PT & T VS.

NLRC
Respondent Grace De Guzman was illegally dismissed from work
due to companys policy of not accepting married women for employment.
Ruling:
PETITION DISMISSED.
Marriage is a special contract that cannot be restricted by
discriminatory policies of private individuals or corporations. Wheres a
company policy disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts
marriage, the Supreme Court invalidated such policy as it not only runs
afoul the constitutional provision on equal protection but also on the
fundamental policy of the State toward marriage. The danger of such
policy against marriage followed by PT&T is that it strike at the very
essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution
and ultimately of the family as the foundation of the nation.

ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR

Respondent Escritor was charged of disgraceful and immoral conduct
for living with a man not her husband and having a child out of wedlock.
However, she testified that she was already a widow when she started
living with another man without the benefit of marriage for 20 years and that
they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the
Jehovas witness, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their
religious beliefs.
Ruling:
CASE REMANDED TO THE SC OCAD FOR REHEARING.

Escritor cannot be held administratively liable. The Court held thus,

Should the Court prohibit and punish respondents conduct where it is
protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Courts action would be an
unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. We cannot
therefore, take a passing look at respondents claim of religious freedom,
but must instead apply the compelling state interest test. The government
must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity to
discharge its burden of demonstrating the states compelling interest which
can override respondents religious belief and practice.

GOITIA VS. CAMPOS RUEDA

Petitioner wife filed an action against respondent husband for support
outside of the conjugal domicile, due to the latters demand that she
perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs which the wife
refuses to perform, which just refusals of the petitioner would result to
maltreatment by words and deed and inflict injuries upon the different parts
of her body, thus petitioner was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and
take refuge in the home of her parents.
Ruling:
Petition granted (in favor of petitioner)
Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new
relation, the rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon the
agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and
prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the object of a
marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable one of the
parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some
way should be obtainable. The law provides that defendant, who is obliged
to support the wife, may fulfil his obligation either by paying her a fixed
pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the

option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the defendant
to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was
forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and
physical assaults of the defendant. Thus, petitioner may claim support
from the respondent for separate maintenance even outside of the conjugal
home.

BALOGBOG VS. CA
Respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action
for partition claiming they were the legitimate children of deceased Gavino
Balogbog with their mother Catalina Ubas. Herein petitioners however
opposed the petition alleging that their brother, Gavino, died single and
without issue in their parents residence. Respondents presented two
witnesses testifying to their legitimacy and the marriage between Gavino
and Catalina, likewise the testimony of their own mother, however no
certificate of marriage was presented as the latter claimed that the same
was burned during the war.
Ruling:
The decision appealed from is affirmed (in favour of private
respondents)
Although a marriage certificate is considered primary evidence of
marriage, failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place.
Other evidence such as testimonies of witnesses may be presented to
prove marriage. The presumption is that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife are in fact married and this can only be
rebutted by cogent proof to the contrary, which is not obtaining in the
above-cited case.

COSCA VS. PALAYPAYON

Respondent Judge Lucio Palaypayon was administratively charged
for illegal solemnization of marriage for solemnizing marriages even without
a marriage license which is a formal requisite of marriage.
Ruling:
The Court imposes a fine on respondent judge
The Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of
marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license, except in the cases
provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any
of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void
ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not
affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

WASSMER VS. VELEZ

Petitioner and respondent decided to get married and set a schedule
thereof. Preparations for the wedding were made, but a day before the
wedding, respondent left and was never heard from again, thus prompting
petitioner to file an action for breach of promise to marry.
Ruling:
The trial court judgment is affirmed (in favor of petitioner)
A mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to
formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity,
only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite

different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for

which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Article 21 of the Civil Code.

NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY

Respondent Judge Domagtoy was administratively charged with
gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law
for: 1) solemnizing a wedding despite the knowledge that the groom is
merely separated from his first wife; and 2) performing a marriage
ceremony outside his courts jurisdiction as such respondent judge holds
office and has jurisdiction in the MCTC Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del
Norte, while the wedding was solemnized at his resident in the municipality
of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
Ruling:
Respondent judge is suspended for six months
1. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract
a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been
precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage
subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous
marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or
presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of
law. In this case, the groom did not institute a summary
proceeding for the declaration of his first wifes presumptive death,
thus he remains married to his first wife and his second marriage
shall render void for being a bigamous marriage.

2. Article 7 provides that marriage may be solemnized by, among

others, any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts
jurisdiction. Article 8 which is a direct provision, refers only to the
venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the
authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding
provision. Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may
officiate in weddings only with said areas and not beyond. Where
a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction,
there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in
Article 3 of the Family Code, which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.

ARANES VS. OCCIANO

Petitioner charged respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law
for solemnizing her marriage without the requisite marriage license and
outside his territorial jurisdiction. Consequently, when her husband passed
away, petitioners right to inherit the vast properties left by her husband was
not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of her
late husband.
Ruling:
Respondent judge is fined.
The SC held that a marriage, which preceded the issuance of the
marriage license, is void and that subsequent issuance cannot render or
even add an iota of validity to the marriage except in cases provided by
law. It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to conduct marriage and respondent judge did not possess such
authority when he solemnized the marriage of the petitioner. Judges, who
are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in wedding only within

said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside
his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite
laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

REPUBLIC VS. ORBECIDO

Respondent Orbecido filed a petition for authority to remarry invoking
paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code after learning that his wife,
who had been naturalized as an American citizen and thereafter obtained a
divorce decree of their marriage and then married an American. There
being no opposition filed in his petition, the trial court granted the same.
Ruling:
Petition for review granted. Decision of the trial court allowing
the divorced husband to remarry is set aside.
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code provides that where a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
The SC held that in applying this provision two elements must exist:
1) that there is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
and a foreigner; and 2) a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. In this case respondents wife
was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that
has been celebrated between him and his wife. As fate would have it, the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating
her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of paragraph

2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus respondent, the

divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his
allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise,
before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the
party pleading it 1) must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it; 2) such foreign law must also be
proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws; 3)
respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife
to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be
no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another
marriage.

NINAL VS. BAYADOG

Pepito Ninal was married to Teodulfa Bellones, mother of herein
petitioners Babyline, Ingrid, Archie and Pepito, Jr. Teodulfa died as she
was shot by Pepito in 1985. After 1 year and 8 months after the death of
his wife, Pepito married Norma herein respondent Norma Badayog without
any marriage license, however in lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit
stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years
and were thus exempted from securing a marriage license. In 1997, Pepito
died in a car accident, which prompted herein petitioners to file a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage of Pepito and Norma on the ground
that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
Ruling:
The petition is granted. The assailed order of RTC reversed and
set aside and the case is reinstated.

The 5-year common-law cohabitation period is counted back from the

date of celebration of marriage, should a period of legal union had it not
been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the
years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period
of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is, unbroken.
The 5-year period cohabitation invoked by herein respondent was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the
time when he started cohabiting with respondent. The subsistence of the
marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by
either spouse with any third party as being one as husband and wife.
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void
ab initio because of the absence of such element.

MANZANO VS. SANCHEZ

Petitioner avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David
Manzano, having been married to him in 1966. However, her husband
contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent
Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or
ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage
contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated.
Respondent Judge alleged that he agreed to solemnize the marriage in
question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code. He claimed that
when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao, he knew
that the two had been living together as husband and wife for 7 years
already without the benefit of marriage.
Ruling:
Respondent judge is fined.

Respondent judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he

solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

REPUBLIC VS. DAYOT

Jose Dayot and Felisa Dayot were married in 1986 solemnized by
Rev. Tomas Atienza. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn
affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity and
that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least 5 years. In 1993, Jose filed a complaint for annulment and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage against Felisa contending that their
marriage is a sham as no marriage ceremony actually took place. He did
not execute the sworn affidavit and that his consent to the marriage was
secured through fraud.
Ruling:
The petition is denied.
declared null and void.

The marriage of Jose to Felisa is

Jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed
back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of
legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the
years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five
years and continuity that is unbroken.

REPUBLIC VS. CA & MOLINA

Roridel Molina filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
against her husband Reynaldo Molina on the ground of psychological
incapacity, as the latter showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a
husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers
on whom he squandered money; that he depended on his parents for aid
and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their
finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that Reynaldo has
no job and Roridel was the sole breadwinner of the family; that Reynaldo
had shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with
essential marital obligations and was highly immature and habitually
quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served.
Ruling:
The SC reversed and set aside the assailed decision, holding the
marriage of Roridel to Reynaldo subsisting and remains valid.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b)
juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. In the case of Reynaldo, there is
no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. The
evidence adduced by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband
could not get along with each other. There had been no showing of the
gravity of the problem, neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.
the SC reversed and set aside the assailed decision, holding the marriage
of Roridel to Reynaldo subsisting and remains valid.
From their submissions and the Courts own deliberations, the
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the
Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and
the bar:

1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the

plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be medically
or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven
by experts and clearly explained in the decision.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children.
7. Interpretations given by the National Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which shall be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition.

SANTOS VS. CA
Leouel and Julia got married on 1986. In 1988, Julia left for the US
despite Leouels pleas to dissuade her. Seven months later after her
departure, Julia called up Leouel for the first time and promised to return

home upon the expiration of her contract in 1989, but she never did.
Leouel visited the US and he desperately tried to locate or to somehow get
in touch with Julia but all his efforts were of no avail. Having failed to get
Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed a complaint for voiding of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower courts
decision.
Ruling:
The SC denied the petition.
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in
our law on marriage. Thus correlated, psychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render
help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated.

REPUBLIC VS. QUINTERO-HAMANO

Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the
ground of psychological incapacity, which incapacity became manifest only
after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to

Japan and after sending money to Lolita and their child for two months,
Toshio stopped giving financial support and abandoned them. The trial
court granted the petition and declared the marriage of Lolita to Toshio null
and void. On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court decision.
Ruling:
The SC granted the petition for review, reversing and setting
aside the Court of Appeals decision.
Mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to
them did not automatically constitute psychological incapacity.
His
behaviour merely indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a
spouse falling short of reasonable expectations. Lolita failed to prove any
severe and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in
accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos: psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.
The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause
may be medically or clinically identified. What is important is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys
psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

ANTONIO VS. REYES

Petitioner and respondent got married in 1989 when petitioner was 26
years old and respondent was 36. In 1993, petitioner filed a petition to
have his marriage to respondent declared null and void based on Article 36

of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically

incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. As
manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner
claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around
her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or
things. The trial court declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void. The Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
Manila likewise annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties on the ground
of due discretion on the part of the parties. However, the CA reversed the
RTC judgment for insufficiency of evidence.
Ruling:
The SC found the present case sufficiently satisfied the
guidelines in Molina, hence declared the marriage null and void.
First, petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the
psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he
presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wifes
behaviour.
Second, the root cause of respondents psychological
incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial
courts decision.
Third, respondents psychological incapacity was
established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the
celebration of marriage. Fourth, the gravity of respondents psychological
incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Fifth, respondent is evidently unable to comply
with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of
the Family Code. Sixth, the Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to
take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was
annulled by the Catholic Church. Seventh, the final point of contention is
the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

CHI MING TSOI VS. CA

Respondent Gina Lao-Tsoi filed a petition for the annulment of her
marriage to herein petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity
alleging that the latter is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show
his penis and that there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between
them since their marriage on May 22, 1988 until their separation on March
15, 1989. The trial court declared the marriage null and void. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Ruling:
The petition is denied.
respondent null and void.

The marriage between petitioner and

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private

respondent. That is a shared feeling which between husband and wife
must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a
deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process.
An expressive interest in each others feelings at a time it is needed by the
other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is
definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the
relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime
social institution.
The Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the
parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied
judgment of respondent appellate court.

TE VS. TE

Ruling: