Professional Documents
Culture Documents
HONORABLE
RAUL E. DE LEON
G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995
FACTS:
On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of
Investigation
(NBI)
filed
with
the
Department of Justice a letter-complaint
charging
petitioners
Hubert
Webb,
Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and
six (6) other persons with the crime of
Rape and Homicide of Carmela N.
Vizconde, her mother Estrellita NicolasVizconde, and her sister Anne Marie
Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W.
Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro
Manila on June 30, 1991.
Forthwith, the Department of Justice
formed a panel of prosecutors headed by
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio
R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary
investigation.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its
finding of probable cause. They assail the
credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently
weak and uncorroborated due to the
inconsistencies between her April 28,
1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn
statements. They criticize the procedure
followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not
examine witnesses to clarify the alleged
inconsistencies.
Petitioners charge that respondent Judge
Raul de Leon and, later, respondent
Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants
of
arrest
against
them
without
conducting the required preliminary
examination.
Petitioners complain about the denial of
their constitutional right to due process
and violation of their right to an impartial
investigation. They also assail the
prejudicial publicity that attended their
preliminary investigation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise
gravely abused its discretion in holding
that there is probable cause to charge
them with the crime of rape and
homicide
2. Whether or not respondent Judges de
Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their
discretion when they failed to conduct a
preliminary examination before issuing
warrants of arrest against them
3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied
them their constitutional right to due
process
during
their
preliminary
investigation
4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel
unlawfully
intruded
into
judicial
prerogative when it failed to charge
Jessica Alfaro in the information as an
accused.
HELD:
1. NO.
2. NO.
3. NO. There is no merit in this contention
because petitioners were given all the
opportunities to be heard.
4. NO.
REASONS:
1. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did
not gravely abuse its discretion when it
found probable cause against the
petitioners. A probable cause needs only
to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not, a crime has been
committed and was committed by the
suspects. Probable cause need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence
of guilt, neither on evidence establishing
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
definitely, not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt.
2. The Court ruled that respondent
judges did not gravely abuse their
discretion. In arrest cases, there must be
a probable cause that a crime has been
committed and that the person to be
(G)
Ruling:
The warrant complained of is upheld and
declared valid insofar as it orders the
arrest of the petitioners. Said warrant is
voided to the extent that it is issued
against fifty (50) "John Does." The
respondent Judge is directed to forward
to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur
the
record
of
the
preliminary
investigation of the complaint in Criminal
Case No. 1728 of his court for further
appropriate action.
RD:
RD:
As held in Soliven v. Makasiar, the Judge
does not have to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. The
Prosecutor can perform the same
functions as a commissioner for the
taking of the evidence. However, there
should be necessary documents and a
report supporting the Fiscal's bare
certification. All of these should be before
the Judge.
Labrador,
as
modified
by
the
memorandum[5] of SPO Tamayo, was
approved by Ombudsman Conrado M.
Vasquez on May 5, 1992. Thus, herein
petitioners were charged accordingly
before
the
Sandiganbayan
in
an
information[6] filed on May 18, 1992.
Attached to the information were the
resolution of GIO Labrador and the
memorandum of SPO Tamayo. The said
information reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution
Officer III, Office of the Special
Prosecutor, hereby accuses ROLANDO
NARCISO and DORIS TERESA HO,
President of National Marine Corporation,
of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as
amended, committed as follows:
That on or about April 4, 1989, and for
sometime
prior
and/or
subsequent
thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named
accused ROLANDO NARCISO, a public
officer, being then the Vice-President of
the National Steel Corporation (NSC), a
government-owned
or
controlled
corporation organized and operating
under the Philippine laws, and DORIS
TERESA HO, a private individual and then
the
President
of
National
Marine
Corporation (NMC), a private corporation
organized and operating under our
Corporation
law,
conspiring
and
confederating with one another, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally, with evident bad faith and
through manifest partiality, cause undue
injury to the National Steel Corporation
(NSC),
by
entering
without
legal
justification into a negotiated contract of
affreightment disadvantageous to the
NSC for the haulage of its products at the
rate of P129.50/MT, from Iligan City to
Manila, despite their full knowledge that
the rate they have agreed upon was
much higher than those offered by the
Loadstar Shipping Company, Inc. (LSCI)
and Premier Shipping Lines, Inc. (PSLI), in
CONTRARY TO LAW.
to
make
his
supporting
aid him in
as to the
cause.[10]
of
the
of each case.
We cannot determine
beforehand how cursory or exhaustive
the Judges examination should be. The
Judge has to exercise sound discretion
for, after all, the personal determination
is vested in the Judge by the
Constitution. It can be as brief or as
detailed as the circumstances of each
case require. To be sure, the Judge must
go beyond the Prosecutors certification
and
investigation
report
whenever
necessary.
He should call for [the]
complainant
and
[the]
witnesses
themselves to answer the courts probing
questions when the circumstances of the
case so require.[15] [underscoring
supplied]
The above rulings in Soliven, Inting and
Lim Sr. were iterated in Allado vs.
Diokno[16] where we explained again
what probable cause means. Probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest is the existence of such facts and
circumstances
that
would
lead
a
reasonably discreet and prudent person
to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be
arrested.[17] Hence, the judge, before
issuing a warrant of arrest, must satisfy
himself that based on the evidence
submitted there is sufficient proof that a
crime has been committed and that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty
thereof.[18] At this stage of the criminal
proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to
review in detail the evidence submitted
during the preliminary investigation. It is
sufficient that he personally evaluates
such evidence in determining probable
cause.[19] In Webb vs. De Leon,[20] we
stressed
that
the
judge
merely
determines the probability, not the
certainty, of guilt of the accused and, in
doing so, he need not conduct a de novo
hearing. He simply personally reviews
the prosecutors initial determination
finding probable cause to see if it is
supported by substantial evidence.