election Code the Comelec has the
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations all
election offenses punishable under the code and the Regional
Trial Court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try
and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of
the same. The Metropolitan Trial Court, by way of exception
exercise jurisdiction only on offenses relating to failure to
register or to vote.Noting that these provisions stands
together with the provision that any election offense under
the code shall be punishable with imprisonment for one (1)
year to six (6) years and shall not be subject to probation
(Section 264, Omnibus Election Code). We submit that it is
the special intention of the code to vest upon the Regional
Trial Court jurisdiction over election cases as matter of
exemption to the provisions on jurisdiction over criminal
cases found under B.P. Reg. 129, as amended. Consequently,
the amendment of B.P. Reg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7691
does not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over criminal election
offenses despite its expanded jurisdiction.
If Atty. Balbuena was diligent enough, he would have known
that the correct name of the complainant in the case referred
to is neither Alberto Naldeza as indicated in the motion for
reconsideration nor Alberto alone as stated in the petition, but
ALBERTO NALDOZA. Moreover, the case was not reported in
volume 245 of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA)
as falsely represented in the paragraph 16 of the petition, but
in volume 254 of the SCRA.
Worse, in both the motion for reconsideration and the
petition, Atty. Balbuena deliberately made it appear that the
quoted portions were our findings or rulings, or, put a little
differently, our own words. The truth is, the quoted portion is
just a part of the memorandum of the Court Administrator
quoted in the decision.
Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility[14] mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly
misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition
is GRANTED. The challenged orders of public respondent
Judge Tomas B. Noynay of 25 August 1997 and 17 October
1997 in Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442 to A-1449 are
SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to try and decide
said cases with
purposeful dispatch
and, further,
ADMONISHED to faithfully comply with Canons 4 and 18 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics and Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct.

Atty. Jose P. Balbuena is ADMONISHED to be more careful

in the discharge of his duty to the court as a lawyer under the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS, petitioner,
vs. HON.
LORENZO R. SILVA, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branches 2 and 3, Balanga, Bataan, HON.
BENJAMIN T. VIANZON, as Presiding Judge,
Branch 1, of the same Court, ERASTO
TANCIONGCO,
and
NORMA
CASTILLO, respondents.

Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo who has been authorized

by the Commission on Elections to prosecute the cases, was
required to comment on the Notice of Appeal which does not
bear his signature. In his comment dated May 9, 1997, the
Chief State Prosecutor states that he cannot give his
conformity to the Notice of Appeal filed by Jose P. Balbuena of
the Comelec as it would not be consistent with his position
that he would abide by whatever finding the court may come
up with on the existence of probable cause as against the
accused Erasto Tanciongco and Norma Castillo. Consequently,
the notice of appeal filed by Jose P. Balbuena is unauthorized
and without legal effect.
WHEREFORE, the Notice of Appeal dated April 13, 1997, filed
by Jose P. Balbuena is denied due course. [4]

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

SO ORDERED.

This case presents for determination the extent of

control which those designated by the Commission on
Elections have in the prosecution of election offenses. The
facts are not in dispute. Pursuant to its power under Art. IX-C,
2(6) of the Constitution, the COMELEC charged private
respondents Erasto Tanciongco and Norma Castillo with
violations of 27 of R.A. No. 6646, together with Zenon Uy, in
twelve separate informations filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Bataan. Tanciongco, who is provincial prosecutor of
Bataan, was vice chairman, while Castillo, who is division
superintendent of schools, was secretary of the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Bataan. Uy, who is assistant regional
director of elections, was chairman of the board. In each
information, the three were accused of having tampered, in
conspiracy with one another, with the certificates of canvass
by increasing the votes received by then senatorial candidate
Juan Ponce Enrile in certain municipalities of Bataan in the
May 8, 1995 elections.

Judge Vianzon took a similar course in Criminal Case

Nos. 6438, 6440, 6442, 6444 and 6471. In his order of May
23, 1997, he stated:

The twelve cases were raffled to three branches of the

court presided over by respondent judges, Honorable Lorenzo
R. Silva Jr. (Branches 2 and 3) and Honorable Benjamin T.
Vianzon (Branch 1).
On October 30, 1996, Tanciongco and Castillo filed a
joint Omnibus Motion for Examination of Evidence to
Determine the Existence of Probable Cause; Suspension of
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest; and Dismissal of the
Cases. Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo, who had been
designated by the Commission on Elections to prosecute the
cases, filed a comment joining in private respondents
request. On the other hand, the complainant, Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr. expressed no objection to the dismissal of the
cases against the two. [1]
In orders dated March 31 and April 7, 1997 respectively,
Judges Silva and Vianzon summarily dismissed the cases
against private respondents.[2]
The COMELEC sought to appeal the dismissal of the
cases to the Court of Appeals by filing notices on April 18,
1997,[3] but the judges denied due course to its appeal. The
sole basis for the denials was the fact that the prosecutor,
whom the COMELEC had deputized to prosecute the cases,
had earlier taken a contrary stand against the COMELEC.
Thus, in his order, dated May 16, 1997, denying due
course to the Notice of Appeal of the COMELEC in Criminal
Case Nos. 6439, 6441, 6443, 6445, 6646, 6647, and 6470,
Judge Silva, Jr. stated:
A Notice of Appeal dated April 18, 1997, in the above-entitled
cases was filed on April 23, 1997 by Jose P. Balbuena, Director
IV, Law Department, Commission on Elections, from the Order
of the Court dated March 31, 1997, insofar as it dismissed the
above-entitled cases as regards the accused Erasto
Tanciongco and Norma P. Castillo.

Considering that Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo has

filed his comment to the Notice of Appeal filed by Director
Jose P. Balbuena of the COMELEC, manifesting his nonconformity with the same because of his previous
commitment to abide by the ruling of this court on the
Omnibus Motion filed by accused Tanciongco and Castillo and
the Motion to Quash filed by accused Uy, and considering
further that Chief State Prosecutor has been duly deputized by
the COMELEC en banc to handle the prosecution of this case,
the said Notice of Appeal is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Hence this petition for certiorari and mandamus seeking
the nullification of the orders of the two judges, denying due
course to the Notices of Appeal of the COMELEC. [6]
The issue is not just the right of the prosecution to
appeal from the previous orders of dismissal. It is settled that
the approval of a notice of appeal, in cases where no record
on appeal is required by law, is a ministerial duty of the court
to which the notice of appeal is addressed, provided that such
appeal is timely filed. [7] Of course in criminal cases the
prosecution cannot appeal if the accused would thereby be
placed in double jeopardy, but here the cases were dismissed
by the judges before the accused were arraigned and,
therefore, jeopardy has not attached.
For while the right to appeal is statutory and is not
constitutional, once it is granted by statute, its denial
would be a violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution.[8]
The ultimate question concerns the authority of the
COMELEC prosecutor. More precisely, the question is, who has
authority to decide whether or not to appeal from the orders
of dismissal the COMELEC or its designated prosecutor? The
trial courts held the view that the Chief State Prosecutors
decision not to appeal the dismissal of the cases, consistent
with his earlier decision to leave the determination of the
existence of probable cause to the trial courts, was binding on
them.
We think this view to be mistaken. The authority to
decide whether or not to appeal the dismissal belongs to the
COMELEC. Art. IX-C, 2(6) of the Constitution expressly vests in
it the power and function to investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices.As this Court has held:

In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not

only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of
election laws. This means that the COMELEC is empowered to
conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election
offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine
probable cause and for filing an information in court. This
power is exclusive with COMELEC.[9]
Indeed, even before the present Constitution, the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) and, before it, the 1971
Election Code (R.A. No. 6388) and the 1978 Election Code
(P.D. No. 1296) already gave the COMELEC the exclusive
power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses and to prosecute them in court. [10] The purpose is to
place in the hands of an independent prosecutor the
investigation and prosecution of election offenses.[11]
Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to prosecute
the cases act as its deputies. They derive their authority from
it and not from their offices.[12] Consequently, it was beyond
the power of Chief State Prosecutor Zuo to oppose the appeal
of the COMELEC. For that matter, it was beyond his power, as
COMELEC-designated prosecutor, to leave to the trial courts
the determination of whether there was probable cause for
the filing of the cases and, if it found none, whether the cases
should be dismissed. Those cases were filed by the COMELEC
after appropriate preliminary investigation. If the Chief State
Prosecutor thought there was no probable cause for
proceeding against private respondents, he should have
discussed the matter with the COMELEC and awaited its
instruction. If he disagreed with the COMELECs findings, he
should have sought permission to withdraw from the
cases. But he could not leave the determination of probable
cause to the courts and agree in advance to the dismissal of
the cases should the courts find no probable cause for
proceeding with the trial of the accused. It was, therefore,
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judges
to rely on the manifestation of Chief State Prosecutor Zuo as
basis for denying due course to the notices of appeal filed by
the COMELEC.
Whether respondent judges also erred in dismissing the
cases filed by the COMELEC indeed, whether the trial courts at
that stage were justified in inquiring into the existence of
probable cause because of exceptional reasons [13] must be
determined in the appeal after it is allowed. Here we only hold
that whether the orders of dismissal should be appealed is for
the COMELEC to decide, not for Chief State Prosecutor Zuo
whom it has merely deputized to represent it in court.
Private respondents have nothing to say on this
question. Their sole contention is that the petition should be
dismissed because , so it is argued, it should have been
brought in the name of the People of the Philippines and have
been filed by the Solicitor General.
This contention is without merit. This is not the first time
the COMELEC has come to this Court in its own name in
regard to an action taken against it in cases filed by it in the
lower courts. In Commission on Elections v. Court of
Appeals[14] the COMELECs right to appeal from the decision of
the Court of Appeals dismissing a criminal case filed by it was
sustained. This Court said:
The COMELEC has sufficient interest in filing the petition [for
certiorari] to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals
having sustained the demurrer to evidence in the criminal
case against private respondent for violation of the Election
Laws. This is so, for it is not only entrusted with the duty to
enforce the said law but also to prosecute all election
offenses.
Under the Constitution, the COMELEC has the power to
prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts
or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices (Art. IX [C], Sec. 2[6]), and under the Omnibus

Election Code, (BP Blg. 881), it may avail of the assistance of

other prosecution arms of the government (Sec. 265). Thus,
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gave the Chief State,
Provincial and City Prosecutors a continuing authority as
deputies to prosecute offenses punishable under the Election
laws (COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Part 12, Rule 34, Sec. 2).
We have allowed government agencies to handle their cases
before appellate courts, to the exclusion of the Solicitor
General.[15]
In Commission on Elections v. Romillo [16] the right of the
COMELEC to file a petition for certiorari and mandamus to
question the dismissal of criminal cases which it had filed for
violation of the Election Code was assumed. Although the
petition was eventually dismissed, the ruling was based not
on the lack of authority of the COMELEC to file the petition but
on this Courts determination that the dismissal of the criminal
cases by the trial court was correct, considering that the
evidence was insufficient.
Indeed, under the Rules of Court, the proper party who
can file a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus is
the person aggrieved by the action of a tribunal, board or
official because such action was taken without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion or in willful
neglect of duty.[17] In contrast to an appealed case which is
brought in the name of the parties in the court of origin and
for this reason retains its title below, the case, which is an
original action, is brought by him.[18]
In this case, denied by the courts below the authority to
prosecute the criminal actions because they recognized
instead the Chief State Prosecutor as the representative of the
People, the COMELEC had to bring this suit to seek vindication
of its authority. Naturally, the petition has to be brought in its
name as the aggrieved party. In Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Bataan v. Dollete,[19] this Court granted a petition
for certiorari, which the fiscal had filed in his name, to annul
an order of the trial court denying his right to make an
independent examination of the witnesses for the prosecution
for the purpose of satisfying himself of the sufficiency of the
evidence.
Considering the authority of the COMELEC over the
prosecution of election offenses, its decision to bring this
instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is conclusive on
the Solicitor General. It would simply be a matter of referring
this case to the Solicitor General so that, if he agrees, he may
take over the conduct of this case. Otherwise, the COMELEC
could just continue handling this case as it has actually done.
Hence, the omission of the COMELEC to refer this
petition to the Office of the Solicitor General for
representation should be disregarded. To make the filing of
this case depend on his decision would be to place him in the
same position in which respondent judges placed Chief State
Prosecutor Zuo. That would further negate the constitutional
function of the COMELEC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders
dated May 16, 1997 and May 23, 1997 of respondent judges
are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void and respondent judges
are ORDERED to give due course to the appeals of petitioner
from their respective orders in Criminal Case Nos. 6438, 6440,
6442, 6444 and 6471 (filed in Branch 1); Criminal Case Nos.
6439, 6441, 6443, 6445, 6446, and 6470 (filed in Branch
2); and Criminal Case No. 6447 (filed in Branch 3).
SO ORDERED.

EUGENIO "JING-JING" FAELNAR, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. RAMON CODILLA, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 19,

Cebu
City,
and
ELECTIONS, respondents.

COMMISSION

ON

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order, dated
July 29, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cebu
City, denying petitioners motion to quash in Criminal Cases
Nos. CBU-49941[1] and 49942,[2] and the order, dated October
4, 1999, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows: Nexold
On April 8, 1997, petitioner Eugenio Faelnar filed a certificate
of candidacy for the position of Barangay Chairman of
Barangay Guadalupe, Cebu City in the May 12, 1997 barangay
elections. The following day, on April 9, 1997, a basketball
tournament, dubbed the "2nd JING-JING FAELNARS CUP,"
opened at the Guadalupe Sports Complex and lasted up to
April 30, 1997. This gave rise to a complaint for electioneering
filed against petitioner and Cecilio Gillamac by Antonio Luy.
The complaint alleged that the basketball tournament was
actually a campaign gimmick staged outside the campaign
period which officially started on May 1, 1997, in violation of
the Omnibus Election Code. Luy alleged that: (1) during the
tournament, a streamer bearing petitioners name was placed
on the facade of the Guadalupe Sports Complex; (2)
petitioners name was repeatedly mentioned over the
microphone during the games; (3) the tournament was widely
published in the local newspaper; and (4) a raffle sponsored
by Cecilio Gillamac was held with home appliances given
away as prizes.
Petitioner denied participation in the tournament and claimed
that its major sponsor was Gillamac Marketing, Inc. He
contended that the same was purely a sporting event for the
benefit of the youth. Manikx
The complaint was investigated by Atty. Edwin Cadungog,
election officer of Cebu City, who later recommended the
dismissal of the charges against petitioner and Gillamac. On
the other hand, the Law Department of the COMELEC
recommended the filing of a case against petitioner and
Gillamac for violation of 80,[3] in relation to 262,[4] of the
Omnibus Election Code, and 50 of COMELEC Resolution No.
2888, in relation to 12 of Republic Act No. 6679.[5]
In its Resolution No. 97-3040, dated September 16, 1997, the
COMELEC en banc resolved to dismiss the case. However, on
motion of Antonio Luy, the COMELEC reconsidered its action
and ordered the filing of the necessary Informations against
petitioner and Gillamac.
Accordingly, petitioner and Gillamac were formally charged in
the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City under two Informations in
Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-49941 and CBU-49942.
Petitioner moved to quash the information or, in the
alternative, for reinvestigation of the case, contending that
Resolution No. 97-3040, which dismissed the complaint
against him, was immediately executory and could no longer
be reconsidered. Misox
Petitioners motion was denied by the trial court in an order
dated July 29, 1999. He moved for reconsideration, but his
motion was likewise denied by the court in its order, dated
October 4, 1999. Hence this petition.
Petitioner reiterates his argument in the trial court that
COMELEC Resolution No. 97-3040, which dismissed the
complaint against him, can no longer be reconsidered by the
COMELEC. He contends that under the Rules of Procedure of
the COMELEC, the dismissal of the complaint was immediately
final and executory. Additionally, he avers that Antonio Luys
Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution No. 97-3040 is a
prohibited pleading under the Commissions Rules of
Procedure. He avers that since the resolution in question was
immediately final and executory, it was no longer within the
power of the COMELEC to reconsider. Consequently,

Resolution No. 98-2914, in directing the filing of charges in

court, was "ultra-vires," and the Informations filed against him
should have been quashed.[6]
The petition is without merit.
First. While the instant petition challenges the trial courts
orders denying petitioners motion to quash the complaints in
Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-49941 and 49942, the grounds relied
upon by petitioner are directed at the validity of Resolution
No. 98-2914 of the COMELEC. Thus, petitioner prays that said
resolution be declared null and void.[7]
This petition is nothing but an attempt to circumvent a final
resolution of the COMELEC.
Resolution No. 98-2914 was promulgated by the COMELEC en
banc on October 29, 1998. Petitioners remedy was to seek its
annulment by way of a special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Rule 64, 2 provides:
SEC. 2. Mode of Review. A judgment or final
order or resolution of the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit may
be brought by the aggrieved party to the
Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65,
except as hereinafter provided.
Sec. 3 of said Rule provides that such petition shall be filed
within 30 days from notice of the resolution sought to be
reviewed. No such petition was ever filed. The present petition
to set aside the orders of the trial court denying its motion to
quash and motion for reconsideration was filed only on
November 12, 1999, more than a year after Resolution No. 982194 was promulgated on October 29, 1998. Consequently,
the resolution is now final and binding upon the
parties. Maniks
Even if said resolution is erroneous for being contrary to the
provisions of the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC, the
same is not void. Since it has become final and executory, it is
already binding and effective. [8]
Second. The above discussion should be enough to dispose
of this petition. However, we think there is an important
question of law that must not be left undecided, i.e., is the
resolution of the COMELEC dismissing the criminal complaint
for violation of the election laws immediately final and
executory, as petitioner contends?
The contention is untenable. In support of his claims,
petitioner cites Rule 13, 1(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the
COMELEC which provides:
SECTION 1. What pleadings are not allowed.
- The following pleadings are not allowed:
....
(d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc
ruling, resolution, order or decision; . . . .
The above quoted provision, however, is taken from the 1988
COMELEC Rules of Procedure which has already been
amended. The 1993 Rules of Procedure, now provides:
Rule 13. - Prohibited Pleadings.
SECTION 1. What pleadings are not allowed.
The following pleadings are not allowed:
....
(d) motion for reconsideration of an en
banc ruling,
resolution,
order
or
decision except
in
election
offense
cases; . . . (Emphasis added).
Under the present rule, therefore, a motion for reconsideration
of a ruling, resolution or decision of the COMELEC en banc is
allowed in cases involving election offenses.

Here, there is no question that what is involved is a resolution

of the COMELEC en banc in an election offense. Hence, a
motion for reconsideration of such resolution is allowed under
the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC.
Petitioner likewise invokes Rule 34, 10 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure which provides that Manikanx
SEC. 10. Appeals from the Action of the
State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal.
Appeals from the resolution of the State
Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Fiscal on the
recommendation
or
resolution
of
investigating officers may be made only to
the Commission within ten (10) days from
receipt
of
the
resolution
of
said
officials, provided, however that this shall
not divest the Commission of its power
to motu proprio review, revise, modify or
reverse the resolution of the chief state
prosecutor
and/or
provincial/city
prosecutors. The decision of the Commission
on said appeals shall be immediately
executory and final. (Emphasis added)
Even a cursory reading of the above rule, however, will show
that it governs appeals from the action of the State Prosecutor
or Provincial or City Fiscal on the recommendation or
resolution of investigating officers. The present case does not
involve such an appeal but a resolution of the COMELEC itself
in the exercise of its exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of election offense cases.[9] Such distinction can
be easily explained.
In cases where the State Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Fiscal
exercises the delegated power [10] to conduct preliminary
investigation of election offense cases, after the investigating
officer submits his recommendation, said officers already
resolve the issue of probable cause. From such resolution,
appeal to the COMELEC lies. As the exercise by the
Commission of its review powers would, at this point, already
constitute a second look on the issue of probable cause, the
COMELECs ruling on the appeal would be immediately final
and executory. Oldmisox
On the other hand, if the preliminary investigation of a
complaint for election offense is conducted by the COMELEC
itself, its investigating officer prepares a report upon which
the Commissions Law Department makes its recommendation
to the COMELEC en banc on whether there is probable cause
to prosecute. It is thus the COMELEC en banc which
determines the existence of probable cause. [11] Consequently,
an appeal to the Commission is unavailing. Under the present
Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC, however, a motion for
reconsideration of such resolution is allowed. This effectively
allows for a review of the original resolution, in the same
manner that the COMELEC, on appeal or motu proprio, may
review the resolution of the State Prosecutor, or Provincial or
City Fiscal.
Reliance by petitioner upon Rule 34, 10 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure is thus without any basis.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
HERMAN TIU LAUREL, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA,
BRANCH
10,
and
the
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS, respondents. Ncm
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner seeks to annul the Court of Appeals decision, as
well as its resolution denying reconsideration, in C.A. G.R. SP
No. 42618, which upheld the trial courts denial of his motion
to quash the charges against him for falsification of public
documents and violation of the Omnibus Election Code.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

On 13 December 1995, the Hon. Bernardo P.
Pardo,
Chairman
of
respondent
COMELEC[1] sent a verified letter-complaint
to Jose P. Balbuena, Director of the Law
Department of the said respondent,
charging petitioner with "Falsification of
Public Documents" and violation of [Section
74] of the Omnibus Election Code, stating in
the same letter the facts on which he relies
upon to support his accusations, which
are, inter alia, that petitioner "was born in
Manila on October 8, 1951 xxx (and) (a)t the
time of his birth, both his father and mother
were Chinese citizens. xxx On February 20,
1995, Herman Tiu Laurel filed a certificate of
candidacy with the Law Department xxx for
the position of Senator, stating that he is a
natural-born Filipino citizen xxx. This
statement xxx is false and constitutes not
only a falsification of public documents but
also a violation of the Omnibus Election
Code."
On the basis of the said Complaint, an
investigation
was conducted by the
COMELEC Law Department, docketed as EO
Case No. 95-843 entitled The Hon. Bernardo
P. Pardo, Complainant, versus Herman Tiu
Laurel, Respondent. Thereafter, or on 18
January 1996, a Report was made by the
said Department recommending the filing of
an Information against petitioner for
violation of the Omnibus Election Code, as
well as for Falsification under Articles 171
and 172 of the Revised Penal Code. During
an en banc meeting of the COMELEC held on
25 January 1997, the said Report was
deliberated upon, after which COMELEC
resolved:
"1. To file the necessary
information
against
respondent Herman Tiu
Laurel
with
the
appropriate
court
for
violation of Section 74, in
relation to Section 262 of
the
Omnibus
Election
Code, the prosecution of
which shall be handled by
a lawyer to be designated
by the Director IV of the
Law Department with the
duty to render periodic
report after every hearing.
2. To file a criminal
complaint
with
the
appropriate court against
the same respondent for
falsification defined and
penalized
under
paragraph 4, Article 171,
in relation to paragraph 1,
Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code." Ncmmis
Pursuant thereto, on 05 February 1995, an
information for "Violation of Section 74, in
relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus
Election Code" was filed by Director Jose F.
Balbuena against petitioner, which was
raffled to respondent court, docketed as
Crim. Case No. 96-147550.
On 14 February 1996, or after the filing of
the Information, plaintiff filed a Motion for

Inhibition in EO Case No. 95-843, seeking

the inhibition of the entire COMELEC,
alleging that "(r)espondent (petitioner
herein) is not confident that this present
forum is capable of fairly and impartially
rendering a resolution on the merits of the
above-captioned complaint", [stating] his
reasons therefor. In a Minute Resolution, the
COMELEC informed petitioner "that the
Commission has lost jurisdiction over the
case as it is now before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila xxx." With respect to the
Information, plaintiff in turn filed on 07 May
1996 a Motion to Quash the same, alleging
lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority on
the part of Director Balbuena to file the
information. On 16 May 1996, respondent
COMELEC, through Director Aliodem D.
Dalaig of the Law Department, filed an
Opposition thereto. On 20 May 1996,
plaintiff filed his Reply.
On 11 September 1996, respondent court
issued the first questioned order, the
decretal portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of
all the foregoing, the
Motion to Quash together
with
the
Alternative
Motions contained therein
is hereby denied."
To this, petitioner duly excepted on 09
October 1996 by filing a Motion for
Reconsideration, which respondent court
denied in its second questioned order dated
29 October 1996."[2]
From the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner
then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
He alleged, in essence, that the COMELEC violated its own
rules of procedure on the initiation of the preliminary
investigation and the consequent filing of a criminal complaint
against him.[3] The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court and
ruled that the proper procedure was followed by the
COMELEC.
According to the Court of Appeals, the complaint signed by
Pardo was in the nature of a motu proprio complaint filed by
the COMELEC and signed by the Chairman, pursuant to Rule
34, Section 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Pardos
referral of the complaint to the COMELECs Law Department
and the subsequent preliminary investigation were likewise
done in accordance with the rules.
The complaint being an official act, it bears the presumption
of having been regularly performed. Scnc m
The Court of Appeals added that even if the complaint were to
be considered as a complaint filed by a private citizen, still,
Pardo as head of the COMELEC had the authority to direct
commencement of a preliminary investigation in connection
therewith.
At the same time, however, the Court of Appeals also directed
the trial court to remand the case to the COMELEC for
reception of petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
COMELEC resolution dated January 25, 1996,[4] which
approved the filing of a criminal complaint against petitioner.
Petitioner claimed that he failed to receive copy of this
resolution and, consequently, failed to move for its
reconsideration.[5]
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration of its decision. Hence, the present petition, in
which petitioner raises the following issues:
A. It was error for the Court of Appeals to
hold there was no flaw in the procedure

followed by the COMELEC in the conduct of

the preliminary investigation.
B. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that
petitioners protestations on COMELECs
having acted as complainant, investigator,
prosecutor, judge and executioner in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation ring
hollow.[6]
Petitioner asserts that the preliminary investigation was
defective since the complaint was not initiated in accordance
with applicable law and rules. He alleges that the information
filed with the trial court was void and respondent judge could
not have acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner cites Section 3, Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, which provides:
"Sec. 3. Initiation of complaint. -- Initiation of
complaint for election offenses may be
done motu proprio by the Commission,
or upon written complaint by any
citizen xxx." (Emphasis by petitioner)
Petitioner contends that the complaint filed by Pardo was not
in the nature of a motu proprio complaint filed by the
COMELEC since Pardo, by himself alone, was not the
COMELEC. If the complaint were to be considered as one filed
by a private citizen, then Pardo as a citizen did not have the
requisite authority to file his complaint directly with the
COMELECs Law Department. Petitioner contends that only the
COMELEC has the capacity to do so, under Section 5 of said
Rule 34. Sdaa miso
"SEC.
5. Referral
for
Preliminary
Investigation.
- If
the
complaint
is
initiated motu proprio by the Commission,
or is filed with the Commission by any
aggrieved party, it shall be referred to the
Law Department for investigation. xxx"
Petitioner argues that a resolution of the COMELEC en banc is
necessary for the referral of a complaint to the Law
Department. He asserts that Pardo did not have the authority,
as a private citizen, to directly file his complaint with the Law
Department. According to petitioner, Pardo should have filed
his complaint with the COMELEC and the latter should have
passed a resolution en banc referring the matter to the Law
Department.[7] Petitioner insists that only the COMELEC,
through an en banc resolution, may direct the Law
Department to conduct an investigation. Thus, it was wrong
for Pardo to direct the Law Department to conduct a
preliminary investigation, as he did in his complaint, and the
latter "could and should not have acted pursuant to Chairman
Pardos complaint."[8]
Moreover, petitioner avers that the resolution of the
COMELEC en banc dated January 25, 1996, issued after the
preliminary investigation and which recommended the filing of
charges against him, did not cure the irregularities present
during the preliminary investigation.
Lastly, petitioner contends he could no longer expect
impartiality and fairness from the COMELEC. In his
Memorandum, petitioner declared,
"This was the then COMELEC boss,
personally and by himself, (who) gathered
the evidence in an attempt to nail down
petitioner. The then COMELEC Chairman was
the complainant as well. And, as his lettercomplaint incontrovertibly shows, it was
also the then COMELEC Chairman who
directed that a preliminary investigation be
conducted and completed within 30 days."[9]
Petitioner concludes that the COMELEC could not but be
partial in this case, hence the proceedings are fatally biased
against him. Sdaad

On
the
other
hand,
the
COMELEC
in
its
Memorandum[10] contends that the complaint was properly
filed since Section 4(b), Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure specifically states that the complaint shall be filed
with the Law Department. It is of no moment that the
complainant was, at that time, the chairman of the COMELEC
himself. This should not preclude him from filing a complaint
with the COMELEC for alleged violations of election laws,
provided he does not participate in the discussions regarding
the case. The COMELEC points out that, indeed, Pardo did not
participate in the deliberation of his own complaint.

COMELEC. This is obvious from the opening sentence of the

complaint, which starts with "I hereby charge..." It is also
manifest in the verification of the complaint in which Pardo
stated that he is the complainant therein. The fact that the
complaint was verified is another indication that it was filed
by a private citizen, for only such complaints require
verification. Pardo must have known this.

On the charge that there can be no fairness in the

investigation of the complaint filed by the COMELEC chairman,
the COMELEC points out that the Commission is a collegiate
body. It is the entire membership of the Commission that
deliberates and decides on cases brought before it and not
just the chairman. To disallow the COMELEC in this case from
conducting a preliminary investigation would be to tie the
hands of the Commission and prevent it from performing its
constitutional mandate. It could also cause a deluge in the
number of election law violators.

Could Pardo then have, in his personal capacity, filed his

complaint directly with the COMELECs Law Department? We
believe he could, under Rule 34, Section 4 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, which clearly provides:

In addition, the COMELEC asserts that petitioner was given

the opportunity to present evidence in his defense while
Pardos complaint was being investigated by the Commission.
The Constitution gives the COMELEC the power to investigate
and, where appropriate, to prosecute cases of violations of
election laws.[11] This power is an exclusive prerogative of the
COMELEC.[12]
There are two ways through which a complaint for election
offenses may be initiated. It may be filed by the
COMELEC motu proprio, or it may be filed via written
complaint by any citizen of the Philippines, candidate,
registered political party, coalition of political parties or
organizations under the partylist system or any accredited
citizens arms of the Commission.[13]
Motu proprio complaints may be signed by the Chairman of
the COMELEC and need not be verified.[14]
On the other hand, complaints filed by parties other than the
COMELEC must be verified and supported by affidavits and
other evidence.[15]
The complaint shall be filed with the COMELEC Law
Department or with the offices of election registrars,
provincial election supervisors or regional election directors,
or of the state prosecutor, provincial or city fiscal.[16]
Whether initiated motu proprio or filed with the COMELEC by
any other party, the complaint shall be referred to the
COMELEC Law Department for investigation. Upon direction of
the Chairman, the preliminary investigation may be delegated
to any lawyer of the Department, any Regional Election
Director or Provincial Election Supervisor, or any COMELEC
lawyer.[17] Scs daad
The complaint subject of this case was filed by then COMELEC
Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo. It was addressed to Jose P.
Balbuena, director of the COMELEC Law Department. It starts
with the following statement:
"I
hereby
charge
former
senatorial
candidate
Herman
Tiu
Laurel
with
falsification of public documents and
violation of the Omnibus Election Code." [18]
In the same complaint, Pardo directed the conduct of a
preliminary investigation of the charges he leveled against Tiu
Laurel, to be completed within 30 days. In the verification at
the end of the complaint, he stated that, "I am the
complainant in the ... letter complaint..." [19]
Was the complaint one initiated by the COMELEC motu
proprio?
To our mind, the complaint in question in this case is one filed
by Pardo in his personal capacity and not as chairman of the

Besides, the COMELEC itself, in its Comment filed before this

Court, admitted that the complaint was initiated in Pardos
"individual capacity."[20]

SEC. 4. Form of Complaint and Where to

File. - xxxSup rema
(b) The complaint shall be
filed
with
the
Law
Department of
the
Commission; or with the
offices of the Election
Registrars,
Provincial
Election Supervisors or
Regional
Election
Directors, or the State
Prosecutor,
Provincial
Fiscal
or
City
Fiscal..."(Underscoring
supplied.)
But petitioner insists, and this is the crux of his arguments,
that absent an en banc resolution directing the Law
Department to conduct a preliminary investigation, there
could be no valid investigation. Without a valid preliminary
investigation, no valid information could be filed against him.
He cites Rule 34, Section 5 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
in support of his claim.
"SEC.
5.
Referral
for
Preliminary
Investigation.-If
the
complaint
is
initiated motu proprio by the Commission,
or is filed with the Commission by any
aggrieved party, it shall be referred to the
Law Department for investigation. Upon
direction
of
the
Chairman
of
the
Commission, the preliminary investigation
may be delegated to any lawyer of said
Department, or to any of the Regional
Election Directors or Provincial Election
Supervisors,
or
any
lawyer
of
the
Commission."
However, we fail to see from Section 5 the requirement that
only the COMELEC en banc may refer a complaint to the Law
Department for investigation. What Section 5 states only is
that it is the Law Department, not another office, of the
COMELEC which may conduct an investigation into the
allegations in the complaint. There is no specific requirement
as to how referral to the department shall be made. We
cannot read into the rules what simply is not there.
Section 5 refers to two situations, one of which is where a
complaint filed by a party other than the COMELEC is
addressed to the Commission itself. Since it is not the entire
Commission that conducts the preliminary investigation, the
complaint must necessarily be referred to its Law Department.
Under the rules, this department is tasked with conducting
preliminary investigations of complaints filed before the
COMELEC.[21] Where, as in this case, the complaint was
directly filed with the Law Department under Section 4 of Rule
34, obviously there is no need to refer such complaint to the
same Law Department.
There is likewise no rule against the COMELEC chairman
directing the conduct of a preliminary investigation, even if he
himself were the complainant in his private capacity. In fact,

under Section 5, the preliminary investigation may be

delegated to any of those officials specified in the rule, upon
the direction of the COMELEC chairman. We agree with the
Court of Appeals observation that, Juris
"[E]ven if we regard the complaint to have
been filed by Chairman Pardo as a private
citizen, there is no rhyme nor reason why he
cannot direct the Law Department to
perform an investigation and delegate the
conduct of preliminary investigation to any
lawyer of said Department in his capacity as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
The justification is, in so doing, he was
merely acting pursuant to Section 5 of Rule
34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. No
clash or conflict could be attributed in his
performance of the said acts, one as a
private citizen, and the other as Chairman of
COMELEC, as it would not be him but
another lawyer in the Legal Department that
would actually be carrying out the
preliminary investigation. The outcome of
the inquiry, therefore, could not, per se, be
considered as sullied with bias."[22]
Clearly, the applicable rules were followed in the conduct of
the preliminary investigation of Pardos complaint against
petitioner, contrary to the latters assertion.
Anent petitioners contention that bias tainted the preliminary
investigation, we again quote with approval from the ruling of
the Court of Appeals:
"There may be evidence that the relations
between petitioner and Chairman Pardo are
not exactly cordial. However, this should not
detract from the validity of the preliminary
investigation and corresponding Information
filed against the petitioner, for two (2)
important reasons: First, the records will
readily support the conclusion that there is
sufficient evidentiary basis to at least find
probable cause to indict the petitioner for
violation of the Omnibus Election Code; and
second, it also appears from the records
that, apart from directing the Law
Department to launch an investigation,
Chairman Pardo had no other participation
in the proceedings which led to the filing of
the Information."[23]
The entire COMELEC cannot possibly be restrained from
investigating the complaint filed against petitioner, as the
latter would like the courts to do. The COMELEC is mandated
by no less than the Constitution to investigate and prosecute,
when necessary, violations of election laws. This power is
lodged exclusively with the COMELEC. For the entire
Commission to inhibit itself from investigating the complaint
against petitioner would be nothing short of an abandonment
of its mandate under the Constitution and the Omnibus
Election Code. This we cannot allow. Sc juris
As regards the alleged failure of the COMELEC to serve
petitioner with a copy of its resolution recommending the
filing of an information against him, this is denied by the
COMELEC. However, the Court of Appeals found that, indeed,
there is no showing that petitioner was ever sent a copy of
said resolution. This factual finding is binding upon this Court.
Thus, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, the case should be
remanded to the COMELEC for reception of petitioners motion
for reconsideration of the January 25, 1996 resolution, if
petitioner is still interested in submitting one. The proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 96-147550 should be suspended while
resolution of the motion that may be filed is pending.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42618 is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
V.A.
TAN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RUSTICO T. ILAGAN,
Regional Election Director, Commission on Elections,
Region
XI,
Davao
City,
and
SENFORIANO
B.
ALTERADO, respondents.
Leonido C. Delante for petitioner.
Eduardo C. de Vera for Atty. S.B. Alterado.

VITUG, J.:
On 10 May 1992, petitioner, as incumbent city Prosecutor of
Davao City, was designated by the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC")
as
Vice-Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers of Davao City
for the 11th May 1992 synchronized national and local
elections conformably with the provisions of Section 20(a) of
Republic Act No. 6646 and Section 221(b) of the Omnibus
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881).
On the basis of the votes canvassed by the Board of
Canvassers, Manuel Garcia was proclaimed the winning
candidate for a congressional seat to represent the Second
District of Davao City in the House of Representatives.
Private respondent Alterado, himself a candidate for the
position, filed a number of cases questioning the validity of
the proclamation of Manuel Garcia and accusing the members
of the City Board of Canvassers of "unlawful, erroneous,
incomplete and irregular canvass." Meanwhile, the electoral
protest of private respondent Alterado was dismissed by the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ("HRET"). The
criminal complaint for "Falsification of Public Documents and
Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" before
the Office of the Ombudsman was likewise dismissed on the
ground of lack of criminal intent on the part of therein
respondents. Still pending is an administrative charge, the
case now before us, instituted in the COMELEC against the
City Board of Canvassers, including herein petitioner, for
"Misconduct, Neglect of Duty, Gross Incompetence and Acts
Inimical to the Service."
Petitioner moved to dismiss the administrative complaint
against him for alleged lack of jurisdiction of the COMELEC
thereover, he being under the Executive Department of the
government. The COMELEC denied petitioner's motion to
dismiss.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner contends that the COMELEC has committed grave
abuse of discretion and acted without jurisdiction in
continuing to take action on the administrative case. He
argues that
1) Petitioner is the City Prosecutor of Davao
City. His office belongs to the executive
branch of the government, more particularly
to the Department of Justice. As such, he is
under the administrative jurisdiction of the
said department and not of respondent
COMELEC.
2) The Civil Service Law provides that
department heads "shall have jurisdiction to
investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers under
their jurisdiction" (Section 47[b], P.D. 807).
3) Section 2, Article IX of the 1987
Constitution which authorizes respondent
COMELEC to deputize public officers
belonging to the executive department is for
the purpose of insuring free, orderly and
honest elections. It does not include and
comprehend
administrative
disciplinary

jurisdiction over officials belonging to the

executive branch of government. That
jurisdiction over deputized executive officers
cannot be deemed to include such powers
as would allow encroachment into the
domain of the executive branch under guise
of administering laws relative to elections.
4) Section 38 of P.D. 807 cited by
respondents COMELEC and Ilagan as basis
for their authority to investigate petitioner
(Annex G) offers no help to said
respondents. The said provision merely lays
down the procedure for administrative cases
against
non-presidential
appointees.
Petitioner here, the city prosecutor for
Davao City is a presidential appointee. 1
We find ourselves being unable to sustain the petition.
The COMELEC's authority under Section 2(6-8), Article IX, of
the Constitution is virtually all-encompassing when it comes
to election matters. In respect particularly to sanctions
against election offenses, we quote:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall
exercise the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its
own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion
or exclusion of voters; investigate and,
where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election laws, including acts or
omission
constituting
election
frauds,
offenses, and malpractices.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) Recommend to the President the
removal of any officer or employee it has
deputized or the imposition of any other
disciplinary action, for violation or disregard
of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or
decision.
Additionally, Section 52, Article VII, of the Omnibus Election
Code, provides:
Sec. 52. Powers and functions of the
Commission on Elections. In addition to
the powers and functions conferred upon it
by the Constitution, the Commission shall
have exclusive charge of the enforcement
and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections for the purpose of
insuring free, orderly and honest elections,
and shall:
a.
Exercise
direct
and
immediate
supervision and control over national and
local officials or employees, including
members of any national or local law
enforcement agency and instrumentality of
the government required by law to perform
duties relative to the conduct of elections. In
addition, it may authorize CMP Cadets
eighteen years of age and above to act as
its deputies for the purpose of enforcing its
orders.
The Commission may relieve any officer or
employee referred to in the preceding
paragraph from the performance of his
duties relating to electoral processes who
violates the election law or fails to comply
with its instructions, orders, decisions or
rulings, and appoint his substitute. Upon
recommendation of the Commission, the
corresponding
proper
authority
shall

suspend or remove from office any or all of

such officers or employees who may, after
due process, be found guilty of such
violation or failure.
It should be stressed that the administrative case against
petitioner, taken cognizance of by, and still pending with, the
COMELEC, is in relation to the performance of his duties as an
election canvasser and not as a city prosecutor. The
COMELEC's mandate includes its authority to exercise direct
and immediate supervision and control over national and local
officials or employees, including members of any national or
local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the
government, required by law to perform duties relative to the
conduct of elections. In order to help ensure that such duly
deputized officials and employees of government carry out
their respective assigned tasks, the law has also provided
than
upon
the
COMELEC's
recommendation,
the
corresponding proper authority (the Secretary of the
Department of Justice in the case at bar) shall take
appropriate action, either to suspend or remove from office
the officer or employee who may, after due process, be found
guilty of violation of election laws or failure to comply with
instructions, orders, decision or rulings of the COMELEC.
Unavoidably,
the
COMELEC,
prior
to
making
its
recommendation, must first satisfy itself that there indeed has
been an infraction of the law, or of its directives issued
conformably therewith, by the person administratively
charged. It also stands to reason that it is the COMELEC, being
in the best position to assess how its deputized officials and
employees perform or have performed in their duties, that
should conduct the administrative inquiry. To say that the
COMELEC is without jurisdiction to look into charges of
election offenses committed by officials and employees of
government outside the regular employ of the COMELEC
would be to unduly deny to it the proper and sound exercise
of such recommendatory power and, perhaps more than that,
even a possible denial of due process to the official or
employee concerned.
Observe, nevertheless, that the COMELEC merely may issue a
recommendation for disciplinary action but that it is the
executive department to which the charged official or
employee belongs which has the ultimate authority to impose
the disciplinary penalty. The law then does not detract from,
but is congruent with, the general administrative authority of
the department of government concerned over its own
personnel.
Petitioner's assertion that private respondent Alterado has
resorted to forum-shopping is unacceptable. The investigation
then being conducted by the Ombudsman on the criminal
case for falsification and violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, on the one hand, and the inquiry into
the administrative charges by the COMELEC, on the other
hand, are entirely independent proceedings. Neither would
the results in one conclude the other. Thus, an absolution from
a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution
(Office of the Court Administrator vs. Enriquez, 218
SCRA 1), or vice versa. So, also, the dismissal by the
COMELEC of SPC Case No. 92-232 on the ground that the case
constituted an electoral protest within the jurisdiction of the
HRET and not of the COMELEC (affirmed by this Court in G.R.
No. 106452) does not necessarily foreclosure the matter of
possible liability, if warranted, of those who might have
improperly acted in the canvass of votes.
There are other issues, mainly factual, that are raised and
averred
to
show
petitioner's
innocence
from
the
administrative charges. Petitioner's allegations may well be
true but this petition at bench may not preempt the
determination of those factual matters yet to be passed upon
in the pending administrative proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Relampagos vs. Cumba, 243 SCRA 690, April 27, 1995

Facts: In the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992, the
petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the
position of Mayor in the municipality of Magallanes, Agusan
del Norte. The latter was proclaimed the winning candidate.
Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election
protest with the RTC of Agusan del Norte. On June 29, 1994,
the trial court, per Judge Rosario F. Dabalos, found the
petitioner to have won with a margin of six votes over the
private respondent and rendered judgement in favor of the
petitioner.
The private respondent appealed the decision to the
COMELEC which was later on given a due course by the trial
court. The petitioner then filed with the trial court a motion for
execution pending appeal. The trial court granted the
petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal despite the
opposition of the private respondent. The corresponding writ
of execution was forthwith issued. Thereafter, the private
respondent filed a motion for a reconsideration which was
later on denied. The private respondent then filed with the
respondent COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the
aforesaid order of the trial court granting the motion for
execution pending appeal and the writ of execution. The
COMELEC granted the petition on February 9, 1995, ordering
the petitioner Rosita Cumba is ordered restored to her position
as Municipality Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte,
upholding its exclusive authority to decide petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus where the COMELEC
maintains that there is a special law granting it such
jurisdiction Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which remains in full
force as it was not expressly repealed by the Omnibus
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881).
Issue: Whether or not the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) has jurisdiction over petitions for, certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where it has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction
Held: Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 remains in full force and
effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2),
Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the
authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.