Dead Mans Statute

FELICITO G. SANSON VS CA
Felicito G. Sanson (Sanson), in his capacity as creditor, filed before the RTC for the settlement of the estate of Juan Bon Fing Sy
(the deceased) who died on January 10, 1990. Sanson claimed that the deceased was indebted to him in the amount of
P603,000.00 and to his sister Celedonia Sanson-Saquin (Celedonia) in the amount of P360,000.00.
Petitioners-appellants Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and his mother Angeles Montinola (Angeles) later filed separate claims against the
estate, alleging that the deceased owed them P50,000.00 and P150,000.00, respectively.
Issue
Whether the testimonies of Jade, Sanson and Celedonia should not be admitted by virtue of the Dead Mans Statute. NO
Ruling
As for the administratrixs invocation of the Dead Mans Statute, the same does not likewise lie. The rule renders incompetent: 1)
parties to a case; 2) their assignors; or 3) persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.
The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication so as to disqualify persons not mentioned
therein. Mere witnesses who are not included in the above enumeration are not prohibited from testifying as to a
conversation or transaction between the deceased and a third person, if he took no active part therein.
Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor a person in whose behalf the case is being prosecuted. She testified
as a witness to the transaction. In transactions similar to those involved in the case at bar, the witnesses are commonly family
members or relatives of the parties. Should their testimonies be excluded due to their apparent interest as a result of their
relationship to the parties, there would be a dearth of evidence to prove the transactions. In any event, as will be discussed later,
independently of the testimony of Jade, the claims of the Montinolas would still prosper on the basis of their documentary evidence
the checks.
As Sanson and Celedonia, their claims against the same estate arose from separate transactions. Sanson is a third party with
respect to Celedonias claim. And Celedonia is a third party with respect to Sansons claim. One is not thus disqualified to testify on
the others transaction.
In any event, what the Dead Mans Statute proscribes is the admission of testimonial evidence upon a claim which arose before the
death of the deceased. The incompetency is confined to the giving of testimony. Since the separate claims of Sanson and
Celedonia are supported by checks-documentary evidence, their claims can be prosecuted on the bases of said checks.
Besides, the administratrix waived the application of the Dead Mans Statute when she cross-examined them.

APOLONIO GARCIA VS VDA. DE CAPARAS

Flora Makapugay (Makapugay) is the owner of a 2.5-hectare farm in Barangay Lugam, Malolos, Bulacan (the land) covered by and
being tilled by Eugenio Caparas (Eugenio) as agricultural lessee under a leasehold agreement. Makapugay passed away and was
succeeded by her nephews and niece. Before she passed away, Makapugay appointed Amanda as her attorney-in-fact. After
Eugenio died, or in 1974, Amanda and Pedro entered into an agreement entitled "Kasunduan sa Buwisan",Agricultural Leasehold
Contract, covering the land. In said agreements, Pedro was installed and recognized as the lone agricultural lessee and cultivator of
the land.Pedro passed away in 1984, and his wife, herein respondent Dominga Robles Vda. de Caparas (Dominga), took over as
agricultural lessee.
What the PARAD, DARAB and CA failed to consider and realize is that Amandas declaration in her Affidavit covering Pedros
alleged admission and recognition of the alternate farming scheme is inadmissible for being a violation of the Dead Mans Statute,
which provides that "[i]f one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental
disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the
transaction." Thus, since Pedro is deceased, and Amandas declaration which pertains to the leasehold agreement affects the 1996
"Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" which she as assignor entered into with petitioners, and which is now the subject matter of the
present case and claim against Pedros surviving spouse and lawful successor-in-interest Dominga, such declaration cannot be

admitted and used against the latter, who is placed in an unfair situation by reason of her being unable to contradict or disprove
such declaration as a result of her husband-declarant Pedros prior death.
If petitioners earnestly believed that they had a right, under their supposed mutual agreement with Pedro, to cultivate the land under
an alternate farming scheme, then they should have confronted Pedro or sought an audience with Amanda to discuss the possibility
of their institution as co-lessees of the land; and they should have done so soon after the passing away of their father Eugenio.
However, it was only in 1996, or 17 years after Pedro was installed as tenant in 1979 and long after his death in 1984, that they
came forward to question Pedros succession to the leasehold. As correctly held by the PARAD, petitioners slept on their rights, and
are thus precluded from questioning Pedros 1979 agricultural leasehold contract.

ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
TEODORO R. REGALA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
PCGG want to build up their case against Eduardo Coujuanco for the anomalies in the COCO LEVY FUNDS. PCGG wants
petitioners divulge that Cojuangco indeed was a client of their firm, as well as other information regarding Cojuangco.
Issue: Can the PCGG compel petitioners to divulge its clients name? NO
As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in mystery. Under this premise, the general rule in our
jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of
this client.
The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.
1.

the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.

2.

the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege
does not attach until there is a client.

3.

the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.

4.

due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. "A party suing
or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is." He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces.

EXCEPTIONS
1.

Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that
client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.

2.

Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; his identity is privileged.

3.

Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the
said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a
crime, the client's name is privileged.

Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege when the
client's name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences.
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case falls
under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's

connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects
the subject matter or the substance (without which there would be not attorney-client relationship).
PEOPLE VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Petitioner seeks the annulment of the resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan which denied petitioner's motion for the discharge of
respondent Generoso S. Sansaet to be utilized as a state witness, and its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of its
preceding disposition involving a case of falsification of documents filed against Paredes, his client.
Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already committed, made by a party who committed it, to an
attorney, consulted as such, are privileged communications. Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that
communications between attorney and client having to do with the client's contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance
thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications between attorney and client.
In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansate as state witness are the communications made to him by
physical acts and/or accompanying words of Parades at the time he and Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of
Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet
and culminated in the criminal charges now pending in respondent Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the confidential
communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to the crime of falsification which had not
yet been committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his present co-respondents, later committed. Having
been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications are outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege.
CHAN VS CHAN
Petitioner Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent
Johnny Chan (Johnny), the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of their children to her.
Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient
due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs.

Issue
Whether hospital records are covered by the physician-patient privilege.
The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets information while professionally
attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the patients consent as to any facts which would blacken the latters
reputation. This rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and
give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure.
Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all that had transpired between him and the
patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk.
To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital recordsthe results of tests that the physician ordered,
the diagnosis of the patients illness, and the advice or treatment he gave himwould be to allow access to evidence that is
inadmissible without the patients consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the patients records. Disclosing them
would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without
the latters prior consent.
KROHN VS CA and KROHN
The subject of the evaluation report, Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn, invoking the rule on privileged communication between physician
and patient, seeks to enjoin her husband from disclosing the contents of the report. After failing to convince the trial court and the
appellate court, she is now before us on a petition for review on certiorari.
The requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (b) the person
against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person acquired

the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (d) the information was necessary to enable him to
act in that capacity; and, (e) the information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of
the patient.
In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and
clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition
because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed
the report.
Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the testimony of private respondent on the ground that it was privileged. In his
Manifestation, he invoked the rule on privileged communications but never questioned the testimony as hearsay. It was a fatal
mistake. For, in failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel waived his right to make such objection
and, consequently, the evidence offered may be admitted.
Marital Disqualification Rule
MAXIMO ALVAREZ VS RAMIREZ
Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal Case for arson pending before the Regional Trial Court.
The accused is Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of respondent. On June 21,
1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as the first witness against petitioner, her husband.
Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection.
Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify
for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a
criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latters direct descendants or ascendants.
The reasons given for the rule are:
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of an occasional failure
of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of
the other.
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and
in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons
which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations
are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based
upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury
based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life, which the law aims
at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
Filial Privilege
IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION AND CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE RECORD OF BIRTH EMMA K. LEE
Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from China. They had 11
children, namely, Rita K. Lee, Leoncio K. Lee, Lucia K. Lee-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Rosa Lee-Vanderlek, Melody Lee-Chin,
Henry K. Lee, Natividad Lee-Miguel, Victoriano K. Lee, and Thomas K. Lee (collectively, the Lee-Keh children). In 1948, Lee brought
from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve as housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh children believe that
Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into another property of Lee nearby, and had a relation with him. Shortly after Keh died in 1989,
the Lee-Keh children learned that Tius children with Lee (collectively, the Lees other children) claimed that they, too, were children of
Lee and Keh.
Can a step-mother be compelled to testify against her step-daughter. YES
But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply
to them because the rule applies only to direct ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A
stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother. Article 965 thus provides:

Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the
family with those who descend from him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he
descends.
Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.
ADMISSION IN SILENCE
FRANCISCO VILLANUEVA VS BALAGUER
Petitioner Francisco N. Villanueva, then Assistant Manager for Operations of IBC-13was dismissed from employment on the ground
of loss of confidence for purportedly selling forged certificates of performance. Contesting his termination, petitioner filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal before the National Labor Relations Commission. During the pendency of the labor case, news
articles about irregularities in IBC-13 were published.In these news articles, respondent Virgilio P. Balaguer, then President of IBC13, was quoted to have said that he uncovered various anomalies in IBC-13 during his tenure which led to the dismissal of an
operations executive for selling forged certificates of performance.
One cannot prove his claim by placing the burden of proof on the other party. Indeed, (a) man cannot make evidence for himself by
writing a letter containing the statements that he wishes to prove. He does not make the letter evidence by sending it to the party
against whom he wishes to prove the facts [stated therein]. He no more can impose a duty to answer a charge than he can impose
a duty to pay by sending goods. Therefore a failure to answer such adverse assertions in the absence of further circumstances
making an answer requisite or natural has no effect as an admission.
Moreover, the rule on admission by silence applies to adverse statements in writing if the party was carrying on a mutual
correspondence with the declarant. However, if there was no such mutual correspondence, the rule is relaxed on the theory that
while the party would have immediately reacted by a denial if the statements were orally made in his presence, such prompt
response can generally not be expected if the party still has to resort to a written reply.
In the same manner, we also cannot assume an admission by silence on the part of Balaguer by virtue of his failure to protest or
disclaim the attribution to him by the newspapers that he is the source of the articles. As explained above, the rule on admission by
silence is relaxed when the statement is not made orally in ones presence or when one still has to resort to a written reply, or when
there is no mutual correspondence between the parties.
Judicial Admission
HEIRS OF PEDRO CLEMEA ZURBANO VS HEIRS OF IRENE B. BIEN
Whether petitioners, the heirs of Pedro Clemea y Zurbano, should be made to pay respondents, the heirs of Irene B. Bien,
compensatory damages for depriving them of the owners share of the harvest from a tract of riceland in Bolo, Municipality
of Tiwi, Albay.
A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter contradict it. The exception is found only in those
rare instances when the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion and because of strong reasons to support its stand, may relieve a
party from the consequences of his admission.
Self-serving evidence refers only to acts or declarations made by a party in his own interest at some place and time out of court,
and it does not include testimony that he gives as a witness in court. interest alone is not a ground for disregarding a partys
testimony. Elsewhere it has been said that the interest of a witness does not ipso facto deprive his testimony of probative force or
require it to be disregarded, and the trier of facts is entitled to accept as much of the witness testimony as he finds credible and to
reject the rest. To these dicta we give our complete assent. Petitioners arguments to the contrary must be rejected.In view of the
foregoing, we hold that the appellate court committed no reversible error in relying on Gregorio Clemeas testimony.
RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE
PEOPLE VS ATENCIO
Ricardo, Domingo and Silvestre together with Bonifacio were charged with the crime Robbery in Band with Triple Homicide. The
prosecution utilized Bonifacio as witness. The other accused invokes the res inter alios acta rule.
The testimony of discharged witness Bonifacio Gremio, placing Atencio and company plotted to rob the victims,admissible as
evidence against his co-accused. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be
given evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration, applies on
it to extrajudicial acts or declarations, but not to testimony given on the stand at the trial, where the defendant has the ooportunity to
cross examine the declarant.

When Bonifacio Gremio, in this case, took the witness stand and testified on the participation of Atencio, Domingo and Colisao in the
crime, he was not making admission or declaration as a co-conspirator; he was an eye-witness identifying them in connection with
the incident, and whose testimony could have been shaken by cross-examination or disproved by other evidence. As it happened
here, the testimony of Bonifacio withstood the cross-examinations by separate counsel for the accused.
NARRA NICKEL MINING VS REDMONT
Respondent Redmont took interest in mining and exploring areas in Palawam. It learned that the areas were already covered by
petitioner. Now, respondent prays for the cancellation of petitioners permit on the ground that it did not comply with the required
Filipino ownership of Mining companies.
Is Section 29 and 31 of Rule 130 applicable. NO
Petitioners claim that before the mentioned rules can be applied to a case the partnership relation must be shown and that proof of
the fact must be made by the evidence other than the admission itself. Thus the CA erred in finding that a partnership relationship
exists between them and MBMI because in fact no partnership exists.
A partnership is defined as two or more persons who bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common
fund with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves.
On the other hand, joint ventures have been deemed to be akin to partnerships since it is difficult to distinguish between joint
ventures and partnerships.
Though some claim that partnerships and joint ventures are totally different animals, there are very few rules that differentiate one
from the other; thus, joint ventures are deemedakin or similar to a partnership. In fact, in joint venture agreements, rules and
legal incidents governing partnerships are applied.
Accordingly, culled from the incidents and records of this case, it can be assumed that the relationships entered between and
among petitioners and MBMI are no simple joint venture agreements. As a rule, corporations are prohibited from entering into
partnership agreements; consequently, corporations enter into joint venture agreements with other corporations or partnerships for
certain transactions in order to form pseudo partnerships. Obviously, as the intricate web of ventures entered into by and among
petitioners and MBMI was executed to circumvent the legal prohibition against corporations entering into partnerships, then the
relationship created should be deemed as partnerships, and the laws on partnership should be applied. Thus, a joint venture
agreement between and among corporations may be seen as similar to partnerships since the elements of partnership are present.
Considering that the relationships found between petitioners and MBMI are considered to be partnerships, then the CA is
justified in applying Sec. 29, Rule 130 of the Rules by stating that by entering into a joint venture, MBMI have a joint interest with
Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.