G.R. No.

L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN
VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA
CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his
capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6,
Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners
seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in
the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234,
265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406,
415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594,
599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030,
1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644,
1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155,
161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228,
231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293,
297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382,
385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576,
587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532,
1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609,
1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742,
1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804,
1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840,
1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892,
1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044,
2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507,
509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568,
570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92,
94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground
that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted
that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by
the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the
requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties"
within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person

unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other
specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and
to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and
its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their
petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a
private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or
some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it
is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell
vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the
mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in
interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any
legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested
in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party
to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the
position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr.
Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that
the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought
to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be
applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general
rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under
the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not
applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel
for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those
in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings
no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the
Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned
case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is
a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed
to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same,
considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the
people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for
the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus
submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they
are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point
stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long
line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases
where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is
material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not
when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with
the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the
conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts
and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive
and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published;
[4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by
law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines
shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which
he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various
laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the
height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had
no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so
vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore
enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates
and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative
recordsno such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without
publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been
promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such
decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden
tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de
conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official
Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That
duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern
is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official
Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be
included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated
by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category.
Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law,
he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said
in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of
the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the
Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of
all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain
their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question
as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented
prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken
the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been
found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights
and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton
v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559,
566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to
be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official.
Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations
deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the
nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These
questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of
courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party
under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared
unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official
Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees
sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030,
inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters
nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their
subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented
or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino,
ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make
the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently
recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government,
as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been
published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide
that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988

FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF
MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.
RESOLUTION

CORTES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the Special First
Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CAG.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the decision in
said case had become final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners' motion
for reconsideration for having been filed out of time.

At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as required by Rule
65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition did not suffer from this defect, this
Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed
and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to
private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned
by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do
so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII,
presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence
and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received
by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an
appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was
eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their
motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27,
1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and
denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises,
Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period for appealing
or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified
the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion
may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its
sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53,
August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate and clarify the modes and
periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed the
prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of the grace period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30,
1986 of the Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30,
1986, within which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or
reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still
within the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669, October
28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]
In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987,
more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within
the coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace period to
the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek
refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the
case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time
the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no
law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be
binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in
active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have
been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions
(G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the
proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial
collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last clear chance"
to avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore,
petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has
been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.

[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001]

HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta,
Pangasinan,respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior
existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R.
Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano
charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the
Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to
him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.[1] Four children
were born out of that marriage.[2] On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage
with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. [3] When respondent Judge solemnized said
marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract
clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage
between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that
the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of
marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. [4] According to him, had he known that the late Manzano
was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be
charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being
designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that
respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit
the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the
complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two
separate affidavits[5] of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of
his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly
stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their
respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had
never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the
basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of
the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications
of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must
concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time
of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five
years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage. [6]
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their
separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their
marriage contract, it was indicated that both were separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. [7] In fact, in his Comment, he
stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from
contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos
subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were
subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time
already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of
legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not
severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the
parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at
bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda
Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation,
free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a
subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who
arelegally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It
could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the
impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and
bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has special application to judges,
[8]
who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal
principles.[9] And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.[10]
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with
the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is
increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, respondent.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge
Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at No. 34
Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which he purchased in
1987, whenever he is in Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his
(complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting with
De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent and instead left the house after giving
instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his
children for him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children,
as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore, he alleges
that respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument with De Castro
inside the latter's office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of the
administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by
De Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was even a witness to the
withdrawal of the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against complainant. According to him, it
was the sister of De Castro who called the police to arrest complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with
her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town
mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the
request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in
Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned
respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on December
4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because
his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a
party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering
that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the
second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said
Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of
procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40
to his case.

The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of
any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA
229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural
laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of
marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the
time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never
secured any marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is necessary before
one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when
he and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two
occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge,
his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was already in the
judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety,
not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a private
individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A judge, in order
to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at
all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts
too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and
uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v. Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 [1994]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement
benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the government,
including government-owned and controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, G.R. No. 179922

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also CHICO-NAZARIO,
known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. NACHURA, and
DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD REYES, JJ.
SANDOVAL CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA.
DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO Promulgated:
CARLOS II,
Respondents. December 16, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:

ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during
the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and
annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or
confession of judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) which reversed and set aside the summary judgment [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action
for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of money,
and damages.
The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant suit are unveiled as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their
compulsory heirs,Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly described as
follows:
Parcel No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the Court of
Land Registration.
Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of
Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa,Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of
Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.
Parcel No. 3
A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a nonsubd. project), being a portion of Lot159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot 155, Muntinlupa
Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on
the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an
area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS, more or less.

PARCEL No. 4
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot 28,
Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa
Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and on the West.,
along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing an area
of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.
PARCEL No. 5

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda por el
NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el
SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se
halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de
concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong
Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA
(150) METROS CUADRADOS.
PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda por el
NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el
SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se
halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon
de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles
Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de CIENTO
CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.[3]
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was
made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn
over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of
Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued by
the Registry of Deeds of Makati City;TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City;
and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No. 160401
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son,
Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilos death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of
respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are covered
by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the approval of a
partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective shares
in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This includes the remaining 6,691square-meter portion of said land.
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing
the remaining land of the first parcel between them.
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,[4] 2,331 square meters of the second parcel
of land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter portion was later
divided between petitioner and respondents.

The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on August 17,
1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental compromise
agreement, which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts,
the parties equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against
respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of
marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and
damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and
respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise
maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo
Carlos II.
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent
Felicidad with respect to the subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the certificates
of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of
title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.
Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.
On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material averments
of petitioners complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the requisite
marriage license did not invalidate Felicidads marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II
was the illegitimate child of the deceased TeofiloCarlos with another woman.
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked that their
counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees, be granted.
But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary
judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized the
marriage. Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the
certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.
On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of
irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own motion
for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit,
Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.

Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of
respondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384,
entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Pias. In her testimony, respondent Felicidad
narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo. [5]
Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its report
and manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants (respondents) Motion for
Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiffs (petitioners) Counter-Motion for
Summary Judgment is hereby granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiff as follows:
1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo
Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite onMay 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage
Certificate submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage
license;
2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural,
illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum
of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at the legal rate from date of filing of
the instant complaint until fully paid;
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less
the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061
of the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel
said title and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract, Annex K of complaint, between plaintiff and defendant
Sandoval null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati City to
cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the
sole name of plaintiff herein;
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and
defendant Sandoval null and void;
7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant
Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of
Manila to issue another title in the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;
8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant
Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of
Manila to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiffs evidence on his
claim for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees, appearance fees, and
litigation expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that
the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling the
marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET

ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new oneis entered REMANDING the case to the court of
origin for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a
quo contrary to law and public policy as ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact
that it was appellants who first sought summary judgment from the trial court, did not
justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action to recover upon a claim
or to obtain a declaratory relief, the rule on summary judgment apply (sic) to an action to
annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented and the desire to
expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify a misinterpretation of the rule. The first
paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code expressly prohibit the rendition of
decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically
amount to these methods explicitly proscribed by the law.
We are not unmindful of appellees argument that the foregoing safeguards have
traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of spouses in the matter of dissolution of
marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively dissolved
the marriage herein impugned. The fact, however, that appellees own brother and
appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband and wife for thirty years and that
the annulment of their marriage is the very means by which the latter is sought to be
deprived of her participation in the estate left by the former call for a closer and more
thorough inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the case. Rather that the summary
nature by which the court a quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the effect
that the material facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of marriage should always
be proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to
tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the
adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved. (Underscoring supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary
judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the
court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. While it may be readily conceded
that a valid marriage license is among the formal requisites of marriage, the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58
of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage license on the
marriage contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant
Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents it to
be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandovals
affirmation of the existence of said marriage license is corroborated by the following
statement in the affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who
officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:
That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license
issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the said marriage
contract executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the
number of said marriage license was inadvertently not placed in the
marriage contract for the reason that it was the Office Clerk who filled up
the blanks in the Marriage Contract who in turn, may have overlooked
the same.
Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the
considered view that the veracity and credibility of the foregoing statement as well as the
motivations underlying the same should be properly threshed out in a trial of the case on
the merits.

If the non-presentation of the marriage contract the primary evidence of marriage

is not proof that a marriage did not take place, neither should appellants non-presentation
of the subject marriage license be taken as proof that the same was not procured. The
burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the
plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the
legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said of the trial courts rejection of the
relationship between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of the
inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandovals statements. Although it had effectively
disavowed appellants prior claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II,
the averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of appellees brother, to Our
mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility of the said appellants illegitimate filiation,
his right to prove the same or, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as
such.
Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellees
bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased from an indigent
couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support what could
well be a minors total forfeiture of the rights arising from his putative filiation. Inconsistent
though it may be to her previous statements, appellant Felicidad Sandovals declaration
regarding the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when considered in
the light of the fact that, during the last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said
appellant the use of his name and the shelter of his household. The least that the trial
court could have done in the premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in order to be
able to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos
II.[8]
On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of
the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.
Issues
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:
1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the
Decision, Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioners Motion for reconsideration under the
Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage,
petitioner respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a grave
reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that the
circumstances of this case are different from that contemplated and intended by law, or
has otherwise decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by the Supreme
Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in accord with law or with the applicable
decisions of this Honorable Court;
2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof,
entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings,
petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a serious
reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of
Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing Summary
Judgments;
3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu
thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground of
speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications of the
laws and misapprehension of the facts.[9] (Underscoring supplied)
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a
judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial. But there are other

procedural issues, including the capacity of one who is not a spouse in bringing the action for nullity of
marriage.
Our Ruling
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither
judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment
disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19 [10] of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an
issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the
court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint
shall always be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment,
instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the Rule on
judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise considered the provisions
on summary judgments, to wit:
Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary
judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the
court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. x x x[11]
But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in
reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings
and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in
annulment of marriage.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the question on the application of summary judgments
or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been stamped with
clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took effect on March 15, 2003[12] is
found in Section 17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the
case. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters
involving property relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must
be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of
judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)
Likewise instructive is the Courts pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.[13] In that case, We
excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application of summary judgments.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or

declaration of its nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is applicable to all
kinds of actions.[14] (Underscoring supplied)

By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and
duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of the
public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State should have been given the
opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered. [15]
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting attorney to
appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no
suppression of evidence.Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor
has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. (a) x x x
(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene
for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of
evidence. (Underscoring supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that the
interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages by
preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence. [16]
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife.Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside
of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable
marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be
filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of
the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate
heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can
only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to
seek its dissolution.[17] (Underscoring supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy,
loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when and how to build the foundations
of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the
directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and should decide when
to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends

only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988.[18]
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks
the beginning of the end of theright of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case
against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of
their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or
intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for,
as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.[19]
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced
before March 15, 2003although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is
so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003[20] is prospective in its application. Thus,
the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,[21] viz.:
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the
Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application.[22] (Underscoring
supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The
marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when
the marriage took place.[23]
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable
law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. [24] But the Civil Code is silent
as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an
action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as
a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit.[25] Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that
every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. [26]
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be
affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question
involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the case is
dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. [27]
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,[28] where the Court held:
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the
respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no
specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however,
only aparty who can demonstrate proper interest can file the same. A petition to declare
the nullity of marriage, like any otheractions, must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial

v. Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects
their successional rights.
xxxx
In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage
cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law
allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional
evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce
decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts
remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not
allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents
marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduced the amount of moral damages
from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages fromP200,000.00
to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained
which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to
declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal
personality to file the same.[29] (Underscoring supplied)
III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-ininterest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving
compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession,
successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory heirs
are called to succeed by operation of law.[30]
Upon Teofilos death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and Teofilo
II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code. [31]
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a collateral relative,
such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he
still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral
relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or

adopted child or children of the deceased precludes succession by collateral relatives.[32] Conversely, if
there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives
shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.[33]
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or
adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his
deceased brother with respondentFelicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like a brother
and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies without issue and without
ascendants in the direct line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other
siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or
adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate of his brother, the first half being
allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-partyinterest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent
Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage
case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son
of Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then
petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and
respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to be protected,
hence, does not have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be found to be void
from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the presence of descendant,
illegitimate,[34] or even an adopted child[35] excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the
decedent.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or
nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of
marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate,
illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper
and in order.There is a need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other causes of
action before it.
Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of the case
concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should not leave the matter
hanging in limbo.
This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the
parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case. [36]
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, petitioners bare
allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is insufficient to support a total
forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to support its
pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent
Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of respondent
Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided by Article 167 of
the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:

ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)
It is stressed that Felicidads declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that is
proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by
the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived
within a valid marriage.[37]
Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning
reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so, as said
disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage in controversy was null and void ab
initio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the status and
filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of marriage between
respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted son of the
late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of
marriage for lack of cause of action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED AND SET
ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give this
case priority in its calendar.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
NITA CHENG,

G.R. No. 174238

Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

- versus -

SPOUSES WILLIAM SY and

TESSIE SY,
Respondents.

Promulgated:
July 7, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

This is a petition[1] for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Order dated January
2, 2006[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18, Manila in Civil Case No. 05-112452 entitled Anita
Cheng v. Spouses William Sy and Tessie Sy.
The antecedents are as follows
Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC, Branch 7, Manila against respondent
spouses William and Tessie Sy (Criminal Case No. 98-969952 against Tessie Sy and Criminal Case No.
98-969953 against William Sy) for issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) Check Nos. 171762
and 71860 for P300,000.00 each, in payment of their loan, both of which were dishonored upon
presentment for having been drawn against a closed account.
Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner, on January 20, 1999, filed against respondents two (2)
cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
Branch 25, Manila (Criminal Case Nos. 341458-59).
On March 16, 2004, the RTC, Branch 7, Manila dismissed the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution
to prove the elements of the crime. The Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 98-969952 contained no
declaration as to the civil liability of Tessie Sy.[3] On the other hand, the Order in Criminal Case No. 98969953 contained a statement, Hence, if there is any liability of the accused, the same is purely civil, not
criminal in nature.[4]
Later, the MeTC, Branch 25, Manila, dismissed, on demurrer, the BP Blg. 22 cases in its Order [5] dated
February 7, 2005 on account of the failure of petitioner to identify the accused respondents in open
court. The Order also did not make any pronouncement as to the civil liability of accused respondents.
On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against respondents before the RTC, Branch 18, Manila, a
complaint[6] for collection of a sum of money with damages (Civil Case No. 05-112452) based on the
same loaned amount ofP600,000.00 covered by the two PBC checks previously subject of the estafa and
BP Blg. 22 cases.
In the assailed Order[7] dated January 2, 2006, the RTC, Branch 18, Manila, dismissed the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the civil action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 with damages
was already impliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of Section 1, paragraph (b) of Rule 111 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration [8] which the court denied in its Order [9] dated June 5,
2006. Hence, this petition, raising the sole legal issue

Whether or not Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and
Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on the Rules and Guidelines in the filing and
prosecution of criminal cases under BP Blg. 22 are applicable to the present case where
the nature of the order dismissing the cases for bouncing checks against the
respondents was [based] on the failure of the prosecution to identify both the accused
(respondents herein)?[10]

Essentially, petitioner argues that since the BP Blg. 22 cases were filed on January 20, 1999, the 2000
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure promulgated on December 1, 2000 should not apply, as it must be
given only prospective application.She further contends that that her case falls within the following
exceptions to the rule that the civil action correspondent to the criminal action is deemed instituted with
the latter
(1) additional evidence as to the identities of the accused is necessary for the resolution
of the civil aspect of the case;
(2) a separate complaint would be just as efficacious as or even more expedient than a
timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further
hearings on the civil aspect of the case;
(3) the trial court failed to make any pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused
amounting to a reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated in a
separate action;
(4) the trial court did not declare that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did
not exist;
(5) the civil complaint is based on an obligation ex-contractu and not ex-delicto pursuant
to Article 31[11] of the Civil Code; and
(6) the claim for civil liability for damages may be had under Article 29 [12] of the Civil Code.
Petitioner also points out that she was not assisted by any private prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22
proceedings.
The rule is that upon the filing of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases against respondents, where the
petitioner has not made any waiver, express reservation to litigate separately, or has not instituted the
corresponding civil action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 and damages prior to the criminal action,
the civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal cases. [13]
This rule applies especially with the advent of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Thus, during the pendency of both the estafa and the BP Blg. 22 cases, the action to recover
the civil liability was impliedly instituted and remained pending before the respective trial courts. This is
consonant with our ruling in Rodriguez v. Ponferrada[14] that the possible single civil liability arising from
the act of issuing a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil actions deemed instituted with the
estafa case and the prosecution for violation of BP Blg. 22, simultaneously available to the complaining
party, without traversing the prohibition against forum shopping. [15] Prior to the judgment in either the
estafa case or the BP Blg. 22 case, petitioner, as the complainant, cannot be deemed to have elected
either of the civil actions both impliedly instituted in the said criminal proceedings to the exclusion of the
other.[16]
The dismissal of the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime beyond
reasonable doubtwhere in Criminal Case No. 98-969952 there was no pronouncement as regards the civil

liability of the accused and in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 where the trial court declared that the liability
of the accused was only civil in natureproduced the legal effect of a reservation by the petitioner of her
right to litigate separately the civil action impliedly instituted with the estafa cases, following Article 29 of
the Civil Code.[17]
However, although this civil action could have been litigated separately on account of the dismissal of the
estafa cases on reasonable doubt, the petitioner was deemed to have also elected that such civil action
be prosecuted together with the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of the Rodriguez v. Ponferrada ruling.
With the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases for failure to establish the identity of the accused, the question
that arises is whether such dismissal would have the same legal effect as the dismissed estafa cases. Put
differently, may petitioners action to recover respondents civil liability be also allowed to prosper
separately after the BP Blg. 22 cases were dismissed?
Section 1 (b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.
xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately
shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the
filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the
actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover
liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall
pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so
alleged but any of these damages [is] subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees
based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced,
it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the
latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal
actions.

Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure should not apply
because she filed her BP Blg. 22 complaints in 1999. It is now settled that rules of procedure apply even
to cases already pending at the time of their promulgation. The fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants rights does not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. It is
axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as
a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. [18]
Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of BP Blg. 22 includes the
corresponding civil action to recover the amount of the checks. It should be stressed, this policy is
intended to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the
reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal

complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil
action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourages the consolidation of the civil
and criminal cases. Thus, where petitioners rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the
court trying the BP Blg. 22 cases, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted
on account of res judicata, for failure of petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the cases. In view of this
special rule governing actions for violation of BP Blg. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code is not applicable. [19]
Be it remembered that rules governing procedure before the courts, while not cast in stone, are for the
speedy, efficient, and orderly dispensation of justice and should therefore be adhered to in order to attain
this objective.[20]
However, in applying the procedure discussed above, it appears that petitioner would be left
without a remedy to recover from respondents the P600,000.00 allegedly loaned from her. This could
prejudice even the petitioners Notice of Claim involving the same amount filed in Special Proceedings No.
98-88390 (Petition for Voluntary Insolvency by Kolin Enterprises, William Sy and Tessie Sy), which case
was reportedly archived for failure to prosecute the petition for an unreasonable length of time.
[21]

Expectedly, respondents would raise the same defense that petitioner had already elected to litigate

the civil action to recover the amount of the checks along with the BP Blg. 22 cases.
It is in this light that we find petitioners contention that she was not assisted by a private prosecutor during
the BP Blg. 22 proceedings critical. Petitioner indirectly protests that the public prosecutor failed to protect
and prosecute her cause when he failed to have her establish the identities of the accused during the trial
and when he failed to appeal the civil action deemed impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases. On
this ground, we agree with petitioner.
Faced with the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases, petitioners recourse pursuant to the prevailing
rules of procedure would have been to appeal the civil action to recover the amount loaned to
respondents corresponding to the bounced checks. Hence, the said civil action may proceed requiring
only a preponderance of evidence on the part of petitioner. Her failure to appeal within the reglementary
period was tantamount to a waiver altogether of the remedy to recover the civil liability of
respondents. However, due to the gross mistake of the prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 cases, we are
constrained to digress from this rule.
It is true that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsel. [22] But this rule
admits of exceptions (1) where the counsels mistake is so great and serious that the client is prejudiced
and denied his day in court, or (2) where the counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the clients
deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law. [23] Tested against these guidelines, we hold
that petitioners lot falls within the exceptions.
It is an oft-repeated exhortation to counsels to be well-informed of existing laws and rules and to
keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. Unless they faithfully
comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as
members of the Bar.[24] Further, lawyers in the government service are expected to be more conscientious
in the performance of their duties as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the

Bar but are also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service. [25] Apparently, the public
prosecutor neglected to equip himself with the knowledge of the proper procedure for BP Blg. 22 cases
under the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure such that he failed to appeal the civil action impliedly
instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases, the only remaining remedy available to petitioner to be able to
recover the money she loaned to respondents, upon the dismissal of the criminal cases on demurrer. By
this failure, petitioner was denied her day in court to prosecute the respondents for their obligation to pay
their loan.
Moreover, we take into consideration the trial courts observation when it dismissed the estafa
charge in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 that if there was any liability on the part of respondents, it was
civil in nature. Hence, if the loan be proven true, the inability of petitioner to recover the loaned amount
would be tantamount to unjust enrichment of respondents, as they may now conveniently evade payment
of their obligation merely on account of a technicality applied against petitioner.
There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived
at the expense of or with damages to another. This doctrine simply means that a person shall not be
allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at anothers expense. One condition for invoking this
principle of unjust enrichment is that the aggrieved party has no other recourse based on contract, quasicontract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision of law.[26]
Court litigations are primarily designed to search for the truth, and a liberal interpretation and
application of the rules which will give the parties the fullest opportunity to adduce proof is the best way to
ferret out the truth. The dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be
barred by technicalities.[27] For reasons of substantial justice and equity, as the complement of the legal
jurisdiction that seeks to dispense justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and
want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so,
[28]

we thus rule, pro hac vice, in favor of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. 05-112452 entitled Anita Cheng v. Spouses
William Sy and Tessie Sy is hereby ordered REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150429 August 29, 2006
ROBERTO G. FAMANILA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Spc. Fmr. Seventh Division) and BARBERSHIP MANAGEMENT
LIMITED and NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS, INC. Respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 50615 dated March 30, 2001 which affirmed the Decision 2 of the National Labor Relations

Commission (NLRC) dated March 31, 1998 dismissing petitioners complaint for payment of disability and
other benefits for lack of merit and the Resolution 3 dated October 5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In 1989, respondent NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. hired the services of petitioner Roberto G.
Famanila as Messman 4 for Hansa Riga, a vessel registered and owned by its principal and corespondent, Barbership Management Limited.
On June 21, 1990, while Hansa Riga was docked at the port of Eureka, California, U.S.A. and while
petitioner was assisting in the loading operations, the latter complained of a headache. Petitioner
experienced dizziness and he subsequently collapsed. Upon examination, it was determined that he had
a sudden attack of left cerebral hemorrhage from a ruptured cerebral aneurysm. 5 Petitioner underwent a
brain operation and he was confined at the Emmanuel Hospital in Portland, Oregon, U.S.A. On July 19,
1990, he underwent a second brain operation.
Owing to petitioners physical and mental condition, he was repatriated to the Philippines. On August 21,
1990, he was examined at the American Hospital in Intramuros, Manila where the examining physician,
Dr. Patricia Abesamis declared that he "cannot go back to sea duty and has been observed for 120 days,
he is being declared permanently, totally disabled." 6
Thereafter, authorized representatives of the respondents convinced him to settle his claim amicably by
accepting the amount of US$13,200. 7 Petitioner accepted the offer as evidenced by his signature in the
Receipt and Release dated February 28, 1991. 8 His wife, Gloria Famanila and one Richard Famanila,
acted as witnesses in the signing of the release.
On June 11, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint 9 with the NLRC which was docketed as NLRC OCW Case
No. 6-838-97-L praying for an award of disability benefits, share in the insurance proceeds, moral
damages and attorneys fees. On September 29, 1997, Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Voltaire A. Balitaan
dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioner appealed the decision with the NLRC.
On March 31, 1998, the NLRC promulgated its decision 10 finding the appeal to be without merit and
ordered its dismissal. When the motion for reconsideration 11 was denied by the NLRC in its resolution
dated June 29, 1998, 12 petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. On December 2, 1998, we
resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals pursuant to our ruling in St. Martin Funeral Home v.
National Labor Relations Commission. 13
On March 30, 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision which dismissed the petition
for lack of merit. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, the present petition for review
raising the following issues:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE RECEIPT AND RELEASE
SINCE PETITIONERS CONSENT THERETO WAS VITIATED THEREBY MAKING THE SAME VOID
AND UNENFORCEABLE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE PRESCRIPTION PERIOD APPLICABLE TO
THE CLAIM OF THE PETITIONER IS THE 3-YEAR PERIOD PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE LABOR
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND NOT THE 10-YEAR PERIOD PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE CIVIL
CODE.
Petitioner claims that he did not sign the Receipt and Release voluntarily or freely because he was
permanently disabled and in financial constraints. These factors allegedly vitiated his consent which
makes the Receipt and Release void and unenforceable.
The petition lacks merit.
It is fundamental that the scope of the Supreme Courts judicial review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is confined only to errors of law. It does not extend to questions of fact. More so in labor cases
where the doctrine applies with greater force. 14 The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have already determined
the factual issues, and these were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Thus, they are accorded not only
great respect but also finality and are deemed binding upon this Court so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence. 15 We reviewed the records of the case and we find no reason to deviate from the
findings of the labor arbiter, NLRC and the Court of Appeals.

A vitiated consent does not make a contract void and unenforceable. A vitiated consent only gives rise to
a voidable agreement. Under the Civil Code, the vices of consent are mistake, violence, intimidation,
undue influence or fraud. 16 If consent is given through any of the aforementioned vices of consent, the
contract is voidable. 17 A voidable contract is binding unless annulled by a proper action in court. 18
Petitioner contends that his permanent and total disability vitiated his consent to the Receipt and Release
thereby rendering it void and unenforceable. However, disability is not among the factors that may vitiate
consent. Besides, save for petitioners self-serving allegations, there is no proof on record that his
consent was vitiated on account of his disability. In the absence of such proof of vitiated consent, the
validity of the Receipt and Release must be upheld. We agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals
that:
In the case at bar, there is nothing in the records to show that petitioners consent was vitiated when he
signed the agreement. Granting that petitioner has not fully recovered his health at the time he signed the
subject document, the same cannot still lead to the conclusion that he did not voluntar[il]y accept the
agreement, for his wife and another relative witnessed his signing.
Moreover, the document entitled receipt and release which was attached by petitioner in his appeal does
not show on its face any violation of law or public policy. In fact, petitioner did not present any proof to
show that the consideration for the same is not reasonable and acceptable. Absent any evidence to
support the same, the Court cannot, on its own accord, decide against the unreasonableness of the
consideration. 19
It is true that quitclaims and waivers are oftentimes frowned upon and are considered as ineffective in
barring recovery for the full measure of the workers right and that acceptance of the benefits therefrom
does not amount to estoppel. 20 The reason is plain. Employer and employee, obviously do not stand on
the same footing. 21However, not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the
agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the
parties and may not later be disowned simply because of change of mind. It is only where there is clear
proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of the settlement
are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it
is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was
doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be
recognized as a valid and binding undertaking, 22 as in this case.
To be valid and effective, waivers must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms, leaving no doubt as to
the intention of those giving up a right or a benefit that legally pertains to them. 23 We have reviewed the
terms and conditions contained in the Receipt and Release and we find the same to be clear and
unambiguous. The signing was even witnessed by petitioners wife, Gloria T. Famanila and one Richard T.
Famanila. The Receipt and Release provides in part:
That for and in consideration of the sum of THIRTEEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS
(US$13,200.00) or its equivalent in Philippine currency THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND
NINE HUNDRED FOUR PESOS (365,904.00), the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged to my full
and complete satisfaction x x x I, ROBERTO G. FAMANILA, x x x hereby remise, release and forever
discharge said vessel "HANSA RIGA", her Owners, operators, managers, charterers, agents,
underwriters, P and I Club, master, officers, and crew and all parties at interest therein or thereon,
whether named or not named, including but not limited to BARBER SHIP MANAGEMENT LIMITED, NFD
INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS, INC. and ASSURANCEFORENIGEN GARD from any and all
claims, demands, debts, dues, liens, actions or causes of action, at law or in equity, in common law or in
admiralty, statutory or contractual, arising from and under the laws of the United States of America,
Norway, Hongkong or the Republic of the Philippines and/or any other foreign country now held, owned or
possessed by me or by any person or persons, arising from or related to or concerning whether directly or
indirectly, proximately or remotely, without being limited to but including the said illness suffered by me on
board the vessel "HANSA RIGA" on or about 21st June 1990 at Portland, Oregon and disability
compensation in connection therewith.
This instrument is a GENERAL RELEASE intended to release all liabilities of any character and/or claims
or damages and/or losses and/or any other liabilities whatsoever, whether contractual or statutory, at
common law or in equity, tortious or in admiralty, now or henceforth in any way related to or occurring as a
consequence of the illness suffered by me as Messman of the vessel "HANSA RIGA", including but not
limited to all damages and/or losses consisting of loss of support, loss of earning capacity, loss of all
benefits of whatsoever nature and extent incurred, physical pain and suffering and/or all damages and/or
indemnities claimable in law, tort, contract, common law, equity and/or admiralty by me or by any person
or persons pursuant to the laws of the United States of America, Norway, Hongkong or the Republic of the
Philippines and of all other countries whatsoever.

I hereby certify that I am of legal age and that I fully understand this instrument which was read to me in
the local dialect and I agree that this is a FULL AND FINAL RELEASE AND DISCHARGE of all parties
and things referred to herein, and I further agree that this release may be pleaded as an absolute and
final bar to any suit or suits or legal proceedings that may hereafter be prosecuted by me or by any one
claiming by, through, or under me, against any of the persons or things
referred to or related herein, for any matter or thing referred to or related herein.

24

It is elementary that a contract is perfected by mere consent and from that moment the parties are bound
not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which,
according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. 25 Further, dire necessity is
not an acceptable ground for annulling the Receipt and Release since it has not been shown that
petitioner was forced to sign it. 26
Regarding prescription, the applicable prescriptive period for the money claims against the respondents is
the three year period pursuant to Article 291 of the Labor Code which provides that:
ART. 291. Money Claims. All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during
the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued;
otherwise they shall be forever barred.
xxxx
Since petitioners demand for an award of disability benefits is a money claim arising from his
employment, Article 291 of the Labor Code applies. From the time petitioner was declared permanently
and totally disabled on August 21, 1990 which gave rise to his entitlement to disability benefits up to the
time that he filed the complaint on June 11, 1997, more than three years have elapsed thereby effectively
barring his claim.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 30, 2001 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 50615 which affirmed the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
dismissing petitioners complaint for disability and other benefits for lack of merit, and
the Resolution dated October 5, 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 163707

September 15, 2006

MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 138,
Makati City and minors, KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI, represented by their
mother, REMEDIOS OANES,respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the January 22, 2004 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 79742, which affirmed the Orders dated July 21, 20002 and July 17, 20033 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 in SP Proc. Case No. 4549 denying petitioner's motion to dismiss;
and its May 25, 2004 Resolution4 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by
their mother Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for letters of administration 5 before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4549 and
entitled Intestate Estate of Sima Wei(a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim).
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who
died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting

of real and personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy,
Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for the appointment
of a regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei's estate. They likewise prayed that, in the
meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of the
estate. Attached to private respondents' petition was a Certification Against Forum Shopping 6 signed by
their counsel, Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez.
In his Comment/Opposition,7 petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his
deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of administration
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. He further argued that private respondents should
have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article
175 of the Family Code.
The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss 8 on the ground that the certification against
forum shopping should have been signed by private respondents and not their counsel. They contended
that Remedios should have executed the certification on behalf of her minor daughters as mandated by
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss, 9 petitioner and his co-heirs
alleged that private respondents' claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by
reason of Remedios' June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial
and educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the
estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.
The Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as the Supplemental Motion to
Dismiss. It ruled that while the Release and Waiver of Claim was signed by Remedios, it had not been
established that she was the duly constituted guardian of her minor daughters. Thus, no renunciation of
right occurred. Applying a liberal application of the rules, the trial court also rejected petitioner's objections
on the certification against forum shopping.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court in its assailed Decision dated January 22,
2004, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and
accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of merit. Consequently, the assailed Orders dated July 21, 2000
and July 17, 2003 are hereby both AFFIRMED. Respondent Judge is hereby DIRECTED to
resolve the controversy over the illegitimate filiation of the private respondents (sic) minors [-]
Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei who are claiming successional rights in the intestate
estate of the deceased Sima Wei, a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim.
SO ORDERED.10
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals disregarded existing rules on certification against forum
shopping; that the Release and Waiver of Claim executed by Remedios released and discharged the Guy
family and the estate of Sima Wei from any claims or liabilities; and that private respondents do not have
the legal personality to institute the petition for letters of administration as they failed to prove their filiation
during the lifetime of Sima Wei in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code.
Private respondents contend that their counsel's certification can be considered substantial compliance
with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping, and that the petition raises no new issues to warrant
the reversal of the decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
The issues for resolution are: 1) whether private respondents' petition should be dismissed for failure to
comply with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping; 2) whether the Release and Waiver of Claim
precludes private respondents from claiming their successional rights; and 3) whether private
respondents are barred by prescription from proving their filiation.
The petition lacks merit.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification of non-forum shopping should be
executed by the plaintiff or the principal party. Failure to comply with the requirement shall be cause for
dismissal of the case. However, a liberal application of the rules is proper where the higher interest of
justice would be served. In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals,11 we ruled that while a petition may have been

flawed where the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not by the party, this
procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice. 12 So it is in the present
controversy where the merits13 of the case and the absence of an intention to violate the rules with
impunity should be considered as compelling reasons to temper the strict application of the rules.
As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar private respondents from
claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which
legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and
clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.14
In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim does
not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00
and an educational plan for her minor daughters "by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of
any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy
Susim."15 Considering that the document did not specifically mention private respondents' hereditary
share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.
Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private respondents, such
waiver will not bar the latter's claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides:
ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or repudiate an
inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents
or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only
by judicial authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons designated by the
testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property, or in their default, to those
mentioned in Article 1030. (Emphasis supplied)
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial
approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property 16 which must pass the court's
scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and
Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights
as heirs of the deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where
one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material
fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or
misapprehension of fact.17
In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights
because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased.
Petitioner himself has consistently denied that private respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be
inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do not have
such right. Hence, petitioner's invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents must fail.
Anent the issue on private respondents' filiation, we agree with the Court of Appeals that a ruling on the
same would be premature considering that private respondents have yet to present evidence. Before the
Family Code took effect, the governing law on actions for recognition of illegitimate children was Article
285 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the
lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may
file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing
had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document.
(Emphasis supplied)

We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo18 that illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code
took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition for
a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away
by the passage of the Family Code.19
On the other hand, Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which superseded Article 285 of the
Civil Code, provide:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and
shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In
these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or
both of the parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth appearing
in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for recognition may be brought by the
child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action is based upon open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the type of evidence to be
adduced by private respondents in proving their filiation. However, it would be impossible to determine the
same in this case as there has been no reception of evidence yet. This Court is not a trier of facts. Such
matters may be resolved only by the Regional Trial Court after a full-blown trial.
While the original action filed by private respondents was a petition for letters of administration, the trial
court is not precluded from receiving evidence on private respondents' filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to
matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the
estate, including the determination of the status of each heir.20 That the two causes of action, one to
compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our
jurisprudence.21 As held in Briz v. Briz:22
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event maintain a
complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior
relief in the character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this court must be answered in the
affirmative, provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of
action are present in the particular case. In other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring
that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a
successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the
character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment
as to require that a rule should be here applied different from that generally applicable in other
cases. x x x

The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is
undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous
cases, and the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to
compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact acknowledged, may maintain partition
proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his coheirs (Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8 Phil.,
5; Tiamson vs. Tiamson, 32 Phil., 62); and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the
distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother (Capistrano vs. Fabella, 8 Phil.,
135; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil., 249; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855). In neither of these
situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling
acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the
other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship
is appropriate to such proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 22, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742 affirming the denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its Resolution
dated May 25, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Let the records
be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 174689

October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female.
(Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from
inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked
the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two
human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas"
(Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes
made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a persons sex? May a person
successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of
a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his
first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition,
docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines
Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes
Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. 1 Feeling trapped in a mans
body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated
on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery 2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was
thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the
Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the
procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have
his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to
"female."

An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the Peoples Journal Tonight, a newspaper of
general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks. 3 Copies of the order were sent to the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the
petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American
fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision 4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or
for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his
present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt,
thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune
to be trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against
him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the
community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the muchawaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and the realization of their
dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition
despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to
interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil
Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner,
specifically for petitioners first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioners gender
from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari
in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate
by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that
the trial courts decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in
the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals
granted the Republics petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP
Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under
Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. 10
The petition lacks merit.
A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As
found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or
for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible
with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the
civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. 11 A
change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. 13 In
this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA
9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for
change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first
name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name
is first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and
procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily
administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of first
name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner
and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to
make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery.
However, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. 18 RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion,
changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil
registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the
use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he
might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioners first name was not
within that courts primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar
concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy
was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the
proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More
importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all
these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners petition in so far as the change of his
first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment

The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must
look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. 22 Rule 108 now applies only to
substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of

clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is
harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the
like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or
changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That
no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the
petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: 24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship;
(13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those
that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion
that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means
"to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations,
acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages,
naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage,
declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil
interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial
decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a
person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among
those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law,
expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. 27

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status include such matters
as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations,
and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce,
and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a persons legal
capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by
special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal
to petitioners cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child,
shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be
exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than
thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent
of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and
hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in
case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the
infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx

xxx

xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time
of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if
not attended by error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the
absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register
Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in
their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex
is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female" 32 or
"the distinction between male and female." 33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young" 34 and
male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova." 35 Thus, the words "male" and
"female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment.
Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are
presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary." 36 Since the
statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it
cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or something
that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth
certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of
Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and
equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is
wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioners first step towards

his eventual marriage to his male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is
a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is
the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes
sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family
relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a maleto-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women
such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, 39 certain felonies under the Revised
Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be
substantially affected if petitioners petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment
by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to
engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend
it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative
guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or
change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof
must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a
person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with
his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment
of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as
having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter,
or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the
written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the]
realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social
convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks
involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the
Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent
Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the
Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a
citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they
established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and

December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and
that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the
Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to
render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the
conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred
by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below
denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in
the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of
this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal.
certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the
trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted
capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its
supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the
proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have given it due
course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the
Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property
because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they
had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and
that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over
the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a
foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of
jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between
petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community
property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is
the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who
appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private
respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his
attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in
the understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly
stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W.
Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on
my behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further
contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private

respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this
case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law
and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States
in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband
and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to
one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is
unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty
party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from
the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married
to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code
cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint
filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and
ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be
followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay
down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent
Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and
Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough,
and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil
Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a
separation de facto between them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private
respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local
Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living
apart since April, 1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still
pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the
child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally and
internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally
founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent
filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said
respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another
man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the
corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8,
1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were
accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The
case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case
No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other
case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 8752434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid
resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition
was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice,
through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city
fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet
arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his
office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the
cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 8752435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A
motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was
denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the
arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not
guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by
respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered
detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not
guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for
a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to
quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide
the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the
purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final
divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case
No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez acted on the
aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the
respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against
chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has
long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional,
and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the
offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as
jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without
which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the
crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The
so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do
not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was added
and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a
deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the
crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized
by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily
follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the
filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity
to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or
petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the
same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary
since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of
the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the socalled "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for
adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to
commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the
outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by
petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still
subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence
since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had
ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence
the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must
indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action
would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such
capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at
the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party
bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to
when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal
prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status.
Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in
the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and
the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the
latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours,
yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to
institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have
the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been
properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the
criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that

'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband
or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense
is said to have been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was
begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the
complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse,
as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this provision in the statute; and we are
of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is
commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction,
considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such
nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the
complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by
this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the
matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United
States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a
trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered
to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his
pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of
the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen.
For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of
the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce
for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said
respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor
marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger
of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular
formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of.
The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other,
hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent.
In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal
Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely
stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital
vows, even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared
null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it
cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity
because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed.
There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of
nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within
the purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was
filed before the termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule

and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case,
by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the
same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had
duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but
which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the
one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
enteredDISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary
restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001]

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a.

RECIO, respondent.

GRACE

J.

GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

vs.

REDERICK

A.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is
valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.Our courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national
law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January
7, 1999 Decision[1] and the March 24, 1999 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch
28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry
under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties. [3]
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal,
on March 1, 1987.[4] They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, [5] a decree of
divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate of Australian
Citizenship issued by the Australian government.[6] Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and respondent were married
on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. [7] In their application for a
marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino. [8]
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution
of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996,
in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. [9]

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage [10] in the court a
quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he
married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondents marriage to Editha
Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior
marriage and its subsequent dissolution.[11] He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen
had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989; [12] thus, he was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for the declaration
of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney,
Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down. [13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated no
cause of action.[14] The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent. [15] The court marked and
admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. [16] After they submitted their respective memoranda,
the case was submitted for resolution.[17]
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was
valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect
in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondents alleged lack of legal capacity to
remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian
divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.
Hence, this Petition.[18]

Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
1
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso
facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second
marriage with the petitioner.
2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity
to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioners marriage to the respondent
3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the
Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in
Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment
granting the divorce decree before our courts.[19]
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal
ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether

respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner.Because of our ruling on these two,
there is no more necessity to take up the rest.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,[20] petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other
foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the
foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent
miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages
solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci
celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of
the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our
discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. [21] A
marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of
Articles 15[22] and 17[23] of the Civil Code.[24] In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article
26[25] of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. [26] A divorce obtained abroad by a
couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective national laws.[27]
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be
made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decreesthat aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. [28] Therefore, before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. [29] Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with
the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as
follows:
ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a
sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
xxxxxxxxx
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be
required to
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be
required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the
death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial
decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in
the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons.

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document -- a
written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity
and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary
value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. [30] A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. [31] The
decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country. [32]
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested[33] by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. [34]
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued
by an Australian family court. [35]However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been
registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.[36] The trial court ruled that it was admissible,
subject to petitioners qualification.[37] Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the
judge.Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act
of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.[38]
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent
was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.
[39]
Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights
belonging to a citizen.[40] Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don
the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to
the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because
she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied
with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she
had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly
known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound
discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. [41] In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of
proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants
have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.
[42]
Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian
law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. [43] Like
any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters
that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. [44] The power of judicial notice must
be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the
negative.

Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally
incapacitated to marry her in 1994.Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of
a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones
are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind
terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. [45] There is no
showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional

judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute
divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected. [46]
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices,
still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the
guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying
again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.[47]
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the
other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.[48]
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence,
we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian
divorce ipso facto restored respondents capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this
matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or
presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 [49] of the Rules of Court, for the
simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under
Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was
not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof
that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the
party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to
establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and
admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for
a marriage license.[50]
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry
petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented
before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A Complaint; [51](b) Exhibit B Certificate of Marriage
Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;[52] (c) Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio
(Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila; [53] (d) Exhibit D
Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment between
Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records; [54] and (e) Exhibit E Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[55] (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended Answer; [56] (b) Exhibit 2
Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia; [57] (c) Exhibit
3 Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio; [58] (d) Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate; [59] and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory Declaration of the Legal
Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995. [60]
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with
petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show
the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to
contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the
ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry
petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to
remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to
marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the
ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both
obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in
Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to
the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondents legal capacity
to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as
above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998]

FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN,* respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J .:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May
1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship
soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.She submitted in the
divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately
from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final
judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but
their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain
Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate
of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to
as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo,
Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as surviving children of
Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal,
which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was
later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and the Padlan children)
submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce
between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the
deceased Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the
distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as well as the
six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial court
required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be
considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being
submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao[1] which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino
citizens sought and decreed after theeffectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction,"[2] disregarded the divorce between petitioner and
Arturo. Consequently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in
1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of
judicial approval.[3] On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that marriage existed between
private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had been
acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a
brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987[4] only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of
Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two
intestate heirs.[5]
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs that
the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who was
recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15
February 1988[6] partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of
Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other
half.[7] Private respondent was not declared an heir.Although it was stated in the aforementioned records
of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was
celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors
allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a hearing, in
violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each
person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11
September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order of
the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings. [8] On 18 April
1996 it denied reconsideration.[9]
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that there
is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the
Padlan children or as to their respective shares in the intestate estate of the decedent; and, second, the
issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent is one of law
which can be resolved in the present petition based on established facts and admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is
a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversyshall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to
inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and
petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; [10] nor as to their respective hereditary
shares. But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court,
after the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of
the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring
the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after
which, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for
resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the
issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she had
secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted
procedural rule.[11] To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally
married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained. [12] Reading between the lines, the implication is that
petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have
prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to
ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as
the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court
perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she
stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr.
[13]
that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. [14] Petitioner
opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the issue on her citizenship. [15] The trial court did not
grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that
both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines." [16] It maintained that
their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine
jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time
of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the
time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce
was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she
was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and
petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; [17] it did not merit
enlightenment however from petitioner.[18]In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is brought
anew to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic
notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer
certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial
court. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she was since 1954.
[19]
Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner
however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the
time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently,
respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for further
proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to
the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship
was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior

marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void
from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse
that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. [20]
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and her counsel to be declared in
contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping, [21] the same lacks
merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve the same transactions and same essential
facts and circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. [22] The
present petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3)
trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles of certain properties belonging
to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the
remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision
holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the
appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the
Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis,
all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court
however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial courtshould be limited to the hereditary
rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present
petition for forum shopping is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 162580

January 27, 2006

ELMAR O. PEREZ, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Fifth Division, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and LILY GOMEZCATINDIG, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the July 25, 2003
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74456 which set aside and declared as null and void
the September 30, 2002 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 84, granting
petitioners motion for leave to file intervention and admitting the Complaint-in-Intervention 3 in Civil Case
No. Q-01-44847; and its January 23, 2004 Resolution 4 denying the motion for reconsideration.
Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig 5 twice on May 16, 1968. The first
marriage ceremony was celebrated at the Central Methodist Church at T.M. Kalaw Street, Ermita, Manila
while the second took place at the Lourdes Catholic Church in La Loma, Quezon City. The marriage
produced four children.
Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems that they decided to separate from each
other. Upon advice of a mutual friend, they decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic.
Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge of
the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a
divorce action under its laws.6
Thereafter, on April 30, 1984, the private respondents filed a joint petition for dissolution of conjugal
partnership with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. On June 12, 1984, the civil court in the Dominican
Republic ratified the divorce by mutual consent of Tristan and Lily. Subsequently, on June 23, 1984, the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, ordered the complete separation of properties between
Tristan and Lily.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United
States7 and both lived as husband and wife until October 2001. Their union produced one offspring. 8

During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the Dominican
Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines
and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under Philippine law. When she confronted Tristan
about this, the latter assured her that he would legalize their union after he obtains an annulment of his
marriage with Lily. Tristan further promised the petitioner that he would adopt their son so that he would
be entitled to an equal share in his estate as that of each of his children with Lily.9
On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as Case No. Q-01-44847.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention 10 claiming that she has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation because she knows certain information which might aid the trial court at
a truthful, fair and just adjudication of the annulment case, which the trial court granted on September 30,
2002. Petitioners complaint-in-intervention was also ordered admitted.
Tristan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the order
dated September 30, 2002 of the trial court. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and declared as
null and void the September 30, 2002 Order of the trial court granting the motion for leave to file
intervention and admitting the complaint-in-intervention.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition filed
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion in disregarding her legal interest in the annulment case between Tristan and Lily.
The petition lacks merit.
Ordinarily, the proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, if the error subject of the recourse
is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was granted by a court with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as alleged in this case, the proper remedy is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules.11This is based on the premise that in issuing the assailed
decision and resolution, the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess
of lack of jurisdiction and there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A
remedy is considered plain, speedy, and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effect of the judgment and the acts of the lower court. 12
It is therefore incumbent upon the petitioner to establish that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated the assailed decision and
resolution.
We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates
or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. By grave abuse of discretion is meant,
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.13 The word
"capricious," usually used in tandem with the term "arbitrary," conveys the notion of willful and
unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective hand of certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is imperative.14
The Rules of Court laid down the parameters before a person, not a party to a case can intervene, thus:
Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with
leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether
or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding. 15
The requirements for intervention are: [a] legal interest in the matter in litigation; and [b] consideration
must be given as to whether the adjudication of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or
whether the intervenors rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or not. 16
Legal interest, which entitles a person to intervene, must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct
and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of

the judgment.17 Such interest must be actual, direct and material, and not simply contingent and
expectant.18
Petitioner claims that her status as the wife and companion of Tristan for 17 years vests her with the
requisite legal interest required of a would-be intervenor under the Rules of Court.
Petitioners claim lacks merit. Under the law, petitioner was never the legal wife of Tristan, hence her
claim of legal interest has no basis.
When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce
decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage bond
between them. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. 19 Regardless
of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by Philippine laws with respect
to his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a
Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married here or abroad, initiates a petition abroad to obtain
an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting an absolute divorce
decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce. 20
When Tristan and Lily married on May 18, 1968, their marriage was governed by the provisions of the
Civil Code21which took effect on August 30, 1950. In the case of Tenchavez v. Escano22 we held:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present
Civil Code (Rep. Act No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the
marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of
divorce, entitled to validity in the country. (Emphasis added)
Thus, petitioners claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their marriage was celebrated abroad lacks
merit. Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which her motion for intervention is
based.
Since petitioners motion for leave to file intervention was bereft of the indispensable requirement of legal
interest, the issuance by the trial court of the order granting the same and admitting the complaint-inintervention was attended with grave abuse of discretion. Consequently, the Court of Appeals correctly set
aside and declared as null and void the said order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated July 25, 2003 and Resolution
dated January 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74456 are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133743

February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029

February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January

31, 1996 3Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and
its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the
former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His
first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely:
Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias.
However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a
Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before
Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage
up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146
thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was
residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedents
surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his
second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued
at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed
that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage,
filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action.
Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of
Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that
respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo
since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the
dismissal10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two
motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the
powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village,
Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of
absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage
of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal
capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down
in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous
marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the
Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify
Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled
that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that
venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and
academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan
pending the resolution of said motion.

Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar
also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing
that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The case
was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on the
twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar
manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for
reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June
14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at
the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna.
Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that
respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage
with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving
Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a
Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied
because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration
motions were denied. 28

26

and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in
its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of
the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of
residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished
from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in
Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was
properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. IbaySomera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of
the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result,
under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with
respondent. Thus
With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of
E.O. No. 227, there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view sweeping statement of
Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state
against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the
courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having
been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992,32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity
to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner
should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the
judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration
Appeals.

34

which were denied by the Court of

On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari.
later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36

35

Rodolfo

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for
letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of
Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC,
Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38"residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one
domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was
performed during the subsistence of the latters marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2,
Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void
bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence,
she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of
Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his
death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining
the residence as contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases
make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing
venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other
words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in
a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones
domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be
more than temporary.41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of
the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are
inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a
distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the
venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is,
the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. 42 However, for
purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.43 Hence, it is possible
that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time
of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983
showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing
statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to
December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa."
Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village
Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the
deceaseds children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling cards 49stating that his
home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial
address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing
the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration
was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa.

The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and
the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial
jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order
No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration,
we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may
validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized
on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we
need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering
that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife,
which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that
the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties
from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the
divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after
the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of
the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction
are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the
bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a
wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a
penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed
from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered
married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and
obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property.She should not be discriminated against in her own country
if the ends of justice are to be served. 54(Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of
a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing
the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the
effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or
cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998,
the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the
Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between
parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence
of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M.
Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the
aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent behind
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was
added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court
held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines,
and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis
added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof,
our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the
parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be
productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the
other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce
abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine
law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Courts rulings in the cases discussed
above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are
to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should
be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be
interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice
are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid,
may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a
situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in

slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will,
that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt
to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where
these words import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render
every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in
every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when
the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention
of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent
and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific
guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of
the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record
of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having
legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office. 71
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and
proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce
decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find
that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may
be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint
efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the
surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be
filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or
one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and
not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the
estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If
she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her
marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a
co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between
parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void
from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it
is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable
provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil
Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are
incapacitated to marry. 78In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the
acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court
described the property regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership
will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof
of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of
properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively,
we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or
the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence
and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
opponents defense. x x x81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the
February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners motion to dismiss and its
October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this
case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171914

July 23, 2014

SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLEROLUNA,Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law.
Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted
as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be
enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision
promulgated on November 11, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the
decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati City.2 The
CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the husband in a condominium unit, and in
the law books of the husband acquired during the second marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar,
Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his first wife,

herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially married ina civil
ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Paraaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947 and later
solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In
ATTY. LUNAs marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan
Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L.
Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA
eventually agreed to live apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to
which end, they entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to
dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from the
Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo,
Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY. LUNA
contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned
to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko
(LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora Development
Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium unit) at Gamboa St.,
Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters, for P1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment basis for
36months starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit was to be usedas law office of LUPSICON.
After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983,
and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which was registered bearing the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G.
Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA
CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x" Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA
and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E.
Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G.
Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the partners
but the same was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated that the interest
of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter established
and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a portion of the office condominium
unit as their office. The said law firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office furniture
and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNAs son of the first
marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit belonging to his
father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz &
Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law books, office
furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of
ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil Case
No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired during the existence of the
marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since they had no children,
SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of proindiviso share consisting of her share in the said properties plus her share in the net estate of ATTY.
LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the latters last will and testament; and thatthe heirs of ATTY.
LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the subject properties. The
complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the portion of the subject properties;that the
same be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on the condominium unit pertaining to the share of
SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be appointed to preserve ad administer the subject
properties;and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay attorneys feesand costs of the suit to
SOLEDAD.3
Ruling of the RTC

On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the aforementioned facts, 4 disposing
thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the SIXTH FLOOR of the
KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No.
21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS is adjudged to
have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry;
(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium unit, hence
the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati with
respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA
married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation,
American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit and
defendants are ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as appropriate arrangements have
been madefor transport and storage.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA.6
On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS ACQUIRED
THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT
CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE TESTIMONY
OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE
UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS
ALREADY DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
AND LUNA;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE OF
THE DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACTTHAT THE
NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE
FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE
APPLICABLE;
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and
IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE INTERVENTION
FOR FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING FEE.7

In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the trial court, to wit:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN THE
LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFFS MONEY;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW
BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNAS LAW OFFICE; and
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID FOR
THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD PRESCRIBED AND
BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.8
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision, 9 holding and ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latters death on July 12, 1997.
The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did not terminate his
prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not recognized in our
jurisdiction. x x x10
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of MakatiCity,
Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIEDas follows:
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW
LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761
consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS is hereby
adjudged to defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(first marriage), having been acquired from the sole funds and sole industry of Juan Luces Luna
while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still
subsisting and valid;
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any other concept over the
condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry
of Deeds ofMakati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from
"JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia
Zaballero Luna";
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna(first
marriage) are hereby declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the
condominium unit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.11
On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration. 13
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on certiorarithat:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Agreement for Separation and Property
Settlement executed by Luna and Respondent Eugenia was unenforceable; hence, their conjugal
partnership was not dissolved and liquidated;
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican Republic courts
approval of the Agreement;
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient proof
of actual contribution to the acquisition of purchase of the subjectcondominium unit; and

D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to the subject
law books.14
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be entitled to the
25/100 pro indivisoshare in the condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the law that should determine,
firstly, whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly
dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly, whether the second marriage entered into by the late Atty.
Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property. Ruling of the Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
1. Atty. Lunas first marriage with Eugenia
subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on
September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which
adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that
Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad. 15 Pursuant to the nationality rule,
Philippine laws governed thiscase by virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until
the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute
divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of
absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, 16 even if either or both of
the spouses are residing abroad.17 Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions under our laws
have beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective marriages
have been limited to the declaration of nullity ofthe marriage and the annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad,
did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death
on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an inviolable
social institution,19 and regards it as a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
for the establishment of a conjugal and family life. 20 The non-recognition of absolute divorce in the
Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital union especially among Filipino
citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the death of
either spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage
between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given legal
or judicial recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.
2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
was void for lack of court approval
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement (Agreement) that the
late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered into and executed in connection with the divorce proceedings
before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible error in decreeing
otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to their
marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the time
of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the event that they had not entered
into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Codeclearly so
provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or

conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between
husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly:
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund
the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon
the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by
either spouse during the marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes of termination
enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per sedissolve and liquidate their
conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent court was still required
under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of
property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.
(1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be decreed when
the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction, or has
been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.
xxxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the
conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicialapproval or the voluntary dissolution of the
conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear atthe hearing to safeguard his interests.
Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such
measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The
provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be applicable.
(1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic
sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the late Atty. Luna and
Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took place only as an
incident ofthe action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications for their
execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds raised in the action for divorce. 21 With the
divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to Philippine public
policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable under
Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the
lifetime of their marriage.
3. Atty. Lunas marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,
was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership

What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Lunas subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976 was
void for being bigamous,22 on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been
dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had
subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil
Codeclearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead
by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. 23 A bigamous marriage is considered void
ab initio.24
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of its being
bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on coownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married,
ortheir marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by eitheror both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such
fact.1wphi1 To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of
her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without
sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court explained in Saguid
v. Court of Appeals:25
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership
ofproperties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively,
we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of coownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous and adulterousunion is without
basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of
the disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the controverted
property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of
coownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or
the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence
and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
opponents defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to
present evidence ex parte.1wphi1 The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The
law gives the defendantsome measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the
complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court isconvinced that the facts proven by the
plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a
mereallegation is not evidence.26
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in the purchase of the
condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least P306,572.00, consisting in direct contributions
ofP159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had obtained from Premex Financing and Banco
Filipino totaling P146,825.30;27 and that such aggregate contributions of P306,572.00 corresponded to
almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the condominium unit amounting to P362,264.00
of the units purchase price of P1,449,056.00.28 The petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid
for solely out of her personal funds, proof of which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" note; 29 that
she had the financial capacity to make the contributions and purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not
acquire the properties on his own due to the meagerness of the income derived from his law practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?

In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioners assertions on her actual contributions
through the following findings and conclusions, namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds were
used to buy the law office condominium and the law books subject matter in contentionin this case proof
that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the Family Code to apply as to
cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and wife but
not married, or under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the
rules on co-ownership would govern. But this was not readily applicable to many situations and thus it
created a void at first because it applied only if the parties were not in any way incapacitated or were
without impediment to marry each other (for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there still
exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife). This void
was filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the property acquired by both
of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in
common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares
were prima faciepresumed to be equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution
was required. The same rule and presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of
credit. If one of the parties was validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to
the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in
bad faith was not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in
the last paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad faith.
Co-ownership was the exception while conjugal partnership of gains was the strict rule whereby marriage
was an inviolable social institution and divorce decrees are not recognized in the Philippines, as was held
by the Supreme Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escao, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965, 15
SCRA 355, thus:
xxxx
As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to prove that
she made an actual contribution to purchase the said property. She failed to establish that the four (4)
checks that she presented were indeed used for the acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA in the
condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the Decision of the trial court, viz.:
"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for P55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was issued on
January 27, 1977, which was thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of Agreement, Exhibit "7" was
signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in the amount of P97,588.89, Exhibit "P" was payable to
Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, thiswas in payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The third check
which was for P49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also for payment of the loan of
Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit "M", forP4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980. None of the
foregoing prove that the amounts delivered by plaintiff to the payees were for the acquisition of the
subject condominium unit. The connection was simply not established. x x x"
SOLEDADs claim that she made a cash contribution of P100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is
no basis for SOLEDADs claim of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit and the
trial court correctly found that the same was acquired through the sole industry of ATTY. LUNA, thus:
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the condominium unit was in the name of Atty. Luna,
together with his partners in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff does not appear as vendee or as the
spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for the use of the Law firm of Atty. Luna. The loans from
Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust Company were loans of Atty. Luna and his
partners and plaintiff does not have evidence to show that she paid for them fully or partially. x x x"
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the name of "JUAN LUCES
LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the condominium
unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration
does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase "married to" preceding
"Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that SOLEDAD had no
participation in the law firm or in the purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove that she
had anything to contribute and that she actually purchased or paid for the law office amortization and for
the law books. It is more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who bought the law office space and
the law books from his earnings from his practice of law rather than embarrassingly beg or ask from
SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he headed. 30

The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both because they were
substantiated by the records and because we have not been shown any reason to revisit and undo them.
Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge her burden of proof. Her
mere allegations on her contributions, not being evidence, 31 did not serve the purpose. In contrast, given
the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna
acquired the properties out of his own personal funds and effort remained. It should then be justly
concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of
his death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the 25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the
condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11, 2005; and ORDERS the
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 188289

August 20, 2014

DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner,

vs.
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 9 May 2008 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R .. CV No. 88686, which affirmed in part the 8 December 2006 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96.
The factual antecedents are as follow:
David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3 December 1988 in Quezon
City, Philippines. They resided in California, United States of America (USA) where they eventually
acquired American citizenship. They then begot two children, namely: Jerome T.
Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and JenaT. Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. David was
engaged in courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in San Francisco, California.
During the marriage, they acquired the following properties in the Philippines and in the USA:
PHILIPPINES
PROPERTY

FAIR MARKET VALUE

P1,693,125.00

House and Lot with an area of 150 sq. m.

located at 1085 Norma Street, Sampaloc,
Manila (Sampaloc property)
P400,000.00
Agricultural land with an area of 20,742 sq. m.
located at Laboy, Dipaculao, Aurora
P490,000.00
A parcel of land with an area of 2.5 hectares
located at Maria Aurora, Aurora
P175,000.00
A parcel of land with an area of 175 sq.m.

located at Sabang Baler, Aurora

P750,000.00
3-has. coconut plantation in San Joaquin Maria
Aurora, Aurora
USA
PROPERTY

FAIR MARKET VALUE

House and Lot at 1155 Hanover Street, Daly

City, California
$550,000.00
(unpaid debt of $285,000.00)
$3,000
Furniture and furnishings
$9,000
Jewelries (ring and watch)
$13,770.00
2000 Nissan Frontier 4x4 pickup truck
$8,000
Bank of America Checking Account

Bank of America Cash Deposit

$100,000.00
Life Insurance (Cash Value)
$56,228.00

Retirement, pension, profit-sharing, annuities

The Sampaloc property used to beowned by Davids parents. The parties herein secured a loan from a
bank and mortgaged the property. When said property was about to be foreclosed, the couple paid a total
of P1.5 Million for the redemption of the same.
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in 2001. In December
2002,Leticia executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc property
for P2.2 Million. According to Leticia, sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his family and lived
with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia claimed that David agreed toand executed a Joint
Affidavit with Leticia in the presence of Davids father, Atty. Isaias Noveras, on 3 December 2003 stating
that: 1) the P1.1Million proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property shall be paid to and collected by
Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay to LeticiaP750,000.00, which is equivalent to half of the amount
of the redemption price of the Sampaloc property; and 3) that David shall renounce and forfeit all his
rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties situated in the Philippines. 5 David was able to
collect P1,790,000.00 from the sale of the Sampaloc property, leaving an unpaid balance of P410,000.00.
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the Superior
Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce on 24 June 2005

and judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005.6 The California court granted to Leticia the custody of
her two children, as well as all the couples properties in the USA. 7
On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of
Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and Davids failure to comply with his
obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the power to administer all conjugal properties in the
Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and desist from selling the subject conjugal properties; 3)
the declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited in favor of her children; 4) David to remit half of the
purchase price as share of Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment
ofP50,000.00 and P100,000.00 litigation expenses.8
In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was entered on 29 June
2005 by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal
partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of
liquidation, including attorneys fees of both parties be charged against the conjugal partnership. 9
The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as follow:
1. Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of abandonment and marital
infidelity which can result intothe forfeiture of the parties properties in favor of the petitioner and
their two (2) children.
2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California, U.S.A. and the same
can be included in the judicial separation prayed for.
3. Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner Leticia T. Noveras and
respondent David A. Noveras will amount to a waiver or forfeiture of the latters property rights
over their conjugal properties.
4. Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras isentitled to reimbursement of onehalf of the P2.2 [M]illion
sales proceeds of their property in Sampaloc, Manila and one-half of the P1.5 [M]illion used to
redeem the property of Atty. Isaias Noveras, including interests and charges.
5. How the absolute community properties should be distributed.
6. Whether or not the attorneys feesand litigation expenses of the parties were chargeable
against their conjugal properties.
Corollary to the aboveis the issue of:
Whether or not the two common children of the parties are entitled to support and presumptive
legitimes.10
On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:
1. The absolute community of property of the parties is hereby declared DISSOLVED;
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property ofthe parties in the Philippines are
hereby ordered to be awarded to respondent David A. Noveras only, with the properties in the
United States of America remaining in the sole ownership of petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a.
Leticia Tacbiana pursuant to the divorce decree issuedby the Superior Court of California, County
of San Mateo, United States of America, dissolving the marriage of the parties as of June 24,
2005. The titles presently covering said properties shall be cancelled and new titles be issued in
the name of the party to whom said properties are awarded;
3. One-half of the properties awarded to respondent David A. Noveras in the preceding paragraph
are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, his two minor children with petitioner LeticiaNoveras a.k.a.
Leticia Tacbiana as their presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on the titles
covering the said properties.Their share in the income from these properties shall be remitted to
them annually by the respondent within the first half of January of each year, starting January
2008;
4. One-half of the properties in the United States of America awarded to petitioner Leticia
Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana in paragraph 2 are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, her two
minor children with respondent David A. Noveras as their presumptive legitimes and said

legitimes must be annotated on the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their share in
the income from these properties, if any, shall be remitted to them annually by the petitioner
within the first half of January of each year, starting January 2008;
5. For the support of their two (2) minor children, Jerome and Jena, respondent David A. Noveras
shall give them US$100.00 as monthly allowance in addition to their income from their
presumptive legitimes, while petitioner Leticia Tacbiana shall take care of their food, clothing,
education and other needs while they are in her custody in the USA. The monthly allowance due
from the respondent shall be increased in the future as the needs of the children require and his
financial capacity can afford;
6. Of the unpaid amount of P410,000.00 on the purchase price of the Sampaloc property, the
Paringit Spouses are hereby ordered to pay P5,000.00 to respondent David A. Noveras
and P405,000.00 to the two children. The share of the respondent may be paid to him directly but
the share of the two children shall be deposited with a local bank in Baler, Aurora, in a joint
account tobe taken out in their names, withdrawal from which shall only be made by them or by
their representative duly authorized with a Special Power of Attorney. Such payment/deposit shall
be made withinthe period of thirty (30) days after receipt of a copy of this Decision, with the
passbook of the joint account to be submitted to the custody of the Clerk of Court of this Court
within the same period. Said passbook can be withdrawn from the Clerk of Court only by the
children or their attorney-in-fact; and
7. The litigation expenses and attorneys fees incurred by the parties shall be shouldered by them
individually.11
The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover their legal and
personalstatus are those of the USA. With respect to their marriage, the parties are divorced by virtue of
the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by the Superior Court of California, County of San
Mateo on 24June 2005. Under their law, the parties marriage had already been dissolved. Thus, the trial
court considered the petition filed by Leticia as one for liquidation of the absolute community of property
regime with the determination of the legitimes, support and custody of the children, instead of an action
for judicial separation of conjugal property.
With respect to their property relations, the trial court first classified their property regime as absolute
community of property because they did not execute any marriage settlement before the solemnization of
their marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code. Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance with
the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because the court cannot take judicial
notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any proof of their national law. The trial court held
that as the instant petition does not fall under the provisions of the law for the grant of judicial separation
of properties, the absolute community properties cannot beforfeited in favor of Leticia and her children.
Moreover, the trial court observed that Leticia failed to prove abandonment and infidelity with
preponderant evidence.
The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to the reimbursements she is praying for
considering that she already acquired all of the properties in the USA. Relying still on the principle of
equity, the Court also adjudicated the Philippine properties to David, subject to the payment of the
childrens presumptive legitimes. The trial court held that under Article 89 of the Family Code, the waiver
or renunciation made by David of his property rights in the Joint Affidavit is void.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial courts Decision by directing the equal division of the
Philippine properties between the spouses. Moreover with respect to the common childrens presumptive
legitime, the appellate court ordered both spouses to each pay their children the amount of P520,000.00,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Numbers 2, 4 and 6 of the assailedDecision
dated December 8, 2006 of Branch 96, RTC of Baler, Aurora Province, in Civil Case No. 828 are hereby
MODIFIED to read as follows:
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in the Philippines are
hereby divided equally between petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana (sic) and
respondent David A. Noveras;
xxx
4. One-half of the properties awarded to petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) in paragraph 2 shall
pertain to her minor children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes which shall be

annotated on the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their share in the income
therefrom, if any, shall be remitted to them by petitioner annually within the first half of January,
starting 2008;
xxx
6. Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) are each ordered to pay the
amount ofP520,000.00 to their two children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes
from the sale of the Sampaloc property inclusive of the receivables therefrom, which shall be
deposited to a local bank of Baler, Aurora, under a joint account in the latters names. The
payment/deposit shall be made within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt ofa copy of this
Decision and the corresponding passbook entrusted to the custody ofthe Clerk of Court a
quowithin the same period, withdrawable only by the children or their attorney-in-fact.
A number 8 is hereby added, which shall read as follows:
8. Respondent David A. Noveras is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) the
amount ofP1,040,000.00 representing her share in the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc
property.
The last paragraph shall read as follows:
Send a copy of this Decision to the local civil registry of Baler, Aurora; the local civil registry of Quezon
City; the Civil RegistrarGeneral, National Statistics Office, Vibal Building, Times Street corner EDSA,
Quezon City; the Office of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Aurora; and to the children, Jerome
Noveras and Jena Noveras.
The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED.12
In the present petition, David insists that the Court of Appeals should have recognized the California
Judgment which awarded the Philippine properties to him because said judgment was part of the pleading
presented and offered in evidence before the trial court. David argues that allowing Leticia to share in the
Philippine properties is tantamount to unjust enrichment in favor of Leticia considering that the latter was
already granted all US properties by the California court.
In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the
USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of California in
June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect to their
properties in the Philippines, Leticiafiled a petition for judicial separation ofconjugal properties.
At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of marriage
between the parties. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,13 we stated that:
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts
do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no
sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another
country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must beproven as facts under our rules
on evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the
alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or
in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense. 14
The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the foreigner must
comply with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.15
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be
proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody
thereof. Such official publication or copy must beaccompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by
any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must state, in substance, that
the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, asthe case may be, and must be under
the official seal of the attesting officer.

Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of
the attesting officer, if there be any, or if hebe the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such
court.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to
prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.
It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals,16 we relaxed the requirement on certification where we
held that "[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizenwhen she secured the divorce and that
divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign
divorce decree duly authenticatedby the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient." In this
case however, it appears that there is no seal from the office where the divorce decree was obtained.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption 17 as the lower courts did with respect to the
property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because, to begin
with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of
the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus
erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made before the celebration of
marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification isjudicially approved and
refers only to the instances provided in Articles 66,67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code. 18
Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of property on paragraphs 4 and 6
of Article 135 of the Family Code, to wit:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil
interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority ofthe spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her
obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused
that power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year
and reconciliation is highly improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against the
guiltyor absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree ofjudicial separation of property.
(Emphasis supplied).
The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this case to necessitate judicial
separation of properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family Code. The trial court ratiocinated:
Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code quoted above, must be for a valid cause
and the spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he/she has left the conjugal dwelling
without intention of returning. The intention of not returning is prima facie presumed if the allegedly [sic]
abandoning spouse failed to give any information as to his or her whereabouts within the period of three
months from such abandonment.
In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has returned to and stayed at his hometown
in Maria Aurora, Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him there after the alleged
abandonment. Also, the respondent has been going back to the USA to visit her and their children until
the relations between them worsened. The last visit of said respondent was in October 2004 when he and
the petitioner discussed the filing by the latter of a petition for dissolution of marriage with the California

court. Such turn for the worse of their relationship and the filing of the saidpetition can also be considered
as valid causes for the respondent to stay in the Philippines. 19
Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not tackled in the
trial courts decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the absolute
community of properties.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated for more
than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been
proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David decided to go
back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has
been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio,
who worked in the hospital where David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of Estrellita
listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form. 20 Third and more significantly, they had filed
for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for
judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically dissolves the
absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 ofthe Family Code, thus:
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138.
(Emphasis supplied).
Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute community regime
and the following procedure should apply:
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community
and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of
insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to
each of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets,
which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division
was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of
such share provided in this Code. For purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in
accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),the said profits shall be the increase in value
between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in
accordance with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal
dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated tothe spouse with whom the
majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are
deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no
such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children.
At the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the case to the trial court. Instead, we shall

adopt the modifications made by the Court of Appeals on the trial courts Decision with respect to
liquidation.
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California
properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well
as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be
limited to the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification madeby the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in the
absolutecommunity properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their childrens presumptive
legitimes, which the appellate court explained in this wise:
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc
property.1wphi1 While both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property,
absent a clear showing where their contributions came from, the same is presumed to have come from
the community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the redemption money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property for the benefit
of the absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of P120,000.00 incurred in
going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses in the amount of P300,000.00
when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement
of Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 duly received by
the Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to settle the criminal case of his personal
driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share
equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount ofP120,000.00 or in the respective amounts
of P1,040,000.00.
xxxx
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children and
descendants consists of one-half or the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The children
arc therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute community,
which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well as to their respective shares
in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps. Paringit in
the amount of P410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the amount
of P520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom. 21
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.
88686 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.