THE ARABIC PLOTINUS:

A STUDY OF THE "THEOLOGY OF ARISTOTLE"

AND RELATED TEXTS
Peter S. Adamson

UMI Co. Dissertation # 9971880

DEDICATION

This dissenation is dedicated to my grandparents,

Anhur and Florence Adamson.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A NOTE ON ABBREVIATIONS AND TRANSLATIONS

AC KN OWLEDGMENTS

vi
vii

INTR 0 D U CTI0 N

"

_ _

CHAPTER I: THE ARABIC PLOTINUS TEXTS AND THEIR ORIGIN

1.1 The Arabic Plotinus corpus
1.1.1 Th.A
1.1.2 DS
1.1.3 GS
_
1.1.4 The common Arabic Plotinus source
1.1.5 The nature of the paraphrase
1.1.6 The order of Th.A and its place in * AP
1.2 The origins of AP
1.2.1 The identity of the Adaptor
1.2.2 The role of Porphyry
1.3 Other texts related to AP
1.3.1 Early works related to AP _
1.3.2 The later influence of AP

9
9
11
II
12
14
19
39
40
42
.47
47
50

CHAPTER 2: THE PROLOGUE AND THE "HEADINGS"

58
2.1 The Prologue
58
2.1.1 Sources of the Prologue: the Metaphysics and AP ..__ mm.61
69
2.1.2 AI-KindT as the author of the Prologue
2.1.3 The conception of philosophy in the Prologue
76
2.2 The ..Headings_
79
2.2.1 The textual basis of the headings
80
2.2.2 The purpose of the headings
82
2.2.3 Philosophical views in the headings
85
CHAPTER 3: SOUL
3.1 Aristotelian influence on the Adaptor's theory of soul
3.1.1 Mfmar III and the question of enlelechia
3.1.2 Soul's relationship to body
3.1.3 AP and the Arabic paraphrase of the De Anima
3.2 Ethical Views in AP
3.2.1 Virtue and the cosmos

iii

87
87
88
94
105
113
114

3.2.2 Desire__. .._

_._
_. .__
3.2.3 Memory and the fall of the soul_

_._._.__
.._._ _

._._

__ 122
-.--_.. 128

CHAPTER 4: INTELLECT__ _
_._
_._._._ _.._._.._
_._
__.__
__.139
4.1 Learned ignorance .._ .
_. __
_._ _._._.
_ _..__. .
139
_._ ...._..._.__ ._.140
4.1.1 The doctrine of mfmar [I..._._ __ _._. .._._.
_ _.__.. ._._
147
4.1.2 A potency higher than act._.
4.1.3 Porphyry and learned ignorance in AP .__ __ _._..__
__.157
CHAPTER 5: THE FIRST PRlNCIPLE _
_.
__.._
._..
_.. ._164
5.1 Oivine predication ..
_._ _
_
._._
.
.__._.._164
5.1.1 Negative theology in AP ._.__.._._
_ _ _ _.
_ 165
.
J70
5.1.2 Positive theology in AP __ _ _._. ._._._. ._ _
5.1.3 Predication by way of causality and eminence __._ _.._ _ 173
5.1.4 Is the First Principle "complete"?.._._._
._
_ __..__ _.177
_
_ _ _. . ._. ._
__.._ __ 186
5.2 God and being..__.. ._..
5.2.1 The terminology of existence.._
_.._ _
_. .._.._..__._.187
5.2.2 God as the First Being and only being_._ __
__
193
5.2.3 God as pure actuality and Cause of being _..
_._
_.199
5.2.4 The background of the doctrine of attributes and God
as anniyya faqa[ in AP .._ _.._.
_._.__._._
_ __._.205
_
_ _.._.218
5.3 Creation __....-..... .....__.._._..._..._....._._ _._.._._. .__.
5.3.1 Mediated creation vs. unmediated creation
_._ __
._.219
_ _ _
_
_.._._. __.__..__225
5.3.2 Creation and time _.._.__._
5.3.3 Creation and necessity.._.._ _._. ._.__..__
._..__..230
5.3.4 God and thinking
__ __._
__._._
._._
_ 236
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION ._
_
_.__
.
_._. __
244
6.1 The coherence of the Adaptor' s thought ._ _ _
_
_..245
6.2 What sources influenced the Adaptor?_
_
_.._._ __.._
_.._..__..__250
6.3 Who was the Adaptor?._.__._._
_ _.
256

APPENDlX A: AL-KINDI AND THE ARABlC PLOTlNUS.._

A.l God and be ing._ ._..__.__._._._. ._
_
_
A.2 The emanative hierarchy__
_ _._
_..__ _ _.
A.3 Theory of the intellect
_.
..
._ _
A.4 The soul and recollection
_._.
_
A.5 Astrology _ _ __
_
_.._.,.._
_'. _ _. _

_.260
_ _ __.267
_
272
_ _._279
_ _..__.__285
291

APPENDlX B: IBN SINA AND THE '''THEOLOGY OF ARISTOTLE~

B.I The treatment of soul in Ibn Slnff s commentary ._
__
B.2 Mystical knowledge in Ibn Srn~rs commentary
_
B.3 Creation and emanation in Ibn SIna~s commentary

IV

_.. _.303
307
_ _312
319

APPENDIX C: TRANS LA TION OF IBN SINA ~S NOTES ON THE

"THEOLOGY OF ARISTOTLE"
_._._
__._ _
_._323
C.I Notes on MTmar 1 _._ _._._
_.._._._
_ __.__._
_323
C.2 Notes on MTmar If._.._ _
_
_
_ _ _
__.._ _333
C.3 Notes on MTmar IV.
_.._ _
_. ._._._.._
_
340
C.4 Notes on Mimar V _
_._
__.._ _ _._._
_..344
C .5 Notes on MTmar VII._ __.._ _.__._._ __ _ _._._._._ _
_
__.350
C.6 Notes on MTmar VIIf
_._._
_._
_. .__
_ _.. _.355
C.7 Notes on MTmar fX
358
361

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A NOTE ON ABBREVIATIONS
AND TRANSLATIONS

The following abbreviations have been commonly used in this dissertation:

B:

References to the Anlbic text in Badawl. A. (ed.), AI-Aflatfinivva al-Muhdatha

"inda 31-' Arab, (Cairo: 1955).

Lewis: References to the English translation in P. Henry & H.-R. Schwyzer (eds.), Plotini
Opera. Tomus II: Enneades IV-V: Plotiniana Arabica ad codicum fidem anglice vertit G.
Lewis (Paris & Brussels: 1959).
Th.A: The '-Theology of Aristotle," Arabic text in B.
GS:

The "Sayings of the Greek Sage," Arabic text in B.

DS:

The '"Letter on Divine Science," Arabic text in B.

All quotations from the Arabic Plotinus texts use section numbers from Lewis, with the
page number from B given in brackets (e.g. Th.A IVA [B 44]).
Enn:

References to the Greek text in Plotinus, Enneads, translated by A.H. Armstrong,

7 volumes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966-1988).

All translations are mine unless otherwise noted. Arabic and Greek terms are
transliterated, with aspirated consonants in Arabic cnderlined (where the consonant
would normally have been underlined, e.g. in the title of a book, I have not underlined the
aspirated letters).

vi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

[ would like to gratefully acknowledge the following people for their generous
support of this project. First my advisors, David Burrell and Stephen Gersh, for their
comments on the work and their enthusiasm for the project. I am equally grateful to my
two unofficial" advisors: Richard Taylor of Marquette University, who first suggested
the project. and Cristina 0' Ancona Costa of the Universities of Padua and Pisa. Both
were extraordinarily supportive of the dissertation; indeed it would be difficult to imagine
two distinguished scholars who would be more giving of their energy and time for the
work of younger researchers like myself. [would also like to thank the Philosophy
Department of Notre Dame in general, and Paul Weithman, David O'Connor, Michael
Loux, Ken Sayre in particular for their advice during my graduate career.
My biggest debt of thanks is, however, to my family. I dedicate this dissertation
to my grandparents Arthur and Florence, in thanks for their support and encouragement
before and during my studies. Likewise my parents Joyce and David could not have been
more supportive, and I am thankful to them for more than I can say here. Above aU I
would like to thank my wife Ursula, for her love and for her endurance and patience,
without which I never could have completed this project or my degree.

vii

INTRODUCTION

Open any book on Islamic intellectual history, and you are liable to find a
sentence or two on the so-called ""Theology of Aristotle. "I The importance of this text in
the classical era of Arabic philosophy can scarcely be exaggerated. The '"Theology" was
a translation or paraphrase of the writings of Plotinus, yet it was mistaken for a work of
Aristotle. To imagine the importance that was attached to this text, one need only
consider the situation of the earliest Muslim thinkers who described themselves explicitly
as philosophers. They regarded Aristotle as the greatest representative of Greek wisdom,
yet Aristotle's works fell far short of providing answers to some rather pressing
questions. What did Greek philosophy have to say about the nature of God or creation,
for instance? Philosophers from John Philoponus onwards sensed the inadequacy of the
genuine Aristotelian corpus for answering these questions: thus Aquinas, for example,
articulated how Christian revelation was needed to flesh out Aristotle's notion of God as
a cause of motion. But in the "Theology of Aristotle:" the Arabic world found a text that
ex pounded such topics at length. It is unclear when this text of Plotinus was first
mistaken for one by Aristotle, and how long the misconception persisted. But whether or

J A representative example can be found in Alben Hourani. A History of the Arab Peoples
(Warner Books: New York. 1991). 172-173: "The line of philosophers which culminated in Ibn Sina found
the answer to questions [about God) in the Neo-Platonic version of Greek philosophy, made more
acceptable by the fact that a major work of the school. a kind of paraphrase of pan of Plotinus' Enneads.
was generally regarded as being a work of Aristotle (the so-called 'Theology of Aristotle'):' Compare
Majid Fakhry. A History of Islamic Philosophy (Columbia U. Press: New York. 1970). 19-26.

not the first readers of the ""Theology" thought it was a genuine work from the
Aristotelian corpus is beside the point, for as we shall see, at this period there was a
tendency to see all of Greek philosophy as one harmonious piece. Thus Plotinus was
used to extend and even complete the Aristotelian philosophical heritage.
This is the standard picture of the historical relevance of the ""Theology," and it is
correct as far as it goes. It is an understanding that underlies almost all of the work done
on the 'Theology" beginning in the late 19th century and continuing through the late 20th
century. In general this work has focused on broadly philological issues relevant to the
"Theology": who wrote it, when was it written, on what sources did it draw, and what did
the original text look like? These are of course important issues, but for a long time they
overshadowed another aspect of the text, namely the substantive philosophical changes
that were introduced into Plotinus' thought by whoever translated it into Arabic. It is
only within the last decade that these changes have been given serious study. At the risk
of engaging in polemic, let me suggest a reason for this. Generally speaking, there is a
tendency on the part of Western scholars to study Arabic philosophy from one of two
points of view. Either it is seen as setting the stage for 12th and 13th century European
philosophy, and particularly Aquinas, or it is seen as carrying on Greek philosophical
ideas on as they became unavailable in Europe. It is the latter point of view which
dominated studies of the Theology": the text was primarily seen as important because it
conveyed Plotinus to the Arabic world, not as a work in its own right with original
philosophical importance. To say that Muslim thinkers drew on the '"Theology" is, on
this view, just to say that they drew on Plotinus.

This way of approaching the ""Theology" has been challenged implicitly by recent
studies of the text, especially by Cristina D' Ancona Costa and Richard Taylor. This
dissertation is an attempt to carry the challenge further by providing a systematic study of
what is philosophically new and interesting in the Arabic version of Plotinus. Before
undertaking this task, it may be useful to give some background which would explain
how a work that is, after all, just a translation could be of such philosophical significance
in its own right.
As we will see below, the Arabic Plotinus was produced in the translation circle
of the first Muslim to think of himself as a

i"'philosopher~'~

ai-KindT (died shortly after 276

A.H./870 A.D.). What I have said above about studies of the ""Theology" could also be
applied to studies ofal-KindT"s circle: it is only recently that scholars have provided
satisfactory studies of the context in which this group of translators operated. Their
devotion to Greek philosophy and its transmission is beyond question. But, in the words
of one Muslim

scholar~ the

translation movement led by ai-KindT "was by no means an

'innocent' operation or 'neutral' educational endeavor naturally flowing from the

intellectual evolution of the time. Instead, it was part of a broader strategy used by the
newly established Abbassid dynasty to confront hostile forces, namely the Persian
aristocracy.":! This suggestion is fleshed out at much greater length in a superb recent
work by Dmitri Gutas. 3 Gutas argues that the' Abbasid caliphate supported Greek
philosophy as a rival intellectual tradition which could challenge the Zorastrian tradition
:! Mohammed 'Abd al-labri. Arab-Islamic Philosophv: a Contemporary Critique. translated by Aziz
Abbassi (Center for Middle Eastern SlUdies at U. Texas at Austin: Austin. 1999).49. See also Gerhard
Endress. "The Circle of ai-KindT:' in The Ancient Tradition in Christian and Islamic Hellenism. edited by
G. Endress and R. Kirk (Research School CNWS: Leiden. (997).45.

.l

Dmitri Gutas. Greek Thought. Arabic Culture (Routledge: London. 1998).

in their seat in Persia. Without going into the intricacies of his

argument~ let

us note the

importance of the idea that there was a political or ideological motivation behind the
translation movement in the time of the Abbasids.
One effect of this motivation was a desire on the part of al-Kindf and others to
present Greek philosophy as a unified whole. Given that their purpose was to set Greek
philosophy over against other rival intellectual currents,4 it would have been
counterproductive for them to acknowledge the tensions and debates within Greek
philosophy that tend to occupy the modern historian of philosophy. In

addition~

the

translation movement was at least in part an attempt to provide answers to the pressing
questions and problems of the historical context in which the translations were

made~

i.e.

9th century Islam. Again. this means that al-Kindf and his translators were keen to
present Greek philosophy as answering such questions and as giving one coherent answer
when possible. Gerhard Endress has captured this situation in saying that "The growing
insistence on the essential unity of philosophical

truth~

on the harmony between Plato's

and Aristotle's doctrine... is indicative of an attitude of compromise which made

philosophy fit to serve as a scientific interpretation of monotheistic and creationist
religion.,,5
These pressures had the consequence that translators who rendered philosophical
texts from Syriac and Greek into Arabic did not aspire to present "objective" or simply
"correct" translations. Instead, they felt free to change the text at will and even to
.: In addition to the intellectual threat posed by the Persian tradition. it is likely that al-Kindi was
opposing anti-rationalist movements within Islamic theology. Thus he was to some extent sympathetic with
the rationalist Mutazilites, whether or not he fully espoused their doctrines. The ideological struggle in
favor of Greek philosophy was, then. being waged by ai-KindT and his circle on at least two fronts.
5

Endress ( 1997), 52.

introduce completely original passages amplifying or interpreting the views of the

original author. We find an extreme example of this in the Arabic Plotinus. but the case
is not unique: another well-known example is the Book on the Pure Good. a paraphrase of
Produs' Elements of Theology which would be known in the Latin west as the Liber de
Causis. (Indeed. this text departs even more from its source than does the Arabic
Plotinus, containing very little in the way of direct translation from the Greek source.) In
accordance with the motivations described above. the changes are generally of two types:
(a) [n order to present Greek philosophy as a unified whole, translators did not hesitate to
alter their sources to bring them into line with other, authoritati ve Greek texts. Many
examples of this strategy are provided in this dissertation, such as the alteration of
Plotinus' theory of soul to make it accord with Aristotle's De Anima.
(b) In order to answer problems from their own intellectual milieu. translators went so far
as to construct original philosophical arguments and views that they introduced into the
body of the paraphrase. Many of the mest interesting changes to be studied below. such
as the theory of learned ignorance. the use of divine attributes. and the characterization of
God as pure Being. fall into this category. This is not to say that the translators did not
depend partially on other Greek sources such as Aristotle. Rather. it is to highlight the
original way in which they took ideas from several Greek texts (as weB as their own
ideas) and wove them into new and original positions relevant to the contemporary
situation. 6

6 In a similar vein. Dmitri Gutas has described the translation activiry as ""a creative process": "The
changes and additions that we frequently see in the translated text vis-a-vis the Greek original were either
amplificatory and explanatory. or systematic and tendentious. This means that some of the translations were
deliberately not literal because they were made for a specific purpose and to serve certain theoretical
positions already held" (Gutas (1998), 146).

The texts that resulted from this process -- and there is perhaps no better example
than the Arabic Plotinus -- are thus important and interesting in two ways. First, the
original arguments themselves are often quite sophisticated and should be taken seriously
as positions on important topics in theology, philosophy of religion, metaphysics and so
on. Second, in many cases the version of the text produced by the translator is of
immense historical importance. For one thing the text shows that Greek philosophy was
already being interpreted and developed upon its first entry into the Arabic speaking
world. Also, these translations and the Arabic Plotinus in particular were the source for
Neoplatonism in Islamic philosophy. So we cannot properly understand the way that
figures like ai-KindT, al-FambL Ibn STniL and the Persian Illuminationists drew on Greek
philosophy unless we acknowledge that their engagement with these translations was

/lot

equivalent to a confrontation with the original writings of Plotinus and others. I have
attempted to show how our understanding of these later figures might be enhanced by a
study of the Arabic Plotinus in appendices included here, on ai-KindT and Ibn STna.
So much, then, for the reasons why it is worthwhile to study the Arabic Plotinus
and take it seriously as a work of philosophy in its own right. I close this introduction
with a brief overview of the dissertation:
In Chapter I, I explain some of the vexed philological issues surrounding the text. This
is a necessary preliminary to understanding the philosophical aspects of the Arabic
Plotinus. However, I also try to engage these issues in such a way as to make plausible
my interpretation of the Arabic Plotinus as an original, well-thought out adaptation of the

Enneads (it has often previously been thought of as the work of a sort of translator hack
or dilettante).

 In Chapter 2. I deal with two parts of the Arabic Plotinus materials that demand a
separate treatment from the paraphrase proper: the Prologue to the "'Theology" and a set
of "headings" which preface the "'Theology." Among other things, I argue that the former
may have been the work of ai-Kindt.
The rest of the dissertation is arranged according to the ascending levels of the Plotinian
hierarchy: Soul, Intellect, and the First Principle. In Chapter 3 on soul I examine how the
Arabic Plotinus is affected by the authors familiarity with Aristotle's De Anima. and also
deal with a cluster of issues in the paraphrase relevant for ethics.
Chapter 4 is devoted to the study of one important theme in the Arabic Plotinus: the
concept of an '"ignorance higher than knowledge." I suggest that this notion may have
come to the author from a Greek source, but that his understanding of such ""learned
ignorance" is an original one

ba~ed again

on Aristotle.

Chapter 5 deals with the treatment of God in the Arabic Plotinus. In particular, I show
that the author has original and systematic views on divine attributes and the metaphysics
of God and creation, and that these views respond to contemporary debates in Islam.
After a brief conclusion. three appendices are devoted to (a) al-Kindrs use of the
Arabic Plotinus. (b) a study of Ibn STna's commentary on the ....Theology."' and (c) a
translation of Ibn SIna's commentary.

CHAPTER I

THE ARABIC PLOTINUS TEXTS AND THEIR ORIGIN

The main purpose of this study is the examination of the philosophical doctrines
presented in the Arabic Plotinus texts. This analysis requires, however, a discussion of
the nature of these texts and of the complicated question of their origins. Indeed. it would
be fair to say that the present study is only now possible because of decades of research
into these issues. I do not hope to settle here most of the significant philological
questions surrounding the Arabic Plotinus. and in fact I will argue in this chapter that
several of these questions cannot be answered with certainty. at least in the absence of
textual evidence that may yet be discovered. Still, as will shortly become clear. a
profitable discussion of the philosophy in the Arabic Plotinus requires frequent reference
to the history of the texts. With this in mind, in this chapter I wilJ first give a detailed
description of the Arabic Plotinus corpus, and then go on to discuss some of the more
important issues surrounding the origins of that corpus. The latter section may at the
same time serve as a survey of much of the previous scholarship on these texts. since the
bulk of research on the Arabic Plotinus has centered on these textual and historical issues.
Finally. I will briefly address the later influence of the Arabic Plotinus in Islamic
philosophy by mentioning some of the later sources that bear directly on these texts.

1.1 The Arabic Plotinus corpus

The Arabic Plotinus materials have come down to us in the form of three texts. The first,
the most well-known and by far the longest of the three is the so-called Theology of
Aristotle (hereafter Th.A). The second, and shortest, is the Letter on Oi vine Science
(hereafter DS). The third and final ""text" actually consists of a number of fragments
attributed to ""the Greek Sage (aJ-shaykh al-yfiniinf)," which are collectively referred to as
the Savin2s of the Greek Sage (hereafter GS). These collected texts represent the Arabic
Plotinus corpus (hereafter AP). An Arabic edition of almost all this material was
published in 1955 by "Abdurrahman BadaWf, and this is the Arabic text which I use here. I
The scholar Geoffrey Lewis, having completed an improved critical edition of the Arabic
as his dissertation at Oxford, has provided us with an English translation of all three texts,
which is available in the second volume of the Henry and Schwyzer edition of Plotinus'
works.:! [will cite all three texts by the section numbers in Lewis' translation, though aU
translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

1.1.1 Th.A

The existence of a '"Theology of Aristotle" was first made well-known last century with
the publication of an Arabic text and subsequent German translation by F. Oieterici,
though it was not at that time clear that the text was in fact a paraphrase of Plotinus'
I Badawr. A. (ed.), AI-Atlatfiniyya al-muhdatha 'inda al-Arab. (Cairo: 1955). For the Greek text
of [he Enneads I have used volumes IV, V and VI of Plotinus. Enneads. translated by A.H. Armstrong. 7
volumes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1966-1988).

Enneads. Dieterici's

version~

though it was based on manuscripts fewer than and inferior

to those used by Badawf and Lewis. has the same fonn as the text ofTh.A we have now:
it is divided into ten so-called mayiimir, mfmar being a Syriac word meaning "chapter:~
The mayiimir vary in length, and cover parts, but not

all~

of Enneads IV-VI. As in all three

parts of AP, the text takes the form of a translation-cum-paraphrase of Plotinus: most
sentences are at least in part direct translations of the

Greek~

but also contain original

material. There are also complete departures from the Greek ranging in length from one
sentence to entire

paragraphs~

though the latter are relatively rare. The text includes the

occasional "title," sometimes based on a title of one of Plotinus' treatises, both at the
beginning of some mayiimir and also, more unusually, in the middle of a mfmar. The ten
mayiimir collectively make up the paraphrase" portion ofTh.A. There are two
additional parts of the text: the first is a Prologue bearing an inscription attributing the
text to Aristotle, and mentioning the names of the commentator, translator, and editor of
the text. After this inscription. the Prologue gives a short explanation of the task to be
undertaken in Th.A and finally a list of topics to be covered in the text. Between this
Prologue and the paraphrase is a list of ru 'iis -- headings, or heads, or chief points" -which present themselves as an itinerary of issues to be raised in the text. However, the
r1l "iis are in fact a series of short paraphrases. more or less in the style of the main

paraphrase, paralleling Enn IVA. 1-34.

[n terms of content, Th.A raises, in the course of covering parts of eight treatises
by Plotinus, many of the major issues familiar to readers of the Enneads, including
Z P. Henry & H.-R. Schwyzer (eds.), Plotini Opera. Tomus II: Enneades V-V: Plotiniana Arabica
ad codicum fidem anglice venit G. Lewis (Paris & Brussels: 1959). Parts of the translation ofGS in this
volume are by Rosenthal.

10

detailed discussions of the First Cause (Plotinus' One) and Intellect. The soul is,
however, the level of Plotinus' cosmos which is treated at greatest length: of the ten

maylimir, six have soul has their main focus, and the remaining four each have significant
sections devoted to soul. Below I address the question of whether this focus on soul is
accidental or by design.

1.1.2 OS
Though its title suggests that DS should be some kind of epistle, the text is in fact simply
another continuous paraphrase of Plotinus, this time of Enn V.9, V.3, VA, and V.5 (in
that order, with a concluding fragment from V.9). It contains two "titles" like those
found in Th.A, corresponding to the titles ofEnn V.3 and VA (OS 47, (56). Unlike
Th.A. OS has little to say about soul and concentrates on the Intellect and the First Cause.
Its total length is about that of one of the longest of Th.A s mayiimir. The text was
originally misattributed to al-Farab.. but was sho\\ll by Paul Kraus to belong to AP. 3

1.1.3 GS
The final surviving portion of AP is a set of fragmentary "sayings" culled from three
sources, and generally exhibiting the paraphrastic style of Th.A and DS. Almost all of the
sayings are taken from a manuscript discovered at Oxford. published and translated by
Franz Rosentha1. 4 Further fragments from the Oxford MS were found and made available

., Kraus. P.. "Plorin chez les Arabes: Remarques sur un nouveau fragment de la paraphrase arabe
des El1Ileades:' Bulletin de rJnstitul dEgvple. 23 (1941).263-95 .
.s Rosenthal. F.. 'Ash-Shaykh al-Yl1nani and the Arabic Plolinus Source: Orientalia 21 (1952),
461-92: 22 (1953).370-400: 24 (1955).42-66.

II

(in the translation mentioned above) by Lewis. s The remaining fragments (translated in
Lewis' GS IX) are culled from the Muntakhab siwiin al-hikma and al-Shahrastanf's Kiliib
ai-mila! ,va a!-niha!, each of which quote a body of sayings attributed to a "Greek sage,"

presumably drawing on the same source, the Siwiin a/-lzikJlla.6 Unsurprisingly, the two
sets of quotes overlap to some extent. A number of passages in GS 1- vm also overlap
with passages from Th.A, sometimes adding material to what has been preserved in Th.A.
Neither of these two texts overlap with OS, however.

I. 1.4 The common Arabic Plotinus source

It is clear from the style and paraphrastic nature of these three texts that they all represent
an original Arabic Plotinus source, which we may call *AP. 7 It is equally clear that our
AP may lack a good deal of the material originally contained in *AP. Perhaps this
material included the entirety of Enn IV-VI, though the extent of the paraphrase must of
course remain a matter of conjecture. The consistency of style in what is left to us of the
paraphrase, on the other hand, makes it virtually certain that one person composed the
paraphrase in * AP, whether or not it was actually based directly on the Greek text of the
Enneads. Much of the scholarship on AP has been devoted to speculation as to the
identity of this author. The philosophical study of the text to be undertaken here will
provide us with important evidence towards answering this question. For now, I will

See Henry & Schwyzer ( 1959). xxxiii.

6 The Mlmtakhab was originally attributed to al-Sijistani. which is why Rosenthal's translation
marks one set of sayings as al-Sijistanrs. See F.W. Zimmerman. ''The Origins of the So Called Theology of
Aristotle:' in Kraye et al. (1986).208-9.

7 I follow Zimmermann in marking non-extant texts with an asterisk. For the stylistic unity of the
Arabic Plotinus text'i. see G. Endress. Proclus Arabus: Zwanzig Abschnitte aus der InstilUlio Theologica in

12

refer to the person who composed *AP as "the Adaptor. n It is worth noting that whatever
the Adaptor had in front of him while writing the paraphrase, we can be certain that his
source was ultimately based on Porphyry's edition of the Enneads. The restriction of AP
to the latter three Enneads suggests this, since these treatises were taken out of
chronologicaJ order and placed together by Porphyry. In addition, sometimes the
paraphrase passes immediately from one treatise to another preserving Porphyry's order.
For example, Th.A 1.20 parallels the ending of Enn IV.7 (Plotinus' 2nd treatise,
chronologically), and Th.A 1.21 parallels the first sentence of Enn IV.S (6th
chronologically). Even more convincingly, the beginning of Th.A II parallels the
beginning of Enn 1V.4 and thus preserves a sentence break introduced by Porphyry. 8
What else can be said with certainty about * AP? [n short, not very much. On the
basis of stylistic similarities, Gerhard Endress has shown that the AP texts belong to the
body of translations and adaptations made by al-Kindi~s circle in Baghdad in the 9th
century.9 This includes the well-known adaptation of Proclus' Elements of Theology, the
Book on the Pure Good, known later in the West as the Liber de Causis. Since the
Prologue of Th.A infonns us that aI-KindT '''corrected (a~la!laf' the paraphrase, this
evidence confirms the testimony of the text itself. [t is tempting to think. on this basis,
that the Prologue may actually have prefaced * AP in its entirety, and not just Th.A.
Further evidence for this is provided by doctrinal and terminological parallels between the
Prologue and AP. indicating that it was written by the Adaptor or one of his collaborators
Arabischer Obersctzung (Beirut & Wiesbaden: Steiner Verlag. 1973). 186. For the unity of DS and Th.A.
see Kraus ( 1941). 292-294. For the unity of GS and Th.A. see Rosenthal (1952).465-468.
8 See Zimmermann (1986).228 fn.23. and H.-R. Schwyzer. "Die pseudoaristotelische Theologie
und die PJotin-Ausgabe des Porphyrios:' Rheinisches Museum f"tir Philoloeie. 90 (1941),223.

13

(ai-KindY being one intriguing possibility). For example. the Prologue uses the
characteristic phrase "'Cause of causes" (ProI.14), and as we will see in chapter 2,
generally fits the philosophical profile of the Adaptor. One might then further speculate
that the attribution of Th.A to Aristotle would have been applied to the entirety of * AP.
In fact, though, there is reason to think that this misattribution only occurred later.

lo

At

any rate, we can proceed on the assumption that all the elements belonging to AP
mentioned above were originally united as a single work based either on Porphyrys
edition of the Enneads, or some later modification of that text. Further, the Arabic text

*AP \vas produced by al-KindTs circle~ though so far it is unclear whether this group was
also responsible for the original changes from the Greek text: the Arabic text could
simply be a translation of a paraphrase done in Syriac or Greek.

I. 1.5 The nature of the paraphrase

The paraphrastic nature of AP has been elegantly expressed with a device used in Lewis'
translation. Those parts of the text which are based directly on the Greek text of the
Enneads, as we have it today. are written in italics, and the rest in roman lettering.
Merely by skimming through Lewis' translation, one can thus get a sense of how closely
the Adaptor is sticking to Plotinus. own words: it is rare that he strays far from the task of
translating, but even more rare that he restricts himself to translation. As helpful as
Lewis' practice of italicizing direct quotation may be, it should also be said that the
italic/roman distinction can be quite misleading. Even in the case of "direct" translation,

<)

Endress ( 1973). 186.

III

See Zimmennann ( 1986). 118-125.

14

of course. we might expect a fair amount of divergence between AP and the Enneads
simply because of the dissimilarity of Arabic and Greek. But comparison of Lewis'
translation to the original Arabic and Greek texts reveals that the italicized portions are
often only tangentially related to what Plotinus himself wrote. Take. for example. a
section of AP (OS 18) paralleling the first sentence of Enn V.9.6: Lewis translates "The
mind is all things and contains all t/zings: it does not, however, contain them as a
substrate to them. but as their maker, and it is to them as cause." with the entire sentence

in italics. [n the Greek we find ....Intellect is the beings (fa onta) and it has them all in it
not as in a place. but as having itself and being one with them." At the very least. the
passage in AP must be considered an "interpretation" of Plotinus. for example by
substituting the notion of "substrate (mawdit)" for "place (topOS):11 And in fact the
'translation" adds two ideas which are not in this passage of Plotinus at all. though
Plotinus might agree to them: the characterizations of intellect as maker and cause of all
things. This is far from an isolated example. Indeed one is hard pressed to find
significant portions of italic text that could be considered "neutral" translation.
At the same time. the roman passages in Lewis can often be seen as in fact related
to the Greek, even if they are not strict translation. For instance. consider this passage
from GS. The translation is mine. but [ retain Lewis' italics:
GS 1.32-36 [B 188]: The Greek Sage said: the first originated intellect does not
have a form. When it connects to the First Originator. it comes to have a form,
because it is limited. For it is molded and comes to have a shape and a form. As
for the First Originator. He has no form. because there is not something else above
Him which He would wish to limit Him. and there is nothing below Him which
He would want to limit Him. For He is without limit in every way. Therefore He
II A better word to translate topos would be maw!i.i", which has the same root -- perhaps this
suggested the "interpretation" to the Adaptor.

15

comes to not have a shape or a fomz. If the First Originator were[onn, the
intellect u-,ould be some logos (kalima). And the intellect is not a logos, and there
is no logos in it, because it was originated without its Originator having an
attribute or a fonn, so that he would have put that form and logos in it. For the
intellect is not a logos nor is there a logos in it, but rather it makes the logos in the
things, because it has an attribute and a shape. For when it makes the thing, it
impresses the thing with some of its attributes. This impression is the active logos
in the thing. It is necessary that the First [not] be multiple in any way. Othenvise
the multiplicity in Him would be attached to another One before Him. Rather, it
is necessary that He is one, and pure good, and that He is the originator of one
good thing which has a form of goodness: either it is the impression from the First
Originator, or it is the impression of its impression.

Now consider the parallel Greek text:

Enn VI.7.17: Thus intellect is also a trace of that, but since intellect is fonn and in
extension and multiplicity, that [i.e. the One] is shapeless and formless; for thus it
makes fonns. But if that were form, intellect would be logos. But the first must
not be multiple in any way, for the multiplicity of it would depend on another
before it.

Clearly Lewis is right that very little of the Arabic directly parallels Plotinus' Greek. But
it is just as clear that the views presented in the Arabic are directly inspired by the Greek
text, even as they are being modified. The use of the word kalima throughout the passage
is perhaps the most obvious indicator of this. Again, it is not unusual that non-italic
passages "parallel" the Greek in this looser sense. 12 Since both the italics and non-italics
in Lewis' translation can be misleading in this way, we will be well served by closely
comparing ail Arabic texts to the Greek of Plotinus. This is the procedure I will normally
follow in the following chapters.
We have seen, then, that the Adaptor is responsible for a great deal of material
"original" to AP, in other words not found directly in parallel passages of the Enneads.

16

This is true not only of the longer independent passages scattered through APt but also on
a sen tence-by-sentence basis throughout the paraphrastic translation. What. then, is the
relationship between the original parts of AP and the parts which are taken directly from
Plotinus? Or. to put the same problem another way, what was the Adaptor's attitude
towards the text of Plotinus he had before him, given that he saw fit to introduce nonoriginal elements into the text? There are four possible answers to this question:
(a) The simplest possibility is that the Adaptor is just trying to comment on Plotinus in
order to explain Plotinus' own meaning more clearly, or to bring out the structure of
Plotinus' often rather compressed arguments. On this view the paraphrase would be
chiefly an attempt at explication. The Adaptor is clearly engaged in this task at some
points in AP: he often explicitly states what he takes to be the premises of Plotinus'
arguments (as at Th.A ill.7). or formulates more clearly the position Plotinus is attacking
(as at Th.A IX. 14).
(b) Again. the Adaptor may see himself as a faithful expositor of Plotinus. but one who is

actually giving an interpretation of Plotinus -- a commentator of sorts. Commentary is of

course difficult to distinguish from mere explication, but also seems to fall within the
Adaptor's intent. At Th.A X.14. for instance, he tries to explain why Plotinus calls the
activity of soul an "image." Of course, even in cases where the Adaptor seems to be
making a good faith effort to explore Plotinus' thought more deeply. we may find that the
"commentary" actually diverges from the views supported in the Enneads.

12 To give only one other ex.ample. Th.A V.38-42 is, as Lewis indicates, verbally a digression from
its Greek source. Yet it is also based on that source. as an extension of Plotinus' discussion of the fact that
the "why" of intellect is in intellect itself.

17

(c) The Adaptor may also introduce material that is extraneous to Plotinus, yet only
tenuously engaged with the ideas in the parallel text. Occasionally, for instance, we find
physical theories thrown into AP almost as an afterthought (such as the assertion at Th.A

VrII.IO that flesh is solidified blood), as well as more significant passages introducing
non-Plotinian philosophical doctrines.
(d) Finally. the Adaptor may actually take it upon himself to "correct" the doctrines
presented in the Enneads. While it seems true that, as EW. Zimmermann has remarked,
the Adaptor "endeavors, above all. to give a fair and sympathetic account of Plotinus," it
has not been sufficiently noticed that the Adaptor makes a number of intentional and
sometimes philosophically sophisticated changes in the paraphrase that can only be
described as corrective. There are passages where the Adaptor makes a point which is the
reverse of what Plotinus holds in the parallel Greek text. A banal example is Th.A
Vlli.25. which asserts that the "'last motion" of mind is like a line or homogeneous body,
which in fact is precisely what Plotinus denies (Enn VI.7.13). More commonly. additions
in the paraphrase make subtle but crucial modifications to the position Plotinus holds.
Many of the passages we will examine in the course of the coming chapters faIl into this
category. One of the most striking examples parallels the famous beginning of Enn V.2,
itself drawn from Plato' s Parmenides:

'~he One

is all things and not one of them." In

Arabic we find: "The Pure One is the cause of all things, and is not like any of the things"
(Th.A X.I). This "translation" obviously does not differ from its source because the
Adaptor misread the Greek. Rather, the Adaptor has deliberately chosen a different
locution.

18

Such corrections raise the possibility that the Adaptor has set out to provide not
only access to Plotinus' philosophy, but also a philosophy of his own which both depends
on Plotinus and goes beyond it in various ways. Certainly, the paraphrase exhibits all
four of the above relationships to its source text; it is only after a thorough philosophical
analysis that we will be able to confidently say whether the Adaptor saw himself chiefly
as an expositor. a commentator, or a corrector of Plotinus. But these brief remarks on the
relationship between the paraphrase and the Greek original should already suggest that
the Adaptor was not merely. as has been suggested by some, a translator of questionable
erudition, given to fanciful enlargements on his source. On the contrary, as I hope the
following chapters will show. the Adaptor was a philosopher in his own right.

1.1.6 The order of Th.A and its place in * AP

One of the most obvious textual problems confronting a reader of AP is that the
paraphrase does not follow the order of the Enneads. A section from Enn VI may be
followed by one from IV, and so on. We might expect this in the case ofGS. The
"sayings" are. after all, clearly fragments left over from *AP, and it is not therefore
surprising that they might be out of order. One might extend this argument: since in fact
all three parts of AP are only portions of the original *AP, all three may well have lost
their original ordering while undergoing the vicissitudes of text transmission. This is in
fact the opinion of Zimmennann. the author of the most detailed discussion of the origins
of the Arabic Plotinus. 13 He remarks that "there is no rational plan behind the choice and
order of passages in" Th.A. and that the text follows a chaotic path back and forth

13

Zimmermann (1986). For more on his views. see section 1.2.1 below.

19

without rhyme or reason."lol In Zimmermann~s view, this is the result of a textual

catastrophe which resulted in the dispersion of loose fragments of the original *AP, two
of these sets of fragments being represented by GS and DS. A remaining set, which
Zimmermann describes as essentially a pile of loose leaves from *AP or a copy thereof,
were stitched together by a later editor and have come down to us as Th.A. Thus the
order of Th.A tells us nothing about the original order of *AP, and indeed it should be
presumed that * AP simply followed the order of the Enneads. 15 Now, I think
Zimmermann is right that some measure of textual disorder has befallen the text which
we now have as Th.A. This is particularly evident in mfmar

vm, as we will see below.

However, [ would argue that the text of Th.A is not nearly as chaotic as Zimmermann
thinks. A reader predisposed to see some ordering principle in Th.A will, [suggest, find
the traces of such a principle, as well as traces of its disturbance.
[ can show this only with a specific discussion of the themes central to each of the
maylimir, which happily can serve at the same time as a survey of the issues addressed in

the text. This will also be of some use in laying the background for the following
chapters on the philosophical doctrines of AP. Two preliminary points are in order.
First. we should bear in mind that if the Adaptor was in fact trying to re-order the

I.tZimmermann(1986). 119. 125.

15 His full views on the matter can be found in "Appendix IX: Codex *Kappa/*kappa and the
Editor of K:' Zimmermann (1986).152-162. Brietly. he argues as follows: if the manuscript confonting the
editor of the Th.A was just the "tattered remains" (152) of *AP. we should expect a number ofjarring
breaks in the text. Zimmermann explores the hypothesis that this editor set out to smooth over such breaks.
adding a'i little as possible but enough to finish incomplete sentences, etc. Major breaks. some of them at
least. were bridged by adding the mfmur headings. This hypothesis. argues Zimmermann. is borne out by a
study of the bridging passages between "breaks." Without going into a detailed discussion of
Zimmermann's arguments. it is wonh pointing out here that whatever was thus contributed by the editor of
the Th.A could just as easily have been contributed by the Adaptor. That is. if the Adaptor produced a text
which was out of order with the Enneads, he may have written his own "bridging" passages - I give an
example of this in what follows.

20

Enneads according to some plan, the possibilities open to him were restricted by what he
found in Plotinus (perhaps only Enneads IV-VI, and indeed not even necessarily all of
these treatises. since some have no parallel in AP). That is, he would be trying to impose
an order by selecting passages of the Enneads with given themes, which would give rise
to a rather loosely ordered compilation in any event. Second, it may help my argument to
provide an example in which the Adaptor has unquestionably not followed the text of the
Enneads. This example is the transition from DS 63 to DS 64. The text reads as follows:
DS 63 [B 171-172]: This is the first intelligible. And the first intellect is that
existing in act. because it is not the intellect in potency, but rather it is in act. so its
intelligible is also in act.
64: We direct our discourse to the intellect which is intellect, and it is that about
which we said that it and the intelligibles are one thing, and it is the true intellect,
and its intelligibles are true intelligibles...
The fonner passage parallels Enn V.3.5.40-42. the latter parallels V.3.6.28ff.. so that
there is a gap of 36 lines of Greek between the two. If AP followed the order of the
Enneads throughout. this gap would originally have been filled by further paraphrase.
which we no longer have. But if we direct our attention to the Greek paralleling 64, we
find the following: ..Let [the soul] therefore transpose (meta/heto) the image to the true
intellect..... The Adaptor has intentionally mistranslated metarhero. rendering the phrase
as "Let us direct our discourse..:' Thus he changes the sense of the verb to refer to the
shifting of the argument in his own paraphrase. This change allows him to write a
bridging passage between 63 and 64. so it could only have been written by the Adaptor
(since he was the one with access to the original Greek). Then it was the Adaptor who
smoothed the transition over this gap in the paraphrase, not a later editor. 16
16 Other examples in DS where the Adaptor is a more likely source for bridging passages are 93-4.
97-8. and J49-150.

21

If this is

right~

then the Adaptor was apparently selective in choosing which

passages he would paraphrase. This suggests that he may also have been willing to adjust
the order of the text as part of that same selectivity. Why would the Adaptor do this? We
can only speculate. but one obvious motive would be greater interest in some passages as
opposed to others. This kind of motivation seems to explain another skipped portion of
Greek between Th.A X.8l and 82. Having paraphrased up to Enn VI.7.6.19 or so (the
paraphrase is fairly loose). the Adaptor skips a stretch of Greek containing reference to
pagan demons and gods. and then picks up at Enn VI.7.7.l8. leaving out 35 lines of
Greek. Perhaps the Adaptor was embarrassed or simply uninterested in the references
Plotinus makes to daimolles; we cannot tell. What is quite suggestive. though. is the fact
that he resumes his paraphrase immediately following an admission by Plotinus that the
intervening passages were a digression from the main problem at hand: "in following
from one thing to another we have arrived at this. But our argument (logos) was in what
way sensation is of man and how those [i.e. noetic things] do not look towards birth:'
Taking note of Plotinus' cue, the Adaptor skipped those passages not germane to the
main line of the argument. This reinforces our sense of the Adaptor as a selective and
critical translator. and suggests that he may have been capable of imposing his own order
on Plotinus' text. Granting that this is a possibility. what order can be discerned in the
apparent confusion of Th.A?
!vlimar I: One of the simplest pieces of evidence for the Adaptor's role in altering the

order of his source text is the use of the word mfmar itself. The word is Syriac, which

22

suggests that a Syrian played some role in the formation of Th.A. 17 If this was the case.
two explanations are possible: first. that * AP was based on a Syriac version of the
Enneads; perhaps the paraphrase was already to be found in this version. Second. it was
used by the Syrian translator Ibn Na"ima al-Him~i. who has been identified as a likely
author for the paraphrase. The second possibility. it should be added. is rather more
persuasive than the first: Why would a translator charged with translating the entirety of
*AP from Syriac into Arabic hesitate to also translate the word mimar? At any rate. if
either of these is the correct explanation. then the division of * AP into the mayiimir took
place very early in the history of * AP, indeed at the point of its translation into Arabic at
the latest. 18 And the re-ordering of the text cannot. of course. have happened any later
than the addition of the mayiimir titles.
Consideration of the content of this first mimar provides. I think. a striking piece
of evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the order of Th.A is at least partially
intentional. After an introductory section describing the status of soul in the Plotinian
cosmos (Th.A 1.1-16), the paraphrase begins to introduce the views of "the Ancients" in
favor of the eternity and fall of soul. This is accomplished in three sections. 1.17-20 is
17 Although it does not prove this. because the word was used by non-Syrians occasionally in the
9th century. See Zimmermann (1986). 151-2.

[~ Zimmermann (1986) argues (151 ) that the beginning of Th.A II shows that the use of the word
mlmar is a later addition to the text. It reads as follows: '"The first of the questions (masa'il) of the second
part (maqiila) of the Book of Theology." Zimmermann thinks this derives from the title of the parallel
Greek text. Enn IVA: "On Problems of the Soul. the Second (deuteron):' The later editor ofTh.A would
then have mistaken this for an announcement that the second chapter ofTh.A itself was now beginning. and
accordingly supplied the additional heading "al-mimar al-lhiinl:' and also the words "of the Book of
Theology" in the first sentence. The scenario Zimmermann describes is possible. but not necessary -- !:!im~f
may have used the word maqiila to refer to Plotinus' treatise. and reserved the word mimar for the chapters
of his own paraphrase. Nor is there any reason to think that the beginning of IVA could not have been
deliberately taken as the paraJleltext for the beginning ofTh.A II. Zimmermann's interpretation would be
far more convincing if the phrase he attributes to !:!im~f looked like a title or heading. but "The first of the
questions..:' looks more like the beginning of the text itself. Then it may well have been Him~i. or whoever
the Adaptor was. who added the mimar title.

23

based on Plotinus' argument that common religious practices confirm that the belief in
the immortality of the soul is widespread (the parallel Greek text is the end of Enn IV.7).
Th.A 1.21-43 continues on into Enn IV.8, and includes Plotinus' quotation of various
ancient philosophers (Heraclitus, Empedocles, Pythagoras, Plato), also arguing for the
sours higher status and fall into this world. Finally, a section independent of the Greek
text (1.44-58) concludes the first mlmar, attributing to Plato many of the basic
cosmological principles that will be defended in AP. The paraphrase draws heavily on
the doctrines of the Enneads in this section, even though it does not parallel any specific
text.
What. then, unites the content of Th.A I? In short, the mfmar presents a
doxography of the soul. Indeed, if one were looking for a long passage in the Enneads
which cites the opinions of others as to the nature of soul, one could hardly do better than
to choose the passages running from the end of 1V.7 until IV.8.1. And there is a good
reason why the Adaptor would do this: as we know from the Prologue to Th.A, the
Adaptor sees the paraphrase as either fitting into the Aristotelian corpus or actually
representing a work by Aristotle. But all the most important works of Aristotle begin
with a survey of the views of previous philosophers. The fact that mfmar I also offers a
doxography fits perfectly into the Prologue's presentation ofTh.A as an Aristotelian work
or a work in the spirit of Aristotle. It might be objected that, if this were the case, the first
milnar would surely cover more of Enn IV.8, which is throughout an explicit presentation

of the views of Plato. This objection is sharpened by the fact that much of this
presentation has been preserved in AP, as GS 1.47-91. This suggests that the fragment in
GS was originally attached to what is now the conclusion of mfmar J. This is certainly

24

possible, and in fact does not present a serious challenge to the hypothesis that his first
mTmar

is intended as a doxography: the fragment in GS explicitly draws on Plato (1.47)

and returns, as does Plotinus, to mention Empedocles and Heraclitus (1.88-89). However,
I think it is more likely that mimar I did in fact have the form it does now. This is
suggested, first of all, by the fact that mfmar [ ends with a lengthy independent passage
which is clearly intended to replace the discussion of Plato's views in Enn IV.8 with a
summary of those views. Secondly, the fragment in GS seems to be designed as an
independent piece of text. It is introduced by the addition "Plato says..:' at GS 1.47,
which the Adaptor must have written (since it would require reference to the Greek to
know that Plato' s views are being presented). And it concludes with a passage that both
caps the argument of the section and depends on the Greek (which, again, means the
Adaptor wrote this conclusion). This strongly suggests that the GS fragment was
originally separated from mimar I, perhaps because it dealt with a more specific problem
than was appropriate for the introductory part of Th.A, or because it seemed to have
intellect and not soul as its primary theme. 19
Another objection against the idea that the first mimar is intended as the
beginning of a reorganized text is provided by Zimmermann. The first sentence of the

mima,. reads: "Now to our topic (amma ba'du): as it has been made clear and proven that
the soul is not bodily, and that it does not die, does not corrupt, and does not perish, but is
permanent and eternal, we wish to investigate about it also how it separates itself from the

1'1 As we will see below, the beginning of Th.A VII also seems to be originally written by the
Adaptor as the start of the mfmar: this part of the paraphrase follows what is preserved in GS 47-91. The
Adaptor's procedure here. then. was to paraphrase the first part ofEnn IV.S as the end of his doxography. to
Ihen paraphrase most of the middle of IV.S as the free-standing fragment ofGS, and finally to take the
conclusion of rv.s as a summary of Plotinus' own views to begin mimllr VII of Th.A.

25

intellectual world and descends to this

sensible~ corporeal

world and comes into this

gross, transient body falling under genesis and corruption." Zimmermann remarks:
'lhat's no way to begin an account. however unsystematic. of God.

Mind~

Soul and

Nature,.. :!O Yet there are other explanations for the fact that this opening seems to take
some tasks as already accomplished. Perhaps the Adaptor is referring to other works of
Aristotle or,

indeed~

of the Ancients in general, in other words taking it to be a well-

known fact that the soul is incorporeal and immortal. And Zimmermann himself argues
that * AP was only part of a larger work (which he calls the *Theology) containing
paraphrases of other ancient

philosophers~ like

Alexander and Proclus. If this is the case,

then the reference could go back to earlier sections of this larger group of texts. Thus the
sentence does not disprove our current hypothesis. The worst that this passage actually
proves that the Adaptor is tolerant of redundancy, since he later paraphrases further
arguments for the soul's immortality.
Afimar U: If the first mlmar is designed to introduce the main topic of Th.A, that suggests
that the paraphrase will be concerned above all with soul. We have already mentioned
above that Th.A does in fact spend most of its time on the subject of soul. but does it do
so in an organized fashion? A possible clue is given at the outset of mlmar ill: "'As we
have established what introductory discussion was necessary about the intellect, the
universal soul, the rational soul. the brute soul and the growing and natural soul, and have
arranged the discussion of it in a natural order, following the course of nature, we now
discuss the explanation of the quiddity (miihiyya) of the substance of the

~o Zimmermann (1986), 125.

26

soul.'~

The

question, then, is whether the first two mayiimir could be construed as giving such an
introductory discussion of the soul.
As we have already seen, mfmar I gave a doxography of the soul. The second
mJmar falls into two parts. The first, IT. I-56, raises the question of the soul's status while

joined to the intellectual world. Specifically, what does the soul remember of this lower
world when it is in the higher world? While this is the putative point of the section, in
fact 1-56 presents a comprehensive discussion of the relationship between soul and
intellect: the contrast between soul's thought and intellect's thought forms a basis for a
general contrast between the two hypostases. The section ends with a long independent
passage which concludes quite emphatically, asserting among other things that "the
quality (kaY.f(vya) of the soul and its state after its arrival in the intellectual world and its
return to if' has been described (IT.55). The second section, IT.57-99, discusses the way in
which soul comes to be in the body, and how it is related to the body and yet distinct from
it. The section ends with an equally explicit conclusion, also original in the paraphrase:
So it has been made clear and proven that the soul is not in the body according to any of
the ways which we have mentioned and made clear" (U.99). While the function of this
mJmar is not, perhaps, as obvious as that of the first, these two sections do seem to offer

an "introduction" to the question of soul by summarizing sours relation to the two worlds
between which soul resides. The discussion of sours bodily faculties also may provide
the basis for the claim in ill. I that the various "kinds" of soul have already been
discussed. 21

21

See Th.A 11.19-20.60.63-82.

27

J'vfimar Ill: This mfmar is devoted to refuting mistaken theories of soul. It falls into three

parts: a refutation of simple materialism ( I-53), of the Pythagorean theory that soul is the
harmony of the body (54-66), and of the Peripatetic theory that soul is the elltelechia of
body (67-76). The three parts are united, however, by the fact that the Adaptor (and to
some extent, Plotinus as well) sees the latter two possibilities as somewhat more
sophisticated varieties of materialism.:!2 Thus the entire mfmar follows naturally from the
concluding passage of mfmar n, cited above. Since Th.A ill falls entirely within Enn
IV.7 there is also little difficulty in assuming that it was a continuous part of *AP. The
only problem with its internal order is the passage m.27-33, which returns to paraphrase a
section of Greek text immediately before that paralleled by the beginning of ill. Even
stranger, ill.33 and IDA repeat the paraphrase of the same sentence of Greek. This latter
fact, I think, suggests that it was again the Adaptor who was responsible for this particular
bit of re-ordering, since a later editor would not have known to transfer the same passage
from UI.33 to IlIA. Only the person with the Greek text in front of him would have
known that this same passage both preceded the text paralleled in li.5 and followed that
paralleled in IlI.32. Why the Adaptor returned to paraphrase the passages from before his
own beginning is less clear, except that the parallel text for the beginning of In
(paralleling rOA-5) sounds more like the beginning of an argument: HThat the bodies can
do what they can by bodiless powers is clear from the following points (ek ronde delon):'
i'vfimar IV: The title of the fourth mfmar suggests that it will depart from the theme of

soul and begin to discuss the intellect: "On the Nobility of the World of Intellect and its

~l In chapter 3. we will see that the Adaptor is even willing to accept the doctrine of eme/echia as
long as it does not collapse into a form of materialism.

28

Beauty:' This parallels the title of Enn V.8 (Peri tOll noetou kallous), however, so it is
not necessarily the Adaptor's own notion of what will be the dominant topic of the
mT!nar.

23

And in fact, the portion of Enn IV.8 paralleled in Th.A IV deals not chiefly

with intellect, but with the beauty of the sensible world: the argument is chiefly
concerned to show that this sensible beauty has its source in a higher reality. Thus we are
in a sense still dealing with the rejection of materialism. One might also consider the
focus of Th.A IV to be the relationship of soul to intellect, since Plotinus' point is of
course to urge the soul to direct its attention towards the higher realities, and not the
sense-world (see, for instance, 1V.45). If this is the case, IV (soul's relationship to
intellect) makes a reasonable bridge between the discussion of materialism in ill (soul's
relationship with matter) and V (soul's relationship with the First Cause, as we shall see
shortly). Some evidence for this interpretation is provided by the fact that the last passage
paralleled in Th.A IV is the beginning of Enn V.8.4, after which Plotinus begins a
discussion of nOlls proper, which has little bearing on soul. The abrupt ending of IV,
however, may well indicate some kind of corruption in the text, even though the closing
section (IV .59) continues the trend of ending the mayiimir with a passage original in the
..,~

paraphrase.-

:!J The Adaptor routinely translated the titles he found in his source text - these titles sometimes
come in the middle of a mfmar. Zimmermann takes the latter fact to argue against the idea that the Adaptor
is responsible for the mayiimir headings. The point does not seem decisive. At most. it shows that the
Adaptor translated what was in front of him unless he had a reason not to.
:!-t Furthermore. in the case ofTh.A JV.57 and Th.A X.137 we have another Greek passage which
is paralleled twice: ...and they see everything (ta pallta)... and themselves in others:' (V.8.4.3-4). Since
the Greek is paralleled further after IV.57, it cannot be that this part of X was simply detatched from the end
of IV. Rather it suggests that the Adaptor. having perhaps lost interest in Enn V.8 for the purposes of the
fourth mimar. returned to the same point in the text later. re-paraphrased the same sentence. and continued
\\lith the text which is preserved in the tenth mimal". This seems especially likely in light of the fact that the
two paraphrases of this same Greek passage are somewhat different: only the Adaptor could have produced
two different translations of the same Greek sentence.

29

Afimar V: It has already been suggested that Th.A IV-V constitutes an ascent up the
Plotinian hierarchy with reference to soul. The title itself bears out this hypothesis:
although it is based on the Greek title of Enn V1.7, it adds references to the Creator:
"Regarding the Creator (a/-barf) and the origination of what He originates, and the state
of things with Him." (In Greek: "How the Multiplicity of Fonns was Generated and on
the Good.") The parallel text surely inspired the Adaptor's characterization of the topic
under discussion: it begins by referring to '"the God (ho rheos)" sending souls into the
lower world. 25 The text continues by discussing whether origination entails discursive
thought. Again, we have the contrast between soul and the higher principles. In a brief
independent section the Adaptor indicates that he is still chiefly interested in soul: "If this
is the case, then we revert and say that the souls, when they were in their world before
descending into generation. were sensitive; except that their sense was an intellectual
sense'~

(Th.A V.I5). Five more lines of Arabic text on the soul intervene before the

Adaptor returns to his source text. Eventually the mimar turns to Plotinus' own topic,
which is actually the intellect, but shortly thereafter the text concludes with another,
apparently conclusory, independent passage (V.52). Certainly nothing in this mimar
forces us to see it as fitting into the order suggested so far. But neither is it an obvious
product of a chaotic manuscript, and V. I 5-16 suggests that it belongs in the Th.A s
general plan of concentrating on the soul, however tangentially.
AlTmar VI: Perhaps the most puzzling mfmar for anyone trying to reconstruct a rational

order to Th.A is the sixth. Paralleling Enn [VA, it deals with the relation of stars to

25 Though. typicaJly. the Adaptor gives the paraphrase a much more monotheistic cast. changing
"tht: God or some god (ho theos e l/zeos lis)" to "the First Creator."

30

things in the rest of the sense world, and with the question of how magic works. But VI
is not obviously out of place in the order suggested thus far: it is drawn from one of the
treatises on "Problems of the Soul,n and in fact the issues of the stars and magic are
relevant to the Th.As conception of soul. It may be that the Adaptor, having first given
an introduction to the soul. then a discussion of its nature. and then treatments of its
relation to intellect and God. is now ready to deal with more specific problems relating to
soul. But just as likely, the mimar is an indication of the some textual corruption. As we
will see, some amount of corruption must be allowed to explain the present state of Th.A.
This is of course compatible with the thesis of intentional ordering defended thus far: the
presence of some textual disruption does not mean that all departures from the order of
the Enneads are fortuitous.
}vfimar VII: As the title (original in the paraphrase) announces. the seventh mfmar returns

to the topic of sours nature. The Greek text covered by this mimar is the end of Enn
IV.8: the same treatise which was the source for much of the doxography in mfmar I. The
fact that the ending of mimor VII parallels the end of IV.8 suggests an original break in
the text. and the beginning of VII is also suggestive. It starts just at the point where
Plotinus is turning from his discussion of Plato's theory of soul to his own concluding
comments: "Then [the soul], despite being divine and from a place above, comes inside
the body and, [despite] being the lowest god. descends on its own (alilexolls;o) and
because of its power and thus puts in order what is after this." If it is true that the
Adaptor left the middle parts of Enn IV.8 out of his doxography. he may have returned to
finish the last part of the text in this separate mfmar as a summary of Plotinus' own views

31

on the same subject. 26 It is less clear, however, why this mfmar would come so late in
Th.A. Given that this section of the Enneads is concerned mostly with the fall of soul
into body and what causes that fall, the Adaptor could have considered it as addressing a
more sped fie point. On the basis of mfmar VI. we have already hypothesized that these
later mayamir are devoted to particular problems dealing with soul. This part of the
paraphrase, then, may bear out that hypothesis. We will see shortly that mimar IX does
so as well.
l\timar VII/: The eighth mfmar, among the longest in Th.A, is clearly marked by textual

corruption. As Zimmermann has remarked. the beginning seems to have followed X.136
in the original paraphrase, so that the heading would be the work of a later editor. 27 The
topic in the first part of vm (I-52), furthermore, does not seem to fit weB with a set of
texts on the soul. Rather, the comparison pursued here (paralleling Enn VI.7) is between
the sensible and intellectual worlds. 28 After the first part of vrn, the textual chaos
becomes even more obvious: Vrn.53 is prefaced by the note: ""This section (bab) had no
heading (ra's) in the copy,',29 This means that Vrn.53ff. need not have originally
folIowed Vm.I-52, and indeed probably did not. The second part of VIII, at any rate,
begins with a very long independent passage discussing the soul's potentiality (52-66),
~6 See fn.18 above.
'17

Zimmermann (1986). 160-1.

'1S It may be relevant that the paraphrase breaks offjust before Enn VI.7.15. where Plotinus turns
from discussing !lOllS proper to the relationship between flotlS and the One. I will argue below that Th.A is
the result of an attempt on the part of the Adaptor to present a group of texts concentrating on soul. and that
other remains of *AP come from sections devoted to intellect and God. The break after VIII.52 is evidence.
though slight evidence. that the Adaptor also separated texts dealing with llOUS from texts dealing with the
First Principle. A very similar break occurs after VIII. 143. which parallels EnnV.I.6. Again. in what
follows Plotinus shifts his focus to the One. leaving the topic of flOIlS behind. Here the division is not so
clear. however: some of the discussion bearing on the One (in particular. how it is able to generate nOils) is
retained before the paraphra'ie breaks off.

32

and then resumes the paraphrase of the treatise (Enn IV.4) dealt with in the first part of

mimar II. If it is true that Th.A was a collection of texts on the soul. this may well have
been part of it. Given considerations that I will note below (section 4.1.2), it seems
possible (as Zimmermann would also have to maintain) that this section originally
followed Th.A II.56. Against this interpretation, one might point out the emphatic
concluding tone of II.56, which does not seem a natural segue into the continued
arguments of Vrn.52ff, though of course this final sentence could have been written by a
later editor. At any rate, it seems safe enough to conclude that Vm.53-97 represents a
fragment from the paraphrase dealing with soul, which was corrupted and mixed with
other texts to form mimar VID. (The end of this section. Vm.97, is sufficiently abrupt
that it seems unlikely to have been the original conclusion for this part of the paraphrase.)
What follows in VIII tends to support this hypothesis. It is a long section (98-143) on the
One and intellect that overlaps with parts of GS. The same (with the exception of overlap
with GS) is true of the remainder of vm (144-189). This last section could have
belonged to a part of AP devoted to intellect since, as pointed out in the concluding
passage (VIn. J89), it concentrates on the beauty of the noetic world.

Allmar IX: After the chaos of vm, the ninth mimar seems to constitute a return to the
familiar concerns of Th.A. Again. the mima,. falls into two parts: the first (1-63) is drawn
from Enn IV.7 and argues for the immortality of the soul. This section seems to be
designed as a self-contained chapter ofTh.A: it begins with the first sentence of IV.7 and
ends with an original conclusion of the kind familiar from previous mayiimir. 30 The

19

See p. 99. fn.9 in Badawi"(1955).

~O And again. lhere is a shift in the argument immediately following in Plotinus.

33

placement of mfmar lX sorts well with the exploration of specific problems related to
soul in VI and VII (and perhaps Vill.53-97). Having shown early in Th.A that the soul is
not a body, the Adaptor here proves on the basis of this that the soul is immortal.
The second part (64-90), paralleling Enn V.1, is another matter. It begins with the
heading "Some odd points," and the evidence of the text does not seem to speak strongly
for or against including it in an original mfmar IX. The section does begin with a one
sentence introduction, but this can easily be taken as a later addition. The closing
sentence does not have the emphatic finality of some we have seen, but it parallels the
end of V.I and so probably does preserve an original break in the text. This latter fact is
the most persuasive reason to think the second part of IX belongs where it is, attached to
the first part. A reference to materialism added by the Adaptor in 1X.78 also helps to
unite the two parts. Still, it may well be that the second part of IX was only attached to
the first part later, as the heading seems to suggest. 31
Afimar X: The final mlmar of Th.A, according to its title, deals with "The First Cause and

the Things that Originate From It." This is based on the title of Enn V.2 C'On the Genesis
and Order of Those After the First"), though the Arabic title puts more emphasis on the
First itself as the topic. In fact, turning to the text we find that the first section of X (133) deals largely with intellect and soul, and their relation to the higher principles,
especially the One. In other words, as one might suspect, the Greek title represents the
content of the section more accurately. The section paraIIels the entirety of the short

.'1 The other possible interpretation of the heading is that the Adaptor wrote it to indicate that he
was changing topic between 63 and 64. and that the lalter portion simply covers points that did not fit easily
into any other pan of *Th.A.

34

treatise V.2, and ends with an original concluding passage of the sort now familiar to us
(31-33).
In section two of mfmar X (34-136), drawn from Enn VI.7, the text focuses on the
status of things as Forms in the intellect, and in particular on the nature of man in the
noetic realm. Or, as it is put at X.78ff., the chief question is the relationship between "the
man of soul" and "the man of intellect." Shortly thereafter comes the gap (X.81-2) which
we suggested above is a sure sign of selective paraphrase on the part of the Adaptor. The
ending of this second section is quite abrupt, and no wonder: for this is the missing
paraphrase from before the first section of mfmar VID. The clear implication is that
X.34-136 preceded VID.I-5 I in the text. If it is the case, as we argued above, that

vm.l-

51 was not part of the original order of Th.A, then neither was X.34-136. The same
argument would hold for the third and final section of X (137-194), which also focuses on
the intellectual realm. All this raises the question of how much, if any, of the last mfmar
could have fit into an intentionally ordered text whose purpose was to present a doctrine
of the soul. Certainly, everything following X.34 is the product of textual corruption. It
is possible that the first section of the mfmar, however, was designed as a concluding
discussion of the soul's relation to the upper principles, or perhaps even as a bridge
between the part of * AP dealing with soul and that dealing with intellect and the One.
But given the title of mfmar X, I am inclined to think that the entirety of X must be
excluded from a work chiefly dealing with soul.
Before drawing any further conclusions, let us summarize the themes of the
mayiimir:

35

I: A doxography on the topic of soul.

II: I-56 discusses relation of soul to intellect; 57-99 the relation of soul to body.
III: Refutation of materialism regarding soul.

IV: Continuation of rejection of materialism; the relation of soul to intellect.

V: The First Principle, with a possible focus on sours relation to that Principle.

VI: The stars and magic. The first of a series of specific problems regarding soul?
VII: Fall of the soul.

VIII: Obviously corrupt. The second section (53-97) is germane to soul.

IX: Immortality of the soul. The second section (64-90) was probably not originally
attached.
X: Obviously corrupt. The first section (1-33) could be a conclusion to the paraphrase on
soul.
Far from the obvious chaos Zimmermann finds in Th.A, we have here the traces
of a possible organization for the text. The most striking features of this are the
apparently doxographic function of mimar I, the focus throughout almost the entire text
on soul, and the progression of the text from the nature of soul to its relation to the other
hypostases of the Plotinian cosmos, followed perhaps by sections dealing with more
specific problems regarding soul. It is also worth noting that the mayiimir most difficult
to reconcile with this scheme are

vm and X, which are certainly corrupt and therefore no

reliable indicator of the original state of Th.A. 32 Against Zimmermann's hypothesis that
Th .A was pieced together from a pile of loose parts of * AP, then, I would suggest the
~2 It may also be significant that these two mayiimir differ strikingly in length from the other eight.
being roughly twice as long as most of the others. This alone suggests that they may have been altered by
the addition of extraneous material from elsewhere in *AP.

36

following as a possible history of the text. Confronted with a text of the Enneads or, very
likely, the second half thereof (Enn IV-VI), the Adaptor set out to reorganize the text
according to the Plotinian hierarchy. The entire resulting text was the original * AP, and
since it included the Prologue the title of .heology" probably applied to this complete
text. One part of *AP. which we can call *Th.A, was intended to deal with soul. and
most of the current Th.A consists of parts of this text. Given the likelihood that the word

'mtmar' dates from very early in the fonnative history ofTh,A, we may hypothesize that
*Th.A was divided by the Adaptor into sections that he called mayiimir. Other portions
of *AP were devoted to the intellect and the First Principle (it is unclear whether intellect
was dealt with separately from the One). Given the focus of OS on these higher
principles, it derives from these other portions. This, incidentally, provides us with an
excellent explanation for why Th.A and OS do not overlap. As for GS, it is difficult to
say more than that it represents fragments from various parts of *AP. 33 The entire text

* AP did undergo a process of serious corruption, as Zimmermann argues, yet this

corruption was not as complete as he supposes. It was, however, disruptive enough to
split up the corpus into three different texts. A later editor in the possession of *Th.A (or
parts of it) and other fragments from *AP affixed the fragments to *Th.A, perhaps using
the Adaptors word mfmar when re-titling the confused results (namely Th.A

vrn and X).

It is of course a matter of speculation to try to separate the re-orderings of the Adaptor

33 Two things are worth noting in passing about GS. despite its obviously fragmentary nature. The
first is that these fragments may also preserve some intentional re-ordering by the Adaptor. For example.
the section GS 1I.59ff, which is drawn from Enn IV.4. deals with the universal soul. and follows a section
(GS 11.45-58) which has the same theme. but is taken from Enn IV.9. The two sections also resonate with
one another through their use of the signet-ring metaphor (GS 11.53 and 61 ). Another example is the
transition from GS 72-3: the parallel passages are separated by over 100 lines of Greek. but the two parts of
the paraphrase are united by their use of the same example of light's presence in air. The second is that

37

from those of the editor of Th.A, but cenainly the more jarring and nonsensical junctures
(which are mostly in the later parts of Th.A) are the work of this editor. In most cases, it
seems, the editor ofTh.A did far less editing than even Zimmermann supposed, which is
why some breaks in the text are completely abrupt or marked by admissions of textual
confusion.
All this tends to cast doubt on, or at least force us to examine more critically, the
views of Zimmermann on the origins of Th.A. Yet there are also a variety of points to be
raised against our revised history. Why, for instance, do the mfmar labels preface the
corrupt parts ofTh.A, and why don't they appear at all in other parts of AP? The former
could be ascribed to the editor of Th.A, as just suggested, and the latter could be a
combination of bad luck (the titles have been lost) or the fact that the Adaptor only used
the word in his section on the soul. Still, the fact is awkward. Further, if the ordering
principle is as we have described, then why doesn't the Adaptor make it more explicit?
The only explicit suggestion of a master plan for the text is at the end of the Prologue, and
its support for our thesis is to some extent ambiguous. 34 Surely, if the Adaptor had gone
to the trouble to rearrange pans of the Enneads into Th.A, he would have drawn attention
to the fact more conspicuously. Another hypothesis, taking these last points into account,
would be that the Adaptor was not the person who rearranged * AP into a section on soul.
That is, there could be three levels of "adaptation": (I) the Adaptor himself, who wrote a
paraphrase of the last three Enneads, (2) a first editor who separated the texts according to
there are fragments in GS which deal with soul: given the corruption in the later parts of Th.A. it is possible
that these fragments were originally in the pan of *AP dealing with soul. that is, in *Th.A.
:4 If the Prologue does support my interpretation. then it suggests that the pans of *AP dealing
with the intellect and the One were originally before *Th.A. not after it. But the opposite is suggested by

38

topic. (3) a final editor responsible for our Th.A, who patched up a corrupted copy of the
work of editor (2). But given that the re-ordering in the paraphrase can sometimes be
attributed with confidence to the Adaptor. as I have argued above, I think this hypothesis
is exceedingly unlikely. If there was an intentional re-ordering of the text, it was almost
certainly the Adaptor who did it.
This brings us back to what is, for the purposes of this study, the most important
lesson of our discussion of the order of AP. The Adaptor mayor may not have been the
one who seriously changed the sequence of the Plotinian texts in the paraphrase. But
several pieces of evidence adduced above make it clear that he was to some extent
selective in choosing what to paraphrase: we saw at least two places where he was almost
certainly responsible for a "gap" in what was paraphrased. 35 This has important
implications for our analysis of the philosophy of AP, because it shows that the Adaptor
was a critical reader of Plotinus. We will see many examples in the following chapters
that show his philosophically critical attitude. The evidence thus far demonstrates the
extent to which this attitude governed the entire project of rendering Plotinus into Arabic.

1.2 The origins of AP

As remarked above. the bulk of research on the Arabic Plotinus is devoted to determining
the origins of AP, and the possible sources on which the Adaptor drew in composing it.
Below I discuss some of the most important contributions and outstanding questions
regarding AP's history and the influences that may be detected in it. Foremost among
the fact that it is the latter parts of Th.A which are seriously corrupted. On the other hand. perhaps the order
of topics in the Prologue simply reflects the importance of the topics. not their order in the text.
35

At DS 63-64 and Th.A X.81-82.

39

these questions, of course, is the identity of the Adaptor, since knowing this would tell us
a great deal about his philosophical project and the sources he may have used. But other
specific problems have emerged from previous literature on AP: the role of Porphyry in
its history, the relation of AP to ai-KindT and other texts produced by al-Kindrs circle.
and its later influence on Arabic philosophy. I will reserve mention of the so-called
"Long Version" of Th.A until discussion of these later texts, for reasons which will
become clear (see below, 1.3.2).

1.2.1 The identity of the Adaptor

The Prologue of Th.A, as mentioned above, bears an inscription which may shed some
light on the question of who composed *AP. It reads as follows:
Prol.l [B 3]: The first mfmar of the book of Aristotle the philosopher named in
Greek 'Theology (lIIhiillgiyii),' that is, doctrine on divinity (rubiibiyya). The
commentary (tajsfr) of Porphyry (Furjilrfus) of Tyre, translated (Ilaqala) into
Arabic by "Abd al-Masih Ibn "Abdallah ibn Na-ima al-Him~I. and corrected
(a~la!la) for Ahmad ibn al-Mu't~im Billah by Abu YusufYa"qiib ibn Ishaq alKindT.
\Ve saw above (section 1.104) that the Prologue very likely preceded the entirety of * AP,
so that the roles assigned here should hold true not just for Th.A, but for as and DS as
well. The question, then. is how to intepret this inscription: does it tell us who the
Adaptor is? Certainly. on the most natural reading of the verbs used (my translation
attempts to follow such a reading), it sounds as though the Adaptor should be Porphyry.
This impression is supported by the use of the noun tafsir, which strongly suggests that
the text in front of us is not a putative work on theology by Aristotle, but in fact a

40

commentary by Porphyry based on that work. 36 Still, this evidence is not decisive: as
Zimmermann has pointed out, the claim could result from confusion over the fact that
Porphyry was the editor of the Enneads. Zimmennann himself holds that, despite the
unambiguous statement here that he translated (not composed) AP, it was actually Ibn
Na'ima al-Him~I who wrote the paraphrase. His main argument for this is that there are
some features of the paraphrase that can only have been added by someone writing in
Arabic. Chief among the textual evidence for this fact are references to the Qur~an.37 and
we will also see that the philosophical views of the Adaptor are motivated by theological
disputes in the Muslim world.
If substantial parts of the paraphrase were written by an Arabic author, then
Him~I

is indeed the likeliest candidate. For the role assigned to aI-KindT with the term

"corrected" rules out revision on the scale of the Adaptor's undertaking.

Him~r. on

the

other hand. may have taken numerous liberties as a translator. This was not uncommon
in al-KindT"s circle. if the other texts that have come down to us are any indication.:nl
Unfortunately, we do not know enough about

Him~T to

help confinn or rule out his

authorship of the paraphrase. His name tells us that he was a Syrian Christian,39 and of
Course he would have been one of the members ofal-KindI's circle of translators, which
suggests that he may well have been engaged with the wider project of transmitting
Hellenist philosophy. We also know that he translated logical works from the
.~6 Zimmermann. I think, minimizes this impression by implying that the text has the verb ifassara>
inslead (Zimmermann (1986). 118). The term taftir could also be translated more broadly as "explanation"
or "expounding:'
37 See Zimmennann (1986). 115-6, 141-2. Somewhat less convincing. but much more colorful. is
the reference made by the Adaptor to snake-channing at Th.A VI.27.
.; 8

For example. the Arabic Proclus texts discussed in Endress ( 1973).

41

Aristotelian corpus. This sorts well with the features of the paraphrase that import. for
example, Aristotelian ideas into Plotinus. Zimmermann argues that there is a pervasive
"dilettantism" in AP, which is easily attributed to someone like Him~i.-to I believe the
following chapters will show that. even if the Adaptor's knowledge of Greek texts was
not what it might have been, he was anything but a philosophic dilettante. Yet there is
equally no reason to think that one of al-Kindrs translators could not have been a man of
considerable philosophical subtlety:u And, as will become clear, it cannot be shown that
the Adaptor was influenced by texts that someone like

Him~i would

certainly not have

known. Thus I agree with Zimmermann that there is nothing in AP which rules out
Him~f as

an Adaptor, though I do not think we can say with confidence that

Zimmermann's solution is the correct one. What does seem to me right about
Zimmermann's thesis is that it attributes the adaptation to only one author. The
considerations above about the intentional re-ordering in * AP serve only to strengthen
this conclusion.

1.2.2 The role of Porphyry

Zimmermann, in arguing that it was

Him~f

who composed the paraphrase, challenged the

opinion that had overwhelmingly prevailed until that time, namely that AP represents a

39

Zi mmermann ( 1986). 136: he was "presumably a Melkite from western Syria."

-JO Zimmermann (1986). 117. See also 116: "[The author of AP] bears the features. not ofa learned
Greek philosopher. but of an amateur. The man we are looking for knows the Koran [and] has an uncertain
grasp of Greek philosophy:'

-II This underscores the fact that. even if we could identify Him~T as the Adaptor. this would lead to
no considerable increase in our philosophical understanding of AP. After all. we know almost nothing else
about tlim~ls philosophical background. except that he also translated works by Aristotle. One reason.
then. that [ reserve judgment on the question of the Adaptor's identity is to foreground questions about the
philosophical content of AP rather than questions about its authorship.

42

Porphyrian commentary on Plotinus. As we have seen. the best piece of evidence for this
internal to AP is the assertion in the Prologue that Th.A is a "commentary" by Porphyry.
But there is striking evidence for the same thesis external to AP: in his Life of Plotinus,
Porphyry mentions that he wrote "commentaries (hypnomnemara)" for some passages in
the Enneads. and headings (kephalaia)" to accompany almost all of Plotinus' writings. 4 :!
Not only does the mention of "commentaries" match the attribution in the Prologue. but
the kephalaia are echoed by the so-called ru'iis (literally. "heads") that have come down
to us attached to Th.A. The latter correspondence is especially striking given the
etymological similarity of the words:u Indeed. Henry and Schwyzer were sufficiently
struck by this to translate ru 'iis as "cephalaea in their edition of Plotinus and Lewis'
translation of AP.
Nor does the evidence for the Porphyry hyPOthesis stop there. In two papers
presented in Paris in 1969. Pierre Thillet and S. Pines argued that AP bore definite marks
of Porphyry's philosophical influence. Thillet's primary argument for this is that. like
Porphyry in his Sentences. the author of AP holds to a doctrine of docta ignorantia. or an
ignorance higher than knowledge.~ Pines. meanwhile. concentrates on the paraHels
-ll Life:: of Plotinus. 26. The:: only treatise not given kephalaia by Porphyry was 1.6. "On Beauty:'
See also Zimmermann's discussion of this passage. Zimmermann (1986) 170-177.
-I.; Zimmermann, rather desperately it seems to me, argues (Zimmermann ( 1986), 171) that since
the Adaptor uses the term ru'iis at one point (Ru ';ls.60) to mean something different. he would not have
used it to mean "heading:'
-l-l P. Thillet. "[ndices Porphyriens dans la Theologie d'AristOle:' in in Le Neoplatonisme.
Colloques [nternationaux. du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifiquc. Sciences Humaines. Royaumont
9-13 luin 1969 (Paris. 1971). 299. Thillet also provides the following supplementary arguments: (a) the use
of the Arabic term hay'a to signify the union of soul and body could translate the Porphyrian term schesis
(296): (b) AP avoids paraphrasing passages which subscribe to metempsychosis. which Porphyry rejected
(ibid.): (c) AP uses causal language more frequently than Plotinus (296-7); (d) the Adaplor is intimately
familiar with the tex.t of the Enneads (198. fn.5).

Briefly. [ should point out that these are fairly weak arguments: (a) as we will see, the
theory of soul's relation to body in AP is mostly indebted to Aristotle; (b) not only could passages

43

between AP and a commentary on Plato ~ s Parmenides which has been attributed to

Porphyry: the idea that the One is both "pure being" (in AP, anniyyajaqa[, in Porphyry,

einai monon) and the cause of being, and the idea that the One creates

being~

but intellect

is required to "actualize" it as the Forms..J5 As we will see later on, these are central
issues in the philosophy of AP. Whether they are traces left by the hand of Porphyry is a
matter of heated debate: Christina D' Ancona Costa has argued that, despite a superficial
resemblance between AP's doctrines and those of the Parmenides commentary, the two
texts actually have quite different views.';6 But recently Richard Taylor has defended the
similarity of the pure being' doctrine in AP and Porphyry.';7 I will return to these more
properly philosophical debates below in my discussion of learned ignorance in chapter 4
and the First Principle in chapter 5.
Restricting ourselves, then, to the philological evidence, how likely is it that AP
represents in some way the writings of Porphyry? Two crucial points bearing on this
question have already emerged. First, at least some of the paraphrase was written by an
author from the Muslim world, with

Him~i being

a strong possibility. Second. the

supporting metempsychosis be absent by chance. but a later Adaptor who was a Christian or Muslim would
have been at least as likely to avoid such doctrines (we have already seen a case where the Adaptor may
have dodged Plotinus' suppon of pagan demons); (c) there are a variety of linguistic habits which
characterize AP. most of which are not reminiscent of Porphyry: (d) there is no way of knowing how
familiar a later Adaptor might have been with the entire Enneads. but we will see that he approached the
tex.t with considerable philosophical sophistication. For a discussion of the theme of learned ignorance. see
below. section 4.1.3.
':5 S. Pines. "La Longue Recension della Theologie d'Aristote dans ses rappons avec la doctrine
ismaelienne:' Revue des etudes islamiques. 22 (1954). 7-20.
':0 C. D' Ancona Costa. Recherches sur Ie Liber de Causis. Etudes de philosophic medievale. vol.
72. Paris: J. Vrin. 1995). 141-3 and 146. By the same author, "II tema della 'docta ignorantia' nel
neoplatonismo arabo. Un contributo all'analisi delle fonti di 'Teologia di Aristotele: mimiir n:' in
Concordia Discors: Studi offeni a Giovanni Santinello (Medioevo e Umanismo 84) (Padova: Editrice
Antenore, 1993). 12ff.

-n R.C. Taylor, "Aquinas. the Plotinialla Arabica and the Metaphysics of Being and Actuality:'
Journal of the History ofldeas 59 (1998).241-264.

44

paraphrase was composed by one author. In favor of the first point. we have the textual
evidence supplied by Zimmermann. This evidence is admittedly rather slim. inasmuch as
it relies on fairly vague parallels between AP and the

Qur~an and

Zimmennann's

conviction that the Adaptor was a neophyte regarding Greek philosophy. More
substantial evidence can be adduced. however, from the philosophical study undertaken
here: on several points. the Adaptor seems concerned to address philosophical problems
proper ro the theological debates of Islam. To give only one example, the Adaptor's
treatment of divine predication very deliberately employs the vocabulary (notably the
term ~ifa, or attribute") of those debates, often importing this vocabulary into texts
without a parallel in the Greek. While we will need to consider the possible Porphyrian
nature of some of the Adaptor's doctrines. there is no question that the paraphrase
includes much that Porphyry could not have written. Further, as Zimmermann has
argued, the striking coincidence of Porphyry's kephalaia and the TU 'iis of Th.A seems to
be, on closer inspection, just that: a coincidence. For the TU 'uS seem completely useless
a~

an actual set of "headings" for the Enneads. Rather, they are bits of paraphrase drawn

from Enn IVA, and as Zimmermann has suggested, look more like a "first-stage skeleton
translation" than anything Porphyry would have produced. 48
As for the second point, namely that the paraphrase is united as the work of only
one Adaptor, this is a more subjective issue. The entire paraphrase is united stylistically,
but then of course if one person, writing in Arabic, had added his own material to a
commentary by Porphyry, the resulting text would be have the style of that later author.
And in concluding his own strenuous, and largely convincing, arguments against the

-18

Zimmermann (1986). 127. See below, 2.2.2. for funher discussion of the purpose of the ru'ils.

45

Porphyry hypothesis, Zimmermann remarks: It is not my purpose to deny the possibility

of some reliance by

Him~i

on Porphyrian glosses lost to us. That possibility has little

bearing on the crucial questions surrounding the origins of *AP." In other words, even if
much of the paraphrase is not by Porphyry. there is no way to rule out the possibility that
it was based. not on the Enneads, but on Porphyry's hypnomnemata. While this may not
be crucial for determining the textual origins of AP, it could be decisive philosophically,
since the possible influence of Porphyry bears on such central issues as the doctrine of
"pure being' in AP. We need to argue, then, not only that there is no need to posit a
Porphyrian source text for the paraphrase. but that the paraphrase was definitely based on
Plotinus' text and nothing else. My own impression is that. at a minimum, almost all of
the paraphrasing was done by a later Adaptor. I base this impression on the doctrinal
themes that run through the paraphrase, many of which seem to be non-Porphyrian (as
argued above). In other words, there seems only to be one layer of doctrinal modification
to Plotinus, not two, potentially clashing, modifications. But if the source text was by
Porphyry. it should have been a full-blown commentary; this would lead us to expect a
great deal of Porphyry in the paraphrase, not just a hint of his influence here or there. All
this suggests that it was our later Adaptor who based the paraphrase directly on the text of
the Enneads. But the conclusion is subjective, because a differently inclined reader might
come away with the reverse impression: the few elements that are definitely nonPorphyrian are accretions to a primarily Porphyrian text, and it is Porphyry who is
responsible for the doctrinal continuity of AP. While I think this is unlikely, the two
theses can only be adjudicated after a thorough philosophical analysis of the text. Thus I
will return to this question in the concluding chapter of this study. One further point to

46

bear in mind in the meantime. however. is that even if Porphyry did not compose any of
the paraphrase, he still might have influenced it: for perhaps the Adaptor read something
by Porphyry, or a mediating text which provided indirect Porphyrian influence.

1.3 Other texts related to AP

Tracing the full extent and nature of the reception of AP in the Islamic. Jewish
and Christian worlds is a task well beyond the purposes of this study. But since [ have
already indicated the important role of AP. and especially Th.A. in transmitting
Neoplatonism to the Arabic-speaking milieu. it might be helpful to indicate some of the
texts and authors who provide the most eloquent testimony to this influence. [t will also
be helpful at the outset to sort out the place of AP among the texts of its own day. There
are a number of contemporary or near-contemporary works that are, to varying degrees,
related to AP. We will have the opportunity to revisit several of these in our study of AP.
I will end this chapter. then. by mentioning first some texts roughly contemporary to AP,
and then texts and authors that used AP later in the tradition. [will not attempt to give
any analysis of these texts here. but will restrict myself to noting relatively
uncontroversial connections between them and AP.

I.3. I Earl y works related to AP

(a) Zimmermann"s *Tlzeology: In his extensive philological study of AP. Fritz
Zimmermann has argued that the original paraphrase of Plotinus, *AP. was part of a
larger collection of texts made by al-Kindi~s translators. He suggests that this collection

47

was a sort of ""metaphysics file"" used byal-KindI. 49 He calls this the *Theology. The
evidence for such an original" larger collection comes from three sources.

First~

al-FarabI

attributes to the 4iheology"' of Aristotle ideas that actually derive from the Arabic version
of Proclus (see (c) below) and from translations of Alexander of Aphrodesias. AIBaghdadI. depending on al-Farabi. also associates texts deriving from Proclus and
Alexander with such a

Theology.~"

Yet in referring to the same

text~

al-FarabI quotes at

length from some version of the Arabic Plotinus. 5o Proclus and Alexander are
transmitted together in a confused fashion by al-DimashqI~ a bit later than al-KindI"s
circle. Zimmennann concludes from this evidence that these bits of Proclus and
Alexander were also part of a text called the 4iheology." which also contained the Arabic
Plotinus texts. This, then. would be the original *Theology, source for AP and also the
Liber de Causis. If Zimmermann is right we have yet another indication of the
eclecticism of al-Kindrs circle. and in particular their \villingness to combine different
strands of Greek thought (the Peripatetic Alexander and the Neoplatonic Plotinus and
Proclus) into a single whole, in this case a single work! In addition. since this larger
*T/zeology also seems to have been mistakenly attributed to Aristotle, we should take it

into account when trying to decide why Th.A was taken for an Aristotelian work. 5 I
(b) The Treatise on the Two Worlds: In his publication of the texts that make up GS,
Franz Rosenthal included a work also attributed to the "Greek sage," called The Treatise

oN Zi mmermann ( 1986). 13 I. For an update of his views on this and related issues. see
Zi mmermann. uProclus Arabus Rides Again." Arabic Sciences and Philosophv 4 (1994). 9-51.

50 It is not clear whether this version is our Th.A or the Longer Version of Th.A. for which see
below. 1.3.2 (a).
51 This laner point also goes for the Liber de Causis. since it too is wrongly attributed to Aristotle
and could derive ultimately from Zimmermann's *Tlzeology.

48

on an Explanation of the Two Worlds, the Spiritual and the Bodily.52 The work is clearly
based largely on Plotinus, because it is Plotinian in doctrine and frequently parallels
specific texts in the Enneads. However, the Treatise is not derived from *AP, because it
contains little or nothing in the way of actual quotation from Plotinus. At one point, we
do find a near quotation from Th.A (Treatise 32, paralleling Th.A VI.40 and 48-49), but
here too Th.A seems closer to Plotinus' Greek than the Treatise does. It seems reasonable
to suppose that the Treatise is based, not on the Enneads, but on AP or some portion
thereof. For further discussion of this text, see below, 3.2.3.
(c) Proclus Arabus and the Liber de Causis: In the Latin West, a pseudo-Aristotelian
work of Neoplatonism played a role similar to that ofTh.A in the Arabic-speaking world.
This work was not part of AP, but rather the Liber de Causis, a similar paraphrase based
on Proclus' Elements of Theology rather than on Plotinus. In Arabic it was called the
'Book on the Pure Good," not the "'Book of Causes." Gerhard Endress has shown that
this Proclean paraphrase was, like AP, produced in al-Kind"f s circle in Baghdad. along
with another group of twenty Proclean propositions studied by Endress. 53 I will call the
latter group of propositions the Proclus Arabus. While neither group of propositions
directly transmits material from the Enneads, both are characterized by the same sorts of
philosophical transformations that we find in AP. For example, the Proclus Arabus
shares with AP the doctrine that God is "only being (amliyya faqa!J:,5~ A plethora of
philosophical paraJlels between the paraphrases in AP and the Liber de Causis has been
uncovered by Cristina D' Ancona Costa, and on this basis she has argued that the Liber de

5l

Rosenthal (1955),42-65.

53

Endress (1973).

49

Causis is posterior to and deeply influenced by the Plotinian paraphrase.55 The simplest
point in favor of this interpretation is perhaps the most compelling one: the Liber de
Causis throws over the more complex Proclean system in favor of a three-hypostasis
Plotinian cosmos, consisting of God, the intellect, and soul. I will, however, have
occasion to note more subtle borrowings from AP in the de Causis.

1.3.2 The later influence of AP

(a) The "Longer Version" ofTh.A: By the early 16th century in Europe, there was a
version of the '"Theology of Aristotle" available in Latin. A Jewish physician, Moses
Arovas, made this Latin "Theology" from an Arabic text discovered in Damascus. Its
publication in 1519 was followed by an improved Latin text by Jacques Charpentier in
1572. 56 There are important differences between this Latin "Theology" and our Th.A.
Some of these differences have to do with the organization of the text: the Latin version is
longer. and split into 14 instead of 10 chapters. Further, there are doctrinal differences; in
particular, the Latin or Longer Version (hereafter LV) espouses a doctrine of the "word,"
an uncreated hypostasis between God and the first created effect, which is intellect. It
was long thought that these variations were due to European, Christian alterations to the
text. This misconception was banished in 1929 by A. Borissov's discovery of an Arabic
text for LV which represents the source for the Latin translation. and which in fact
contains the same doctrinal divergences. Thus Borissov correctly thought that LV was a

5-l

Proclus Arabus. prop.21. line 36. See Endress ( 1973). 204.

55

See the articles collected in D' Ancona Costa ( 1995).

56 I take this information from P. Fenton. "The Arabic and Hebrew Versions of the Theology of
Aristorle. in Kraye et al. (1986). 241.

50

much earlier. different version of the '7heology" written in Arabic. Incorrectly. he

thought that LV was actually an earlier version than our Th.A. and that some editor had
expunged those doctrines favorable to Christianity. in order to produce the shorter version
of the 'Theology" (that is. Th.A). That this is incorrect can be inferred from the fact that
none of the portions of LV with no parallel in Th.A have a parallel in the Enneads. which
seems to indicate that Th.A is closer to the Greek source than LV. 57
When was LV composed. then? This is a matter of great dispute. and numerous
eminent scholars have suggested mutually incompatible answers to the question. Shlomo
Pines argues that LV may have represent an

Ism~i"ilr version

of the '''Theology'' or a

version which anticipates Isma"Ilism. In support of this he points out several parallels
between the ideosyncratic notions of LV and the Isma"nTs. for instance. the
aforementioned doctrine of the Word. which is identical with the will. knowledge and
command (amr) of God. and the characterization of God as non-being (in LV.laysa).58
S.M. Stem gives an intricate argument to show that LV. along with works by Isaac Israeli
and Ibn Hasday" all depend on some unknown Neoplatonic source text. 59 Zimmermann
argues against both these positions. holding that LV was produced prior to the Isma"ili
movement. probably by the early 10th century. and that it might have been the source for
Isaac Israeli. who was in tum the source for Ibn Hasday.60 Paul Fenton. usefully stressing

57

The same point is made by Zimmermann (1986).112.

5S Pines ( 1954). On closer inspection. these doctrines also tend to militate against a Christian
source for LV. The use of the term "command" (amr). for example. is probably inspired by the Qur"an
<Pines. 8).
59 S.M. Stern. "Ibn Hasday's Neoplatonist: A Neoplatonic Treatise and its Influence on Isaac
Israeli and the Longer Version of the Theology of Aristotle:' Oriens 23-4 (1961). 58-120. Reprinted in
Stern. Medieval Arabic and Hebrew Thought (London: Variorum. 1983).
611

See Zimmermann (1986). appendices XVIII-XIX.

51

the popularity of LV in the Jewish medieval tradition, suggests that this longer
'"Theology" might have been produced by Jews living in Egypt under the Fatimids. 61
These are not issues that can be sorted out here. More important for our purposes
is the recognition that Borissov was in fact wrong that LV predates the shorter version of
the ''Theology'' which I have called Th.A. The latter is the text we will be examining in
this study. so it is imperative to detennine that it, and not LV, represents the thought of
the Adaptor. Now. the shorter Th.A does prepare the way for several of the doctrines
peculiar to LV. For example. the Adaptor's rather literal and quite widespread translation
of Plotinus' logos as kalima facilitates adding a docrine of the Word to the text.
However, the Adaptor usually talks about these "words" the way Plotinus does: as forms
in the sensible world which participate in the intelligible Forms (a doctrine which goes
back. of course, to the logoi spennarikoi of the Stoics). Far from saying that the Word is
hypostasized above intellect, he insists that intellect is itself transcendent above the
kalimiil (GS 1.32-35).62 In a related contrast. the Adaptor says that God creates "without

an intermediary," (Th.A X.153 and elsewhere), whereas LV says that ""there exists no
intermediate between [the intellect] and Him other than His command, that is, His word,
which is the cause of the intellect. ,,63 The doctrines of LV should, then. be seen as
accretions to the text of Th.A. As such, they have no place in a reconstruction of the
Adaptor's thought. and for this reason I have excluded LV from further consideration in
what follows.

61

Fenton (1986), 256.

61

Although he does invent the term "intellectual word (kalima 'aqliyyar (VIII. 133. IX.49).

6.l

I translate this from Pines' French text. Pines (1954). 8.

52

(b) Isaac Israeli (10th century): Thanks to the efforts of S.M. Stem and A. Altmann, we
have a good understanding of the Jewish Neoplatonist philosopher Ishaq Isririli. 64 Israeli
was deeply influenced by al-KindT~ whose thought is suffused with ideas from AP (see
appendix A below), and he read either LV or its source text, depending on whether one
accepts Stern's or Zimmermann's reconstruction of Israeli's relation to LV. Here I
summarize some of the ideas taken over from the tradition of AP into his works65 :
God creates through His power and will," a formulation found also in LV. However,
in Israeli God's power and will are not hypostatized, but identical to His essence.
God creates His first effect "without an intermediary," a formulation that goes back to
Th.A and also appears in ai-KindT (see below. appendix A section 2). As in Th.A, God is
the "Cause of causes," and characterized as a Creator even though, according to Israeli,
the intellect goes on to create further effects by necessary emanation. This latter point,
too seems to accord with al-KindT's position in his treatise On the True Agent, and it has
affinities in both Th.A and LV. The latter two texts, and especially LV. anticipate
Israel i' s use of the phrase "First Creator" to describe God.
Israeli's taxonomy of the fourfold intellect is heavily dependent on al-KindT~ who in
turn was deeply influenced by AP (see appendix A, section 3). Israeli is also one member
of the tradition that sees matter as one of the primary causes of the universe. a tradition
most closely associated with Solomon Ibn Gabirol. In the case of Israeli, universal matter
is described as an effect of God which. together with universal form, is prior to intellect.

~ See A. Altmann and S.M. Stem. Isaac Israeli: A NeopIatonic Philosopher of the Early Tenth
Century (London: Greenwood. 1958).
1>5

I take these points from Altmann and Stern (1958).151-217.

53

This is not
matter.

Plotinian~ but

However~

may have as an ultimate source Plotinus' doctrine of intelligible

passages on this topic from the Enneads do not appear in our AP.

For Israeli there is a three-fold division of universal soul on the model of the
Aristotelian individual soul (nutritive, sensitive and rational), which is taken from LV.
There is also an hypostatization of nature, which is equated with the heavenly sphere.
This may likewise derive from LV.
Several metaphors used by Israeli can be found in
lower emanations as a

"horizon:~

AP~

e.g. the characterization of the

the use of darkness~~ and shadow" to describe these

lowest entities (which parallels LV), and the comparison of intellect to the light of the
sun.
(c) al-FarabT (died ca. 950): A rough contemporary of Isaac Israeli, the better-known alFarubi provides us 'With perhaps the most notorious invocation ofTh.A as a pseudoAristotelian text. In a work devoted to showing the agreement between Aristotle and
Plato. al-FarabT cites the

"Theology~' to

show that Aristotle believed in creation ex nihilo,

the presence of unity in every multiplicity, and the existence of spiritual Forms on the
Platonic model. He also quotes the famous ascent passage from the beginning of Th.A
(.21 ff, paralleling Enn IV .8.1).66 The latter citation is of particular relevance for us,
since the first three references to the "Theology" seem to be based not on AP, but on
Proclus Arabus and perhaps LV. 67 Needless to say, this confusion of the Arabic Plotinus

66 This passage C'Often [ have been alone with my soul and doffed my body...") was perhaps the
most intluemial single portion of AP. appearing widely in Islamic and Jewish literature as a kind of
Neoplatonic commonplace. Among Jewish authors. for example. it is quoted in Moses Ibn Ezra and Ibn
Falaqera. and probably influences Israeli and Ibn Gabirol: see Altmann and Stern (1958). 191.

67 See Zimmermann's discussion of these references in Zimmennann (1986). 177-180. The

citations appear in al-Farabrs Harmony between Plato and Aristotle. which is available in al-Farabi.
Altariibfs philosophische Abhandlungen. edited by F. Dieterici (Osnabriick: 1982). The use of Proclus

54

and Proc1us texts facilitated

al-Farabi~s attempt

to reconcile Aristotle to Plato; it also

provides us with a clue as to how early the misattribution of AP to Aristotle occurred. It

is not yet clear, however. whether al-Farabr read something similar to Th.A or the Longer
Version, though the Arabic Plotinus was surely an important influence on his thought in
whatever form it reached him.
(d) al-Sijistani (died ca. 985) and al-ShahrastanI (1086-1153): Several of the fragments
we possess in GS were preserved for us by al-Sharastani in his work on Muslim sects.
Kitfib al-Milal wa'I-Nihal. For much of his information on philosophy, including the
texts attributed to the "Greek sage," he drew upon Siwan al-Hikma, a collection of texts
and information produced in the school of al-Sijistani in Baghdad. An abridged version
of this text, the Muntakhab al-Siwan al-Hikma, contains further quotes from the '''Greek
sage," which partially parallel those found in al-Shahrastani. 68 AI-SijistanI was one of
several important philosophers who bridge the gap between the more familiar al-Farabi
and Ibn Sina. The philosophy of al-Sijistani and his school has been studied in detail by
Joel Kraemer; it was a philosophy suffused with Neoplatonism. 69 As with al-Farabi, the
influence of AP on Sijistanr was decisive and extensive. Hopefully it will suffice to give
one example of this influence here: it is reported that al-Sijistanf called God the First
existent" (al-mmljiid al-an:u:al), and echoing AP, "being alone" (anniyyafaqaf) (see
above, 5.2.1). We see further use of the terminology of AP when Sijistfuif remarks that
Arabus togcther with Th.A as a source called the 'Theology" is one of the main reasons to support
Zimmermann's *Tlleology hypothesis.
6/l These passages are collected in Lewis' translation as GS IX; I cite them as GS IX SijJSah.
followed by the section number. As Zimmermann (1986).212. observes. GS as a whole looks like a "mixed
bag of extracts derived by various routes" from the original Arabic Plotinus source. This holds true for the
quotations provided in al-Shahrastani and the Muntakhab.
69

Sec J. Kraemer. Philosophy in the Renaissance ofrslam (Leiden: E.l. Brill, 1986).

55

we "can only know concerning the unique One His anniyya and His huwiyya," where
both of these terms are used to mean "being," as opposed to the later use of huwiyya to
mean "essence:,70 It is clear that AP is the ultimate source for these ideas and
terminology; that it was the immediate source is suggested by the presence of quotes from
the "Greek sage" in Siwan al-Hikma.
(e) Commentators: The enduring interest of Muslims and Jews in AP is reflected in the
series of commentaries written on Th.A. The most eminent of the commentators is Ibn
STna. also known as Avicenna (980-1037), His commentary, actually more like a series
of notes on the text, is included in a late work of his, The Fair Jud2ment (al-Ins@. In
appendices Band C below, I have provided a discussion and translation of these notes.
Another commentator was aI-BaghdadT (died 1231). who may have based his
commentary on LV, and who included it in his epitomization of numerous works under
the heading of an Aristotelian "Metaphysics:,71 Later, in the Iranian illuminationist
tradition, the attention paid to Th.A by Ibn STna and al-Suhrawardi (who cites Th.A I in
his Book of Oriental Wisdom) provoked commentaries by aI-ShTrazT (died 1532 or 1542)
and Sa"td Qummt(died 1691).72 We may conclude, then, that AP was influential from
the earl iest days of Arabic philosophy in the works of ai-Kindt. used consistently as this
philosophy developed through figures like al-FarabL al-Sijistant and Ibn Stna. and still
considered important in the later illuminationist tradition. Thus it is fair to say that

70

Kraemer (1986).216-221. The translation is Kraemer's.

71 Other works included texts by Alexander and the Liber de Causis. as well as the real
Metaphysics and commentaries on it by Alexander and Themistius~ see Zimmermann (1986), 180. His
epitomes are published in 'A. Badawi. Aristl1 'ind al-'Arab. (Cairo: 1947).
7:! See M. Aouad "La 'Theologie d' Aristole' et autres textes du Plotinus Arabus:' in Dictionnaire
des Philosophes antiques I. edited by R. Goulet (Paris: 1989),588-589.

56

mainstream Islamic philosophy was always at least in part an engagement with the work
of Plotinus. and that this engagement took place through interpretation of the Arabic
version produced by the Adaptor.

57

CHAPTER 2

THE PROLOGUE AND THE "HEADINGS"

In addition to the main text of the paraphrase which is split up into

Th.A~ GS

and

OS, the Arabic Plotinus contains two fairly mysterious elements, both included as
introductory material for the body of Th.A. These two elements are a Prologue and a set
of "heads" or "headings" (n,'its). The Prologue begins with valuable information about
the transmission

ofTh.A~

including its putative title, author, commentator. translator, and

editor (Prol.l). It goes on to present Th.A as the completion of Aristotle' s philosophy

(ProI.2-II)~ and

to give a concise summary of subjects to be covered in the body of the

paraphrase (ProI.12-22). This is followed immediately by the

headings.~'

which seem to

be a more detailed list of topics taken up in the parallel translation; hence each heading
begins with the worldji. in the sense of on..:' or 'regarding.. :~ In this chapter we will
consider the textual role intended for both the Prologue and the headings. as well as their
philosophical relevance and authorship.

2.1 The Prologue

For ease of reference, I include here

at

the outset a complete translation of the Prologue.

With a few exceptions. my translation does not have any crucial disagreements with that
of Lewis, and as always I retain his section numbers, though the translation is my own.

58

I The first chapter of the book of Aristotle the philosopher, called in Greek
"Theologia.' and it speaks of divinity; an exposition (tajsfr) of Porphyry of Syria,
translated (naqala) into Arabic by AbdalmasIh b. Abdallah b. Na"ima al-Him~1
and improved for Ahmad b. al-Mut~im billah by Abu Yusuf Ya-qub b. Ishaq alKindt. mercy on him and his family.
2 It is fitting for all who strive after knowledge of the end (ghiiya) at which he
aims (iimadu), due to the necessity attaching to it and the extent of the advantage
bestowed upon him from adhering to the path towards what is desired, to tread the
ways (asiilfb) leading to total certainty, removing doubt while leading him to what
he was searching for, and for his behavior to attach obediently to what gives him a
taste of the pleasure of progressing in the practices of the sciences, lifting [him] to
the limit of eminence, the natural desire for which causes intellectual souls to
progress.
3 The wise man said: the first desired is the last attained, and the first attained is
the last desired. Where we get to is the first science which is included in our
book, this being the extreme of our objective and the end of our desire in the end
of what was accomplished from our treatises.
4 And because the end of every investigation and search is only the attainment of
truth, and the end of every act is the execution of the activity, the examination of
the investigation and speculation confers the fixed knowledge that all agents
which come into being act because of the natural, eternal desire and that that
desire and search are a second cause, and that if the meaning of the end, which is
sought in philosophy. is not established, [then] investigation and speculation are
futile, and knowledge is also futile, and goodness and activity are futile.
5 And since it has been established in the agreement of the most excellent
philosophers that the initial, beginning causes of the world are four, and they are
material, formal, agent cause and perfection, it is necessary to speculate on them
and on the accidents arising from and in them. and to know their beginnings and
their causes and the active words in them, and which of the causes among them is
most worthy of precedence and rule. although there is equality among them in
some modes of equality.
6 We have completed previously an explanation of this and an account of their
causes in our book which is after the Physics, and ordered these causes in the
divine intellectual order, following an exposition of the soul and of nature and its
activity.
7 And we established there also the notion of the sought end. through sufficient
[and] compeIling rules, and we made clear that possessors of middles must have
ends, and that the desired is the end, and that the meaning of end is that others
exist because of it, and that it is not because of anything else.
8 The establishment of the existence (anniyyiit) of knowledge is an indication of
the existence (anniyya) of an end, because knowledge is the grasping of the end,
since it is impossible to divide what is infinite with what has end and limit.
9 Research into the principles of the sciences is a useful introduction for him who
wishes to pursue knowledge of the thing sought, and training and skilJ in the
exercising of the sciences are required for him who wishes to proceed to the

59

natural sciences, because they are an aid towards attaining the object of desire and
the exploration of what is sought.
10 And since we have finished with what is customary in introductions, which
are the principles bringing about the explanation for what we wish to explain in
this book of ours, let us avoid prolixity in this discipline, since we have made it
clear in the book of Metaphysics (ma[ii[iijiis"iqii).
11 And let us limit [ourselves] to what we executed there, and mention now our
objective in what we wish to explain in this book of ours, namely universal
knowledge, which is written in order to complete the whole of our philosophy,
and towards which we directed the purpose of what our treatises contain, in order
that the mention of its objectives might prompt the reader to desire it, and help in
understanding what has preceded.
12 Thus let us proceed in this to mention the entirety of the objective which we
intend in this book of ours. and we tirst indicate what we intend to make clear
with a brief, concise as possible, comprehensive plan of the entirety of what is
contained in the book.
13 Then we will mention the heads of the questions which we intend to set forth
and summarize them. Then we will begin to make clear the discussion of each
one of them with a correct. complete discussion, if God will.
14 Our objective, then, in this book is a discussion of the First Divinity and an
explanation of it, and that it is the First Cause and that eternity and time are under
it, and that it is the Cause of causes, and their originator in a certain way, and that
the illuminating power comes from it to the intellect, and from it through the
intermediary of the intellect to the universal, celestial soul, and from the intellect
through the intermediary of soul to nature, and from the soul through the mediary
of nature to becoming [and] perishing things,
15 and that this act comes to be from it without motion, and that the motion of all
things is from it and because of it, and that things are moved towards it through a
sort of longing and striving.
16 Then we will mention after this the intellectual world, and treat of its
brilliance and nobility and beauty, and we will mention the divine, pure, excellent,
brilliant forms, which are in it, and that from it are adorned all things and their
beauty, and that all sensory things resemble them, except that through the
multiplicity of their shells they are not capable of true imitation in their
description. I
17 Then we will mention the universal celestial soul and also describe how power
emanates from the intellect to it, and how [the intellect] makes [the soul] resemble
it.

18 And we will mention the beauty of the stars and their adornment and the
brilliance of those forms which are in the stars.
19 Then we will mention the nature moving under the sphere of the moon. and
how the celestial power comes to it, and how it receives that and comes to

Lewis translates the end of this sentence differently: .....we cannot express reality by describing

[hem:'

60

resemble it, and makes manifest its influence in sensible, material, perishable
things.
20 Then, we will mention the state of these rational souls in descending to their
world and joining to the world of bodily things, and their ascent, and the discovery
of the cause in this.
21 And we will mention the noble, divine soul, which adheres to the intellectual
excellences, and is not overwhelmed with bodily desires.
22 And we will also mention the state of the animal souls and the vegetative
souls, and the soul of the earth and of fire, and other things than these.
The portion of the Prologue that has received the most attention is of course Pro I. I, with
its claims about the provenance of the text. We have already discussed the significance
of this information above (1.1.2). Thus I will focus here on the remainder of the
Prologue. Specifically I want to deal with three issues. First, I will attempt to show that
the Prologue draws on two major sources: Aristotle's Metaphysics and the paraphrase of
AP itself. Second. I \vill argue that the author of the Prologue was most likely ai-KindT.
Third, I will discuss the conception of philosophy found in the Prologue, and its relation
to the paraphrase it introduces.

2.1.1 Sources of the Prologue: the Metaphysics and AP

Olhers have remarked on the presence of parallels between the Prologue of AP and
Aristotle's Metaphysics. Indeed, Zimmermann reports that Lewis described the Prologue
as a "patchwork of allusions to... Aristotle's Metaphysics.',2 In fact published works have
only located one significant borrowing from the Metaphysics in the Prologue, albeit a
significant one. Here I will try, however, to make good on Zimmennann's
characterization by showing that almost every sentence in the first half of the Prologue

:!

Zimmermann (1986). 121.

61

has some corresponding text in the Metaphysics. I wiJl move through the Prologue
sequentially in order to achieve this.
The first Aristotelian parallel in the Prologue is actually not from the Metaphysics,
but from the tradition of commentary on the Categories. This appears in ProL2, in the
saying: "the first desired is the last attained, and the first attained is the last desired." The
history of this saying has been studied by S.M. Stem, though he omits to mention its
appearance in this context. 3 The saying first entered Arabic literature in the paraphrase of
Aristotle's logical works written by Ibn al-Muqaffa' in the second half of the 8th century,4
in other words not long before the translation work done by the circle of aI-KindT in the
first half of the 9th century. (Indeed, if we can accept the testimony of the Prologue, AP
or at least the Prologue itself was composed during the reign of the Caliph aI-Mu 't~im,
to whose son the work is dedicated -- this would date the text between 833 and 842.)
The next borrowings from Aristotle come in ProIA, which begins: "the end of
every investigation and search is only the attainment of truth, and the end of every act is
the execution of the activity." As Zimmermann and D' Ancona Costa have pointed out,
this is drawn from Meta ex I 993b20: for the end of theoretical knowledge is truth, and
[the end] of practical knowledge [is] action (ergon).5 The same sentence in the Prologue
goes on to point out that the quest for truth would be futile if there were no "end" to it.

3 S.M. Stern. "'The First in Thought is the Last in Action': the History ofa Saying Attributed to
Aristotle:' in S.M. Stern. Medieval Arabic and Hebrew Thought (London: Variorum Reprints, 1983),234252.

.: Stern. 236.
5 See C. D'Ancona Costa. "AI-Kind. on the Subject Matter of the First Philosophy. Direct and
Indirect Sources of 'Falsafa-I-Ola.' Chapter One," in Wa~ ist Philosophie im Mittelalter. edited by I. A,
Aertsen and A. Speer. Miscellanea Mediaevalia (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 1998),845: Zimmermann
(1986), Appendix III. 137-138.

62

D' Ancona Costa has also suggested parallels in the Metaphysics for this idea (B 4
999a27-28, a 2 993a 18-20,

4 lOO6a8-9), though none of the parallels shows literal

quotation. 6 What is more remarkable is that the same conjunction of ideas is found in
another work probably produced at about the same time: al-Kindfs On First Philosophy
(FP):

FP 97,9-11 :Because the objective (glzarad) of the philosopher is, regarding his act
rUm), hitting (i~iiba) the truth, and regarding his activity ('ama/), acting truthfully

bi-/-!laqq) though the act (alp"l) is not endless (sannat/). because we

stop and the activity ceases when we come to the truth. 7

(0/- 'amal

The association of these two ideas in both texts is an initial reason to suspect that aI-KindT
was the author of the Prologue. 8
As the Prologue continues, the author continues to depend on Aristotle. The next
passage, Prol.5, features a reference to Aristotle's four causes, attributing this theory of
"the most excellent philosophers:' This might in itself be an echo of Meta 988b20, which
implies that Aristotle's predecessors had an unsystematic grasp of the four causes. But
the passage would also seem to lend support to Zimmermann's contention that at this
point, the author is not actually pretending to be Aristotle. as a reader familiar with the

O'Ancona Costa (1998). 845-846.

7 There is no complete English translation of the text. Citations for this and all other works of alKindI are. unless otherwise noted, from the first volume of AI-KindT. Ras~ril aI-Kind. al Falsafivva. edited
by M:A.H. Abu Rida., volume 1-11 (Cairo: 1950. 1953).

s O'Ancona Costa further argues as follows: the Kindian text is clearly based on the version of the
Metaphvsics prepared for him by Us!ath. which can be found in the Bouyges edition of Ibn Rushd's
commentary on the Metaphysics: "the end (ghaya) of knowledge (al- 'Hm) is hitting (i~iiba) the truth, and
the end of virtue (a/-fa4l) is acting truthfully (al- 'amal bi-/-!laqq)" (Bouyges I I J. fn.2). Kindi retains the
misreading of "virtue:' apparently. in his phrase "acting truthfully;' or at least so argues [vry in his
commentary on FP 118. Because the parallel in the Prologue adheres more closely to the Greek. O'Ancona
Costa suggests that this is a reason to think that the Prologue was composed later than FP. afler the mistaken
reading was somehow corrected. However. funher parallels between the Prologue and US!3th's version of
the Metaphvsics will be provided below. so that I think we can still believe that the author of the Prologue
took his ideas from that source.

63

theory of the four causes would recognize the "most excellent philosophers" as a
reference to Aristotle and his followers. While the author is clearly (and more or less
explicitly) drawing on Aristotle here. it seems fruitless to try to find a single parallel
passage for such a common Aristotelian notion. It is worth noting only that the term used
here. "perfection." to describe final

cause~

is a commonplace in works from

al-Kindi~s

circle. AI-KindT himself uses the phrase '''perfective cause" ('illa... mutammima: FP
101.4), and similar tenninology is used in the contemporaneous paraphrase of Aristotle ~ s
De Anima ([ 'il/a] ... tamiimiyya: 193.3).
The next sentence contains the first direct reference to the Metaphysics in the
Prologue, as well as a more oblique reference to the De Anima:
Prol.6 We have completed previously an explanation of this and an account of
their causes in our book which is after the Physics~ and ordered these causes in the
divine intellectual order. following an exposition of the soul and of nature and its
activity.
Strangely. the first part of this passage may be an echo of the very text to which it refers.
After mentioning the four types of causes~ Aristotle writes:
Meta A 3 983b I : We have theorized about these [causes] already in the [books]
on physics (Ielheorelai men olin hikan6s peri alilon hemin en lois peri phl/seos).
The structure of this passage is similar to that of Prol.6. despite referring us back to a
different text. While this parallel may not be overly convincing, there are clear quotations
of the Metaphysics in what follows. In the sequel the author writes:
Pro I. 7 the meaning of end (al-ghaya) is that others exist (yaqiin) because of it (bisahahihii). and that it is not because of anything else.
This looks like a parallel to Meta a 2 994b9 ff. and indeed the Arabic of Us!ath's
~ranslation of that

passage is quite close to what we find here in the Prologue:

64

Bouyges [ 30.10-12: Also, the thing because of which (bi-sababiht) the things are
is an end (ghaya), and this is the things whose existence (wujild) is not because of
anything else subsequent to it (tiilin ghayrilu), because the existence of the rest of
9
the things is because of it.
An even closer textual parallel presents itself as we read on in the Prologue.
Compare the following passages, the first from the Prologue, and the second from
Us!iHh' s translation of Meta a 2 994b 1Off:
Prol.8 The establishment of the existence of knowledge is an indication of the
existence of an end, because knowledge is the grasping of the end. since it is
impossible to divide what is infinite with what has end and limit.
Bouyges 130.12-31.4: Thus it is necessary that there is something of this sort
(shay' hadlli/zi !liilihl). otherwise there would be things limitlessly better, for if

there is not something of this sort among things. then there will not be the thing
because of which the things are. And those who make things limitless (g/zayr
mutanlihin) make futile (yllbatu!iin) the nature of goodness (jiltl) without knowing
they do so - nothing would want to do any action -- that is. there would be an act
which would fail to reach a limit.
Here both passages share the same notion that knowledge is assured by the existence of
an end or "limit" (nihiiya). But a more remarkable parallel can be found by turning back
to a part of the Prologue we have already discussed:
Prol.4: if the meaning of the end. which is sought in philosophy, is not
established, [then] investigation and speculation are futile (balalar). and
knowledge is also futile. and goodness (jiid)1O and activity are futile.
I would argue that both Prol.4 and Prol.8 are based on this part of the Arabic translation
of the Metaphysics. Furthermore, Prol.4 seems to be drawing on the very vocabulary of

') See also Meta A 2 982b24ff. and compare a passage in the De Anima paraphrase: "We say that
the beautiful is that which one wants for the reason (mill ajlt1 of something else (glzayriJuT' (195.1-5).
Translations of the Arabic version of the Metaphysics are from Averroes. Tafsir rna ba'd at;tabiat. ed. M.
Bouyges (Beyrouth: Dar el-Machreq. 1973). with volume. page and line number cited.
III Lewis translates "effort." presumably readingjahd because of the sense of the passage- But
given that the mss. actually readjiid and there exists this striking parallel with Us!ath. I have preferred to
retain the original reading of the Arabic.

65

this Arabic version, with its use of the term "futile" (biilil), which has no basis in the
original Greek. and the term "goodness" Ufid). Along with parallels presented above. this
should be enough to convince us that the author of the Prologue not only made use of the
Metaphvsics. but used Us!uth's translation when he did so.
I have found no further passages in the Prologue which quote at length from the
Metaphysics. but two more philosophical parallels are worth pointing out. After another
explicit reference to the Metaphysics in Pro I. IO. this time transliterating the Greek name
of the work (meta ta phusika), we find the phrase "universal knowledge ('ifm kul/f)" used
in Pral.l I. This parallels the use of a similar expression at Meta A 2 982310ff: katholou

epistemen. which Ross actually translates "universal knowledge:' And at Prol.15. in the
midst of a supposed overview of matters to be dealt with in Th.A, the author writes: "this
act comes to be from [the First Cause] without motion. and that the motion of all things is
from it and because of it, and that things are moved towards it through a sort of longing
and striving:' Obviously enough. the author here is thinking of Aristotle's theory of God
as the unmoved mover and final cause of motion. as described in Book A of the
Metaphvsics. The presence of these Aristotelian ideas in a summary of AP suggests the
extent to which the author of the Prologue felt that Aristotle' s ideas were compatible and
even of a piece with those of Plotinus. Similar reconciliations of the two Greek
philosophers occur in the paraphrase as well. including one passage (GS 1.28) where the
Adaptor likewise says that the First Cause does not move (see below. 5.2.3). Still.
Prol. I5 remains the most explicit affirmation of Aristotle's actual theology in the socalled '"Theology of Aristotle."

66

It may be helpful to summarize the findings of this section thus far, with the
corresponding texts from Aristotle and the Prologue. Parallels that indicate the use of
Us!ath's version of the Metaphysics are marked with an asterisk. I I
Prolmwe

Aristotle Source

ProL2

Arabic commentaries on the Categories (Ibn aI-Muqaffa')

ProIA

Meta a 2 994bIOff*; a 1993b20

Prol. 6

~Ieta

Prol.7

Meta a 2 994b9 ff*

Prol.8

Meta a 2 994b IOff

Prol.ll

Meta A 2 982a20ff

Prol.15

Meta Bk. A

A 3 983b 1

This summary shows. I think, that the first half of the Prologue (2-11) is meant to be
nothing more than, as Zimmermann put it, a "patchwork" of Aristotelian citations. This
will of course be relevant when we discuss the philosophical agenda of the Prologue.
Let us now tum to the other textual source for the Prologue, namely the rest of
AP. [t seems that, whereas the first part of the Prologue is inspired chiefly by Aristotle.
the second part (12-22) is inspired by a reading of the Arabic paraphrase of Plotinus -despite the Aristotelian digression that is Pro I. 15. Firstly, it is obvious that the summary
in this part of the Prologue is specifically Plotinian, and not just generally Neoplatonic.

II Notice that [ claim to find at least two parallels between the Prologue and Metaphysics A. This
raises the question of whether US!3th's translation contained that book of the Metaphysics. Averroes. who
used Ihis translation for his Long Commentao' on the Metaphvsics. did not have this book in the Us!ath
version and used that of Nalif Ibn Ayman. Might this indicate that Us!iith did not translate Book A? If the
parallels I have presented are convincing. they provide a further reason to hold instead. with F.E. Peters and
A. Manin. that Averroes simply did not have access to this part of Us!ath's translation. See A. Martin "La

67

This is clear from the sequence of hypostases: the First. followed by Intellect, soul,
nature. and the physical world. As D' Ancona Costa has pointed out, the inclusion of
"nature" here as a separate hypostasis could only be derived from Enn V.2.1, which is
paralleled in GS. 12 When the same sequence of hypostases (excepting nature) appears in
texts like the Liber de Causis, this is best explained by appealing to Plotinian influence on
the author of the Proclean paraphrase.
Secondly, it is equally clear that the author of the Prologue is familiar with the
Enneads in the form of the Arabic paraphrase. This is shown by a number of
terminological features in the Prologue that are held in common with the main text. For
example. we find in the Prologue such key translation terms as anniyya (ProL8, see below
5.2.1), "intellectual world" (ProL16, see Th.A 1.1, 11.46, Vlli.55, Vm.179, X.3),
"universal soul" (Prol.l7, see Th.A 1.43; VII.46; VID.3, 77;

as 1.68. 70; n.1), and "brute

soul" (Prol.22, see below, 3.1.2). More tellingly, there are terms in the Prologue which
appear as neologisms in the paraphrase: "active word," the Adaptor's peculiar translation
of logos (Prol.S) and. as a term for God, the "cause of causes" (Pro I. 14. see Th.A X 154;
X.18I; OS 71, 151; GS n.87). Finally, there are at least two passages in the Prologue that
seem to be directly inspired by specific passages from other parts of AP. The first is a
parallel with the headings:
Pro1.14: ...it is the First Cause and eternity and time are under it.

ru 'lIS 44: On eternity, and that it is the act of the intellect, and time (reading
zimiin), [and that it is] the act of the souL"
Merap"ysique. Tradition Syriaque et Arabe:' in Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques I. edited by R.
Goulet (Paris: 1989).531.
I~ See O' Ancona Costa, "Porphyry. Universal Soul and the Arabic Plotinus:' Arabic Sciences and
Philosophv 9 (1999a), 63.

68

The second is in

Pro1.16~

which uses the phrase "the multiplicity of their shells (qushiir):'

a phrase that also appears at Th.A Vill.54. 13

These parallels show that the author of the Prologue was fully conversant with
AP. not only in terms of the cosmological scheme laid out in Pro I. 14-22. but also in terms
of the characteristic vocabulary of the paraphrase. It is noteworthy that. with some
exceptions. the textual parallels with Aristotle occur in the first. "Aristotelian" part of the
Prologue. and the vocabulary proper to AP predominates the latter, "Plotinian" section.
At the risk of indulging in speculation. I would say that this suggests that the author was
steeped in Aristotelian texts before he encountered Plotinus. He was trying. in the
Prologue. to establish an background for the ideas he found in AP by referring to the
works of Aristotle with which he was already conversant. particularly the Metaphysics
but also, apparently, the De Anima (ProI.6). Of course. the use of terminology that
overlaps with AP might be taken to suggest that this Aristotelian author was none other
than the Adaptor. the author of the paraphrase as a whole. But it could easily have been
an attentive reader of AP. one who had already internalized the vocabulary of the
paraphrase. In the following section. I will suggest that this was most likely the case. and
that the Prologue was written not by the author of AP~ but by its '''editor'': al-Kindi.

2.1.2 AI-KindT as the author of the Prologue

Just as much speculation has been devoted to the question of the authorship of AP as a
whole, so various candidates have been put forth as the author of the Prologue. 14 It is

69

often, though not always. assumed that the author of the Prologue would be the author of
the paraphrase in AP. As we have seen above. however. to the extent that the Prologue
depends on Greek sources, it depends on the Arabic versions of those sources (Us!ath's
Metaphvsics and AP), so that the author of the paraphrase need not even have known
Greek. Nor is it necessarily natural to assume that the Prologue was written by the author
of the paraphrase, since presumably the last person to make alterations to the text was the
last person named in the chain of transmission at Prol. L namely al-KindI. 15 I am not the
first person to suggest al-KindI as the author of the paraphrase; among others. D'Ancona
Costa makes the same suggestion in a recent article., partially on the basis of the identical
conjunction of ideas found at ProiA and FP 97.9-11. 16 Here I would like to provide
further support for this hypothesis by means of a stylistic analysis of the Prologue. My
aim is to show that several motifs and images used in the Prologue and not in the
paraphrase in AP are favored in other writings of al-KindI.
Towards this end, let us consider among other texts the introduction to a closely
related \'lork by al-KindL his On the Ouantity of the Books of Aristotle. and What is

13 Another possible parallel is the final sentence in the Prologue (ProI.22). which refers to "the soul
of eanh and fire:' in an apparent reference to the title of mimar VIII.
i': See Aouad ( 1989). 546-547. for an overview of sources which take a position on this question.
He names Porphyry as the "hypothese majoritaire" (547).
15 While I will address the identity of the Adaptor funher in chapter 6. here it is peninent to note
that the Adaptor introduces many changes into the paraphrase in inspired mistranslations of the Greek. so
that presumably these changes were in place by the time the text reached al-Kindi - who was not a
translator of the text and probably did not even know Greek. See also Zimmennann (1986). 122: "if it was
[al-Kindr] who. so to speak_ prepared Him~rs work for publication. one might expect him to have
contributed the preface:' Zimmermann goes on. however. to argue that Him~r himself wrote the Prologue.

16

See above. and D' Ancona Costa (1998).

70

Necessary for the Obtaining of Philosophy CAR 263-284, hereafter Quantity). 17 My

translation of this introduction follows:
[363] The letter of al-Kindr on (5) the Quantity of the Books of Aristotle and
what is necessary for the obtaining of philosophy.
May God protect you through His favor, and give you success in reaching the
truth and apply what the tcuth necessitates. You ask -- may God help you in the
things you search for (nla[liibatiki) and bring you to what is close to this, and keep
you away from ignorance, and impart to you the illumination of the truth -- that I
advise you about the books of Aristotle the Greek, in which he expounds his
philosophy, according to their number and their ordering (mariilib). and which are
indispensable for him who wishes to attain philosophy (10) and its acquisition and
clarity, and [about] his objectives (aghriif!) in [these books], in a summarizing,
concise discussion.
And upon my life, there is indeed in what you ask a great deal towards the
achievement of philosophy, because in the exposition of this is an increase in
ardor for philosophy for the possessors of illuminated, harmonious souls, who can
perceive visions of the finding of the truth, and seek the vivifying pastures of the
intellect. For in the inquiry (kashf) of this is the certainty of the paths (wug,1!l alslIbll!) towards the limit of intellectual nobility, which is adored by such souls as
these we have already mentioned, (15) and from it there is a motion towards free
entry [along these paths] 18. And through the clarification of this [one may
achieve] the perseverance [to go along] trails (durl/b) [364] in journeying (qat)
the distances and making one able to bear the heavy burden of death. [Death], as
we have said, is the arrival at the things that are sought (marliib) by [such souls],
which are in proportion only with their journey (qar), especially when they have
in every instant (na;.ra) something from those paths (subu!), and attain a part of
the things they search for (math/batiha), and an acquisition (tahsfl) of the benefit
(rib!l) of the possession of these things, and assistance in what [assures] the
grasping of what they intended (maq~iid), and facilitation of being steadfast
against the difficulties of this, and advancing to the motion which is its objective
(glzaraf!).

(5) Thus I have described for you, regarding this, what will satisfy your
desire (muriid) in [asking] your question, and more in addition, in a definition
which may illumine your intellect with the truths of things and the objectives of
the good, which calls [us] to itself and is desired for itself, and not for anything
else. For everything desired is only desired for the sake of the good, and as for the
17 For an Italian translation and an Arabic text better than that in Abu Rida, see M. Guidi and R.
\Valzer. Uno serino introdunivo allo studio di Aristotele (Rome: Reale Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei.
1940). For a partial translation into English. but not including the preface translated here. see N. Rescher.
AI-KindT's Sketch of Aristotles Organon:' The New Scholasticism 37 (1963).44-58.

IS Here [ give a rather speculative translation. The Italian translation is different but also marked
as speculative at this point.

71

good, it is not desired for anything else. but rather for itself. [I have done this] to
the extent which is enough for your question. Through God is our success, and in
Him is our trust, and He is the greatness in all of what is ours!
This prefatory passage displays several literary features also found in the
Prologue. First, in the Prologue we find use of the metaphor of philosophy as following a
path, way, or road: ...the exten t of the advantage (manfa 'a) bestowed upon him from
adhering to the road (mas/ak) towards what is desired, to tread the ways (asiitib) leading
to total certainty..." (ProI.2). The same metaphor appears here in Quantitv as well, with
such phrases as "certainty of the paths (wllgiib. a/-subul) towards the limit of intellectual
nobility." Later in the same

lener~ ai-KindT marks

a transition as follows: "Now that we

have completed the preceding research (ba!lth) about the conduct of the paths (slIliik als1Ibi,/) of knowledge, according to their ordering, which lead to the end (nihiiya) of man,

let us now speak of the objectives of the books of Aristotle..." (AR 378.15-16). This
favorite figure of al-KindT's appears in other works as well. where it often reminds one of
similar metaphors in the Qur'an. not least the famous identification of Islam as the
"straight path.,,19
A related trope, and perhaps the most striking literary feature of the Prologue. is a
repeated emphasis on '"ends" and '"objectives":
ProL2 It is fitting for all who strive after knowledge of the end (ghiiya) at which
he aims ('iimadu) ... removing doubt while leading him to what he was searching
(la/aba) for...
ProL3 ...the first science which is included in our book. this being the extreme
(aq~ii) of our objective (gharad) and the end (ghiiya) of our desire in the end of
what was accomplished from our treatises.

19 See. for example: On the Unicity of God and the Finitude of the Body of the World: .....may
[God J guide you to [he path of good sense (sahli rashiid)...' (201.14). and That There Exist Separate
Substances: May God help you to achievement (darak) of the truth and guide you on His path (sabil)!"
(265.6. ).

72

ProiA And because the end (ghiiya) of every investigation ifaf1n and search
(lalab) is only the attainment of truth, and the end of every act is the execution of
the activity... if the meaning of the end, which is sought in philosophy, is not
established, [then] investigation and speculation (na~ar) are futile.
Prol.7 the notion of the sought end (al-ghiiya al-ma[liiba)...
Prol.8 knowledge is the grasping (al-wuqiij) of the end...
Prol.9 the natural sciences... are an aid towards attaining the object of desire
(nayl al-buglzya) and the exploration of what is sought (al-irtiyiid aI-mar/lib).
Pro I. 12 .. .the entirety of the objective (gharad) which we intend in this book of
ours... 20
Again, this is a trope found in the introduction to Quantity, in particular with the use of
the word "objective (gharad):' as ....the objectives of the good" and '''advancing to the
motion \vhich is its objective." Indeed here ai-Kind! promises to explain the "objectives
(aghriid)" of Aristotle's works, and this terminology continues throughout the letter.

The same theme appears in other Kindian works. for example the letter discussed
by Endress which deals with the soul's reminiscence: "'Wenn ich nun dariiber in Form
von Frage und Antwort handele, so nur deshalb, weil diese Form die erstrebte Einsicht
erleichtert und dem Verstandnis hilft, die Sache ganz zu begreifen.,,21 Another example
from al-KindI"s Discourse on the Soul is striking because of its juxtaposition of two
words also combined in Prol.3, glzaraq and ghaya: "And the unhappy, deluded, ignorant
one is the one who is satisfied with sensory pleasures for himself, and they are his most
frequent objectives (aghriid) and his utmost end (mllntahan ghiiyatihi):' (AR 277.8-9).
We might add that the echoes of the Prologue in the introduction to Quantitv include the
definition of "'end" itself. In the Prologue we find: "the meaning of end (al-ghaya) is that
others exist (yaqiin) because of it (bi-sababihii), and that it is not because of anything

1(1

The word "objective"' (glraraf!) also appears in ProUI and 14.

21 G. Endress. "AI-Kindl tiber die Wiedererinnerung der Seele:' Griens 34 ( 1994). 207. [give the
German translation of Endress here. as no Arabic text is available to me.

73

else'" (ProI.7). Above we saw that this formulation may have been based on Us!ath's
version of the Metaphvsics. In Quantity (364.7-8) the same definition reads: "'for
everything desired is only desired for the sake of the good. and as for the good, it is not
desired for anything else, but rather for itself... 22
Other aspects of the Prologue also find echoes in the corpus of al-Kindr s
writings. Consider, for example, this passage: HAnd we will mention the noble, divine
soul (al-nafs a/-sharifa al-iliihiyya), which adheres to the intellectual excellences (fadii'il
a/- 'aq/iyya). and is not overwhelmed (yanghamisu) with bodily desires (al-shahawiit albadaniY)'ar' (ProI.21). This has several parallels in the Discourse on the Soul, including

the very similar phrase "whoever is overcome by desire (man giza/bat 'aliihu alshahwiiniyya)" (00 274.16-17). In the same work ai-KindT also calls the soul "'divine
(i/iihf)" (273.7) and "'noble (shariff' (273.4).13 And the definition of God as an unmoved

mover (ProLI5), which as we argued above is based on the Metaphysics, is a fundamental

part of al-Kindrs thought:
FP 162.6-9: Since the cause of becoming is the True, First One, the cause of
origination is the True, First One. and is the cause from which there is an
origination of motion, I mean, the mover (mll!larrik) of the origination of motion.
That is. the mover is the agent. So the True, First One, since He is the cause of
the origination of the motion of becoming -- that is. being affected -- is the
Originator of the totality of things that come to be.
On the Definitions and Descriptions of Things 165.4: The First Cause: originative,
acting, perfecting the whole, not moved.

II cr. also FP 101.4: "perfective cause Cilia... mutammi",a). I mean that because of which a thing
Note thai. like the Prologue and the Arabic paraphrase of the De Anima. aI-Kind. uses the root ram",
for final cause.

IS.

13 The word sharifand its cognates are favorites in the Discourse on the Soul: see 274.13. 277.8.
278.9. 278.15. 279.2. 279.17. 280.1.

74

This parallel, along with the focus on teleology, suggests that the pattern of references to
Aristotle we find in the Prologue is very much in line with al-Kindrs conception of
Aristotelianism as a whole.
Finally, one of the more surprising aspects of the Prologue may have a
correspondence in al-Kindrs writings. In Pro1.6 and Prol. I9. the author seems to treat
nature as a separate hypostasis mediating between soul and the physical world. As
mentioned above. this may be based on an unusual passage in the Enneads. though in
general nature receives a somewhat different treatment at the hands of the Adaptor than
that found in Plotinus. Now, in al-Kindrs On the Definitions and Descriptions of Things,
nature seems to be grouped with the Plotinian hypostases, since the first four definitions
are First Cause, intellect. nature. and soul (165.4-7). If. as one scholar has suggested. this
list of principles is a response to Plotinus,24 then it is the same response as that found here
in the Prologue.
Of course, I am not under the illusion that such stylistic and philosophical
parallels can provide incontrovertible proof that al-Kindr wrote the Prologue. This is
especially the case if we. with Zimmermann. suppose that the problem of the Prologue's
authorship is only a choice between al-Him~l and al-Kindr. 25 After all, stylistic features
can only do so much to distinguish between two authors whose writings were so close in
time, place, and intention. Now, of these two candidates, Zimmennann opts for

al-Him~L

on the basis that (a) the style of the Prologue is more ""clumsy" than that of aI-KindT. (b)

1-1 Klein-Franke. "al-Kindrs 'On Definitions and Descriptions of Things: Le Museon: Revue des
etudes orientales 95 (1982). 199. Ironically. Klein-Franke assumes that aI-KindT bases this on the text of
the Prologue, not that of the paraphrase.
...

.,

- Zimmermann (1986). 12 I.

75

al-KindL unlike the Prologue~ cites Us!ath's version of the Metaphvsics, 26 and (c) in the
absence of evidence that ai-KindT wrote the Prologue, the "safest bee is to attribute it to
Him~I.

We have just given evidence of the sort Zimmermann found lacking in

(c)~

and

we saw above that (b) is probably not true: the Prologue does cite Ustath's version of the
Metaphvsics. The remaining point (a) is rather subjective, and in fact I am inclined to
think that the writing style of the Prologue, which, in the memorable phrase of
Zimmennann, is "turgid (Q a degree,',2? has more in common with al-Kindrs style than
the style of the paraphrase in AP. As Zimmennann admits, it is initially attractive to
attribute the Prologue to KindT, and I hope here to have made this conclusion even more
attractive, without necessarily claiming to have proved it.

2.1.3 The conception of philosophy in the Prologue

Whether or not the person who wrote the Prologue was the same as the person who wrote
the paraphrase in AP, the Prologue gives us valuable information about how Plotinus'
philosophy was perceived around the time of its translation into Arabic. It introduces
Plotinian philosophy as the "first science" and "universal knowledge," and thus as the
highest achievement of human wisdom. The purpose of this section is to look at this
conception in greater detail.
As the saying which begins Prol.3 suggests, Th.A represents the knowledge which
is the last thing that we attain, but the first that we desire; in other words, it is our most
final end. Once attained, this will confer "total certainty" and "the limit of eminence" on

26

Zimmermann (1986),122.

2i

Zimmermann (1986), 121.

76

us (ProI.2). This is in line with the idea, found in Aristotle's Ethics. that our final end is
our happiness. Much of the first part of the Prologue is devoted to fleshing out the
reasons why this is the last and highest knowledge attained by us. The author conceives
of philosophy along Aristotelian lines. such that the different branches of knowledge, or
sciences ('uli7m. literally ""knowledges") build upon one another. Thus in Prol.9. the
author presents a sequence in which we first research the ""principles" (awa'iI, literally
--firsts") of the sciences, then progress to the ""naturaJ sciences:' In Pro1.6. the author fits
the Aristotelian corpus into this scheme: ""following an exposition of the soul and of
nature." in other words, following the natural sciences, we come to the Metaphysics.
This book establishes the explanation and causes of Aristotle's four general types of
cause and their ""divine intellectual order... 28
Now. part of what was established in the Metaphvsics. according to the author,
was the existence of a most final end. The author even provides us with an argument that
there is such an end in Prol.8: if there were not, there could be no knowledge (see aJso
ProIA). For knowledge grasps an end. not what is infinite. apparently because knowledge
di vides things according to ""end and limit" (here one might think of a similar conception
in Latin medieval philosophy in which knowledge "delimits' something by "defining" it,
that is by making it finite). The final end grasped by this knowledge will presumably be
the cause among causes which is "'most worthy of precedence and rule" (Prol.5), and this

18 This scheme has cenain affinities with the description of the Aristotelian corpus found in alKindls Quantity. Interestingly. after a similar progression from the logical works (the "principles" of the
Prologue'!). to the natural sciences (the Physics, the De Caelo, the Meteorologica. On Generation and
Corruption, etc.), to the De Anima. and then to the Metaphysics. which is said to concentrate primarily on
God. aI-KindT refers us to the Ethics and the Politics as describing the happiness which perfects the soul.
This corresponds to the emphasis in the Prologue on the ability of Th.A to let us attain our final end. thus in
a sense serving the same purpose as the ethical works of Aristotle.

77

is of course God. The idea of a most precedent cause dovetails nicely with the phrase
"the Cause of causes," which appears at Pro I. 14 and is borrowed from the paraphrase in
AP (see above). Similarly, the definition ofuend" at Pro1.7, which is that "others exist
because of it, and it is not because of anything else," is echoed at Pro I. 15, where it is said
that "the motion of all things is from [God] and because of [God]," even though God
Himself remains unmoving. The highest achievement of the Metaphysics, then, is to
establish that there is a final, highest end that is at the top of a hierarchy of causes that
exist in a "divine order."
All of this suggests that the Metaphysics has already achieved the summit of
human knowledge by building on previous sciences in order to reach the funhest end.
This in tum suggests a troubling conclusion: that the philosophy in Th.A will actually be
superfluous. Yet at Prol.ll the author says that the Plotinian doctrine that is to come will
"complete the whole of our philosophy," that is, Aristotelian philosophy. While we
might wish for the author to say more about what Th.A can achieve that was left
"incomplete" by the Metaphysics, I think there are two answers at least suggested here.
The first is that the Metaphvsics chiefly proved only the existence of the First Principle,
without really discussing or describing it at length. Indeed, according to ProI.5-6, the
Metaphysics was devoted largely to a discussion of the four Aristotelian causes in
general, not primarily to the highest cause. Hence the primary "objective" mentioned for
Th.A is "a discussion of the First Divinity" (ProI.14). This brings us to the second
purpose of Th.A. It will be noticed that the Aristotelian scheme laid out in Pro1.2-13 is a
sort of ascent, from initial principles to the final end and cause. The Plotinian scheme
laid out in Pro I. 14-22, on the other hand, is a descent from the First Cause to its effects.

78

This suggests that the (possibly more adequate) discussion of God in Th.A will in tum
give us a better understanding of the procession of God~s effects.

All of this has echoes in the philosophy of late antiquity prior to its transmission
to the Arabic speaking world. We have the generally Platonic scheme of an epistemic
ascent and

descent~

up and then down the hierarchy of causes. More specifically, we

have, as 0' Ancona Costa has noted in the context of al-KindI"s On First Philosophy, the
Alexandrian conception that Aristotelianism leads to and is completed by Platonism, and
that the highest science somehow "contains" the conclusions of all the other sciences. 29
(This latter point might supply a reason to think. as the author here does, that a grasp of
the First Cause will provide a better grasp of His effects.) The author of the Prologue
seems especially determined to emphasize that Aristotelianism is not at all in conflict
with the Plotinian philosophy ofTh.A, to the point where (as we noted above) he inserts
the Aristotelian doctrine of Prol.15 into a summary of the Plotinian cosmos. This
suggests that, as Zimmermann has argued, even if the author of the Prologue did not think
the philosophical work preserved in AP was written by Aristotle, he would have been
happy to describe AP as Aristotelian.

2.2 The "Headings"

One of the strongest points in favor of the Porphyrian hypothesis, the idea that AP was in
some sense produced by Porphyry, is the presence of 142 ""headings" after the Prologue
and before the paraphrase in Th.A. Announced as the ""headings of the questions (ru lis
al-masii iI)," they have often been seen as preserving the (otherwise lost) kephalaia that

79

Porphyry claimed to have produced for the Enneads. This contention has been disputed
at length by Zimmennann, and though I will not pause in this section to address the
Porphyrian hyPOthesis directly, the material to be presented will support Zimmermann in
his rejection of that hyPOthesis. 3o Now, what we can say for sure is that these headings
have their ultimate textual basis in Enn IVA. One question is whether the headings were
in fact made with direct reference to the Greek text. or whether they are notes on the
Arabic text of the paraphrase. Another question is what function these headings were
intended to serve. Here I will give answers to these questions, though some of these
answers are offered tentatively. I will conclude the chapter with a brief consideration of
the philosophical points made in the headings, and their correspondence to the
philosophical views in the paraphrase proper.

2.2.1 The textual basis of the headings

In order to establish the purposes and identity of the author of the headings, it would be

quite useful to know what he had in front of him as a source text. Were the headings
based on the paraphrase in AP or directly on the Greek? Fortunately, there are headings
which translate passages from Enn IVA that are also paraphrased in Th.A and GS. In
order to answer this question, then. we need only compare parallel translations and decide
which translations come closer to the Greek. Zimmermann has suggested that the

headings are a kind of "skeleton translation" of the Greek -- if this is the case, the

29

See DAnconaCosta (1998).851-855.

30 See Aouad (1989). 548-550. for an overview of relevant secondary material. Much of this
material does support the Porphyry hypothesis in reference to the headings, to the point where
Zimmermann's rejection of it overturned an orthodoxy with regard to the origins of AP.

80

headings should adhere more closely to the Greek than the paraphrase does. If the
headings are some sort of glosses on the Arabic text, then the headings will have to repeat
any (mis)translations in the parallel paraphrase.
Now. one of the puzzles of the headings is that we find passages indicating that
both of these are the case.

Often. the paraphrase in Th.A or as gives a better and more

complete translation of Enn IV A than do the headings. To take a brief example. at Enn
IV.4.6 Plotinus makes a reference to the world soul (tou palZtos psuchi)." The passage
in question was translated twice. once in Th.A and once in the headings:
Th.A Vill.77 [B 104]: ...the soul of the all... (nafs a/-ku/I)
ru'iis.22 [B 10]: On the divine, noble soul.
Here. obviously, the Adaptor's translation in the paraphrase is closer than that in the
headings. The same goes for GS; at

as U.65-66. there is a close translation of the

parallel Greek text. and the same passage is summarized loosely at ru'llsAI. On the other
hand. there are also passages in the Greek that are more closely translated in the headings
than in the paraphrase, For example:
Enn IV.4.4: There [in the noetic world], [the soul] sees (hora) the good through
intellect.
ru 'iis.13 [B 9]: On the soul. and that when it is in the intellectual world. it only
sees (lara) the Pure Good through the intellect.
Th.A UA3 [B 36]: We say that, when the soul is in the higher world, it yearns for
the pure. first Good. It only arrives (ataya) at the first Good through the
intermediary of the intellect.
Here the verb sees" is faithfully rendered in the headings. but changed in Th.A. Again,
the same holds true for GS:

81

Enn IVA. 13: But what is the difference between such phronesis and the nature we
have spoken of?
ru '11s.36 [B 10J: On the distinction
Ulikma) of the all.

ifa~.l)

between the nature and the wisdom

GS 0.60 [Lewis translation]: If anyone asks about the difference between soul and
nature...
Here plzronesis has been translated more or less accurately as wisdom" in the headings,
and replaced by "soul" in the paraphrase. The fact that sometimes, the translation in the
headings is bettcr than that in the paraphrase, and sometimes worse, forces us to conclude
that both the headings and the paraphrase were made with the original Greek text as a
basis. This further suggests quite strongly that the same person composed both the
Arabic of the headings and that of the paraphrase. The Adaptor was, then, the author of
the headings.

2.2.2 The purpose of the headings

As Zimmermann has noted, the translations found in the headings and paraphrase are very
closely linked. despite being "independent" in the sense that both were made by someone
who was referring to the Greek text. This repeated access to the Greek did not prevent
the appearance of some mistranslations in both the headings and the paraphrase, as
Zimmennann notes with reference to ru 'iis.12 and Th.A 0.41. both of which mistake a
passage about soul for a passage about imagination. 31 Similarly, as Thillet pointed out,
the surprising doctrine that there is an ignorance superior to knowledge is found in two

31 Zimmermann (1986). 167. A similar double mistake occurs at ru ';is.7 and Th.A ([.24. which
artribule to the intellect a passage which in Plotinus is about a thinking person or soul.

82

parallel translations, ru 'zls.16 and Th.A 11.47, both translating IV.4.4. 32 Taking this into
account, Zimmermann proposed that the headings are a skeleton translation preparing the
way for AP. On this view, presumably, the headings were composed first, and the
paraphrase in AP was composed on the basis of this with reference to the Greek text. 33
While [ think we cannot rule this out as a possibility, it seems a poor explanation
of the intention behind the headings. This is so for a number of reasons. First of all, the
headings would not be very useful as a skeleton translation. They leave out more of the
text than they include. especially towards the end of the collection of headings. Also, the
headings tend to summarize Greek passages that are treated at greater length in the
paraphrase. reducing their utility as a translation guide. Second, Zimmermann' s
hypothesis does not explain why the Adaptor put the headings in the form of questions
and topics. starting with phrases like On the intellect..... or "On the souL... Third, the
Prologue provides us with a plan for Th.A as a whole which includes the headings, and
this implies that the headings were not a preliminary translation but intended as part of
the finished work. Let us take a closer look at that passage from the Prologue:
Prol. 12-13 [8 6]: Thus let us proceed in this to mention the entirety of the
objective which we intend in this book of ours, and we first indicate what we
intend to make clear with a brief, concise as possible, comprehensive plan of the
entirety of what is contained in the book. Then we will mention the headings of
the questions which we intend to set forth and summarize them. Then we will
begin to make clear the discussion of each one of them with a correct, complete
discussion, if God will.

[f. as Zimmermann also assumes, the Prologue was composed around the same time as
AP as a whole (and especially if, as [ argued above, it was composed by ai-KindT or if. as

~:! See below. 4.1. Zimmennann (1986). 167.

3~ Zimmermann (1986). 168.

83

Zimmermann holds, it was composed by

Him~i)~ this

should be a fairly reliable report on

the content of Th.A as it was originally planned. Then the headings should be summaries
of topics to be taken up in a more "complete discussion" in the paraphrase.
I submit that, when we examine the headings more closely, this is precisely what
they tum out to be. A rather obvious point which has nonetheless escaped the notice of
commentators on AP thus far is that these are called the "'headings of the questions:'
They are based on Enn IV.4, which is called "'Problems Regarding the Sou I." Nor is there
evidence that there were headings for any other part of the Greek text. But then the
reference to "questions (masii'i/)" listed in the headings could be a reference to Plotinus'
apodaL The headings, then. are a list of problems or topics taken up by Plotinus in his

text on the soul -- an ideal introduction for a hypothetical section of AP dealing with soul,
which I argued above (1.1.6) is precisely what we have in our Th.A. Indeed, someone,
possibly a later editor of Th.A, found the headings to be useful precisely in this way. and
Ii fted two headings to serve as the topical heading for mimar VI of Th.A.
If this is the purpose of the headings, we may hope to find signs of it in the
headings themselves, signs, that is. that they were intended to summarize the topics laid
out in the parallel Greek text. In fact I think that this intention does become particularly
evident in the later headings, which tend to skip more of the Greek in gaps between
headings.3~ For example, ru 'us.88 ([B 14]: "'On the things falling under vision, and how

the soul sees them'') seems to paraJlel a lengthier discussion of soul's vision in Enn
IVA.23. Likewise. n"lls.IOI ([B 15]: "On the body of the earth, and what the thing is

3-1 A good example earlier in the headings. however. is ru iis.3 [B 8J: "That the intellectual things
which are in the higher world are not under time. and they are not generated (kllwU:;lIat) one thing after

84

which the soul gives to it -- the earth. when one part of it is joined to another part. is not
like when it is separated") summarizes several sentences of Greek in Enn IV.4.27. Even
more clearly. ru 'lis. 102 ([B 15]: "On the earth and that in it is vegetative power and a
sensitive power and an intellect. and [the intellect] is that which the ancients named
Demeter") covers everything in Gk. from ekasron men olin (27 line II) to end of 27 (line
18), i.e. about half of a chapter from the treatise in Greek. Finally, nl 'iis. 138 ([8 18]:
On the parts. and how they agree with the all. but are opposed to each other, and the
similitude of this is that of the art of dancing") looks to be intended as a summary of the
entirety of IV.4,33. Hence none of these headings I have just mentioned are tied very
specifically to just one Greek sentence; they range instead over several sentences or even
a paragraph of the Greek, encapsulating the main gist of the longer parallel passage. This
also explains. of course. why the headings are presented as a list of topics and questions
for discussion, and why the paraphrase expands on the translations in the headings:
because the paraphrase is supposed to give the answers to these questions.

2,2.3 Philosophical views in the headings

Precisely because of their summarizing, brief manner. the headings provide little in the
way philosophical interest. They do, however. mention several themes of interest that are
developed at greater length in the paraphrase. Most notably. as already mentioned. these
themes include the idea of a docra ignorantia. or ignorance higher than knowledge
Cru'iis.16). The following heading. which says that in the higher world soul's memory is

in potency. may be an echo of the theme of a potency higher than act. In ch.4, I will argue
another. and they do not admit panition (aI-raj:;;"), and therefore they have no need for memory:' This

85

that these two themes, juxtaposed here in nl 'iis.16-17, are philosophical1y linked as
well. 35 Briefly, here are some further themes raised in the headings:
(I) At ru l/s.44, eternity and time are said to be characteristic of intellect and soul,
respectively. This connects well with the idea that God is above eternity and time, as the
Creator of both. (See below, 5.3.2, and in particular Th.A IX.73. Compare also Liber de
Causis, Prop.2.) A related heading is ru 'iis.46, which reports that soul is the maker of
time, a view also asserted at Th.A n.14.
(2) At ru 'iis.5I, we find the philosophically significant tenn "active word" as a translation
of the Plotinian logos.
(3) ru'l/s.I09-IIO use the phrase "brute soul (al-nafs al-bahimiyya)," which is perhaps
taken from the previous chapter in Greek (Enn IV.4.28) and its use of the phrase alogos
pSllche. Intriguingly, this soul is said to be the "perfection (tamiim) of the body" at

ru 'tis. I09. This is in agreement with the defense of the Aristotelian theory of soul that we
find in Th.A mimar ill (see below, 3.1.1; for the "brute soul" see section 3.1.2). This
focus on the lower manifestations of soul continues in ru 'zls.112 ("inferior soul") and 114
("the brute and natural souls:' neither mentioned in the parallel Greek text).
These philosophical divergences from the Greek parallel, then, divergences in the
main paraphrase. This gives us further reason to think that the Adaptor was the author of
both headings and paraphrase, and that his own philosophical views were systematic
enough that he already included some of them in his list of the topics to be raised in
reference to the soul.

summarizes the points made in the more extended and complete paraphrase in Th.A 11.7-9.
35

See below. 4. 1.2.

86

CHAPTER 3

SOUL

3. I Aristotelian influence on the Adaptor's theory of soul'

As we have seen above, there is good reason to think that AP is one of the texts produced
by the circle of translators in 9th century Baghdad who were associated with ai-Kind.
One of the major goals of al-KindI and his circle seems to have been the synthesis of
available Greek texts into a coherent philosophy. Thus ai-Kind. himself produced
doxographical works (for example his Discourse on the Soul) and a survey of the
Aristotelian corpus. If the Adaptor worked in such a milieu, he may well have been
influenced by other philosophical sources in making a paraphrase of Plotinus.
Zimmermann has suggested that such an influence is at work in mlmar

m, where the

Adaptor may have drawn on the contemporary paraphrase of Aristotle's De Anima in

order to "reconcile" Plotinus with an Aristotelian theory of the soul as the entelechia of
the body.2 In this first section on soul, I will examine the relationship of soul and body in
AP. and expand on Zimmermann's thesis in an effort to show that the Adaptor was
indeed, in this respect at least, an Aristotelian interpreter of Plotinus.

I A version of this section will be published as "Aristotelianism and the Soul in the Arabic
Plotinus:' forthcoming in The Journal of the History of Ideas.

Zimmermann (1986). 117.

87

3.1.1 i\.tfimar ill and the question of entelechia

Students of Aristotle are familiar with his thesis that soul is the form of the body. In the
H

De Anima Aristotle explains this further by claiming that the soul is the perfection or
ellte/eclzia of the body (414a26).3 Of course there are various problems with the

interpretation of this doctrine. Here the most significant such problem is the question of
whether the soul could exist separately from the body. Aristotle himself gives a qualified
"no" to this question in De Anima II. I (4 I3a4-6). saying that at least a part of the soul
would corrupt with the body, but the question was nevertheless debated in the later
commentary tradition. Plotinus was critical of the Aristotelian doctrine of soul, since it
seemed to imply that soul was either inseparable from body, or at least properly
conceived of as the form of the body. For Plotinus, the soul properly exists as its own
hypostasis above body. One could say that for Plotinus, the problem is to explain how
soul can be in" body or related to it at all, whereas for Aristotle the problem is to explain
how. if at all. soul could exist separately from body.
Some passages in AP gi ve the impression that the Adaptor followed Plotinus in
criticizing the notion that soul is the form of body. For example, he did not depart
significantly from his source over the question of whether the soul is predicated of the
body:
Th.A II.91 [843-4]: And the soul is also not in the body like a predicated
(ma!lmii!) thing, and this is because the predicated thing is only an impression
from the impressions of the bearer of predication (hami!), for example color and
figure: for these two are only impressions of the body [that is] the bearer for them,
and the impressions do not separate from their bearers except through the

~ Citations from the De Anima are from the Greek text in Aristotle. On the Soul. Parva Naturalia.
On Breath. translated by W.S. Hen (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1957).

88

corruption of their bearers. But the soul separates from the body without
corrupting or dissolving through the dissolution of the body.
Enn 1V.3.20: But neither is [soul] in the body as in a substratum (hllpokeimeno),
for what is in a substrate is an affection (pathos) of what it is in, like color and
figure, and the soul is separable.
[n both texts we see a theme that is repeated many times in Plotinus' works on the soul,
and in AP, namely that the soul cannot be essentiaJly related to the body because it can
survive being separated from body. The Adaptor repeats the point in the same section,
and adds a further argument for soul's independence:
Th.A 1I.96-9 [B 44]: The soul is not like a form in matter, and this is because the
form does not separate from the matter except through corruption. The soul is not
in the body like this, but rather it is separated from the body without corruption.
Also, matter is before form, and the body is not before the soul, and this is
because the soul is that which puts form in matter, that is, it is that which informs
matter and that which gives body to matter. And if it is the soul that informs
matter and gives body to it, then there is no doubt that it is not in the body like
form in matter, because the cause is not in the effect like a predicated thing.
Otherwise, the cause would be an impression for the effect, and this is extremely
absurd, because the effect is (he impression and the cause is the impressor. The
cause is in the effect like the impressing agent, and the effect is in the cause like
an impressed effect.
Enn IV.3.20 [paralleling Th.A II.96-7]: Neither is [soul] as form in matter, for the
form in matter is inseparable, and the form [comes] later to matter already in
being. But the soul makes the form in the matter, being other than the form.
Here the Adaptor adds, in an original passage, that soul cannot be the form of matter in
the sense of an "impression" (athar) or effect of the matter, because then it would be the
effect of the body instead of its cause. However, the Adaptor expands on Plotinus' claim
that the soul "makes the form" in the body, saying twice that soul "informs" matter and
"makes it bodily"

(tu~awwiru, tujissimu).

Though these two verbs might associate the

soul more closely with body than Plotinus does here, the overaJl impression of the
passage is that the soul is not the form of the body, but the cause of that form.

89

Let us now tum to the passage Zimmermann cites from m'imar ffi. The section
parallels part of Plotinus' critique of other views on the nature of the soul, and follows the
criticism of the Pythagorean theory that soul is the harmony of the body. Plotinus then
addresses Aristotle's view:
Enn IV.7.S 5 : One could examine how it is said of the soul that it is entelechia as
follows: they say that the soul in the composite has the order of form regarding the
ensouled body as matter, but is not the form of every body nor [of body] as body,
but "of a natural organic [body] having life potentially." If, then, it is likened [to
body] by being placed with it, as is the shape of the statue to bronze, then when
the body was divided the soul would be partitioned at the same time, and when
some part was cut off a part of soul would be with what was cut off.
Plotinus goes on to point out that in his view, the entelechia theory of soul would make
several activities of soul impossible, namely sleep, reason's opposition to desire, and
even thought in general. Then, he argues, there must be some aspect of soul, the rational
soul" (logizomenen psuchen), which is separable from body. But, finally, even the
desiring and growing functions of the soul would be separable, since we desire the nonbodily and the same soul can exist in different bodies at different times. He concludes:
"[the soul] does not have being (to einai) from being the form of something, but is a
substance, not taking its being from its foundation in body, but being before becoming of
this [body]"' (Enn IV.7.S 5 ). Notice that the argument is based on showing that soul cannot
be entelecltia if it can be separated from the body, a strategy we already saw the Adaptor
preserve in his paraphrase.
The Adaptor paraphrases the long passage above as follows:
Th.A rn.67-70 [B 54]: If they say that the most excellent philosophers agree that
4
the soul is the perfection of the body. and perfection is not substance, so therefore
the soul is not substance, because the perfection of the thing is only from the
~ Tamiim: elsewhere [ translate this as "completion:'

90

substance of the thing, then we say that we must examine their saying that the soul
is some perfection, and with what meaning they call it ellteleclzia (inlaliishfii).
We say that the most excellent philosophers mentioned that the soul is in the body
only as (bi-manzi/: lit. "'in the position of') a form through which the body is
ensouled, just as matter is body through form. Except that if the soul is the form
of the body, then it is not a form to every body insofar as it is body, but rather is
only form to a 'body possessing life potentially." If the soul is a perfection
according to this description ~ifa), it is not of the domain of bodies. This is
because, if it were form for the body like the form that is in a bronze idol, then if
the body were divided and partitioned, [the soul] would also be divided and
partitioned, and if one of the members of the body were cut off, then something of
[the soul] would also be cut off. And this is not the case. Therefore the soul is
not a form of perfection like the natural and artificial form, but rather is only a
perfection because it is what perfects the body so that it comes to possess
sensation and intellect.
Here the Adaptor agrees with Plotinus that soul is not in body as the form of the body
itself, as what he elsewhere calls a "material form." (This, I take it. is the force of the
phrase natural and artificial form" in the last sentence, given that this material form is
the only form had by natural and artificial things which have no souls.) Yet the Adaptor.
unlike Plotinus, holds that in a sense the soul is the perfection or enteleclzia of the body.
That this approval stems from the Adaptor's knowledge of Aristotle is clear. First, he
says it is a view to which ....the most excellent philosophers agree." replacing Plotinus'
more non-committal 'it is said (/egetai)." Second. he retains the Greek word enteleclzia
as a transliteration, which lends an air of authority to the view under discussion, and may
imply that he knows the same word is used in Aristotle. Third, he faithfully retains the
quotation from Aristotle that soul is the form of a '''body possessing life potentially." The
translation in Arabic here is very close to that in the Arabic paraphrase of the De Anima:
Th.A m.68 [B 54]: Iziya ~iira al.jism dlzii !layiih bi- 'l-qltwa ("it is the form of the
body having life in potency").

91

De Anima Paraphrase 215.5: al-nafs tarniim li-jism labiT dhii !layiih bi- 'l-qllwa
("'the soul is a perfection for the natural body having life in potency,,).5
All this suggests that the Adaptor recognized Plotinus' quotation from Aristotle and,
along with it, the Aristotelian provenance of the theory of entelechia.
In what sense, then, does the Adaptor recommend we understand Aristotle's
definition of soul? He says that soul is, in fact, the perfection or enrelechia of body, but
only because it is the source of the body's perfection. Hence he concludes this passage by
saying that "the soul is not a fonn of perfection like the natural and artificial form, but
rather is only a perfection because it is what perfects the body.-, This is a doctrine that
seems to have been in the Adaptor's mind in a passage we examined above, where he said
(Th.A n.96-99) that the soul is not literally the fonn of the body, even though the effect
is in the cause," in other words, the form for the body is in soul. The Adaptor repeats the
point when he comes to Plotinus' skeptical remark: "'the reasoning soul, then, must be

entelechia in another way than this, if one should use this name" (Enn IV.7.S5). The
paraphrase reads:
Th.A ill.75-6 [B 55]: As for us. we say that there is no other soul besides this
rational soul, which is in the body now, and it is that which the philosophers say is
the enteleclzia of the body, even though they only mentioned that it is enrelechia
and a form of perfection in another way, different from the way which the
materialists mention it. I mean that it is not perfection like the natural, effected
perfection. but is rather active perfection (tamiimfii'il), that is, it makes (yajalu)
perfection. With this meaning, they say that [soul] is the perfection of the natural,
organic body which possesses the soul potentially6.

5 R. Arnzen. Aristoteles' De Anima. eine verlorene spatantike paraphrase in arabischer und

persi scher Oberlieferun! (Leiden: Brill. 1998). All citations from the Arabic paraphrase of De Anima are
from this text. Notice that the elements of the De Anima definition not used here by the Adaptor. namely
the words af-famam and !abi"l. are used nearby in 111.67 and 111.76.

(, Reading bi- l-qllwah.

92

Notice that the Adaptor here makes a distinction between two possible interpretations of
Aristotle's theory. On the first, "materialist" theory, the soul is a natural perfection
caused by something else. This theory would be vulnerable to the criticisms Plotinus
presents in the parallel text. On the second theory, which the Adaptor adopts, soul is the
source of perfection and as a result can be called a perfection in a higher sense. The
result is that. where Plotinus is actually criticizing the doctrine of the De Anima, the
Adaptor is only correcting what he sees as a possible misinterpretation of that doctrine.
Especially intriguing here is the strategy used by the Adaptor to define entelechia
in a way that is not vulnerable to Plotinus' arguments. On the one hand, he is arguing
that a cause always shares a nature with its effect, so that the effect is "in" the cause.
Both Aristotle and Plotinus would agree to this: Aristotle because the actuality of the
cause must be similar to the actuality of the effect, and Plotinus because what participates
in its cause cannot be whoIly different from its source. But it seems to be the latter sense
the Adaptor has in mind here: he is not thinking of Aristotelian physical causality, where
a thing is similar to its efficient cause in its actuality, but of a hierarchical sort of
causality. In other words. the difference between form in soul and in body is not just that
between agent and patient, but that between a higher and lower version of the same form.
We can detect a further Neoplatonist tendency in the Adaptor's fluid use of the terms in
question. Because the soul is the cause of form in the body, he holds that there is no
sharp distinction to be made between soul and this form. Hence he can still agree with
Aristotle that the body possesses soul potentially. and notfonn potentially. Soul" is

7 I am indebted to Prof. Richard Taylor for bringing to my attention the importance of this
distinction here.

93

being treated here as a word with different levels of application~ since the Adaptor
considers it to be both a principle separable from the

body~

and hence distinct from the

body. and a principle that is in" and 'informs a particular body. The passages we have
looked at so far indicate that the Adaptor is determined to hold on to both of these
conceptions of soul. as both independent from and within body. Perhaps this is
unremarkable: the Adaptor does not depart greatly from Plotinus in this dual view of soul.
After all. Plotinus does think of the soul as

"fallen~'

into the body, and as a result will also

speak of soul being "in" the body in some sense. 8 However. as we will see in the next
section, the Adaptor associates soul with body more closely than does Plotinus, and even
holds that the soul can become, in a sense, corporeal.

3.1.2 sours relationship to body

The attempt to detect Aristotelian influence on the Adaptor must take into account the
extent to which Plotinus' own thought has absorbed Aristotelian elements. To the extent
that the Adaptor just repeats these elements in his paraphrase, we cannot say that the
Adaptor really departs from Plotinus because of the influence of, for example, the De
Anima. On the other hand, I would argue, these Aristotelian components of Plotinus'
system facilitate the Adaptor's project of bringing Aristotle into the text of the Enneads.
This is one reason to think that the Adaptor is not so much interested in revising Plotinus
to accommodate his Aristotelian sources, as he is in describing a single system of
"ancient" thought which is drawn from a number of different sources. [n the next two
sections, this sort of strategy will emerge with regard to the relation of soul and body.

See. for instance. Enn IV.8.1.

94

Here is an example of how the Adaptor paraphrases parts of Plotinus' text that
have an Aristotelian ring to them:
Enn IV.7.3: If the body is simple and they do not say that the material is such as to
have life through itself - for matter is not like that - but what is as fonn brings
the life. then if they say that this form is a substance. then not the composite. but
one of these [parts of the composite] will be the soul.
Th.A IX.35 [B 125]: We say that the simple body is composed from matter and
form. It is impossible to say that the body possesses soul from the side of matter.
because matter is not a quality for it. The body only possesses soul and life from
the side of the form. because the body possesses taxis flaqis) and exposition
through the soul. and the taxis and exposition are from the domain of the soul.
because it belongs to the soul that there is taxis through it. 9
Here Plotinus indirectly compares soul to form ("what is as form brings life"). This is the
occasion for the Adaptor to say. more explicitly, that the body's reception of form is its
reception of soul. Furthermore. the fact that the body is composed from matter and
fonn. put together with the close association of soul and form, seems to license the
Aristotelian conclusion that a living body is a compound of soul and matter. The Adaptor
comes closer to this conclusion in another, similar passage:
Th.A IX. 12-3 [B 122]: As for the soul. it is fixed and eternal in one state. not
corrupting and not passing away. Through [the soul] the man becomes what he is,
namely the true thing in which there is no falsehood. when it is subjoined to the
body. The need of the soul for the body is like the need of form for matter. and
like the need of the artisan for the instrument. Therefore the man is the soul.
because he is what he is through the soul and becomes fixed and eternal through
it. and through the body he becomes passing-away and corrupting.
Enn IV.?I: (fthis [body] is a part of us. the whole is not immortal. but if it is a
tool. then it must. as given for some time. be of a nature to exist for that time. But

9 Notice that. despite the transliteration [aqis in the Arabic here. there is no use of the word taxis
(meaning "order") in the corresponding Greek. This. to my mind. is a good reason to think that the Arabic
text of the paraphrase came directly from the Greek. and not through a Syriac paraphrase. For a writer who
would use a Greek loan word is likely to know Greek; but if the author of the Arabic paraphrase knew
Greek. it seems superfluous to posit a mediating Syriac text. See also Th.A VII1.46. which likewise uses the
word [aqis without a Greek parallel.

95

[the other part] is the most important and is the man himself. If [the soul] is this,
then it is to body as form to matter and as user to tool.
Here Plotinus suggests that there is analogy between soul and fonn, and the Adaptor
enlarges on this analogy by saying that, as form "needs" matter (presumably in order to be
instantiated as a particular), so soul "needs" the body, so that it can have something to
use. like an instrument.
But the most crucial passage for the idea that a human is compounded of soul and
body comes in a more complex discussion found in mfmar X. The parallel Greek text is
Enn VL7.4-5. Here Plotinus gives a detailed explanation of how "man" is emanated from
'lOllS

to Soul and then into matter. arguing that "man" exists separately at each level.

There are, then, three versions of man. and as Plotinus says (Enn VI.7.6) the intellectual
man (110 ell

no antlzropos) "illuminates the second [man], and this illuminates the third:'

In this part of the paraphrase the Adaptor understands Plotinus to be saying that the
"third" or lower" man is. in effect. the man of Aristotle's De Anima: a living thing
composed from soul and body. His interpretation seems to be based to some extent on a
passage where Plotinus supposes living things to be such composites: "but the living
thing is (composed] from soul and body" (Enn VI.7.4, line 12). The Adaptor follows this
wi th the paraphrase:
Th.A X.56 [B 142]: If the description ~ifa) of man is what is composed from
rational soul and body, then it is impossible that [the man] has a figure (shaba!J.)
of this description which is eternal. The man is only parts at the point of the
assembly of the soul and the body. But rather, his quiddity (miihiyya) indicates
the man being generated in the future, not the man who is called the intellectual
and formal man.
Enn VI. 7.4: But if that which is [composed] from rational soul and body is the
logos of the man, how could it be an eternallzypostasis, with this logos of this sort
of man being generated when body and soul are brought together?

96

Here Plotinus is denying that 'man" is in fact a compound of soul and body, or more
precisely, that the logos of that composite would not be the logos of man. Rather, he
wants to hold that the logos of man must be a higher principle, separate from matter. He
makes this clear a few lines later when he rejects Aristotle's idea that the logos would be
a "this in a this" (tod' ell tode). At this very point, the Adaptor paraphrases as follows:
Th.A X.59 [8 143]: One must, when one wants to describe a material thing,
describe it with its matter as well, and not describe it only with the word which
made this thing. If one wants to describe an immaterial thing, then one may
describe it only with the fonn.
Enn VI.7.4: One must. even though one must speak of the logo; of enmattered
forms as regarding matter (meta hules). yet grasp even more the logos which
makes. for example, the man.
Here the Adaptor has changed the point of the passage. Plotinus argues that there is a
place for discussion of matter when defining the material thing, but that primarily the

logos is a transcendent principle. By contrast, the Adaptor argues (as would Aristotle)
that it is only immaterial things that are described or defined purely with reference to an
immaterial form.

lo

With these slight shifts in the paraphrase, the Adaptor has prepared the way for a
more Aristotelian reading of Plotinus: that man, considered as a living, material thing. is
the above-mentioned compound of body and soul. Thus we must describe man as a
compound of both matter and form, or soul. He also recognizes the two "higher men" of
Plotinus: the man of pure soul and the highest man in Intellect (see Th.A X.78). But at

need

to

III Compare Aristotle' s comments at Metaphysics HA. I044a33-1 044b I I. where he stresses the
mention the material cause in giving an account of generated substances.

97

the lowest level, he accepts Aristotle's conception of what man" is. This comes out
most strongly a bit later in the section:
Th.A X. 64 [B 144]: If the soul is not man, then man must therefore be a word
(kalama) other than the word of the soul. If this is the case, then what is it that
keeps us from saying: the man is what is composed from both soul and body?
Enn VI.7.5: Therefore the man must be a logos other than the soul. What prevents
that the man is a composite, a soul in some logos?
Here we see a more blatant change on the Adaptor's part. since the compound Plotinus is
speaking of is composed of soul and logos. not body and soul. I would suggest that this
change is due to the fact that, throughout this part of mlmar X, the Adaptor is writing his
paraphrase with Aristotle's theory of soul in the back of his mind. This thesis is further
confirmed shortly thereafter:
Th.A X.72 [B 145]: This man is the one which the noble, divine Plato defined,
except that he expanded his definition. and said that the man which uses the body
and performs his activities through bodily instruments is just a soul using the body
first. As for the noble, divine soul, it uses the body in a secondary way. that is,
through the intermediary of the animal soul (al-nafs al-!laywiiniyya).
Enn VI. 7 .5: This is that which Plato is defining, and he added 'using a body'
because it rides on the one which uses a body first, but the one [which uses the
body] secondarily is more godlike.
[mportant here is the addition of the final phrase. 'through the intermediary of the animal
soul:' By this addition the Adaptor implies that there is a soul at a lower level. the
"animal" soul, wh.ich is compounded together with body to form the lowest man. If this
is in fact his understanding of the human soul -- that it exists as a material form in its
lowest instantiation, then this allows us to better understand the treatment of elltelechia in
mimar III. For the lowest sort of soul turns out to be something very much like the

Aristotelian soul. which is a perfection emanated from what is purely soul.

98

An important objection to such an interpretation of the Adaptor's view is that he

often follows Plotinus in denying that soul is form. If he is really interested in defending
the Aristotelian view, shouldn't he insist that soul is. in some sense. form? We already
saw one passage (Th.A 1X.35) in which the Adaptor does associate soul closely with
form. On the other hand. other passages we looked at above seem to explicitly deny that
soul is form in any sense. for example Th.A U.96: 7he soul is not like a form in matter:'
Another. more extensive such passage can be found in mimar IX:
Th.A 1X.6-7 [B 121-122]: This is because. when the body remains alone, and the
noble soul is not in it. it is incapable of remaining and of being a continuous unity,
because it dissolves and is separated into the form and the matter, and it is only
separated into these two because it is composed from them. The body only
dissolves and separates. and fails to remain continuous in one state, due to the
withdrawal of the soul. because the soul is that which composes [the body] from
matter and fonn. So when it withdraws from it. it does not take long for [the
body] to separate into the things from which it was composed.
Enn IV.7.1: [The body] is not [one]. because it receives dissolution into shape
(morphen) and matter.
It seems abundantly clear from this paraphrase that the soul is distinct from the form of
the body, since. as the Adaptor says. the soul is the cause of that form. This might lead us
to take somewhat less seriously the claim soon afterwards (1X.12) that the soul is to body
'as form to matter" (see above). However, I think that such a rigorous distinction
between form and soul is not what the Adaptor has in mind. Consider the following
comment from another portion of AP. which has no Greek parallel text:
OS 168 [B 189]: The third intelligible is the sensible, material form. which is
intelligible accidentally, not through its essence. This is because the intellect is
that which distinguishes [the form] from its bearer in reasoning (amr al-manriq):
it describes them as if they were subsistent in themselves (bi-dhiitihii), distinct
from their bearers.

99

This passage shows that the Adaptor recognizes a form belonging to physical substances
which is actually "sensible" - presumably what he has in mind here is something like the
shape of a body, or any other form which accounts for its physical characteristics. It is
quite likely. I think, that he also means this sort of form in Th.A IX.6-7, just quoted
above: this is the form of the body, the "natural and artificial form" we saw mentioned at
Th.A ill. 70. For here the Greek word morphe has been translated as form,' so that the
Adaptor might not mean. say. the substantial form of the thing ("humanity" in the case of
a human), but only its physical form or shape.' Then his point is that soul is what
compounds a body out of matter and "sensible or material" forms. But the soul may still,
in some sense, be the "fonn" of the body as is implied in other passages. This is
especially so given that, as we have seen. the Adaptor conceives the lowest instantiation
of the soul along Aristotelian lines, that is. as entelechia. and as that which combines with
body to make man.
We can be clearer about the sense in which soul is the form of body, or becomes
bodily, by focusing on the Adaptor's treatment of different parts or faculties of the soul.
In the first mimar we read:
Th.A 1.14 [B 20]: As for the soul of man. its essence has three parts: vegetative.
animal. and rational. and it is separated from the body upon its collapse and
dissolution, except that the pure, clean soul which has not been dirtied and has not
been sullied by the squalors of the body. when it separates from the sensible
world, will then return to those substances quickly and without hesitating.
Enn 1V.7.14: If it is said that the soul of man. being tripartate (trimere), will be
destroyed by its composition. we also will say that the pure [souls]. when set free,
shed that which was plastered to them in their generation.
There is an obvious addition here that specifies what the three parts of this "tripartate"
soul would be. Not only does Plotinus not say what the three parts are, but if he had. he

100

would presumably not have given the list found in Th.A. for he is doubtless thinking of
the tripartate soul in the Republic. The Adaptor's division seems rather to be drawn from
Aristotle. At the outset of the Arabic De Anima paraphrase. for example. we find a
similar division of soul into the growth soul. the sensitive soul. and the rational soul"
(185.2-3). This technical division of soul is yet another Aristotelian aspect of the
Adaptor" s doctrine.
Now, we have already seen that the Adaptor is concerned both to agree with
Plotinus that the soul can exist independently of body. and to retain the close connection
bet"veen soul and body found in the De Anima. The division of the soul into parts or
faculties gives him a way to account for this twofold nature of soul. He holds that the
soul is "bodily" or in" body with regards to some of its faculties. in particular those of
the nutritive and animal or sensitive soul. But with regard to the rational" soul. the soul
transcends body and survives the corruption of the body. Thus we find statements like
the following:
Th.A 0.67 [B 40]: These faculties are not like the sensory faculties. but they are
according to another kind. This is because the sensory faculties are parts after
these faculties, and therefore they come to be more corporeal (ashaddall
tujassumall).
Similarly. in mimar 0 there is a lengthy discussion of how the soul is divided" in the
body. Here the Adaptor goes beyond the parallel text in Plotinus to say that the soul is
divided in place by exercising its different functions in different parts of the body.
However. he insists that this division is an accident that comes to the soul as a result of its
residing in body. as opposed to an essential division. The passage is largely independent
from the original Greek:

IOl

Th.A II.58-61 [B 38-9]: It must be known whether the soul is divided

(tatajazza 'u), or not divided, and if it is divided, then is it divided through its
essence, or through an accident (bi- 'ara4in)? And likewise, if it is not divided
then is it not divided through its essence, or through an accident? We say that the
soul is divided through an accident, and this is because, when it is in the body,
then it admits of division through the division of the body. as you say that the
thinking part is other than the brute (hahimf) part, and its sensual part is other than
its wrathful part. By "part" we only mean a part of the body in which is the
thinking faculty of the soul, and the part in which is the sensual faculty, and the
part in which is the wrathful faculty. For the soul only admits division through an
accident, not through its essence, that is, through the part of the body which it is
in. But as for [the soul] in itself. it does not admit of division at all. When we say
that the soul is not divided, we only say this generally and essentially, and when
we say that the soul admits division, we only say this secondarily and accidentally,
because [the soul] is only divided when it comes into the bodies. II
Enn IV.3.19: ...whether the "indivisible" (to ameriston) and the "divisible"
[aspects of the soul] are in the same place? ...just as we say that the reasoning part
(/ogizomenon) is one thing and the irrational part (alogon) another... "Indivisible"
is said simply, but "divisible" not simply, but [Plato] says that [soul] "becomes
divisible in the bodies," and not that it has become [this way before].
Shortly afterwards we have a passage which is completely independent from the Greek:
Th.A U.70 [B 40]: The faculty of the soul is of two sorts: one of them is divided
through the parts of the body like the senses. and the other is not divided through
the parts of the body, like the augmentative faculty and the appetetive faculty, for
they are spread through the whole body of the plant. The faculties divided
through the parts of the body are brought together by another faculty, more
lasting, more noble, and higher than them.
Taking these lines together with 0.58-61, we see the Adaptor adding a number of
important points to Plotinus' discussion of whether soul can become divided:
(l)

The division of soul is accidental, not essential.

(2) The division of soul in body is tied to its division into faculties or "powers" (quwan).

J I I read the sense of the Arabic differently from Lewis: the Adaptor is asking whether the division
of the soul is essenrial or accidental. not whether the soul is an accident. Lewis also translates rataja~'1l
as "particularized:' which I think is somewhat misleading.

102

(3) Part of the soul, which is more "lasting and noble:' remains undivided and
presumably above body.
This last point refers, it seems, to the '"thinking" or ""rational" soul, which is superior to
the bodily aspects of soul. The Adaptor makes this distinction here and elsewhere with
reference to the "brute" soul, al-Ilafs al-bahfmiyya. This distinction parallels one made
by Plotinus himself, between the rational soul and the '"irrational soul" (alogos psuchif). 12
Mentions of the brute soul in AP often make the point that this lower soul is affected by
and existent in body, in a way that the rational soul is not. For example, at Th.A VI.50 he
says: "this is because some impressions fall on the brute soul, and it receives them, to the
exclusion of the rational souL" One of these impressions, needless to say, is the
""division" attributed to the soul in mfmar n. There is an ontological distinction, then,
between different levels of the soul, which corresponds to the difference between the
faculties of the soul. 13 It seems likely that the Adaptor thought of the lower or "'brute"
soul chiefly in terms of doctrines taken from Aristotle. After all, much of De Anima, and
especially much of the Arabic paraphrase of De Anima, is taken up by discussions of
nutrition. motion and sensation, aU faculties that for the Adaptor would be associated
with the brute soul. If he holds, with Plotinus, that there is also a higher, non-bodily sort
of faculty associated with the human soul, then this need not be seen as a rejection of
Aristotelian doctrine. For support of this notion in Aristotle, one need only to tum to the
beginning of the second book of the De Anima: ""regarding the intellect and the
I:! See Th.A VI.26-9. and the parallel mention of the alogos pSlIchei at Enn rV.4.40.25; also Th.A
VI.49-50. with the Greek phrase used at Enn IVA.43 lines 8 and 12.

13 See also Th.A IX.64 [B 129]: "We say that the proof that the soul is in this world through some
of its faculties and is in the intellectual world through the rest of its faculties is justice. righteousness. and

103

theoretical powers, it is not yet clear [what we should say]. but this seems to be another
kind of soul. [differing] just as the eternal from the corruptible" (413b24-27). And as we
will see below. the Arabic paraphrase of the De Anima reads the third book of the text in
a Plotinian light. Indeed, one issue we will need to address is that of the mutual influence
that these two Arabic paraphrases had upon each other.
It is clear, at any rate, that the Adaptor's division of soul into "rational" and

"bruten soul further facilitated his doctrine that the soul is closely tied to body. Other
passages on this topic in AP show that these close ties can, in the Adaptor's view, lead to
a complete "corporealization" of soul, or a complete fall of soul into the material realm.
Most such passages tie this fall to ethical concerns. The Adaptor argues, firstly, that the
higher soul is immune to ethical lapses:
Th.A VID.l 08 [B 109]: We must not ascribe any of the acts to the intellectual soul
except the acts which the soul does intelJectually, namely its essential,
commendable. noble acts. As for the base. blameworthy acts, they must not be
related to the intellectual soul, but rather only related to the brute soul (al-nafs albahfmiyya), because they are impressions that fallon this soul. not on the
intellectual soul.
Enn V.I.3: These alone must be called acts of soul, that which [it does 1noetically
and which is proper to it (hosa oikothen); the worse is from something else and
belongs to a soul of such a kind.
Note that here the Adaptor adds the distinction we have been discussing, between the
brute and intellectual soul. Elsewhere he goes even further, suggesting that these "base
acts" can lead the soul to fall entirely down to the level of the material. Neither of the
following examples have Greek parallels:

the other excellences." This passage. incidentally, makes a completely different point from that made in the
parallel Greek text, which argues that vinue exists discursively in soul, and non-discursively in II01IS.

104

Th.A IX.68 [B 129]: When [the soul] continues the vision of the intellect, it
acquires from [intellect] the noble excellences. But if it is unmindful and turns to
sense and occupies itself with this, then the intellect does not emanate any of the
excellences on it, and it comes to be like one of the sensory, base things.
Th.A X.20 [8 136]: The soul only makes these impressions upon ('inda) its desire
for the vilest, lowest thing. When it desires it [the soul] makes an impression in
it. and comes to be, along with ('inda) sense, more vile than any other. I';
It is hard to imagine Plotinus saying that the soul could ever descend to such a debased
state. It seems that the Adaptor uses the stronger rhetoric in order to emphasize the
disastrous moral consequences that follow when the soul is turned away from the higher
world. He often adds a moral dimension to his source, for example in this passage which
reinforces the claims quoted above:
DS 46 [B 170]: It is likewise for the rational soul: everything which it acquires
from the pure, bright intellect is something noble and excellent as well, and
everything it acquires from sense is something base and vile.
Enn V.9.13: ...but soul is from intellect, taking other things, among which are
these, from matter.
We will see below some of the further implications of the Adaptor's treatment of ethical
issues. Here, it suffices to point out that his ethical doctrines are reinforced by the notion
that the soul can fall utterly into body, becoming, so to speak, cOrPOreal. This notion was,
perhaps, more plausible to the Adaptor than to Plotinus, owing to the Adaptor's use of a
more Aristotelian conception of soul throughout his paraphrase.

3.1.3 AP and the Arabic paraphrase of the De Anima

So far in this section we have concentrated our attention on the ways in which the
Adaptor's handling of Plotinus was influenced by Aristotle, and in particular by the
IJ Reading aklziss with Lewis. Badawis reading, which makes no sense in this context. would
have "more beautiful than every beauty:'

105

doctrines of the De Anima. But it should also be acknowledged that this could work the
other way: an Arabic paraphrase of the De Anima that originated in al-Kindrs circle l5
seems to have been written under the influence of Plotinian doctrine. In his meticulously
researched volume on the De Anima paraphrase, Rudiger Arnzen provides several
parallels that would indicate this is the case:
1. The De Anima paraphrase says that the soul always knows (201.15), as opposed to
going from potency to act in intellection. Arnzen draws a parallel between this and DS
237 (""it is impossible that the intellect is sometimes knowing and sometimes ignorant"),
which directly parallels Enn V.9.2. 16
2. In the De Anima paraphrase, we find a passage (203.9-15) which shows that the soul is
not a body, because it does not have parts, even though the presence of different sense
faculties in different organs might suggest that it does. This parallels a passage in
Plotinus (Enn IV.3.3) where he says that neither the world soul nor the individual soul are
divided into parts because of sensation. 17 The Greek passage is not paraphrased in AP
(though later portions of Enn IV.3 are). Compare, however, the treatment of the division
of soul in mTmar

n (Th.A IT.58ff.) discussed above.

3. The paraphrase of De Anima says that the soul is the perfection (farnam) of body. but a
separable perfection, like the pilot of a ship. Here the non-separable perfection is
compared to the heat that is the perfection of fire. Arnzen finds a parallel for this at Enn
VA.2: "There is the actuality (energeia) that is of the substance, and another actuality that

15 Sec [he linguistic parallels between this paraphrase and AP. as well as other products of alKindT's circle. provided by Arnzen (1998). 108-114. See also Endress (1973). 189.
16

Arnzen (1998). I IS.

17

Arnzen (1998). 115-7.

106

is from the

substance:~

Plotinus aJso uses fire as an example for these sorts of actuality.

This passage is paralleled at OS 173-177. 18

4. The distinction found in Th.A

m between entelechia as perfection and as that which is

a cause of perfection (see above) is also found in the De Anima paraphrase: "Perfection
(aI-farnam) is of two kinds: one of these is that the thing is the perfection itself (bi-

'aynihi). for example the heat of fire, for the fire is perfected through it and thus is fire.

And the second kind is that the thing is making the

perfection~ for

example the sailor is

the perfection of the ship" (217.9-12).19 Arnzen remarks that the writer of the De Anima
paraphrase here seems to have been motivated not so much by the desire to interpret
Aristotle in a Plotinian

light~

or to defend Aristotle from Plotinus, as he was to "attain a

synthesis of both philosophical systems.":w

5. Finally, Arnzen sees the writer of the De Anima paraphrase as trying to steer a middle
course between Aristotle and Plotinus when he says that soul is not in the body like a
material form

(ka-al-~lIrah al-hayfi/aniyya)"

(315.11). On the one hand, says Arnzen,

this accepts Plotinus' point that a material form cannot separate from the

body~

whereas

soul can. On the other, he does not go so far as to reject the entire idea that soul is form
or enteleclzia. because he refers only to a "material form." Here one might think of the
similar strategy we saw above in AP, where the Adaptor seemed to deny only that the
soul is the fonn of the body in the sense of a physicaJ shape.

18 Arnzen (1998). 117. Note that in the De Anima paraphrase. as in AP. farnam translates
t!luefechia. not energeia (e.g. at De Anima paraphrase 215.] 2. translating directly De Anima 412b5). Still.

the notions of perfection and actuality seem close enough in all of these texts to license the parallel drawn
by Arnzen.
19

Arnzen (1998). I 18.

10

Arnzen (1998).119.

107

To this list, we can add further thematic parallels between the two Arabic
paraphrases. One of the most striking is the distinction made in the De Anima paraphrase
between the rational soul (al-nafs al-nii[iqah) and lower parts of the soul. Whereas the
latter are destroyed with the body (319.9-10), the rational soul his not mixed with
anything material or bodily, and is not body" (189.14-5). As a result of this, ""there is no
doubt that the rational soul is eternal, does not corrupt, and does not perish" (311.5-6).
Furthermore, the body hinders the functioning of the intellectual soul (319.3-4). and is the
cause of the soul's '"forgetfulness" (327.5). While Aristotle's text. especially De Anima
III.5, does of course provide support for the idea that intellect (nails) is eternal (430a23),
the identification of rational soul as an eternal faculty of the human soul does not seem to
come from Aristotle. The difference between these two positions -- an eternal naus as
opposed to an eternal rational soul -- is underscored by the De Anima paraphrase itself.
For it argues separately that the intellect ('aql) is eternal (309.16-7) and that the rational
soul is eternal (311.5-6), and indeed seems to use the first point as evidence for the
second. While it would be rash to say that this doctrine is derived from Plotinus. given
the complexities of the tradition of commentary on the De Anima. the notion of a
separable and eternal rational soul does provide an important philosophical parallel to
AP. As we saw above, the Adaptor treats the lower or brute soul in a rather Aristotelian
way, and emphasizes its connection to body in contrast to the rational soul. The author of
the De Anima paraphrase. conversely. departs from his own source text to treat the
rational soul as a transcendent. non-bodily principle in line with the Plotinian soul.
Whatever the sources of either paraphrase. it is worth noting that they take an identical

108

position on the immortality of the soul: the lower, bodily faculties are destroyed with the
body. but the part of soul that is related to the intellect is eternal. 2 1
This is only one of a number of doctrinal agreements between the two Arabic
paraphrases. We might further add the insistence in the De Anima paraphrase on the idea
that the soul is a "simple substance (jawJzar mabsiiV:,22 The simplicity of substance is
crucial in AP. since the Adaptor argues that the soul's simplicity means that it cannot be
destroyed (see, for example, Th.A D('4)_ The eternity and simplicity of soul are likewise
linked in the De Anima paraphrase (196.5-6). Both paraphrases also use the simplicity of
soul as evidence that the soul is immaterial (see Th.A IX.13. De Anima paraphrase
203.16-8). While these parallels cannot demonstrate direct textual influence, they
increase our sense of the similarity of the views set forth in the two texts. It might be
added here that this rather Neoplatonized conception of the soul as a simple substance
seems to have carried considerable weight in al-KindI" s circle as an interpretation of the
De Anima. Thus al-Kindl's Doctrine of the Soul begins by asserting that soul is a
simple substance." and another work by aI-Kind. summarizes Aristotle's doctrine on the
soul by saying that soul is a simple substance whose acts manifest from the bodies. ,.23
Another parallel between the De Anima paraphrase and AP can be found in their
respecti ve critiques of previous views on the soul. In both Greek source texts there are
extended discussions showing the falsity of psychologies from the Greek tradition.
Aristotle criticizes materialist views of the soul in De Anima 1.2. views on the soul's

ZI

Note that this is also the position of aI-Kindt in his Discourse on the Soul. See appendix A.

!l De Anima paraphrase 202. 212. 306. For the doctrine that the soul is simple. see also p.196.
The paraphrase refers to the soul as substance also at 180. 214. 222. 314. and 320.

!J

AI-KindT (1950). Discourse on the SOlll 280.8. Brief Statement on the Soul 281.5-6.

109

motion in 1.3, and the Pythagorean view of soul as hannony of the body in 1.4. Plotinus
follows a similar procedure, arguing against those who describe soul as material, as
harmony, and as entelechia. We have already seen how the Adaptor was influenced by
Aristotle in his paraphrase of the latter point. Now, the Arabic paraphrase of the De
Anima departs considerably from its source in its criticisms of previous views, depending
partiaIly on arguments taken from John Philoponus. 24 As a result, its rejection of the
materialist view of soul is more explicit than Aristotles and is based on different
arguments. (Indeed, Aristotle does not concentrate on proving the immateriality of soul
at all, contenting himself with the observation that ""all define the soul by three things,
motion. sensation, and immateriality" (405bl 1-2).) While one might argue that the
emphasis on this point in the De Anima paraphrase is inspired by Plotinus' text. I find no
striking parallel between the arguments against materialism in the two texts.
We do find a parallel argument. however, when we come to the question of
whether soul is the harmony of the body. Aristotle argues against this (De Anima 1.4) by
saying that the harmony of body is just health, and that soul can be a harmony neither in
the sense of spatial proportion nor in the sense of a ratio of blended consituents. In the
De Anima paraphrase, we find a different argument:
De Anima paraphrase 211.1-3: If the soul is like this, that is, a shape which comes
about from the fonnation (ta 'Ilj) of the bodies, we say: it would therefore be
necessary that there are in us many souls, because the fonnation of every one of
the members of the body is different from the formation of every other [member].
If this were the case. then it would be necessary that there are many souls in us,
and this is absurd (barN).
Compare this to the following passage in the Enneads:

z': See notes in Arnzen (1998). 364ff.

110

Enn rv.7.S 4 : And for each part, which is mixed differently, there would be a
different soul, so that there would be many [souls].
The parallel with AP is even stronger:
Th.A lli.61 [B 53]: Also, if the harmony (i 'tiliif-- same root as ta 'lifabove) only
happens from the harmony of bodies. and the harmony is soul. and the union of
every one of the members of the body is different from the union of every other
[member], you are harmonizing many souls in the body. and this is very repugnant
(shan!').

The similarity of the phrasing in the two Arabic texts makes it extremely unlikely that
both were drawing independently on the text of the Enneads. Given that the passage in
Th.A is itself a paraphrase of Plotinus, it seems clear that in this case the author of the De
Anima paraphrase was drawing on AP.
This passage. then, should be added to one discussed by Arnzen, in which the De
Anima paraphrase draws on the beginning of Th.A to point out that the body holds the
soul back from returning to "its world" (Th.A 1.1 and De Anima paraphrase 319.5-6).
These parallels prove that AP was a source for the Aristotelian paraphrase. Arnzen
provides a parallel that may show that the reverse is also true:
De Anima paraphrase 309.3-11: Sense is not from the realm of the intellect, and
this is because sense is corrupted by the powerful sensible which is beyond
proportion, and [then] it cannot perceive the weak sensible which is deficient of
proportion. But the intellect is not like this, because it perceives the strong
intelligible, and what is weak among the imelligibles is not thereby hidden from
it, but rather it is more able to [perceive] it... because the greater the power of the
intelligible. and the more noble its substance is, the more the intellect increases in
light and knowledge and endurance.
Th.A VIII. 164: The longer vision gazes at the sensible thing, the more the sensible
thing harms it, until it brings it to be outside sense; that is, [vision] does not sense
the thing. But as for intellectual vision, it is the opposite of that. I mean that, the
longer its gaze upon the intelligible. the more is its knowledge and the more it
deserves to be intellect.

III

There is no parallel in the Enneads for this passage. Rather, like the section from the De
Anima paraphrase. the Adaptor's thought here depends closely on Aristotle:
De Anima 429a31-429b4: For sensation is not able to perceive after a violent
(spllOdra) sensation... but the intellect, whenever it thinks the powerful (sphodra)

intelligible, does not think the less intelligible less, but rather more.
While there can be no doubt that the passage in Th.A derives ultimately from the Greek
text of the De Anima, I think it is less clear that this derivation was by way of the Arabic
De Anima paraphrase. Arnzen concludes that the Adaptor was using the Arabic text, and
not the Greek, on the basis of the similarity between the final phrases in the passages
cited. However, the parallel here is not as strong as that in the case of the argument about
harmony cited above. The only word used in both passages is ""knowledge" (rna "rifa),
though Arnzen is right to point out the structural similarity of the phrasing. This seems
insufficient evidence for the claim that AP uses the De Anima paraphrase, and not just the
De Anima itself, as a textual source. 25
The relation of AP to the De Anima paraphrase, then. seems to be as follows. We
can be sure that the author of the De Anima paraphrase had access to AP when he
composed his own text. It is possible, but. I think. still uncertain. that the Adaptor relied
upon the Arabic version of the De Anima. 26 If he did, then Arnzen is right to point out
that the two paraphrases must have been composed contemporaneously. both parts of the

25 See also Arnzen (1998). 123 fn.59. which rejects a different argument by Zimmermann for the
reliance of AP upon the Oe Anima paraphrase.
:!6 Since the parallels discussed above deal only with Th.A and not GS or OS. it remains unclear
whether the author of the Oe Anima paraphrase read only Th.A or some more complete version of the
Arabic Plotinus. (See. however. Arnzen (1998). 121. which argues that one parallel between the texts
shows the author of the De Anima paraphrase using an earlier text of the Arabic Plotinus not split up into
Th.A. GS and OS.) But given the overwhelming evidence that all parts of AP were written by a single
author as one text. it seems safe (Q assume that ifTh.A was influenced by the De Anima paraphrase. then
the same goes for AP as a whole.

112

translation project in al-Kindrs circle. 27 As he also says. the authors of the two
paraphrases would have referred to each other's texts as they composed their own. The
other possibility is that the Adaptor referred to the original Greek of the De Anima while
composing AP, and that the De Anima paraphrase was produced later. In either case, two
important conclusions emerge from our textual comparison. First, it adds to our sense of
AP as part of a larger translation project. Second, it is apparent that both paraphrases
were intended not only as translations, but also as texts that would show the agreement of
their own sources with other Greek works. Thus the author of the De Anima paraphrase
wove Plotinian ideas into the fabric of an Aristotelian source. And. as we have seen in
this section, the Adaptor used Aristotle's De Anima. perhaps in its original Greek version.
as a tool for interpreting Plotinus.

3.2 Ethical views in AP

We saw above in section 3.1.2 of this chapter that the Adaptor emphasizes ethical
concerns in passages that deal with the relation of soul to body. This is one example of a
broad tendency in AP to inject ethical language into passages where such concerns are not
present, or are at least not explicit. Sometimes this tendency is fairly innocuous. as in the
follOWing example:
Th.A VI.39 [B 78]: It is no wonder if he who prays sometimes is listened to,
because he is not strange in this world. especially if he is satisfactory and upright.
Enn IV.4.42: Likewise the all gives to its parts... for it is present to its parts by its
nature, so that the one praying is certainly not a foreigner.

:27 See Arnzen (1998), 123.

113

Here the

Adaptor~

perhaps out of concern to link prayer and moral rectitude, has added

the last phrase in the sentence with no prompting from Plotinus. Such additions are
common in AP, and may suggest that the Adaptor is more concerned with ethical
questions than Plotinus, or that he was interested in making explicit the ethical
dimensions of Plotinian thought. We might say that the Adaptor "moralizes" as he
translates his source text. But such a statement is too general and vague to be of any real
philosophical significance. Therefore I will restrict the following inquiry to passages that
raise the question of a real departure from Plotinus on the Adaptor's part. These fall into
three categories: statements linking the virtues to the cosmic hierarchy, the thematization
of the notion of hdesire" in AP, and the treatment of the sours fall away from intellect.

3.2.1 Virtue and the cosmos

As just noted, the Adaptor is fond of inserting ethically loaded statements into his
translation. This is especially common in passages that deal with the ascent of soul from
the material world to the intellectual realm. Of course, in Plotinus this ascent also has an
ethical meaning. For Plotinus, to ascend higher in the cosmic hierarchy is to come closer
[0

the Good. and this ascent is therefore the only true good for man. Thus Plotinus is

fairly dismissive of the so-called "civic

virtues~~ (politikai

aretai) in his treatise on virtues

(Enn. 1.2), arguing that they may assist in re-ordering the soul, but do not constitute true
virtue, which of course consists in a return to the intelligible. The ethical imperative
implicit here is. then, to give up the things of the physical world (civic virtue helps us to
relinquish these) and tum our attention to the eternal realities. In accordance with this

114

doctrine, passages paralleled in AP make mention of our attachment to the material world
as a hinderance to the soul's ascent. For example:
Th.A Vll.49 [891]: These [sensible] things make [the soul] heedless and fanciful,
and hinder it from casting its gaze upon itself and its part which remains in the
higher world. This is because base matters have overcome [the soul), like
blameworthy longing (shalnva) and base pleasure, so it has abandoned its eternal
things in order to attain, by abandoning them, the pleasures of this sensible world,
and it does not know that it has removed itself from the pleasure which is the true
pleasure, since it has come to the pleasure which passes away, and is not enduring
or fixed.
Enn IV.8.8: ." because what they [the partial souls] attend to is partial and
deficient, and has many foreign things around it, and many things which it desires
(eplzietai). And it takes pleasure, and pleasure deceives it.
It would be fair to say that, in expanding on this passage. the Adaptor strikes a much

more righteous tone than Plotinus, using stronger language ('"blameworthy longing and
base pleasures") to underscore the same point. Still, the philosophical view remains
fundamentally the same.
Where the Adaptor subtly departs from his source is in passages that imply that
the soul can only ascend through virtue. In a passage that has no basis in the Greek, the
Adaptor writes:
Th.A X.71 [B 145]: Whoever wants to see the true, first man must be good and
excellent (fiigilan).28 and have strong senses that are not obstructed by the
radiance (ishriiq) of the lights shining on them...
Here the second point is certainly inspired by Plotinian light metaphors. But it would be
difficult to find a text in which Plotinus so unequivocally states that moral goodness is a

1M The wordfiidil and other words based on the same root are common in AP. One word derived
from the same root isfadiri!. which can be lranslated as "excellences" bUI also has the more specific
meaning of "vinues:' Usually throughoul the dissertation r lranslale all words based on this root with fonns
of the word "excellent:' but I will translate/adaiI as "virtues" in conlexts where this is clearly the intended
meaning, as in cases where the word is accompanied by examples of specific virtues.

liS

precondition for sight of the noetic world. The Adaptor brings this same sensibility to
paraphrases of the Greek text:
Th.A IV.44 [B 61]: The beauty of the soul is only manifest to you in the upright
man, because when the upright man casts base things from his soul and adorns his
soul with satisfactory deeds, the first light emanates upon his soul from its light
and brings [his soul] to be beautiful and splendid.
Enn V.8.3: [The sours logos] is most manifest in the honest soul (spoudaia
pSllche) and is already proceeded in beauty, for by adorning the soul and giving it

light from a greater light which is primarily beauty, by being in the soul it makes
one conclude what the thing before it is like...
While Plotinus does say that it is the good man who most has the higher beauties shining
in his soul, he does not state that "satisfactory deeds" are a condition for receiving an
emanation from nOlls.
It might be argued that, if this is a departure from Plotinus, it is a very slight one.
As already mentioned, Plotinus sees good deeds as at least conducive to ascent, if not as
an absolute requirement. Yet the Adaptor's emphasis on virtue in the conversion of soul
goes beyond this. In several passages, he mistranslates passages to emphasize that the
soul's regaining its transcendent state is essentially an attainment of virtue. Consider the
following two paraphrases:
DS 231-2 [B 183]: Among them are a class raised a little above sense, and this is
because the intellective soul has moved them from the loathesome thing to the
search for the more excellent thing, but they have abandoned the examination of
the noble virtues ifagii'il) and have used earthly, base deeds, and made the first
thing, beyond which there is nothing else, among the earthly things falling under
sense. Through sense they wanted to reach the knowledge of the first thing. since
they were incapable of the knowledge which the intellect attains.
Enn V.9.1: And there are those who have risen a little from what is lower, having
been moved by the better [part] of their soul towards the more beautiful from the
pleasant, but unable to see the higher. as having nothing else where they can
stand. they come down in the name of virtue (to tes aretes onomari) to actions and
choices of what is lower. from which they first tried to lift themselves.

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Th.A IV.3? [B 61]: We say that we find the beautiful form not in bodies, like the
mathematical forms, for they are not bodily, but are simply figures having
linearity, and like the forms which are in the silvered mirror, and like the forms
which are in the soul, for it is the beautiful form in truth, I mean the form of the
soul: forbearance (!li/m) and dignity, and what is similar to these.
Enn V.8.2: But it is clear that the beauty which is pursued is other and not in
magnitude, [from] the beauty in mathematics and that in habits and generally that
in souls, which is in truth a greater beauty than when you see practical wisdom
(phronesin) and esteem it.
In both of these passages the Adaptor changes the role played by virtue in the Greek text.
In the first case, Plotinus mentions virtue only by way of pointing out the hypocrisy of the
descending soul: such a soul might claim to descend in the name of virtue. But the
Adaptor, in what one might consider an inspired mistranslation, treats virtue as precisely
that which the soul has given up by its descent. He goes even further in the second
passage. Here. Plotinus is actually saying that plzrones;s is a lower good or beauty than
that to which we should really aspire. The Adaptor, on the other hand, treats virtues as
the very form of soul. He corrects Plotinus, rejecting the notion that the concerns of
practical virtue are somehow lower than the highest attainments of the human soul.
Such passages provide a context for the most striking original discussion of virtue
in AP. which comes in mimar IX of Th.A. In an extended passage that departs widely
from the parallel Greek text, the Adaptor makes it clear that he considers the cosmic
hierarchy to be equally a hierarchy of virtue, and God to be the pinnacle of the virtues.
The occasion for this discourse on virtue is the following argument of Plotinus':
Enn V.I. II : Then, since there exists the soul reasoning about the just and
beautiful (dikaion ka; lea/on), and reasoning (log;smou), seeking whether this is
just and this is beautiful, it is necessary that there is also some pennanent justice,
from which reasoning comes to be in soul. Or how else would it reason? And if
soul sometimes reasons about these things, sometimes not, there must be in us

II?

intellect which does not reason about, but always has the just, and be also the
principle. cause, and god of intellect.
The point of this passage is that, if the soul reasons discursively about the good. there
must be a non-discursive goodness in the intellect that is the source and principle of the
sours reasoning. Indeed the example "justice" seems to be chosen here not because
Plotinus is interested in a discussion of the virtues or ethics, but because it is a caliie where
one might plausibly argue for an eternal principle to serve as the object of reasoning. It is
likely that similar discussions in Plato also lie behind this choice.
Be that as it may. the Adaptor's response to the passage is to enlarge on the ethical
dimension of the argument rather than the epistemological dimension:
Th.A IX.64-66 [B 129]: "We say that the proof that the soul is in this world
through some of its faculties and is in the intellectual world through the rest of its
faculties is justice ('ad!), righteousness ~alii!J), and the other virtues ifaf!.ii'il).
This is because, when the soul thinks about justice and righteousness, and then it
examines something [to find out] whether it is justice or righteousness or not like
this. then there is no doubt that in the intellect there is something of justice and
righteousness which the soul things about and investigates... If this is the case, we
say that justice and righteousness and the other virtues are existent. if the soul
things about them or does not think [about them]. And they are only existent in
the intellect. in a higher and more sublime way than that in the soul.
This part of the paraphrase stays fairly close to Plotinus' text and argument. But in what
follows. the Adaptor gives that argument a rather different significance:
Th.A IX.67-68 [B 129-130]: This is because the intellect is that which conveys
justice, righteousness and the other virtues. The virtues are not enduringly in the
thinking soul, but rather they are sometimes existent in it. since it thinks about
them. This is because, when the soul casts its gaze on the intellect. it attains from
it the grade of virtues in the measure which it casts its gaze on it. When [the soul]
continues the vision of the intelJect, it acquires from [intellect] the noble virtues.
But if it is unmindful and turns to sense and occupies itself with this, then the
intellect does not emanate any of the virtues on it. and it comes to be like one of
the sensory, base things.

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Plotinus argued that the soul has an epistemic relationship with the intellect: if it wants to
know what something is, such as justice, it must make the intellectual form of justice the
object of its inquiry. Hence that form is the source of the sours deliberation; as Plotinus
says, "from [intellectual justice] reasoning comes to be in the souL" But the Adaptor
draws a different conclusion, namely that the very virtue of justice comes to be in the soul
as an emanation from the intellect. There seems to be an added premise here. namely that
if the soul is thinking about virtue. then the soul will be virtuous. It follows from this.
presumably, that the intellect is somehow more "'virtuous" than the soul, since it has a
permanent intellectual possession of virtue.
And indeed. this is the next conclusion stated by the Adaptor. But he does not
stop there, instead going on to argue that if the intellect is virtuous, then it too must have
acquired the virtues from its own source, the First Cause:
Th.A IX.69-71 [B 130]: As for the intellect, all the virtues are in it enduringly, not
sometimes existent and sometimes not. but in it always. If they are in it
enduringly, then they are acquired. for the reason that the intellect only acquires
them from the First Cause. The virtues only come to be in the intellect enduringly
because the intellect does not subside in its vision of the First Cause. and is not
distracted from it. The virtues are in it enduringly. except that they are perfected
in the extreme. and they are correct with no error in them, because they come to
be in it from the First Cause with no intermediary, and the intellect attaches to it
to the extent of what is brought to it from above.
And as for the First Cause, the excellences are in it in the way of a cause
(bi-nau:"in "illat), not that it is the position of a receptacle for the virtues. but
rather its whole is a being (amziyya) which is all the virtues, even though the
virtues flow (tanhu "ll) from it without it being divided or moving or resting in one
place.
I think that there is a clear argument here. which rests more or less entirely on principles
that can be drawn from Plotinus. We could summarize the argument as follows:

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( I) What thinks about virtue has virtue, presumably because of the identity of knower

and known (an assumption of both Aristotelian and Plotinian epistemology).

(2) The soul is sometimes virtuous, namely when it thinks about virtue by reasoning.
But the intellect is always virtuous. because the virtues exist eternally in intellect as
forms.
(3) But everything that exists in intellect comes from the First, and more generally, every
effect is contained in a more transcendent way in its cause. 29
(4) Then the First has the virtues in the highest way, and indeed since the First is selfidentical in every way. the First is identical with the virtues C"its whole is a being which is
all the virtues").
The Adaptor" s view. then. has some basis in Plotinus. But the conclusion that the
First has or is the virtues is certainly non-Plotinian. Indeed. in Plotinus' treatment of the
virtues in Enn 1.2. he says explicitly that "virtue is of the soul. but it is not of intellect nor
of that beyond [intellect]" (Enn 1.2.3). Why would the Adaptor ascribe the virtues to
every level of the cosmic hierarchy in this way? While any answer would be speculative.
a likely response does present itself: he does so in order to underscore the religious
context of ethics. By making God the highest principle of the virtues. he provides a
philosophical argument for the theological view that the source of human goodness is
ultimately divine. Other passages further underscore this religious ethical context:
Th.A Vl.47 [B 79]: If someone says: if tricks and spells affect things. and man in
particular. what is the state of the man who is excellent (fQd.il). reverent (barr),
and pious (taqfy): is it possible that enchantment affects him... or is this
impossible?
19 See chapter 5 for further discussion of this principle as applied to the First. especially sections
5.2.3 and 5.3.1.

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Enn lV.4.43: But how is the honest man (spolldaios) [affected] by bewitchment
and drugs?
Th.A 1.30-32 [B 23]: As for Empedocles, he says that the souls were in the high.
noble place, and when they erred they fell into this world. He also only came to
this world as a fugitive from the wrath of God, the Exalted, because when he
descended to this world he came to aid the souls whose intellects have become
confused... And he commanded them to ask forgiveness of God -- may He be
exalted...
Enn 1V.8.1: EmpedocJes says it is a law for the transgressing (hamartanousa;s)
souls to fall here, and he himself has come as a fugitive from the gods (phugas
theothen)."

The addition in the first passage, from mfmar VI, has a fairly straightforward purpose.
Whereas Plotinus wants to ask whether the virtuous man can be affected by magic (he
will go on to argue that such a person can only be affected in that part of him which is not
communing with the higher world), the Adaptor is concerned about the relationship
between magic and religion. Thus he expands on the question to specify that it is in his
relationship to God that the man in question is to be admired. The second example is
more interesting: here the Adaptor not only injects religious themes similar to those we
have seen throughout this section, but he makes Empedocles the mouthpiece for these
themes. Particularly interesting is the seamless combination of Empedocles' Greek piety,
as seen in the direct quotation that appears in Plotinus. and the more personal approach
found in Th.A, which portrays God as both wrathful and forgiving. Indeed this may be
the passage in AP which shows most clearly that the Adaptor was trying to produce a text
that would fit into the context of a monotheistic religion with the notion of sin and

121

forgiveness, presumably either [slam or Christianity (or both).30 The fact that these
notions are attributed to Empedocles underscores the Adaptor's willingness, indeed
eagerness, to show the compatibility of Greek philosophy and these religious traditions.

3.2.2 Desire
There are a number of terms that appear with striking frequency in AP with no apparent
basis in Plotinus. Many of these may be explained simply by the differences between
Greek and Arabic, and few are of obvious philosophical significance. We do find
exceptions to this rule, however. In chapter five, for instance, we will examine a set of
crucial original terms in AP that have to do with being (5.2.1). Another exception is the
use of the word desire" (shalvq), which repeatedly appears in AP without translating any
corresponding Greek term. 31 The novel terminology of being is of obvious philosophical
interest. and has attracted the notice of other scholars. The habit of speaking of desire"
is not as striking, yet a closer look at the theme of desire in AP will reveal something
about the Adaptor's ethical views, namely that he uses Aristotle's notion of final cause to
understand the relationships between levels of the Plotinian hierarchy.
Many passages that mention desire do so in order to explain the descent of soul to
the material world. (Th.A X.20 is a good example; see translation above, section 3.1.2.)
It is tempting, then, to suppose that if the Adaptor uses the word desire' in a technical

3ll This observation would harmonize well with the thesis that the Adaptor was Him~i. a Christian
who would have been writing for a largely muslim audience. But cenainly the passage is strong evidence
that. whoever the Adaptor was. he was living in a Christian or [slamic context. and not a Greek pagan
context.

.'. For example. at Th.A [1.43-45. IV.51. IX.74. Synonyms inserted in a similar way include "covet
at Th.A 1.27-28. VIlLI I4.IX.54. [will treat the use of this term as a manifestation of the
same tendency on the Adaptor's part.
(!l.ara~a): as

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sense, it may play the role performed by to/rna (roughly, Haudacity") in Plotinus. That is,
the soul's desire leads it to seek otherness and separation from its source in intellect.
Unfortunately there is no (surviving) paraphrase of the most famous passage on to/rna in
Enn V.I.l. But some passages in AP do support such an interpretation:
Th.A D.38 [B 35]: When the soul separates from the intellect and refuses to unite
with it and be such that it and [the intellect] are one, [and] desires (ishtiiqat) that it
be alone with itself, and that it and the intellect be two, not one, then it is attentive
to this world and casts its gaze on something below intellect, then it acquires
memory and comes to possess memory.
Enn [vA.3: But if it leaves from there [Le. the upper world] and cannot tolerate
oneness (to /zen), but embraces itself and wishes (ethe/esasa) to be other, and so to
speak sticks its head out, it then acquires memory.
Here the Adaptor's train of thought follows Plotinus' rather closely, and even the use of
"desires" is a translation of Plotinus' "wishes:,32
Other texts. however, show that the theme of desire in AP differs from the theme
of [olma in the Enneads. 33 This is for two reasons. First, the Adaptor applies ....desire.. to
en ti ties other than soul. For example, at the very outset of Th.A he talks about the desire
of intellect:
Th.A IA-5 [B 19]: Like the woman who has conceived and to whom labor pains
come, so that she bears what is in her womb, likewise the intellect, when it is
informed with the form of desire, it desires to bring into act the fonn which is in
it, and it strives after that intensely, and it has birth pains and brings it [i.e. the
form] into act, because of its desire for the sensible world. When the intellect
receives the desire [to go] down, the soul is informed by it. Therefore the soul is
only an intellect informed with the form of desire, except that the soul sometimes
has a universal desire, and sometimes has a particular desire.
J: See also GS 1.68. which speaks of individual souls desiring to stand alone away from the world
soul.
JJ It is worth noting that. at Th.A X.24, the Adaptor translates a passage which uses the word
tolmerotaton (V.2.2). He omits the term completely from the paraphrase. That the Adaptor was unaware of
the significance of the concept is unsurprising, since this is the only mention of tolma in the Greek texts
paraphrased in AP. For a treatment of tolma in Plotinus. see N.J. Torchia. Plotinus. To/ma. and the Descent
of Bein~ (New York: Peler Lang. 1993).

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Enn 1V.7.13: But that which receives desire (orexin), being successive to that
intellect, goes forward so to speak by its reception of desire, and now desiring to
make order in accordance with a form in intellect, as if pregnant from those
[forms] and in labor pains to give binh, is in haste to make and creates
(demiollrgei). And straining with this haste towards the sensible, with the entire
soul of the all it goes beyond that of the all which it directs and helps to care for.
Notice that here the Adaptor departs flagrantly from Plotinus, who is clearly talking about
the desire of soul, and transfers the theme to intellect. 34 Plotinus elsewhere does attribute
rolma to the intellect (VI.9.9, with no parallel in AP), but there the issue is the intellect's

separation from the One, not a descent of intellect into the material realm. The Adaptor's
willingness to attribute desire more widely than Plotinus does reaches a rather absurd
climax in the following passage:
Th.A IX.54 [B 128]: ...it was necessary for [the materialists] to say that it is the
bodies which covet (ra!lri~ll) to search for a place [to be] in, and are fixed in the
powers of the soul. The soul is the place of the bodies, and they are fixed and
abiding in it...
Enn 1V.7.4: [The materialists] must seek [a place] where they may establish the
bodies...
Here the coveting or desiring 35 is transferred from the materialists to the bodies
themselves. Even if we regard this as a mere error in translation, it is telling that the
Adaptor was not struck by the absurdity of attributing desires to bodies rather than the
souls that inhabit them.

3-1 One might compare the discussion of desire in Enn VI.8.2-3. and especially the comment at the
end of VL8.3 that the "desires (orexeis) of intellect" are completely free. However there is no comparison
here of the intellect's desires to the downw~rd-Ieadingdesires of soul. On the contrary. Plotinus is
emphasizing the freedom of intellect from those desires associated with external determination. which are
characteristic of the bodily realm.

35

See above. fn. 31.

124

A second disanalogy between "desire" in AP and Plotinus' tolma is that the

Adaptor recognizes an upward desire as well as a downward desire. This tendency is
shown in passages such as the following:
Th.A VID.II4 [B 110]: He will see there the things filled with light, intellect and
wisdom. and there there is no mockery or play, because pure seriousness there is
because of the light emanating onto them and because each of them covets
lra!J.ri~u) ascent to the degree of its companion, and to approach the First Light
which is emanating onto that world.
Th.A VIII. 159 [B 117]: Thus the excellent man desiring (mushtiiq) to gaze upon
the higher world. when he comes to be together with one of the lords of the
celestial bodies, must be according to the description which we have given. and
must eternaIly covet (ya!lri~lI) to see the higher world which is above that lord
with whom he is together. Indeed the sight of that world is more excellent and
higher than the sight of the world of heaven.
Coupled with the previous tendency to attribute desire to all levels of the Plotinian
hierarchy (excluding the First. but including even bodies), we can draw the following
conclusion about the term shawq in AP. Plotinus' toblla is a fairly specific notion used to
explain specific phenomena, namely the inteIlect's self-distinction from the One and the
fall of the soul. But desire in AP is a very general concept that covers the impetus for any
relation between the levels of the hierarchy. Thus it may describe sour s blameworthy
desire for the "vile" things of the material world. or sours commendable desire to unite
with the astral lords and ultimately intellect.
The result of this is that the Adaptor describes Plotinian procession and return
under the rubric of desiring or willing. This is an approach which makes emanation and
the return of all things to their source into a fundamentally ethical issue. and which also

125

implies a degree of freedom or will at every level of the cosmos. 36 These implications
emerge more or less explicitly in an original passage in DS:
DS 166-167 [8 179]: The imelligibles are three: the first, which is the true
intelligible. This is because intellectual and sensible things desire (Iashliiq) to
know it, but it does not desire to know anything, because they are in it and it is a
cause for them... and it is the originator of the intellect. The second intelligible is
the intellect, although it is intelligible and intelligent: it desires to know what is in
it. and is intelligible for what is below it.
Here the theme of desire is used to achieve a convergence of the metaphysical. ethical.
and epistemological dimensions of Plotinus' thought: when x has its being from y, x will
desire to know y. This is properly ordered desire. If y has a desire for x, on the other
hand, then y will tum away from its own cause and stray from its good, as the soul does
when it conceives a desire for the material world.
The argument is certainly a Plotinian one, but it emphasizes a notion that is
central to the philosophy of both Plotinus and Aristotle, namely final causality. It seems
likely that the Adaptor, writing under the influence of Aristotle, sought to make the
implications of final causality in the Plotinian cosmology even more explicit. The theme
of desire makes it possible for him to do this. The Aristotelian overtones of this tendency
come out most clearly in passages that describe God as a final cause. In chapter two we
have already examined one such passage from the Prologue: "this act comes to be from
[the First Cause] without motion, and the motion of all things is from it and because of it,
and that things are moved towards it through a sort of desire (shawq) and striving"
(Prol.1S). Here is another from GS:

~6 This latter tendency accords with what we find in the Adaprors treatment of God as willing.
which is probably drawn from Enn VI.8 (see below, 5.3.3).

126

GS Sij.2 [B 196]: But if the intellect and the soul are two circles, the circle of the
intellect never moves, but rather is at rest eternally, similar to its center. As for
the circle of the soul, it moves towards its center, which is the intellect. But the
circle of the intellect, even though it is similar to its substance, moves with a
motion of desire (haraka al-ishtiyiiq), because it desires its center, which is the
First Good. Likewise, the circle of the soul also moves with a desiring motion,
except that there is in its motion a deviation, because it desires the intellect and
the First Good.
Enn IV.4.16: But if one orders the good as a center, then one would order the
intellect as an unmoving circle, and the soul as a moving circle, but moving
through longing (ephesez).
Here the term ephesei is the occasion for the Adaptor to insert the "desire" theme. But
note that as he does so he assimilates the metaphor of soul and intellect as circles to the
Aristotelian model: the First becomes an unmoving center,37 the intellect is at first said to
be motionless, following Plotinus, but then admitted to be moved because of its motion
towards the object of its desire. The soul, finally, moves in a "deviating" fashion because
it has multiple objects of desire. Here it is tempting to compare the Adaptor's scheme to
Aristotelian cosmology, in which God (and only God) is unmoving. because God has no
further final cause as an object of desire, and God's effects are moved through final
causality.38 Even the deviating motion of soul may be inspired by the complex motion of
heavenly bodies with more than one immaterial mover in Metaphysics A. Of course, it
must be admitted that Plotinus is to say the least comfortable with the notion of final
causality, so that the Adaptor's wider application of desire is not obviously in conflict
with his source text. However, the Adaptor's predilection for this mode of thought is
another small piece of evidence for his Aristotelian sensibilities.
37 Cf. GS Sah.12. which says explicitly and without a Plotinian parallel that the First is
"permanently unchanging" and "motionless" [Lewis translation].

_~s The same doctrine is presented in Th.A 1.30-32. including an initial statement that the intellect
does not move. corrected to allow for the motion of intellect when it desires the First.

127

3.2.3 Memory and the fall of the soul

In this section so far. we have seen that the Adaptor has a tendency to think of the
Plotinian hierarchy in moral terms. He associates ascent in the hierarchy with virtue and
well-ordered desire. and descent with moral failure. Earlier in this chapter (section 3.1.2)
I suggested that this leads the Adaptor to go beyond Plotinus by deploring the base state

of the fallen soul. He goes so far as to say. for example. that the soul "comes to be like
one of the sensory. base things" (Th.A IX.68). As we have just seen. this debasement is
linked to misguided desire. Thus the Adaptor also says that when the soul ""desires the
vilest. lowest thing... it comes to be... more vile than every vileness" (Th.A X.20). I
would like to show now how these themes apply to a section of paraphrase in Th.A II and
VIII paralleling Plotinus' discussion of memory in Enn IV.4.

39

In so doing. I will be differing from the opinion of Charles Genequand. who in a

recent article compares this part of Th.A to two related Arabic texts: a work on the soul
attributed to Porphyry (kfaqiilat Ii-Furjiirfiis Ii 'I-Nafs. hereafter Magalat fi 'I-Nafs) and a
treatise attributed to the "Greek Sage" (hereafter Treatise on the Two Worlds):~o
Genequand argues that, although there are textual parallels between Maqalat fi'l-Nafs
and Th.A, we find a divergence in views by which Th.A agrees with Plotinus that the soul

39

As [ argue below. 4.1.2. these portions ofTh.A

n and VIII were likely attached to one another

originally.
~l) Genequand. c.. "La Memoire de ['arne: Porphyry et la Tizeologie d'Aristote." Bulletin d'etudes
orientales 48 (1996). 103-113. Magalat fi 'I-Nafs was published in Kutsch. W.. "Ein arabisches Bruchstiick
aus Porphyrios ("?) Peri Psylches. und die Frage des Verfassers der 'Theologie des Aristoteles,''' Melanges
de rUniversite Saint Joseph. 31 (1954). with Arabic text (268-269) and Gennan translation (270-273). The
Treatise. whose full title is "An Epistle by the Greek Sage. on an Explanation of the Two Worlds. the
Spiritual and the Bodily." was published by Rosenthal (1955. with Arabic text and English translation) as
pan of the materials from GS. [follow Henry & Schwyzer (1959). xxxiv. in rejecting the Treatise as pan of
GS: see above. 1.3.1.

128

does not completely descend, but remains suspended between the intellectual and bodily
worlds, whereas Magalat fi 'l-Nafs and the Treatise on the Two Worlds both hold that the
soul does descend completely into body:H Here I will argue that, on the contrary, Th.A II
and

vm also present a pessimistic view according to which the soul can fall completely

into body, a view which is similar to and perhaps even the basis of those found in
Maqalat fi 'J-Nafs and the Treatise on the Two Worlds.
The question posed by Plotinus at the beginning of Enn IVA is whether the soul.
once it is united with intellect, will remember the things it did and knew when it was
embodied. His answer is that the soul does not remember such things, nor does it need
to. Indeed it cannot remember at all, because memory implies temporality and changing
thoughts. and if united to intellect the soul exists above time and change. It also does not
need to remember, because the principles of things in the bodily world all exist in nallS,
so that the soul will know them through its noetic activity anyway. Let us examine the
way the Adaptor paraphrases a passage making the first point, that soul will after its
ascent transcend time and change:
Th.A II.2 [B 29]: If someone says: does [the soul] remember what it was in from
this lower world? We say: it does not remember anything of what it thought about
here. and does not utter anything of what it spoke here. or what it philosophized.
The proof that this is the case is its coming-to-be (kawn) in this world.
3: For whenever it is immaculate and pure, it is not content to gaze upon this
world or anything which it is in, and does not remember what it saw of what is
past.
4-5 [B 29-30]: But if casts its vision on the higher, eternal world, and gazes at it
eternally, and it seeks that and remembers it.... None of the knowledge it had in
that noble world is overthrown from it. such that it would need to remember it
later. Rather. [the knowledge] is eternally available in its intellect; it does not
need to remember it. because it is eternally in its presence (bayna aydinii), and is
not overthrown. The only thing that is overthrown from it is all knowledge it has
-II

Genequand (1996). 108-109.

129

in this world~ since it does not covet to take hold of it, and does not want to see it
eternally. It does not covet to take hold of it, only because it is a changeable
knowledge in accordance with changeable substance, and it is not the business of
the soul to take hold of the changeable thing and cleave to it.
Enn IVA. I : (a)Then [will the soul remember] nothing of the [things] here, such as
that it philosophized, and even that when it was here (entauIlla ousa) it
contemplated the [things] there? (b) But if, when one projects one's thought on
something, one cannot do anything else but to think and contemplate that thing -and the -1 thought iC is not included in the thinking, but one would say this later,
if ever, but this is already a change -- (c) [one] would not be able, being purely in
the intelligible (en 10 noeto katharos onra), to remember any of the things which
happened to one when one was here.
One strange thing about this paraphrase is that it re-orders the text of Plotinus: Th.A 11.2
paraphrases what 1 have labelled section (a), Th.A 11.3 jumps ahead to (c), and Th.A 11.4-5
return to paraphrase (b). This is perhaps confusing but not philosophicaJIy interesting.
More significant are several misreadings and additions made by the Adaptor. First, he
mistranslates the phrase when [the soul] was here" to the more assertive '"The proof of
that is that is [the soul] coming-to-be in this world:- This implies that the very presence
of soul in the bodily world shows the extent to which it has forgotten the intelligible
world. But Plotinus is not yet discussing whether the embodied soul remembers its
intelligible state: on the contrary, he is asking whether the soul remembers the lower
world having made its ascent. A second mistranslation renders "[when one is] purely in
the intelligible" as "whenever [the soul] is immaculate and pure," misreading the adverb
"purely" (katharos) as a description of the soul in intellect. This echoes numerous
passages in AP saying that the soul must be "purified" or "cleansed" to escape the bodily
world. 42 Finally, in Th.A 11.5, the Adaptor brings in the theme of desire, stressing that the

-12 See. e.g.. Th.A [1.35. VH1.61. Other passages show the Adaptor exaggerating Plotinus'
references to pure souls. For example. translating Plotinus' statement that "the pure (katharas) [souls].
when set free. shed that which was plastered to them in their generation:' (Enn IV.7.14). the Adaptor writes:

130

soul will not "covet"'

(h.ara~a)

lower things when it is with intellect. In other words. it is

rid of the disordered desires that caused it to fall in the first place.
A bit later in the second mfmar, we find an extended and largely original passage
in which the Adaptor indulges in his characteristic pessimism about falling into the bodily
realm, this time with regard to intellect:
Th.A 0.27-29 [B 33]: This is because, when the intellect is in its intellectual
world, it does not cast its vision on anything under it, but on itself alone. When it
is in another world not its own, that is, the sensible world, then it casts its vision
sometimes on the things and sometimes on itself alone. This is only so because of
the state of the body in which it comes to be through the intermediary of the soul.
For, when it is quite mixed with the body. it casts its gaze on the things, and when
it is a little unmixed it casts its gaze on itself alone. For the intellect does not
change and does not deviate from state to state except in the way we have said.
Enn IV.4.2: But if he does this, he changes his thoughts (tas noeseis), which we
ourselves did not accept before.
Here the Adaptor departs from Plotinus in several ways. First, and most oddly. he speaks
of the descent of intellect into body, instead of the descent of soul. We can account for
this by bearing in mind that the Adaptor tends to compress soul and inteJlect into one
level of the Plotinian hierarchy called the "intelligible world. ,~3 Thus if soul descends,
then intellect may likewise descend. Second, he reverses the view of Plotinus found in
the brief parallel passage, namely that intellection is by its nature unchanging. In
contradiction to this the Adaptor holds that the intellect can change and descend into
body, and can "cast its vision" on body and itself variously. This rejection of Plotinus'

'...lhc pure. clean soul which has not been dinied and has not been sullied by the squalors of the body.
when it separates from the sensible world. then it will return to those substances quickly and without
hesitating" (Th.A 1.14 [B 20D.
-13

See below. 5.3.1.

131

views is smoothed over in the final sentence, where he translates Plotinus accurately Cfor
the intellect does not change

H
)

and then adds except in the way we have said:.44

The mistranslations we have just examined fall into the pattern of the Adaptor's
pessimistic and moralizing tendencies, though without introducing any systematic change
into the discussion of memory. They do, however, set the backdrop for such a systematic
change found in Th.A 11.39-42. The parallel text in Plotinus is the beginning of Enn
IV.4.3. Here Plotinus is explaining that when the soul chooses to be alone and distinct
from intellect, it then becomes different and "falls." It is at this point that the soul
acquires memory. The soul retains a memory of the intelligible world it has left, because
the soul does not completely fall into body:
Enn IVA.3: The memory of the [things] there holds it back from falling, but the
[memory] of the [things] here carries it here. The [memory] of the [things] in
heaven holds it there, and in general. it is and becomes what it remembers.
As Genequand rightly points out, this is the doctrine that would be criticized by later
Neoplatonists such as Proclus, who held that the soul does descend so as to fall
completely away from intellect:~5 The final phrase of this Plotinus quote could be taken
to imply that the soul simply becomes "what it remembers:' that is, if it only remembers
its bodily existence it becomes fully bodily. But as Plotinus' discussion goes on it
becomes clear that this is not his position. He holds, for example, that we might have
memories of the intelligible world that we are not aware

0[46

But in the parallel

oW This is an excellent example of a "mistranslation" that is unmistakably intentional. for the final
phrase was clearly included in order to reconcile the Plotinian statement with his own conclusions. This
shows that the Adaptor knew his view to be in tension with Plotinus' and that he was willing to modify his
translation to deal with [hat tension.

.15

See citations given by Genequand (1996). 108. fn.25.

J6 Enn IV.4.4. This statement is the ultimate basis of a crucial. if very different passage. in Th.A [[
tha[ sets out the doctrine of an ignorance higher than knowledge. See below. 3.1.1.

132

paraphrase. the Adaptor does draw the conclusion that the soul can fall completely away
from intellect:
Th.A II.39, 42 [B 35-36]: If [the soul] remembers the things that are there. it does
not descend here. but if it remembers this lower world it descends from that noble
world. But it descends either to the heavenly bodies and remains there, or
descends to this earthly world. If it descends to the heavenly bodies. it does not
remember anything but tht: heavenly bodies alone. and it becomes similar to them.
Likewise, when it descends to the earthly world it becomes similar to it and does
not remember anything else....
It has then become clear that the soul, when it remembers anyone thing,
becomes similar to that and comes to be like it. be this thing noble or base.
Remarkably. the Adaptor not only repeats the statement that the soul becomes "like" the
bodies (compare to Th.A lX.68, quoted at the beginning of this section). but also again
reverses what he finds in Plotinus by saying that the soul does not remember the
intelligible world when it falls sufficiently low. Because his understanding of the
Plotinian universe is a fundamentally ethical one. he considers it possible for the soul to
descend far enough that it has no relation to intellect. In other words. he would agree
with Proclus and other later Neoplatonists in their critique of Plotinus:H In this state the
soul will not remember intellect at all, and the extent of our forgetting corresponds to the
extent of our fallenness.
Now, this reading directly contradicts that given by Genequand. He interprets
Th.A as agreeing with Plotinus that the soul does not descend completely.48 His proof
text appears in the continued discussion of memory in mlmar Vill:

-17 It is possible that the Adaptor was actually influenced by some of these Neoplatonic texts in his
view. I consider it more likely. however. that his position departs from Plotinus out of moral zeal rather
than fidelity to other Greek sources. In fact there is no sign here that he is aware of the issue as a possible
critique of Plotinus. While his view is in fact different from Plotinus. it is not even clear that he knows this
to be the case. since Plotinus' doctrine of the partial fall requires a fairly subtle reading of this pan of the
Enneads.
-IS

Genequand (1996). 108.

133

Th.A Vill.73-75 [B 103-104]: Someone may say: if, through the lack of time and
existences. the soul is spared the need to remember much, there is no doubt that
more existences and greater length of time make the memory forget. This is
because, when the existences (akwiin) constantly (dii ';man) grasp the soul, it
forgets what was in it before it entered into generation (kawn), and does not
remember that because of its distance from the first state it was in, and its staying
in constant downward motion. Then the soul does not remember anything at all.
and when it does not remember, it cannot imagine its intellectual world. And
when it cannot imagine this. it does not want to make distinctions (tumayyizu).
and it is like the brute soul (a/-nafs al-bahimiyya). and this is most repugnant.
We say that the soul. even though it has descended from high to low. is not
forced to descend to every depth. or to move down constantly. But rather it
moves to some place. and then it stops there. When it enters into generation (a/kaH:n), it does not necessarily enter into every existent until it reaches the last of
the existences. But rather, it finishes at one of the existences and stops there. and
continues to desire to depart upwards from it, until it comes to be above every
existent in which it was in the first state.
Enn IV.4.5: But when they descend from the noetic, then how [do the souls
remember]? They will stir their memory. though less than those [higher souls], of
the same things, for they will have different things to remember (alia
mnemoneuein). and more time will have led to complete forgetting of many
things. But if they tum towards the sensible world (ton austheton kosmon), and
fall into birth here. in what way will they remember? It is not necessary that they
fall into every depth. for it is also [possible that] the moving [souls] stop after a
certain distance. and nothing hinders that they escape again. before going to the
lowest place in generation.
Genequand places great weight on the statement that it would be ....repugnant.. to suppose
that the soul can become Iike the brute soul:' Yet we know the Adaptor thinks this is
possible, since he says at Th.A IX.68 and [1.42 that the soul can become like even the
basest of things. Towards resolving this apparent contradiction, it should be borne in
mind that this statement appears in indirect discourse: it is part of a possible objection he
goes on to answer:~9 [n his answer he follows Plotinus by making the noncommittal

~9 It is also unclear why the Adaptor would take this objection seriously. or what "repugnant"'
means here. It could mean. for example. morally repugnant. and the Adaptor could just be responding to
the objection thal not all souls are completely morally bankrupt. He might also be saying that it is hard to
imagine how the intellectual soul could transform into the bestial soul. But of course. he must hold that soul
in general can descend so far. or there could be no bestial soul.

134

claim that the soul need not descend completely in every case. Notice that the Adaptor
ties desire to the sours tum back towards the intellect: its free-fall lasts until it ""stops"
and 'desires to depart upwards." Furthermore. in this passage too the Adaptor introduces
his own notion that the soul will fall into a complete forgetfulness if it descends too far. 50
Thus. pace Genequand. the overall sense of the passage does not show the Adaptor
closely following Plotinus. and indeed it can be read as cohering with other passages that
show a marked departure from Plotinus.
Genequand astutely points out that the two other texts mentioned above. which
are likely related to AP in some way, depart from Plotinus' doctrine on the fall of the
soul. But given the analysis presented above. we can group Th.A itself in with these
other contrasting texts. Let us first examine the Treatise on the Two Worlds, which to all
appearances is a summary of Plotinian ideas and not a translation or paraphrase of
anything in the Enneads. Let us deal in tum with some of the relevant texts mentioned by
Genequand: 51
Treatise on the Two Worlds 6: [The Greek Sage] says that [souls] move from one
body to another, and this [happens] when. upon its separation from the body
which it was in, it does not leave for its world. This befalls it either because of
ignorance of that world. even such that it is not attentive to that at all, or because
of its contentedness with the body which it was in. and its love of pleasure, for
this is [the reason for] its attachment and assimilation to the body. or because of
its forgetting...
This passage echoes a theme we have found repeatedly in Th.A, namely that the soul is
trapped in the bodily world owing to its untoward desire for or satisfaction with bodily
things. The Treatise also allows for the possibility that the soul can ""assimilate" (i.e.
50 Immediately prior to this, in Th.A VH1.72, this is confirmed by the Adaptor's statement that
exrcnded bodily existence will lead to complete forgetting of the intellectual world.
SI

Genequand (1996). 109. Translations are mine but section numbers are from Rosenthal (1955).

135

become similar) to the body as part of this process, and also that the soul will completely
forget what it knew. Shortly after this, we read:

Treatise on the Two Worlds 8: The souls which conduct themselves badly are
afflicted with a punishment from the First Governor, through pains and sorrows
they are exposed to, and they journey in bodies which are subject to generation
and corruption, and many deaths.
9: As for the souls that conduct themselves well, this does not befall them. If it
does befall them at some time, they are rewarded for this by being spared pains
after this, and it becomes easy [for them] to ascend to their world.
In these two sections the author of the Treatise shares the Adaptor's tendency to provide a
religious backdrop for the ascent and descent of the soul. 51 The soul's sojourn in body is
identified as a punishment from God, and its ascent as a reward. This goes beyond any
eschatological statements found in AP, but can be usefully compared to Th.A 1.30-32,
which likewise makes the ascent of soul dependent on God's assistance.
Finally. there are passages in the Treatise which parallel the Adaptor's treatment
of the specific issue of memory. Two such passages are as follows:
Treatise on the Two Worlds 18: Learning is remembering. The soul does not
remember its states prior to falling into the body of man. It remembers its states
after it leaves the body of man. If it is ignorant and loves bodily pleasures, it
desires what it was in and is intensely regretful. If it knows the wickedness of this
world it is content to leave the body, and it flees from this world hastily until it
comes to its world.
20: In that world there is no memory, because there is no past or future in it, but
all of the existents (mauj'-idat) and their forms are subsisting in it in one state.
And all actions and other things that are in this world are for [the soul] like
something present <!liigir) in itself ifi dhiitihii) through sight, not through memory.
Also. when the soul separates from the bodily world, it is united with the intellect
because of its being unmixed (khiilii~ with the body and the senses. So it is as if
it and the intellect are one thing. The forms of all the existents are present to it, so
there is no memory and no forgetting, but one complete, fixed knowledge ('ilm
wa!lid tamm thabit).

52

Similar passages in (he Treatise appear at 15-17 and 34.

136

Here the Treatise agrees with the Adaptor and Plotinus that there is no memory in the
intelligible

world~

and with the Adaptor that the soul will forget its prior existence when

it falls into the body. Not only does the moral tendency of both sections echo that of the
Adaptor~

but there are many terminological links here between the Treatise and Th.A: the

term '"desire (shan'q)" appears, as do the metaphors of the soul being ""mixed" with the
body but ""unmixed'~ when with intellect (cf. Th.A 11.28, which also uses the root khala~a)
and things being ""present (hiiff.ir)" to the soul (Th.A 11.8. translating paron in Greek).
The terms Hcomplete" and "fixed" in the last phrase are also favorites of the Adaptor.
These textual and doctrinal parallels between Th.A and the Treatise suggest a
close relationship between the two works~ and it is reasonable to suppose that the Treatise
was in some way based on Th.A or some other subsection of *AP (the original Arabic
Plotinus source). For Th.A contains direct correspondences with the Greek of Plotinus~
whereas the Treatise has only thematic

parallels~

and we have just seen that in at least one

case these themes seem to be those of Th.A. My own view is that the Treatise is intended
as a summary of views found in the Arabic

Plotinus~

that appears in GS and the Treatise is, as others have

and that the sobriquet ""Greek sage'~

argued~ an

honorific name for

Plotinus. However, since the Treatise is not part of the actual paraphrase of Plotinus~
there is no reason to include it in AP or to think that it was authored by the

Adaptor~

therefore I exclude it from extensive consideration in this study.

Finally, let us glance at the last text dealt with by Genequand, the supposedly
Porphyrian Magalat fI

~1-Nafs.

This brief work contains one passage dealing with the

same issue of memory and he fall of the soul: 53

53

My translation of Arabic text in Kutsch (1954), with Kutsch's section number.

137

Maqalat IT 'I-Nafs 4: There is no doubt that we are pure intellect (a/- 'aql al-naqf).
This is the opinion of the excellent Aristotle. The proof of this is his statement
[about] why we do not remember the higher world, when we have descended from
it to this world? Then he answered and said: we come not to remember the
intellectual world because we have come to be in this sensory world, and [because
of] our mixture with material things, and we have separated from that world,
because we cannot be there while the stain from the material things is in us. We
come to be as if we were not there at all, due to matter's overpowering us. And
we come to be as if we began from this world, due to the intensity of our deviation
toward it and the impressions which are in it from us...
The passage is clearly based on the discussion of memory in Enn IV.4, and begins with
the same question that begins that treatise as well as mimar II. Oddly, however, the text
attributes the discussion to Aristotle. This more or less proves that Maqalat fi 'I-Nafs is
not a work by Porphyry, who would of course not make this mistake. 54 The passage also
repeats the now-familiar claim that our immersion in the bodily world makes us forget the
intelligible world, and uses more vocabulary reminiscent of AP ("deviation," compare to
Th.A II.33 and elsewhere; "'intellectual" or "higher world" and "'sensory world"; the
metaphor of mauer's effect on the soul as a "stain" on its purity or as '''mixture,'' for
which see above). This might also suggest that Maqalat IT "I-Nafs is based on Th.A,
though the extensive suggestions made by Kutsch about sources for the work indicate
that, at the very least, this Pseudo-Porphyrian work is not solely derived from the Arabic
Plotinus.

5.1 A brief discussion of memory in Porphyry cited by Kutch (1954), 275 is Sentences 15: "Memory
is not a saving-up of imaginations (phanrusion soleria). but a new self-presentation of things one was
concerned with:' This seems to have little to do with the text in Magalat IT "I-Nafs, and it should be
contrasted with a passage in Th.A H.40. which actually claims. as does Plotinus. that memory is a sort of
imagining. This is another small point against the hypothesis that Porphyry was the Adaptor.

138

CHAPTER 4

INTELLECT

4.1 Learned ignorance

The theme of docta ignorantia, a ""leamed ignorance" or an ignorance that transcends
knowledge, is a familiar one to students of Neoplatonism. It is perhaps most closely
associated with the 15th century philosopher Nicholas of Cusa, but of course appears
much earlier in the Neoplatonic tradition. Among these earlier appearances is the
discussion of a ""knowledge beyond knowledge and ignorance" (gnosin exo gnoseos kai
aglloias) in a fragment of the Commentary on the Parmenides attributed to Porphyry. I In

the Arabic tradition. a doctrine of learned ignorance appears for the first time in AP,
specifically in two passages: rll'tis 16 and a lengthy departure from the Greek text found
in the second mlmar of Th.A. This parallel between the Parmenides Commentary and AP
has been cited as a primary argument in favor of Porphyrian influence on AP. 2 This
provides a philological motive for close inspection of the doctrine as found in AP.
Perhaps more importantly. the notion of an "ignorance more noble than every knowledge"
is among the most striking additions made by the Adaptor in his paraphrase of Plotinus: it

P. Hadot. Pornhvre et Victorinus. volumes I-ll (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes. (968). 78. lines

See below. section 4.1.3.

10-11.

139

shows the Adaptor at his most

independent~ either

as an original thinker or as a

transmitter of non-Plotinian Greek philosophy.

4.1.1 The doctrine of mimar II

A long passage in the second mfmar, almost completely independent from the Greek text.
provides a developed discussion of the theme of learned ignorance. I quote the passage
here in its entirety:
Th.A [1.46-52 [B 36-7]: Someone may say: if the soul has imagined this [lower]
world before it reaches it, then there is no doubt that it also imagines [the lower
world] after it has left it, and reached the higher world. If it has imagined it, then
there is no doubt that it remembers it. But you have said that, when [the soul] is
in the intellectual world, it does not remember anything from this world at ail.
We say that the soul, even if it has imagined this world before it came to it,
nevertheless it imagined it intellectually, and this act is ignorance (jah/). not
knowledge (ma' rifa). Except that this ignorance is more noble than every
knowledge, and this is because the intellect is ignorant of what is above it through
an ignorance which is more noble than knowledge ('Um). If it remembers the
things which are there, it does not descend to here, because the memory of those
noble things prevents it from coming down to here. If it remembers the lower
world, it descends from the noble world, but that may be in various ways, and this
is because the intellect is ignorant of its cause above it. namely the First, Ultimate
Cause, and it does not know [its cause] completely, because if it knew it
completely, it would be above [that cause] and a cause for it. It is absurd that
anything be above its own cause and a cause for its cause, because then the effect
would be the cause for its own cause, and the cause would be the effect of its own
effect, and this is very repugnant.
The intellect is ignorant of the things that are under it, as we have said
before, because it does not need knowledge (ma'rifa) of them, because they are in
it, and it is their cause. The ignorance of the intellect is not a privation ('adam) of
knowledge~ but rather it is the ultimate knowledge, and this is because it knows
the things not as with the knowledge the things have of themselves~ but rather
[with a knowledge] above this, and more excellent and higher, because it is their
cause. The knowledge that things have of themselves is, for ('inda) the intellect,
ignorance, because it is not proper ~a!J.i!la) or complete knowledge. Therefore we
say that the intellect is ignorant of the things that are under it. [and] we mean by
this that it knows the things which are beneath it completely, not like the
knowledge they have of themselves. It does not need knowledge of them, because
it is a cause [for them] and in it are all its effects. If [all the effects] are in it, then

140

it does not need knowledge of them. Likewise, the soul is ignorant of its effects in
the way which we have mentioned above, and does not need knowledge of
anything except for knowledge of the intellect and the First Cause, because these
two are above it.
The first thing to notice about this passage is that it is not completely independent
from the Greek text, for it seems to be based on the following remark in Plotinus:
Enn IV.4.4 : For it could happen, even while one is not conscious (me
parakolout!lounta) that one has [something], that one holds [that thing] to oneself
more strongly than if one did know.
This text is certainly far from an endorsement of any ""learned ignorance. n Rather, here
Plotinus makes a characteristically subtle distinction between knowing something and
being aware that one knows something. Perhaps the distinction was lost on the Adaptor;
at any rate, his paraphrase introduces the wholly different distinction of ignorance and
knowledge (II.47). Certainly, then, the Adaptor did not take the notion of learned
ignorance from the parallel text in Plotinus. Rather, one has the sense that he came to the
text with this doctrine in hand, and saw the passage as an opportunity for a digression on
the subject. This should encourage us to think that the Adaptor has another source in
mind here, and is not just providing an unusually original interpretation of something in
the Enneads.
A second thing to notice about the passage is that it is not the only reference to
learned ignorance in Th.A. As mentioned above, one of the "heads" refers to the doctrine
as well:
Th.A ru'iis.16: On the intellect, and that knowledge (ma'rifa) there is below
ignorance (jah/), and ignorance is the glory of the intellect there.

141

This heading is in fact a paraphrase of the very same text in Enn IV.4.4 quoted above.
This is a significant fact for the question of the relationship of the 'headings" to the main
text of Th.A. It seems that one of two interpretations is open to us. The first is that the
Adaptor wrote both paraphrases

himself~

and both times the passage reminded him of the

notion of learned ignorance. The second is that the Adaptor found the remark on learned
ignorance already before him in a set of 'headings" in his source

text~

and translated

nt "tis" 16 more or less verbatim. The long passage in the second mfmar would then be a

sort of commentary on this earlier heading. This would be consistent with the idea that
the "heads" are just an Arabic translation of Porphyry~s Greek keplzalaia~ and that
Porphyry is thus the direct source of the doctrine of learned ignorance. We will have
occasion to return to this point below ~ when we discuss the possible relation of this
discussion of ignorance to that of Porphyry. But given that our current purpose is to
analyze the theory as it appears in the

text~

the heading is of little value, if only because of

its brevity. It affirms only that at the level of intellect~ ignorance is superior to
knowledge. without explaining why or in what sense this might be so.
Let us move. then, to a careful analysis of the passage in mfmor IT. A key element
of the passage is the fact that not one, but two sorts of ignorance are described here by the
Adaptor. In both cases. despite the fact that the digression is introduced regarding the
soul and its knowledge of this

world~

the ignorance is in fact associated with "the

intellect. The sudden transition from soul to intellect can be explained by the fact that
the Adaptor does not always distinguish carefully between these two hypostases.
Encouraged, perhaps, by Aristotle's use of the term nOlls in the De Anima as the highest
faculty of the soul, the Adaptor is prone to collapsing these two parts of the Plotinian

142

cosmos together. 3 One sort of ignorance described by the Adaptor is ignorance of "what
is above it:' namely"the First, Ultimate Cause." The other sort of ignorance is "of the
things that are under it," that is, objects in the sensory world. I will call these respectively
"ignorance of the higher" and ....ignorance of the lower." The Adaptor himself does not
seem to be keeping this distinction clearly in view: in ll.47, he shifts from describing the
ignorance of soul as an intellectual imagination of things in ""this world," that is,
ignorance of the lower, to the ignorance of the higher that is attributed to intellect. A
similar shift occurs in U.49. Despite these shifts, the Adaptor does give two clearly
distinct arguments for the two varieties of learned ignorance.
The argument for ignorance of the higher is as follows: ""the intellect is ignorant of
its cause above it, namely the First, Ultimate Cause, and it does not know [its cause]
completely, because if it knew it completely, it would be above [that cause] and a cause
for it" (II.49). Here, "'ignorance" refers to an actual lack of knowledge on the part of the
intellect: it fails to have an exhaustive grasp of its cause, and necessarily so. For,
according to this passage, there is an intimate link between the causal hierarchy and
knowledge. In general, a cause can know its effect completely, but not vice-versa. This
has the important immediate consequence that there can be no perfect knowledge of God
by anything else, since God is the highest cause:~ One can hardly recognize this without
thinking of the scholastic distinction between knowledge through causes, or propter quid,
J See also below. 5.3.1. However. there is a distinction apparently being made between the
ignorance of intellect and of soul at 11.52.
-l As Cristina D'Ancona Costa has pointed out. the same doctrine can be found in the Liber de
Causis. Prop. 5: And thus it happens that the First is the one for which description fails. And this is only
like this because there is above it no cause through which it is known. And each thing is only known and
described from its cause. And when the thing is only a cause and not an effect. it is not known by a prior

143

and knowledge quia, that is, knowledge of causes through effects. A common source for
both doctrines readily suggests itself: Aristotle's theory of demonstrative knowledge. As
Aristotle puts it, "'We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a
thing... when we think that we know the cause on which the fact depends, as the cause of
that fact and of no other, and, funher, that the fact could not be other than it is:,5 The
same doctrine can be found in other Aristotelian works, notably the Metaphysics (see, for
instance, 981 b: "the master workers in each craft are more honorable and know in a truer
sense... because they know the causes of the things that are done"). The assumption
behind this passage, that knowledge of a thing can only be through a perfect grasp of the
cause of that thing, is cenainly an Aristotelian one. And we have already seen evidence
that the Adaptor knew the Aristotelian corpus. 6 This seems a likely source, then, for at
least part of the Adaptor's reasoning about the intellect's ignorance of the One.
A related line of reasoning is developed with regard to "ignorance of the lower."
At

U.s I. the Adaptor argues that the

intellect does not need" to know things in the

sensory world, "because they are in it, and it is their cause." Thus the intellect is ignorant
in this sense as well. But in this case, the ignorance in question is no longer a deficiency
of knowledge, but rather a transcending of knowledge:
Th.A II.51: The ignorance of the intellect is not a privation of knowledge, but
rather it is the ultimate knowledge, and this is because it knows the things not as
with the knowledge the things have of themselves, but rather [with a knowledge]
above this. and more excellent and higher, because it is their cause. The

cause, and is not described because it is higher than description. and speech does not reach it:' See
D' Ancona Costa ( 1993). 18.

s Posterior Analytics. 71 b 1Off.

(, For example. on the assumption that AP was produced in al-Kindls circle. the Adaptor would
have known Us!ath's translation of the Metaphysics. See Zimmermann (1986). appendix III (136).

144

knowledge that things have of themselves is, for the intellect, ignorance, because
it is not proper or complete knowledge.
Again. the Adaptor is relying here on the notion that the intellect can Uknow" the lower
things by knowing their cause, namely itself. In this sense, it does know these lower
things. But in another sense, it does not: if by "knowledge" we mean the sort of
knowledge that the lower things have of themselves and of each other, then the intellect
"fails" to have this sort of knowledge, for it is above such knowledge. This lower
knowledge is not described here, except that we may infer that it is not knowledge that
proceeds from a complete grasp of causes. In Aristotelian terms. it is knowledge that falls
shon of complete scientific demonstration, which the Adaptor calls "proper and
complete." Again, this doctrine of ignorance of the lower would have a significant
corollary regarding God: if the argument is extended to the level of the divine, God will
be revealed to know His creation only by knowing Himself. This. of course, would later
be the position of Ibn STna on the question of Providence. We will briefly return below to
the consequences of the doctrine for God's knowledge in AP.
Though one must acknowledge the Aristotelian premise employed by the Adaptor
in these two arguments. one must also acknowledge that simple familiarity with the
Aristotelian concept of demonstration would not be sufficient to inspire the doctrine. For,
consider some of the un-Aristotelian aspects of the arguments just presented. Firstly,
though Aristotle says that complete knowledge requires knowledge of causes, he does not
conclude from this that if x has complete knowledge of y, then x is itself the cause of y.
But this is exactly what the Adaptor seems to hold in his argument for ignorance of the
higher: he says that if the intellect knew the First completely, it itself would be "a cause"

145

for the First. 1 This is a crucial premise. for without this premise one need not conclude
that effects can never know their causes completely. Secondly, a corresponding premise
in the argument for ignorance of the lower seems manifestly contrary to Aristotle's intent.
The Adaptor argues that if the intellect knows itself as the cause of lower things. it does
!lO!

need to know the lower things. But on Aristotle' s account. to know the cause of a

thing just is to have the best sort of knowledge of that thing. The Adaptor. then.
concludes that the intellect is in a sense ""ignoranC when a straightforward Aristotelian
would have presumably inferred that we can only speak of knowledge in the case of the
intellect. if intellect is the cause of what is known.
Finally. and perhaps most significantly. there is nothing in Aristotle to suggest that
one might call a certain type of knowledge ""ignorance'" because it is more complete than
a more familiar. or lower. sort of knowledge. This terminological choice. almost
rhetorical in its force, seems more at home in the Neoplatonic dialectic of affirmative and
negative predication which is employed with regard to transcendent causes. None of this
is to take away from the Aristotelian overtones of the Adaptor's thought process in this
passage. Rather. what I want to suggest is that the arguments in U.46-52 are most likely
the work of someone who is trying to write an Aristotelian gloss on a notion of learned
ignorance which he has from somewhere else. No text of Aristotle states that there is a
form of ignorance superior to knowledge. But it is quite plausible that a reader of
7 Richard Taylor has suggested to me that this conclusion could be reached from Aristotelian
premisscs as follows. If (a) thc intcllect is identical to its intelligible object, and (b) the intellect could only
have demonstrative propter quid knowledge of God by knowing the cause of God. then it follows (c) that
the intellect would have to be the cause of God to know God demonstratively. (For the use Averroes makes
of this line of reasoning. see Richard Taylor. "Averroes on Psychology and the Principles of Metaphysics:'
Journal of the History of Philosophv XXVI. 4 (1998).507-523.) Even though point (b) is Aristotelian. as I
argued above. point (a) is Plotinian as well as Aristotelian. See. for example. Th.A n.21. which follows

146

Aristotle might read somewhere else that the intellect is ignorant in the sense of having a
transcendent knowledge, and conclude that this is because it is a transcendent cause. So
with regard to this passage, we are left in the following predicament: we know that the
Adaptor brought an Aristotelian sensibility to his interpretation of the ignorance of the
intellect. But we do not know what motivates him to explain the intellect's cognition
precisely in terms of ignorance, either with regard to his other philosophical views or his
sources. To move towards an answer to the first part of this dilemma, a consideration of
some further context from AP will be helpful.

4.1.2 A potency higher than act

One of the few original passages in AP that can be compared to Th.A II.46-52 in terms of
its complexity and length is Th.A Vill.52-68, a discussion of potency in the intellectual
world. Although these two passages are far separated in the text of Th.A, a closer
inspection of the text shows that they may be closely related. For the long section in
mfmar vrn is not, in fact, entirely independent from the Greek. Rather, it is a sort of

commentary on a section of Enn IVA, in fact on the section immediately following that
paraphrased in the passage from mimar II. In other words, these two long "independent"
passages would together represent an uninterrupted commentary on Enn IV.4.4-5. (I call
them a commentary" because their relation to the Greek is too loose to really make them
a "paraphrase:') We may add into consideration the fact that Th.A Vrn.52ff is without
doubt a loose fragment from AP, since it begins in several manuscripts with the heading

PIOlinus closely in asserting that the intellect takes on the form it knows. The Adaptor seems to recognize
the Aristotelian heritage of this view, since he adds that the mind becomes like its object "in act:'

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""This is a chapter (bab) for which no heading was found in the copy:,8 Further, as I wilJ
show below, the philosophical themes pursued in the two original passages have certain
important affinities. All of this suggests that this portion of mimar VIII may well have
been originally attached to the material found in mimar U (see also above, 1.1.6).
Just as the passage we have examined above argued that, in the intellect, there is
an ignorance superior to knowledge, the passage in mimar vm contends that the intellect
has a potency superior to act. This notion seems to have been inspired by the parallel text
in Greek:
Enn IV.4.4-5: But if [the soul], when it goes away from the [higher] place,
recovers its memories, somehow it had them there. Indeed: in potency (dllnamel).
But the actuality (energe;a) of those [intellectual things] obscured the memory.
For [the memories] were not as present images (ke;meno; tllpoi). such as would
perhaps lead to an absurd consequence, but rather there was the potency which
was later set free into actuality. Thus, with the actuality in the noetic ceasing to be
active, the soul saw that which it had formerly been seeing, before it came to be
there.
Well then? Now does this potency, through which there is remembering,
bring [the things of the higher world] into actuality? Indeed, if we did not see
these things, then by memory, but if [we did see] them, then we saw by what was
there. For this is awakened by what awakens it, and this is the seeing of what we
have mentioned. For, when describing [the higher world], one must not use an
image or a syllogism taking its principles from somewhere else; but, regarding
noetic things, even here one speaks by the same power (dlllZamill) which can
contemplate them there.
Here Plotinus is trying to explain how the soul could have had "memories'" in the noetic
world without actually remembering the way it does when it has fallen into bodies. He
suggests that, when it is in contact with 1l011S, the soul only has these memories in
potency, but they are released into act when the soul falls. This in itself suggests a sense
in which act could be worse than potency, insofar as the actualization of memory is an

See Badawi (1955),99 fu.9.

148

actualizing that only occurs with the fall of the soul. There may also have been some
confusion on the Adaptor's part owing to the double meaning of dllnamis, which can
mean both "power" and "potency." (Indeed, the corresponding Arabic term qu'tf.!a has
precisely the same double meaning.) Though clearly the first use of dllnamis here means
potency as opposed to actuality, the second use in the last sentence refers only to a power
or capacity that the soul always has and can use to know the intelligibles. This could also
have suggested to the Adaptor that the soul's task is to recover or use the

upotency~

- the

dunamis -- which it had in the upper world.

All of this was the occasion for the Adaptor to provide us with a systematic
discussion of potency and act. He begins the passage by remarking:
Th.A Vill.52-3 [B 99-100]: We say: act (ft'!) is more excellent than potency
in this world. But in the higher wocld, potency is more excellent than act,
and this is because the potency which is in the intellectual substances is that which
has no need for act [going] from one thing to another thing other than itself. For
they are complete and perfect, perceiving (tudrikll) the spiritual things as vision is
aware of the sensible things. Potency there is like vision here, but in the sensible
world, [potencyJ needs to come into act, in order to perceive of the sensible
things. The cause of that are the shells of the substances, which they put on in this
world. This is because they cannot achieve the substances and powers (quwan) of
the things except by piercing the shells, and for this they need act. When the
substances are stripped and the powers are revealed, then potency is sufficient in
itself, and does not need act to perceive the substances.
(quwa)

Here the Adaptor distinguishes between two ways of understanding potency. In the
"higher" world, perception occurs without moving ""from one thing to another," that is,
perception is completed all at once without any discursivity. Thus he compares it to
vision, which can take in its entire object all at once. Because there is no change from
potency to act, the Adaptor holds that perception occurs without any actualization:

149

potency just is perception.

Of course this account of intellection is completely Plotinian,

including the comparison of noesis to vision; the Adaptor is merely describing PIotinus'
theory of intellection in a new way, by calling it a sort of potency. In this lower world,
perception does require going through steps or stages, and it is this motion or discursivity
that requires an actualization of potency. These same points are underscored in the
passage as it continues:
Th.A Vill.54 [B 100]: If this is the case, we return and say that the soul, when it is
in the intellectual place, only sees itself and the thing which are there through its
potency, because the things which are there are simple, and the simple is
perceived only by what is simple like it. But when it is in this sensible place, it
does not attain what is there except through severe exertion, due to the
multiplicity of the shells that it has put on. And exertion is act, and act is
composite (murakkab), and the composite does not truly perceive the simple
things.
The same reasoning is expressed somewhat differently here, as the Adaptor emphasizes
the "simplicity" of what perceives through potency, and the composite" nature of
anything that needs to go from potency to act. The tacit argument for this would seem to
be as follows: whatever needs to go from potency to act has multiplicity, because the very
process of actualization is a change from one thing to another. But what can perceive
through potency undergoes no process or change at all in its perception, because its initial
and permanent state is one of complete perception. Again, this seems to be a doctrine
Plotinus could agree to, especially with its emphasis on bodies, or "shells," as
inextricably linked to multiplicity in perception.

<J This is partially based on Aristotle's discussion of the grades of actuality in De Anima U.5: when
a sighted person sees. or when someone with knowledge uses that knowledge, this is not a change in the
person doing the seeing or knowing. As Aristotle puts it. the transition from potency to act here is "either
not a being altered... or is some other lYpe of alteration" (417b). See also Arnzen (1998). 245.

150

As the passage continues, the Adaptor introduces further distinctions between

potency in its higher manifestation, which grasps all at once, and the lower potency that
requires act. At Vlli.55, he underscores the point that it is only actualization that
accounts for this difference: "the act fills the potency in the sensible world, and prevents
it from perceiving what it had perceived." And in the next sentence, he explains why a
potency that receives act is different from one that does not:
Th.A VIII.56: If someone says that when the perceiver perceives something
through potency and then perceives it through act, this [latter form of perception]
is more fixed and powerful, because act is completion (tamam) -- we say, indeed,
if the perception has perceived the thing through receiving its impression. [In that
case] the potency is as if it receives and inscribes the impression of the thing, and
the act completes this impression. Then the act is the completion of the potency.
Here, the Adaptor presents a possible objection to his own theory: act is the perfection or
"completion" of potency, and that a potency will thus be superior when it does receive
act. Note that this is an objection posed in Aristotelian terms, with its emphasis on the
perfective role of actuality. The language used to describe this, famam, also echoes this
sensibility, since the same word is used in Arabic translations of Aristotle in al-Kindrs
circle to describe actualization. 1O In answering the objection, the Adaptor is careful to
show that, in a sense, Aristotle's analysis of potency and act is correct. For a "lower"
potency is indeed actualized by receiving an "impression" (arhar) from what it
perceives. I I But the ""higher" potency does not need to receive such an impression, for
reasons detailed above, so that there is a sort of potency not described by Aristotle's

III See the Arabic paraphrase of the De Anima. Arnzen (1998).215.5. 217.4ff. Unlikefi'/. which
translates energeia both in Plotinus and Aristotle. lamii", is a piece of technical terminology taken from
readings of Aristotle. But see also below, 5.1.4 for a study of another use of liimm proper to AP.

II Again. the language has parallels in the De Anima paraphrase: see for example Arnzen ( 1998).
255.15 and 17, which use the verb alhara to describe the influence of a sensible on the sense organ.

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analysis. While this passage. and the way I have just described it, might suggest that
these two different potencies are simply different phenomena. the Adaptor is clear
throughout this long independent section that he is talking about one potency which
works differently in the two worlds. Thus, at Vill.66 he says that '"the soul comes to see
what is here through the potency through which it saw them there." In Vm.64-66, he also
descri bes our coming to know the noetic world as a hraising" of our potency to the higher
plane, where it need no longer receive actualization or impressions.
The relevance of all this for the theme of learned ignorance becomes clearer when
we examine another element of the Adaptor's theory of potency. He says:
Th.A VIll.59-60 [B 100-1]: When the soul refrains from using act in the
intellectual things and does not need thought in [its] perception of that world, that
potency returns to it. or rather awakens. because it was not separate from the soul,
and the soul sees the things which it saw before it came to this world without
needing reflection or thought. If [the soul] does not need reflection. it does not
need act... This is because the act either is in the thing reflecting or in the natural
thing. As for the fixed potency, it is in the substances that become aware of the
things properly, without reflection or thought. and this is because they view the
things visually.
Here. the Adaptor specifies the sort of discursivity that is lacking in the higher
manifestation of potency_ At this level, perception can occur without 'reflection or
thought:' This redundant phrase. rawryQ wafikr. occurs many times in AP, usually in
contexts where the Adaptor is denying that God thinks. I:! Here the point is, again, a
Plotinian one: the soul can rise above discursive thought if it ascends to the level of
intellect, and attain a sort of intellection that is comparable to immediate vision. Here we
have, then, another description of a transcendent form of perception, one which is
described negatively (potency, instead of ignorance) because it lacks what is required in

11

See below. 5.3.4.

152

lower perception

(act~

instead of "knowledge"). Yet there remains something surprising

about the Adaptor's use of the terminology of act and potency to describe this
fundamentally Plotinian conception of an intellection that lacks discursivity. For in fact,
Plotinus himself is apt to describe the same thing as a pure actuality, as here in one
treatise on 'lOllS: "for the noetic is some actuality (energeia). since it is manifestly not a
potency (dllllal1lis)"' (Enn V.3.5). This is of course connected to Plotinus' view that the
God described by Aristotle. the pure actuality of thought thinking itself, can only be the
second principle because of its duality as thought and thinker. While we may not have
expected that the Adaptor would grasp this historical dimension of Plotinus' thought, it
should have been abundantly clear to him that. for the author of his source text, the
intellect is associated primarily with act, and not potency.
The puzzle deepens when we tum away from the passage from mfmar

vm we

have been studying. and look at other passages in which the Adaptor seems to follow a
more traditionally Plotinian line of thought about potency and act. For example:
Th.A V ill. 106-7 [B 109]: If [the soul] is intellectual. its intellect is only through
thought and reflection. because it is an acquired intellect... The intellect is that
which completes the soul, because it is that which procreated it. We say that the
person (shakh~ of the soul is from intellect. and the reasoning (nll[q) existing in
act 13 belongs only to the intellect, not to the thing falling under vision.
Enn V.I.3: Being, then. from intellect, [the soul] is noetic (noera), and its intellect
is in reasonings (logismois)~ and again, its perfection (te/eiosis) is from [intellect],
as the father raises [a son] he procreated. who is imperfect (Olt te/eion) in
comparison to himself. Then the hypostasis [of the soul] is from intellect. and its
reason (logos) is in actuality by its seeing intellect. For when it looks into
intellect, it has within and belonging to it that which it thinks and acts.

Here I read bi-a/-ft" with Lewis. which seems a better reading given the parallel Greek text.

153

Here the Adaptor follows Plotinus in saying that the intellect is in act, and also by saying
that the intellect is what "'completes" the soul; recall that we previously saw that
completion was associated with the actualization that takes place in the lower world.
How can we reconcile such passages with the doctrine of a potency higher than act? I~
One possible answer is to focus on the fact that, as mentioned above, the word quwa we
have translated throughout as "'potency" can also mean "power." This makes possible
passages like the following. which exploits the double meaning of quwa:
DS 147-8 [B 177]: We must know that the First Cause originates the things
without division, that is, it does not originate them one after another, but it
originates them all at once, as if they were one thing. The reason for this is that
the second cause is an act, and the first cause is a capacity (qudra). The actuality
does not happen except in a divided way, that is, it only performs a divided act.
As for the potency (al-qllwa), it is the power (al-qwva) which is able (taqwayu) to
originate all the things at once, as if they were one thing. IS
Enn V.3.15: But [The One] had [all things] such that they were not divided. They
are divided in the second, in the logos. For this is already actuality, but the [One]
is the potency (dunamis) of all things.
This passage has an important implication. namely that the Adaptor may sometimes use
the words "potency" and "act" relatively. By this I mean that he may call the source of
any "actuality" a "potency," as here the One is described as a power or potency because it
produces the "act" that is intellect. The same terminology is elsewhere applied the same
way to intellect and soul, and their respective effects:
OS 12 [B 168]: The intellect is the form for soul, and is that which informs [soul]
through the various forms, just as the soul informs the bodies with various forms.

I': For other passages which associate actuality with the intellect. see Th.A X.51-2. GS 11.15. The
first of these is especially emphatic: "it is repugnant that there be anything sensitive in potence [in the
intellect I. and that it then be in this world sensitive in act." But this may not clash directly with Th.A
VUL52-68. since it has to do only with sensation. not perception generally.

15 The verb raqwayu is the same root as lflln.'a. and more or less forces us to read the second qlln.'a
as a reference to an ability or power.

154

Likewise for the intellect: God has put the potency of the totality of the forms in
it.
OS 17: Therefore, it is impossible, if one thing is in another thing in potency, that
the principles for living things are in the soul. This is because the things which go
out from [the soul] are in it first in potency, and therefore they manifest in
actuality.
All this suggests that the Adaptor's apparently technical use of the words
"potency" and "act'" is actually rather fluid. He will describe intellect variously as in
potency or in act. because with respect to something below it, it is in potency in the sense
that it is the "power" which produces that thing. Thus his insistence that intellection is a
form of potency is primarily intended to point out that it is different than lower
perception: it is simple, immediate, and involves no discursive thought. This use of
terminology is exactly parallel to the use of the term ""ignorance" to describe the
knowledge of the intellect. One could loosely say that both cases fall under the
description of a via negativa: the Adaptor attributes some lack or deprivation to the
intellect (ignorance. potency) to illustrate that it transcends the things we normally
associate with the respective positive term (knowledge. act). In neither case does he
mean that the intellect lacks these positive terms in the sense of a defect; rather, it
posesses knowledge and act in a higher way, a way so transcendent that we can describe,
for example. the knowledge of intellect as a sort of ignorance.
To anticipate some of the findings to be presented in chapter five, this strategy is
most important when it is applied to the highest, most transcendent principle: God. The
close connection between the issues we have discussed in this section and those to be
pursued in relation to the First are underscored in the following paraphrase:
DS 123-5 [B 175]: If someone asks: if you make it so that the First Knower does
not know, you make Him such that He does not sense either, and from this

155

follows what is repugnant. We say: we only say that He does not know, not
because He is ignorant, which is the opposite of knowledge. but [instead] we
mean that He is above knowledge ifa~vqa al- 'ifm). This is because there is no
knowing (al- 'iilim) except when there is a knowledge and an object of knowledge,
and there is no intellecting (al- 'iiqif) except when there is an intellect and an
object of intellect, so there is multiplicity with respect to this. But we have said
that He does not receive multiplicity in any respect.
Enn V.3.14: For we make it many by making it known and knowing (gnoston kai
gnosin). and giving intellection (Iloein) to it, we make it have need of the
intellection.
This is one of two passages in AP which explicitly says that God does "not know"
because His knowledge is higher than knowledge. 16 Though the doctrine is here applied
to God instead of intellect, it is applied with the same logic: the Adaptor does not mean
that God lacks knowledge, but that His knowledge is of a different, higher sort than that
of the intellect. In this case, God does not know" if this is taken to imply some sort of
multiplicity. such as that between the knower and known, Of course. Plotinus makes the
same argument but draws the more radical conclusion, in the parallel passage. that the
One does not have any knowledge or intellection of any sort. The Adaptor has supplied
us with a hint as to why he did not follow Plotinus' doctrine fully, but instead resorted to
the notion of learned ignorance. For he says that if the First does not think or perceive
what is below Him. from this follows what is repugnant." Quite likely the repugnant
result he has in mind is that Providence would be impossible. which is unacceptable
given the religious context of AP (either Christian or Muslim). Of course. the same
problem would exercise later writers in Arabic philosophy. This passage is then a

16 The other passage is GS 1.25 [8 1871: ""[The First Principle] has no motion. because He is before
motion. before thought (fikr). and before knowledge ('ifm). and there is nothing in Him which He would
want to know. as the knower knows. but rather He is the knowledge which does not need to know by any
other knowledge. because He is the pure. ultimate knowedge containing all knowledge. and [is) the cause of
the sciences (al- 'uliim: literally 'the knowledges' ):' See below. 4.1.3 for further discussion of this text.

156

foreshadowing of Ibn Sina's attempts to explain how Providence is possible if God does
not know particulars, and of al-Ghazalrs attack on these attempts in the eleventh
discussion of his Tahafut al-Falasifa. 17

4.1.3 Porphyry and learned ignorance in AP

We have now seen the philosophical motivation for the doctrine of learned ignorance in
AP.

[r

falls into a general pattern of thought on the Adaptor's part in which he uses terms

implying deprivation in order to express transcendence. Let us, then, tum to the question
of the sources of the doctrine of ignorance as used by the Adaptor. I argued above that a
major source for his defense of the doctrine was Aristotelian, but that Aristotle could not
have been the entire inspiration for the passage in the second mimar. As previously
mentioned, many commentators have seen in this passage a reflection of Porphyrian
influence. In particular. an article by Pierre Thillet which appeared in 1971, and which
remains among the most forceful presentations of the thesis that Porphyry was the author
of AP, takes as a major point of interpretation the use of the doctrine of docta ignorantia
by the Adaptor. 18 He cites Th.A n.46-52, ru 'iis 16, and DS 123ff. (all cited above) as the
appearances of the doctrine in AP, and compares these texts to a line from the Sentences
of Porphyry: "One often speaks of what is beyond intellect (noli) in according to
intellection (kala ten noesin), but one contemplates it with a non-intellection lY-tter than
intellection (lhe6reitai anoesia kreittoni noese6s), just as one often speaks of someone
17 See Ibn STna, al-Shifir: al-Wihiyyiit. edited by G. Anawati (Le Caire. 1960). V1.8. French
translation: La Metaphysigue du Shifii". translated by G. Anawati. (Paris: J. Vrin. 1978): aJ-GhmrliJT, The
Incoherence of the Philosophers. translated by M. Marmura (Provo: Brigham Young University Press.
1997). 128-133.
18

Thillet ( 1971 ). 297-30 I.

157

sleeping as if they were awake." 19 One might raise here the question of whether the tenus

noesis and anoesia, which I have translated quite literally as "intellection" and nonintellection," should be understood as knowledge and ignorance. respectively (as in
ThilIet's translation). But any hesitance on this score may be forestalled by turning to
another Porphyrian text, a set of fragments from his commentary on the Parmenides. 20
In this text. Porphyry does speak. literally of ignorance (agnoia) and opposes this,
not to noesis, but to gnosis:
In Parm. V.IO-15: [say that there is a knowledge beyond knowledge and
ignorance (gnosin exo gnoseos ka; aglloias). from which there is knowledge. And
how, if knowing, does [God] not know, or how, knowing, is He not in ignorance?
Because He does not know. not as having come to be in ignorance, (15) but as
transcending (huperechon) every knowledge.
Just as, in the passage from the Sentences, Porphyry spoke of a "non-intellection better
than intellection." so here he recognizes a "knowledge beyond knowledge and
ignorance:' As Thillet points out, these are paralleled nicely in AP by the phrase "'an
ignorance which is more noble than every knowledge" (Th.A 11.47), and the statement:
"we only say that He does not know. not because He is ignorant, which is the opposite of
knowledge. but [instead] we mean that He is above knowledge" (OS 124). Note that
these passages actually speak of ignorance in two different senses. In the text from the
Sentences cited by Thillet. Porphyry is speaking of an ignorance on the part of the
intellect which tries to grasp the One -- in this case. ignorance is higher than knowledge

I')

Sentences 25.

10 Here I will simply assume that this text has in fact been attributed correctly to Porphyry. which
some have disputed. For a defense of its authenticity. see Hadot (1968). 102 ff. I will cite the passage by
section and line number from vol. II of the same work: the fragments can be found in their entirety in that
volume. 64-113. with an accompanying French translation.

158

because it does not do violence to the nature of the One through the multiplicity of
intellection. This doctrine is, of course, quite compatible with Plotinus.
In the passage from the Parmenides commentary, on the other hand, Porphyry

undertakes a dialectical discussion of the knowledge of God (ho rheas). He first broaches
the topic by remarking that God is never in ignorance (IV.34), but thell qualifies this by
saying that God is neither in a state of knowledge nor in a state of ignorance, in the
passage quoted above. If God is not knowing, this is only because He transcends
knowledge in the sense of a knowledge that is multiple. This is underscored in what
follows:
In Parm. V.19-31: This is the knowledge of God, appearing (e/nphainollsa)
without any otherness or dyad, and no difference in thought (eipnoian) between
knowledge and object of knowledge, but, as being inseparable from itself, even
though it is not in ignorance, it does not know. It is not ignorant, even if it does
not know... Truly, if it is granted that in some way there is ignorance in Him, this
is not according to contrariety (anli6sin) and deprivation (sieresin) ... Wherefore, if
He is not ignorant then He knows. and in this way He is found to be superior
(krei/ton) to knowledge and ignorance, and knows all things, but not in the way
the other knowers do. 21
This too, is Plotinian insofar as it emphasizes the lack of duality on the part of the One. It
strays from Plotinus somewhat more in its willingness to attribute knowledge of a more
transcendent kind to God, yet there are of course passages in the Enneads that would
countenance such a doctrine. Indeed, as Hadot shows in his study of the commentary
fragments, this section is based on Enneads VI.9.6, in which Plotinus similarly argues that
God transcends both knowledge and ignorance. 22 Porphyry departs from Plotinus only by

21 h should be noted here that the text in this section is largely corrupted. and [ am often following
Thillefs conclusions as to the proper reading of the remaining Greek. The ellipses in my translation mark
completely corrupted sections of the text.
21

Hadat ( 1968). voLI. 123.

159

arguing that this transcendence may be tenned a type of knowledge~ whereas Plotinus
concludes that 'What is thought [Le. the One] does not think (noesis Oll

noel)~

but is the

cause of thinking for something else... the cause of all things is none of them.' Insofar as
the Adaptor makes the same departure from his

source~ this

may argue in favor of

Porphyrian influence on AP.

Further evidence for such influence might be seen in the following passage in
Porphyry:
In Parm. VIA-IO: There is also a knowledge which knows an object. going from
ignorance to knowledge of the object of knowledge. and again there is another.
absolute, knowledge, which is not knowing an object nor of an object of
knowledge.
Compare this to part of the text in DS quoted previously:
DS 125 [B 175): This is because there is no knowing (al- 'iilim) except when there
is a knowledge and an object of knowledge, and there is no intellecting (al- 'iiqil)
except when there is an intellect and an object of intellect, so there is multiplicity
with respect to this.
These two texts show both Porphyry and the Adaptor thinking along Plotinian lines. and
arguing thar knowledge or intellection (at least, the non-transcendent variety) inescapably
involves multiplicity. Porphyry's argument for this is particularly interesting: he says that
knowledge of an object must necessarily move from ignorance to knowledge. This is
reminiscent of the argument we studied above. in which the Adaptor argued that purely
noetic intellection does not go from potency to act (i.e. from ignorance to knowledge), but
knows all things through a higher potency. All these points make the hypothesis of
Porphyrian influence on AP seem rather plausible.
I think. however, that a closer look at these parallels reduces the temptation to
gi ve much credence to such a hypothesis. Let us begin by returning to the fact that

160

Porphyry's text on ignordllce in the Parmenides commentary was based on Enn. VI.9.6.
This is significant because one of the key texts in AP dealing with God as a knower
transcending intellection also comes from the same Plotinian source:
GS 1.25 [B 187]: [The First Principle] has no motion, because He is before
motion, before thought, and before knowledge, and there is nothing in Him which
He would want to know, as the knower knows, but rather He is the knowledge
which does not need to know by any other knowledge, because He is the pure,
ultimate knowedge containing all knowledge, and [is] the cause of the sciences. 23
Enn. VI.9.6: There is no intellection [in the One], because there is no otherness,
and there is no motion, for it is before motion and before thought. For what
would it think? Itself? Then before thinking it would be ignorant (agnoon).
The passage in Plotinus is followed by the brief meditation on the problem of ignorance,
which was the inspiration for Porphyry in his commentary. Unfortunately no paraphrase
of this following passage remains in AP, if it ever even existed. But it is clear from GS
1.25 that the Adaptor would have read Plotinus' comments on ignorance. These could

have been a source for his own doctrine. just as they were a source for Porphyry. It might
be argued that the Adaptor makes the same departure from Plotinus as Porphyry, by
reversing the sense of the passage and insisting that the First does have knowledge in
some higher sense. But such a transformation was well within the bounds of the
Adaptor's strategy in the paraphrase. There are similar transformations, for instance,
regarding whether the One thinks. 24 And we saw above that there is a motivation for the
Adaptor to make such a change, even without Porphyrian influence: if the First does not
know, there can be no Providence. Thus it seems superfluous to suppose that the doctrine

23

For this passage see also above, fn.16 in section 4.1.2.

z': See C. D'Ancona Costa. "Divine and Human Knowledge in the Plotiniana Arabica:' The
Perennial Tradition of Neoplatonism. edited by J.L. Cleary (Leuven: Leuven University Press. 1997).419442. See also below. 5.3.4.

161

in AP represents, somehow, Porphyry's doctrines from the Parmenides commentary;

these same ideas were available to the Adaptor from Plotinus himself, and their
transformation falls into a pattern easily explicable without reference to Porphyry.
This leaves us with the problem of the passage in mfmar n, by far the most
developed text in AP dealing with ignorance. This passage does seem strikingly
independent from Plotinus. Its doctrine seems unrelated to that found in the Parmenides
commentary, since there Porphyry is describing the status of the One's knowledge, not
the knowledge that the intellect has of the One. A more fruitful parallel is provided by
the passage in the Sentences, which speaks of an anoesia kreitloni noeseos, a nonh

intellection better than intellection." Certainly, like the Adaptor, Porphyry is committed
to the notion that one must accept a certain ignorance with regard to the First Principle.
But again, this is an idea that is found in Plotinus. even if he does not use the language of
docta ignorantia. More robust parallels would be needed to suggest Porphyrian influence

on mfmar

n.

Not only are such parallels lacking. but none of the details of the Adaptor's

argument in this mfmar seem to be explained at all by referring to Porphyry. The linking
of knowledge and causality, as argued above, seems Aristotelian. The second notion of
ignorance. namely that the intellect is ignorant of its own effects, is not explained by the
Porphyrian hypothesis.
Indeed, it seems that the only thing the PorphYrian hypothesis might explain is the
use of the term ignorance" to describe such a higher form of knowledge. But, as
0' Ancona Costa has pointed out. there are other possible sources for this terminology,
like the Pseudo-Dionysius. I myself would argue that, if all we are trying to explain is the
appearance of the term "ignorance" in this context, that is too little information to reliably

162

choose anyone source as the one used by the Adaptor. It seems likely that he took the
notion of a transcendent ignorance from some other Greek source, though it is not
impossible that it was suggested to him by Plotinus (for example, by VI.9.6). But what is
much more important is how he developed that notion, especially in mfmar U. And this
development seems to be best explained by a creative application of the Aristotelian
doctrine of knowledge through causality. I would argue, then, that the theme of learned
ignorance shows the Adaptor not as a slavish transmitter of views from other Greek
sources. but as an independently minded philosopher combining the idea of learned
ignorance (whatever its origin) with views taken from Plotinus and Aristotle to produce a
largely novel doctrine. Other motivations peculiar to the Adaptor's situation may also
have played a role; for example, we have noted that religious committments could have
led him to reverse Plotinus' doctrine on God's knowledge or intellection. All of this is
consistent with the idea that the Adaptor was a member of al-Kindrs circle. and that he
was using sources we know would have been available to such a translator. If anything is
surprising in the interpretation given here, it is the extent to which the Adaptor's own
view on learned ignorance does not depend on prior sources.

163

CHAPTER 5

THE FIRST PRINCIPLE

5,I Divine predication

One of the most intriguing claims made in recent literature about AP is Cristina
D'Ancona Costa's contention that the Adaptor was influenced by the works of the
Pseudo-Dionysius. She has adduced a number of parallels between AP and Dionysius
(especially the Divine Names) to prove this point: the description of God's relationship to
His effects, I the view that God is "only being,.1 and creates "through being,',3 and the
doctrine of docta ignorantia. ~ Of course, if D' Ancona Costa is right about this, we might
most expect Dionysian influence to appear in AP in regards to the issue that is most
central to the Divine Names: the problem of divine predication. s Thus a closer look at
how the Adaptor conceives of such predications may shed light on a current debate over
the sources of AP, At the same time. this problem serves as a background for many of

I "Esse quod est supra eternitatem. La Cause Premiere, r etre el r eternite dans Ie Liber de Causis
et dans ses sources:' in D' Ancona Costa (1995). 65.
:! "'Cause prime non est yliathim: Liber de Causis, prop. 8[91: Ie fonti e la dottrina:' in D'Ancona
Costa (1995), 115-7.

-' "La doctrine neoplatonicienne de l'eU"e entre I'antiquite tardive et Ie moyen age. Le Liber de
Callsis par rapport a ses sources:' in O'Ancona Costa (1995). 149.
-l

0' Ancona Costa (1993).20-1.

S And indeed O'Ancona Costa has defended her thesis in this regard as well. See, for instance.
"'Cause prime non est yliathim: Liber de Causis, prop. 8[9J: Ie fonti e la dottrina," in D'Ancona Costa

(1995), I 15-8.

164

the most important modifications found in the paraphrdSe. which show the Adaptor
consistently speaking of God in ways Plotinus almost never speaks of the One. Therefore
a discussion of divine predication in AP is a propaedeutic for the other topics to be raised
in this chapter. First I will address the general theme of divine predications, or as the
Adaptor prefers to say. "attributes:' in AP. We will see that the Adaptor has a consistent
theory of how such attributes work. which is perhaps inspired by but fundamentally
different from that of Plotinus. Then. [ will show the application of this theory in a
specific case: the question of whether or not God can be called ucomplete:'

5.1.1 Negative theology in AP

The idea that the One cannot be described is a familiar theme in the Enneads. With the
exception of a few scattered passages and the unusual Enn VI.8. Plotinus is adamant that
we cannot say anything truly of the One -- not that it thinks. not that it exists. not even
that it is "One...6 This is not to deny that Plotinus does speak about the One. Rather, he
sums up his own position as follows: "How, then. do we speak about it ourselves? We do
say something about it. but we do not say it itself (ou men auto legomen). [and] we have
neither knowledge (gnosin) nor thought (noesin) of it" (Enn V.3.14). In keeping with this
statement, Plotinus will often indulge in metaphorical descriptions of the One or its
activities. but never with the confidence that he has said something unrestrictedly true of
the One or named it in some way. The best way to think of the One. he suggests, is to not
think anything of it at all. hence the famous ending to this same treatise: "We do not see

See Enn V.3.IO. V.3.13. See also H.A. Wolfson. "Albinus and Plotinus on Divine Attributes,"

Harvard Theological Review 45 (1952). I 15-130.

165

[the One] by any other light. How does this, then, happen? Take away everything
(aphele panta)" (Enn V.3.17). With the possible exception of VI.8,7 the Enneads give

then a generally negative view of the possibility of speaking or thinking of the First
Principle.

In keeping with this view, the Adaptor denies repeatedly in AP that God has
"attributes fdiflit)." For instance, we read that Uno one can describe Him with an attribute
appropriare to Him, or know Him with a knowledge oftme nature (kunhY" (OS 133,
paralleling the text in Enn V.3.14 cited above), 8 and that 6'whoever wants [to] describe ~i;;:
Creator, may He be exalted, must remove from Him the totality of attributes'" (OS 224).
The Adaptor recognizes two reasons for this lack of attributes in the First, both of them
drawn from the text of the Enneads. First of all, possessing attributes implies
multiplicity. The Adaptor is more specific than Plotinus in arguing that the fact that
intellect and soul can be described (i.e. that they possess attributes) is the reason for their
relative lack of simplicity:
Th.A Vill.20-1 [894]: Although the things which are there are simple, you will
not find anything among them except that it is varied through the plurality of
attributes which are in it, except that it does not increase or grow, as the bodily
things increase and grow. The intellect that is there is not simple, as if it were a
thing with no thing in it, and the soul which is there is not simple according to this
description ("alii hiidhihi al-~ifa), but rather the intellect and the soul and the other
things which are there are simple, varied by the totality of the attributes
appropriate for each one.

7 See below for funher discussion of mis treatise. Though the Adaptor may well have read VI.8.
no paraphrase of the treatise has come down to us.
!l [t should be noted that the verb "describe" (U'a~afa) used throughout AP has the same root as the
noun attribute" (~ifa). so that texts that discuss ""describing' the First may be taken to allude to the problem
of attributes.

166

The Greek text that inspired this passage is in fact rather vague: 'For neither is naliS
simple, nor the soul that is from it, but all are variegated according to [their] simplicity"
(Enn VI. 7. 13). Still, while the Adaptor is departing from Plotinus in this text, his
argument is in part based on a Plotinian view: if naliS is the object of its own thought,
then it cannot be completely simple. For thought implies duality. In this sense Plotinus
would also argue that the mere fact that nails can be described shows that it is multiple.
But the specifics of the Adaptors view are not so clearly taken from the Enneads. The
crux of the argument in the paraphrase is that only a "thing with no thing in it" can be
utterly simple. The intellect does not have such simplicity, because the attribute is
something distinct from intellect that is "in" it. The Adaptor makes a distinction, then,
between an existent thing and that which is true of it, or attributed to it.
To a large extent this way of putting the point is aJso Plotinian. In Plotinus' view,
the multiplicity of forms (which correspond to attributes) in intellect is one indication that
intellect is a "one-many" (hen polla). Similarly, the Adaptor sees the attributes of
intellect as forming a unity and giving intellect its identity:
Th.A V.37 [871]: Therefore [the intellect's] attributes come to be it, and it is
named by the name of each one of them. If the intellect and its attributes are
according to this description ~ifa), there is no need to say: why is this attribute in
it, because it [the attribute] is it [the intellect] (hiya huwa), and all its attributes are
together.

Like Plotinus, the Adaptor distinguishes even this unity of attributes from the purer unity
of the First. This comes out clearly in the following passage: "the First Originator is one
alone. I mean that He is only being (anlliyyafaqa[), having no attribute suitable to Him"

167

(GS 1.11).9 For the Adaptor. being is the underlying subject ofa predication. and the
predications or attributes determine what that being will be: But the First. as
indescribable, remains "being alone," or "only being," because it can have no attributes
which introduce multiplicity above and beyond its simple being.
The Adaptor uses more Plotinian vocabulary to make the same point, and
sometimes uses that vocabulary in a systematic way. Consider the following passage
from the paraphrase:
GS 1.32-35 [B 188]: The first originated intellect does not have a form. When it
connects to the First Originator. it comes to have a form, because it is limited. For
it is molded and comes to have a shape and a form. As for the First Originator,
He has no form, because there is not something else above Him which He would
wish to limit Him, and there is nothing below Him which He would want to limit
Him. For He is without limit in every way. Therefore He comes to not have a
shape or a form. If the First Originator were form, the intellect would be some
logos (kalima). And the intellect is not a logos, and there is no logos in it,
because it was originated without its Originator having an attribute or a form, so
that he would have put that form and logos in it. For the intellect is not a logos
nor is there a logos in it. but rather it makes the logos in the things. because it has
an attribute and a shape.
Here the Adaptor provides us with a hierarchy of terms for describing predication. The
First has no predicates at alI -- it has "no shape or form" (this is taken frem Plotinus: the
One is amorplzos kai alleidos, Enn VI. 7.17). As in Plotinus, it is through its relationship
to the One that intellect comes to have a "limit" or form. But this form is different from
the "logos" which is found in the effects of intellect, because only something that already
has a form can give that form to something else. The Adaptor. then, uses "logos" here in
the technical sense of a form impressed upon an effect by a cause that has the same form.
Thus he distinguishes between the causality of something without attributes and the
'} See below. 5.2 for an extended discussion of the phrase all1riyyafaqa[. its proper translation. and
its relation to the problem of attributes.

168

causality of something with attributes. The same distinction is expressed in the Adaptor's
more idiosyncratic language when he says:
Th.A V.46: The totality of active things [perfonn] their acts only through
attributes in them, not through their being. As for the First Agent, it makes the
thing through none of the attributes, because there is absolutely no attribute in it,
but it acts through its being (lllIwiyya).
We can summarize the Adaptor's view, then, as follows:
First Principle: Only being. Has no attribute. shape, or form. Acts "by being." Does not

make logos.
Intellect: Being plus attribute, shape or form. Has no "logos." Acts ""by an attribute:'

Makes logos.
All effect of intellect: Something that receives a '"logos" from intellect.

This takes us to the second argument the Adaptor gi ves for the absence of
attributes in the First. We have just seen the Adaptor argue that, because the effect of
intellect possesses logos, there can be no logos in the intellect. He applies the same
principle when he argues that God can have no attributes, because He is the cause of what
has attributes: ""None of the attributes of things are in the Creator, may He be exalted.
And He is above all the attributes, because He is the cause of the attributes" (DS 225).
This is taken almost directly from Plotinus: ""And we must, then, not add anything of the
later and the lesser, but say that that moves above these and is the cause of these. but is
itself not these" (Enn V.5.13). As in Plotinus, the basis of this argument is that the
intellect is itself all things and has all attributes: ""The intellect only comes to be the
totality of the things because in it is the totality of the attributes of things" (Th.A Vm.36).
But if we assume that a cause cannot have anything belonging properly to its effect. then

169

this means the One cannot have any attribute in it at all: "'the intellect became all things,
because its Originator is not like anything. The First Originator comes not to resemble
anything, because all things are from Him" (GS 1.10). The Adaptor goes even further
than Plotinus by giving an argument for accepting this assumption as a general principle:
'Necessarily, the oneness of the originated is not like (mith!) the oneness of the
Originator, otherwise the Originator and the originated and the cause and the effect would
be one thing" (Th.A X.93). This suggests, we may add, how seriously the Adaptor takes
the idea that attributes determine the nature or being of a thing: the passage implies that
two things that have the same attributes will in fact be the same thing.

5.1.2 Positive theology in AP

So far we have seen that, on the basis of two general arguments found in Plotinus, the
Adaptor rejects the possibility of describing or giving attributes to the First Principle.
Now, let us turn our attention to passages which exhibit the opposite tendency. In Enn
V.8.12, Plotinus remarks that, when speaking of the One, "we use [temporal] names out
of the necessity to wish to signify (semainein ethelein):' The Adaptor's paraphrase is
even stronger, as it does not include etJze/ein: "we only apply these names to that First
Light because we are compelled to make them an indication" (Th.A Vill. 182). With
Plotinus, then, the Adaptor holds both that the First has no attributes and that one must
nevertheless speak of Him somehow. (t would seem that we must draw the conclusion
that any names thus given to the First will be mere metaphor. But the Adaptor does not
draw this conclusion.

170

First of all~ the Adaptor often shows himself to be more willing than Plotinus to
describe the First.

Consider~

for example~ the following passage as compared to its Greek

parallel:
OS 117-120 [B 175]: Even though we say that He is other than them~ and other
than substance, other than intellect, and other than all other things~ we do not say
that He is not a substance~ and we do not say that He is lacking intellect~ lacking
sighi~ and lacking knowledge. But we say that He is above substance~ and above
intellect~ and above sight~ and above knowledge. And this is because He sees and
knows His essence, which is the essence which is above every essence. Therefore
He is the knowledge which is above every knowledge, because He is the First
Knowledge, just as He is above every intellect as He is above every knowledge.
because He does not need to know at all. Knowledge is only in the second
substance, because it needs to know the First Substance.

Enn V.3.12: For what comes from [the One] (to ap' autou) is not cut off from it~
and again is not the same as it, nor is it such as to not be substance, nor is it such
as to be blind, but it sees and knows itself and is the first knower. But [the One],
as beyond intellect (to de osper epekeina nou), is also beyond knowledge. As it
does not need anything at all, so it does not [need] knowing. But knowing is in
the second. For knowledge is one thing, but it is one without the "something," for
if it is one thing, it is not Oneness itself; for the "itself' (auto) is before the
"something" (1i).
Here the Adaptor has apparently made a crass translation error by taking the subject of the
first sentence to be the

One~

instead of intellect. But can this have been mere error? In

Plotinus, it is quite clear that there is a change in subject halfway through the passage, so
that the first remarks refer to the intellect and the latter remarks to the One. In DS the
Adaptor glosses over this change in subject: the phrases which mark out each subject (to
ap' autou and to de osper epekeina nOll) are both omitted in the Adaptor's version. This

is. then, no mistranslation, but a deliberate transfer of Plotinus' positive remarks on

intellect to the First Principle. Also significant is the fact that the Adaptor seems to
consider phrases like "above substance" ifawqa al-jawhar) to be compatible with (and

171

not, as Plotinus implies here, contrasted with) being a substance in some sense ("'we do
not say that He is not a substance"). We will see further use of this strategy below.
Another tendency found in the paraphrase that tends towards a more positive
attitude towards divine predication is the notion that some names are more appropriate to
the First than others. Immediately following the passage just cited, we find the following
in the paraphrase and its source:
DS 121-2 [B 175]: The name ofrrue substance lO is not befitting for Him, but we
find nothing similar to Him in all things, and no name which is befitting to
nothing else but Him alone. Therefore we name Him with the most excellent of
names by which it is possible to name Him.
Enn V.3.13: Therefore it is truly unspeakable, for whatever you say, you speak of
something. But "beyond all things and beyond the majesty Of,lI intellect is the
only true one of all [ways of speaking about it], not as being its name, but because
[it says that] it is not something among all things, and "has no name," because
nothing is [said] about it. But as far as is possible, we try to signify (semainein)
about it to ourselves.
Even in this fairly negative passage, the Adaptor introduces a notion not found in the
Greek: the "most excellent of names" (aidal al-asmii '). The same point is stated in a
more general way in another passage with no Greek parallel: "the attributes (.iflit) of the
effect are more appropriately ascribed to the cause than to the effect; particularly when
they are noble, they are more appropriate to the cause than to the effect" (Th.A II.76).
These two passages imply a division between two types of attributes: those that are
"noble" or "most excellent," and therefore may be more appropriately ascribed to the
First. and other attributes, which cannot be used the same way. 12

III Ism al-jawhar al-!.!aqq: Lewis translates substance. properly so called:' I assume this is not
based on a different manuscipt reading. but is an attempt to take the sense of al-!l.aqq differently.
II

A quote from Republic VI: see Plotinus (1966-1988). volume V. 116. fn.1.

l~ For funher argument on the theological context of this doctrine. see below. 5.2.4.

172

5.1.3 Predication by way of causality and eminence

As we have seen. the Adaptor combines acceptance of Plotinus' relativelyapophatic
attitude towards the One with a more kataphatic tendency to accept certain attributes of
God. Given the sophistication the Adaptor brings to some of the passages cited above. it
is not surprising to find that he tries to resolve this tension in the paraphrase. 13 He does
this by arguing that the attributes of God's effects can be predicated of Him. with certain
restrictions. There are two passages in AP which state this doctrine very explicitly.
Especially noteworthy is the use of the same tenninology in both passages:
Th.A X.154 [B 156-167]: All things are ascribed (tullsabu) to it because it is the
Cause of causes. and the Wisdom of wisdoms, as we have said many times. For if
the first Wisdom is the Cause of causes. then every act its effect does is ascribed
to it also. in a loftier and more excellent way (bi-naw'in arfa'in wa-afdalin).
OS 228 [B 183]: And the noble agent is more excellent than the effect of the act.
and all the attributes of the effect of the act are in the agent. except that they are in
it in a loftier and higher way (bi-naw';n arfa'in wa-a'liiin).
In neither case is the doctrine espoused here taken from a parallel text in Plotinus. 14
D' Ancona Costa has spoken of a hvia eminentiae" in the Liber de Causis,I5 and argued

that this is a doctrinal parallel between the two texts, What is clear in both AP and the de
Causis is that the First can only be named in relation to His effects, or, to put it more
13 Of course. it cannot be ruled out that the Adaptor is trying to reconcile tensions that he finds in
the text of the Enneads itself -- particularly if he knew Enn VI.8. the Adaptor might be inclined to look for a
way to accomodate both the positive and negative statements of Plotinus about the One. in addition to
adding his own more positive claims about God.

1-1

Th.A X.154 is completely independent. DS 228 parallels the end of Enn V.5: "For the maker (to

paiaull. referring to the Good) is better than the made, for it is more complete." Note that this is another

case where the Adaptor has introduced the theme of the First's attributes into a passage about something
else.

173

accurately, that the attributes of the effects are transferred to the First but used of Him in a
different way. 16 The view breaks down into two parts: (a) the First is in some way like
what He creates, and therefore can be named according to the attributes of what He
creates; (b) the First remains other than, or as the Adaptor often puts it, "above" ifawqa)
His effects, so that these names must mean something different when used of Him.
Strictly speaking, the first aspect could be called a via callsalitatis, and the second a via
eminelltiae.
(a) The way of causality is expressed in AP by the use of the catchphrase bi-nut'.,"in

'illatin, "'in the way of a cause." For example:

Th.A IX.7l [B 130]: As for the First Cause, the excellences are in it in the way of
a cause, not that it is the position of a receptacle for the excellences, but rather its
entirety is a being (anniyya) which is all the excellences.
Again. we have here the denial that the attributes, in this case the "excellences" (or
"virtues") exist in the First. The same formulation accompanied many of the passages we
examined above which denied attributes to the First. Yet the First has those attributes

15 '''Cause prime non est yliathim. Liber de Causis. prop. 8(9): Ie fonti e la doltrina:' in
D' An(;ona Costa (1995).99. Note the terminological parallel between the end of Liber de Causis Prop.5
and the two passages just cited from AP.
Ib The main thrust of Prop.S in the Liber de Causis is in fact that the First is /lot describable. As
we have seen. the Adaptor says the same thing in the paraphrase. despite subcribing to the via emillellliae.
In the de Causis. the reasoning behind the indescribability of the First is as follows: '"The First Cause is
higher than description (~ifa). and language is incapable of its description on account of the the description
of its being. because it is above every single cause. But it is described only by the second causes. which are
enlightened from the illumination of the First Cause. And this is because the cause which illuminates first
illuminates its effect and is not illumined by another light. because it is the pure light above which there is
no light- And thus it happens that the First is the one for which description fails" (Prop.5). For the Arabic
text: O. Bardenhewer. Die pseudo-aristotelische Schrift tiber das reine Gute (Frankfun a.M.: Minerva.
1882). 69-70. It is wonh noting that the same argument could be extracted from a key passage in AP. At
Th.A [1.49. while discussing the theme of docta ig/lorantia. the Adaptor argues that if the intellect knew the
First perfectly. it would be its cause. This implies a linkage of knowledge and causality similar to that in the
de Causis.

174

insofar as He is the cause of what has them primarily. The same ambiguity is expressed
in the following passages:
Th.A X.153: All things are in it, and it is not all things,17 because it is the cause of
all intellectual and sensible things.
GS LII: all things are in it, and it is not in anything, except in the way of a cause.

An obvious interpretation of such passages would be the most reductive one

possible: when the Adaptor says an attribute is in the First "'in the way of a cause:' he
means simply that the First is the cause of what has the attribute, and nothing more. 18
The Adaptor himself suggests such an interpretation at times:
GS IX.7 [B 197]: If we describe [God] with all goodnesses and excellences, we
only mean by this that He is the cause of goodnesses and excellence, and that He
put in them in the forms and is their Originator.
But as we have already seen, the Adaptor seems to hold that a cause must genuinely
possess whatever it gives to its effect, even if it does not possess it in the same way. He
applies this rule to divine predication at least in part because it applies to the causal
relations that obtain between intellect and soul, or soul and body. For example, the
contrast made (at GS I.32ff.) between form and logos is based on the idea that the same
thing cannot be in intellect and soul in the same way, since one is cause and the other

17 Lewis has "and all things are following:' Here. atypically. Badawls text seems more plausible.
Though Lewis is following the nonnally laudable course of assimilating the paraphrase to the Greek as
much as possible. the version in Badawl might itselfbe a reference back to the beginning ofEnn V.2: to hell
panra ka; oude hell. The italics in Lewis' translation of Th.A X.IS3 are misleading: the Greek does not say
that all things are in the One because it is their cause.
IS Such an austere view of divine attributes is not unknown in Arabic philosophy. One is
reminded. for example. of Maimonides' treatment of the same subject. insofar as Maimonides would argue
that sentences like "God is all-powerfur' do not actually make a positive predication of God. Rather. such
statements are either denials about God ('"There is no limit to Goo"s power") or about God's effects.

175

effecl. I9 Yet the same thing must in some way exist in both cause and effect, or there
would be no basis for the causal relationship. If the Adaptor is applying a set of general
"rules" governing causality to the First, then he is in some sense departing from Plotinus,
who would not necessarily agree, for instance, that the relationship between One and
intellect is analogous to that between intellect and Soul. Again, we see the Adaptor
moving towards a more positive doctrine of divine predication than that of Plotinus.
(b) This impression is confinned when we tum our attention to the second aspect of this
theory of predication, the via eminenriae. According to this mode of discourse, although
the attributes are "in" the First, they mean something different when predicated of Him.
The Adaptor expresses this in the paraphrase by routinely modifying attributes in some
way when he ascribes them to the First. A common formula is to affix the word "pure"
(mallf!) to such terms, for example by calling God the "pure Good.":w Other terms used

similarly are "First" (awwal) and "true" (haqq). Also common is the strategy of saying
that God is "above" ifa ....,rqa) a given attribute. While this last might seem to amount
simply to denying the attribute of God, the Adaptor suggests differently: 'the good comes
from a cause which is above the good, rather it is the pure good" (OS 227). And again, in
a passage we have already examined: 'we do not say that He is lacking intellect, lacking
sight, and lacking knowledge, but we say that He is above substance, and above intellect,
and above sight, and above knowledge" (OS 117-118). These statements suggest that the
Adaptor uses fawqa much in the same way as a Greek writer might use !luper, as a prefix

19 See also. for example. Th.A IX.66: "we say that justice and righteousness and the other
excellences are existent. whether the soul things about them or does not think [about them]. Indeed they are
existent in the intellect in a higher and loftier way than that in the soul:'

10

Th.A 1.48; OS 227: GS 1.24. 36: 11.89: IX.2.

176

which modifies an adjective without negating it.:!l Finally. the Adaptor frequently refers
to the First using phrases like "Cause of causes," "Light of lights," and so on. 22 All these
modifications show that the Adaptor. throughout the entire paraphrase, speaks of the First
in a way that is infonned by the doctrine of via eminentiae that he espouses explicitly in a
few passages. Insofar as the modifications are not based on parallel Greek passages, we
can say that this doctrine was important enough to the Adaptor that he deliberately
imported it into the paraphrase. 23 We have not shown, however. that the Adaptor
necessarily thought that he was introducing language that was counter to the intentions of
Plotinus. To get a better sense of the Adaptor's relationship to Plotinus on this issue, let
us tum to the case of a specific divine attribute.

5.1A Is the First Principle "complete"?

At the beginning of EnnV.2, Plotinus raises a central question regarding the One: how
does a multiplicity come from something that contains no multiplicity? His answer
includes the following passage: "For, being perfect (teleion) by not seeking and not
having and not needing, overflows, as it were, and its superfulness makes something
other than itself." The passage is remarkable in that it apparently ascribes an attribute,
"perfection," to the One without qualification. For a reader concerned with the problem
~I Obviously. if this is the case then it is a point in favorofD'Ancona Costa's Dionysius

hypothesis.
22 See Th.A Pro I. 14. X.91, X.154-5. X.181: DS 71,151,154; GS 11.87. Th.A. X.154. in
particular. uses nearly all the strategies we have mentioned so far.

~J It is wonh noting here that the via causaliraris could be at least panially inspired by Aristotelian
metaphysical views. Since. in Aristotle, an agent possesses in actuality what it bestows on its effect. it
....'ould make sense to reason from the nature of the effect to the nature of the cause. This may lie behind the
Adaptor"s statement that God has the attributes found in His effects "in the way of a cause:' For a concrete
example of such Aristotelian reasoning in AP. see below, 5.2.3.

177

of divine attributes the passage is even more provocative because Plotinus more
commonly ascribes "perfection" to 1l0llS. Many passages where he does

so~ indeed~ are

paralleled in AP (see below). The Adaptor was clearly intrigued by the term: the Arabic
words tiimm (complete) and kamfl (perfect)~ two possible translations of teleios~ appear
routinely in his paraphrase~ and especially throughout Th.A X. 24 I will argue below that
in this mrmar, the Adaptor modified Plotinus' text to develop an original doctrine
regarding the First's Hcompleteness:' Before taking a closer look at this

modification~

though, let us consider what the term "complete" means in the paraphrase.
The primary meaning of liimm is found in passages that say that the intellect
contains '"all things." At one point this is offered practically as a definition of the term:
Th.A X.43 [B 140-141]: If you say "substance:' or knowledge, or something
similar to these things, you find that this is in the first form. And from this we say
that it [the first form] is complete~ because all things are found in it.
Though the word te/eios does not appear in the passage parallel to this bit of paraphrase,
other passages in the Enneads could have served as the source for this "definition":
Th.A VID.116-7 [B 110]: AJI things are in [the intellect] and none of them is
outside it... The upper world only comes to be complete and perfect because there
is no thing in it which it does not encompass in knowledge.
Enn V.1.4: Where would [intellect] leave to, having all things in itself?... And
therefore all things are perfect (teleia) in it, so that it is wholly perfect (pante
fe/eios), not having what is not perfect. 25

::!-l Often. the Adaptor uses the two words as a couplet. e.g. at Th.A X.38: the "Originator is
complete (riimm) and perfect (kamlf) ..... He uses either both words to translate the one Greek word. teleion.
or less commonly tiimm alone (e.g. at Th.A X.6). This leads me to think that. at least in the contexts
relevant to our current concerns. the two Arabic terms are being used as synonyms. See also the discussion
of Synonymenlziiujil1lgen in texts from al-Kindrs circle at Endress (1973). 155-162.

25 A similar source could be VUI.I 1-12. paralleling Enn VI.7.12. though the word there (again
quoting Plato) is pal/teles. not teleiOlL See also Th.A X.48 ('"the intellect is complete and perfect in the
totality of things'). paralleling Enn VI.7.3: "if [nails) is perfect (teleios), it has the causes in itselC'

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The Adaptor closely associates the word tiimm with the word niiqi$.., deficiency." This is
treated in a number of passages as the contrary of "complete," to the point where the
Adaptor is even willing to paraphrase a Greek text denying that there is deficiency in the
First (meden elleipsolltos) by saying that the First is "complete and perfect" (Th.A
V.20).26 This. then. is the basic sense of the term tiimm: to have all things, which is the

same thing as not having any deficiency. The Adaptor sometimes uses tiimm to mean
only this sort of complete existence or lack of defect, for example at Th.A

n.64 where he

says that the soul is complete and perfect" in the limbs of the body, simply because it
exists throughout the entire body. But we can see from other passages that, in some
cases. liimm can have a more technical meaning.
One aspect of this more specific meaning is that, if something is complete, then
not only does it have all things, but it must have them simultaneously" or "all at once."
In a passage original in the paraphrase, the Adaptor says:
Th.A X.38 [B 139-140]: But as for the things which are in the higher world, they
do not admit of increase and decrease. because their Originator is complete
(tiimm) and perfect (kiimil), and originates their essence (dhiit) and attributes
Cdifii/) together, simultaneously. so that they thereby become complete and perfect.
And if they are thereby complete and perfect, then they are therefore eternally in
one state. and are all things in the sense which we mentioned above, and this is
that none of the attributes and none of those forms can be mentioned without you
finding them in it.
Completion precludes change, and also requires that "all the things" contained in intellect
came to it simultaneously." rather than one after another. Often. when the Adaptor
introduces the word tiimm into his paraphrase without a parallel fe/elon in the Greek, it is
because the passage deals with a lack of change or with the idea that something has all

:!6

See also Th.A V.39ff.. X.5. 96. 121.

179

things in it at once. In doing so he associates the following ideas with the claim that
something is complete n :
(a) The complete is eternal or atemporal (Th.A V.17ff., 33, XAO).
(b) The acts of a complete thing are not one after another, nor do they have a beginning
and end:' but rather they are all at once (Th.A V.47, X.39).
(c) As a corollary of this, the complete cannot think discursively, because this involves a
"transfer" from one thing to the next (Th.A Vill.52, 115-7, X.40).
(d) The complete must be one, not many: the many is deficient" (Th.A X.96, 126).
All of these features are attributed to both intellect and the First, suggesting that, at least
to some extent, the Adaptor follows Plotinus in applying the notion of "completeness" to
both hypostases. But a final theme which the Adaptor associates with the term tiimm
complicates this neat picture considerably.
This theme is the relationship of the attribute completeness" to all the attributes
as a whole. In the passage just cited above (X.38), the Adaptor holds, as a sort of
corollary to the idea that "all things" are in what is complete, that all attributes" are
found in the complete. No attribute or form can be mentioned" which does not exist in
intellect. 27 This is because these attributes are made simultaneously with the essence
(dhiil) of the intellect. This is of course one basis for the claims (a)-(d) we have just seen

in other parts of the paraphrase: if the intellect's very essence is the same as what it
contains. it cannot change, so that it is (a) atemporal and has no transition (b) between its
acts or (c) its intellection. Finally, (d) the intellect is one, because all the forms or

27 That the "higher world" in question refers to intellect, and not God. is clear from the context as
well as the Adaptor's routine practice of using this sobriquet for the world of intellect.

180

attributes in it are united in one essence. All this seems to be taken directly from
Plotinus' descriptions of nallS, though Plotinus does not seem to use the word teleios in
the complex sense that the Adaptor uses tiimm and kamil. The intellect, then, would seem
to be the primary subject for the attribute complete." This impression, though, is
apparently contradicted by the following passage, also original with the Adaptor:
Th.A V.39-41 [B 71]: And the intellect only comes to be according to this
description fdifa) because its Originator originated it completely, because He is
also complete. with no defect. When He originated the intellect He originated it
complete and perfect, and made its quiddity (mil 7ya) the cause of its generation.
The First Agent acts likewise: because when He does an act, He makes "why is
itT' (lima kana) enter into "what is itT' (rna "ul...a) Thus when you know "what is
it:' you know "why is if' (lima hllwa) also. And the complete agent acts in this
way. The complete agent is the one that does its act through being alone (biannihi faqaO, through none of the attributes. As for the defective agent, it is the
one which does its act not through being alone, but through some one of its
attributes. Therefore, it does not do a complete, perfect act. And this is because it
is not able to do its act and its end together, because it is defective, not complete.
Here we have some of the familiar features associated with completeness: the
simultaneity of beginning and end and opposition to "deficiency." Yet here, it is the First,
not intellect. Who is said to be primarily complete. Indeed, the Adaptor says that the
complete agent acts through "being alone," and not through "attributes," which can be
true ollly of the First, as we saw above. Here, then, the Adaptor actually denies that the
intellect should properly be called "complete," reserving this term for the First. Nor is
this passage an isolated exception in the Adaptor's theory of completeness:
GS 1.12-14 [8 185]: As for the intellect, the things are in it, and it is in the things.
And the things only come to be in the intellect because their forms are in it, and
scattered forth from it, because it is the cause of the things which are below it.
However, though the intellect is the cause of the things which are below it, it is
not the complete cause of a thing, because it is only a cause of the form of the
thing, not the cause of its being (hllwiyya). As for the First Agent, He is a
complete cause (' ilia liimma). This is because He is the cause of the being of the

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thing and its form without an intermediary. and the cause of the being of the soul
28
and the form of the things through the intermediary of the intellect.
In this passage, also original in the paraphrase. the Adaptor repeats that it is only the First
that is a "complete" cause, and that the causality exercised by something complete has to
do with being, rather than form. One might be inclined to say that, in these two passages.
we have simply caught the Adaptor in an embarrassing self-contradiction. Though he
normally applies the term tiimm to intellect, and even has a developed idea of what this
means which he derived from Plotinus, in these two places he gives up that use of the
term in his zeal to praise the First Cause. A critic of the Adaptor might accuse him of
self-contradiction on this point, or say that he is equivocating on the term ucomplete."
We can best defend the Adaptor from these charges by finaJly turning our
attention to mimar X. The beginning of this mimar parallels the beginning of Enn V.2, a
passage we looked at above. The Adaptor finds in Plotinus the somewhat surprising
claim that the One is "perfect (teleiOlz) by not seeking and not having and not needing."
He paraphrases the text in this way:
Th.A X.6 [B 135]: And the indication that the pure One is complete and above
completeness (tammfawqa a/-tamam) is that it has no need of anything and does
not seek the acquisition of anything, and because of the intensity of its
completeness and excess another thing comes to be from it.
Remarkably, the Adaptor corrects Plotinus here by saying that the First is not just
complete, but both complete and above completeness. A similar correction begins the
mTmar:

2ll See below. 5.3.1 for a funher discussion of this key passage. which also introduces a distinction
between creation of being and creation of form. Rosenthars translation. which is the one found at Henry &
Schwyzer ( 1959). 281. is misleading here. because he translates 'il/a tiimma as "final cause." rather than
"complete cause:' As Pines (1954). 306. points out. this phrase sometimes means "final cause" in Arabic
philosophy. but there is no reason to translate it that way here.

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Enn V.2.1: The One is all things and not one of them.
Th.A X.l: The pure One is the cause of all things. and is not like any of the things.
This correction also bears on the issue of completeness. of course. since the Adaptor is
rejecting the statement that the One is ""all things:' which is equivalent to saYing that He
is complete, as we saw above. In X.6. he seems to have a more nuanced reaction to
Plotinus' text: rather than simply negating the statement that the One is complete. he says
that the First is somehow complete and not complete at the same time. This is the first of
several attempts in mfmar X to correct Plotinus' text in favor of an original view
regarding the First's completeness. The Adaptor lays out his view in more detail in an
original passage that immediately precedes the correction in X.6:
Th.A X.4-5 [B 134-135]: And I say that the pure One is above completeness
ifa~vqa al-tamam) and perfection (ai-kamal), and as for the sensible world. it is
deficient (niiqin. because it is originated from the complete thing, which is the
intellect. 29 And the intellect only comes to be complete and perfect because it is
originated from the true, pure One, which is above completeness. It is not
possible that the thing that is above completeness originates the defective thing
with no intermediary, and it is not possible that the complete thing originates
something complete like itself. because origination is deficiency.3D I mean the
originated is not in the rank of the originator. but is beneath it.
This passage is unique in its explicit assertion of a hierarchy based on completeness,
applied to the Plotinian cosmos. Here the First is said to be above completeness, while
the sensible world is. as it were. ""below" completeness. that is to say deficient. It is
intellect that is complete. and this is because it is caused by what is above completeness.
This is further explained shortly afterwards:

29 Reading with the version in Badawr (1955). 34. th.1. In the main text he has ""...because it is
originated. and the complete thing is intellect:"
Jll

Reading with Lewis. Badawl has /ianllllhll.li alibdii' llaqi~lm.

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Th.A X.7 [B 135]: ... because the thing that is above completeness cannot
produce unless the thing is complete. Otherwise it is not above completeness.
And this is because, if the complete thing produces anything, then a fortiori the
thing which is above completeness produces completeness, because it produces
the complete thing than which no produced thing can be more powerful, more
splendid or more high.
Here the Adaptor is applying the via causalitatis that we saw above: a cause must be
unlike its effect, or it would be the same thing. The principle is applied both to the causal
relationship between the One and intellect and to that between intellect and the sense
"'orld. In both cases, the effect falls short of its effect in terms of completeness. This in
itself suggests that when the Adaptor says the First is "above" completeness, he is not
simply denying that the First is complete -- for the mere absence of completeness is the
deficiency that is found in the sense world. Rather, he is saying that the First cannot be
properly described as "complete:' because it is intellect that is complete. If the First is
complete in some sense. then He has a completeness that somehow goes beyond that
found in intellect.
This interpretation is confirmed by passages inserted by the Adaptor through
mfmar

X. and elsewhere in AP. many of which have already been cited. 31 These passages

imply both that the First is complete and perfect (Th.A V.17. 39; VIII. 16. 98; X.38. 40,
47,89,96,185; DS 178; as I.12ff.) and that the First is above completeness. so that
properly speaking, it is the intellect that is complete (Th.A V.33; VIll. 11-12; X.4-8, 88,

~I The relevant passages I have found in Th.A X are X. 4, 6. 38.43.47. 88-89. 96. 121. and 185.
The distribution of these passages tends to suggest that. as [ argued in chapter I. X.137ff. was not originally
attached to Ihe rest of X. because in this latter section there is only one passage that might be relevant. and
even it does not use the word liimm (X.18S). The fact that the "completeness" question unifies X.I-33 with
what follows might be a weak argument for thinking these first two pans of m'imar X (i.e. 1-33 and 34-136)
were originally joined. But the presence of the same themes in other parts of AP gives all of this a limited
imponance for reconstructing the textual order. [think it is more likely that the theme of completeness was
of concern to the Adaptor throughout the pans of the paraphrase deal ing with the First.

184

121). I would suggest that these apparently contradictory sets of passages are united by
the idea that the intellect can be called complete because the First is complete. and viceversa:
Th.A V.17 [B 68]: "We say that every act (fi'1) the First Creator does (fa 'ala) is
complete and Perfect. because He is a complete cause ('illa liimma) with no other
cause beyond Him.
The intellect, as act of the complete First, is also complete. But the very fact that the
intellect is complete implies that., strictly speaking. the First must be uabove"
completeness, at least in the sense in which completeness is ascribed to intellect. We
have here, then, a clear application of the twofold theory of predication we saw the
Adaptor articulate in some other passages. According to this doctrine, there is a sense in
which the attributes had by intellect are shared by the First., and a sense in which they are
transcended by the First. This double use of the attributes is based on causality and
eminence: the First is both complete and above completeness, insofar as it must be both
similar to and different from its effect.
The kind of "correction" we saw in Th.A X.I-8 shows. I think, that the Adaptor
was concerned to import this doctrine into parts of the Enneads which seemed not to use
such a theory of predication. At the very least, then, the Adaptor took it upon himself to
modify examples of discourse about the First Principle that he found in his source text.
Whether or not he thought he could do this and remain true to Plotinus is less clear.
Certainly, it does not seem that any text paraphrased in AP was the source for the
Adaptor's theory of divine attributes. For in the passages we have examined, the most
crucial statements regarding divine attribution in general. and completeness in particular,
are independent from the Greek text. Yet this does not yet rule out the possibility that the

185

Adaptor was influenced by other parts of the Plotinian corpus. Specifically. he may have
been trying to import the more positive doctrine of divine attribution he found in Enn
VI.8 into other parts of the Enneads. On the other hand. D' Ancona Costa has argued that
the sources of this theory of predication in AP are to be sought in the works of the
Pseudo-Dionysius. We will be in a better position to assess these claims after turning our
attention to another. more straightforwardly ontological. aspect of the Adaptor's theology.

5.2 God and being

We have just examined the Adaptor's understanding of theological discourse, that is. the
status of attributes or names given to God. The following section, as will become clear,
will have close ties with the preceding discussion. Here [ will take up the issue which is.
perhaps, the most philosophically significant theme proper to AP: the idea that God is
"only being." ill a recent article. Richard Taylor addressed the presence of this theme in
AP and showed that it may stand behind the well-known medieval tradition that describes
God as being itself (esse ipsum), which finds its way into the Liber de Causis and
ultimately Thomas Aquinas. 32 Given that the characteristic terminology of being in AP
appears in later Arabic philosophers, we might add that al-Hirabr and Ibn srna may also
be examples of the direct or indirect influence of AP in Arabic Neoplatonism. 33 The

l! Taylor (1998). It should be noted. however. that the phrase esse ipsum does not appear in the
Latin Liber de Causis: as Taylor points out (217). the phrases used are ells {alllum and ellS primum. We
cannot go here into the complexities of this translation issue. though some of the terminological
considerations presented below. 5.2.1. have obvious relevance.

3] In both authors we have the assertion that for God. miihiyya ("'essence") is the same as a1l1liyya
or Iwwiyya ("being"): see M.-T. dAlvemy. "Anniyya-Anitas:' in Melanges offens a Etienne Gilson
(Toronto: Pontifical Institute. 1959). 71. citing al-Farabrs Fusi,s al-hikma (Pearls of Wisdom). and 77.
citing Ibn STna in a/-Shi@'. See also F. Shehadi. Metaphysics in Islamic Philosophy (Delmar, New York:
Caravan Books. 1982). 55 and 84.

186

theme of God as pure being has also been treated in a number of other articles on AP.
including several by D' Ancona Costa. 3~ In this section I will build on the work done in
these articles, beginning with an overview of the relevant terminology used by in AP.

5.2.1 The terminology of existence

Scholars have long been struck by the presence in AP of terms which are apparent
neologisms introduced into Arabic at the time of al-Kindrs circle of translators in 9th
century Baghdad. Already in the 19th century, Gennan scholars speculated about the
derivation of two key terms, anniyya and Izllwiyya. 35 As we will see, in the context of AP
both of these terms should be translated as being," though Lewis in his English
translation renders huwiyya as identity:' To these we can add the term ann. which will
be explained below, and a few other terms for "being" or hexisience" in AP. A brief
discussion of each of these will be required before we can move on to an analysis of how
the Adaptor uses them. Of particular interest, of course, will be the Greek words they are
used to translate.
(a) AllIziyya

(~I):

this is the term used most commonly in AP when speaking of God as

pure being, or, more accurately, only being" (anniyya faqa[). As Endress remarks, it
would seem at first glance to be an abstract noun based on anna, an Arabic particle

3-l See D' Ancona Costa, "Esse quod est supra etemitatern. La Cause Premiere. retre el retemite
dans Ie Liberde CaCtsis et dans ses sources:' in D'Ancona Costa (1995).63: "La doctrine Neoplatonicienne
de r etre entre r Anliquite tardive et Ie Moyen Age. Le Liber de Callsis par rapport a ses sources:' in
D' Ancona Costa ( 1995).139-152: "'Cause prime non est yliathim: Liber de Causis. prop. 8[9]: Ie fonti e la
dottrina:' in D'Ancona Costa (1995),107.
.:15 See R.M. Frank. '"The Origin of the Arabic Philosophical Tenn amriyya:' Cahiers de Byrsa 6
(1956), 181-182.

187

usually translated "that'~ (as in "it is true that ai-KindT is a philosopher,,).36 In general~ the
ending -iyya is used in Arabic to form abstract nouns of this sort (see below for another
example~ huwiyya).

A slightly different conjecture is that the word should be vocalized

inniyya. as an abstraction of the assertive particle inna ("verily," or indeed,,).37 BadawI

has suggested that anniyya could be a transliteration of the Greek einai, to be. ~,38
Finally, a more fanciful derivation found in some later Arabic literature would have the
term as an abstraction of the first person prounoun ana, so that anniyya would literally
mean "I-ness:,39 We need not enter into this debate here; I will follow the majority of
scholars (including Taylor, D' Ancona Costa and Endress) and vocalize the term anniyya,
though without presupposing any particular etymological derivation.
As remarked above, this

term~

like

hlllviyya~ appears

in Arabic for the first time in

ai-KindT's circle, and AP may be the oldest extant text to use the word. It also appears in
the Book on the Pure Good (later the Liber de Causis), Us!ath's contemporaneous
translation of Aristotle's

Metaphysics~ the

works of aI-KindI himself. and many later

Arabic texts"~o But the earliest appearances of the term are all in translations of texts
from the Greek philosophical tradition. This suggests that the meaning of alll1iyya can be
fixed by the Greek terms it translates. In AP and other texts, anniyJ'a is used as a
translation both for 011 ('being") and einai Cto be..):H The plural, anniyyiit, sometimes is

36

Endress ( 1973), 80.

3;

Shehadi (1982), 9-10.

38

For Badaw-ls clai~ see Frank (1956), 182 and 183 fn.l. Against this. see Frank. 192.

.19

Against this possibility, see Simon van den Burgh's article on "all/liyya" in EI:!. vol.l.

-to See Endress (1973).95-106. The later uses of amliyya include those in sufi literature. which is a
source for the aforementioned derivation from ana. See d' Alvemy (1959). 65.
':1

See Endress (1973).92-94, and also the many examples given in this section of the dissertation.

188

used to translate ollta ("beings"). Now. it has been suggested by Frank that these
translators. including the Adaptor. would not have used the same term to translate on and
einai if they had had the Greek text in front of them:~2 He suggests. therefore, that these
indiscriminate translations are the result of conflation of on and einai in intermediary
texts composed in Syriac:B While I am not in a position to deal with the complexities of
his argument, I will note two points against this possibility. First. unlike Greek, Arabic
does not have separate words for the participle and infinitive of "'to be:' Thus it is hardly
surprising that translators would have failed to translate on and einai with separate terms.
Second, Frank makes the crucial assumption that the Arabic texts in question (and AP in
particular) were. in fact, based on Syriac intermediary texts. This is what leads him to
inquire into possible Syriac origins for the term in the first place. Given the more recent
arguments of Zimmermann to the effect that there was no such Syriac intermediary text in
the case of AP. Frank's view comes to look less likely.~
(b) HuwiYJ'a

(~."...):

Like anni})'a, this term looks like an abstractive noun, in this case

based on the word huwa, meaning or "'he" or "'it:' This would yield a literal meaning
something like the Latin tenn ipseiras. Later in Arabic philosophy, the term is used to
mean '''identity,'' or '''individua1ity:~5 And in fact, there is one passage in AP where
Izuwiyya is used to translate lautotes, '''identity'' or '''sameness'':
Th.A Vm.125 [B 112]: If this is the case, then we consider and say that the
principles are intellect, being (anniyya), otherness. and identity (hu,viyya).
-1Z

Frank (1956), 192.

-1~ See Frank (1956). 192-199. His analysis is difficult [0 follow for readers who are, like myself,
innocent of Syriac. However. a useful summary of his view is given by Endress (1973),82-83.
-1':

Zimmermann (1986),113-118.

-15

See d'Alvemy (1959), 66.

189

Enn V.1.4: Therefore the first things (Ia proIa) are

sameness (nolls, on, heleroles, tautotes).

intellect~

being, otherness, and

Note that here, Jlllwiyya is treated as having a different meaning from anniyya. Despite
this, elsewhere throughout AP, Illlwiyya is used to mean "being," usually translating on
but in one case translating einai (Th.A X.179).46 Indeed, it seems that with the exception
of Th.A VHLI25, the Adaptor uses huwiyya and anniyya as synonyms. This tendency
was carried forth past the time of al-Kindi: aI-Farabi says explicitly that the two words
mean the same thing, and opposes them to miihiyya, essence.,.47 I have found no
literature speculating on why the term hu,viyya. despite evidently being derived from the
term "it," would come to mean "being" in the early Arabic period. However, one relevant
consideration might be that existential sentences can be formed in Arabic without a verb,
using only a pronoun, as in a locution that sometimes appears in AP: huwa Izuwa or Jziya
hUH:a,

"it is if' (for example~ at Th.A V.3?, X.186, OS 116).

(c): Ann: The most vexing of the terms to be taken up here is

transliterated anl1,

Wln,

wI,

which could be

or anna. The question of how to transliterate this word is of

considerable moment. It is raised in reference to passages like the following:

Th.A X.175 [8 160]: ...their Originator is one and simple, originating the simple
things all at once, through being alone (.k.&i ~'-:a).
Here we want to understand what the final phrase in Arabic means. I have translated it as
'"through being alone," as would Badawf. His interpretation of this construction. which
appears frequently in AP, is that linn is a transliteration of the Greek on. Another
';6 Il is interesting that though neither translation is consistent. the Adaptor is more likely to use
mmiyya when the parallel Greek term is ei1lai. and Illl,,:iyya when it is Oil. For texts showing the use of
IWH'iyya in AP. see Endress. 94-5. and of course passages presented below in this section.

190

possible interpretation would be bi-annihi jaqal: "through the fact that it is, alone,"
treating the word in question as anna, the conjoining particle mentioned above with
reference to anlliyya. In support of the latter possibility. we may note three things: first,
the Adaptor already uses two other words (anniyya and Imwiyya) to translate on. Second.
scmetimes the word in question is used as a translation of eina; (as at Th.A X.88). which
makes little sense if it is a transliteration of a different word. Third, and most
convincingly. there are other passages in AP where the Adaptor uses anna in
constructions like the one proposed here. For example:
OS 105 [B 174]: [The intellect] acts by the fact that it is intellect (bi-anllahu 'aq).
These points suggest strongly that Badawl is wrong to see the term as a transliteration of
Oil,

and others have disagreed with him for similar reasons:~8 But unfortunately. other

passages in AP prevent us from reading all these instances as anna:

Th.A VID.186 [B 120]: As for the intellectual world. it is governed by the First
Being (JJ'i1 u'il), and He is the First Originator... (See also GS IX.Sij.2 [B 196].)
Here, the word for God I have translated as "Being" is clearly not a conjunction. but a
noun. Therefore we cannot read all such occurrences as the ordinary connective particle
an/la. The solution I will adopt here will be that of Endress: to reject (for the first two

reasons given above) BadawI's interpretation of the word as a transliteration of on. and
instead read ann. a noun derived from anna and serving as an exact synonym with
a/l/liyya:~9 Still. it is worth bearing in mind that at least occurrences of this phrase could

-17

See d'A)vemy (1959). 71.

-IS

See Frank (1956). 200-20 I.

-19

Endress (1973). 83-84.

191

be read bi-allnalzufaqa!.. "through the fact that He is. alone." I think that such readings
are compatible with the interpretation to be offered below.
(d) Other terms: There are two remaining terms that refer to existence or being, neither of
them presenting particular difficulties of interpretation. The first is the verb "to be" itself,

kana. 50 Here we need only single out for special mention the noun kawn based on this
verb. This can, and in AP often does. mean "existence" (for example at Th.A X.179).
But it can also mean "generation:' and in this sense is sometimes opposed to fasiid.
"corruption" (as at Vll.19). In one case (Th.A VU.6) the Adaptor uses the phrase "the
path of existence and beings" (a/-kaum wa '/-anniyyal), which suggests a close
relationship between kawll and anniyya. The second group of terms to be mentioned are
those based on the root w-j-d, such as wlIjiid, "existence," and mauiz/d, "existent."
Appearances of these forms in AP, as far as I can make out, are in accordance with the
usage familiar to students of Arabic philosophy in general, though the term """ujiid does
not attain anything like the prominence it receives in Ibn

SIn~

for example.

On the basis of the above remarks. I will treat anniyya, huwiy)'a, and ann as
synonyms, and translate all of them as "'being" (or in plural. "beings"), except when
context dictates otherwise. I reserve "existence" and "existent" to translate kawn and
l1'ujiid / mmtjl1d. though again context may dictate alternate translations, especially

"generation" in the case of kall/n. It is tempting to also translate anniyya as "existing,"

rather than "being;' and to translate allniyyafaqaf. as "simply existing." The reason this
is tempting is that it does not seem to reify God as some sort of Platonic form of Being. or
suggest that the Adaptor simply assimilates the First to Plotinus' intellect. In fact his

50

For a general discussion of kana. see Shehadi (1982),4-9.

192

doctrine is both more subtle than this and less committed to an ontological
substantification of the First (he does not hold. for example, that God is just a "thing"
which is equivalent to "being" with no other features; such a view would clearly
compromise God's transcendence). Despite these advantages. I prefer to retain "being"
as a translation for amziyya, huwiyya. and ann, for the following reasons. First, these
terms are used to translate einai and on, and this suggests a corresponding English
translation as ....being" (in Greek '''exist'' would be closer to the semantic range of
huparchein). Second, anniyya is sometimes used as a singular noun, and it is felicitous
that "being" can also be used in this sense, even if the Adaptor does not want to suggest
that God is "a being." Third, and most important, I do not want to suggest that we find an
existence/essence distinction in AP. In some ways, the Adaptor's position anticipates
Avicenna in this regard, but as we will see the doctrine of AP has less to do with a
metaphysical characterization of God, and more to do with a discussion of theological
discourse.

5.2.2 God as the First Being and only being

It was mentioned above that the plural anniyyiit is sometimes used to translate onta,
"beings." This suggests that when the Adaptor refers to God as anniyya, he might mean
only to indicate that God is something that exists, a being or an entity. Now, one
common phrase used by the Adaptor to refer to God in AP is "the first being:' al-anniyya
al-iilii or, more rarely, ai-ann al-awwal (as at Th.A Vlli.186 [B 120]), and once even alIwwiYJ'a al-iilii (OS 39 [B 170]). If we adopt an understanding of alZlliyya as meaning
only something like "a being:' or "an entity," we can interpret this to mean that God is

193

simply the highest of the things that exist. Saying that he is the First among existents
distinguishes Him from created things, but only because He is prior, not because He has
or is "being n in some radically different sense. Such an interpretation fits passages like
the following:
Th.A VII.21 [B 87]: It is [the First Creator] Who is holding the totality of things,
even though the intellectual things are true beings (anniyyiit l!aqqiyya), because
they are originated from the First Being (al-anniyya al-ii/ii) without an
intennediary.

If this were the only context in which the Adaptor referred to God as anniyya, we might
content ourselves with such a reductive reading: God is the first being, meaning only that
he is a primus inter pares. 51
As we will see, other passages indicate a much richer understanding of God as
being. But let us pause, before looking at these passages, to note that even such a modest
view of God as alllliyya would be a considerable surprise in the context of AP. For,
famously. in Plotinus the One cannot even be said to exist, transcending as it does all
being. Properly being is equivalent to nous in the Plotinian system. Plotinus argues that
if the One were to exist, then it would be permissible to say"the One is," but this would
already allow some sort of duality to exist at the level of the purely One. 5:! He says
explicitly at one point that "being itself is multiple in itself' (auto to einai en hallto polu
esti: Enn V.3.13), and is fond of using the phrase from Republic, "beyond being"
(epekeina ousias), to refer to the One (e.g. at V.6.6). Now, of course things are rarely this
simple with Plotinus, and we will see that there are indications, especially in the
remarkable treatise Enn VI.8, that Plotinus accepts some form of existence, actuality. or

51

As Taylor (1998), 219, points out, this is essentially the view of God found in Aristotle.

194

being for the One. Nevertheless. the Adaptor adds many references to the

Fi~~

as

alllliyya. even though he is clearly aware that Plotinus holds being to be associated

primarily with intellect. That he is aware of this is clear from more faithful paraphrases
like the following:
Th.A VID.122-124 [B 111-112]: Each one of the things which are in [the
intellectual] world are intellect and being (anniyya). and the whole (a/-kul) of
them is also intellect and being. The intellect and being there do not separate. and
this is because the intellect is only intellect ("aql) because it thinks (va "qilu) being.
and being is only being because it is thought by the intellecL. The intellect and
being (al-anniyya) were originated (ubdi"an) together; for this reason one of these
two does not separate from the other. However, even though the intellect and
being are two, they are intelJect and being together. and are thinking and thought
together.
Enn V.1.4: Each of them is intellect and being (on). and the whole is universal
intelJect and universal being (pan on), the intellect making being exist through
thinking (kata to /loebt hllpizistas to on). and being giving thinking and being (to
einai) to intellect by being thought... For they are together and exist together
(sll1luparclrei) and do not leave one another, but this one is two beings. at once
intellect and being, thinking and thought. intellect as (kata) thinking, and being as
thought.
There are other passages that are even more straightforward in denying being to the First.
At one point (Th.A V ill. 135 [B 113]), the Adaptor refers to the intellect. not the First, as
"the first being (al-anniyya al-iilii)." and at another he accepts one of Plotinus' rejections

of being in the One:

Th.A X.2 [B 134]: Because it is pure One, all things flow forth from it. and this is
because, even though it has no being (huwiyya), being (huwiyya) flows forth from
it. 53

5:!

See Enn V.3.l3.

53 This is the most explicit denial of being [0 the First in AP. and one might well wonder whether
the Adaptor chose the term Illlw;yya here because he did not want to deny the term allll;yya to God. so that
perhaps he is making some distinction between the two. [think this is tempting. but should be rejected
since he actually prefers to translate 011 with hllw;yya generally. Also. he elsewhere calls God hllU'(rya
faqa[. with no reason to do this in the parallel Greek text (OS 100 (8 174]).

195

Enn V.2.1: It is because nothing is in [the One] that all is from it, and it order for
being (to on) to be, this is not being (ollk on), but its generator.
Note that even though the Adaptor is willing to follow Plotinus here, he does not follow
him completely. For, rather than rendering the text accurately and saying that God is not
being (touto autos ollk on). he says that God has no being (lam takun Ii-hi huwiyya).
Here one might speculate that the Adaptor is trying to hold on to the idea that God is
being. though he is prepared to admit that God does not have being, perhaps thinking that
this would imply that God has being as something external attributed to him. This will
become more plausible in consideration of the analysis to be given below.
Let us proceed to examine passages that refer to God as anniyya, and go beyond
the simple assertion that God is the First Being." Another favorite phrase of the
Adaptor's using alllliyya to describe God is to say that He is or acts through anniyya

faqar, "only being," or "being alone." The same phrase appears using both ann (Th.A
V.14 [B 67]) and hlll,v;y)'a (DS 100 [B 174]). A useful passage that may help us in

understanding this concept is the following one, which has no Greek parallel:
OS 99 [B 174]: Then the intellect is multiple, as opposed to ('inda) the high thing
which is only itself (al-ladhi huuJajaqa[).
Here. the Adaptor says that God is nothing other than what He is. This, [ would argue, is
principally what he intends by saying that God is "being alone": that God has no
additional or multiple features in addition to the fact that He is. This introduces the
dominant theme associated with the phrase "being alone" in AP: that God has no
attributes. We saw some passages to this effect above in section 5.1. Let us consider
another in greater detail:

196

as 1.10-11 [B

185]: He said that the intellect became all things, because its
originator is not like anything. The First Originator does not resemble anything,
because all things are from Him, and because He has no shape <l1.ilya) and no
particularly inherent fonn ~17ra khii~a liizama). And this is because the First
Originator is one alone (wii!J.id wa!J.idah), I mean that He is only being (anniyya
faqa!), having no attribute ~ifa) suitable to Him, because all attributes are
scattered forth from Him. For this reason all things are in Him, and He is not in
anything, except in the the way of a cause (hi-now'ill 'il/arin).
Enn V.I.7: [The intellect] sees from itself (hauto ekeithen}... that life and thought
and all things [are from the One], because that is not all things. For in this way all
things are from that, because that is not confined by any shape (morphe). For that
is one alone (monon gar hen ekeino)... Therefore that is none of the things in the
intellect, but all things are from it.
This passage displays many of the elements of the Adaptor's theory of attributes we saw
above: the One has none of the attributes, because as their cause He is above them. Yet,
He does have them "in the way of a cause," and so they can be said truly of him in a
different way. The phrase anniyyajaqa! is brought in to emphasize that the First has no
attributes that belong properly to lower things. He simply exists, and so enters into no
predicative relations.
Similarly, the Adaptor frequently says that the One causes through being alone,
and that this means that He does not need any attribute besides existence to create or
emanate the world:
Th.A X.88 [B 147]: The First Creator originated the higher world by being alone
(bi-allni)~\'ajaqa!J,not by any other attribute other than being.
This is contrasted to the way that the intellect causes, for, as we saw, the intellect is
"complete" in the sense of possessing all attributes:
Th.A X.175 [B 160]: ...their Originator is one and simple, originating the simple
things all at once, through being alone (bi-annihi jaqa[), not in any other of the
ways of the intellect.

197

This theme is extended to other observations about divine causality. For example. the
Adaptor often says that. because God creates through being alone, He does not have to
think or reflect in order to create. Further, God does not need to will creation, because
will strictly conceived is an additional aspect of something beyond its being. For
example, in a passage with no Greek parallel the Adaptor says:
DS 105-107 [8 174]: We say that between the intellect and its act is the will (aliriidah). This is because it wills, then acts, because it does not act through its
being (bi-aniyyatihi) but acts by the fact that it is mind (bi-annahll 'aq). and the
intellect is knowing, and the knowing is willing. This is because it wills (or:
wants) something and then desires knowledge of it. If the intellect is according to
this description. then there is no doubt that it is many, not one. Therefore it is not
the First Agent. and this is because the act of the First Agent is not preceded by
will, because it only acts through being alone (bi-annihi faqat).
Here the point made by the Adaptor is not only that will belongs properly to things below
the First, but also that if God willed He would be many. A similar point is made in
reference to thinking and reflection: that if there were any reflection in Him, He would be
reflecting about something external to Him. and therefore He would not be purely alone
as the First Principle (see Th.A 111.49 [8 51-52]). In later sections of this chapter we will
look further at both of these themes. divine thought and divine will. For now it suffices
to note the Adaptor's view that God is "only being" underscores the fact that, if He were
more than being, He would not be the First. He presents two arguments for this: first, that
He would be made comparable to His own effects by sharing univocal attributes with
them. Second, that a plurality of attributes in Him would make Him multiple, instead of
purely one. Thus the language of anniyyafaqa[ is in part an expansion on the theme of
negative theology we examined above. In 5.2.4 below. I will return to this issue in order
to discuss the relevance of the theory of attributes and anniyya jaqa[ for determining the

198

Adaptor's sources and philosophical motives. Before we tum to this, however, [would
like to look in the next section at a further aspect of the theory of God as being in AP: the
idea that God is pure act, and communicates being to His effects.

5.2.3 God as pure actuality and Cause of being

Thus far we have seen that the Adaptor regards God as "only being" to emphasize His
simplicity and lack of attributes. But this does not provide a real answer to the pressing
question asked above: given that Plotinus emphasizes the One's transcendence above
being. why should the Adaptor say that the First even exists? To answer this question
more fully, let us tum to a revealing passage in the third mlmar:
Th.A m.47-49 [B 51-52]: As for the Creator, the exalted One, He originates the
beings (anniyiit) and forms of things, yet He originates some of the forms without
an intermediary, and some of them through an intermediary. He only originates
the beings and forms of things because He is the thing existing truly in act, rather
He is pure act (hllwa ai-shay' al-kii 'in bi-al-fl1 !laqqan, bal hllwa al-ft[ al-nlah{/).
When He acts, He only gazes at Himself, and thus performs His act all at once.
But as for the intellect, even though it is what it is in act, since there is something
else above it, the power of that thing attains it, and because of this [the intellect]
desires to be similar to the First Agent, which is pure act. When it wishes to act, it
only gazes at what is above it, and thus performs its act in the extreme of purity.
Likewise, even though the soul is what it is in act, because the intellect comes to
be above it, something of [the intelIect's] power attains [the soul]. When [the
soul] acts, it only gazes at the intellect, and thus does what it does. But as for the
First Agent - and He is pure act - He performs His act gazing upon Himself,
not on something external to Him, because there is nothing else external to Him
which is higher or better (adnii) than Him.
While this long passage has no direct paralIel, it seems to be a sort of commentary on, or
at least a digression inspired by, the following bit of Greek text: "The better, having a
different nature than body and always being in act (energeia), is first; thus intelIect and
soul are before nature" (Enn IV. 7.8 3 ). Here, the Adaptor has apparently extended this

199

general principle, that the better is always in act, to the level of the First. 54 Reasoning
that the First is the best, with nothing above it, he concludes that the First is therefore the
most actual, or pure act." Particularly striking is the image of God gazing upon Himself,
which echoes the notion of God acting through Himself or through being alone. There
seems. then, to be a readily available premise for the Adaptor's train of thought in the
Greek. But this of course is a far cry from satisfactorily explaining why he would apply
to God Plotinus' idea that nOlls is superior, and therefore more actual. In what follows I
will provide two further explanations for this departure from Plotinus.
(a) The first is that this passage (and in general the doctrine of God as being) can be seen
in part as an application of predication by way of causality. The Adaptor says several
times in his paraphrase that God's proper effect is being. Below, in 5.3.1, we will discuss
D' Ancona Costa's observation that AP holds to a doctrine of creation mediante
intelligentia." The doctrine is that God creates being, and this created being is then

delimited by form through the act of intellect. This is similar to a doctrine found in the
Liber de Causis, which asserts that the first effect of the Highest Cause is Being (anniyya:
Prop.4). While O' Ancona Costa's interpretation of AP is based mostly on one key
passage (Th.A X.9), there are several passages that affinn the more general principle that
the First is a cause of being. For example:
Th.A V.29 [B 69-70]: I do not say that the form of the intellect is the cause of its
own being (anniyyatihi), but I do say that when you unroll the fonn of the
intellect. and you want to examine what it is (rna hiya), you find in that very same
examination why it is (lima Iziya) as well.
5.1 This passage can be interestingly contrasted to that in mfmar VIII which argues for a potency
higher than act. as studied above. 4.1.2. It is another piece of evidence for the position I took there, namely
that ( I ) the quwa ascribed to God can be read as "power" in addition to "potency," and (2) the Adaptor may
be willing (0 describe God as in potency according to the "'ia llegari'l'a. and as actual according the ,'ia
callsaliwtis. This will be borne out by the argument developed in this section.

200

Enn VI.7.2: But I do not say that the form of each thing is the cause of its being
(einai) -- though this is true - but that, if you unfold each form itself on itself, you

will find in it the why (dia

ti).

A striking feature of this passage is that the Adaptor omitted to translate the phrase tOlltO
men gar alethes ("though this is true"), with the result that he denies, rather than affirms,
the statement that the intellect is in some sense the cause of its own being. This task he
reserves for the First Cause itself:
Th.A Vill.130 [B 112]: If anyone asks: who brought the intellect to be in this state
and who ennobled it thus? We say: He who originated it, and He is the True.
Pure, Simple One, surrounding the totality of simple composed things, and who is
before every multiple thing, and is the cause of the being (anniyya) of the thing
and its multiplicity, and is the Maker of number.
Enn V.1.5: Who, then, generated this [i.e. the god above soul]? The simple, and
the [one] before such multiplicity, the cause of both the being (einai) and the
multiple being (po/lin einai) of this, the maker of number.
As we can see from the parallel Greek text here, it is no departure from Plotinus to say
that the One is the cause of being. Indeed, if anything this is more straightforwardly true
for Plotinus than for the Adaptor, since Plotinus associates being primarily with intellect,
the effect of the One, rather than with the One itself.
But what is important here is that, if God is properly the cause of being, then this
gi ves the Adaptor license to ascribe being to God, in accordance with predication by way
of causality. This comes out in passages like the following:
Th.A 1.47 [B 26]: When [Plato] finished this distinction [between true beings (a/anniyyat al-!laqqiyya), and sensible things], he began, saying that the cause of the
true beings, which have no bodies, and the sensible things possessing bodies, is
one, and it is the First Being (al-anniyya a/-ilia), and by this he meant the Creator
(al-bari '), the Maker (a/-khaliq), exalted be His name.
Th.A Vll.21 [B 87]: ...the intellectual things are true beings, because they are
originated from the First Being without an intermediary...

201

GS 1.7 [B 184]: The things only streamed forth from Him and came to possess
being (anniyiit) from the excess of the power and intensity of His being
(anniyatihi).
DS 144 [B 177]: The One is the cause of the multiplicity of things, and the
existence (wujiid) of the One is in them as a whole, and in each one of them...
This last passage, also quoted above, is particularly noteworthy because the parallel
Greek passage discusses the fact that things get being by participation, but in intellect, not
in the First. Similar passages talk about intellect becoming a light or substance because
of the fact that they were caused by the First Light (GS 1.17) or the First Substance (Th.A
X.l68). But, as suggested by the fact that he frequently refers to God as the First Being
or "being alone:' the Adaptor seems to conceive of "being" as the most adequate term to
apply to God. (The other titles for God favored in AP are relational: Cause of causes:'
"Creator:' "Originator," and so on.) The passages we have just looked at account for this
preference on the Adaptor's part for "being" as the central trait of God. For, if being is
the chief effect of God, and we speak of God most perspicuously by transferring His
effects to him through predication by way of causality, then God will be grasped most
adequately by speaking of Him as being. The close association of being and actuality. of
course, means that the same line of thought applies to the passage we examined above,
Th.A III.45-49. and the Adaptor's willingness there to call God "pure actuality."
(b) A second, perhaps more speculative, explanation for this passage in mfmar ill can be
found by turning to a work that the Adaptor almost certainly knew: Aristotle's
Metaphvsics. There are references to this text in the Prologue to Th.A, and would have
had access to the translation of Us!ath if he was a member of ai-KindT's circle. Since we
have already seen a close relationship between AP and other texts from this circle of

202

translators (e.g. the Arabic paraphrase of the De Anima: see below, 3.1.3), the possibility
of influence from that version of the Metaphysics seems at least plausible.
Now, in book Lambda of the Metaphysics, Aristotle argues that if there is not
something that is without potentiality, then there can be no explanation for eternal
motion. For only a cause that is purely actual can guarantee actualization for the motion
of the heavens at all times. 55 On this basis. he reaches the conclusion which (in Us!ath's
Arabic translation) reads: ""therefore, such a principle as this must be a substance which is
act (jawhar huwaji'l):56 If the Adaptor knew this text. then he would have had a good
reason to hold that the First is "pure act," as he says in mfmar m. Note also that, in that
passage. the Adaptor says that the First acts '-gazing upon Himself, not on something
external to Him," while the intellect gazes at the First. Of course. the latter idea, that
IlOllS

is what it is by gazing upon the One. is purely Plotinian. And the idea that the One

thinks Himself also appears in one exceptional passage:

Enn V.4.2: But how does this intellect come from the intelligible? The
intelligible remains by itself and is not deficient, as the seeing and intellecting -- [
call the thinking deficient in comparison to that [i.e. the One] -- but [the
intelligible, i.e. the One] is not like what is senseless. but rather all things belong
to it and are in it and together with it, it discerns (diakritikon) itself completely,
lives in itself and [has] all things in itself, and its consideration (karanoesis) of
itself is itself. being by a sort of awareness (llOionei sunaisthesei ollsa) in eternal
rest. and in an intellection different from that of the noetic.

55 [ take this argument to rest on the principle of plenitude, that is. the assumption that all real
possibilities are realized in time. Aristotle argues that, if the cause of motion were to any extent in potency.
it might not be actual at some time so as to cause the motions of the heavens. But, by the principle of
plenitude, if this cause might not exist or be actual at some time, then at some time it will fail to be actual.
and then the heavenly motion will not be eternal.
56 This Arabic translation can be found in Bouyges' edition of Ibn Rushd's commentary on the
Metaphvsics, Avermes. Tafsir rna ba'd at=tabrat. ed. Maurice Bouyges (Beyrouth: Dar el-Machreq. 1973).
The passage is at textus 30, page 1563 line 2.

203

So there is some basis in Plotinus for the doctrines espoused in the passage on "pure

act'~

in mlmar III. Yet the Aristotelian overtones of the way the doctrines are presented there
are striking. First, there is the statement that God acts by gazing upon Himself. This is
paralleled by Aristotle's view that the first mover is thought thinking itself, and imparts
motion by thinking itself. 57 Second, there is the point that the First "performs His act
gazing upon Himself... because there is nothing else external to Him which is higher or
better than Him" (Th.A lli.50).

Again~

in Aristotle we find the statement that "the

intelligence ifahm) which is in itself is of that which is most excellent in itself, and the
greatest [intelligence] is of that which is greatest: 58 Elsewhere, the Adaptor mentions
that. when the First acts, he does not act through motion <GS 1.28), perhaps thinking of
Aristotle's unmoved mover. These parallels add further credence to the possibility that
the Adaptor had Aristotle' s Metaphysics in mind when he described the First as pure act.
It should be noted that these two reasons for calling God pure act are not
necessarily in tension with one another. While it would be exclusively Platonic to speak
of created things having their being through a participation in God as pure being or act,
the Adaptor does not usually speak this way. Rather, as we saw above, he holds simply
that God is the cause of their being or act, and thus must have being or act Himself in the
way of a cause. This predication by way of causality is in harmony with Aristotelianism,
since Aristotle also holds that the cause transfers its actuality to its effect. Of course, this
is not to say that access to Aristotle was necessarily the only determining factor in the
Adaptor's doctrines; further such factors will be explored in the next section. It is only to

57

See Bouyges (1973). textus 39.

S!l

Bouyges (1973), textus 39, page 1613 line 7 to 1614 line I.

204

point out

that~

whatever other sources the Adaptor drew upon, he may still have

conceived of himself as a good Aristotelian.

5.2.4 The background of the doctrine of attributes and God as anniyyafaqa! in AP

Having now examined two of the most important aspects of the Adaptor's theology, we
are now in a better position to make conjectures about the philosophical sources that
influenced that theology.

First~

let us summarize the key doctrines presented thus far in

sections 5.1 and 5.2.

(a) God can be said to have no attributes. There are two arguments for this. First, if God
had attributes He would be multiple. Second, if God had attributes He would be similar
to His effects.
(b) Yet. we must speak of the First, and when we do so we should apply only the "'most
excellent of names:'
(c) We car:; allow such discourse on the basis of predication by causality: transferring the
attributes of God's effects to Him. According to such predications God is both similar to
His effects, as containing them "'in the way of a cause," and dissimilar to them as "above"
(jaH'qa) them. We saw a detailed application of this method in the case of the attribute

"complete" (tamm).
(d) God is "only being:' By this the Adaptor means several things. First, that God is the
highest among beings -- striking here is the affirmation, contra Plotinus, that God is not
utterly beyond being. Second, that God has no attributes which would cause Him to be
multiple or like His effects: He acts only 'through Himself" or "through being alone," not
through any attribute. Third, that God is pure act, and that His effects get their being or

205

actuality from Him: thus God is called act or being through a predication along the Jines
described in point (c).
Now, three principle suggestions have been made in order to explain the presence
of these doctrines in AP. Here I will assess the usefulness of these suggestions. and add a
fourth of my own. The first suggestion. made by Richard Taylor. is that the Adaptor read
Enn VI.8 and was importing ideas he found there into the rest of the Enneads.
Unfortunately we do not know whether the Adaptor read VI.8, but given that both Enn
VI.7 and VI.9 appear in the paraphrase. it seems likely.59 Now, in VI.8, Plotinus indulges
in kataphatic theology that goes well beyond what he is normally prepared to accept.
First of all, Plotinus allows that., though we cannot properly speak of the One. if we do we
can only speak of Him by "transposing (metatherontes) the lesser from the lesser things to
if' (Enn VI.8.8). This, as we have seen, is also the Adaptor's strategy. though without the
more specific argument that this is possible because of the causal relationship between
God and creation. Second, Plotinus allows that in such discourse, the One can be called
"being": "then being (to e;nal), in the way we say that to be (hos legomen ekeino einai),
[is known] from those after it" (Enn VI.8.11). He also associates existence at the level of
the One with actuality. ellergeia: "its, so to speak. existence, is. so to speak, actuality (he

11Oioll Izupostasis autOll he hoion energeia)" (Enn VI.8.7). Similarly, he says that, if we
say there is actuality at the level of the One, "actuality and [the One] itself are not
different (me heteroll ellergeia ka; autos)" (Enn VI.8.12). Such passages may stand
behind the Adaptor's view that the One is "only being" and "'pure act:' Finally. we saw
above that a characteristic locution in AP is to call the First "'Cause of cause." "Light of

59

Taylor (1998).236. makes the same point.

206

lights:~

and so on. This is paralleled in VI.8 as well, since Plotinus at one point caJls the

One the "cause of a cause (aition tOll airioll)" (Enn VI.8.18, line 38).
These parallels do not explain all aspects of the Adaptor's handling of theological
discourse; most glaring, perhaps. is the lack of statements in VI.8 to the effect that the
One has attributes of "'Iesser" things "in the way of a cause." Yet they do go a long way
towards suggesting a possible source for the Adaptor, especially since it is so likely that
the Adaptor would have read this treatise. I do not think. however. that parallels with
VI.8 can serve as a sufficient explanation for the doctrines we have studied above. This
is for two reasons. First, even in VI.8 Plotinus is extraordinarily careful to qualify his
statements about the One. There has been much debate about the use of the term IlOion
r"as it were:' or "so to speak") in this treatise, which is used liberally to modify such
statements. At one
terms ""life:'

point~

Plotinus uses hoion four times in one

"substance:~ and "generates'~ (Enn

sentence~ to

modify the

VI.8.7). At another. he asserts explicitly

that each thing said about the Good is to be understood as modified by to Izoiol! (Enn
VI.8.13. line 50). Many passages in VI.8 talk about the need to be silent with regard to
the One. or the fact that when speaking of Him we depart from "correcf' speech for the
sake of persuasion (Enn VI.8. 13). The question, then, is why the Adaptor ignored these
qualifications when he transferred the doctrines of VI.8 to the rest of the Enneads. He
never uses any expression that might be the equivalent of hoion (such as the roughly
equivalent prefix ka). A second problem with this thesis is that. even supposing the
Adaptor to have had a purely kataphatic reading of VI.8 (so that he ignored the
aforementioned qualifications). we would still need to explain his motivation in applying
the unusual doctrines of VI.8 to the rest of the Enneads. Even if the Adaptor found

207

useful conceptual tools in VI.8, he is likely to have been motivated by concerns beyond
simple exegesis when we find him adding doctrines that are foreign to or even in tension
with the specific Greek texts that are paraphrased in AP.
A second possible source for the Adaptor, suggested in many places by Cristina
D' Ancona Costa, are the works of the Pseudo-Dionysius. She has made a strong case for
the possibility of such an influence, and there is no need to rehearse her arguments at
length here. In further support of her claim, however, we may add that (as mentioned
above) the consistent use ofjau:qa to modify traits of God may parallel the Dionysian use
of huper for the same purpose. Like Dionysius, the Adaptor uses this strategy to suggest
that the First has the traits of His effects, but in a higher and therefore different way.
Also, the use of the aforementioned phrase "in the way of a cause" to describe the way
that the First has His attributes parallels Dionysius much better than Plotinus. 6o Against
the Dionysian hypothesis, we may note with Taylor that the identification of the First as
"pure act" finds little support in the Dionysian cOrpUS. 61 And of course, the above point
against Plotinus holds true for Dionysius as well: it is not enough to say that the Adaptor
could have gotten these ideas from Dionysius. We must show a sufficient motive for him
to suffuse his Plotinian text with these more kataphatic ideas.
A third source suggested for the doctrines on pure being in AP is Porphyry.62 In
chapter 4, I argued against the Porphyrian hypothesis with regard to the notion of docta

60 Sec O'Ancona Costa's discussion of the phrase kat' aitiall in "La doctrine Neoplatonicienne de
("etre entre r Antiquite tardive et Ie Moyen Age. Le Liber de Callsis par rapport it ses sources:' in
D'Ancona Costa (1995). 150-15 I.

61 Unpublished footnote in the original version of Taylor ( 1998). lowe a debt of thanks to
Professor Taylor for making this version of the paper available to me.

6:!

See Pines (1954),309-310.

208

ignorantia, and [ think a similar approach must be taken here. Still, the hypothesis has an

initial plausibility with respect to the theme of God and being. In the fragment from his
Parmenides Commentary, we find Porphyry referring to the One as to einai monon (IV.8),
which could be a direct source for the phrase anniyyafaqa[ in AP. Later fragments
present a more complex discussion of the relationship between the One and being. In
fragments XI-XU, Porphyry makes a distinction between the "'first One" and the hsecond
One" in trying to understand the different descriptions of to hen given in the first two
hypotheses of Plato's Parmenides. He says that there is a second One which comes from
the First, and this is a participant in its substance, and has only a "derived being"
(ekklinomenol1 to einai: XI1.28). Porphyry expresses this difference by making a

distinction between the first One as to einai ("to be''), and the second One or "OneBeing" as 0l1t05 C'being"):
Parm. Commentary XD.23: "because the One which is beyond substance and
being (epekeilla ousias kai ontos) is not being, nor substance, nor act (Oil . ouk
estill oude ousia oude ellergeia), but rather it acts and is itself pure "to act"
(eJlergein katharOlz), such that it is "to be" itself prior to being (auto to einai to
pro tOll ontos).
Here we have also the idea of God as pure act, as found in mimar ill of Th.A. We can
add yet another reason for thinking that the Adaptor may be expressing a Porphyrian
viewpoint: the fragments assert that "what is after something and what is before it are in
some sense (tropon tina) the same" (XI.34-35), which might be taken to suggest that the
cause of something will share its characteristics.

209

Now, against the Porphyrian hypothesis, D' Ancona Costa has pointed out that the
crucial distinction between to einai and ontos does not find its way into AP.63 Richard
Taylor has countered, reasonably enough, that this absence can be ascribed to the fact that
there is no way to make this grammatical distinction in Arabic.64 But given our study of
the relevant terminology above (5.2. I), a rejoinder suggests itself: while it is true that
there is no way to render the to einai / Olltos distinction into Arabic, the Adaptor does
distinguish to some extent between to on and to einai by translating the fonner (usually)
as Izllwiyya, and the latter (usually) as anniyya. Yet the fact that he does not do this
consistently suggests that the Adaptor did not have in mind any technical distinction
between the two tenns, such as comes out so strongly in the Parmenides Commentary.65
Further, there is no doctrine whatsoever of a second One or One-Being in AP. whereas
this would seem to be the most characteristic feature of the Porphyrian fragments we have
just examined. Again. as in the case of Dionysius. I think it would be unreasonable to
rule out the possibility that Porphyrian influence finds its way directly or indirectly into
AP. Yet the characteristic doctrines of AP are very different from those of Porphyry. and
the overlaps between the two can be explained by referring to other sources (as. for
example. [ explained the doctrine of the First as "pure act" by referring to Aristotle). 66

b_' O'Ancona Costa. in "La doctrine Neoplatonicienne de I"etre entre rAntiquite tardive et Ie
Moyen Age. Le Liber de Callsis par rapport a ses sources:' in D' Ancona Costa (1995). 147.
6-l As we had occasion to observe above. Taylor makes this point in a footnOle in the original
version of Taylor (1998).
b5

See above. fn.53.

66 To this we can add the point that the doctrines found in Porphyry can themselves be explained as
extentions of doctrines found in Plotinus. especially Enn VI.8. See Kevin Corrigan. "Amelius. Plotinus and
Porphyry on Being. intellect and the One. A Reappraisal." Aufstieg und Niedereang cler r6mischen Welt.
Teil II: Principiat. Bd.36. 2. Teilband (1987).975-993.

210

This brings us to my own, fourth suggestion for establishing the background of

the ideas sketched in this chapter so far. This suggestion is intended not only to identify
possible sources used by the Adaptor, but also to explain his motives in pursuing the
ontological and kataphatic doctrine of predication found in AP. I would suggest that this
can best be explained by referring to the Ka/am tradition that would have been known to
anyone working in the intellectual climate of 9th century Baghdad.67 Here I am
expanding on a suggestion made by Cristina D'Ancona Costa, that the Adaptor was
concerned with the problem of the divine attributes, or ~iftit Alliih, and that in AP "'la
doctrine de Plotin... a ete integree dans un contexte theologique preexistant.',68 Several
things indicate that the Adaptor's discussion of divine predication was written in such a
context. First, we have the use of the word ~ifa itself. This term, meaning "attribute,"
was a piece of grammatical terminology until it came to be applied to the question of the
divine attributes, and this application is found in the writings of the mutakallimiin. 69 Not
only does the Adaptor use the word ~ifa to translate more neutral Greek terms,70 but he
also repeatedly makes reference to "attributes' when there is no parallel language in the
Enneads at all. We have seen many examples of this in the passages cited in this chapter
thus far. 7I This leads the Adaptor to rewrite many passages in Plotinus which do not
specifically deal with naming the One so that they focus on the problem of divine
67 [ am assuming throughout this section that AP was in fact composed in the context of al-Kindls
circle. AI-KindT himselflived in the first half of the 9th century. and the output of the translation circle
would have started under the rule of the caliph al-Ma'mun (813-833).
6S "La doctrine Neoplatonicienne de r etre entre I' Antiquite tardive et Ie Moyen Age. Le Liber de
Callsis par rapport it ses sources:' in D'Ancona Costa (1995). 147, and "'Cause prime non est yliathim:
Liber de Causis, prop_ 8[9]: Ie fonti e la dottrina:' in D'Ancona Costa (1995), 112.

69

See article on ~ifa in Ell. voJ.(X, 551.

70

For example at DS 137. where ~ifa seems to stand in for Plotinus' "logos."

2ff

attributes. Finally, as noted above (5.1.2), there is a reference at Enn V.3.13 to aldol 01-

asmii " the ""most excellent names" of God. This seems to echo the Qur'anic injunction to
call God by His "most beautiful names (al-asmli ' al-!!lIsnli)."

72

Now. we kno"v that al-Kindrs sympathies, within Islamic theology or Ka/lim, lay
with the mu "tazilites. 73 If the Adaptor is signaling his entry into the debate over the
divine attributes with his use of the term ~ijal, we might expect that he also would side
with the mu"tazilites. The mu'tazilites represent one side of a controversy which raged
within Kallim beginning, perhaps, in the 8th century but coming to prominence in the 9th
century with the rise of the mu'tazilite schools in

B~ra

and Baghdad. The common

position held by members of both schools is that the ~ijQt or attributes are not real entities
in God. Indeed this is said by BaghdadI and Shahrastani" to be one of the defining
characteristics of mu 'tazilism. 74 This means that there is a background in the Ka/lim
immediately prior to the writing of AP for position (a) noted above: that God has no
attributes. As noted above, the Adaptor provides two arguments for this. First, if God
had attributes, he would be multiple, and second, if God had attributes he would be like
created things. The first argument is frequently associated with the mu'tazilite position,
so that ShahrasUinI for instance says that they denied attributes 'because if the attributes

71

For example: Th.A IV.45-6. V.36-40. VIII.21. OS 133-7. 207-8.224-8.

7"!-

7: 180. 17: I 10.20:8.

73 Sec George N. Atiyeh. AI-Kindi: the Philosopher aCme Arabs (Islamabad: Islamic Research
Institute. (967).4. and Richard Walzer. "New Studies on al-Kindf' in Greek into Arabic (Oxford: Bruno
Cassirer. 1962). 175-205. Alfred Ivry has argued in the introduction to his translation orOn First
Philosophv (AI-Kindi's Metaphysics (Albany: SUNY Press. 1974) 22-34) that al-Kindiactually regarded
the mu'tazilites as inrellectual rivals. but he does not deny substantial sympathy for their views on alKindls part. A similar position is taken up by Hillary Wiesener in The Cosmology of al-Kindi (Ph.D.
thesis. Harvard University. 1993).

212

shared in the eternity of God, which is His special characteristic, they would also share in
His Godhead: 75 More specifically, the founding father of mutazilism, W~i1 b. "A!a'
(699-748), is said to have argued that "to assert the existence of an eternal entity or an
eternal attribute [in God] would be to say that there were two Gods: 76 The second
argument appears among the mu"tazilites as well. For example. 100m b. ~afwan is
quoted as follows: '"I will not say that God is a thing., for this is likening Him to things... I
shall not describe Him by a description which may be applied to others. such as existent
thing. living, knowing, willing. and others like them."n Such a view is based on the
Qur'an's assertion that God has no like. 78
Despite these arguments. there was not always a radical denial of divine attributes
on the part of the mu'tazilites (indeed. reports alleging this radical position are
suspicious. since they are typically found in heresiographies by ash "arites and other
opponents of mu "tazilism). Thus point (b) above, that we must somehow attribute the
most excellent names to God. is also paralleled in early mu 'tazilite views. Some of these
mutakallimun held that the attributes were to be understood negatively. using an
interpretation like that later found in Maimonides. This was typical. for instance, of
Najjar. Dirar and

Haf~ aJ-Fard.

all of whom were active at the end of the 8th or the first

7.: See BaghdadI, al-Farg bavn al-Firag, translated as Moslem Schisms and Sects, tr. Kate
Chambers Seelye (New York: AMS Press, 1966). 116: Shahrastanl. Kitab al-Milal wa 'I-NihaJ. translated as
Muslim Sects and Divisions, tr. A.K. Kazi and J.G. Rynn (London: Kegan Paul, (984),41.
7S

Shahrastanr (1984).42. Seelye translation. See also anicle on ~ifa in Ef!, vol.IX, 552

7b

Shahrastani ( 1984). 43. See!ye translation.

77 These reports are in the Kitab MagaHit al-fsHimivin wa-IkhliHif aJ-Musallin of al-Ash'arl. cited in
H.A. Wolfson. The Philosophy of 'he Kalam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1976),220-221.
78

42 :9 .

213

half of the 9th century.79 The doctrines found in AP do not seem to be aligned with this
wing of the mutaziIites. Rather, they are similar to the thought of a writer like Abu

~I-

Hudhayl al-" Allaf (742-840)~ an important figure in the history of fiU 'tazilism, who
among other things first developed the notion of accidents which inhere in substances, or
atoms. SO Abu 'I-Hudhayl is said to have summarized his own view as follows: '"[God] is
knowing in an act of knowing that is He and is powerful in a power of efficient causality
that is He and is living in a life that is He... When I say 'God is knowing,' I affirm that He
has an act of knowing that is God and deny that there is ignorance in God:,81 Though
Abu 'l-Hudhayl does recognize a negative interpretation of the attributes (so that
"knowing" connotes a lack of ignorance), he also has a positive interpretation which is of
more interest to us here.
On this interpretation, God's positive attributes are identical to God Himself. Or,
as Abu 'I-Hudhayl is reported to have held in ShahrastanI, '''God is

"knowing~

with

knowledge and His knowledge is His essence," which is to say that we must affirm "the
reality of an... attribute which is itself identical with the essence:,82 Ash'art reports that
for Abu 'I-HudhayL God has the attributes "essentially (/i-dhiitihi: lit. "by His
essence,).',83 This corresponds to similar language in other early mU'tazilites, who said
that God has His attributes as or through His essence. Thus Najjar and Dirar expanded on

79 See Shahrastiini(1984), 76. Wolfson (1976).223-224. For dates of all the mu'tazilites
mentioned in Ihis section and a brief overview of their careers, see Fuat Sezgin. Geschichte des arabischen
Schriftums voL I. 613-627.

so See article in EI 2, vol.l, page 128.

81 From a passage in Ash'arls MagaHit. cited in Richard M. Frank, "The Divine Attributes
According to the Teaching of Abu 'I-Hudhayl al-'AUaf.' Le Museon 82 (1969).453.

Sl

Shahrastanf. 46. See Frank. (1969), 461 and 469.

83

See Wolfson (1976). 225.

214

their negative view of the attributes by adding that God possesses the attributes "by
Himself (li-Ilafsihi)," and Ibn KuIHib held that

'~he

attributes of God are essential to Him

(!i-dhiilihi):'~ Now, we saw above in point (d) that the Adaptor holds a similar view of

di vine attributes, according to which they cannot be said to be distinct from each other or
from the First Himself. Sometimes in AP, this point is expressed in identical language to
that we have just seen in the writers of the Kaliim:
GS LI9 [B 186]: As for the light which illuminates the intellect, it is not in any
other thing, but rather is one light, abiding fixed through its essence (bi-dhiitihi),
illuminating the totality of things.
Th.A 1V.45 [B 62]: "The First Light is not light in anything, but is light alone
abiding through its essence (bi-dhiitihi). Therefore this light comes to illuminate
the soul by the intennediary of the intellect, through no attributes (bi-ghayr ~iflit),
like the attributes of fire, and none of the active things.
The contrast between God's acting through attributes and acting through Himself or His
essence (bi-dhiitihi could be translated either way) is of course closely tied to the idea of
God as "only being:' amziyyajaqa[. For the point of this latter phrase, as we saw above.
is to assert that God has no composition through attributes: He is Himself alone. only His
being without any modifications or differentiations in that being. The same point is being
made by Abu 'I-Hudhayl and other mutakallimiin. and in similar language. Hence R.M.
Frank remarks that for Abu 'I-Hudhayl, "the attribute is precisely God Himself in the
perfection which is His being. ,,85
It might be thought that the Adaptor is taking a more reductive view of the

attributes than these other authors. As we have seen, he usually associates God as

an/liyya jaqa[ with the simple rejection of attributes, whereas Abu 'l-Hudhayl and others

II.:

Wolfson (1976), 223 and 208_

215

held that a given attribute is just identical to God's being. But recall that there is a
positive moment in the Adaptor's theory of predication, and therefore that the statement
that God is "only being" does not exclude the attributes in every sense. Thus in AP we
find:
DS 154-5 [B 177]: We say that the First Cause is the life of lives. the intellect of
intellects, and the good of goods, and that these things are being (al-anniyya), not
other than being (ghayr al-anlliyya). Therefore this being (hadhihi anniyya)
comes to be every life and every intellect, and there is nothing outside of it: no life
or mind.
Here is a clear affirmation of the equivalence of the attributes to God's being. This
parallel, along with the others we have drawn between AP and the mutakallimiin, show
that the Adaptor was very much concerned to deal with the problem of divine attributes
when he was writing his paraphrase. At the very least. the vocabulary he uses when
dealing with this problem and the rough outlines of his solution to it are in close harmony
to the mu'tazilite position. This harmonizes well with the presumed SYmpathies of alKind)' s circle, which operated under an .Abbasid caliphate friendly to mu'tazilite
doctrines.
One might, of course, raise the question of whether the mutakallimun themselves
got their position from Greek philosophy, and indeed from Neoplatonic sources. For
example, ShahrastanI says that Abu 'I-Hudhayl got his doctrine on the attributes from
"the philosophers," who say that God's attributes are the same as His essence. 86
Similarly, Wolfson has argued that when the mutakallimiin said that God has His
attributes "through Himself" (li-nafsihi, li-dhiilihi) they were just following Greek

85

Frank ( 1969). 459.

8t,

See Frank (1969),461.

216

sources which gave them the concept of kath' hauto ('"through itself~) predication. 87
These points are well-taken, though with regard to the first one must take into account the
tendency of later opponents to accuse mu "tazilitism of being derived from

foreign~

non-

Islamic sources. They might indicate that the line of influence was not from the
mu "tazilites to

AP~

but vice-versa.

However~ it

is certain that AP was composed later

than the Kafiim doctrines we have seen here. Abu "l-Hudhayl. for example. died at an
advanced age at about 841, and his doctrines would have been formed and propagated
before the rise of the Kindian translation movement. ss Also~ the use of characteristic

Kaliim terminology. especially the word ~ifa, shows the Adaptor's engagement with a
pre-existing controversy within the Kaliim. So we can confidently claim that the
Adaptor's thought on this issue was formed at least in part by that engagement. This
suggests that, more generally, it might be worthwhile to rethink much of the early
translation movement in the Arabic-speaking world against the context of more
mainstream Islamic theological controversy.89
However. we should also recognize the limitations of the thesis I have presented
here. Insofar as one of the most important parts of the Adaptor's view is that we can
predicate the attributes of God because He causes the attributes in lower things. the
Adaptor is bringing to bear ideas that were not apparently proper to the context of the

87 Wolfson (1976).226. In AP. there is at least one place where bi-dhiitihi translates kat'" "auto.
in fact in a passage just cited above: GS 1.19. paralleling Enn V.6.4.

ss Frank says this explicitly. though he alleges some other form of Neoplatonic influence on Abu
"I-Hudhayl: Frank (1969). 457.
89 A good example of such a rethinking is the recent book by Dmitri Gutas (1998), which shows
that the translation movement was the outcome of a variety of political and theological forces proper to the
"Abbiisid caliphate.

217

Kaliim. 9o Indeed. it is reasonable to suggest that the debate over the ~iflit A/Nih in the 9th

century gave the Adaptor a pressing reason to look for viable positions within Greek
sources. This would provide the motivation we were looking for to explain why he might
have imported ideas from Enneads VI.8. Porphyry, or Dionysius into his paraphrase. even
in the face of an original Greek text which at times resisted these more kataphatic ideas.
It is worth noting. in a more speculative vein. that it was only a bit later that Abu Hashim
(890-933) developed his theory of "modes (a!lwaf):' which attempted a compromise
position between the mu"tazilite rejection of real entitative status for the attributes and the
orthodox acceptance of such a status. This suggests that. during the time AP was
composed. there would have been a desire for a more subtle "'middle path" between
outright embrace or rejection of the attributes. The Adaptor's forays into divine
predication by eminence and causality may have been an attempt to fill just such a lacuna
in the Islamic theological debate of his time.

5.3 Creation
Among the most striking stylistic features of AP, in contrast to the Enneads, is its
repeated reference to the First Principle as a Creator God. As can be seen from many
texts cited above, this is marked by the use of several honorific titles for God: "the
Creator (al-biiri')," ""the Maker (al-khiiliq):' and ""the Originator (al-mubdi')" are the
most common. These titles may be taken from the canonical Muslim names of God. In
addition, adulatory exclamations often accompany references to God. reminding the
90 In fact Abu 'I-Hudhayl and Ibn Kullab did hold that one of the chiefuses of divine attributes is
to refer to God as cause. See Richard M. Frank. Beings and Their Attributes (Albany: SUNY Press. 1978).

218

reader that the First is to be exalted. 91 Similar adulations abound in the works of alKindL though in both cases it must be admitted that they could easily be additions by later
scribes. This conflation of Plotinus' One with the God worshipped in Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam may lead us to expect that the Adaptor would modify Plotinus~
handling of the origination of the cosmos. Of course, the tension between the
Neoplatonic conception of this origination as a necessary emanation and the Islamic
belief in a free act of creation is a central theme in Islamic philosophy. In this section I
will show that this tension can already be found in AP: the re-thinking and modification
of Neoplatonic emanationism begins within the Arabic translation of Plotinus itself.

5.3.1 Mediated creation vs. unmediated creation

One of the most difficult problems raised for any Neoplatonic account of the world's
origination is the question of how a universe characterized by multiplicity can come from
a source that is purely one. Plotinus himself mentions as a particularly vexing difficulty
"[the question] discussed by the wise men of old, how from the One, if it is such as we
say it is. anything else, whether a multitude or a dyad or a number, came into existence,
and why it did not on the contrary remain by itself' (Enn V.I.6). Despite this puzzle
Plotinus asserts that the One can in fact immediately produce something multiple, namely
the "one-many" that is intellect. A different solution is found in later Neoplatonized
Arabic philosophy: famously, Ibn Sina asserts as a general principle that 'the one as such

12. Sri II. these Mu 'lazilile thinkers do not develop the son of \'ia callsa[ifat;s found in AP. because they do
not argue that we actually transfer the attributes from created effects to the Creator.
91 For example. at Th.A lIlA I. 47. V.S. VII.6. X.ISS. GS IX.Sij 8. though this is a very small
selection of such occurences.

219

only produces one.',91 In accordance with this. he postulates a series of intellects

mediating between the purely simple Necessary Being and the sublunary world, and
explains how multiplicity first comes to be at the level of the highest created intellect.
This emanationist Neoplatonic scheme is primajacie in tension with the Qur~an~s
insistence that God creates individual things found in the sensory world. Thus Ibn STna
was taken to task by al-GhazalT for removing God from an immediate relationship with
His effects.
All this should motivate us to take a careful look at what the Adaptor has to say
about mediation of God ~s creative act. Specifically, does God create all things without an
intermediary, or does He create only the intellect, which goes on to originate the lower
levels of the hierarchy? The question is sharpened further when we note that the Adaptor
repeatedly uses a technical term to refer to such an intermediary principle: tawaSSll!. But
any hopes we might have that the Adaptor presents a simple answer to the question are
dashed when we further note that passages in AP seem to come down on both sides of the
question:
Th.A rnA? [B 51]: As for the Creator, the exalted One, He originates the beings
(Gnniyyiil) and forms of things, except that He originates some of the forms
without an intermediary (bi-glzayr tawassliD. and some of them through an
intermediary (bi-tawassuV.
Th.A Vill.46 [B 98]: As for the First Maker, He makes all the things which He
makes without an intermediary (bi-glzayr tawassul). together, and all at once.
Neither of these passages has any parallel in the Greek. though certainly the idea
presented in the first passage seems to be derived from Plotinus. As for the second, one

91

rbn Sfna (1960), IX.4. 405.

220

might suspect that such statements are made to avoid taking away from the role of God as
omnipotent Creator. That suspicion is, I would say, confirmed in another passage:
Th.A VU.5 [B 84]The indication that this is the case [i.e. that causes must produce
effects] is created things, for though they are beautiful, splendid, great in
ornamentation, perfected, falling under vision, the seer comes, if he is intelligent,
not to wonder at the decoration of their exterior, but rather looks at their interior
and wonders at their Creator (bari') and Originator, and does not doubt that He is
in the extreme of beauty and splendor, with no limit to His power, since He made
(fa 'ala) these works (afli7l), filled with beauty and loveliness (jamal).
This almost poetic discourse on the majesty of the Creator is based on a similar passage
in the Greek, but there Plotinus is praising the soul, not the One, as maker (pokilias) of
the sensible world (Enn IV.8.5). Instead, the Adaptor lauds the First directly as the
Creator of sensible things.
Such passages might encourage us to think that, although the Adaptor normally
does say that the First creates the world through the intermediary of the intellect, he is
also uncomfortable with that limited role for God. What is not so apparent at first glance
is that the Adaptor has a sophisticated position that allows him to affirm bOlh that God
creates all things and that He creates them through an intermediary. This position is most
clearly expressed in a text found in DS:
DS 147-148 [B 177]: We must know that the First Cause originates the things
without division, that is, it does not originate them one after another, but it
originates them all at once, as if they were one thing. The reason for this is that
the second cause is an act, and the first cause is a power (qudra). The actuality
does not happen except in a divided way, that is, it only performs a divided act.
As for the potency (al-qmva), it is the power (al-quwa) which is able (laq~"'aYll) to
originate all the things at once, as if they were one thing.
Enn V.3.15: But [The One] had [all things] such that they were not divided
(diakekrimena). They are divided in the second, in the logos. For this is already
actuality, but the [One] is the potency (dllnamis) of all things.

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This is a passage we have already had occasion to examine (4.1.2), where we were
concerned to explain the notion of a "'potency higher than acl." As we noted there, the
Adaptor in this passage is exploiting the double sense of the word quwa, which like the
Greek dwzamis can mean both "'potency" and "power." In this passage the reason that
potency is said to be higher than act is that it does not require "division." Thus, in the
actuality that is intellect, things (i.e. the intelligible Forms) are divided from one another,
but they are all together in the First, "as if they were one thing."
This suggests a way that the Adaptor can maintain that the First does create all
things, but through an intermediary: they are all in His creative potency or power, but that
power is only unfolded in an emanation that divides into act what pre-exists in God as
potency. In the sense that all things are contained in the power that expresses itself in the
first emanation of intellect, God can be said to create "without an intermediary."
Th.A VID.46 [B 98]: I say that the totality of intelligibles and living things is in
the intellect, and this is because they are divided in it. But the division in the
intellect is not because the things there are abiding in it, nor because the things are
composed in it, but it is the maker of the things. even though it makes one thing
after another thing, in succession (tartib) and taxis. As for the First Maker, He
makes all the things He makes without an intermediary. together. and all at once.
Again. we have here the contrast between the making of intellect, which is divided. and
God's making, which is utterly one and therefore involves no mediation between things.
Similarly. the Adaptor says at one point that God "is a wisdom in which is the totality of
things. and a power (qudra) that originated all things" (Th.A X.I53 [B 156]). and at
another that "when aU [things] are together and are not extended. spread forth. or
separated from the First Creator. then one of them is not the cause of the generation of
another. but rather the First Creator is the cause of the generation of all of them" (Th.A

222

V.22 [B 68]). Of course, none of this takes away from the fact that the Adaptor accepts a
stepwise hierarchy of emanation: the First emanates the intellect, which goes on to
emanate lower things. Thus Ibn SInifs principle that "one only produces

one~"

is not

violated: only intellect is brought into actuality directly by the First. And yet all
even sensible

things~ are

things~

created by God insofar as they are contained in the pre-actual

transcendence of God~ s potency. This has the salutary effect of introducing an immediate
relationship between God and each created thing.
Here we might pause to note that, even though the Adaptor to this extent accepts
the Plotinian emanation scheme and the sort of mediation it implies~ there is a tendency in
AP to compress the emanative hierarchy.

Certainly~ there

are many texts in which the

Adaptor holds to the emanative progression that is so characteristic of Plotinus: the One,
intellect. soul, and the sensible world. 93 But other passages collapse the soul and the
intellect together into a first effect of God called "the intelligible world." Hence, at DS
166-168. the Adaptor says that the first intelligible is

God~

the second is the intellect, and

the third is sensible form (instead of soul). Elsewhere he says that God "originated the
other things through the intermediary of that form... This form is the higher worId~ I
mean, intellects and souls" (Th.A X.192 [B 163]). And in the same mfmar, the Adaptor
says that both intellect and soul are originated without an intermediary, while sensible
things come to be through the intennediary of these higher created principles (Th.A
X.31). It has been observed that there is a tendency in the Liber de Causis to simplify

9.' See. for example. the original but passage at GS [.41-45. which has the sequence: the First. the
intellect. the soul. the heavenly body. the eanhly bodies. Here each level is called the "impression" of the
previous level. The Adaptor concludes the passage by observing. much in the spirit of the doctrine we have
just discussed: "The First Agent is the Originator and Preserver of all of them. However. He is the
Originaror of some of them without an intermediary. and of others through an intennediary" (GS 1.46).

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Proclus' rather baroque hierarchical system, collapsing the many hypostases into just the
four found in Plotinus. D' Ancona Costa has, rightly I think. suggested that this could
show the influence of AP on the Proclean paraphrase. 9.J It is worth noting. though, that
even in AP there are signs of a desire to simplify the Neoplatonic hierarchy found in
Greek source texts even further.
[ would also like to note here the affinity between the doctrine I have just sketched
-- that God is all things in His potency but has only the inteIIect as an actual effect - and
one D' Ancona Costa has found in AP and the Liber de Causis. She has called this
doctrine creation '"mediante inrelligentia." On this view. the First creates being. which is
then differentiated by the forming principle of intellect. Hence we have the well-known
reference in the de Causis to being as the first created effect (Prop.4), and the statement
that God bestows existence, whereas intellect bestows form (Prop.17).95 As 0' Ancona
Costa argues. these ideas seem closely related to the following passage in AP:
Th.A X.3. 12 [B 134, 136]: [say, shortening the discussion, that while it [the pure
One] is none of the things. all things pour forth from it. But, even though all
things pour forth from it, the first being (hllwiyya), by which I mean the being of
the intellect. is that which pours forth from it first, without an intermediary. Then
there pours forth from it the totality of the beings (huwiyyiit) of the things which
are in the higher world and the lower world, through the intermediary of the being
of the intellect and the intellectual world, ,. The True One originated the being of
the intellect, and the intellect originated the form of the soul from the being which
was originated from the True One through the intermediary of the being of the
intellect.

1).1 D' Ancona Costa. "La doctrine de la creation 'mediante intelligentia' dans Ie Liber de Causes et
dans ses sources:' in 0' Ancona Costa (1995), 79-80.

95 See D'Ancona Costa. "La doctrine de la creation 'mediante intclligentia' dans Ie Liber de
Causes et dans ses sources," in D'Ancona Costa (1995). 78 and 83.

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As we noted above (5.2.3). this makes being (anniyya or huwiyya) the immediate and
proper effect of the First. with all other things being indirect effects through the mediation
of the intellect. 96
Now.. the idea of creation mediante intelligentia squares quite well with the
doctrine we have been discussing. For. suppose with the Adaptor that all things are in an
undifferentiated (or as he says. "undivided'') potency that is God's power. When this
potency is actualized. then, we will have an undifferentiated actuality. Because this
actuality has no multiplicity, it can have no attributes. since as we have seen repeatedly
what is simple has no attributes. This, then. will be pure actuality or being. Pure being,
then. can be the only immediate expression of the power of God. and this being can only
be di fferentiated through the further activity of something that has some multiplicity,
namely intellect. And as we have already seen, since pure being is the primary effect of
God, and we speak of God through a via causalitatis.. God will also be called "only
being" to indicate His simplicity and His role as cause of being. Further, all things have
their source in the original being that is first created by God. so that He can truly be called
a Creator. While this latter implication is worked out more fully in the Liber de Causis
than AP, the entire line of reasoning described effectively articulates the passages from
AP we have studied in this section.

5.3.2 Creation and time

While I think that the above arguments have dealt with the most profound modification
used by the Adaptor to re-conceive Plotinian creation." two other points demand at least

96

A similar line of thought seems to be pursued at GS 1.14.

225

brief attention. First. the question of time and creation. which should be addressed if only
because of the importance of the later debate over the eternity of the world in Arabic
philosophy. Second (to be dealt with in section 5.3.3), the question of whether creation is
necessary.
In a presentation of the supposed doctrines of Plato, which ends the first mfmar.
the Adaptor comments at length about the atemporality of creation:
Th.A [.53-57 [B 27-28J: How beautifuHy and how rightly does the philosopher
[i.e. Plato] describe the Creator. may He be exalted. when he says that He created
the inteHect and the soul and nature. and all other things~ But it is necessary for
whoever hears the philosopher's statements that he not consider them literally
['4according to the expression") and imagine that he says that the Creator, may He
be exalted. creates in time. If someone imagines this of him according to his
expression and words. he only expressed himself in this way wishing to follow the
practice of the Ancients.
The Ancients were only forced to mention time regarding the beginning of
creator because the Ancients wished to describe the generation (kawn) of things.
and were forced to incorporate time in their description of the generation and in
their description of creation, which was not in time at all. in order to distinguish
between the first. high causes and the second. low causes. This is because when
one wants to be clear about and recognize cause, one is forced to mention time.
because there is no doubt that the cause is prior to its effect. so that one imagines
that priority is time. and that every agent performs its act in time. But this is not
the case. I mean that not every agent performs its act in time. and not every cause
is prior to its effect in time. If you want to know whether [a given] thing acted on
is temporal or not. then consider the agent. If it is under time, then the thing acted
on is inevitably under time. And if the cause is temporal. the effect is also
temporal. So the agent and the cause indicate the nature of the thing acted on and
the effect: if they are under time or not under time.
One remarkable thing about this passage is the interpretive strategy it recommends for
reading '"the Ancients." that is. Greek philosophical texts. The Adaptor holds that such
texts must not always be understood literally. but should be interpreted in accordance
with acceptable doctrine. Certainly this is the strategy he pursued when translating
Plotinus. as we have now seen many times over.

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In particular. the passage argues that. although causal language in general tends to
imply a temporal relationship. not all causes operate in time. Interestingly. he applies
here another idea we have seen repeatedly in AP: that causes and effects share similar
natures, so that if and only if a cause is temporal will its effect also be under time. The
Adaptor also mentions that temporality is one feature that distinguishes "high" from
"low" causes. The high causes in question are presumably the intelligible world (soul and
intellect) and God Himself. so that God is beyond time. This agrees with ai-KindT, who
says that God is the cause of time," though AP will interpose additional intermediaries
between God and temporal causes. 97 Generally, the Adaptor holds with Plotinus that the
intelligible world is "eternal" and "abiding." and he extends this to the First as well.
Expanding on Plotinus' comment that "generation in time is to be kept away from us
when we are talking about the eternal beings" (Enn V.1.6), the Adaptor says:
Th.A V ill. 142 [B 114]: You must remove from your imagination every generation
(kawll) in time if you want to know how the true. abiding, noble beings (anniyiit)
were originated from the First Originator. because they are only generated from
Him atemporally (bi-ghayr zamiin), and between the origination and the
Originator, and the making and the Maker, there is no intermediary at all.
This passage affirms the eternality of the immediate effects of the First in the
intelligible world. We might ask, however, about the status of the First Himself with
regard to time: is He eternal or beyond even eternity? This question and its relevance for
AP and the de Causis has also been pursued by D' Ancona Costa.98 As she points out, the
Adaptor affirms explicitly that God is above both eternity and time:

97

See al-KindT(1950), 101.17.

98 D' Ancona Costa. ""Esse quod est supra eternitatem. La Cause Premiere, I' ctre et I' etemite dans
Ie Uber de Callsis et dans ses sources:' in D' Ancona Costa (1995).

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Th.A IX.73 [B 130]: The First Cause is standing still (wiiqifa), resting in itself
(siikina.fi dhiilihi), and is not in eternity or time or in place, but rather eternity and
time and place and the rest of the things are only supponed and fixed through it.
Enn V.l.II: [The One] is not divided, but remaining (menonros), and not
remaining in place.
What we find in AP here goes beyond the parallel passage, but as D' Ancona Costa shows
Plotinus holds that eternity (aion) is the "life" of being or intellect. 99 Since the One is
above intellect, this implies that the One is above eternity as well. though Plotinus never
says so as explicitly as the Adaptor does here.
Despite this. the Adaptor also holds that things are eternal as considered in the
divine. In another longer passage devoted to this subject, he says:
Th.A V.21-22 [8 78-79]: Therefore things with the Creator are perfect and
complete. whether temporal or atemporal. and they are eternal (da'iman) with
Him. Likewise, with Him they were with Him at first as they are with Him at the
end. Some temporal things only exist because of others, and this is because, when
the things extend and spread out and are separated from the First Creator, some of
them are the cause of the generation (kawn) of others. When all of them are
together, not extended or stretched out, and not separate from the First Creator,
some of them are not the cause of others, but rather the First Creator is the cause
of the generation of all of them. If some of them are the cause for others, then the
cause only makes the effect because of something. But the First Cause does not
make its effects because of something.
Enn VI.7.1: All things, then, already were and were always (ael), and were
existing such as to say later "this after this"; for when stretched out and so to
speak, unfolded, it can exhibit "this after this," but when being together [it is just]
this (homoll de Oil pall rode); but this is having also its cause itself.
Although this passage follows Plotinus fairly closely, it takes on additional overtones in
the context of the doctrine of creation we saw above (5.3.1). There, we saw that for the
Adaptor all things exist together in God's potency. For the Adaptor things are eternal

99 See D'Ancona Costa, "Esse quod est supra eternitatem. La Cause Premiere.l'etre et I'etemite
dans Ie Uber de Callsis et dans ses sources:' in D' Ancona Costa (1995), 55.

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when they are pre-existent and pre-actual (hence ensuring the possibility of divine
providence. which is established in passages leading up to this one that closely follow
Plotinus).
In this respect. the passage coheres weI! with the rest of the Adaptor's thought. but
a problem arises here as well: we just saw that the Adaptor says that God is not in
eternity, yet here he follows Plotinus in saying that things are eternal when they are with
the First. Moreover, he writes elsewhere:
Th.A VIII. 179-180, 182 [B 119]: For this reason, he is mistaken who says that the
intellectual world corrupts or perishes 9 and this is because its Originator is fixed 9
eternal, not perishing and not failing. If the Originator of the intellect is according
to this state 9 the intellect does not dissolve or corrupt, but rather it endures forever
(yubqayu baqii'an) and abidinglY9 unless He wishes it [to go back] to [its] first
state, I mean, that it perish.... And the First Light 9 which is only being (ann un
faqa!), is eternal 9 never having failed and never failing.
Enn V.8. I2: Therefore they are not right who would destroy [the lower world]
with the intellect remaining, and generate it in this way, as if the maker wished to
make it ... But it always was and will be.
Not only does the Adaptor say here that God is eternal, but he does so without any real
prompting from Plotinus: for here, Plotinus is saying that the eternity of the world is
ensured not because the One is eternal, but because the intellect is eternal. Yet this text
directly contradicts the Adaptor's own statement (in Th.A lX.73) that "the First Cause...
is not in eternity."
Towards resolving this apparent contradiction, we might recall that the Adaptor
consistently holds that the attributes of created things must be both affirmed and denied
of the First. Hence he might say that God is above eternitY9 yet this should signal us that
God is Himself eternal as the source of eternity. Unfortunately there are no texts on this
subject in AP which would explicitly indicate such a solution. At the very least 9 however9

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these passages indicale that the Adaptor has a more complicated and perhaps confused
idea about the relationship between God and eternity than we might expect, given the
straightforwardness of the passage used by 0' Ancona Costa. By contrast, one thing made
very clear in AP is that the intelligible world, if not the entirety of creation, is eternal.
Similarly, at Th.A IX.42, drawing out an argument given by Plotinus, the Adaptor says
that "the world is not abolished entirely:' This indicates that the Adaptor would follow
other [slamic philosophers. who because of Aristotelian influence held that the world is
eternal. 100

5.3.3 Creation and necessity

We have already seen the Adaptor's position on several issues central to later Islamic
philosophy: the eternity of the world, the nature of God, and the mediation of God's
creative acL Another such issue is God's freedom, and the question of whether creation
is necessary or nolo For example, in the third discussion of his Tahafut al-Falasifa, aJGhaziilI argues that the philosophers cannot truly call God an Agent, since they hold His
causal relationship to be necessary, whereas true agents act by their will. Of course the
same question serves as the occasion for Plotinus' treatise VI.8, "On Free Will and the
Will of the One." As we saw above, this treatise may have been a fonnative influence on
the way the Adaptor paraphrased the rest of the Enneads. Looking at the issue of God's
freedom in AP will be another opportunity to test this hypothesis.

IlXI Note. however. that at Th.A VU1.I80. cited above. the Adaptor says that the "first state" of
intellect is for it lIot to exist, which might gesture at some sort of creation ex 11ihi/o. But there is not trace in
AP of al-Kindls stance that the world cannot be eternal. as argued in the second chapter of IT 'I-Falsafa alala. On the other hand. the arguments presented there by ai-KindT prove the impossibility of an eternal
bodily world. and AP only asserts the eternity of an illlelligib/e world.

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Now, there are strong indications in AP that the Adaptor follows Plotinus in
holding that creation is indeed necessary. This comes out explicitly in a passage where
the Adaptor is extending Plotinus' observation that Hthere must not be one alone, for then
all things would have been hidden... and nothing of the beings would exist" (Enn IV.8.6).
He goes on, in an original passage, to state:

Th.A Vll.9 [B 85]: it was necessary that the Creator was not alone, without
creating (yuklzaluqu) any noble thing that receives His light, that is, the intellect.
Likewise. it was necessary that the intellect not be alone, without informing
anything which receives its act, its noble power, and its radiant light. Therefore it
informed the soul.
Another passage found in SijistanI. which seems to have been written by the Adaptor,
argues that the state of created things is necessary because it was designed according to
the highest wisdom (GS IX.Sij 8 [B 197]). lOt None of this conflicts with the usual
statements of Plotinus about the generative act of the One.
For example, Plotinus writes at one point:
Enn V.3.12: For [the One] did not, so to speak (hoion), want intellect to be
generated, so that intellect was generated with wanting (prouthumene) as an
intermediary between that and the generated, engendered intellect. If it wanted in
this way, then it would be incomplete (ateles) and the wanting would not have
anything to want.
The Adaptor not only agrees with the view set forth in this passage, but he enlarges upon
it by adding references to the theme of God as "only being":
OS 105-109 [B 174]: We say that between the intellect and its act is the will (aliriida). This is because it wills, then acts, because it does not act through its being
(bi-aniyyatilzi) but acts by the fact that it is mind (hi-anni"; 'aql) and the intellect

101 I say that this "seems" to have been written by the Adaptor. though it is nO( clear that the text is
direct quotation from *AP. This is because the writing style is somewhat unlike the Adaptor's: for example,
the paragraph uses the second person extensively ("You cannot say anything about this except that it is this
way.....). which is not typical of AP. Also, the latter part of this fragment is a quotation from Th.A X.IS7.
which indicates that it may be only a pastiche of texts handed down as part of the Arabic Plotinus tradition.

231

is knowing, and the knowing is willing. This is because it wills something and
then desires knowledge of it.
If the intellect is according to this description, then there is no doubt that it
is many, not one. Therefore it is not the First Agent, and this is because the act of
the First Agent is not preceeded by will, because it only acts through being alone
(bi-annilzijaqaV. This is because it was not the case that He willed to originate
the intellect, and then there was intellect after will, nor was there a will that there
be some other thing, and then there was this thing. If this were the case, and His
act were proceeded by the will, then He would be deficient (niiqin, were there
will between Him and His effect.
Note that the Adaptor has added a new argument to show why the First cannot have will:
for something to will, it must go from the state of willing to the state of acquisition. But
this implies multiplicity. Thus the intellect can pass from a moment of desire for
knowledge to a moment of possessing that knowledge. But the First acts through "being
alone.'- and as we saw above this means to act in a way that excludes all multiplicity.
This is roughly the line of thought expressed by Plotinus in the parallel passage, though
there the emphasis is not on the multiplicity of what wills, but on the lack implied by
wanting something.
But as in Plotinus, the treatment of God's will in AP is not this simple. The
Adaptor is not content to deny that God wills, but instead, and in accordance with the via
eminentiae we discussed above, holds that God transcends will. Thus, in a discussion of

whether evils come to the sensory world from the heavens. he remarks:
Th.A VI.8 [B 75]: This is because every agent that performs its act by will (biiriida) performs commendable and blameworthy acts. and does good and evil.
But the agent that performs its act without will (bi-ghayr iriida) is one that is
above will (jau.;qa a/-iriida). Therefore it only does good, and all its activities are
pleasing and commendable.
This passage would apply not only to God. but also the other principles of the intelligible
realm. Now. as we know, when the Adaptor says that something acts "above will," this is

232

not merely a negation of will. Thus. he says at another point that God creates "as if
carrying out His will" (Th.A X.192 [B 163 D. While this has no basis in the parallel text.
it does seem to be an echo of Plotinus. who says in VI.8 that all things are "as they would
have been, if the intention of the maker has wished it (hos an esklzen. hos he tou
poiOUlllOS

proairesis ithelese)" (Enn VI.8.17). This suggests. again, that the Adaptor

drew on VI.8 in approaching the rest of the Enneads.

Now, the doctrine set forth by Plotinus in VI.8 is that, though we cannot really
deny will of the One, it is best to say that the One is beyond both necessity and will (see
especially Enn VI.8.9, where Plotinus says both that necessity is among "those following
after the principle," and that will is "after" the One). The Adaptor is even more
forthcoming in providing us with an account showing how necessity and will enter into
the cosmic hierarchy. This account is presented in two texts from the fragments in GS
discovered by Lewis:
GS 1.62-3 [not in B, Lewis' translation]: The genesis of the intellectual cause was
necessary because its maker is pure cause. containing nothing caused. And when
the cause is cause alone. containing neither a cause nor anything caused, genesis
from it is a necessity. By "necessity" [do not mean natural necessity but
volitional necessity. for it is superior to every natural necessity. Pure cause
performs its function above natural and volitional necessity. because it is the cause
of both of them. If the first cause is the cause of natural and volitional necessities.
the things originate from it in a more sublime and lofty way than nature and will.
GS 1.84-6 [not in B, Lewis' translation]: When the soul is intellectual. it performs
its function necessarily and freely, or freely and necessarily: it cannot perform a
function that is purely necessary, because that belongs to the realm of nature, nor a
function that is free, because that is proper to the agent who sometimes acts and
someti mes does not act. And this is not complete freedom of action, because the
completely free agent does not exist unless his action exists: indeed, his existence
is the same as the existence of his action. This is the complete freedom of action,
which resembles necessity in its functioning, without belonging to the realm of
necessity. For this reason the Philosopher sometimes said that the souls
descended to this world freely and sometimes said that the soul descended to this

233

world by necessity. That freedom is not devoid of necessity, nor is this necessity
devoid of that freedom.
The latter passage seems to be an extended meditation on the statement in the parallel
Greek text that '"There is no contradiction... between necessity and willing (anagke,

hekollsion), since willing includes necessity" (IV.8.5).

Taking these two texts together. we have the following view. As in Enn VI.8, the
First or Pure Cause operates above both will and necessity. This is because the First is
the cause of both volition and necessity; thus, in a clear application of the via eminentiae,
the Adaptor says that things "originate from it in a more sublime and lofty way than
nature [i.e. necessity] and will." Below God are the intellectual causes, such as soul,
which performs its act both freely and necessarily. If these causes were purely free, they
would act only some of the time (a similar line of argument to that seen above, where the
Adaptor said that what acts by will sometimes does the good and sometimes the bad). If
they were purely necessary, they would be simple links in a chain of causality, like natural
causes and effects. This remark makes clear that the Adaptor thinks of pure necessity as
occurring only at the level of sensible or "natural" things, the lowest level of the
hierarchy. The combination of necessity and freedom in the intellectual realm seems to
be what the Adaptor means by "volitional necessity" in the other passage cited above.
What is not so straightforward in these two passages is the mention of a "complete
freedom of action" which "resembles necessity in its functioning." But one interpretation
that would make sense of the passage is as follows. The Adaptor contrasts this complete
freedom to that of the agent which only acts some of the time -- there is no explicit
indication of what such an agent might be, but one possibility would be human agents.

234

What is completely free transcends the "realm of necessity" entirely, and its act is the
same as its own existence. This latter point especially implies that the completely free
agent in question is none other than the First, Who as we know is identical with Himself
in every way (so that He is the same as His creative act, for example). If this is right, the
Adaptor is laying out the following scheme, starting with the lowest level:
(a) In the sensible world, we find natural necessity and human action, which is apparently
free in some sense but incomplete because it acts only sometimes. 102
(b) In the intellect and soul, there is a "volitional necessity" which combines necessity
and wiII, having the constancy of the former but the self-determination of the latter.
(c) Above both necessity and will is the First. Yet in another sense we can say that only
the First has complete freedom. a freedom so constant that it resembles necessity. This
resemblance with necessity explains why the effects of God are "necessarily" good and
must "necessarily" occur, that is, because there is no change or variation in this willing.
If this seems to be a somewhat paradoxical view, it is no less puzzling than the
view set forth in Enneads V1.8. There, Plotinus similarly describes the generative activity
of the One as like freedom (because it is self-determined, cf. Enn VI.8.8) and like
necessity (because it always is what is best, cf. Enn VI.8.10), yet above both. Like the
Adaptor, too, Plotinus seems somewhat more comfortable describing the One as free.
because there are no other causes necessitating the One to be or do anything, so (hat the
One is utterly self-determined. Thus the closing passages in the treatise come out
strongly in favor of the idea that the world is generated ...by the will of God" (Enn

102 If this is in fact what the Adaptor means. then he is again showing his mu'tazilite sympathies by
ascribing freedom to human agents.

235

VI.8.21). and identify the One as primarily His will" (proton he boulesis autos). Given
the close harmony between this view and that found in AP. it seems even more probable
that the Adaptor made use of VI.8 in approaching the rest of the Enneads. Of course. this
again presents the problem of why the Adaptor would prefer the doctrines of VI.8 to those
more typically found in what he was paraphrasing in the texts left to us. But given the
theological context which seems to stand behind the characteristic doctrines we have
studied thus far in this chapter. it is perhaps unsurprising that the Adaptor would praise
the First as a Creator who both wills and is beyond willing.

5.3.4 God and thinking

Let us concl ude our discussion of the First Principle in AP by turning to the question of
whether God thinks. This is yet another issue that would become contentious in later
Arabic philosophy. thanks to the debate over whether and in what way God knows His
created effects. On this issue too, aJ-GhazalI criticized Ibn SIna. who claimed that God
does not know particulars directly but only by means of His knowledge of universals.
While this debate is not unrelated to the treatment of God and thinking in AP. the chief
question to be raised here is chiefly that of whether God thinks or knows at all in His act
of creating. Plotinus' answer to this question is developed partially in response to
Aristotle. who famously held that God is thought thinking itselC' In the Enneads this
view is refuted by the consideration that what thinks must be multiple. if only because of
the duality implied by the need for both a subject and object in the act of thinking. The
First Principle, as purely one. transcends intellection. and Aristotle's God is as it were
demoted to the rank of the second principle.

/lOllS.

236

The pattern of divine predication established in the preceding sections would

suggest that the Adaptor will want to hold that God does think in some sense. And
indeed, we will see that the Adaptor does use some of the strategies we have seen above
in holding that God knows His created effects. Still, it should first be noted that there are
frequent passages in AP which deny that God thinks. These passages are characterized by
the use of the apparently redundant phrase "thought and reflection ifikr wa rawiyyar'
throughout AP. For example, the Adaptor says that "the First Originator originated the
intellect without reflection or thought, but with another kind of origination" (Th.A
V ill. 180 [B 119]). Not only does this consistent remotion of thought from the First
parallel Plotinus' treatment of intellection, but the very phrase "thought and reflection"
seems to be based on one Plotinian text paraphrased in AP. At Th.A X.40 [B 140], the
Adaptor mentions that eternal things "are not originated through reflection (rawiyya) or
thought (jikr)," which parallels the phrase "will and reasoning (he bOll/isis kai 110
logismos)" in the parallel Greek text (Enn VI.7.3).

While this establishes a Plotinian basis for the rejection of "thought and
reflection." the Adaptor goes beyond his source at one point in giving a detailed argument
for the impossibility of thought and reflection in God:
Th.A V.8, 11-14 [B 66-67]: We say that the First Creator -- the Exalted One -- did
not originate anything through reflection (rawiyya) or thought (jikr), because
thought has priors (awa 'iI), and the Creator -- the Exalted One -- has no priors.
Thought only exists from another thought, and this is also a thought from another
[thought], and so on until infinity, or from something else which is before thought,
and this thing is either sense or the intellect...
If this is according to our description, we reckon and say that the First
Governor (mlldabbir) did not govern any of the living things or anything of this
lower world or the higher world through thought or reflection at all. Then in fact
there is no reflection or thought in the First Originator. And one says that things
were generated through reflection and thought, meaning by this only that all things

237

were originated in the state in which they are now through the First Wisdom. If a
wise man (hakim)~ excellent in wisdom~ reflected upon doing the like of it, finally
he would not be able to bring it to such perfection. [t has been anticipated
(sabaqa) in the knowledge of the First Wise One (h.aklm) - the Exalted Onethat things must be this way.
Thought is useful in [regard to] the things which do not yet exist. The
thinker only thinks before doing something because of the weakness of his power
to do this thing. Therefore the agent needs to reflect on the thing before doing it,
because he does not have a power of seeing the thing before its existence (kawn).
[so that he would] not need to see how the thing must be. This is because the
need to see the thing before it exists is only fear that the thing is in the contrary
[state] it is in now. And that which does something through its being alone (biannil,i faqa!J does not need to anticipate in its knowledge and wisdom how [the
thing] must be, because only its essence alone acts (yafalu. dhiituhufaqalJ, and if
only its essence alone acts, then there is no need for it to originate through
reflection or thought.
Enn VI.7.1: But what are the principles (arcJzai) of reasonings (logismon)? For
even if they are from other reasonings. they certainly must be directed to
something or some things prior to reasoning... Neither providence for a living
thing nor for this universe as a whole came from reasoning, since there is no
reasoning there at all. But it is called reasoning to indicate that all things [there]
are such as they would be from reasoning later on, and foresight (proorasis)
because they are such as a wise man would foresee (proidoito). For in things not
generated before reasoning, reasoning is useful due to a lack of power before
reasoning, and foresight, because there was no power in the foreseeing through
which there would be no need of foresight. For foresight is in order for not this,
but that [to be the case]. and is a kind of fear of what is not such. Where there is
'"this" alone, there is no foresight. And reasoning is this instead of that. But being
one, why should there be reasoning of anything else?
The basic argument in both texts seems to be that reflection or reasoning is required
because of an inability to know what has not yet come to be. Since all things are already
established for God, there is no such inability. But while the Adaptor has preserved this
argument, he has also made a number of additions.
First. he lays more stress on the role of God as providential. Thus he calls God
the First Governor, and instead of translating Plotinus' statement that things are "as a
wise man would foresee:' writes that they are better than a wise man could produce.

238

Second. he argues that the First does not think because only His essence acts. that is, He
acts through His being alone. This is a gloss on Plotinus' idea that the One does not need
to think about anything, because the One is one. As we have seen, when the Adaptor says
that God is or acts through being alone, he is emphasizing the absolute simplicity of God.
His train of thought in this passage, then, seems to be that thought and reflection are
discursive. and therefore imply multiplicity. It follows that the many passages that deny
thought and retlection of God may be intended only to deny discursive reflection on the
part of God. This leaves open the possibility that God could have a fonn of thinking or
intellection if that intellection were identical with His very essence.
The Adaptor embraces this possibility in another long passage treating the same
themes. The passage appears nearly at the end of Th.A:
Th.A X.185-188, 191 [B 162]: One must not imagine that this description [i.e.
that of a thinking craftsman] applies to the wise Creator -- the Sublime -- because
this is absurd, impossible, and unsuitable for that complete, excellent, noble
substance. It is impossible for us to say that the Creator reflected first about how
to originate the things. and then after that originated them, because it is
unavoidable that the things reflected upon would either be external to Him or
inside Him. If they were external to Him, they would exist before He originated
them. And if they were inside Him, then either they are other than Him or they
are none other than Him. Then He has no need for reflection in the creation
(klzalq) of the things, because He is the things by being the cause for them. And if
they are other than Him. then He would be assumed to be compound. not simple,
and this is absurd. We say that no one can say that the Creator reflects about the
things first, and then originates them, because it is He that originated reflection, so
how could He seek help from them in the origination of the thing when they did
not yet exist? This is absurd.
We say that He is retlection (I11H....a al-rawiyya), and reflection does not
also reflect. [If it did,] it would be necessary that reflection reflects, and so on to
infinity, and this is absurd. So it is clear and certain that those are right who say
that the Creator -- the Exalted One -- originated things without reflection (min
ghayr rawiyya).
Now that the repugnance and impossibility of this statement (qawl) have
been made clear, we say that there is, between Him and His creation, no mediator

239

(mllla~vassit)

which He reflects upon or seeks help from. but [rather] He

originated the things through His being alone (bi-annihi faqa!J.
Here. the Adaptor departs almost completely from his source text to give a sustained
argument which, even as it denies that the First thinks. affirms that we can speak of God
as thought (or reflection") itself. Again. the emphasis is on the simplicity of the First.
and this simplicity is said to rule out any objects of thought outside God (the priors" of
the previous passage) and a multiplicity of such objects within God. Further. as the cause
of retlection. God does not Himself need to reflect. Instead He creates things simply,
without retlection and through His being alone. But. in a clear application of the via

causafitatis. the Adaptor says that God is Himself reflection. rather than what is reflecting
or thinking. In other words. He is the source and principle of thought. but is not Himself
discursively thinking. Similarly. the Adaptor says here that God is the created things by
being their cause, although this does not imply multiplicity in God. Just as God can be
the things Himself in His creative power without being a multiplicity of actual things. so
He can be thought itself without being a thinker who thinks discursively.
Now. an experienced reader of Plotinus might at this point object to the Adaptor
as follows. When Plotinus says that the One does not think. he does not mean to rule out
only discursive thought. which is properly at the level of soul. but all intellection. There
is a simpler form of intellection than discursive thought. but this is the intellection of
IlOliS.

which is still below the One because of its inherent duality. If the Adaptor

describes the First as thought itself. or a simple intellect. is he not transferring what
Plotinus says about no liS to the level of God? The answer. briefly. is yes. And in fact.
there are a number of passages in AP where the Adaptor even more explicitly takes

240

statements about intellect and changes them or hmistranslates" them. so as to refer them
instead to the First. These passages have been expertly analyzed in a recent article by
0' Ancona Costa. so that we need deal with them only briefly here. 103
The two chief passages in question are in OS. At DS 115-120, the Adaptor takes
Plotinus' statement that the noetic is substance and the first knower, and applies this to
God. Similarly, at OS 123-132, the Adaptor is confronted by a Greek text which says that
"we make [the One] many by making it known and

knowing~' (V.3.13).

He reverses the

doctrine of this passage, paraphrasing as follows:

DS 123-124 [8 175]: If someone asks: if you make it so that the First Knower
does not know, you make Him such that He does not sense either. and from this
follows what is repugnant. We say: we only say that He does not know, not
because He is ignorant, which is the opposite of knowledge. but [instead] we
mean that He is above knOWledge ifawqa al- 'Um).
Notice that in the first sentence, the Adaptor seems concerned to preserve God's
providential knowledge of particulars. so that he defends a more direct version of
providence than that found in Ibn Si'na. In the second sentence. we see another
application of the via enzinentiae, as the Adaptor affirms that God is a knower by saying
that He is "above knowledge:' A similar aftirmation can be found in GS, in yet another
passage where the Adaptor reverses the doctrine he finds in his source text:
GS 1.25 [8 187]: [The First Principle] has no motion, because He is before
motion, before thought (jikr), and before knowledge ('ifm). and there is nothing in
Him which He would want to know, as the knower knows, but rather He is the
k.nowledge which does not need to know by any other knowledge. because He is
the pure. ultimate knowledge containing all knowledge. and [is] the cause of the
sciences (al- ulfim. lit. "the knowledges").

IIlJ

D" Ancona Costa (1997).

241

Enn VI.9.6: There is no intellection [in the One], because there is no otherness,
and there is no motion, for it is before motion and before thought. For what
would it think? Itself? Then before thinking it would be ignorant (agnoon).
Thus in these texts the apparent paradox of a God Who does not think or know because
He is above thinking and knowledge. but Who is also the First Knower and pure
knowledge, can be resolved by appealing to the same strategies of divine predication we
have seen throughout this chapter.
Again. here we might raise the question of what sources suggested this treatment
of God and thinking to the Adaptor. D' Ancona Costa makes a persuasive case for the
idea that the Adaptor is trying to preserve the Aristotelian idea of God as pure thought.
To this we can add that in one text that is paraphrased in AP, Plotinus indulges in a
unique description of the One as intellective:
Enn V.4.2: But how does this intellect come from the intelligible? The
intelligible (to noeton) remains by itself and is not deficient... but rather all things
belong to it and are in it and together with it, it discerns (diakritikon) itself
completely, lives in itself and [has] aU things in itself. and its consideration
(katanoesis) of itself is itself, being by a sort of awareness (hoionei szmaisthesei
ollsa) in eternal rest. and in an intellection different from that of the noetic.
This allows for a largely faithful paraphrase that harmonizes well with the passages
examined above:
DS 172 [8 179]: [The First Principle] only perceives the things in an abiding rest.
and intellects the things not in the way than the intellect intellects them, but in a
more noble way.
Further, in the Plotinian quote we have many of the themes that the Adaptor associates
with God as a knower, especially the idea that it can consider all things by considering
itself. So again, the Adaptor may have been willing to import the ideas found in this
exceptional Plotinian passage into the rest of his paraphrase.

242

In seeking a motivation for this, we need look no further than the insistence in AP

that God, as a knower, is providential. Thus the Adaptor associates divine providence
with several of the theological themes we have seen in this chapter: God originated
things through being alone, and through His knowing them, preserving them. and
directing (ylldabbiru) them, not through any attribute (Iii

bi-~ifa min al-~iflif)" (GS

IX.Sij

7 [8 197]). Similarly, at one point he changes a Plotinian text on the intellect to read:
'the First Originator sees the world because He originated the world n (OS 195 [8 (80)),
using the via callsalitatis to account for the possibility of providence. 10* So again, there
were good theological reasons for the Adaptor to change the doctrines he found in
Plotinus. in this case undertaking the rather radical project of changing remarks about the
intellect into statements about a knowing, providential God.

Ill.:

See also DAncona Costa (1997).434.

243

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This dissel1ation has necessarily been devoted to the study of individual

philosophical problems in AP. Hopefully this study has constituted a successful defense
of two more general points that were raised in the introduction. First, the Arabic Plotinus
is philosophically original and interesting. Second, the author, whom I have called the
Adaptor, was guided by his own philosophical preconceptions and objectives, which
notably included reconciling Plotinus' thought with other works of Greek philosophy and
with his own contemporary theological context. [do not know how to extend the
argument for either point, short of adducing fUl1her passages or arguments in AP that
gesture towards the same conclusions. At any rate, the evidence presented in the
foregoing should be sufficient to establish both claims. However. there do remain several
more general questions that can only be answered against the background of a detailed
philosophical study of AP. I propose to address some of these questions here. On the one
hand. there are still questions about the provenance of the text which were deferred in our
survey of the textual evidence in chapter I: in particular, who was the Adaptor, and on
what sources did he draw? These were not the main questions at stake in this
dissertation. Yet much of the previous literature on AP has been devoted to answering
these two questions, so that it is worthwhile to provide answers insofar as is possible

244

here. On the other hand, there remains the question of how the philosophical opinions we
have gleaned from AP hang together: if the Adaptor's philosophical views are original
and interesting, then are they coherent? I will address this question first.

6.1 The coherence of the Adaptor's thought

To a large extent we have been concerned with divergences of the paraphrase from
Plotinus' thought, and we have often had occasion to argue that a given divergence is or
is not compatible with Plotinus. For example, I suggested that the Adaptor modified
Plotinus' views on the One, but often in a way that could be based on other texts in the
Enneads themselves. On the other hand, the defense of the soul as enteleclzia, the
emphasis on ethical dimensions of the cosmic hierarchy, and the notion of learned
ignorance seem at best non-Plotinian and perhaps in direct conflict with Plotinus. These
considerations in tum raise the question of whether the changes introduced into the
paraphrase have an internal consistency. By the very nature of the case we might expect
that the Adaptor, in his attempt to import ideas from other sources and a different
historical context, may not have achieved the degree of consistency that Plotinus himself
did. Here I will suggest a few ways in which this expectation is borne out, and how the
tensions internal to AP may have set the stage for subsequent philosophical
developments.
In 5.2, we had an opportunity to study the concept of "being" as used in AP. Briefly,
we found that the Adaptor's characterization of God as allniyyajaqa[ should not be
assimilated to an A vicennan existence/essence distinction. The conception of God here
owes more to the debate over divine attributes within the Kalam of the 9th century, and it

245

was argued that the identification of God as pure being" refers primarily to God's lack of
attributes. An additional current in the Adaptor's thought displays his allegiance to a
more Aristotelian conception of God as the highest actuality. This constitutes a second
sense in which God is pure being."
Clearly the Adaptor does make an attempt to reconcile these two aspects of God
as pure being. Since God is the Creator of all that has being, God must be identified with
being in a loftier, more exalted sense. The notion of God

a~

lacking attributes is the

negati ve moment of this dialectic (God is above being and thus has none of the modes of
being), while the idea that God is pure actuality is the positive moment (God is pure being
as cause of being). Yet it must also be admitted that the issue demands further
explication. Saying that God is pure being because God lacks attributes could leave the
impression that pure being is a substratum, like prime matter, or Locke's something-Iknow-not-what:' Though this is indeed an implication that would be embraced by later
thinkers like Solomon Ibn Gabirol, I it seems unlikely to be the Adaptor's intent, given his
emphasis on the actuality of God. What is lacking here is a systematic terminology that
would clarify what it is to call God 'being." Of course this lacuna in AP is precisely what
al-Farab. arid Ibn Sfna eliminate by expanding on the characteristic tenninology of alKindfs circle and distinguishing allniyya ("being" or existence") from huwiyya or
rniihiyya ("essence").

Another set of problems arises when we juxtapose the many things the Adaptor says
about God with the epistemological resources he allows himself. In chapter 4, we saw the
I See the recent work of Sarah Pessin on Gabirol. and in particular her "Solomon ibn Gabirol and
the Binarium Famosissimum: From One Must Come Two" presented at the Islamicate Philosophy
Conference at the University of Chicago. October 29. 1999.

246

Adaptor describe intellect's knowledge of God as a sort of "ignorance": the intellect is

ignorant of its cause above it, namely the First, Ultimate Cause, and it does not know [its
cause] completely, because if it knew it completely, it would be above [that cause] and a
cause for if' (Th.A 49). How can we reconcile this statement with the wealth of
information that AP provides about the divine nature?
This problem did not escape the Adaptor's notice. As we have seen, the theory of
learned ignorance is based on the principle of knowledge by causality: the intellect can
know something completely only when it is that thing's cause. So it cannot know God.
But we have also seen the Adaptor repeatedly avail himself of this same principle in
arguing that God has eminently anything possessed by His effects. The theory of
ignorance does not state that the intellect utterly fails to know God, but simply that this
knowledge cannot be complete. (To put it in an Aristotelian way consonant with the
Adaptor's way of understanding the argument: the intellect cannot have demonstrative
knowledge of God.) This line of thought accounts for most of what the Adaptor allows
himself to say about God in AP. However, one wonders whether the epistemology
presented here adequately responds to the tacit theological framework of AP. Some of
the more religious language in AP is hard to support through the via causalitatis, such as
references to "prayer" (Th.A VI.39) and "forgiveness'~ (Th.A 1.30-32). Similarly, the
Adaptor"s habit of calling God a "Creator" might well be seen as problematic from a
Christian or Muslim standpoint, given the ambivalence in AP about whether the world is
created directly or indirectly by God and whether it is created necessarily (see 5.3

247

above).:! Such tensions are only exacerbated by the Prologue's optimistic claim that Th.A
will provide a discussion of the First Di vinity and an explanation of it" (ProI.14), which
h

might lead the reader to assume that AP will present a complete articulation of God's
nature.
Two things might be said in answer to this set of potential difficulties. First,
many of the same problems occur in Plotinus, who likewise speaks of praying to the One
but expresses a certain ambivalence about whether the One has a will. It is not surprising
that such ambivalence is carried over into the Arabic version of his works. Second,
nowhere does AP claim to provide a knowledge so total and adequate that revealed
knowledge would be superfluous. 3 Indeed, astute Muslim or Christian readers of AP
might take as a salutary consequence of the theory of ignorance that we cannot have a
complete knowledge of God through reason alone. 4

:! One sign that the Adaptor may be uncomfortable with the emanative conception of creation in the
Enneads is that he tends to collapse together levels of the cosmic hierarchy (especially soul and intellect. but
also God and intellect when he tranfers statements about 1l0US to the One). This is comparable to the way
the Liber de Causis assimilates the levels of Proclus' hierarchy to the more simplified Plotinian model. It
has rightly been argued that this represents influence from AP on the Liber de Causis: see D'Ancona Costa.
"La doctrine de la creation 'mediante intelligentia' dans Ie Liber de Causes et dans ses sources:' in
D' Ancona Costa (1995), 79ff. But it should also be appreciated that the author of the paraphrase in the
Liber de Causis may have been motivated by the desire to eliminate degrees of separation between the
lowest levels of the cosmos and the Creator. A fruitful topic for further research would be to trace how this
impulse in al-Kindfs translation circle begins the development of the completely different hierarchy found
in al-Farabf and Ibn Sfna. Naturally Aristotle's intellect-movers are a significant influence here. But one
wonders whether the elimination of intellect and soul as independent hypostases does not have some
theological motivation behind it (beginning with al-FarabT the intellects and souls become multiple and
associated with the heavenly bodies).

3 Compare al-Kindf's remarks on the superiority of prophetic knowledge to philosophical

knowledge: Atiyeh (1967). 30-32. AI-KindT suggests that prophetic knowledge would be superior at least in
its clarity and level of conviction. though it is not clear whether he thought prophets could know things that
must remain hidden to normal humans.

.: A relevant passage here is one not discussed previously in the dissertaton: DS 75 [B 172.
paralleling Enn V.3.7): "[fthe intellect cannot know God. may He be exalted. to the utmost degree (kllnh
'i!m) -- because there knowledge and the object of knowledge are one -- then in this way the intellect is
deficient. and this is because it cannot see itself or know itself in this way. since sight and knowledge are the
objects of sight and knowledge:' It is unclear whether the Adaptor is actually trying here to disprm'e that
the intellect is deficient in this way. Plotinus does. of course. accept that intellect can attain union with the

248

 We have seen that one of the most important components of the Adaptor~ s sensibilities
as a translator was his familiarity with Aristotle. Certainly the Adaptor was neither the
first nor the last to try to harmonize Neoplatonism with Aristotle. Indeed, insofar as
Plotinus himself uses Aristotelian terminology and argumentation, the Adaptor's role here
sometimes meant only emphasizing these aspects of his source texts. However, we can
uncover a source of tension in this regard by focusing on the Adaptor's stance towards the
material world. It is well known that Plotinus himself rejected the gnostic conception of
the sensible world as evil. even though he counseled us to raise our attention from
material to immaterial things. This comes out most clearly in Enn 0.9 against the
gnostics, a treatise which the Adaptor may not have read. But whatever his knowledge of
Plotinus' stance on this issue, the Adaptor chose to exaggerate the Enneads' negative
statements about the physical world, as well as the peril that this world presents to our
souls (see above, 3.2). The ethical dimension of the Adaptor's thought, then, is decidedly
scornful regarding things of the lower world.
When we focus on epistemology and metaphysics, though, we get a different
sense of the Adaptor's position. In the Prologue to Th.A, the Aristotelian natural sciences
are clearly given a high priority (see ProI.9). And while there is little sign of this priority
in the paraphrase itself,5 the Adaptor nevertheless takes great pains to preserve Aristotle's
more naturalist theory of soul. As we saw above (3.1.2), he even introduces the
One. and the Adaptor seems to agree (see DS 68-69. Th.A 34-35 -- indeed in both places. the Adaptor
seems more eager than Plotinus to underscore the possibility of such a union). [fthis is the case. then the
Adaptor has failed to explain how a union of intellect with God bears on intellect's ignorance of God.
S The Adaptor does say in one independent passage that "the intellect does not attain what is in
sense except through the soul" (OS 56 [8 171 J). which seems to place some value on sense-knowledge. But
the passage follows close on the heels of a free paraphrase which reads: ..It is likewise for the rational soul:

249

systematic notion of a "brute sour~ to account for this theory. Such alterations suggest
that both the Adaptor and the author of the Prologue (whom I believe to be aI-Kindi) were
keen to defend the value of naturalistic Aristotelian science. Yet this is hard to reconcile
with the Adaptor's castigation of all things material in other passages. I would argue that
the tension results from the Adaptor's attempt to reconcile religious and Neoplatonic
moral views, which favor the immaterial over the material. with Aristotelian natural
science. Again, this tension anticipates the work of later Arabic philosophers. all of
whom tried to balance, even to

reconcile~

Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism.

6.2 What sources influenced the Adaptor?

The tension just described provides a natural preface to the more historical question of
which texts other than Plotinus influenced the Adaptor's thought. I will address this
question by briefly stating the conclusions we can draw from the foregoing study with
regard to the probable sources of AP:
Aristotle: As we have seen

rep~atedly, the

Adaptor's original contributions to the text of

the Enneads are shot through with Aristotelianism. It is, then, quite clear that the Adaptor
read some texts by Aristotle, and read them carefully. However, it is less clear which
texts from the Aristotelian corpus he read. The Prologue to Th.A makes explicit mention
of the Metaphysics, and we know that Us!ath's translation of this text was available in alKindrs circle. 6 Indeed, as we saw above (2.1.1), this translation was probably the source

everything which it acquires from the pure, bright intellect is something noble and excellent as well. and
everyrhing it acquires from sense is something base and vile" (DS 46 [8 170.
(, See Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques voU. 528-534: "La Mitaphysiqlle. Tradition syriaque
et arabe:' and especially page 531 for Us!iith's translation.

250

for the frequent allusions to the Metaphysics found in the Prologue. Although I do not
believe the Adaptor (the author of the paraphrase) was the author of the Prologue, the
Adaptor's familiarity with Aristotelian metaphysical views suggests strongly that he was
exposed to the Metaphysics. In 3.1.3, we saw that the Adaptor certainly had access to the
De Anima, either in the original Greek or in the contemporary Arabic paraphrase. This
much we can say with relative certainty.
\Vhat about the rest ofthe Aristotelian corpus? We know that aI-KindT had access
to a wide-ranging selection of Aristotle's works. In his letter On the Ouantity of the
Books of Aristotle, he mentions several of the logical works from the Organon. works of
natural science (such as De caelo, De generatione et corruptione. De sensu et sensibilia),
the Nichomachean Ethics, De Anima, and the Metaphysics, to name only a selection.7
Sometimes his mention of the works in question. however, is too cursory to show that alKindT had actually read the text, as opposed to seeing the text mentioned or briefly
described in another source. But even restricting ourselves to works we know were
translated in al-Kindi's day, we can mention not only the Metaphvsics and De anima but
also the extensive translations of Ibn al-Bi!rIq. His translations included the De Caelo
(his translation is quoted by al-Kindi). De meteorologica, a number of zoological works.
and the Prior Analytics. 8 Unfortunately we do not know which of these texts the Adaptor
himself would have read, nor is it always possible to be certain which texts were
translated prior to AP. Barring future work on AP which uncovers direct citation of other

See Guidi and Walzer (1940). See also above. 2.1.2.

8 See Endress (1997). 55-58. For the history of the translation of Aristotle's logical works, see also
Henri Hugonnard-Roche. "Les traductions du grec au syriaque et du syriaque a I'arabe (a propos de
'"Organon d'Aristote)." in Recontres de cultures dans la philosophie medievale. edited by Jacqueline
Hamesse and Mana Fattori (Louvain: Universite catholique de Louvain. 1990).131-147.

251

Aristotelian works on the Adaptor's part, we can minimally assume that the Adaptor had
a decent familiarity with the Aristotelian corpus, and directly knew the Metaphysics and
De anima, either in Greek or in their Arabic versions.9
Porphyry: As mentioned previously, one of the persistent interpretations of AP has been
that it somehow represents a work by Porphyry, perhaps a commentary on the Enneads by
its editor. This is based primarily on the mention of Porphyry in the attributions of the
Prologue, but also gains credence by Porphyry's claim to have authored "headings and
commentaries" on Plotinus' works. In 1.2.2, I argued against some of the philological
arguments in favor of the "'Porphyrian hypothesis:' We can now add that our
philosophical study of AP has thrown the hypothesis further into doubt. We saw in 4.1.3
that. although the theme of "learned ignorance" seems at first to connect Porphyry and
AP. the evidence for a direct Porphyrian derivation is not strong. Even if Porphyry were
the ultimate source for the use of the term "an ignorance higher than knowledge," the
Adaptor's conception of that ignorance is not Porphyrian, so the connection would be of
little philosophical interest. Likewise, in 5.2.4, we were unable to completely rule out
Porphyry as a source for the theme of God as "pure being," but again found that the
Adaptor's position is philosophically and terminologically quite different from
Porphyrys. We may conclude that there are no overwhelming philological or
philosophical arguments in favor of the Porphyrian hypothesis. Perhaps more
C) The same goes. incidentally, for works of Plato. some of which were available in the time of alKindT (see Endress (1997), 55, and F. Klein-Franke, "Zur Uberlieferung der platonischen Schriften im
Islam:' Israel Oriental Studies III (1973). 120-139). Despite this. the only significant engagement with
Plato in AP would seem to be the paragraph at the end of mimar I anributing the Plotinian cosmic hierarchy
[0 Plato. Zimmermann may be putting the point too strongly when he says that the Adaptor "clearly thinks
that much or most of Plotinus is strictly an exposition of Plato" (Zimmermann (1986), 145). But as the
mistaken 3trributions of other passages to Plato suggests (see Zimmermann (1986),145-148), the Adaptor's

252

imponantly, even if Porphyry did have some role in the formation of AP (even as an
external source), this role was not large enough to shape the Adaptor's philosophical
views significantly.
Alexander ofAphrodesias and John Philoponus: It seems wonhwhile to mention here the

possibility of direct or indirect influence on AP from Alexander and John Philoponus,

though my comments on this should be seen as suggestions for funher investigation
rather than conclusions. As we have just mentioned, the Adaptor was influenced by
Aristotle's De anima, perhaps by way of the paraphrase of that text produced in aIKindIs circle. Arnzen has argued persuasively that this paraphrase was deeply
influenced by John Philoponus. 1O We also know that Philoponus' commentary on the De
Anima was also translated in al-Kindi"s circle, so this may have been a source for the
characterization of the soul as a "simple substance (jawhar basi[j.'11 Texts by Alexander
of Aphrodesias were also collected and translated into Arabic around this same time,12
and may even have been included along with AP in the large collection of Greek texts
that Zimmermann calls the *Theology.13 It would be instructive to detennine whether the
availability of works by Philoponus or Alexander, or both, influenced the authors of texts
like AP and the Liber de Causis.
Pseudo-Diollysius: The scholar who has written the most in the last ten years on the

Arabic Plotinus is Cristina D' Ancona Costa, and one of her consistent theses has been
main way of understanding Platos thought was indeed to assume that the Enneads accurately retlected that
thought.
10

Arnzen ( 1998). chapter 3.

JI

Endress (1997), 57.

11

Endress (1997),55.

253

that AP (and through AP. the Liber de Causis) was influenced by the thought of the
Pseudo-Dionysius. This interpretation. defended in numerous articles. is based on the
following observations:
1. The theme that God is being or pure being and creates through being. found in AP,
differs from that found in Porphyry. But it has affinities with passages in Dionysius. who
says that God is a cause through His being" (auto to einai: Divine Names IV. I ) and uses
"being" (on.

011(6s 011.

Iro Oil) as a divine name. 14

2. The dialectic of affirmative and negative theology used by the Adaptor is also.
famously. used by Dionysius. For example. in passages on God as being. Dionysius says
both that God is being and above being (huperolisias).15
3. Again, the theme of docta ignorantia that so many have seen as a parallel to Porphyry
is closer to the conception of Dionysius. who says that our knowledge of God is a
"knowledge through ignorance" (he di' agnosias ginoskomene: Divine Names vn.3).16

D Zimmermann (1986). 130. See also S. Fazzo and H. Wiesener. "Alexander of Aphrodesias in
the Kindf-Circle and in al-KindTs Cosmology;~ Arabic Scie"ces alld Philosophy 3 (1993). 119-153.

I~ See her forthcoming articles, "Cause prima superior est om,,; "arratiolle. II lema delle ~ifiil
Alliih nel primo neoplatonismo arabo:' and "L'influence du vocabulaire arabe: causa prima est esse
talltu",:' Also '''Cause prima non est yliathim: Liber de Causis. prop. 8[9}: Ie fonti e la dottrina," in
O'Ancona Costa (1995). 116: "La doctrine Neoplatonicienne de l'etre entre I'Antiquite tardive et Ie Moyen
Age. Le Liberde Callsis par rapport a ses sources:' in D'Ancona Costa (1995). 147-149. She also finds a
parallel between the Divine Names and a statement in Liber de Causis 2 that God is being prior to eternity:
"Esse quod est supra eternitatem. La Cause Premiere, l'etre et l"elernite dans Ie Liberde Causis el dans ses
sources:' in D'Ancona Costa (1995), 65. She traces the use of the notion of something's acting "through its
being" to Syrianus: "L' influence du vocabulaire arabe: causa prima est esse tatrtllm:' and "La doctrine
Neoplatonicienne de ('etre entre (' Antiquite tardive et Ie Moyen Age. Le Liber de Causis par rapport a ses
sources:' in D'Ancona Costa (1995),147.

's For negative theology, see D' Ancona Costa, Christina, "Le Fonti e la Struttura del Liber de
Causis," in French in D'Ancona Costa (1995),51. For the specific example of being and above-being. see
"'Cause prima non est yliathim: Liber de Causis. prop. 8[9J: Ie fonti e la dottrina:' in O' Ancona Costa
(1995), 115
16

O'Ancona Costa (1994),21.

254

4. The translator of the Enneads into Arabic is identified as Ibn Nii"ima al-Him~i; the last
word here means '''from Emessa.:~ which is in Syria. This means he might have had
access to the Dionysian tradition~ since the Divine Names was translated into Syriac.
D' Ancona Costa nevertheless admits that, without the benefit of direct quotation
from the Divine Names in AP, this interpretation remains somewhat speculative,
suggesting at one point that

Dionysius~ AP

and the Liber de Causis form a sort of

doctri nal ""family~ of interrelated texts. 17 Yet, one cannot but be impressed by the sheer
number of paraJlels she finds on both the philosophicaJ and terminological level. In my
view, O' Ancona Costa has made a successful case for the idea that Dionysius is a more
likely philosophical source than Porphyry. But without more extensive textual parallels,
we cannot be sure that the Adaptor was influenced directly by Dionysius, for he may have
gotten these same ideas from a different source or severaJ sources, 18 or he may have
devised them to a large extent on his own. Nor can we rule out a mediating text, perhaps
unknown to

us~

which transmitted Dionysian ideas to the Adaptor. Even indirect

influence from Dionysius could help to explain such striking statements in AP as

Hignorance higher than knowledge" or ""God is being alone."
To my mind, however, the development of these statements and the arguments
which underlie them is of more philosophical interest than their immediate or indirect
source. Quellenforschung should not blind us to the fact that the expositions of both the
ignorance theme and the theme of "'pure being" are largely independent products of the
17 "Esse quod est supra etemitatem. La Cause Premiere. ("etre et reremite dans Ie Liberde Causis
et dans ses sources:' in 0'Ancona Costa (1995), 66.

18 For example, the statement that God's effects are in God "as in a cause" (kat' aitian) is a parallel
between AP and Dionysius. but could also be derived from Proclus: "La doctrine Neoplatonicicnne de I'etre

255

Adaptor's philosophical thought. I have argued that these expositions owe more to
Aristotle and to debates within the KaHim than they do either to Porphyry or Dionysius. 19
Along the same lines, it is worth noting that the characteristic transformations of
Neoplatonic thought that we find in both Dionysius and AP (collapsing of the hypostases,
God as being, negative theology) are to some extent natural and even necessary within the
theological framework of Christianity or Islam. To the extent that this is true, we cannot
rule out an independent development of these themes. 1o

6.3 Who was the Adaptor?

Let us close the body of this dissertation by choosing a most likely candidate to
play the role of the Adaptor. We should first review the reasons for thinking that the
Adaptor was one writer, as opposed to believing that the changes introduced into the text
of the Enneads are the work of a series of authors. First, the style of the Arabic text is as
a rule uniform and fits neatly into the stylistic pattern of works by the translators in aIKindrs circle. This suggests that there were no extensive changes to the text that
postdate the version available in the time of ai-Kind.

Second~

there is a consistent

pattern of translations from Greek terms to Arabic terms, and much of the text remains
close to the Greek original. This suggests that, even if as some think, there was a Syriac
entre I"Antiquite tardive et Ie Moyen Age. Le Liberde Callsis par rapport a ses sources:' in D'Ancona
Costa (1995), 149.
1') In her most recent work D' Ancona Costa has also explored the possibility that the doctrine of
God as pure being is an engagement with the Kalam: see the forthcoming "Cause prima superior esr onuri
l/arrariolle. 11 tema delle ~ifiit Allah nel primo neoplatonismo arabo:'

20 Consider. for example. the fact that Thomas Aquinas inherits at least three independent
traditions that ponray God as transcendent being: those of Dionysius' Divine Names. Avicenna. and
Boethius' De hebdomadibus. Whether the Liber de Causis and by extension AP are a fourth source

256

intermediary text. it was a faithful rendering of the Greek. Third. in the absence of reason
to think otherwise. we should not assume additional stages of transmission (to do so
would be. as Zimmermann says, to assume the existence of "'suppositious entities").
Fourth -- and this to my mind is a crucial point. and one that can be made with conviction
only after a lengthy study of AP such as I have undertaken here -- the philosophical views
in the paraphrase are integrated with one another and motivated by a consistent set of
concerns. This suggests again that the changes in the paraphrase are the work of a single
author. Now. who was that author?
There was a time when the majority of scholars who worked on AP believed that
the author in question was Porphyry. Given my rejection above of significant Porphyrian
influence on AP. I of course reject that hypothesis. Zimmermann has provided numerous
good reasons for its rejection. including mistakes in attribution that Porphyry would not
have made (mistaking Heraclitus for Plato, etc.). More substantively, the philosophical
views in AP do not have. in the final analysis. sufficient affinity with Porphyry's views to
justify naming Porphyry as the Adaptor. This leaves us with two remaining candidates:
ai-KindT and

al-Him~r,

the editor and translator of AP. I have argued previously that the

Prologue is in fact by ai-KindY. and while I myself find the style of the Prologue to be
different from that of the paraphrase. this impression is purely subjective. Prima facie. it
seems that one could justify either attribution:

al-Him~Y could

have written AP and then

turned it over to al-Kindr for minor alterations, or he could have written an almost

depends on whether we choose to assimilme these Arabic paraphrases to Dionysius. or alternatively to see
them as precursors to A vicenna_

257

completely faithful translation which ai-Kindt then subjected to a complete overhaul.

producing the very different paraphrase which has come down to us.
The strongest argument in favor of ai-Kindt is that he was a brilliant enough
philosopher to have made the changes we have documented. He cenainly had the
familiarity with other Greek texts, especiaUy Aristotle, that the Adaptor displays, and
there is a general philosophical agreement between ai-KindT s other works and the
doctrines of AP (see Appendix A). But the argument remains in my view a weak one. for
who is to say that

al-Him~T was

not also a philosopher of great acumen? It has been

common to assume. as Zimmermann for example does. that the translator's frequent
misreadings of Greek and failures to recognize other Greek sources mark him as an
philosophical dilettante. But proficiency in Greek ought not be confused with
philosophical insight. Indeed, what would the linkage of philosophical insight and
facility with Greek imply for al-KindI, who probably did not read Greek at all? If we do
not fall prey to this confusion, there is I think little reason to see AP as the work of a
bumbling translator who was succeeded by a philosophically brilliant editor.
On the other hand. there is a very strong reason to think that

al-Him~t was

the

Adaptor. namely that many of the philosophically interesting changes are tightly
interwoven with translations of the Greek. Certainly there are also interesting
independent passages in AP, but this dissertation has shown that the vast majority of
philosophical relevant passages turn on subtle alterations to the text which could only
have been executed by the translator of the Greek. This is borne out as well by the
handling of Greek terms in AP, whether in the engagement with soul as enrelechia, or in
the systematic and original use of the term anlliyya and its cognates to translate einai and

258

011.

Such a substantive philosophical alteration of the Greek text could only have been

done by ai-KindT ifhe (a) did in fact know Greek~21 and (b) went through the entire
translation~

referring extensively to the original Greek lext~ and introducing substantial

changes to almost every sentence. Point (a) is

possibility one is inclined to wonder
Him~rs

why~

unlikely~ and

while point (b) is a

in that case. ai-KindT did not dispense with al-

services and do the translation himself in the first place. On this basis, I

conclude that the translator. identified for us in the Prologue, brought to his task not only
a knowledge of Greek but also some knowledge of Greek philosophy. an awareness of
contemporary theological debates. and the willingness and ability to devise original
philosophical interpretations of the source text. The Adaptor. then. was

a1-Him~T. and

he

was a philosopher as well as a translator.

:!I Endress (1997).44. concludes that he did not. For a discussion of whether ai-KindT did any of
his own translations. see Cortabarria Beitia. "A partir de queUes sources etudier ai-Kindt?.. MIDEO 10
( (970). 86ff.

259

APPENDIX A

AL-KINDI AND THE ARABIC PLOTINUS

An extensive study of the Arabic Plotinus would be incomplete without a detailed

discussion of its

editor~~ al-Kindi.

We have already made frequent mention of ai-KindT

in attempting to determine the extent of his contribution to AP. In summary, we have

found that al-Kindf was likely the author of the Prologue in Th.A (see above, 2.1.2),
while his impact on the paraphrase itself was probably minimal. We now tum to a study
ofal-Kindf"s own

works~

in order to examine the extent of AP's influence on the thought

of this first self-identified "philosopher" in the Arabic tradition. Unsurprisingly, there is a

strong affinity between the philosophical views of ai-KindT and those presented in AP. so
much so that a thorough examination ofal-Kindf"s use of AP is beyond what can be
provided here. Even though almost all analyses of al-Kindf"s philosophical works make
some reference to Neoplatonic influence from AP, there is no published overview of this
influence. I will attempt to provide such an overview here. without pretending to have
exhausted all manifestations of that influence in the Kindian corpus.
AI-Kindf" s acquaintance with AP grew out of his philosophical project, which was
sponsored by the Abbasid caliphs al-Ma'miin (reigned 813-833) and

260

al-Mut~im

(reigned 833-842). I This project sought to provide Arabic translations of Greek scientific
and philosophical works. AI-Kindi commissioned translations from a group in Baghdad
that included not only Ibn

N~r ima a1-Him~i,

Metaphysics, and YahYa ibn

aJ-Bi!riq~

but also Us!ath, translator of the

who paraphrased several Platonic dialogues. As

we have seen. the Book on the Pure Good (Liber de Causis) and a paraphrase of
Aristotle' s De Anima were aJso produced by this translation circle. The translations of alKindfs circle are united by the style and vocabulary displayed in AP.2 It is not clear
whether al-Kindi himself could read either Greek or Syriac. the languages from which
these translations were made. Though later Arabic biographers credit him with having
written translations himself: such statements are probably based on the fact that al-Kindi
commissioned these translations from others. 3 Be that as it may. he drew on the Greek
tradition extensively to produce a sizable corpus including hundreds of treatises on the
natural sciences. politics. logic and philosophy.~ Unfortunately the vast majority of aJ-

I For their sponsorship and the motives that guided it. see Dmitri Gutas (1998). especially 75-104.
122-126. Though al-Ma'mun is often presented as the first caliph to suppon the translation of Greek texts.
GUlas shows that the 'Abbasids sponsored translations before the time of ai-KindT. AI-KindT dedicated
numerous works to the son of al-Mu t~im. Ahmad. He fell into disfavor. however. under the reign of alMutawakkil: he was deprived temporarily of his library and never regained his status at coun.

See Gutas (1998).145-146.

J M.1. Moosa. in "AI-Kindrs Role in the Transmission of Greek Knowledge to the Arabs:' Journal
of the Pakistan Historical Society 15 (1967). 3-14. concludes that "what al-Kindi did was either to
summarize or revise the Arabic of translated works." though he also asserts that al-Kindi had some
knowledge of Greek. given analysis of Greek loan-words in his treatise On the Quantity of the Books of
Aristotle. However. there seems to be no reason to suppose that aI-KindT's knowledge of Greek was greater
than that of a philosophy student who knows what terms like emelechia or ellergeia mean. without being
able to actually read Greek.

.: In al-Fihrist. al-Nadim gives a partial list of this corpus totalling 242 works. For a
comprehensive overview of the corpus. including notes on the availability of texts and translations, see
Atiyeh (1967). 148-207. Atiyeh lists 270 different titles.
In this appendix. the following abbreviations will be used in citing al-Kindls writings. AR
signifies the edition ofal-Kindfs works published by Muhammad Abu Ridii (1950-1953). and unless
otherwise noted refers to the first volume of this edition. Unless otherwise noted. all page citations in this
appendix are from the first volume of Abu Ridii's edition as well. For the available translations of these
texts, see the bibliography at the end of this dissenation.

261

Kindr s works are no longer extant. but we retain enough of his writings to reconstruct
much of his philosophy. 5
One of the best indications for aI-Kindrs approach in his philosophical works is a
passage found in his most famous treatise, On First Philosophy. He writes:
FP 103.8-11: It is appropriate for us... to follow in this book of ours our custom in
all of our treatises, in supplying completely what the ancients said on this topic,
according to the most direct paths and easiest deponment of the descendants
(abnii') of this path. and to complete what they did not say completely about it. in
accordance with the custom of language and the practices (sunna) of the time, to
the best of our ability.
His procedure. then, is to canvass the views of the "ancients (al-qudamii ) .. (i.e. the

Greeks) on a given topic, to transmit their views and enlarge upon them as necessary.
That he actually employed this approach can be verified by the extensive allusions,
quotations. and paraphrases of Greek texts in his works. For example. a perusal of Alfred
Ivry's notes on his translation of FP shows that nearly every passage in the treatise
derives to some extent from Aristotle. AI-KindT did not. then. aspire to philosophical
originality. The purpose of his writings was in large pan to transmit the knowledge he
found in the translations he had commissioned. Notice that aI-KindT also claims to report
FP: "On First Philosophy" (AR 97-162). QN: "Discourse on the Soul. Epitome of a Book of
Aristotle and Plato. and the other Philosophers" (AR 272-280). Brief Statement on the Soul: "A Statement
on the Soul. Epitomized and Brief' (AR 281-282). Ouantitv: "On the Quantity of the Books of Arist()(le.
and What is Necessary for the Obtaining of Philosophy" (AR 363-384). On [ntellect: "On the [ntellect""
(AR 353-357). On the Cause of Generation and Corruption: On the Explanation of the Proximate Cause of
Generation and Corruption" (AR 214-237). On the Bowing of the Outermost Body: uOn the Explanation of
the Bowing of the Outermost Body and its Obedience to God" (AR 244-261). On Definitions: On the
Definitions and Descriptions of Things" (AR 164-180). Five Substances: Liber de quinque essentiis" (AR,
Volume [I. 9-35). That There Exist Separate Substances: "On That There Exist Separate Substances" (AR
165-269). On Sleep and Dreams: "On Sleep and Dreams" (AR 293-311). On Recollection: "Explanation
of what Remains in the Soul of What it had in the World oflntellect..:' (German translation in Endress
( 1994). 207-2 17. Translations made from German text. with citations to Endress' section numbers). De
Radiis. Latin text in D' Alverny, M.-T. and Hudry. F., 'AI-Kindi. De Radiis:' Archives d'Histoire doctrinale
et liueraire du moyen age 61 (1974).215-259.
5 For a more detailed biography ofal-Kindi. see Atiyeh (1967). 1-16. and Alfred Ivry's
introduction to his translation of On First Philosophy: [vry (1974),3-6.

262

and complete this knowledge Hin accordance with the custom of language and the
practices of the time:' a reference to his attempts to fashion a new Arabic philosophical
vocabulary and, perhaps, to show the relevance and acceptability of Greek views within
an Islamic culture.
This method poses a methodological problem for any scholar who wants to
investigate

al-KindI~s

philosophical views. For. if each of al-Kindfs treatises is in large

part an attempt to transmit the doctrines of a given source, then perhaps we should not
assume that there will be any consistency of views across the Kindian corpus. Hillary
Weisener has aptly written:

'~we

gradually find that no single work of ai-KindT may be

presumed to be complete or absolute in itself; each one addresses a particular subject...

and a particular audience. The genre and title and topic of a work direct and limit what
we can conclude from it:,6 She goes on to illustrate this with reference to al-KindT- s
Discourse on the Soul

~,

which she argues is based on a "'Hermetic source documenC'

that may not have much to do with al-Kindrs '-integral world view:~7 Jean Jolivet
confronts the same problem when discussing whether we can, or should even try to,
reconcile the doctrine of ~ with that of al-Kindrs On Intellect. Again, ~ is described
as a mystical, Hermetic, and Neoplatonic text, in contrast to the roughly Aristotelian tenor
of On Intellect (which he argues persuasively is largely drawn from John Philoponus). If
we can harmonize two such different texts, we will have to speculate rather freely to do
SO.8

The problem is exacerbated by our fragmentary knowledge of al-Kindrs works.

Works now lost to us might expand on the cursory or partial treatments of key issues that

Wiesener ( 1993). 24.

Wiesener ( 1993). 25.

263

we find in the extant treatises, perhaps reconciling doctrines that now require creative
interpretation to bring into harmony.
How we respond to this difficulty will guide our approach in studying al-Kindf.
For example.. should a discussion of Plotinian influence on aI-KindT assume that this
influence will be present only in texts written with certain goals in view? Such an
assumption would naturally suggest that we proceed by discussing the distinct treatises
separately. On the other hand, we might hope to find a systematic appropriation of
Plotinus that guides al-KindI"s thought in general.

Certainly~

if it is possible this latter

sort of interpretation would be more significant than one that treats works in isolation,
works that mayor may not represent al-KindI's considered view. Since I hope to provide
here a systematic interpretation ofal-KindI's corpus~ let me make several points in
defense of a general, cross-textual interpretation of his works.
First. it should be noted that ai-KindT is fundamentally a synthetic philosopher. It
is true that he incorporated into his own writings ideas from various texts, texts we would
now see as opposed to one another (such as Plotinus and Aristotle, or Hermetic texts and
the Aristotelian commentary tradition). However. al-KindI"s professed aim was to show
the harmony and consistency of these disparate sources. We have already seen above that
ai-KindT inherited the Alexandrian ordering of the philosophical sciences, according to
which Plato and Aristotle were in harmony - indeed. in this

tradition~

Platonism is seen

as the fulfillment of Aristotelianism (see above, 2.1.3). Whether or not he wrote the
Prologue to Th.A. it is reasonable to suppose that he agreed with its portrayal of AP as
continuous with and even a'i completing the works of Aristotle. A similar synthetic

J. Jolivel. L'lnrellecl selon Kindi(Leiden: Brill. 1971). 141-144.

264

approach can be found, for example, in his Brief Statement on the Soul. After presenting
a compressed summary of Plato' s and Aristotle's theory of soul, he says, Someone could
think that there is a difference between these two statements" (28 I. 10). He goes on to
show that, on the contrary, Plato and Aristotle hold the same view of soul and its relation
to body. We have also seen that the political pressures on the translation movement
encouraged the presentation of a single, consistent Greek philosophy (see above,
[ntroduction).

r think there can be no doubt that al-KindI was attempting to provide in his

own treatises components of that unified view, whatever the disparate sources and
emphases found in individual Kindian works. To this extent we do violence to his overall
project by reading the works in isolation from one another.
Second. ai-KindT was not averse to drawing on several. apparently opposing
sources in a single treatise. FP is one example: although. as already mentioned. the
treatise depends heavily on Aristotle. arguments for the finitude of the world are drawn
from John Philoponus. the proof of God's existence as the source of unity draws on the
Neoplatonic and/or Neopythagorean traditions. and the text closes with a highly Plotinian
characterization of God.

and the Brief Statement on the Soul explicitly allude to a

multiplicity of sources. Though Wiesener may be correct that ~ is largely inspired by

an unknown Hermetic text, it seems also to preserve part of Aristotle's Eudemos, and as [
have argued elsewhere, it exhibits thematic and textual parallels with Th.A.9 The fact
that al-KindI was willing to base a single treatise on a variety of texts is unsurprising.
given his conviction that these Greek sources were in ultimate agreement. And this
C) For the Eudemos, see Richard Walzer. "Un frammento nuovo di Aristotele" in Walzer (1962).
For Th.A. see Peter Adamson. '"Two Arabic Doxographies on the Soul:' forthcoming in The Modern
School man.

265

aspect of his method more or less forces us to take a synthetic view of his corpus.
Though we should also be sensitive to the particular context of each treatise. 10 we might
misunderstand a particular treatise if we do not take other treatises into account. For
these might provide clues as to why aI-Kindt chose to juxtapose certain sources and
themes.
Third and finally. the synthesis of Greek philosophy undertaken by aI-Kind. was
not simply an attempt to reconcile a large group of sources that he considered equally
important. Rather. certain authors and texts served as his interpretive guides to the rest of
the Greek philosophical world. It is obvious, for example, that ai-Kind. treats Aristotle as
the key to solving most any philosophical problem. He uses most other sources to
supplement or adjust Aristotle. For instance, though he uses arguments from John
Philoponus to avoid accepting Aristotle's position on the eternity of the world, ai-Kindt
never strays far from the Metaphysics in FP, his own work on first philosophy:' In this
sense we can say that Aristotle is always in the background of any Kindian treatise. as a
sort of "master text"' that provides a context for the interpretation of other Greek texts.
Again, this suggests that it could be worthwhile to treat the Kindian corpus as a whole,
because it is unified by its allegiance to an admittedly ideosyncratic version of
Aristotelianism. In what follows. I will contend that AP served as another master text"
for ai-KindT. Its influence appears throughout the philosophical treatises, often in
unexpected or minor ways. Indeed, I hope to show that AP should be placed alongside
Aristotle as one of the dominant forces that shaped al-KindI"s philosophical worldview.

III For example. aI-KindT often says he has included in a treatise only what is necessary or
appropriate for its intended recipient. or only what is needed [0 answer a particular question.

266

A.I God and being

In the introduction to this study I stressed the importance of distinguishing between
Plotinus and the Arabic Plotinus when assessing the extent of Neoplatonic influence on
subsequent Arabic philosophy. A good example of this is al-Kindr s ascription of being
or existence to God. While, as Alfred Ivry has pointed out, this represents a rejection of
the original Plotinian ontology, II it constitutes a major point of agreement between and
aI-KindT and the Arabic Plotinus. In FP. ai-KindT asserts that -"the True is necessarily
existent (nlalt.jlid), so therefore the beings (al-anniyyoO are existent" (97.13). Like the
Adaptor. aI-KindT elsewhere describes God as -'the true Being (al-anniyya al-/1aqq)" (On
the Cause of Generation and Corruption, 215; see e.g. Th.A 1.52, GS 1.27).12 Such
passages show that aI-KindT took up the doctrine that God was both the cause of being
and. thereby, originative being itself. Because of the importance of this theme in AP, it is
worthwhile to pursue the parallel terminology in aI-KindT.
Let us first note that ai-KindT uses the words amziyya and JZln...iyya with much the
same semantic range as we find in AP. As Gerhard Endress has shown, amziyya is used
in ai-Kindt to mean simple "being" or existence." but also as a noun referring to a given
existent, and even as something like essence.,,13 Can we be more specific about what alKindt means when he calls God amziyya? We saw that the Adaptor meant by this
essentially two things: first, that God is eminently being as the cause of being. The same

II Ivry (1974).16. In fairness. [vry actually cites Th.A instead of Plotinus here. since the Adaptor
says at one point that Iww;yya is the first effect of God (the same idea is found in the Liber de Causis).
However Ivry is fully a\\are that al-Kindls position could be taken from AP: see his note on FP 97.13 at
[vry 120.

12

Ivry (1974).120.

13

Endress (1973). 101-102.

267

line of thought is displayed in the text cited above, FP 97.13. Second, the Adaptor says
that God is "only being" (anniyya faqa!J to indicate the lack of a multiplicity of attributes
in Him. Again. ai-KindT seems to hold a similar view in FP:
FP 161.10-14: The cause of unity in unities is the True, First One, and everything
that receives unity is caused. For every one that is not the One in truth is one
metaphorically, not in truth. And every one of the caused unities goes from
[God's] unity to what is other than [God's] being (lluwiyya), I mean that [God] is
not multiple with respect to it existing (min hayth yzljadu). [The effect] is
multiple, not absolutely one, and by "absolute one" I mean [something that is] not
multiple at all. and [something] whose unity is nothing other than its being (wala.vsa ~va!ldatuhll shay 'an glzayr Izuwiyyatuhu).
Particularly revealing here is the last phrase, in which ai-KindT equates God's unity with
absolutely simple being.
Thus, for aI-KindT to call God ""being" or '''nothing other than being" is in a sense
for him to reiterate the conclusion of his famous meditation on negative theology in FP:
"Therefore [God] is pure unity alone (u/a!ldajaqa! mahd)" -- notice the use offaqa!,
echoing the anniyyafaqal of AP, and of mahd, echoing al-khayr al-mahd C'the pure
good") in the Liber de Causis -- " I mean He is nothing other than unity, and every unity
other than Him is multiple" (160.16-17). As in AP, the equation of God with being is
primarily a denial of multiplicity in God. 14 And also echoing AP, this means that God
does not act or create through an extraneous principle, but through his simple being:
"every one of [God's effects] exists when God makes them exist through His being (bihml/(vyatihi)" (162.3). AI-Kindi's use of the terms anniyya and hlnviyya to name God,

then, is not only a terminological parallel with AP, but also motivated by identical
philosophical concerns.
l-t See M.E. Marmura and 1.M. Risl, "AI-Kindrs Discussion of Divine Existence and Oneness:'
Mediaeval Studies 25 (1963). 347-348 for a similar parallel between al-Kindi and OS.

268

Perhaps. like the

Adaptor~ al-Kindi was

motivated by his sympathy for the

Mu'tazilite position on divine attributes. As we have seen, the unity of God was a
favorite theme of the Mu tazilites and led them to deny a multiplicity of predications for
God. Abu Rida has speculated that a similar line of thought underlay al-Kindi"s lost
treatises on the unity of God (taw!iid).15 Another motive can be inferred from a different
sort of polemical work that has in fact come down to us: ai-Kindt's brief treatise against
the Christian doctrine of the Trinity .16 Significantly~ al-Kindi points out that if God were
a Trinity He would be composed of the three persons, but everything composed is caused
(kull murakkab rna liil).17 This is the same line of reasoning we find in FP, where al-

KindT argues that anYthing multiple must have a cause of its unity. God.
uncaused

unity~ and

then~

will be an

it is this that ai-KindT means when he refers to God as being. Thus

al-KindI"s appropriation of the anniyyafaqat theme may have been pan of a proMu "tazilite. anti-Christian polemical effort.
The presence of this complex of issues in ai-KindT raises a question we treated
briefly in our discussion of AP. We have seen that al-KindL like the Adaptor. equates
God with being in order to stress the divine oneness and simplicity. This might well lead
a student of later Arabic philosophy to see a prefiguring of the distinction between
essence and existence, which is found inchoate in al-FarabT and underlies much of Ibn
SInii"s metaphysics. One might argue as follows: in both aI-KindT and AP. we find a
15 See Ivry ( 1974). 24. and fn.15 for references to Abu Rida (1950-1953) and the treatises
mentioned in Atiyeh (1967) and al-Fihrist. See Atiyeh. 192-193. treatises number 185 (Risiila al-Taw!J.id
bi-Taft'lrar) 189 (R. fi ljiiraq ai-MilaI /-Tawhid.... ) and 192 (Kaliim... .fi 'I-Tan-!J.ld).
16 The treatise is preserved by Yahya Ibn'Ad. who quotes it piece by piece in order to refute it.
The Arabic text and a French translation can be found in A. Perier. "Un traite de Yahya ben 'Ad. Defense
du dogme de la Trinite contre les objections d'al-Kind.: Revue de "Orient Christian 3rd series. 22 (192021). 3-21.

269

distinction between u set of attributes and the "being" (anniyya, Illnviyya) which
possesses those attributes. The same notion and terminology is found in the Liber de
Causis: 'And when the individual is not a man, it is u living thing, and [when] not a
living being, it is only being (allniyyafaqaV" (Proposition I: see also above, section
5.2.2). In

FP~

al-KindI writes:

FP 113.11-12: The eternal does not corrupt. because corruption is only the
changing of the predicate (maami'l). not of the first bearer of predication (hamil).
As for the first bearer of predication. which is being (aysa), it does not change.
Here again, we have a conceptual distinction between being'S and the multiple features
that belong to being. As Jean Jolivet
sort of prime matter:' In this

sense~

predicates is the reverse of Ibn

remarks~

in this passage aI-KindI treats being as "u

the distinction aI-KindI makes between being and

SIn~r s

existence / essence distinction: for Ibn SIna.

existence is the actualization of an essence, so it would make more sense to speak of

existence being predicated of essence if one were to speak here of predication' at all.
Still, there is an obvious parallel between the attribute/being distinction in these tex.ts of
aI-KindI's circle and Ibn

SIna~s essence/existence

distinction.

But there are two convincing points to be made against a latent distinction of
existence from essence in aI-KindI. First. aI-KindI considers it impossible for there to be
essences which have no being. We can see this from a passage cited by Jean Jolivet. 19 In
On the Bowing of the Outermost

Body~ aI-Kind!

writes that God "has the power to bring

the ideas (ma'iinJ) into being (kawn)" (257.10). This indicates that an idea -- that is, an

17

Pcrier ( 1920-21 ). 4.

II! Aysa is an unusual term found in ai-KindT but not in AP. He usually uses it in contexts where he
wants to contrast being with non-being (/aysa). and in all probability he fashioned the tenn by imaginatively
dissecting laysa into Ia and aysa. "not" and "being:' For the use of a)'sa see Endress (1973). 104-105.

270

essence -- is not distinct from its being. For God to create an idea just is for Him to bring
it into being. Thus al-KindI rejects a certain picture of creation which might be
associated with Ibn

SIn~

according to which God has access to numerous essences of

possible existents, and creates by actualizing or bestowing existence on some of these

essences. Whether or not this is a fair characterization of Ibn

SIn~r s position~

it paints a

picture of creation that persists today in talk of God creating by actualizing a state of
affairs or possible world.

20

We can see why al-KindI would reject this picture by making a second point: in
FP ai-KindT consciously chooses not to distinguish between being and essence. Consider.

for example, the following:

FP 119.15-16: There is no body without duration, since duration is that which its
being is in (hiya rna lz11wafihu huwiyya), I mean that in which there is what it is
(rna hllwafihu hllwa ma [huwa]).
In this rather bewildering sentence. ai-KindT equates being (Izuwiyya) with "'what a thing
is" (mii huwa). In other words. the thing in question just is its being. A further point is
made more explicitly at the beginning of FP chapter III. AI-KindT argues that a thing
cannot generate its own essence, in other words. be self-caused, because if it did:
FP 123.18-124.3: ...its essence (dhat) would be other than it. because things other
than each other are those for which it is possible that something happen to one and
not happen to the other. Therefore, if it happens to it that it not exist, and it
happens to its essence to exist, then its essence will not be it. But for every thing.
its essence is itself (wa-klll! shay' fa-dhiituhu hiya huwa). So it would not be
itself, and this is also an impossible contradiction.

1<)

Jolivet(1971). 122-123.

~" Such a view is stated strongly by Shahrastanf under the influence orIbn STna; Jolivet (1971)
contrasts this view with ai-KindT's. 123-124.

271

In the previous quote~ al-Kindi pointed out that a thing is the same as its being.

Here~

al-

KindI argues that it is impossible for a thing to be distinct from its essence. But if a thing
is the same as both its being and its essence, then clearly its being and essence are also
identical. Though aI-KindI does make a conceptual or verbal distinction between a thing
X, the being of X, and the essence of X, he resists any attempt to introduce a real
ontological distinction between these three. Of course~ does not rule out that Ibn

Sin~

al-

FarabI and others might have found in aI-KindT the inspiration for such a distinction in the
form of a parallel distinction between being and attribute. AP and al-Kindl. then, may
have set the stage for the celebrated distinction between existence and essence, but
without ever embracing or formulating the distinction themselves.

A.2 The emanative hierarchy

Discussions of the influence of Neoplatonism on Christian, Islamic and Jewish thinkers
often tum on the question of whether their views of creation are emanationist:' In such
discussions it is imperative to specify what we mean byemanationism. 21 By saying that a
philosopher ascribes to a metaphysics of emanation, one might mean merely that the
philosopher uses the language and metaphors of emanation. By this standard ai-KindT is
certainly an emanationist, since he uses the termfayd, common in AP, to refer to God's
creative act. 22 More substantively, the following distinct ideas might be taken as
emanationist: (a) that the world is eternally caused by God (b) that the world is
~l A good example of this strategy is employed by L Gerson in "Plotinus' Metaphysics: Emanation
or Creation'!" in Review of Metaphysics 46 (1993).559-574. Gerson concludes that, on an adequate
understanding of Plotinus even his metaphysics is not straightforwardly emanationist. He opposes
emanationism to creationism. the exemplar of which is Aquinas' metaphysics.
11

See for example FP 162.

272

necessarily caused by God (c) that God's immediate causality is limited to a first effect,
which becomes the immediate cause of the second effect, and so on. Finally, (d)
emanationism might just mean acceptance of the Plotinian series of archai: God,
Intellect, and Soul.
Now. there is no question that al-KindY rejects (a), the eternity of the created
world. In a well-known extended argument in FP, he draws on John Philoponus to show
that the body of the world is finite in time as well as in space. 23 Less obvious is his
position on (b)., whether the world is necessarily caused by God. He has nothing to say
about the subject in FP, though his closing remark that the world's existence is owing to
God's generosity" (jiid: FP 162.16) might be taken to imply that God need not have
created the world. A more revealing text. unexpectedly. is al-KindY's work on the
Aristotelian corpus (Quantity). Here, commenting on the Qur'artic text: when God wills
(iriida) a thing. He says to it: 'be.' and it is" (36:82). ai-KindY writes: ""That is. when He

wills, what He wills exists simultaneously with His will" (Quantity 375.17-18).:N Though
this statement comes in the context of showing that God does not need time in order to
create. it is clear that ai-KindY accepts the Quc'anic notion of creation as proceeding from
God's will. It is worth noting that this does not necessarily indicate a departure from the
thought of AP. The context of the passage in Quantity is the same as that of the
independent passage ending Th.A I, which argues that God's causation is not in time
because God is not subject to time (Th.A 1.53-58). Furthermore, as we saw above (5.3.3),
the Adaptor does not hold simply that God creates necessarily, but rather that His
:!J See K. Staley. "AI-KindT on Creation: Aristotle's Challenge to Islam.' Journal of the History of
Ideas 50 (1989),355-370.

:!~ See J. Jolivet. "AI-KindT, vues sur Ie temps:' Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 3 (1993),67.

273

causation is above will in the normal sense. but such as to exemplify "complete freedom
of action" (GS 1.85). While I have found no trace of this more subtle view in aI-KindT. it
seems reasonable to suppose that both ai-KindT and the Adaptor wished to uphold God's
freedom in the face of mostly opposing passages in the Enneads.
That leaves us. then. with two ways in which al-Kindr s doctrine might be
emanationist. Let us take point (d) first: did ai-KindT accept the Plotinian archai as
presented in AP? We mentioned above (2.1.2) that in On Definitions, aI-KindT begins
with the definitions "First Cause --Intellect - Nature -- Soul" (165.4-7). This seems to
depend not just on Plotinus generally but on the specific passage in Enn V.2.1. paralleled
in GS, where Plotinus implies that Nature is a separate hypostasis. But of course. the
mere choice to list these definitions in this order does not prove allegiance to the
Plotinian hierarchy on al-Kindi"s part. 25 To corroborate this evidence. let us note first
that ai-KindT accepts a

~"two-world"

ontology, where the realm of sense (hiss) is

contrasted to the world of the intellect ('aq). Cristina D' Ancona Costa has drawn
particular attention to FP 106-107, where aI-Kindt says that the world of sense is
"unstable" because of its motion, and so unlike the stable intelligible world. 26 She argues
that the presentation of this generally Platonic idea actually conforms closely to passages
in AP. suggesting that ai-Kindt drew on AP in formulating his epistemology. Cortabarria
Beitia has pointed out a similar passage on On Sorrows which also contrasts the worlds of
sense and intellect. and suggested with less evidence that this too has its source in AP. 27

25

Although such an inference has been drawn by Klein-Franke (1982).199.208.

26 O'Ancona Costa, 'Aristotelian and Neoplatonic Elements in Kindrs Doctrine of Knowledge;'

American Catholic Philosophical Quancrly 73 (1999b). II ff.
27

A. Conabarria Beitia, "La classification des sciences chez aI-KindT:' MIOEO II (1972).62.

274

Then ai-KindT did hold that the intelligible and sensible worlds were distinc4 and
he may have drawn this "two-world" ontology from AP. But did he accept the fullfledged Plotinian hierarchy ofGod~ nOllS, Soul and the sensible world? We can show that
he did by

illustrating~

first. that the intellect was for ai-KindT distinct from and lower than

God. and second that soul exists for aI-KindT between intellect and the sensibles. One
might suppose that the first would not be the case for

al-KindT~

since, in a work preserved

only in Latin translation, he writes that "the things which have no connection with matter
at all are

divine~

such as the things pertaining to God (res quibus non est continuitas cum

Izyle penitus sunt divillUS, sicut tJzeologica)" (Five Substances, II.Il). Assuming that

intellect is free from matter, then intellect will be divine.

that intellect is distinct from

God~

However~

he is very clear in FP

because the intellect is multiple whereas God is one

(FP 155). This is, of course, the same reasoning used by Plotinus to argue that God and
Intellect cannot be identical, pace Aristotle. AI-KindT even remarks that ..one could think
that [the intellect] is the first multiple thing, although it is unified in a certain way"
(155. I0). This is as close as ai-KindT ever comes to explicitly endorsing the notion that

intellect is, as Plotinus would have

it~

a one-many," multiple because of its plurality of

Forms but one because of its identity with those Forms.

We can complete the argument by showing that soul is for aI-KindT a third
principle which exists between the sensible and inteIIigible worlds. Such a view seems to
be presupposed throughout Q~L where al-KindI emphasizes the need for the soul to leave
the things of the physical world and join itself to the "intelligible world." As others have
remarked, the very use of this phrase "intelligible world" seems to depend on AP.2 8 Nor

:!8

See Endress (1994).188: Jolivet (1971) 145. fn.1.

275

is the picture of soul as existing between the sensible and intelligible unique to ~. as we
can see from another passage in Five Substances:
Five Substances IT.II-13: The things which are not inextricably connected to
matter are like the soul [or those things which are not connected to matter]... For
God the exalted has determined them [or ordered them] and placed them between
what is heavy [or solid], in which there is no[thing] light at all. and the light. in
which there is no[thing] heavy at aJi. and this is therefore the path and the way
from the knowledge of substances to the knowledge of the divine.
While the distinction between the "heavy" things of the material world and the "Iight"
things of the divine world may strike us as somewhat quaint. the point is fairly clear. AIKindT has said that the world is divided into three realms: what is materiaL what is free
from matter completely, and what has some connection to matter but is "separate and not
conjoined" to matter (IT. I I ). Soul is of this last kind. and thus exists between the purely
immaterial, which as we have seen is the world of intellect and God Himself, and the
purely material. Thus we may safely conclude that aI-KindT really did see soul as a
hypostaSIS of its own. and that his cosmic hierarchy agrees with that found in Plotinus and
preserved in AP and the Liber de Causis.
This leaves us to address a final aspect of emanationism. point (c): did ai-KindT
think that God caused only the intellect directly, and the rest of creation indirectly through
the intellect? This is a doctrine he could have found in AP, in such striking passages as
the following:
Th.A X. 153 [B 156]: [God] is the cause of all intellectual and sensible things,
although it originated the intellectual things without an intermediary. and
originated the sensible things through the intennediary of the intelligible.
Th.A ID.47 [B 51]: As for the Creator. the exalted One. He originates the beings
and forms of things. except that He originates some of the forms without an
intennediary (bi-glzayr tawassuO. and some of them through an intermediary (bitawassu[).

276

There is in fact room to question whether Plotinus in fact held that, for example, soul is
caused by intellect and not by God. For there are passages where Plotinus says that the
One preserves all things in being, without indicating that this preservation is through the
mediacy of 'lOlIS. 19 But any such ambiguity is removed in AP by the introduction of a
technical phrase: "through an intermediary (bi-tawassll[)." This phrase is used frequently
by the Adaptor, and as we saw (5.3.2), the Adaptor says it is characteristic of God to
create some things, i.e. intellect, without an intermediary (hi-Iii or bi-glzayr tawasslI!J and
other things through the intermediary of intellect.
Now. al-Kindi uses the same terminology in a short treatise that is crucial for
understanding his views on emanation: On the True Agent. He says:
On the True Agent 183.15-16: As for the Creator, may He be exalted, He is the
First Cause of all the effects in a true sense, of those which are through an
intermediary (bi-tawassu!J and those which are without an intermediary (bi-ghayr
tawasslIl)... [He is] a cause through an intermediary for those effects that are after
the first of His effects.
Here al-Kindi draws on the characteristic terminology of AP to make the central point of
his treatise: God is the only true agent, because He is the only agent who is not also an
effect. 30 But by the same token, His effects are also agents in a metaphorical" sense,
because they communicate God's agency to lower effects. Another characteristic bit of
terminology found in this treatise is the use of the root a-Ih-r to describe God's creation:
As for the effect, it is impressed (mllla'thar) with an impression (fa 'thfr) from an

:9 See Gerson (1993).564. Actually, [disagree with Gerson's interpretation here, and believe (hat
Plotinus did ascribe to emanation in (he sense of what Gerson calls a peraccidells causal series where the
One causes only notls to exist, and "OtiS is a sufficient cause for the emanation of soul.
311 The same terminological parallel is pointed out in a somewhat different context by O'Ancona
Costa ( 1999b). 29.

277

impressor (mu'aththir), 1 mean it is the effect of the agent" (On the True Agent 183.7).
This sentence is inspired by similar statements in AP using words of the same root. For
example, at Th.A X.31, the Adaptor says that sensible things "are impressed from causes
that are effects [lit: caused causes). that is, by the intellect through the intermediary of the
soul." And in a crucial passage that describes the emanative hierarchy at greater length
than anywhere else in AP, the Adaptor uses variants of the word "impression" more than
40 times (GS I.36-46). He describes intellect, soul. the heavenly and earthly bodies as the
first. second. third. and fourth "impressions" of God's impressing causality (GS 1.42-45),
and ends by stating:
GS I.46: All the impressions are attached to the first act, which is the intellect.
The intellect is attached to the First Agent. The First Agent is the Originator and
Preserver of all of them. However, He is the Originator of some of them without
an intermediary, and of others through an intermediary.
Given these close terminological parallels. it is not unlikely that this lengthy passage from
GS was an immediate inspiration for al-Kindr s short treatise On the True Agent.
While one could probably multiply further textual parallels, I will note only one
more because of its importance. AI-KindT uses a third characteristic phrase from AP when
he describes God as the "Cause of causes": "We have made clear in our book On First
Philosophy that the First Cause, I mean God, exalted praise be to Him, is the Originator
of all and the Completer of all, the Cause of causes and the Originator of every agent"
(On the Cause of Generation and Corruption 219.8-9). We have already seen that the
epithet "Cause of causes" appears in the Prologue to Th.A. It is a title for God that
eloquently expresses the sort of "emanative" idea we have been exploring: God is the
highest cause. but His primary effects are causes for further effects. Hence al-KindI says

278

here, echoing On the True Agent. that God is a cause of things that are themselves causes
and agents in a derivative way. The presence of this theme in two different treatises.
devoted to quite different topics. indicates that mediated divine causality was a basic tenet
of aI-Kindrs philosophy. Given that this notion is most explicitly presented byal-Kindi
in On the True Agent. and that this treatise is tenninologically similar to AP. it seems safe
to conclude that aI-Kindi was an emanationist in the sense of embracing point (c)
mentioned above. and that he derived this view from AP. We have found. then, that aIKindT rejected the eternity and necessity of the world. In this sense he was not an
"emanationist." Yet he did inherit from Plotinus an emanative theory. insofar as he
accepted the Plotinian hypostases and the emanative notion of mediated causality as
presented in AP.

A.3 Theory of the intellect

One of al-Kindr s most frequently discussed works is his brief epistle On Intellect. In this
work he presents an intriguing four-fold division of intellect which seems to anticipate
the intellective theory of al-FarabT, even as it is likely inspired by works from the Greek
tradition of Aristotelian commentators. For us the crucial element of the work is alKindT s characterization of what he calls the

~"first

inteIlect:' This intellect is contrasted

to the three "second intellects:' and clearly represents al-Kindi's interpretation of the
"'active intellect' described by Aristotle in the famously obscure De Anima ID.5. AlKindT writes:
On Intellect 356.13-357.5: As for the intellect that is in act eternally. and brings
the soul to be in act and intellective. after it was intellective in potency. it and its
object of intellection are not one thing. Therefore the object of intellection in the

279

soul and in the first intellect, with respect to the first intellect, are not one thing.
But with respect to the soul, the intellect and the object of intellection are one
thing. And this [object of intellection] in the intellect, by [its] simplicity, is much
more like the soul and more powerful than in the sensible. Therefore, the intellect
is either a cause and a first for all the objects of intellection and the second
intellects, or it is a second [intellect] and belongs to the soul in potency, when the
soul is not yet intellective in act.
One thing that comes out clearly from this passage is that ai-Kindt distinguishes the first
intellect from the soul's intellect. This should not be surprising given our findings in the
last section. which sho"'"ed that ai-Kindt accepted from Plotinus the idea of a transcendent
intellect above soul. Thus aI-KindT will specify that the intellect belonging to the soul is
not intellect itself, but "intellective soul (Ilafs 'aqliyya):,31 The intellect itself, by
contrast, is called here "first intellect." The distinction between first and second intellects
finds a parallel in both AP and the Liber de Causis. 31 But is al-Kindrs conception of this
transcendent "first intellect" also Plotinian?
Because aI-KindT presents a division of intellect into four types. On Intellect has
often been associated with Alexander of Aphrodesias, who made a similar division of
intellect into three types: active, potential or material, and the intellect with a disposition
(Izexis)

to think. 33 However, Alexander's active intellect is identified with the

Aristotelian prime mover God. whereas we know that ai-KindT distinguished intellect
from God. Alexander also conceives human intellection along different lines than alKindI does. Thus Jean Jolivet. in his magisterial study of aI-Kindi' s theory of intellect.

31 See e.g. ~ 273.16. The same phrase appears in AP. for instance at Th.A VIII. 108. X.63.
Compare also the Magalat rr 'I-Nafs ascribed to Porphry. which uses the phrase 'aql naftani. "psychic
intellccr." See Kutsch (1954). 268 line 14 in the Arabic: Jolivet (1971). 75.

32 Th.A X.34. Liber de Causis Prop.5. See Jolivet (1971).80: H.A Davidson. Alfarabi. Avicenna
and Averroes. on Intellect (New York. Oxford University Press. 1992). 16.
33

See Atiyeh (1967). I 18. On Alexander"s views of intellect. see Davidson (1992). 14 and 20.

280

shows that Alexander was most likely not a source for On Intellect. 34 After considering
Themistius and Simplicius as possible

sources~ Jolivet

argues persuasively that it is John

Philoponus whose thought displays the greatest affinity to aI-Kindrs short treatise on
intellect. In addition to several direct textual parallels adduced by Jolivet. 35 there is a
general philosophical affinity between Philoponus and al-Kindi. Both have a four-fold.
rather than three-fold, division of intellect, and both distinguish the active intellect from
the human intellect (whereas Themistius. for example, is at pains to reject this, saying at
one point that "we are the active intellecC36 ) by characterizing the human intellect as
passing from potency to act without ever attaining pennanent actuality.
I think that we should accept Jolivet's identification of Philoponus' commentary
on the De Anima as the chief and immediate source for al-Kindr s On Intellect. However.
we must reckon with Philoponus' portrayal of the transcendent active intellect as divine.
Indeed Philoponus describes and rejects a theory according to which intellect exists
between God and the human soul. 37 As Gerhard Endress has pointed out. this means that
there is a significant departure from Philoponus on

al-Kindi~s

part, since we know from

FP and other texts that this was precisely his conception of transcendent intellect. 38 Since
the reason given in FP for distinguishing intellect from God is that intellect is "the first

.'-1

Jolivet (1971).31-41.

35

Jolivet (1971).66-70.

36 Two Greek Aristotelian Commentators on the Intellect. translated by Frederic M. Schroeder and
Roben B. Todd (Pontifical Institute: Toronto. 1990).95. Jolivet (1971). 45.
-"7

See lolivet (1971),62-63: Davidson (1992). IS.

38 Endress (1994). 196. He concludes that "ai-KindT contradicts [Philoponus], though he also
charac[erizes the first intellect as always in act: the first cause is the absolute One, not intellect. which
already has [he plurality of forms in if' (196-197). See also Ivry's notes on FP: "in emphasizing the
multiplicity of the intellect and in explicitly separating it from the ultimate Fire Principle. the Divine
Intelligence... ai-KindT modifies the doctrine along Neoplatonic lines" (Ivry (1974). 185).

281

multiple," it is reasonable to suppose that this departure from Philoponus was inspired by
al-Kindrs familiarity with Plotinus. And while On Intellect does not make this point
explicit at least two things suggest that ai-KindY had AP in mind when writing this
treatise as well. First, as already noted, we have a source in AP for the phrase Ufirst
intellect:' Second.. aI-KindY says in the passage quoted above that the object of
intellection has greater simplicity and power in the intellect than in bodies. This evokes
numerous passages in AP that portray the cosmic hierarchy as a descent from simplicity
to mUltiplicity.39
However.. the passage in aI-KindT that displays the greatest dependence on the
theory of intellect found in AP remains FP 154-155. This is not only because of the
characterization of intellect as "'the first multiple" and as necessarily distinct from God,
Who is perfectly one. It is also because of a contrast aI-KindT draws there between

t\VO

levels of knowing or thinking. Recall that the Adaptor uses the termfikr (often paired
with rawi))'a, "reflection") to pick out lower, discursive forms of thought. Thus he is
fond of saying that God does not engage infikr (see above. 5.3.4). In addition, the
Adaptor stresses that intellection is distinct from what Plotinus called dianoia, for soul
must go from one thing to another when it thinks, whereas the intellect is simultaneous
with all its objects: this distinction is marked in Arabic by differentiating thought (fikr)
from contemplation (ta 'ammltl):~o This complex of ideas is reflected in al-KindY:

39 See for example Th.A VIII.20-22. and DS 130-131, which distinguishes intellect as the "second
simple" from the One as the "first simple:' But compare also Alexander's De Inlellectu. translated in
Schroeder and Todd (1990). 51: "For by being itself the only thing that is simple. it has the capacity to think
a simple object. and it is itself the only object of thought that is simple:'

-In For this distinction see Th.A V1l1.65. VIIL I 06. For the idea that intellect does not need to "go
from one thing to another:' see Th.A VIII.52.

282

FP 154.11-16: Motion is existent in the soul, I mean that thought (jikr) passes
from some forms of things to others... Thus thoughts are both multiple and
unified, since every multiple has a whole and a pan... and these are the accidents
of the soul. Thus [soul) is multiple also, and unified in this way. So the True One
is not soul.
Significantly. ai-KindT treats soul differently from intellect here, using the terrnfikr to
demarcate the uniquely discursive thinking that belongs to soul. This suggests that the
distinction between noesis and dianoia is in fact carried over into al-Kindr s works.
mediated through the terminology of AP.
If Plotinus and. mutatis mutandis, the Adaptor distinguish between thought at the
level of intellect and at the level of soul, then all the more so must they distinguish
between intellective thought and sensation. With this distinction comes a corresponding
contrast between forms at the level of the intellect and in the sensible world. As the
passage we have been examining in FP continues. aI-Kind! tells us that soul '-becomes
intellective" (155.6) only when it unites to intelligible fonns. which ai-KindT calls
"universals" (kul/iyyal). This formulation is as Aristotelian as it is Plotinian. For both
Aristotle and Plotinus. of course, intellect is identical with its object, and intellection is
differentiated from sensation insofar as it grasps the universal rather than the particular.
Intellect grasps forms only insofar as they are separable in thought from matter. 41 What is
Plotinian and non-Aristotelian about al-KindI's theory of the intelligibles is that the soul
does not know the "universals" by abstracting them from sense-perception, but instead by
uniting to a transcendent intellect which is identical to the universals.

':1 See. for example. De Anima 430a3-5: "For. with respect to those things without matter. the
thinker and thought are the same." 431 b 16-18: "When [intellect! thinks the mathematicals which are not
separate. it thinks them as separated:'

283

In That There Exist Separate Substances. al-Kindi says that ""that through which
the thing is what it is (rna huwo) is the form of the thing. and is either sensible or
intelligible" (267.10-11). The soul can perceive either sort of form. It perceives the
sensible form through sensation. and the intelligible form through intellection (see On
Sleep and Dreams 301.12-302.9). AI-KindT is clear that the role of intellection is to
perceive the latter form as independent from the particular sensible object:
On Sleep and Dreams 302.13-15: Before they are present, the sensibles are the
forms of the individuals. and the intelligibles are the forms of what is above the
individuals, I mean the species and the genera. The genera and the species and the
particulars are the totality of the intelligibles. 42
Thus one might think that sour s intellection is simply a matter of abstracting the species
and genera from its sensible encounter with the particular. Yet al-Kindi never mentions
such abstraction in connection with the intellect; in this text, he says only that the
imaginative

(mll~awu:ir) faculty

is capable of apprehending forms independent of

matter:B As Jolivet has pointed out. al-Kindi calls the sours use of images stored in the
imagination and separated from matter -discursive thought:' or fikr (On Sleep and
Dreams 3(0).44 Again. this is to be distinguished from intellection, which grasps purely
intelligible forms that are entirely free from matter. The soul can only do this by uniting
with what al-Kindi calls the ""first intellect:' since it is this intellect that is identical \\'ith
the intclligibles in actuality.

-11 The reason aI-KindT says that the individuals are intelligible is given in FP: individuals are
intelligible insofar as the soul can be united with their species and definition. See FP 154.17-155.1.
-13 Compare Th.A JI.54. which says that sense-impressions received by the soul are received only in
the sours imagination. and contrasts imagination with intellect.
+! Thus dreams are a use of fikr without a corresponding sensation. See Jolivet (1971), 130-131;
here he reiterates thatfikr designates "une activite de rarne inferieure a ['intellection:'

284

So we can summarize al-KindTs position as follows. From the Aristotelian

commentary tradition. most likely John Philoponus' commentary on the De Anima, he
inherits a four-fold division of "intellect" in which only the three "lower" or "second"
forms of intellect are associated with soul. While he could also find in Philoponus and
other Platonized Aristotelians the notion of a transcendent intellect, it is from AP that alKindT takes his notion of the intellect as a separate entity higher than soul and lower than
God. This intellect is the beginning of what is multiple. because it is identical with the
multiplicity of intelligible forms in it. Soul can think in two ways: discursively. by using
ideas it gleans from sense-perception. or intellectively, which requires it to be actualized
by the 'first'" active intellect. This distinction in the forms of psychic activity
corresponds to a distinction between intelligible and sensible forms. The fonner can be
attained only if the soul leaves the things of the body and attends to the "intelligible
world:' at which time soul itself becomes intellective and even intellect. if only for a
time. In this complicated confluence of sources and arguments. we have an excellent
example of ai-KindT s response to Greek thought. He freely combines elements from
Neoplatonic and Aristotelian sources, borrowing technical terms from both. In this case,
we might say that he accepts a roughly Aristotelian conception of the sours intellectual
faculties from John Philoponus. but adds on top of this a transcendent intellect as
described in AP.

A.4 The soul and recollection

AI-Kindl"s most important treatise on the soul is AI-Qawl fi "l-Nafs (QN), an intriguing
doxographical text which ascribes Platonic and Hermetic notions on the nature of soul to

285

Plato. Pythagoras, and Aristotle. As I have elsewhere made a detailed study of the
parallels between ~ and AP,45 I will only briefly rehearse the most important of these
parallels here:
(a) We find at least two likely textual parallels between ~ and AP. In the

first~

aI-KindT

compares the soul to a mirror and the body to rust on that mirror; the images may be
drawn from Th.A 1.37-38 ("Empedocles calls the body "rust' .....) and IV.37 (which says
that fonns in the soul are like shapes reflected in a mirror). In the second aI-KindT writes
4

that the sours "substance is from the substance of the Creator, the exalted One, like the
light of the sun from the sun" (273.4-5). This may have been inspired by OS 113: "lhe
intellect is only light flowing from this noble substance, just as the light of the sun flows
to things from the sun."
(b)

and other texts from al-Kindf s circle (like the Arabic paraphrase of the De

Anima) emphasize the simplicity of soul, a point underscored repeatedly in AP (see, e.g.
Th.A lXA. 13).
(c) Like other texts we examined above. ~ portrays the soul as an immaterial substance
which exists between intellect and body. In this epistle ai-KindT also emphasizes the need
for the soul to tum away from body and towards intellect.

in fact implies that the

soul exists in body only temporarily. and will return to its own world after the death of the
body. This theme is confirmed in al-KindI's epistle on recollection (see below), and
could have been derived from AP (see. for instance, Th.A II. I-56).

-15 See Adamson. '1'"wo Early Arabic Doxographies on the Soul: al-Kindr and the "Theology of
Aristotle... forthcoming in The Modern Schoolman 77 (2000). 105-125.

286

(d) In QN al-Kindf holds

that~

although the soul is a separable material substance, it also

has faculties which it gains upon entry into the body. The same conception of soul is
found in other Kindian works. To explain this al-Kindlsays in 00 (273.15-17) that the
soul consists of intellectual sour' and lower faculties, which in AP are grouped under the
tenn "animal sou1." In both Qri and AP (Th.A 1.(4) we find the doctrine that it is only
the fonner, "pure" intellectual soul that survives the death of body to return to the
intellectual world.
On the basis of these thematic parallels, in addition to numerous instances of
shared terminology between the two texts, it seems reasonable to suppose that AP was a
central source for

al-KindT~s

theory of soul. This impression is confinned by another,

more peripheral, work on the soul: al-Kindfs epistle On Recollection. Here ai-KindT
takes up the question that begins Enn IVA and the parallel mimar n in Th.A: what does
soul remember about the intelligible world? It is instructive to compare the way the
question is posed in the two Arabic texts:
Th.A II.1-2 [8 29]: If someone asks: when the soul returns to the intellectual
world, and comes to be together with that intellectual substance, what will it say?
And what will it remember?... Does [the soul] remember what it was in from this
lower world? We say: it does not remember anything of what it thought about
here, and does not utter anything of what it spoke here, or what it philosophized.
On Recollection 2: Someone may ask: does the soul remember what it had
befolc i~s connection with the body, that is, before the use of the senses? [And
will it remember,] upon the corruption of the common [sense] organ, what was
known to it when it used the senses? Answer: the soul remembers what there is to
remember from its condition before the use of the senses when it uses the senses.
And after it has ceased to use the senses through the corruption of the common
organ, it remembers what it had when using the senses.
A striking difference between these two passages is that ai-KindT is, in effect, asking two
questions where the Adaptor asks only one. Both inquire what the soul remembers from

287

the sense world when it is freed from body and united to the intellect. But aI-KindI also
asks whether the soul remembers anything from its prior association with intellect when it
is in the body. In other words, we can delineate three phases in the soul's descent and
return: (a) soul prior to embodiment, (b) soul as embodied, and (c) soul having returned
to inteIIect. Plotinus and the Adaptor are asking about the soul's memory in state (c),
whereas al-KindI is asking about its state in both (b) and (c). While the discussion of
memory in Th.A II does briefly discuss the need for soul to tum away from body to
intellect. this is not called "'memory" in the text.
The contrast is heightened by 4 of On Recollection, which is a fairly detailed
discussion of the Platonic theory of anamnesis. That is, al-KindI says that when soul is in
body, it does not "learn" about intelligible things, but only ....remembers.. them. He even
explains why it might seem to us that we are "learning" even though we are in fact
remembering. This suggests that al-KindI had access to some text dealing with
recollection other than Th.A, such as an Arabic version of Plato's Phaedo..u; But by the
same token, the fact that ai-KindT does discuss the question of what the soul remembers
from the sense world (3) and sets up the question with a sentence of identical structure
to Th.A II. 1-2 in tum suggests that he drew on this part of AP as well. [would propose,
then, that On Recollection is yet another example of ai-KindT's eclecticism, and that he
was exploiting a thematic connection (the topic of memory) between AP and whatever
text or texts gave him access to the original Platonic presentation of anamnesis.
We find further parallels with Th.A II when we turn to al-Kindrs arguments about
the soul's memory. Above. we saw that al-KindI's treatment of intellect turns in part on a
~6 See Endress ( 1994). 188.

288

distinction between properly intelligible forms and forms graspable by sense. The same
theme is developed in On Recollection:
On Recollection 3: For after the use of the senses ceases, [the soul] will grasp the
intellectual things (al-ashyii al- ;aq/iyya): those things, which were [knowable] to
it when it used the senses, are not such as to be grasped with a bodily organ, but
rather essentially.
Later in the epistle. ai-Kindt classifies these ''"intellectual things" as '''primary:' as opposed
to the "secondary" sensible forms (5. 8):n He argues that it is impossible for us to know
the primary intelligibles through sensation, because they are universals and what is
known through the senses is particular and differentiated (5). Further, the soul is
immaterial, so the material cannot make an impression upon it (6). It can know only the
primary intelligibles, which are without place time, or sensible causes" (4). All of this
is in accordance with broadly Platonic doctrine and the epistemology we found in such
Kindian texts as On Intellect, FP,

~,

and On Sleep and Dreams. According to this

epistemology, the soul can grasp pure intelligibles by uniting to the intellect or
"intellectual world" (the latter being a phrase that appears in On Recollection as well as
other texts, and is most likely derived from AP). The part of the soul that does this is the
"intellectual soul," as contrasted with the lower soul. This lower soul can receive sense
impressions and store them in the imagination, but is apparently unable to abstract
intelligible

fOnTIS

from sensible particulars.

The way this doctrine is presented in On RecoIIection seems, again, to be inspired

by the discussion of memory in Th.A II. AI-Kindt concludes the epistle by saying that the
pure intelligibies are primary, eternal, unchanging [and] essential" (8). This last

47

This distinction can be traced ultimately to the Middle Platonists; see Endress (1973). 202.

289

remark echoes a statement in Th.A's discussion of memory, which calls intellect "'fixed,
eternal and motionless" (Th.A U.30). In 5, he emphasizes that it is only in sensation that
we have the differentiation required to grasp particulars; similarly, the Adaptor writes that
the intellect does not involve division "from species into individuals" (Th.A 0.9). But
the strongest parallel in this vein is al-Kindrs remark that knowledge of the primary
intelligibles is "without an intermediary (mutawassi!J" (5, 8). In the Adaptor's
discussion of memory. we find the statement that when the soul is in the intellectual
44

world, it unites to the intellect, and between it and the intellect there is nothing
intermediary (111utawassiO at all." On Recollection is, then, another Kindian work that
seems to have drawn both its doctrine and its vocabulary in large part from AP.
Of course, these parallels should not blind us to the presence of important
differences between al-Kindrs handling of memory and that found in Th.A D. We have
already noted one of these: al-Kindrs view is closer to the classic Platonic notion of
recollection. Also noteworthy is the absence in On Recollection of a dominant theme in
the relevant portion of AP. Throughout this section Plotinus, and following him the
Adaptor. stress that sours union with the intelligible is the attainment of a "timeless" sort
of knowledge. Indeed, the timelessness of intellection is presented as a main reason for
denying that the soul has memory when it has made its ascent (see Th.A U.7, 14-(6). But
ai-KindT never avails himself of the notion that the soul can transcend time. There is
good reason to suppose that the omission is intentional. As mentioned above, ai-KindT is
well-known for rejecting the eternity of the created world. If he were to accept that the
soul and/or intellect has a knowledge which is above or outside of time, he would be
forced to admit that they are created eternally or are uncreated. His opposition to any

290

such position can also be seen from his transfonnation of a passage from the part of Th.A
we have been examining. which says that the soul is "'above time because it is the cause
of time" (Th.A 11.14). AI-KindT repeats the claim in FP, but applies it to God instead of
soul (10 I). It is important to note such alterations of the doctrines ai-KindT found in the
translations he commissioned. For it reminds us that, like the Adaptor, ai-KindT was a
selective and critical transmitter of Greek thought.

A.5 Astrology
The name of ai-KindT was not unkno"'l1 to philosophers of the Latin West in the 12th and
13th century. Not only were many of his works translated into Latin. but Giles of Rome
attacks him by name in his Effores Philosophorum, grouping him with more familiar
figures like al-Ghanili, Ibn Rushd and Maimonides. Surprisingly, the reaction to
"Alkindus:' both positive and negative. centered on al-Kindi"s treatises dealing with the
topic of astrology. Though it is more usual now to credit al-Kindi with being the first to
fonnu late an Arabic philosophical vocabulary and to grapple with the complexities of
Greek metaphysics. a glance at the list of his works confirms his great interest in magic
and astrology. George Atiyeh lists 10 works of ai-Kind"s as ;'astrologicaL" but in fact
many other works of his deal also with the topic. such as On the Sign that Appears in the
Sky and is Called a Planet" and On the Usefulness of Astrology:.48 Two works that
represent al-Kindf as he appeared in the Latin world are De Radiis. an exploration of
astrology and magic and their basis in emanative rays. and The Forty Chapters. a work of
judicial astrology on practical topics. such as how to use the stars to find treasure or

-IS

See Atiyeh (1967).188-190.

291

choose the time for ajoumey..J9 While one might be tempted to dismiss this as a
peripheral. if not embarrassing, aspect of al-KindI"s thought, it is clear that ai-KindT
himself thought of astrology as being integral to his Aristotelian hierarchy of sciences.
For he saw mathematics as preparatory for astronomy, as is clear from works that use
geometrical constructions to prove things about the celestial spheres. 5o Astronomy, in
tum, is required to understand events in the sublunar world. 51
Because of the importance ofastrology in al-Kindl's thought. I have reserved until
now a discussion of how the Adaptor handled astrological themes in AP. As D' Alvemy
and Hudry have astutely noted, ""Ie commentaire de la Theologie fait aux astres une plus
grande place que Plotin:,52 Furthermore, there are significant points of overlap between
al-KindI"s understanding of astrology and the presentation of the heavenly spheres in AP.
Perhaps the most significant of these is ai-KindT's idea that astrology and magic work
primarily because of a universal "harmony" between all things. This is the same
explanation as that given by Plotinus in Enn IVA and transmitted by the Adaptor in Th.A
VI. AI-KindI"s "hannony has as its ultimate ancestor the Stoic notion of a sympatheia
binding the physical universe together, a notion Plotinus took over and exploited not only

-1') For De Radiis. see D'Alverny and Hudry (1974). 139-260. For The Fortv Chapters. see Burnett,
C., "AI-Kind. on Judicial Astrology: "The Fony Chapters, ." Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 3 (1993). 77I 17. For the excerpt on treasure-hunting. see C. Burnett, K. Yamamoto and M. Yano, "AI-Kind. on
Finding Buried Treasure:' Arabic Sciences and Philosophv 7 ( 1997). 57-90. \"'hile De Radiis exists only in
Latin translation. we have both Arabic and Latin texts for The Forty Chapters.

~J See, for example. N. Rescher and H. Khatchadourian. "AI-Kindfs Epistle on the Concentric
Structure of the Universe:' and "AI-Kindfs Epistle on the Finitude of the Universe:' ISIS 56 (1965). 190195 and 426-433. The Adaptor inserts a similar claim into AP. saying at DS 40 that geometry must be
studied to know astronomy.
51

See Cortabarria Beitia (1972).55.

5:!

D'Alverny and Hudry (1974), 157.

292

in his discussions of magic and the heavens~ but also in his theory of vision. 53 In what
follows, I want to expand on these observations by making two points. First, the interest
in astrology on the part of al-KindTs circle leads the Adaptor to modifY and exaggerate
astrological themes he finds in Plotinus. Second, the resulting astrological theory in AP
has specific parallels in ai-KindT's astrological works.
Plotinus accepts the widespread ancient belief that sublunar events are influenced
by the motion of the planets. Indeed, in Enn [VA he takes up the problem of whether the
stars intended to cause events in our world. and if so whether they bear the blame for
evils in the sublunar realm. We will return below to his solution and what the Adaptor
has to say on the same subject. For now let us note simply that astrology is not at all
foreign to Plotinus' thought. Admittedly. the Adaptor speaks more frequently of
causation by the stars than does

Plotinus~

and may ascribe greater efficacy to such

causality than Plotinus would. In an original passage that is intended to explain magic, he
writes:
Th.A VI.35 [B 78]: We say that, in the earthly things there are powers that
perform wondrous acts. They attain the power from the heavenly bodies, because
when they perform their powers, they only perform them through the assistance of
the heavenly bodies.
Not only does the Adaptor explain the magical

wonders'~

with reference to the stars, but

he also makes the stars the necessary and sufficient cause for such events. He is also
prone to injecting astrological themes into passages that originally deal with other topics:
Th.A VI.75 [B 83]: It has been made clear and explained, from what we have
mentioned, that every part of this world is acted on by the heavenly bodies.
53 In De Radiis. the Latin term is armolJ;a: see D' Alverny and Hudry (1974). 220. For the notion
of "sympathY" see Th.A V1.14. The connection between Plotinus and ai-KindT is also suggested by
D'Alvcrny and Hudry. 157.

293

Enn IV.4.45: From all that has been said this is clear: that each thing in the all...
contributes to the all and suffers and acts.
At one point, the Adaptor seems to anticipate the common Arabic theme that the heavens
can serve as a kind of dator!on1larum on matter which is appropriately mixed, writing in
an original passage: "it is from [the heavenly bodies] that the other bodies acquire life"
(Th.A IX.24).s,;
We have frequently had occasion to observe that the Adaptor, like Plotinus, sees
the cosmos as a hierarchy of ordered causes, so that the First Cause has intellect as its
immediate effect, the intellect is a cause for soul, and so on. Several changes in the
paraphrase emphasize that this chain of causality continues through the heavenly world,
so that the heavens are a kind of intermediate cause between soul and the sublunar realm.
Thus the Adaptor says that the heavenly bodies are the third impression of God's activity,
and the earthly bodies are the fourth (GS 1.44-45). This allows him to argue that the
heavens are an instrument for transmitting the governance or Providence (tadblr) of God
to the earthly realm. He says explicitly at one point that Uthe governor (mudabbir) of the
sensible world is the heavenly world" (Th.A Vill. 185 [B 120]). The terminology
provides a direct link to frequent descriptions of God as the highest cause of a
providential governance, the "First Governor" (al-mlldabbir al-au:wal). Even more
striking is a passage where the Adaptor goes well beyond his source to comp~rt" the stars
to God, echoing his frequent claim that God does not think or reflect (see above, 5.3.4):
Th.A Vill.80 [B 105]: [The stars] govern the earthly world in another world, it is
not through a device or through thought or reflection, but rather through the power
which the First Originator and Governor, may He be exalted, puts in them.

5~ Compare On the Bowing of the Outermost Sphere 248.18. See Wiesener ( 1993). 77.

294

Enn IV.4.6: For the good ordering which is from them to the all is of another kind.
All of this strongly intimates that the heavens are perceived as an extension of the

providential activity of God~ and that their causation on us is similar to

God~s causal

relationship to his creation. We will see another such parallel below on the question of
whether the stars will to produce their effects.
Now, aI-Kindi uses the same terminology to express his identical conviction that
the stars act providentially and as an instrument of God~ s governance. Therese-Anne
Druart reports that. in one astrological

text~

al-Kindi says that "astral conjunctions are

simple signs of God' s actions for those who know how to read them, since stars are
intermediaries between God and

US.',55

The same theme is found in On the Cause of

Generation and Corruption. which explains the stars' causation as the product of the
"governance (Iadbfr) of the First Governor (a/-mudabbir al-awlval), I mean the Governor
for every

govemor~ the

Agent for every agent. the Bringer-to-be (mukalvwin) for every

bringer-to-be, the First for every first, and the Cause for every cause" (214.10-11). He
later says that the stars, which are the "proximate efficient cause of generation and
corruption" spoken of in the title, are a product of "the universal governance (al-tadbfr al-

kulll) through the antecedent divine wisdom" (219.11).56 The echo of AP in the first of
these two

passages~

where al-Kindi says that God is the "'Cause of causes" because the

stars are intermediaries for his causality, is not unique among the astrological texts. In De
Radiis, he says that one may describe God as uCause of causes, God of gods and Lord of
55 T.-A. Druart. "AI-Kindls Ethics;' Review of Metaphysics 47 (1993), 346. This is her
characterization of a passage in a Kindian treatise I have not seen. on using astrology to determine the time
of God' s response to a prayer.
56 On [his theme of Providence in On the Cause of Generation and Corruption. see Wiesener
(1993),44-48.

295

lords, First of firsts, God and Creator,',57 before adding that negative predicates are more
appropriate still. AI) of this indicates that ai-KindT was in agreement with the Adaptor's
doctrine that God exercises his Providence (tadbir) through the stars -- the overlapping
vocabulary provides a yet stronger link between AP and al-Kindr s astrological works.58
We find further overlap in astrological doctrine when we tum to two more
specific questions, and how they are answered in AP and ai-KindT. First. do the stars act
out of wi II? And second, how do the stars act on the sublunar realm? The first question
receives a fairly extended treatment in Th.A VI, where the Adaptor is paraphrasing
Plotinus' discussion of whether stars are to blame for evils in the lower world. Plotinus
holds that the stars cause things to happen here only accidentally, as it were. The stars do
not will to cause particular events, but rather the events are by-products of their higherdirected wills, and explained by the universal sympathe;a between all things. He writes:
Enn IVA.39: the problems are already solved, whether the gift of evils come to be
from the gods, by [the fact that] their choices (proairese;s) are not effective
(poiollsas), but come to be by natural necessities, as long as they are from there, as
from pans to [another] part, and as consequents from the life of one thing.
The way the Adaptor paraphrases this passage is remarkable, because it echoes his
handling of God's will:
Th.A VI.7-8 [B75]: We have made clear and shown that no blameworthy thing at
all comes from the heavenly world to the earthly world, and the lords are not a
cause for any of these evils which exist here, because they do not act through wiJl
(hi-iriida). This is because every agent which performs its act by will (bi-iriida)
performs commendable and blameworthy acts, and does good and evil. But the
57 D'Alvemy and Hudry (1974).244. See also their summary. 145. They note that the phrase
"Cause of causes" is paralleled in the Liber de Causis. Prop. 17 (244 fnj). but do not mention AP.
58 One might suppose that aI-KindT and perhaps also the Adaptor were influenced here by
Alexander's Peri Pronoias ("On Providence"). which was translated in aI-KindTs circle, However. in her
study ofal-KindTs use of Alexander. Wiesener actually finds that the translator deemphasized the theme of
divine Providence in his version of this work: see Wiesener ( 1993), 62. This only makes the greater affinity
between aI-KindT and AP more striking.

296

agent which performs its act without will (bi-ghayr iriida) is one that is above will
ifa~vqa al-iriida). Therefore it only does good, and all its activities are pleasing
and commendable.
We saw above (5.3.3) that the Adaptor thinks God acts "above necessity and will" (cf. GS
1.62-63, DS 105-109), and now find the same line of thought applied to the heavens.
I would speculate that the Adaptor assimilates the stars' acts to those of God,
calling both non-volitional. precisely because he sees the stars as part of a benevolent.
Providential chain of causes initiated by God. But as with God. the stars do not act
because they are absolutely detennined to do so. Rather, they always do what is good,
partaking of the higher sort of 'freedom" the Adaptor ascribes to God. This means
always choosing the good. rather than ""performing [both] commendable and blameworthy
acts.~

as free humans do. Turning to al-Kindi, we find a somewhat similar handling of

heavenly volition. In a treatise designed to explain the Qur'anic assertion that the
heavens prostrate themselves to God (55:6), aI-KindT says that the heavens are detennined
in their motions by "the command (amr) of a Commander" (246.14), and yet this
obedience is voluntary.59 The reconciliation of invariably willing the good and freedom
of choice provides another parallel between ai-KindT and AP, though we should note the
difference in formulation. For unlike ai-KindT, on the surface level the Adaptor is
denying that the stars possess will (iriida), even if his deeper meaning is in harmony with
aI-KindI"s.
What about the question of how the stars exercise their influence on the sublunar
world? AI-Kindr seems to have had multiple, inconsistent explanations for this
phenomenon. In On the Cause of Generation and Corruption, he says that the rotation of

59

See also Wiesener ( 1993). 106: Aliyeh ( 1967), 27.

297

the heavenly spheres produces friction, which in tum causes sublunar events. But in De
Radiis ai-KindT provides an elaborate account of how this causation is effected through
"rays" emanated from the heavens. 6o The "proper nature" of the stars includes a
"projection of rays (proieclio radiorllm, probably translating marra!l a/-shu 'ii '):' and the
variation of sublunar effects reflects the variation in these rays.61 AI-Kindi uses
emanative language (effimdere) to describe this stellar radiation. Similarly, in another
treatise he writes:
On the Bowing of the Outermost Sphere (259.13): And this power (al-qudra) is in
truth the true agent, since it is without doubt the bringing of all that is in potency
into act. This is the true "'bowing:' for [God's] generosity in the emanation (alfaydJ of every act. This is the true administration (siyiisa) from the true
Administrator, and it is the bes~ of actions.
Here we have the theme of an emanation from the stars tied to the theme of God's
Providence. This conjunction of ideas is found in a family of texts from al-Kindi"s circle.
The first group of texts is al-Kindrs astrological corpus. The second is the paraphrases of
Alexander's works on Providence and stellar causality, which include statements such as
the following: "the first body emanates (y1l.fi4u) its power firstly upon the simple bodies,
then after that upon the compound bodies.',62 The third, of course, is AP.
Thus we find a particularly interesting modification of Plotinus in the fourth
l1limar of Th.A, which is clearly motivated by the Adaptor's interest in astrology:

Th.A IV.4 [B 56]: We shall give an example of these two world, and say that they
are like two stones, possessing a certain size, except that one of the two stones is
not proportioned, and art has not impressed it at all. And the other is
proportioned, and art has made an impression in it, and given it a shape. It might
60 For this tension in al-Kindis thought. see Wiesener (1993). 71 ff. She argues that the difference
in explanation simply reflects different sources used by al-Kindr.

61

D' Alverny and Hudry (1974),219.

6::!

Wiesener ( 1993), 67. her translation.

298

be engraved with the form of a man or the form of one of the stars: I mean. there
[might be] formed in it the vinues ifad.ii'il) of the stars and the gifts which
emanate from it onto this world.
Enn V.8.1: Let us suppose. if you wish, two stones of [some] size. lying near one
another, one of which is not proponioned or shaped by an. and the other of which
is already subdued by art into a statue of a god or of some man.
As he often does, the Adaptor suppresses Plotinus' mention of a pagan god. and proposes
the "form of a star" in its place.63 But he also adds the notion that the stars emanate onto
the earthly world. The same theme is found in an extended discussion of the soul's union
to the heavens in m[mar

vrn. which describes at length how the one who can unite his

soul to the heavens will be suffused with light. The extension of emanative language to
the stars fits into the pattern we have already observed: because the stars are. for the
Adaptor, one more in a chain of causes that effects God's Providence. the stars' causation
is akin to that of God and the immaterial causes. It is a causation that mediates the acts of
higher causes. a causation above will, and a causation that produces its effects by
emanation.
The discussion of union with the "lords" of the heavenly bodies in Th.A

vm

provides a final, and perhaps most philosophically important link between AP and alKindT's theory of the heavens. In QN, aI-Kindt says that after the death of the body, the
soul undergoes a process of purification during which it rises through the spheres of the
planets, and finally reaches the intelligible world (Q!S: 278). While several commentators
have identified this as an echo of Hennetic doctrine. 64 the passage is paralleled concisely

63 The change cannot be a misreading of Greek rheos, needless to say. But it might have been
inspired by Plotinus' frequent association of rlleo; with the heavenly bodies.
M For example C. Genequand "Platonism and Hermetism in al-KindTsfi al-Nafs:' Zeitschrift fUr
Geschich[e der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften 4 (1987/88),9.

299

in Th.A VIll.68 [B 102]: HWhen the soul raises its potency from this lower world~ [the
potency] is raised first to the

heavens~ then

from the heavens to above the heavens:' In

fact, the Adaptor also holds that when the soul first descends into body, it enters the
heavenly bodies before inhabiting a sublunar body (see GS U.45 and Th.A
inspired by Plotinus' use of the word "heaven" to refer to the

n.39~

which is

intelligible~ not stellar~

realm). While the agreement on this point between aI-KindT and the Adaptor is
intriguing, it seems most likely that both were inspired by other sources. The doctrine
that souls can become associated with the spheres is not only Hermetic. but can be found
in Plutarch and Porphyry as well. 65
This raises a final point that we should address before concluding our discussion
of astrology in AP and ai-KindT. We have found considerable agreement between the
Adaptor and ai-KindT on the basis of astrology and the functioning of stellar causality.
But this does not, of course~ indicate, that AP was the primary source for al-Kindrs
theory. Certainly the paraphrases of Alexander's works are better candidates for that role,
and in fact it would be more reasonable to suppose that the Adaptor was under the
influence of these and other texts that also influenced ai-KindT. More important for us are
the two points mentioned at the outset: first, as we have seen, the Adaptor's translation is
colored by Kindian attitudes towards astrology. Second. we may conclude that al-Kindi
percei ved AP as belonging to a large group of Greek texts which supported his views on
astrology and magic. That he saw no conflict between, for example, the more
straightforward Neoplatonism of Plotinus and the occult tendencies of the Hermetic
tradition, is confirmed by his account of the pagan Harranian ~abians. This account has

65

Genequand (1987/88), 9.

300

luckily been preserved for us byal-Nadim in al-Fihrist. In it, ai-KindT reports, with a
remarkably approving tone, that the

~abians were

in extensive agreement with Aristotle

on many points. Intriguingly, he mentions one "Hannis" as a prominent Sabian -perhaps a transliteration of Hermes? And, most importantly, he ascribes to them several
doctrines familiar to us from AP: God is a pure unity with Uno attribute... connected to
Him:' the soul is an "indestructible, incorporeal essence," and they say that hheaven
moves with a motion which is volumary and in accordance with reason:~ Given that,
after the closure of the schools in Athens in 529, an enclave of Neoplatonism apparently
survived in Harriin past the time of al-Kindi. 67 it would have been reasonable for aI-Kindi
to see the

~abians

and AP as part and parcel of the same tradition. This is not to say that

al-Kind'i explicitly viewed AP as "Hermetic," if he even had such a division in his

taxonomy of the Greeks. It is merely to re-emphasize al-KindI's erenic conception of
Greek thought as a harmonized whole, including even aspects of Greek thought we now
see as outside the mainstream.

A.6 Conclusion
As I said at the outset, I do not pretend that this appendix has presented a complete and
comprehensive assessment of al-Kind'i's use of AP. We have, however, examined so
many texts and themes of ai-Kind.' s, finding so many and such various parallels with AP,
that we may safely conclude that al-Kindrs thought was deeply and holistically

66 See al-NadTm. al-Fihrist. translated by B. Dodge in 2 volumes (New York: Columbia University
Press. 1970). vol.l. 746-750. Quotes are Dodge's translations.
67 See Aristotle Transformed: [he Ancient Commentators and Their Influence edited by R. Sorabji
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). 18.

301

influenced by Plotinus. Furthermore, the parallels we have adduced have frequently

shown affinities not just between aI-Kind. and Plotinus., but between ai-Kind. and the
idiosyncratic views of the paraphrase made by the Adaptor. Ruling out, for reasons given
in chapter 6, an identification of ai-Kind. with the Adaptor., I think it is clear that aI-Kind.
did not just edit all or part of AP, but studied it extensively and drew on it throughout his
works. It was for him, as I have suggested, a kind of "master text," a lens through which
he read other source texts. If all this is right. then AP has its rightful place alongside the
genuine Aristotle as a dominant intellectual force in early Islamic philosophy.

302

APPENDIXB
IBN sINA AND THE -THEOLOGY OF ARISTOTLE~~

One of the enduring controversies surrounding the great Persian philosopher Ibn
Sina (Avicenna) is whether he subscribed to an esoteric~ mystical

doctrine~ a

doctrine he

may have referred to as the "oriental philosophy. ~~ All students of Ibn Sina are familiar
with his Neoplatonizing appropriation of Aristotle in such works as

al-Shifii~ and

al-

Najat. But many commentators have held tha4 in a small group of other works~ Ibn Sina
contrasted this exoteric Aristotelian philosophy with his true views. These views were a
brew of Neoplatonism~Zoroastrianism, and perhaps Isma ~ ilism and ~iifism. This
interpretation is most strongly associated with the work of Henri Corbin, who, in works
on SuhrawardI and then Ibn SIna himself. argued that Ibn SIna anticipates the later
illuminative tradition in Iran with a properly "oriental" philosophy, Persian in heritage
and mystical in outlook. I The putative oriental philosophy is especially characterized,
Corbin and others tell us, by an intuitive, gnostic grasp of the divine on the part of the
human soul, perhaps after the death of the body.
What is the textual evidence for this interpretation of Ibn SIna? A number of
works in the Avicennan corpus might be considered Umystical," especially a series
I See. for example. H. Corbin, Avicenna and the Visionary Recital, translated by W.R. Trask
(Irving. Texas: Spring Publications, 1980) and the summary of this position in E. Panoussi, "La lhesophie
iranienne source d'AvicenneT Revue philosophigue de Louvain 66 (1968), page 251-252.

303

allegorical tracts which form the center of Corbin's interpretation. But the key to
unlocking these allegories is a series of references made in other works to Ibn Sina's
oriental philosophy. He apparently wrote a text called "The Oriental Philosophy" or "The
Oriental Principles" between 1027 and 1034, putting the work late in his writing career. 2
Unfortunately this book is not extant, except for an introduction and the opening section
on logic. There are references to it in aI-Shifii', letters from Ibn STna to students, and
other works. Another relevant text, also written late in Ibn SIna's life, is al-Insaf,
meaning '-The Fair Judgment." According to a letter that Ibn Sina wrote to his student
Kiy~

the title refers to Ibn Sina's adjudication in a dispute between the westerners" and

"easterners," or orientals. 3 Although al-Insafwas to be an extensive work, again most of

it is lost. The surviving portions include scattered notes on Aristotle's De Anima and on
the "Theology of Aristotle." Gratifyingly, these commentaries do indeed make reference
to positions held by the "orientals;' and to the aforementioned work of Ibn Sina's on
oriental philosophy.~
Now, in the introduction to his work on oriental philosophy, Ibn STna remarks that
some of his contemporaries are overly taken with the works of the Peripatetics, and that
wisdom may be gleaned from other traditions. He reports that he himself has come to
disagree with some Peripatetic positions, although he has remained silent on some points
of disagreement. This led the supporters of the "oriental philosophy" interpretation to see
a rejection of classical AristoteIianism (the "occidental philosophy") on the part of Ibn
STna. presumably because it is supplanted by the gnostic views of Ibn STna's mystical

See D. Gutas. Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition (Leiden: Brill. 1988). 115-130.

} See translation of the Letter to Kiya in Gutas (1988).63.

304

works (the "oriental philosophy"). And indeed references to the views of the orientals in
aI-Insafmake it clear that Ibn Sina identifies himself with them, and not with the
occidentals. But in 1951 Shlomo Pines dealt a blow to this reading by pointing out that
the "occidentals" in question are mostly likely not Aristotle and his Greek commentators.
but the Peripatetics of Baghdad in Ibn Sina's own time. 5 Ibn Sina himself~ hailing from
Khurasan in Persia. is by contrast one of the "orientals." Corbin and his followers took
this insight in stride.6 and Pines himself still subscribed to the ,,;ew that Ibn Sina was
trying to identify himself with a properly Persian philosophy. perhaps out of a sense of
nationalist pride. 7 Yet Pines cast serious doubt on the whole thesis of an esoteric oriental
philosophy by pointing out that there is little or no trace of such a Zoroastrian, gnostic
view in any of Ibn

Sina~s

substantive

works~

and that he may have simply been chiding

the Baghdad Peripatetics for their slavish devotion to the textual tradition. Ibn

Sin~

by

contrast. was of course willing to develop his own system on the basis of that same
tradition. An even more skeptical interpretation along these lines has more recently been
taken up by Dmitri Gutas and others. 8

See Gutas ( 1988), 115-1 16.

5 S. Pines, "La 'Philosophie Orientale' d'Avicenna et sa polemique contre les Bagdadiens:'

Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Liueraire du Moyen Age 19 (1952),5-37.
6

See Corbin ( 1980). 271-275.

7 Pines (1952), 32-33. See also Parvis Morewedge, "The Logic of Emanationism and ~l1fism in
the Philosophy of Ibn Sina (Avicenna)," Part I, Journal of the American Oriental Society 91 (1971), 473474.

8 Gutas (1988) refers to the interpretation of Ibn SIn~r s oriental philosophy" as a "comedy of
errors:' and says with some plausibility that this and similar views "tell more about their authors than about
Avicenna" (130, fn.28). See also his anicle "Avicenna: Mysticism:' Encyclopaedia lranica voLIn
(Routledge: New York, 1989), 79-83, and J. Janssens, Bibliography on Ibn Sina (Leuven U. Press: Leuven,
199 I ), who repeatedly sides with Gutas in his comments on other works dealing with the question of
mysticism in Ibn Sina.

305

The history of this debate makes it imperative that we take a closer look at the text
which is, perhaps, most decisive in the question of Ibn Sina and oriental philosophy: his
commentary on the ''Theology of Aristotle u in al-Insaf. 9 In addition to the explicit
references made in this work to the views of the orientals, this commentary includes Ibn
Sin~r s

most explicit engagement with Plotinus. If he was under the sway of an oriental

philosophy which took Neoplatonism as one of its central sources, then his reaction to the
'"Theology" should tell us a great deal about that philosophy. In any event it is likely that
the "Theology" played a central role in the development of Ibn Sina" s thought. In his
letter to Kiya. Ibn Sina wrote:
[In the Fair Judgment (K. al-In~at)] I set forth an exposition (shar!1) of the
obscure passages in the texts, up to the end of the 'Theology,' even though there is
some doubt with regard to the 'Theology' ('alii miifi 'l-uthiUiijiyii min a/-maran),
and spoke about the negligence of [their] commentators (mufassirin).10

This remark shows that Ibn Sina was in doubt as to the authenticity of the '''Theology'' as
an Aristotelian work. Yet it is undeniable that Ibn Sina was deeply influenced by
Neoplatonic philosophy, and the '--rheology" was surely one source, if not the crucial

9 Despite its importance. the commentary has received relatively little scholarly attention. It was
translated into French by G. Vajda. "Les notes d' Avicenne sur la 'Theologie d' Aristote ... Revue Thomiste
51 (1951), 346-406. I offer the first English translation as Appendix C of this dissertation. The only
scholarly articles focusing on the commentary (as far as I know) are L. Gardet, "Avicenne. Commentateur
de Plotin:' in his Etudes de philosophie et de mystigues comparees (1. Vrin: Paris. 1972). 135-146. reprint
of "En I'honneur du millenair d' Avicenne. L'importance d'un texte nouvellement traduit: les gloses
d'Avicenne sur la pseudo Theologie d' Aristote:' Revue Thomiste 51 (1951), 333-345: and J. Janssens.
"Creation and Emanation in Ibn Sina," Documenti e studi sulla traduzione filosofica medievale 8 (1997),
455-477. The Gardet piece uncovers several important themes of the commentary. None of these themes
seem decisive for the question of the oriental philosophy. though overall the piece points towards
conclusions similar to my 0\\11 (that is, that in the commentary Ibn Sina does not break with the views of
texts like ai-Shim'). Janssens' article is more narrowly focused on the question of creation and emanation
in the commentary: we will have an opportunity to visit this theme below.

10 Badawi (1947). 121. Compare. however. Ibn Sina's remark on Th.A 1.30-31, which says the
soul "imagines a species of imagination. to which he has alluded in his books" (45.9-10). If. as seems
likely, the "he" refers to Aristotle. then perhaps Ibn Sina was at least operating on the assumption that
Aristotle was the author of Th.A.

306

source, for this philosophy. Indeed the tone of the commentary itself makes clear how
seriously Ibn STna took the 'Theology.~~11 Thus in what follows I will more closely
examine certain key themes in Ibn srna's commentary. I will argue that, far from being a
jewel in the crown of a gnostic, oriental philosophy, the commentary shows Ibn STna to
be primarily an Aristotelian. There are indeed themes present which point towards a sort
of mystical knowledge, but these themes are ultimately to be understood along lines of
thought quite familiar to students of the supposedly "exoteric" Avicennan philosophy.

8.1 The treatment of soul in Ibn Srna's commentary

Ibn SToff's commentary is generally at pains to agree with the statements found in the
'rheology," even if it sometimes does so by offering rather tendentious interpretations of
the text. Yet the commentary begins with something close to a correction of the
"Theology." Commenting on the assertion in Th.A 1.1 that "the soul is not bodily... [and]
is permanent and eternal," Ibn STna says: "his meaning is that the soul does not exist freed
from the body as the intellectual forms which are mentioned in the Metaphysics are freed.
but rather there exists in [sours] nature an attachment and an inclination with the body in
the beginning" (37.7-9):2 In other words~ Ibn STna denies that the soul has an existence
separate from body and then falls into the body. Rather. the sours existence begins
within a body. and the soul is later freed from the body upon death. Ibn SIna supplies two
reasons for thinking this. One is implied by his comment on Th.A 1.5. which refers to the
II [n the estimation of Kraus. "si Ibn Sin~ en depit de ees doubtes. a eommente r ouvrage. il ne Ie
fait nullement par un souei a peine eonseient de syneretisme nail. mais paree que. quel que soit Ie veritable
auteur de la Tlziologie. eet ouvrage antique renferme des idees philosophiques si elevees qu'elles doivent
etre eonservees et mises a la portee des ehercheurs." Paul Kraus ( 1941). 273.

307

soul as ""an intellect informed by desire." Here Ibn Srna remarks that the soul is We
perfection of a natural,living body" (40.2). This is of course Aristotle's definition of soul
in De Anima 11.1. 13 Ibn Srna is then saying that the soul would be intellect if not for its
being joined to body.
This claim is explained by a second, better-developed reason to think that the soul
cannot exist before its association with body. The relevant argument appears as an
explicit correction to Th.A 1.3 (the soul "desires... the beauty of things which it has seen
in the intellecf'). Ibn SIna writes:
This text "it sees in the intellect" is a corruption. For if the soul has seen the
intellectual world, then it has become perfect, because the seeing of the thing is
the reception of its fonn. But [the text] means the seeing of the things that are in
the intellect. that is, it desires to see them in the intellect. (39.7-9)
Ibn SIna disagrees so much with the doctrine of the text that he assumes it is the product
of a scribal error. What he rejects is the idea that soul has already been in the intellectual
world before its term in the body, such that it would already have seen the forms in the
intellect. If this were the case. soul would have already been perfected. and would have
no need for a span of existence in the body to perfect itself. The Plotinian doctrine of
soul as an eternal hypostasis separate from body is then an impossibility: if soul were free
from body at its inception, it would be perfect and would never fall. Indeed, it would not
be soul at all. but would be pure intellect, as an immaterial entity whose actuality is the
complete range of intelligible forms. 14 Thus Ibn SIna dismisses a foundational

12

Citations from the commentary are to the page and line numbers from the Arabic text in Badawi

13

The definition also appears in Th.A: see above. 3.1.1.

( 1947).

1-1 See Ibn STna's comment on Th.A 1.3: 'Therefore it is likewise inadmissable that such a
substance [i.e. the soull, which does not have its perfections with its first substantification, be purely
intellectual. that is. freed from matter and its attachments in every way" (38.18-39.1).

308

Neoplatonic doctrine in order to hold, with Aristotle, that soul is properly conceived (at
least at its inception) as the fonn of the body.15
The extent to which this doctrine entails a rejection of Plotinus becomes even
more apparent when we tum our attention to the question of how soul does perfect itself.
For Plotinus, of course, the fall of soul into body is an evil for soul, an evil which the soul
can only escape by freeing itself as much as possible from the trappings of the material
world. In a sense, lbn Sfna agrees with

this~

insofar as he also holds that the ultimate

perfection for soul is to separate from body and be united with the intelligible world. 16
Yet Ibn Sfna

holds~ contrary

to Plotinus, that the soul can only be perfected through its

bodily existence. He says at one point that, "if it is possible that [the soul] loses this
deficiency and has a desire for separation, it follows necessarily that it searches for this in
the domain of change, not in the domain of fixity" (39.3-5). Again, "the conditions and
perfections which will come to the soul are not brought to completion except through the
body" (42.9-10). Thus the Avicennan position is that, although the final perfection of the
human soul is to be freed from matter and united with intellect, that perfection can only
be brought about through the soul's association with matter. In his comment on Th.A
VIII.61-63, Ibn STna states this position with particular clarity:

15 It might be objected that Ibn Sina does sometimes accept the fonnulation ofTh.A that soul
"descends" from or was previously in the immaterial world (see. e.g.- the comments on 1.30-31. II.46-47.
VIII. from 72.6-15) so that he either does agree the soul pre-exists body or is inconsistent on the question.
But see his comment on Th.A fX.75-76: "f say that. when [the soul] is seeking them. it thinks. and when
they exist for it. every time it wants [them] it turns away from bodily concerns towards the side of the
intellect. and unites to the intellect... the soul has conjunction [someti mes] and disjunction [at other times]"'
(73.8-12). This suggests that references to soul's existence in the intelligible prior to a given moment when
it is in body actually just allude to previous unions between the (embodied) soul and the intellect.
16

See. e.g. Ibn Sina"s comment on Th.A VII.3-4.

309

If the soul had a perfect potency through which it would unite to the intellect, it
would not need to associate with bodies, for its association with the bodies is in
order to perfect that potency. 17 (71.10-11)
Although the soul is not itself material,I8 it is a substance which exists, as Plotinus
would put it, "'on the horizon" between the material and immaterial worlds. As such, the
soul has faculties which tie it to matter (such as the senses and practical intellect), as well
as the faculty of potential inteUect. 19 It is only when this latter faculty is completely
actualized that the soul will be ready to unite with the active intellect, and be freed from
matter. The key to understanding Ibn

Sin~rs

position is that this actualization can only

happen through the soul's encounter with matter. It must have sense experience in order
to actualize its potential intellect. Thus Ibn SIna devotes several passages in the
commentary to soul's abstraction of intelligible fonos from matter, a notion which does
not appear at aU in the '7heology of Aristotle.' That he conceives this process along
traditionally Aristotelian lines is made clear by an explicit citation of Aristotelian works
in the commentary:
The soul augments [universal forms] in beauty insofar as it abstracts them with
the abstractions mentioned in the books De Anima and Sense and Sensibilia. The
most excellent of these is intellectual abstraction, which removes from them their
material adjuncts and the things which they are in as [in] a covering, [which] are
thought to be from the substances of these forms, but are not. Similarly sensible
[7 See also the comment on 1.14: "1 say: the soul joins to the body in order to have the adornment
which is proper to intellectual things. namely intellectual adornment, and in order to have the possibility of
conjunction with the intellectual substances. which have true pleasure and true beauty and true splendor.
The way of the soul is to make the body and the bodily organs. [thereby] acquiring the perfection proper to
it alone" (41.10- I3).
18 See his comment on Th.A 1.5: ""the soul is an intellectual thing separated from matter in its
essence" (39.15).

19 See Ibn SIna's comment on Th.A VII.45: '"That is. every soul has two powers: a power such that
through it. [the soul) may sense its union to the world of the intellect. and a power such that. through it. [the
soul) may sense its union to the world of sensc. The first power is the material intellect. and the intellect
through natural disposition. The second power -- [and it) is closer to the soul - is the practical intellect.
which is the internal and external senses" (69.14-16).

310

states are thought to be from the true natures of thing, but likewise are not.
Rather, the rational, cleansing soul frees them of these shells and frees them from
the foreign adjuncts. (40.8-13)
Since the soul perfects its intelJective capacity through this process of abstraction, the
soul can only become perfect by existing in the body and having the sense experiences
which provide the opportunity for abstraction. Thus. while Ibn STna's notion of the
ultimate destiny of soul as a separation from body may be Neoplatonic, his understanding
of how the soul prepares itself for that separation is fundamentally Aristotelian.
This makes it awkward for Ibn STna when he encounters the many passages in the
"Theology" which make it clear that association with body is a dire threat to soul's
nature. While Plotinus (ana by extension, Th.A) does not agree with the gnostic or
Manichean idea that the material world is purely evil, he certainly does not believe that
soul needs to have bodily experiences to perfect itself. Rather, as suggested above, for
Plotinus the soul's task is to withdraw from body as much as possible in this life.
Passages to this effect in the ''Theology'' are plentiful. One example is Th.A 1.14: "the
pure, clean soul which has not been dirtied and has not been sullied by the squalors of the
body... will return to those substances quickly and without hesitating.',2o Ibn Sina
responds by distinguishing between good and bad attentions the soul might pay to the
body:
For the soul is not turned away from the higher perfection through association
with the body, if it has not come to use [the body] in a way which is appropriate
[for the body], but rather through a condition which befalls the soul from its
approaching [the lower]. W~en the soul becomes bodily, and there is established
in it a condition of obedience to the bodily things, such as carnal desire, wrath,
and others, and these conditions even come to be dispositions in it, then the soul,
:W If anything. the author of Th.A was even more pessimistic about the sours association with body
than was Plotinus himself. See my discussion of the linking of moral issues to passages on soul and body
above at the end of 3.1.2.

3tt

after [separating from] the body, is in short that which it was in the body, and so is
turned away from the higher world. (41.15-42.3)
The soul is properly superior to body, and it must retain this superiority and not be
mastered by bodily desire. But with the caveat that soul must avoids such pitfalls, Ibn
SIna flatly denies that the body presents any threat to the sours perfection.
have

seen~

Indeed~

as we

it facilitates that perfection. Given the emphasis Ibn Sina places on

Aristotelian abstraction in this regard.. it seems likely that Ibn SIna is consciously trying to
preserve a place for Aristotelian science -- including physical science -- in his eschatology
of soul. Thus so far we have seen that, in his commentary on the "Theology," far from
rejecting his Aristotelian principles Ibn Sina goes out of his way to accommodate them.

8.2 Mystical knowledge in Ibn SIna"s commentary

The reader who wants to see the commentary as a representative of Ibn SIna~s
mystical oriental philosophy will no doubt object~ at this

POint~

that for Ibn Sina mystical

union is not achieved in the preliminary stages of the soul's ascent. Perhaps, not unlike
some late Greek Neoplatonists. Ibn SIna saw Aristotelian science as an initiation into
philosophy which would later be transcended by a higher, non-discursive, mystical
gnosis. This higher stage of knowledge would be realized not necessarily in soul's union
with intellect, but in the nature of intellectual knowledge itself and especially in
intellect's grasp of God, the First Principle. Some interpreters in favor of the oriental
philosophy hypothesis have in fact suggested that this philosophy deals especially with
soul's survi val and knowledge after the death of the body.21 Let us, then, exanline what

21

See Panoussi (1968). 252: Pines (1952).25-26.

312

Ibn STnff has to say about these higher stages of knowledge. It will be necessary to
acknowledge that Ibn STna is concerned with mystical doctrines, including ~iifism, in his
discussion of intellection in the "'Commentary:' But his understanding of this intellection
is. again, grounded in the Aristotelian tradition. Like his doctrine of the perfection of
soul. Ibn

Srn~rs doctrine

of mystical knowledge is a reconciliation of Plotinus and

Aristotle.
The concept in the commentary most likely to provoke speculation about
mysticism is what Ibn STna calls --true vision" (al-mushiihada al-!laqq). This is a name
for soul or intellect's knowledge of God. For example, early in the Commentary he
writes:
Awareness is one thing, and true vision is another. True vision follows
awareness, when the intention is turned towards the True One, and is disjoined
from all that preoccupies it and detains it from seeing it. Here [i.e. in true vision]
there is, together with awareness, a cognizance of the object of awareness,
inasmuch as the object of awareness is suitable and delightful. which is the
resplendence of the pure souL. [which] attains the beloved, which is beloved in
itself, not inasmuch as it is merely subject to awareness and intellection, but
insofar as it is beloved in its substance. If preoccupation screens the awareness
from it, how much more does [it prevent] true vision! I say that you are not
informed of this matter except by experience, and it is not among the things
known by reason. For in the case of every one of the sensible things [Le. acts of
sensation], although reason has a greater part of awareness, the proper states are
known through experience. Just as taste does not touch reason, so likewise with
the utmost degree of sensible pleasure. (44.5-13)
Several aspects of this passage deserve comment. First, note that true vision is being
contrasted with reason (qiyiis). Rational, discursive thought is in fact a distraction that
prevents the soul from attending to the divine essence. 22 This is in line with Ibn STnifs
~1 Cf. Ibn STn~rs comment on Th.A 11.1: "For there there is no deficiency or disruption of the
emanation required for it [the soull to perform an act and attain perfection. and to sayan utterance through
which it attains perfection. And this [disruption would bel thought and memory. and things of that son"
(47.11-12).

313

usual use of the term mushiidaha as an intuitive knowledge excluding discursivity.23

Second~

at least two features of the passage suggest that Ibn SIna was here influenced

by~

or at least concerned with, ~ufism. The mention of God as '-ute beloved" (al- "ashfq)
evokes the .ufi idea of love for God ( ishq), and Ibn SInd also compares true vision to
"taste" (la 'm), a common ~ufi metaphor for the direct experience of God. 24 Finally, Ibn
SInd seems to say that one cannot know what true vision is like until one has experienced
it; it is ineffable in that "it is not among the things known by reason." This might provide
another link to ~ufism, though it may also be simply a restatement of the view that a
vision of God's essence is non-discursive.
The idea that these themes gesture towards a mystical oriental philosophy now
seems more plausible, and becomes more so when we find Ibn SIna referring us to the
"Oriental Wisdom" to learn "how one must speak of the perception of the intellect and
what is above it" (53.19). Since we cannot refer to that lost work, however, it will be
useful to look more closely at Ibn SIna's descriptions of intellection in the commentary.
The commentary repeatedly makes two points about intellect that should be familiar from
Ibn

SIn~r s

other works. First, intellect knows about its effects by knowing itself: "insofar

as it is intellect. it follows necessarily that [the intellect] knows its own essence and that it
knows all things. which follow necessarily from its essence" (62.8-9). Second. intellect
knows all things but knows the particular through universal knowledge. Intellection does
not include knowledge of the particular qua particular. On this issue Ibn SIna agrees with

23

See Panoussi (1968). 248.

2~ The classic tenn for this in ~(jfism is not [a'm. but dlrawq. Still the context of the passage. where
taste is used to illustrate direct experience. supports reading the passage as influenced by ~ufism. A similar
passage. in the comment on IV.IM. compares vision of God with the perception of sweetness.

314

the author of the "'Theology" that there is a sense in which the intellect does not know its
effects: "and this kind of awareness -- and it is named intellectual imagination - is
ignorance of the particular insofar as it is particular" (53.4-5).
Now, both of these points follow from principles of epistemology found in the
Arabic Neoplatonic sources and in Aristotle. As we saw in our discussion of docta
ignorantia in Th.A (see above, chapter 4), the author of AP also developed the idea that

intellect knows about its effects because it knows itself and its effects are contained in it
as in a cause. The view is based on the premise that adequate knowledge is knowledge
through causes, a position also found in the Liber de Causis (Prop. 6) and Aristotle
(again. see above, 4.1.1). Ibn Sina adds to this the further Aristotelian premise that
scientific knowledge is knowledge of universals, not of the particular qua particular.
Aristotle argued for this point in the first book of the Posterior Analytics, chapter 24.
Thus Ibn Sina's commentary displays the same general view of intellection as that found
in his other, ""Aristotelian" works, a view derived from an Aristotle tinged with
Neoplatonic sources. To prove that Ibn Sina also ascribes to a different -'oriental" or
gnostic view of intellection, presumably describing intellect's knowledge of God, we
would need to show that the resources just outlined are incapable of providing a rational
account of such knowledge. To the contrary, Ibn Sina uses precisely these concepts in
further delineating his notion of "true vision."
Let us first take the issue of non-discursivity. Ibn Sina says several times that true
vision, or intellect's knowledge of God, does not take place through reason (qiyiis) or
thought (jikr). Remarking on the fact that intellect's knowledge of God allows it to know
all things as through a cause, Ibn Srna writes: --rhe intellect has known Him and known

315

His essence, and from these two it has known everything all at once, not through
searching or thought" (60.7). Of course, the notion that intellection is non-discursive is
itself a major theme of the 1'heology," where it is often addressed by denying reflection
(rawiyya) or thought (jikr) to God (see above, 5.3.4; the same couplet of reflection and

discursivity is used at Th.A 1.25, a passage commented upon by Ibn Sina). But Ibn SIna
modifies this theme slightly by pointing out that it is the universality of intellect's
knowledge that explains intellect's lack of discursivity:
For there is no transition there from state to state, so that it also does not happen
that the universal concepts temporally precede the particular concepts, as happens
here when one possesses the intelligibles. For one acquires the universal first,
then the temporal state comes to acquire detail. But rather, the knowledge is
general, insofar as it is general, and detailed, insofar as it is detailed,
simultaneously, not divided between two times. (48.10-14)
Thus Ibn Sina links

Plotinus~

contrast of non-discursive noesis with discursive dianoia to

the universaVparticular distinction made in the Posterior Analytics.

If the mysticism of "true vision" is not unique because of its opposition to
discursi ve thought and rationality,25 then perhaps we can locate the "oriental" aspect of
this knowledge by focusing on the source of the vision. Several times in the commentary,
Ibn Sina says that intellect knows God because God directly "reveals" (tajalli) Himself to
intellect. This revelation is seen as a "light" or "emanation" from God, which reaches
soul through the intermediary of intellect (see the comment on IV. 1-44, 55.17-56.13). A
particularly illuminating passage on this topic is the following:
The true nature of the divine is not conceived in the intellect except through a
kind of analogies, and consideration of the necessaries, and through the things that
go out from it, as has been explained, by means of the trace [of the divine]. And
15 This in itself would be a strike against the oriental philosophy interpretation; as Panoussi (1968).
249 remarks. c'esl... Ie caractere intuitif qui differencie la philosophie orientale d'Avicenne de la
philosophie grecque:'

316

if the essence of the intellect were such that it could attain from its essence to
having the true nature of the First clear to it, then the essence of the intellect
would be what necessitates the essence of the First... But its quiddity is not what
necessitates the quiddity of the First, but rather the reverse: the revealing of the
essence of the intellect to the intellect is not passed from the essence of intellect to
the essence of the First. But rather, the true nature of the essence of the First only
appears to it from the essence of the First. (53.9-14)
Here, [ take it that Ibn Sina is making a distinction between two ways intellect could
know God. The first is through God's necessary effects, the trace" of God in created
things. ~6 The second, superior way is derived not from the intellect's own essence, but is
an unmediated contact between intellect and God's essence, initiated by God. Hence Ibn
Sin~r s

point in the passage is to say that this revelation is not necessitated by the

intellect's own essence, but only by God.:!7

Though Louis Gardet has remarked that this is the prototype of what one might
call mystical knowledge according to Ibn

Sin~"

we should note that Ibn Sina's argwnent

is grounded on the principle of knowledge through causality taken from Aristotle and the
Neoplatonists. The intellect cannot know God through its own essence, because if
knowledge is through causes it would then be the cause of God; the same point is made in
the parallel text in the 'iheology" (ll.46-47). If intellect is to know God, then, the

Z6

Remarkably, Ibn Srna suggests that this way of knowing God proceeds by way of"analogy"

(tashkfk), which seems to anticipate Aquinas' doctrine of analogy. This has been suggested by John

Rosheger in a recent unpublished paper: "Are They Real'? Avicenna and the Divine Attributes:'
17 Ibn Srn~rs distinction bet\veen Imowledge ofGod from the "trace" of God in creation and
knowledge of God through a direct revelation echoes the theme, familiar in AP, that knowledge from effect
[0 cause is inferior to knowledge from cause to effect. This raises the question of which son of knowledge
is achieved in Ibn Srn~rs classic metaphysics of the divine. This metaphysics. as set forth in al-Shita' and
other works, deduces the nature of God and His relation to creation from the purely logical distinction
between the necessary and the possible or contingent. One might be tempted to think that this falls into
neither the category of knowledge from God's effects to God or of a divine revelation. However it is wonh
noting that Ibn Srn~rs deductive proof of God's existence depends on the observation that some possible
thing does. in fact. exist. (The logical distinction between the necessary and contingent does not by itself
show that anything need exist. but if we know that something possible does exist we can reason from this to
the existence of a Necessary Being.) Therefore this line of reasoning does depend on an observation of
God"s effects, albeit in the minimal sense of acknowledging the existence and contingency of those effects.

317

knowledge must occur through

God~s essence

and

not~

so to

speak~

on the intellectYs own

power. This is understood as a form of the familiar necessary emanation from God to His
effects in that the revelation occurs automatically once the recipient is prepared. 28 In
y

addition. there are indications that the revelation leads simply to a superior intellection
which can be understood along the same lines as normal intellection:
He mentions true vision~ which is that in which there is no turning towards the
true forms without needing to observe what they bear or what is from them. This
is [the case} only when the power is completed and perfected. and when it has true
vision of the true genus through the potency... (71.18-20)
In the previous section we saw that soul Ys perfection is understood as an actualization of
its potential for knowledge. Again here intellect is perfected when its potency or power
y

for knowing God is

actualized~

and this occurs through the revelation of GodYs essence.

This is not to take away from the originality of Ibn Sina's idea of a necessarily bestowed
revelation, which seems to be an alternative he accepted in response to the negative
theological argument of Th.A

n (and perhaps also Liber de Causis 6).

emphasize that Ibn Sina's true

vision'~ and "revelation~' are

In fact it is to

responses precisely to a

problematic of Greek philosophy, and that he continues to conceive of the knowledge of

God within the guidelines of his Neoplatonized Aristotelianism. If Ibn srna also uses the
language of ~iifism in describing this phenomenon, it is perhaps to validate an indigenous
Islamic mystical tradition by showing how it can be explicated according to philosophical
principles. 29

:!8 '"The necessity [is] ... not with respect to the receiver. except for [its] preparedness" (53.15-16).
See also Gardet (1972). 140.
:!9 The same conclusion is asserted in Gutas (1989). 79: "A vicenna... did maintain the validity of
Sufism. just as he maintained the validity of olher manifestations of Islamic religious life. but he interpreted
it. just as he inlerpreted them. in tenns of his own system."

318

8.3 Creation and emanation in Ibn

Criticisms of Ibn

SIna~s

SIna~ s

commentary

philosophy from al-Ghazail onward have focused on his

Neoplatonic" doctrine of emanation, that is, on the idea that creation is produced from
God necessarily and not by a gratuitous act of God's wilJ. Avicenna's argument for this
is well-known. God creates by thinking Himself, and it is necessary that God thinks
Himself. Therefore the "flowing forth" of things from God is necessitated by the nature
of God's essence as a self-thinking intellect even though, considered purely in
themselves, the created effects are only possible. One of the most intriguing passages in
Ibn SIna's commentary on the

;"Theology'~ addresses

an objection to this theory. Our

understanding of the theory will be deepened by attending to this objection and Ibn SIna's
reply. We will see that Ibn SIna is strikingly aware of the possible repugnance of his
view, and that in defending the view he has recourse to an additional premise, namely the
supreme goodness of God.
The passage in question is the lengthy fifth section grouped among Ibn

SIna~s

comments on mimar V (62.16-64.17). According to Ibn SIna created things are

necessitated by God's thinking them. In this sense they can be said to "emanate" or "flow
forth" from God, though from the point of view of the possible effects this is their
"creation" (the distinction between inbajiisan and ibdii 'an, 62.22-23). The objection to
this picture runs as follows. Imagine that God thinks of an effect, and call this effect X.
Now, we know that X is merely possible-in-itself, where as God is necessary. Therefore
God's thought of X cannot be the same as God's thought of Himself, since a thought of
something possible cannot be identical to a thought of something necessary. But then
God thinks of X as merely possible, and this thought is posterior to God's self-thinking.

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So there is no reason why God must create X: He thinks of it separately from thinking
Himself if He thinks of X at all, and when He thinks of X He perceives that it is merely
possible. and so is free not to create X. The only other option is that He thinks X as
necessary, but of then course X is actually a part of God's essence (God is the only
necessary thing around), and not a thing possible-in-itself. It follows from this that, in
addition to His thought of X as possible, God must intend or decide to create X: "you
must say that He intends [the effects] and arranges them" (63.10).
Furthermore, on Ibn Sina's view, according to which the effects proceed
necessarily from God, there would be no Providence. This is because God would not
choose or intend the effects to proceed in a certain (optimal) way; they would merely
proceed automatically in the only possible way, the way that God must think them. Ibn
Sin~rs

formulation of this part of the objection is particularly striking, because it

anticipates so many other critics who accuse him of "Neoplatonizing" the Islamic notion
of creation: "the generation of the things from the First would be sheer flowing forth
(inhajiis), not attached to His thinking them, even if His thinking them accompanies [the

emanationr' (63.14-15). What the imaginary objector has in mind. then, is that Ibn Sina
makes creation into an automatic emanation with no basis in God's will or desire to
create what is best. Rather, for Ibn Sina, things come from God in the only way possible:
they come into existence as soon as He thinks them, and God cannot avoid thinking them
in precisely the way He does.
What is surprising about Ibn Sina's response to this argument is how much he
concedes to the imaginary objector. He admits that there is no logical necessity for God
to think things the way that He thinks them. Rather, "thinking the best for them is" only

320

"among the facets of their possibility" (63.18-19), so that God does detennine the manner
of the possibles' actual existence. He determines them not, then, according to strict
necessity, but on the basis of His own perfection and goodness: ..they are only
necessitated from Him because He is according to the most excellent among ways of
existence" (63.20-21). Again, "their necessity is not simultaneous with His necessity
without the intermediary of the necessity of His attributes" (64.5). In other words, we
must presuppose His goodness as an additional factor which determines how God
chooses to actualize His effects. 3o Without the added premise that God is essentially
good (a premise which. of course, Ibn SIna thinks can be derived from God's necessity),
we could not argue that God's essence necessitates His effects. Ibn SIna denies only that
God chooses to actualize certain things as if He were desiring those things. They are not
an end for Him "except accidentally" (63.21). Perhaps we might put the point as follows:
God is not good because the things He creates are good. Rather, He is good from His
essence, and it follows from this accidentally that the things He creates will also be the
best possible.
What is interesting about this argument is that Ibn SIna is obviously aware of the
tension between his emanative picture and the orthodox Muslim view of creation. He
wants to show that he can accommodate the crucial aspects of that view, such as
Providence and omnipotence, on his own emanative scheme. But in fact his development

30 Notice that Ibn Srna does seem to imagine that there is a pre-existing range of possibilities, from
which God can choose (as if actualizing a possible world. in contemporary parlance). In the following
paragraph. he deals with the well-put objection that this makes the range of possibilities a second cause
outside of the divine essence. so that the possibilities are a second thing alongside God existing prior to
creation. rbn Srna responds that if the possibility of a thing does not pre-exist, then the thing was in fact
impossible - though he denies that this possibility itself is a cause for the thing. For al-Kindls view of the
same issue. see above. Appendix A section I.

321

of the argument is in large part along Plotinian lines. Plotinus also argues that the One
cannot "want" to make anything and treat its effects as an end~ or it would be
"incomplete" (V.3.12). In the parallel passage of AP, we find the Adaptur stating that
God does not will, but acts "through being alone" (OS 107) which in Ibn

Sin~r s

thought

is assimilated to the notion of creating as a necessary concomitant of the divine essence.

The argument we have just seen~ that God creates what He creates because He is good,
not because He wills or desires it, can also be found in AP: "the agent which performs its
act without will is one that is above wiII. Therefore it only does good" (Th.A VI.S).
Although Ibn Sin~rs argument is cast in his technical, broadly Aristotelian tenninology,
this theme then represents another way in which his thought in the commentary remains
close to what he found in the Arabic Plotinus.

322

APPENDIXC

TRANSLATION OF IBN SINA~S NOTES ON THE THEOLOGY OF ARISTOTLE"

As the final appendix of this dissertation I offer the first English translation of Ibn
Sinif s commentary on Th.A. The Arabic text can be found in Badawi (194 7)~ 37-84. In
preparing the translation I have consulted the French translation in Vajda (1951). I note
variant readings from Badawrs text in the

footnotes~ often

following an emendation

provided by Vajda. In translating I have striven for precision rather than ease of style,
since Vajda's translation is fairly readable, and since it would often require considerable
license to render Ibn
to the text of Ibn

Srn~r s

Sin~r s

complex Arabic syntax into easy-to-read English. In addition

notes, I have included translations of the passages he commented

upon from Th.A. Usually I have followed Badawrs identification of the relevant
passage, and when otherwise this is indicated in the footnotes. Please see Appendix B for
a philosophical analysis of the commentary.

C.I Notes on Mirnar I

[37] Th.A 1.1

As it has been shown and proven that the soul is not bodily, and that it does not die, does
not corrupt, and does not perish, but is pennanent and eternal.
(5) IS: He does not mean that the soul of man is existent before the body for some time,
not tending towards the body and not clothed with it, and then comes to it, because this
notion has been shown to be absurd in the books [of Aristotle?]; although with this [being

323

the case]. the soul [still] does not die. But his meaning is that the soul does not exist'
freed from the body as the intellectual fonus which are mentioned in the Metaphysics are
freed, but rather there exists in [its] nature an attachment and an inclination to the body in
the beginning.
Th.A 1.2
...how it [the soul] is separated from the intellectual world and came down to this sensory,
bodily world, and came to be in this body. coarse, demanding to fall under generation and
corruption. And we say that it is only an intellectual substance. having an intellectual life,
not receiving anything of impressions, and this substance resides in the intelligible world,
fixed in it eternally, and not withdrawing from it.
(l0) IS: He wants to make clear that the substance of the soul of man is not a substance
given perfection in the beginning of its existence, so that it would be such as to be able to
exist in perfection in the beginning of what befalls it in existence, like the state of the first
intellectual substances, but rather it is a substance perfected through what comes to it
through a certain kind of acquisition and search, and that there must be an innate desire
for seeking this perfection, even if [one] might be distracted from it. And before this, he
determines the state of the intellectual substances, and he says that every Uintellectual" -that is, separated from matter - substance only" (15) - that is, not having existence or
perfection of existence except that which is absolutely free from matter - has existence in
act such that it knows its essence, and [also] the principles and consequences that must be
intelligible and follow f:-om this essence, known in act. And it is only intellectual through
its essence because its essence is freed from matter, intelligible by what belongs to it and
what can unite to it. And what is [38] its state regarding itself? When it knows itself, it is
possible for it to know the intelligible things which follow on it without intermediary, and
the possible in the case of this substance is necessary, because [such] substances do not
change, but presuppose their first perfection_ Then the intelligibles which are without
intermediary are known to it, and those which are without intermediary to these are [also]
known to it, and those which are necessitated by the totality of [these] are known to it.
Thus the intellectual world is known to it. It is the intellectual life (5) which [Aristotle]
has dealt with in his books, [by saYing] that it is the most excellent of all lives and the
most pleasurable of all lives, and that all sensible and rational pleasures fall short of it.
He says ""in the intellectual world," that is, the world of freedom from material
attachments, not mixed with or united to or "wearing' a thing in its states. He says fixed
in it etemal1y, not withdrawing from it," that is, this freedom and separation are not
transitory, but eternal, because its cause is self-sufficiency through the First Perfection in
existence, [which is free] from searching (10) due to [its] fixedness and etemality. There
is no rank it seeks nor perfection it pursues, nor does it desire anything other than what
comes to it.

Th.A .3

Reading lam yiijad with Vajda.

324

And [for] every intellectual substance having some desire, this substance is after the
substance which is only intellect~ having no desire. If the intellect acquires some desire~ it
proceeds through this desire on some path.
IS: He says Hand [for] every intellectual substance~n that is~ insofar as it is a substance not
needing to subsist through matter, attaining "a desire,'~ that is, needs something to come
to it which has not come to it, Uthis substance is after the substance which is only
intellect." That is. insofar as it does not achieve perfection in the first instance in which it
is made substance, it is in a second order; that is, it is not purely intellectual in the
substance of its essence and in the perfection of its essence that follows its subsistence.
But if (15) it is. in itself, freed from matter, then the perfection of its essence, which is
after it. has no need of matter. As for the demonstration of this, it is valid, and it is that
every state that is after what was not must depend on bodily motions, and be ascribed to
circular motion. This demonstration does not hold insofar as innovation and change are
bodily, but rather insofar as they are innovation and change. Therefore it is likewise
inadmissable that such a substance, which does not have its perfections with its first
substantification, be [39] purely intellectual, that is, freed from matter and its attachments
in every way. "If the intellect acquires a desire." its search for what it desires is of a kind
other than that of intellect. And indeed the kind of the intellect is a clear. radiant~
generously giving kind, but its emanation comes to the thing because it is in its substance
without doubt and without diminution. If it is possible that it loses this deficiency and
has a desire for separation, it follows necessarily that it searches for this in the domain of
change, (5) not in the domain of fixity, not because the domain of fiXity is miserly in the
removal of this deficiency. but rather through an insufficiency in itself, and because it
needs a polishing coming to it from another side.
Th.A 1.3
It does not covet in its first position. because it desires greatly for act and for the beauty of
things which it has seen in the intellect.
IS: This text "it saw in the intellect" is a corruption. For if the soul has seen the
intellectual world. then it has become perfect, because the seeing of the thing is the
reception of its form. But [the text] means the seeing of the things that are in the
intellect. that is. it desires to see them in the intellect. In general, the desire (10) is
general, not specific, like he who desires sexual intercourse but has not known it nor
experienced its pleasure, and like the irrational animals, since they yeam for the general
and not the specific. except when it is attained.
Th.A 1.4
... likewise the intellect, when the desired object appears to it through the form of desire;
[it needs] to bring into act the form which is in it.
IS: That is. it needs for the perfection through the intellectual form that is in it potentially
to become existent in act.

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Th.A 1.4
... and it strives after that intensely. and it has birth pains and brings it [Le. the fonn] into
act. because of its desire for the sensible world.
IS: It must say ""and its desire for the sensible world intensifies:' because of what we have
made clear. that this world is that in which one seeks separation.

Th.A 1.5
... then the soul is only an intellect formed by the form of desire.
IS: That is. the soul is an intellectual thing separated from matter in its essence, having
taken on a form [40J of desire for the sensible world. 2 This is because the form that has
come to it is soul - and this is because it [the soul] joins with the sensible world. It is
only soul because it is the perfection of a natural, living body.3

Th.A 1.5-6
... but the soul sometimes desires with a universal desire. and sometimes desires with a
particular desire. When it desires with a universal desire, it forms the universal forms in
act, and governs them intellectually and universally. not separating from its universal
world. And when it desires particular things which are forms formed by the universal
[forms], it adorns them and augments them in purity4 and beauty, and corrects whatever
error has befallen them. and governs them in a higher and more exalted way than their
proximate cause does. which is the heavenly bodies.
IS: That is. that that by which the soul, by desiring it, is perfected. may be a universal
object. or it may be a particular object. If it is a universal object. it5 forms the [object's]
universal fonn in act. and acts on it (5) universally. ""not separating from its" intellectual.
"universal world." That is. even if this intellect of the soul is in the body in some way, it
still holds true for it in itself' and insofar as it unites itself with the active intellects. not
separating from them. that is, by turning towards another. And if this desire is for the
particular things that are forms in matters. imitating7 the universal forms, the soul ""adorns
them and augments them in purity and beauty." etc. That is. the soul augments them in
beauty insofar as it abstracts them with the abstractions mentioned in the books De
Anima and Sense and Sensibilia. (10) The most excellent of these is intellectual
abstraction. which removes from them their material adjuncts and the things which they
:!

Literally: ...a form of desire for the sensible world having come to it:"

Reading "body"' with Vajda. The text has na/s, "soul:' which clearly makes no sense.

.: Reading naqa'an with Vajda and Lewis. Note that Ibn Sina makes the same interpretation below.
5 Presumably referring to the soul. though as Vajda remarks the gender of the verb is then wrong.
It could be that Ibn Sina is anticipating by taking the '"intellect of the soul" of the next sentence to be the
subject.
t>

Or, "in its essence": bi-dhiitihii.

Or. "resembling.""

326

are in as [in] a covering, [which] are thought to be from the substances of these fonns, but
are not. Similarly sensible states are thought to be from the true natures of thing, but
likewise are not. Rather. the rational, cleansing soul frees them of these shells and frees
them from the foreign adjuncts and acts on them in a more excellent way than the action
of their proximate causes," which, according to what is mentioned here. are the
"heavenly bodies." That is, the proximate causes (15) join the forms to matters and to the
attachments of matters, though it must be known that the part played by the heavenly
bodies is preparation and making ready. and gradually approximating. [It is] likewise
with the specific forms emanated from the incorporeal principles; [41] however, it only
mentions the heavenly bodies because they are those that join those forms to what brings
about for them the influence of the material shells. As for the incorporeal principles, the
forms only emanate from them in accordance with what is in them. but when they have
been united to the heavenly likeness 8, they inevitably mix with associations. and there
arrives in them the acts and passions continuous between heavenly and earthly things.
when there comes to each things among them (5) its commensurate part to play.
Th.A 1.13-14
Because all of the souls are alive, emitted from one principle. even though each one of
them has a life suited and adapted to it, and all of them are substances. incorporeal and
not admitting division. As for the soul of man. its essence has three parts: vegetative.
animal, and rational. and it is separated from the body upon its collapse and dissolution.
IS: He says "it is separated from the body upon its collapse and dissolution," that is. the
human soul. which is the foundation. and which has these powers. The truth is that man
and every animal has a single soul. and it has several powers. and it is the foundation for
the emitting of the powers. As for [the fact] that the powers remain together with it. it is
for another to study this.
Th.A 1.14
...except that the pure. clean soul which has not been dirtied and has not been sullied by
the squalors of the body. when it separates from the sensible. then it will return to those
substances quickly and without hesitating.
IS: That is, "the pure. clean soul which has not been dirtied and has not been sullied by
the squalors of the body," then "when it separates from" (10) the body. hit returns to" its
world with a lesser effort. I say: the soul joins to the body in order to have the
adornment 9 which is proper to intellectual things, namely intellectual adornment, and in
order to have the possibility of conjunction 10 with the intellectual substances. which have
true pleasure and true beauty and true splendor. The way of the soul is to make the body
8

Mathai. Vajda translates "modele."

Here Vajda suggests an allemate reading: "degree:'

10 I translate this word, irri~a/, as "conjunction" because this is the traditional translation of this
technical term (normally associated with the notion of conjoining to the active intellect). But [ translate
other forms of the root wa~a/a with the verb unite.

327

and the bodily organs, [thereby] acquiring the perfection proper to it alone. And it is
known that the occupation of the soul with the lower side turns it away from the higher
side, just as its approaching II the higher side turns it away from (15) the lower side. For
the soul is not turned away from the higher perfection through association with the body,
if it has not come to use [the body] in a way which is appropriate [for the body], but
rather through a condition which befalls the soul from [42] its approaching [the lower].
When the soul becomes bodily, and there is established in it a condition of obedience to
the bodily things, such as carnal desire, wrath, and others, and these conditions even
come to be dispositions in it, then the soul, after [separating from] the body, is in short
that which it was in the body, and so is turned away from the higher world. By
"squalors" he means vile, base, unnatural, and unsuitable appendages adhering to the
thing which, in comparison to them, is pure. When (5) the soul separates itself from the
body and its condition is ascendant, it remains united to the higher world, in contact with
the more splendid beauty, disconnected from the world which it is in.
Th.A 1.15
As for the soul that has united to the body and submitted to it, and become as if it is
bodily, through the intensity of its immersion in the pleasures and desires of the body,
when it separates itself from the body, it does not unite with its own world except by
great effort, so that every squalor and uncleanliness which attached to it in the body is
thrown off from it.
IS: "When it separates itself from the body, it does not unite with [its own world] except
by great effort." That is, it undergoes a great and enormous torment until 'every
uncleanliness and squalor which attached to it" from "the body" is effaced 'from it,"
because they only remain through evil acts. When they are discontinued, it is possible, or
rather necessary, that they are abolished.
Someone might say: just as the conditions (10) and perfections which will come
to the soul are not brought to completion except through the body, as you have alleged
and demonstrated, so likewise the abolishment of the conditions cannot be except through
the body, because the thing is not abolished through itself. The case of the abolishment
cannot but be as the case of the innovation 12. For we know that the cause of its non-being
after its existing is either that is a condition of the rational, detached soul through its
nature, which it possesses while it is withdrawn from the body, or one of the causes
which is exterior, or one of the subsisting causes which are not according to the way of
innovation, or one of the innovated causes; or else, (15) that condition is not abolished at
all. But if the cause of this [i.e. the abolishment] were a condition of the rational soul or
one of the subsisting causes, it must be that the soul would likewise be freed from the
body and be liberated from these squalors. And [then] there was no reason for its
chastening and its [being] in the body, and for its exercise and its attaChing to this world.
On the contrary, it is the same whether it is sullied or it is pure -- the two states are the
II

Iqbal. which can also have the sense of "being attentive to:

12

Tajaddlld. I have translated words with this root using the teons "innovation' and 'new: What

Ibn STna means is simply the coming to be of something new, that is. creation.

328

same after separation. This is because it is impossible that weakness comes to the
squalors from themselves with no cause, or that the things affecting them have a new
power with no cause. But rather, without the innovation of a state, things will be as [43]
they are, and remain fixed. Therefore it is necessary that the purification from the
squalors does not come after the separation of the soul from the body. When the cause is
an innovated cause, then perhaps there is transmigration to another body. But if [this] is
into the bodies of beasts and wild animals, then certainly so much more so will these
bodies be more [attached to the squalors], and not have the squalors effaced from them.
And if [the transmigration] is into another human body, then the state in that body is like
the state in (5) this body. In the great majority of cases, do the sensory powers not
dominate in the body? And nature does not, for beneficial purposes 13, depend on things
that only happen half the time l4 or less. And if the cause of the innovation is the heavenly
bodies or other things anached to motion, then it will come about that the thing devoid of
matter is .... from the heavenly bodies, without this bringing about, through an
intermediary. a matter associated with it. 15 Perhaps the truth is that those conditions
remain firmly established in the souls, not being abolished at all.
The replies to this (10) are to be found in the Oriental Wisdom.
Th.A L15-18 16
Then it [the soul] returns 17 to its world from which it left, without being destroyed or
passing away. as some people think, because it is attached to its origin l8 , even if it is
distant and remote from it. And it is impossible that any of the beings (anniyyii/) pass
away. because they are true beings, and do not fallout of existence and are not destroyed,
as we have said many times. As for what was necessary to mention for those who do not
accept things except through demonstration and proof, we have [already] finished an
account of this concisely, according to its truth and veracity. But as for the things that we
need to mention for those who do not believe in anything except by direct sensation, we
will mention them and place them at the beginning of our statement on the thing about
which the Ancients and the moderns agree. And what the Ancients agreed about is that,
when the soul becomes dirtied and submits to the body in its [the soul's] desires, wrath
descends upon it from God. After this the man strives to turn back from his bodily acts,
and despises the desires of the body, and begins to abase himself before God, and to ask
Him to pardon him for his sins, and to be pleased with him. Excellent and base people
13 The text has 'arafl al-ma~iiIi!l. For an equally speculative translation of this phrase. see Vajda.
I agree with his understanding of the sense of the passage.

I~ Literally: "that are through equality:'

15 One word in the sentence is meaningless - Badawr (p. 43. tn. 3) is unable to suggest a
meaningful alternative.
16 Badawr only provides the first two sentences of this passage in AristO 'ind al-'Arab:
Arabic text of Th.A in AI-Atlatunivva al-muhdatha 'inda al-' Arab.

r use his

17 Reading larji'u -- see Badawr. AI-Atlatunivva, p. 21 fn.2. Badawl gives the same reading
himself in Aristu.

III

Read bad' with Lewis: Vajda and Badawr read badall ("body"), which makes no sense in the

context.

329

agree to this, and they also agree in asking God to have mercy on their dead and the
departed among their ancestors, and in asking for forgiveness for them. If they were not
certain of the soul's eternity and that it does not die, this would not be their custom, and
would not come to be as a natural, imperative, obligatory practice.

IS: He says "then it returns to its world from which it left:' that is, it remains specially
oriented towards its world, from which its existence begins, "without being destroyed or
passing away.'- He says: '''and it is impossible that" corruption befalls "any of the
beings," the place of which is the world of freedom from matter and of fixity, "because"
these beings "'are beings" in truth. That is, matter is not mixed 19 with them, for
[otherwise] something in potency would mix with them in their substance existing [in
act]. He says: (15) '"because the beings do not fallout of existence and do not" pass
away. "'as we have said," that is, what admits of corruption has matter. "ihe wrath" of
-'God" is being distant from conjunction with the higher realm, where there is exalted
happiness and complete resplendence. [If] they"ask" that "they be forgiven," that which
afflicts them through strange conditions contrary to their desires [wi11 be changed] into
their contraries. And as for "'asking God for mercy on the dead," it is a kind of asking for
the emanation of the divine through supplication. See [further] in the Oriental Wisdom.
Th.A 1.25
When I pass into the world of thought and reflection, thought screens that light and
splendor from me.
IS: [44] He says: '''Thought screens that light and splendor from me." I say that purity of
freedom [from matter] and approaching the truth are tested by the defect [which hinders
one] from attaining it. And how much more so, when it has sight in the mind of
something else than that from which we attain to it? And this something else is the
principles required for thought. For the soul, when it is occupied by something, departs
from other things and is screened off from them. Indeed thought 20 takes a way (5)
towards a considerable awareness of the signification of the divine. But awareness is one
thing, and true vision is another. True vision follows awareness, when the intention is
turned towards the True One, and is disjoined from a11 that preoccupies it and detains it
from seeing it. Here [i.e. in true vision] there is, together with awareness, a cognizance of
the object of awareness, inasmuch as the object of awareness is suitable and delightful.
which is the resplendence of the pure soul, whose state this is, and [which] is liberated
from every ordeal, and [which] attains the beloved, which is beloved in itself, not
inasmuch as it is merely subject to awareness (10) and intellection, but insofar as it is
beloved in its substance. If preoccupation screens the awareness from it, how much more
does [it prevent] true vision! I say that you are not infonned of this matter except by
experience, and it is not among the things known by reason. For in the case of every one
of the sensible things [i.e. acts of sensation], although reason has a greater part of
awareness, the proper states are known through experience. Just as taste does not touch
19

Accepting Vajda's reading, so that the verb agrees with "matter:-

211

Omitting 'Qllhu with Vajda.

330

reason, so likewise with the utmost degree of sensible pleasure. But reason has a greater
part of awareness as vague affirmation, without detail, and likewise [in the case of] the
intellectual pleasures and the utmost degree (15) of states of vision of higher beauty.
Reason only gives you that which is the most excellent splendor. As for its proper
characteristic, you are not informed [of it] except by direct contact, and not everyone has
this available to them.
Th.A 1.27-28
Then I remember Heraclitus, for he instructed [us to] search and seek after the substance
of the soul, and strive after ascent to the noble, higher world. And he said: if someone
striyes after this and rises to the higher world, he is rewarded with the best of rewards,
necessarily.
IS: "Reward" in the customary sense means something repaid for an effort, something
good or bad [45] in the face of [the effort]. In this passage, [it is] the payment [for] the
effort undertaken by the soul in abandoning its first object of desire, which is the body,
[and] awakening to its true object of desire. This, in the first instance, is a hardship, and
requires exercise until it becomes like a natural instinct. For the happiness of the
hereafter is the reward in the face of this effort.
Th.A 1.30-31
As for Empedocles, he said that the souls are in a high, noble place, and when they erred
they fell into this world. And he also only came to this world as a fugitive from the anger
of God.
IS: He says: "when they erred," that is, when they are deficient it is impossible that their
first existence exists (5) except in this way. "They fell," that is, they needed to descend,
for example:! I , from their place, joining to the sensory world. He said: "and" they '''only
came to this world as a fugitive from the anger of God," that is, as a fugitive from
deficiency of substance, [which] remains distant from the providence of God. If some of
the Ancients mention metempsychosis, [this means] that the wicked soul, after separation
from the body, is in bodily, wicked conditions. It only comes to know its injury at that
time. For it is as if it returned to the body, and sometimes this is [just that] it imagines a
species (10) of imagination. to which he has alluded in his books.:!:! It is as if he said that
the soul only comes to this world [through] compassion from God for this world, and to
gi ve adornment to it, so that there is life and intellect in it. For it is what brings this
world to complete perfection, and [otherwise] it would have lacked 23 what is possible of
intellectual life. And if this is possible for it, it is necessary that there is an emanation
from the divine providence, which is pure generosity. Then it is impossible that the parts
(IS) of this world have an intellectual life and not have soul, and therefore [God] made
21

Vajda suggests a titre de cause exemplaire:' The Arabic has marhalafl.

:!:!

One would expect that the he" here refers to Aristotle. This might constitute evidence that Ibn
(0 Aristotle. See Vajda. p.363, fn.l.

STna accepted the attribution ofTh.A

n Reading Ilaqa~a with Vajda.

331

soul to reside in them~ in order that this world be completed through it~ and in order that
there be in it what is possible from each thing in the intellectual world~ that is~ that the
corporeal matter [46] in it be informed according to what is possible for a fonn which is
imitating the true~ intellectual fonn~ which is in the higher world~ and that it have a kind
of life like what is there, and that there be in it a source of intellectual life, like what is
there.
Th.A 1.47-48
[Plato said] that the cause of the hidden beings (anniyyiit), which have no bodies, and the
sensible things possessing bodies~ is one, and it is the first, true being, and we mean by
that the Creator, the Maker, blessed be His name. Then he said that the First Creator,
Who is the cause of the intellectual, eternal beings and the transitory, sensible beings, is
the pure Good, and the good does not befit anything but itself.
IS: What excellent wisdom, that he [Plato?] posited one Originator [both] of the true
intelligible and the thing existent in the sensible, which is the corporeal existent, and He
is the First Truth. And how excellent that he said that "the good does not befit anything
(5) but itself," because the good in every thing is its existing according to the most
complete manner of its existence which is proper to it. But every thing considered in
itself, exclUding the consideration of its relation to the divine command, is deserving of
abolishment, and this is the extreme of evil. The existence and the good proper to it is
given only from [God]. For every thing is as mixed from good and evil: because
considered in itself, it is deficient, but considered [in its relation to] the First, it receives
the good in the measure of its degree and its rank. But the First [has] its existence, its
perfection, its exaltedness and its splendor from its essence, with no other thing mixing
with it. (10) Anything else must be in one of two states: either it is sometimes in potency
and sometimes in act according to its perfection, or it is more excellent than this, but
without having being (al-kawn) in act from its essence, but rather from something else.
For it does not have being in act in every respect and in every way, but rather when
considered in itself24 it does not have being in act, though it is also not impossible. That
which belongs to it, considered in itself, is possibility, which is a potency in some other
way, except that existence is connected to its possibility from something else. There is no
contradiction between being a possible thing according to its essence (15) and necessary
from something else. As for the First, He is existent through Himself, may His power be
exalted.
Th.A 1.53-54
How beautifully and how rightly does the philosopher [i.e. Plato] describe the Creator,
may He be exalted, when he says that He created the intellect and the soul and nature, and
all other things! But it is necessary for whoever hears the philosopher's statements that
he not consider them literaIlr and imagine that he says that the Creator, may He be
exalted, creates in time. If someone imagines this of him according to his expression and
:!~ Or in il5 essence:
:!5

Lilerally: 'according to the expression:'

332

words, he only expressed himself in this way wishing to follow the practice of the
Ancients. The Ancients were only forced to mention time regarding the beginning of
creator because the Ancients wished to describe the generation (kawn) of things, and were
forced to incorporate time in their description of the generation and in their description of
the creation, which was not in time at all.
IS: [47] I say that the procession of act from the First Truth is only posterior regarding the
first beginning, not in time, but according to the essence, according to what is proven in
the books. But when the Ancients wished to explain causality, they needed to mention
priority -- and priority includes time in [its] expression, and likewise in meaning for
someone untrained 26 -- [so that] their modes of expression make one imagine that the act
of the True First is a temporal act, and that its precedence precedes temporally. But this
is false.

C.2 Notes on Mimar II

Th.A II. I
If someone asks: when the soul returns from the higher world and come to be together
with those intellectual substances, what does it say and what does it remember? We say
that the soul, when it comes to be in that intellectual place, it only says and sees and does
what befits this noble world, except that nothing there forces it to act and speak.
IS: He asks: when the soul returns to the higher world, what does it say?" that is, what
comes to it in act? "And what does it remember?" that is, it recalls something absent from
the mind. And we say that when it is freed from the body, and there remains in it no
attachment to its world, then it is only possible that there be in it in act those visions and
other acts:!? which befit this world, (10) which is the world of fixity and being (kawn) in
act, and [which] is the world of conjunction of the soul with the principles in which is the
condition of all existence (wujud), and in which it (i.e. existence) is inscribed. For there
there is no deficiency or disruption of the emanation required for it [the soul] to perform
an act and attain perfection, and to sayan utterance through which it attains perfection.
And this (disruption would be] thought and memory, and things of that sort. For it is
inscribed with the inscription of all existence, and must not seek another inscription and
not be distracted by any of what [48] is in this world or in its acquisition of the particular
conditions [of things in this world], seeking them insofar as they are particular. It cannot
attain them insofar as they are particular. For it is known that the soul, through the
existence of its essence, does not touch the meanings insofar as they are particular. The
pure soul abandons this world and. even though it is later united to the body. it does not
take heed of what happens to [the body], and does not want to remember it. For how
great is the winner of the happiness of pure freedom (from the body] together with (5)
conjunction with the truth!
:!6 In other words, the neophyte is unable to separate the temporal mode of expression from a
temporal meaning.
:!7

Literally: "and the rest of what it acts:'

333

Th.A II.7-10
We say that every knowledge existing in the higher world~ falling under etemity~ is not
temporal. because the things that are in this world were generated atemporally. and thus
the soul came to not be temporal. Thus the soul came to know the things that it had at its
disposal here atemporally also. and does not need to remember them, because they are
like the thing present before it. So the higher and lower things are present before the soul,
[and] are not absent from it when it is the higher intellectual world. The proof of this is
the objects of knowledge. because they do not leave one thing for another thing there, and
do not change from one state to another state, and do not admit the division of genera into
forms and individuals. or that of the forms into genera and universals. going upwards.
Since the objects of knowledge in the upper world are not according to this description,
all of them are present, and the soul has no need to remember them. because it sees them
with its own eyes. 28
IS: The higher world is in the domain of endless duration and eternity, and is the fixed
world. not the world of innovation in which it arises that thought and memory happen.
The world of innovation is the world of motion and time. For the pure intellectual
concepts and the intellectual concepts which come to be particular and material are all
there [i.e. in the higher world] in act. and likewise is the state of our souls. The proof of
this is that one cannot say that the forms of the intelligibles come to the substances that
are in that [higher] world (10) by means of transition from intelligible to intelligible. He
has made this clear. For there is no transition there from state to state, so that it also does
not happen that the universal concepts temporally precede the particular concepts. as
happens here when one possesses the intelligibles. For one acquires the universal first.
then the temporal state comes to acquire detail. But rather, the knowledge is general,
insofar as it is general, and detailed, insofar as it is detailed~ simultaneously. not divided 29
between two times. When it is a certain way in the substance that is like the signet ring.
then it is the same in (15) the substance which is like the wax. Indeed. when [all]
obstacles are eliminated. the relation of the substance which is like wax to [the substance]
which is like the signet ring is one relation~ for one impression is not in it first and the
other delayed, but rather both [are in it] simultaneously. We say that the form of every
thing. universal or particular. comes to be in this world, and every particular is grasped
there in the way necessary from its causes, and this way makes the particular universal.
He has made this clear [49] and has made clear that it is unobjectionable that the
intelligibles are infinite; indeed the impossibility of the infinite is only in specific things.
Th.A n.23-25
If someone says that the intellect. when it does not want to know anything and does not
cast its gaze on anything, then there is no doubt that it is empty [and] void of every thing.
And this is absurd, because it is of the intellect's nature that it know eternally. And if it
18 In this section I follow Lewis in translating a better manuscript than the ones followed by
Badawl in Plotinus apud Arabes. The variant readings are given in Badawls footnotes. on p.30.
29

Here the world "divided (taf~ilu) has the same root as the word detailed' ("uifa~al).

334

knows eternally, then there is no doubt that it casts its gaze on the things eternally, so as
never to be what it is itself. But this is quite repugnant. We say: the intellect is all things,
as we have said many times. So when the intellect thinks itself, then it thinks all things.
[f this is so, we say that the intellect, when it sees itself. sees all things, and is what it is
itself in act, because it casts its gaze on itself, not on something else. so as to encompass
the totality of things which are below it. And when it casts its gaze on the things, it is
encompassed in them. And it is what it is itself in potency, not in act, as we have said
above.
IS: If someone says: you have not established the proposition that the intellect knows
every thing in its essence. 30 Perhaps it thinks other things. not through its essence, but
through the essences of those things. What hindrance is there (5) that this is not intellect
also, and that the priority and posteriority in this are temporal? He replies and says that
the active intellects know the totality of things from their essences, just as they know the
effects from the causes that necessitate them. Indeed the thing only knows its existence in
the way in which its existence is necessary, except for the existence of the First True
Originator. It is not possible that the active intellects know their essences, and that their
knowing their essences necessitates the necessity of the First Originator. For the
necessity of the First Originator is not from their essences, but rather their essences are
from Him. Rather, it is necessary that their intellection of the First Originator (10) is
through the First Originator's revealing Himself to them. When he reveals Himself to
them they know Him. and they know themselves, and they know every thing in the
subsequent orders. 31
But someone may say that the active intellect, if it knows from its essence that its
existence is from another, knows the necessitating Originator according to a way
resembling the way of inference, which is the opposite of demonstration. It is possible
that in this way [i.e. inference], it knows the First Originator from its essence. We say
that. if this is the case, then the [author's] conduct in using the [term] ""moving,,32 is
correct, because when it knows the existence of its essence is from another -- and the
existence (15) of its essence is its being intellectual -- then this being intellectual is from
another. Then it, being intellect, attains this intellect from another. As for its existence
as intellect for things after it, this is only from its essence, because its being intellect for a
thing after it is an effect of its being an intellect through its essence. For being
intellectual in its essence is the cause of its being intellectual in another, since its essence,
which [50] is the being intellectual which is specific to it, is the cause of its being
intellect for another. When it relates to the First, it is possible for us to say that it knows
its essence, and thus knows the First. But it is not possible to say that being intellectual in
its essence is the cause of its being intellectual [such as to know] the First. which is of the
3D This part of the commentary presents a problem because of its use of the word dhiit. which can
be translated "self' or "essence:' Thus this sentence could also be translared the intellect knows every
thing in itself." I have translated dhiir throughout this passage as "essence:' and ask the reader to bear in
mind the double meaning of the tenn.
31

Reading lii/iya with Vajda.

31

fiaraka: in point of fact the word is not used in the relevant text from AP.

335

First. 33 Rather, it is caused by Him~ when this intellectual existence is caused by that
intellectual existence~ receiving from Him. Motion' signifies receiving from another.
But when one brings Him in relation to that which is after Him~ one of the two ways is
not correct (5) to the exclusion of the other, but rather both of the two ways [are correct].
That which is after [intellect] is thought by it, and also has existence from intellect,
[because] it is emanated from the intellect~ not [because] the intellect receives it from
another. Thus it is beyond forgiveness to believe that the complete intellect is knowing
before the existence of its essence, [and that] then, from [its essence] there is the
existence of being intellectual which belongs to the First Originator. But rather, what is
necessary is that it knows His essence as an existent that knows its cause, for this is the
way of true intellection. Even if its intellection of its cause is through a revelation from
the cause to it. which does not happen for any reason at all except for the cause, there is
no reason (10) in the essence of the caused intellect by which it should attain the cause
and know it after knowing its essence.
If someone says: you have alleged that the intellection is not solely with respect to
the quiddity of the inteIIigibles alone, but [also] with respect to the existence of their
quiddity. But you know that their quiddities as such do not depend on one another for the
most part, except [when] one of the two intelligibles is a part of the second intelligible,
which is composed. For [then] its quiddity [Le. of the first] is that of its quiddity [i.e. of
the second]. If this is the case~ it does not know the quiddities whose intellectual
principles are not parts of one another successively. (15) The answer is that the quiddities
are not known by the principles insofar as they are detached quiddities like the Platonic
Forms, but rather the second quiddity is only known because it exists and is necessary
from the first quiddity. But insofar as it is not necessary in [the first quiddity], it does not
know the many separate parts between which there is no one order, and in which no
priority and posteriority occurs. For the simple one has no simultaneous or unranked
relation to the many.
Th.A II.40
When the soul remembers something, it makes itself resemble that thing which it
remembers, because the memory is either intellection or it is imagination. And the
imagination has no fixed essence subsisting in one state, but is in the state of the things
which it sees, whether they are earthly or heavenly. But according to what it sees of the
earthly and heavenly things, it changes in accordance with this and becomes like it.
IS: [51] The heavenly souls, insofar as they are embodied and insofar as they are moving
-- not in the way in which the desired and the beloved move, but rather in the way that
that which seeks movement moves -- perceive the corporeal states through the medium of
their perception of their corporeality, the perception being corporeal and particular,
separated from the pure intellectual perception. For it perceives its body and its moving
of [its body] and what participates in the bodies in motion. It perceives that which is
necessary for it and (5) succeeds it among the things which are ascribed to it when it
ascends to its principles, and its perception of its bodies and what is after its bodies is of a
33

The meaning of this phrase (allarlli-al-mnval) is unclear - see Vajda. p.370 fn.2.

336

kind befitting its bodies. Resemblance is only through perception of its bodies insofar as
it takes their form and engenders from their form the form of something else which is
born from it and associates with it and participates in the impressions proceeding from it.
It yeams for the separated principles in a different way, which is not at issue now. It has.
then, a memory befitting this sort of perception. As for the earthly souls, (10) they also
resemble remembered earthly things, and through them as an intermediary they attain
perception of the heavenly things through sensation. This is another kind of perception
and resemblance. Each one of these two resemblances is ranked lower in comparison to
resemblance to the intellect. He mentions intellectual concepts, and this [means]
extracting the concepts stripped of the shells mixed with them and close to them. stripped
of the particular things which are wrapped in completely pure concepts, which are
concepts freed from foreign adjuncts.
For the soul, then, there are three resemblances: resemblance to intellect, in which
[it is] as remembering the intellectual concepts, resemblance to heavenly bodies, and
resemblance to earthly bodies. And acquisition of each resemblance after its cessation is
memory, and its permanence is memory and preservation.
Th.A U.43-45
We say that, when the soul is in the higher world, it yearns for the pure, first Good. It
only arrives at the first Good through the intermediary of the intellect. Or rather, it is He
Who comes to it. This is because the pure, first Good is not encompassed by anything
and is not screened by anything, and nothing hinders Him from going where He wants.
And when the soul wants [Him] He comes to it, and nothing, whether bodily or spiritual,
hinders Him from this. This is because this first Good sometimes goes to the last thing
through the intermediary of what is adjacent to it. 34 If the soul does not desire the first
Good. and regards the lower world. and yearns for something that is in it, then it is in this
thing to the extent which it remembers it or imagines it.
IS: [52] The intermediary mediates in two ways: either through union or screening. If the
intermediary is unitive, after the union it comes to be as if there is no intermediary,
because when there is union, what unites through an intermediary is not an intermediary
insofar as there is union, even though it is an intermediary insofar as the union is through
it. As for the screening intermediary. it is that without which there is the union of the
thing. Three things unite to the things from the first Good: (5) the first is existence. the
second is the secondary perfections of existence. and the third is the revealing of His
essence and the attainment of knowledge of Him according as it is possible. The unitive
intermediary either mediate~ in existence, and then it gives union to existence, or it
mediates in the perfections of existence, and then it gives union to the perfections of
existence, or it gives union to the revealing of His essence. And here, what unifies
disappears when there is union. For the thing is viewed through the revelation of the
truth, visible without an intermediary insofar as it is visible, even if it is through an
intermediary insofar as it is (10) a caused viewing. Through the revelation of the truth,
there is no screening of His essence from those that receive. And if the reception does
.,-1

Lewis reads "through the three" with another manuscript.

337

not happen except through an intermediary, then this intennediary is the conjunction
[itself], which is the disappearance of the intermediary of the screen. Then the
intermediary is like the withdrawal of mediation, and the revelation of the truth emanates
to the furthest thing that can receive knowledge -- even if the intermediaries are many with an emanation tearing the screen apart.
Th.A II.46-47
Someone may say: if the soul imagines this world before it reaches it, then there is no
doubt that it imagines it also after leaving it and reaching the higher world. For if it
imagines it, then there is no doubt that it remembers it. But you have said that when [the
soul] is in the upper world it does not remember anything of this world at all. We say
that. even if the soul imagines this world before it comes to be in it, it imagines it
intellectually. And this act is only ignorance, not knowledge, even though this ignorance
is nobler than every knowledge. And this is because the intellect is ignorant of what is
above it, with an ignorance that is nobler than knowledge.
IS: The answer to the problem is that the soul, in its previous state, cannot have a
particular, determined perception, [53] or have a particular, determined desire. But
rather, the species of [its] desire is universal, even if it is for a particular [object]. Like
the desire for nourishment, for example, insofar as it is determined by a cause other than
the desire. so that the perception is therefore not, in accordance with this [desire],
posterior to a particular perception. Likewise if [the soul has] memory of the body, it
would not remain afterwards an imaginative memory, but rather an intellectual, inspecific
[memory]. And this kind of awareness - and it is named intellectual imagination -- is
ignorance of the particular (5) insofar as it is particular. Except that this ignorance is not
an ignorance of deficiency, but rather an ignorance of nobility. And this is like what he
says: that it is more excellent that many of the things not be known than that they be
known. 35 And ignorance is twofold: ignorance of what is in a higher rank, and ignorance
of what is in a lower rank. And each one of these has a rule different than the rule of the
other: for the higher thing may be ignorant of the extreme because of the weakness of the
lower, not because the extreme is unknown. And the lower things may be ignorant of the
extreme because the particular extreme is unknown in its essence. The true nature of the
divine is not conceived in the intellect except through a kind (10) of analogies, and
consideration of the necessaries, and through the things that go out from it, as has been
explained, by means of the trace [of the divine]. And if the essence of the intellect were
such that it could attain from its essence to having the true nature of the First clear to it,
then the essence of the intellect would be what necessitates the essence of the First, even
if fathoming to the extreme of the essence of the First attaches to it from [the First]. But
its quiddity is not what necessitates the quiddity of the First, but rather the reverse: the
revealing of the essence of the intellect to the intellect is not passed from the essence of
intellect to the essence of the First. But rather, the true nature of the essence of the First
only appears to it from the essence of the First, insofar as (15) the appearance is necessary
for everything prepared to receive it, the necessity being with respect to [the appearance],
35

This is not. in fact. a direct quote from Th.A.

338

not with respect to the receiver~ except for [its] preparedness. Thus [the receiver]
perceives only so far as is given to it~ without there being any necessity at all in the
essence or quiddity of the intellect. It was the custom of the initiated to take this sort of
perception~ either in concepts or in assertions~ as deficient, not fully fathomed. As for the
detailed discussion~ look in the books and in the Oriental Wisdom~ [to see] how one must
speak of the perception of the intellect and what is above it.
Th.A ll.53-4
We say that the soul~ when it separates from this higher world and comes to be in the
higher, intellectual world, does not remember anything from what it knew~ particularly
when the knowledge which it acquired is base. But rather~ it wants to abandon the totality
of the things which it attained in this world, or else it would be forced to receive there
also the impressions which it receives here. And this is very repugnant: that the soul
would receive the impressions of this world and be in the upper world [at the same time].
(20) IS: He says that the souls do not remember the states of the world insofar as they are
particular, and from this point of view, [54] they are not remembered. Or else it would be
necessary that corporeal affections would befall [the soul], because the perceptions like
these things are through corporeal affections. [The soul] can only remember what it can
represent as an imagined representation ascribed to the representative faculty, and this is
only the case for it when it is affected by the intennediary of a bodily organ, and when
there come to it impressions proper to the corporeal world. [If this] is the case after
separation, it is as if [the soul were] united [to the body].
Th.A II.75-76
The soul does not have diverse powers~ and is not composed from them. Rather, it is
simple, having a noble power,36 eternally giving the faculties to the bodies. And this is
because it is in them in a simple way, not a composite way. When the soul comes to give
the faculties to the bodies, those faculties are ascribed to it. because it is their cause. And
the attributes of the effect are more appropriately ascribed to the cause than to the effect;
particularly when they are noble, they are more appropriate to the cause than to the effect.
(5) IS: 'The soul has" in its substance one faculty, not diverse facuIties," and is also not
an aggregate of diverse faculties. Rather, it is simple" in essence, having a noble
power," and this is what it has in itself, and it is the intellectual faculty, and it "gives the
faculties to the bodies~' as far as they persist according to their composition 37 . The
faculties only multiply insofar as they are powers of the body in the body, not of the soul
in the soul, but rather of the soul through being from it. It is not possible to say that the
soul is one, then divided, or that the powers emanate from it not because of it, but rather
because of the body, so that, (10) the body being of many parts and faculties, diverse in
composition, the soul would because of it be of many parts and diverse faculties. For
what cause is it which necessitates diverse parts and compositions for the body, if not the
36

Reading with Lewis and Badawi. Plotinus. p. 41. fn.7.

37

mi:oj. which can also mean mixture.

339

soul? And what is the cause that there are~ in its act~ diverse compositions and
conditions, if it is not because the faculties the soul needs during its stay in this dwelling
are multiple faculties~ diverse in themselves, and not because it is the bodies that make
them diverse? But rather~ it is the bodies that are conditioned~ through their diversity, to
receive the diversities (15) from [the soul]. For if the soul needs body in its perfections, a
body is made for it, to which it is attached. And if it attains intellectual perfection
through the intermediary of sensory perceptions, it needs to have sensible faculties, some
of which attain [perception] from outside, and some of which are for preserving what is
attained and uniting it to the soul. And it needs to have, after the sensible faculties [55], a
faculty that repels injury -- the irascible and timorous [faculties] - and a faculty that
attracts the beneficial and the necessary - the desiring and nutritive [facuities]. The soul
needs some of these faculties first, immediately38, and needs some of them through the
intennediary of a prior faculty, and this is a fixed need. The soul is made such that it is
proper that these faculties emanate from it into the body. Some of [the faculties], namely
those that are first in material substance, are last in (5) formal substance.
If someone says: why are the faculties multiple, and why are they divided? The
answer is: if you mean ~why are they diverse in their quiddity?' this is not through a cause
from outside, it is impossible for it to be otherwise. Indeed, if there is something
composed in it, then its cause is the cause for the existence of this composition. But as
for fact that this composition is this thing, diversity of the quiddities of things is not the
cause of this, insofar as they are their quiddities, but rather it is impossible that they not
be diverse, and it is necessary for them that they be diverse.
But if you mean~ 'how is it possible (10) that, from the one, there exists a thing
with a diversity of quiddities?' then we say: this is possible in that there are prepared for
them diverse subjects into whkh diverse impressions can proceed from the one. If you
mean: 'how does division of anything happen to [the sou1]?' then [we say that] there is no
division of anything, because one soul is absolutely not divided into many diverse
powers. Certainly, some soul, like the vegetative, may have become divided into similar
or diverse parts, but as for the one and simple being divided into many, this absolutely
does not befall the first soul in its essence, or any of the faculties of the soul.

C.3 Notes on Mimar IV

Th.A IV.1-44
[Vajda and Badawi' take the following commentary to apply loosely to most of the fourth
mimar. Vajda (p.378, fn.4) sees a particular parallel with Th.A IV.41-2 in the first
sentence of Ibn Sin~rs note. I would add that Ibn Sina also seems to already be thinking
ofTh.A IV.44fr., leading into the next passage commented upon.]
IS: He states a kind of definition of interior sensation, not according to the way of reason,
but rather according to the way of intuition, which is not possible for all [people], but
38 a/-wii!.lid illii al-wii!J.id. The sense of this entire sentence is obscure enough that Vajda did not
attempt to translate it directly - see his p.377. fn.3. I also translate more the sense of the passage than the
literal meaning.

340

rather is only possible for those who reject39 the low things of this changing world [56]
and the baseness of achieving its cravings, and the accidents of wrath and covetousness,
and other things besides. For aU this does not deserve that one devote one's attention to
it. ~o When one purifies one's soul and one casts off these wrappings from it, and trains it
and instructs it, one has prepared it to receive the upper emanation. One's soul then sees,
as the first thing, beauty in its particularity, its elevation and its freedom from what other
things are subject to, and there comes to it from God, may He be exalted, a light turning it
away from all things and [leading it to] disdain all (5) sensible things. One's soul is
delighted and rejoices, is in glory and is elevated, and has mercy for the lower things41
which give themselves to nothing and which struggle amongst themselves while they are
in this confusion, since they come to perdition and that which they sought goes astray
from them. And [the soul] has mercy for them insofar as they are surrounded by every
affliction: fear, envy, anxiety, longing, and the extremes of preoccupation. This is a
splendor and a light produced from God through the intermediary of the intellect.
Thought and reason do not lead to it, except in the way of affirmation. As for the way of
what is proper to it, its quiddity, and its nature, (10) only true vision shows the way to
this. And one does not attain this true vision except by preparation for the soundness of
the constitution of the soul, just as someone who has not experienced sweetness accepts
that it is pleasant, through a kind of reason or the testimony [of someone else], but does
not attain the proper characteristic42 of the pleasure except through tasting when it is
prepared for the soundness of the constitution of the body. If there is any harm, then there
is no enjoyment of this, and the vision takes place as the contrary of what was agreed to
above.
Th.A IV .45-46
The First Light is not light in anything, but is light alone, abiding through its essence.
Therefore this light comes to illuminate the soul by the intermediary of the intellect,
through no attributes, like the attributes of fire, and none of the active things. For the
totality of active things [do] their acts only through attributes in them, not through their
being. As for the First Agent, it makes the thing through none of the attributes, because
there is absolutely no attribute in it, but it acts through its essence, and therefore becomes
the First Agent, and the maker of the first beauty, which is in the intellect and the soul.
[S: Since he alluded to the light that is presented to the pure souls from the True Light.
he says that (15) the True "First Light. '0 may its greatness be exalted, his not light." And
it is not [light] according to one of two ways: either because it is not light as the light of a
thing, uniting to what this thing unites to, and then the union of this thing will be the
cause of its union - or also, it is not a light through one of its attributes. so that it would

39

Like Vajda. I am unable to make sense of the Arabic text: ~a!lib al-nafs.

40

Literally: is beneath deserving that one devote attention to it.

41

As BadawTremarks (p.56 th.3) the exact sense is not clear here.

42

The word used here is khiissa. translated as 'what is proper' in the previous sentence.

341

be something not having luminosity43 in its essence~ but rather in something from its
attributes and its consequents. Rather, its quiddity is light insofar as it is its essence. oW
This is because the thing [we are speaking of], insofar as [57] it is the Necessary Existent~
and is the essence of the First Truth~ it is beauty~ perfection~ [highest] degree~ and
remoteness from mixture with matter, non-being, what is in potency, and all else that
disfigures, afflicts, and lowers the existence of a thing. [f the thing is light through its
essence and is light abiding through its essence~ not through anything else~ then it can
unite through every thing to every thing~ when that is prepared to receive it. It is not
particularized prior to its essence by something that is light in it, through which it is
veiled from something else. Rather, it is (5) light for every thing, without the essence
being veiled from it through any other thing.45 Rather, it unites to every receiver through
the revelation of its essence to its essence, being united through its essence. It unites to
every thing by means of every thing, because it is radiant upon every thing, flowing from
itself to every thing. But it, or rather the things, complete a particular order in the
attainment, not because of its essence or their veiling [from it], since it is revealed to
every thing through every thing. 46
That is, if its activity is not through its essence, but through an attribute in it, the
principle of which is not from its essence -- though (10) the attribute is necessitated by
the essence -- and what has been necessitated from its essence because of this attribute
has the essence as its first principle, though not with respect to this attribute, then the
attribute which it has, through which it acts, is not from its essence, but from something
else. Then its activity is from something else, and then its activity is not the activity of
the First Agent. We say that the First Principle -- may His power be praised - either has
no attribute at all, and then its essence is free from attributes, if this is possible; or, its
attribute is an effect of its essence, succeeds it and is necessitated by it. Indeed many
attributes (15) succeed essences, for example what is essential to man, which is the
essence of his essence, brings about that he is in some state and that he is a certain way,
and that he is this way from necessitated properties and accidents which are not
constitutive for him, but rather proceed from his existence and are constituted through his
existence. Indeed if one posits for the First an attribute which is not an effect of its
essence, then [this attribute] will be equal to its essence in necessity of existence, [58] and
its essence will have not priority to it as cause. From this it would be necessary that
necessity of existences happen to both, and the impossibility of this has already been
made clear. Then necessity of existence is eternal for its essence -- may He be exalted-and if it has attributes then they are necessary through the necessity of its essence. But
these are effects. If there is, among these, the luminosity shining on the receivers. then its
first principle is the essence, not these attributes, if there is [any attribute].

':3

niiri}ya: the word is parallel in construction to the word for essence: essence. See Vajda.

p.379 fnA .
.1.:

Vajda does not translate this sentence. but does not explain the omission.

025

Again. Vajda omits the sentence from his translation without explanation.

.t6 Badawi considers the foHowing passage to be Ibn Sin~rs commentary on Th.A IV.45-46. but as
Vajda points out (p.380. fn.2). both paragraphs relate to the same text.

342

Th.A 1V.54-56
The spiritual things are [of several] sorts, and this is because among them is what resides
in the heaven which is above this heaven with stars, and the spiritual things residing in
that heaven are, every one of them, in the wholeness of the sphere of its heaven, except
that every one of them has a IlXed place which is not the place of the others, unlike the
bodily things which are in heaven, because they are not through bodies. And that heaven
is not a body either. Therefore every one of them comes to be in the wholeness of that
heaven. We say that what is beyond this world are heavenly heaven, earth, sea, animals,
plants, and people. And everyone in this world is heavenly, and there is nothing earthly
there at all. The spiritual things which are there are appropriate to the men who are there,
without some of them shunning others, and every one does not reject the other or oppose
it, but rather finds rest with it.
H

IS: (5) He says: "'the spiritual things are [of several] sorts. He passes over the sort that
one grasps and knows, namely the intellects and the souls, and mentions the sort which is
like the souls in the intellects, and the pure souls. Indeed, the intellect in act is inscribed
in the quiddity of every existence. It is not the case, as some say. that there is no
multiplicity there. Not that there is multiplicity there insofar as there are parts of the
essence, but rather it is [due to] necessaries of the essence, and some of these are
necessaries of others of them in the intellectual world, according to what was presented in
the Oriental Wisdom in particular. 47 If this is the case, then the (10) sensible world is
inscribed with what is in the intellectual world through some spiritual things of those
souls that are freed from corporeal matter. The difference between [these freed souls] and
the souls of the sensible world is that the souls of the sensible world are of a rank,
excellence and nobility appropriate to the material essence that is inscribed from above.
And by "inscription' is meant something the sensible world has which is not just an
adornment to the essence, to which that inscription adheres insofar as [the essence]
knows. Rather, that essence is derived48 through itself, and it is more noble than those
intellectual souls which adhere to it insofar as it grasps their essence, even though the
[intellectual] soul is higher in quiddity, (15) and there is a degree and loftiness for the low
quiddity_ 49 For example, the essence of the True One reveals itself when the essence of
the intellect attains it, and the form of the intellect [is revealed] when the soul attains it.
insofar as it is the form of the intellect. There [i.e. in the intellectual world], the form of
heaven and the world, and the form of what is in heaven [59] and the world, is of a higher
and nobler kind. When the matter of the corporeal world is stamped by [the form], it is
ennobled by it, even though it does not attain [the form] as [the form] is, but rather as is
possible for it, and as [the form] comes to be particular and associated with wrappings.
..7 In other words. the essence necessitates some entities. which in turn necessitate others - both
types of entities make up the multiplicity of the intelligible world. The term lawiizim. or "necessaries:'
means something necessitated by something else -- Vajda translates as "concomitants:'

..8 The word for "derived" here has the same root as the word rutba. degree:' One might then
translate: "that essence is given its degree through itself."'
"9 In other words. the lower thing. through its own action of grasping the higher. comes to have a
nobler essence.

343

These forms which are in 50 the intellectual world are not distinguished or segregated from
each other. nor does anyone of them subsist through isolation from another~ as you see
that the sun. in the corporeal world, is isolated from the moon, and Zayd from "Arne.
Rather. all of them are simultaneous, and each of them is in every other. If it were
possible (5) that there were division for each one of them there~ then there would only be
duality in signification alone, but not in any other way than this. As for those [forms]
which are in bodies, they follow in succession both in signification and in fact,sl [insofar
as the bodies] are bodies. But, if they are not taken strictly as bodies. then a multiplicity
of [the forms] may sometimes be simultaneous. like the color and odor in an apple.
Sometimes this can suggest an understanding of something there [in the intellectual
world]. not making a clear distinction except in signification. But in these there is no
incompatibility or contrariety. They are removed from the incompatibility that happens
between the incorporeals that are opposed. incompatible fonns, which cannot join
simultaneously in (10) one essence. Rather. the forms of opposed. incompatible things
support and are at peace with one another there. The perfection of each one of them is
through uniting to one another, and insofar as they are fitting to be united to one another.
through their spirituality.
C.4 Notes on Mlmar V

1. The "created" in the absolute sense is that which [gets] its existence from another
thing. and has from itself that it does not have existence. and again, no matter serves as an
intermediary by the existence of this thing being potentially in it. The "created." in a [60]
particular sense. is that which has such existence in [its] principle, without any
intermediary at all mediating its existence in any way. It has its existence from that which
is the creator. insofar as non-being did not overcome it prior to this. Instead, it is the
creator that gives it existence absolutely, taking away its non-being, without any obstacle
opposing its non-being after it is possible.
"Creation" is the relation of the creator to the created regarding this existence. He
says: the emanation of the forms (5) from the First Truth is not according to the way in
which something is arranged in thought and considered by reason. But rather~ [the forms]
are created with the noble creation that they mentioned, since the Creato~2 creates them
through His essence, not through the mediation of anything other than His essence. 53
Rather. He created the intellect through His essence. Because He reveals Himself to the
intellect. the intellect has known Him and known itself, and from these two it has known
everything all at once, not through searching or [discursi ve] thought. Because He created
this, He created after this -- with an essential, not a temporal, posteriority -- the sensible
world and what is in it. The creation of those things [in the intellect] was not for the sake
of this world. because the more excellent is not for the sake of the more base. Generosity

5/1

Readingfi with Badawfs fit. I - he substitutes min.

51

Literally. "in signification and not in signification:'

52

AI-biirf _ in this section [ have also translated mubdi' as "creator:' but without capitalizing.

53

Compare, for example. Th.A V.40.

344

also does not stop (10) there 9 although this is not because of what is after it. But [rather
this is because] in His creating there is no obstacle to the emanation of the divine
generosity to the last of what receives generosity from Him among the quiddities of
things which obtain their existence from there. Because it is impossible that the divine
abundance 54 come to a stop short of what is possible, and it is impossible that there are
among the effects quiddities which attain all the kinds of intellectual and sensory
existence 9without divine generosity eradicating them 9the production of these things goes
past the complete and perfect things, whose production could have been because of a
need for a cause of existence 9 or a want of or desire for the existence of something, or
because of a purpose (15) in the existence of something without [God] needing them. For
the production is not because of this, but rather because the generosity is as perfect as
possible, and it is right for the quiddities of the effects to receive another, sensible
existence, and what is right in its existence is from [the cause of] the emanation, through
His creation.
2. The beginning of duality in creation - whatever creation is - is that it have possibility
in accordance with its essence, and existence from the First Truth. 55 From these two
there is formed an existent essence. If what is created is intellectual, [61] then it knows
its essence and knows the First. And therefore, from the outset956 it attains from the First
a duality, which does not occur to it posterior to its essence. But rather, its essence is
through the two [acts of knowing]. Then there follows its intellection of what follows it
and proceeds from it. 57 If there is multiplicity in it 9 then it is only necessitated after the
perfection of the essence, just as those existents are after the essence. In this way it is
possible that there is something created from the first created intellect, [namely] an
intellect and a heavenly soul. As for the problem that, from each (5) member of that
duality, there is also another duality from it 9 the following must be the case. We say that
it is impossible that it goes to infinity, since it would therefore be necessary that we find
two pure unities. Then the minimum would be that one of the two is a quiddity and the
other an existent from the First. But we say that the quiddity has no composition in it in
the way of two relations, since it is not created insofar as it is a quiddity, but rather insofar
as existence is conjoined to it. But the quiddity, insofar as it is a quiddity, is not a
collection of quiddity and existence linked together by the First, through which it is
necessary, (10) but rather existence is attached to it as a thing that is extraneous to it.
Then the quiddity does not require duality in its essence because it is a quiddity9 but
rather, this is perhaps because it is the quiddity of something composed in its reality.
As for the aspect of existence, perhaps someone may say: the existence of that
quiddity, taken in itself, can possibly be and possibly not be. But it is necessary from the
First, and the multiplicity [that comes from this] duality goes successively to infinity. We
say that this is not the case. Rather, the existence of that quiddity is nothing but existence
5.$

A/-rna 'nii a/-iliihi al-fti ';{[.

55

For the generation of pluraiity from unity. see for example Th.A X.2.

56

A rather speculative translation of min a/-an-wali. which Vajda leaves out of his translation.

57

I follow Vajda in omitting the last phrase here.fa-takiin ri/ka.

345

itself, and is not something that adheres to existence, but rather it is existence itself,
which (15) adheres to the quiddity. And [the quiddity] has no other existence such that it
could be asked whether it has this possibly. But it is existence in itself, and it is more
general than the existence of the possible and the existence of the necessary. Insofar as it
is considered as existence, you cannot assign specificity to it as possible or as necessary.
As for the coming-to-be of the quiddity, it is possible from the quiddity and necessary
from the First, which is the Necessary. It is this existence insofar as it is this existence.
This possibility is not a part of this existence such that it would thereby be divided, but
rather it is a state necessitated by this quiddity in (20) itself. And this necessity is a state
for that quiddity as it is related to the First. The existence itself, insofar as it is regarded
as itself, is only existence, not any other thing. Rather, it is sometimes combined [with
other things] without thereby being divided in itself. As for how the possibility can be a
concomitant of the quiddities, and whether it enters together with this into creation or not,
and what should be said if it does not enter [into creation] but is something after the first
without being related to creation, and what should be said if it does so enter, this has been
explained in the Oriental Wisdom.
[62] 3. He says that divine mercy necessitates the rectification of weakness in the way
that it is possible to rectify each thing, in its matter and its form. If the living thing is
weak and deprived of intellect, the intellect in it is deceptive -- that is, the intellectual
part, which is a gift and one of the faculties of its soul, which forms it so as to grant it
organs that make it oppose one thing and attract it to another. And by ""intellect," we
mean here the share of the intellectual part which is like one emanation (5) which
continues to diminish and to decline from the intellectual to the psychic 58 to the natural.
But this way of speaking is imaginary; in truth the numerical is not divided except
through proportional relation.
4. He says that this world [i.e. the intellectual world] is complete in the extreme, which is
its excellence, and there is no doubt that in it are all things. 59 That is, insofar as it is
intellect, it follows necessarily that [the intellect] it knows its own essence and that it
knows all things, which follow necessarily from its essence. For if it thinks its essence, it
is thinking what foHows [its essence] necessarily with no intermediary, and is thinking all
things which are necessitated by what it necessitates as well as that [which is
necessitated] (10) without an intermediary, since it is not intellect in potency, needing
anything to be brought to its attention -- such that it could happen that this existence that
it knows, which it cannot possibly be ignorant of, comes to its attention. For this can only
be in deficient intellects. If this is the case, then its wisdom would be our wisdom, if the
middle terms were brought to our attention according to their ranking. Then we would by
necessity know all the conclusions. But there, that which we have in deficient potency, or
in potency that is near completion, is complete in act. It is necessary that [the intellect]
knows everything, and that everything is known: that is, that the form of every thing is
present to it, grasped intellectually (15) and cleansed from strange coverings.
58

Nafsiya. i.e. having to do with the soul. a/-flafs.

59

Compare Th.A V.33. 39. on the completeness of intellect.

346

5. He says: as for the True One, everything that exists from Him is aware that it exists
from Him, and that its existence follows His existence, and that its possibility comes to be
necessary through Him. But it is not from Him that the effect has its aspiration, believes
in its end, or seeks what gives it existence. Rather, His existence is an existence from
which all existence emanates according to its ranking, and according to what He knows to
be best in the existence of every thing, and best for the proper arrangement of all, which
is that He knows60 His emanation from His essence is possible in the most general way,
and that the most beautiful [thing] (20) possible for [the emanation] is to be [a certain
way]. Thus, there comes to be known to Him the possibility that there is existent from
Him the existence of all according to the best way for the proper arrangement of the good.
And the cause of [this order] is His intellection of its essence and His intellection of the
proper, excellent arrangement in the existence of all things. And this concept is called
"flowing forth," as regarding the aspect of the existents [coming] from the First, and
"creation." regarding the aspect of the relation of the First to them.
But someone may say: if the existence of the things is necessitated from His
essence according as they are, then their attachment61 is not effected through His thinking
the existence of all according to the best of ways. [63] If the necessitation of the things
only follows their existence through His intellection, then they are only necessary through
His thinking them. But His thinking them is not of the same rank as His thinking Himself
[or: His essence], but rather [the former] follows His thinking Himself, and it belongs to
His essence to consider them together with His own essence. This [self-thinking] has an
essential priority to what is thought by Him, or to the simultaneous consideration of what
is not necessary [in itself], but rather is only necessary through the intermediary of being
thought. If this is the case, then through [His] consideration of them in the degree in
which He thinks of them, there is only the possibility that they exist from Him. What is
thought by Him is therefore possible (5) from His essence, but not necessary from His
essence. What, then, will be necessary? Of course, if He thought them necessarily, His
thinking of them would suffice for them to have existence from Him in themselves,
concurrently with the thinking. Likewise, their being necessitated by Him would not be
through the intermediary of His thinking them, but would rather be simultaneous or prior
to this.
So [created things] do not exist only because He thinks them, and they are not
only good and properly arranged in the best way because He thinks that the.best
arrangement is this one [which obtains]. Rather, they are necessary in such-and-such a
way through His thinking them in this way. Therefore, either His essence brings the
things into existence not insofar as He thinks them, but insofar as it is His essence, or (10)
you [must] say that He intends them and arranges them. But if you say that He intends
them and arranges them, then you have said once again that He thinks them, because an
intent such as His cannot but be intellectual. It remains that His essence brings the things
into proper arrangement, not only by thinking them according to their ranking and what is
best for them, so that the thinking follows this arrangement of theirs. But in addition,
60

Reading ta'[amu for Ila'[amu.

o(

See Vajda. p.388 fn.3 for an allernale reading.

347

their arrangement is necessary from His essence. and He thinks them in accordance with
their arrangement. [Also. on your view,] the thing which you caIl Providence, namely
that the First thinks the good and the proper. would be eliminated. The generation of the
things from the First would be sheer flowing forth. not attached to His thinking them.
even if (15) His thinking them accompanies [the emanation].
We say that the First thinks the things as possible from Him. in the measure that
the First thinks them. His thinking them as possible is followed by their necessitation in
existence, by which they become necessary from Him. 62 Without His thinking of them.
in the essential ranking they are [only] possible. Necessity is posterior to His thinking
them in the essential ranking. Then, He thinks their necessity from Him according to
their states: some of them are necessary and necessitate what exists from them. and some
of them are not necessary, but possible. Thinking the best for them is among the facets of
their possibility, and the best comes to be among the possibilities for them before they are
thought as the best necessarily. This is Providence: (20) the thinking of the best that is.
Their existence from Him is from the perfection of His existence and what [He has] that
exceeds perfection. They are only necessitated from Him because He is according to the
63
most excellent among ways of existence, and they only come to be like ends
accidentally. As for the True. He is free in His essence from every searching and end,
whether beautiful or not. Indeed, the beautiful is not a cause that draws Him to
something. Otherwise, He would be prompted by it. if He were to love it. But if the
thing is indifferent [for Him], then there is no need [for this]. This is clear to rightthinking intellects. The first is too sublime to [64] be drawn or prompted in any way. nor
is anything external to His existence good in such a way as to exist [on its own merit].
Rather, the existence of every thing is from Him in this way: He thinks His own essence.
through which the existence of every thing is possible. while His thinking them is
necessary. Indeed, His essence is the essence that necessitates from itself those things
that are possible from it, because He thinks them. In this way. Providence completes the
generation of Providence, while the essence is prior to the necessity of the things. It is
only with respect to [the essence] that things are possible from [the essence], (5) yet their
necessity is not simultaneous with His necessity without the intermediary of the necessity
of His attributes. which He has in His essence.
'''Creation'' is when the thing has existence from the First alone, so that the First
and another thing are not [both] causes and conditions for the thing, and the thing then
exists [given both of these]. But what if someone were to say: there is the First as well as
the possibility of the existence of this thing in itself, so two [causes] were prior to it -- for
if there were the First, but there were not simultaneous with Him the possibility of the
existence of this thing in itself, then this thing did not have the possibility of existence in
itself? But the existence of what has no possibility of existence in (10) itself is either
necessary. and so without any cause. or impossible. so again without any cause. Nor
would it be correct to say that the possibility of its existence has the status of a cause.
insofar as its existence may be from [that cause], since the error of this has been made
62 In other words. if God thinks His effects in themselves. they are only possible; but once they
proceed from Him. posterior to this act of thought. they become necessary.
63

Readingfara~rr with Vajda.

348

clear in the books. True creation is when no possibility is possessed for the existence of
the thing, [such] that [its possibility] is prior to it along with its non-being, with a priority
which is not simultaneously associated with its posteriority.64 For you know that some
priorities associate with posteriorities, and some of them do not associate with them.
Therefore, it is necessary that the priority be within the [act of] creation, if creation is the
existence of the thing (IS) only from the Principle alone, without the intermediary of a
cause. Another condition is the priority of the essence of the Creator, [which is] an
essential priority, not a priority excluding posteriority. The latter is a temporal priority.
which is associated with possibility. And every thing returns to it,65 that is, seeks the
perfection of its species, and is perfected through imitation of it.
6. He says: it is necessary to see66 the world in its entirety as a city, governed by the most
excellent law. 67 There is [also] placed in it another arrangement, its parts together, some
parts preceding others, towards a universal arrangement and universal good. (20) [The
world] is one in origin, but subdivided in its branches. Likewise are the heavens, [which
are] of a totality [making up] another city of the first government, which is the
intermediary between the Principle of the government and its lowest extreme. The
government emanates from them in accordance with Providence, and they [Le. the
heavens] move in the first obedience, as they imitate of the pure intelligibles according to
what they know. There follows an arrangement or a good in what is lower, even if it [i.e.
the higher principle] does not intend [the lower] through the essence [of the lower] or on
its account; rather, what is intended is something else. Indeed, it [i.e. the heavenly world]
does not make an impression in the world of generation and corruption through its
motions [65] and its powers such that its motions and powers are on account of [the lower
world], but rather by another cause, from which these impressions follow. Sometimes
[the impressions] are harmful, and sometimes useful, though the harm and evil is not
intended. Indeed, the harmful things follow from them inevitably, without the
objectionable things proceeding from them through the intent of the First. Rather, the
hannful things that follow are necessitated by the good. It is impossible that the causes of
the good are causes for the good in such a way that they can be [these] causes without
necessitating harmful effects. in the first [intention].68 (5) Yet harmful and evil things are
infrequent. For example, the universal utility of fire or water could not be in the world of
generation and corruption, without there thereby being a collision of ordered causes -each of which is put in its place in the order, and each of which has a motion for the
general good -- such that fire bums something precious, or such that water drowns a
living thing. For if fire were placed not so as to bum, and water not so as to drown, or [in
general] the motions of things were placed in such a way that they did not come together
to produce an encounter of fire with a precious garment, or the drowning of a noble living
(W

See Vajda. p.391 fnA.

65

This phrase is treated as a text

66

Reading yudrikll with Badawls p.64, fn.l.

67

Compare Th.A V.II. VI.3-4.

68

I follow Vajda in adding the final word in brackets.

[0

be commented upon; compare Th.A X.33.

349

thing in ( 10) water, then it would be impossible that there was that general good, or that
infrequent evil. But the loss of the general good would be a greater [harmJ than the
frequent evil, indeed this would be a general evil.
C.5 Notes on Mimar VU69

[66] (5) Th.A VD.l

We say that, although the noble and sovereign soul left its high world and descended to
this low world, it did this through the nature of its high ability and power, to inform and
govern the being that is after it.
IS: That is, "the soul... descended... through its high ability and power," 70 which is "to
inform" the existence which is adjacent to it and succeeds it, namely sensible existence,
"and to govern" it and [be that] from which it acquires perfection.
Th.A Vn.2
[f [the soul] is liberated from this world after informing and governing it, and comes to its
own world quickly, then its descent to this world does not hurt her in any way, but rather
it benefits from this. This is because it acquires from this world the knowledge of evil,
and knows what its nature is, after expending its powers on it and showing its noble,
motionless doings and acts which were in it when it was in the intellectual world.
IS: That is, if [the soulJ is pure it is easy for it to separate from its [current] world with
alacrity, by being perfected, by connecting its nature to the nature of its intellectual
principles, and by being unblemished by stains that would impede it, after the dissolution
of the ( 10) corporeal compound, from adhering to the intellectual world. And insofar as
it is quick to adhere to what is prior to it, it is not harmed by its descent, "but rather it
benefits from this."
9

Th.A Vll.3-4
If [the soul] were not to demonstrate its acts and shown its powers, and let them be seen,
then these powers and activities would be futile in it, and the soul would forget the firm
and precise excellences and acts, were they hidden and not apparent. If this were the
case. it would not know the power of the soul nor know its nobility. This is because the
act is only the manifestation and appearance of the hidden power. If the power of the soul
were hidden and did not appear., then it would corrupt and be as if it never was at all.
IS: He has in mind that the Creator put in the nature and powers of the soul that it do
these acts and undergo [67J these passivities in order to be thereby liberated when it has
1

Vajda pointed out that Badawf's section 7 of the commentary on mfmar V is actually just
repetition of commentary on parts of mimar VII: see below. and Vajda"s p.393 fn.1 and p.395 fn.4.
(

70 [n the manuscript we find '-through its ability and its capacity for victory:~ but as Badawi points
out (p.66 fn.2) this looks like a misreading of"and its high power:' which would parallel the text in Th.A.
The two alternate readings appear similar enough in Arabic to explain the manuscript error.

350

fallen and left the intellectual in the way which befits the soul, [namely] that it be
intellectual in [itself.f 1 Otherwise, [the soul] would lack what is in its power in
overcoming the world of evil, in conquering it and acquiring the condition of
preparedness [for ascent], together with the absence of blemish and intellectual
perfection.
Th.A VII.5
The indication that this is the case is created things, for though they are beautiful,
splendid, great in ornamentation, perfected, falling under vision, the one who sees, if he
be intelligent, does not wonder at the decoration of their exterior, but rather looks at their
interior and wonders at their Creator and Originator, and does not doubt that He is the
paragon of beauty and splendor. with no limit to His power, since He made these works.
filled with beauty and loveliness and perfection.
IS: His intention is not to suggest that the Creator thereby acquires a [higher] degree or
rank, or that He creates (5) things is in order to gain some advantage. Indeed, that He
comes to knows something He creates through His majesty. and that he does not know it
through this [thing itself] is more appropriate and more beautiful and more customary for
Him than not knowing [in this way]. Nor does the emanation of existence from Him
make [His] essence noble and [His] existence perfect. The state of things in His case is
not like the state of things in the soul, for the soul is completed through the body and is
perfected through administering to it. But he says that72 were it not for the production of
God -- may He be exalted -- and His majesty, and were He not such as to have this
capacity [for creation]. His essence would not be the exalted essence. Not that [creation]
is the cause of His essence being exalted; it is rather the proof that His essence is exalted,
and that it is necessary (10) for [His] exalted essence that it be such as to emanate
existence from itself according to its arrangement. For this succession is from His
existence, yet not according as its existence is noble through itself. Rather, because His
existence is what is noble through itself, it is necessary that existence emanate from Him.
If existence were not to emanate from Him, this would not be that because of which His
essence was not noble. It would rather be primary that His essence was not noble,
through something in itself or through [some other] cause. For we are supposing that
generosity does not emar13te from Him, is not necessitated by Him and does not follow
from Him. 73

71 As Vajda remarks (p.394. fn.3) this last phrase is rather obscure. However this translation.
which follows that suggested to Vajda by Gardet. seems a likely reading.
71

This begins the section repeated on p.65 (line 12) of Badawls edition.

73 The alternate tex.t (p.65.17-18) has: ...but rather it would be first that His essence was not noble.
lhrough something in itself. or through a cause which opposes that generosity emanate from Him. be
necessitated by Him. and follow from Him."

351

Th.A VII.7
For if the eternal things and the vanishing things falling under generation and corruption
were not existent~ the first One would not be a true cause. And how is it possible that the
things are not existent~ [since] their cause is a true cause~ a true light and a true good?
(15) IS: That is, if the Creator had not been such as to provide existence for all
"vanishing" things and all ""eternal" things, He would not be the First Truth. Not that His
primacy would be removed if existence did not emanate from Him, but rather -- if this
were the case -- it would show that His primacy is not existent, not that [His lacking of
emanating] is the cause of the removal of [His primacy]. [The author] wants to make
clear that, if the soul were not such [68] as to be able to administer what was mentioned
above, its nobility would not be fixed. 74
Th.A VII. 10
Likewise, it could not be that the soul was alone in this higher intellectual world~ and that
there was nothing that receives its impressions. For this reason it descended to the lower
world, in order to manifest its eminent acts and powers. And this is necessary for every
nature: that it perform its activities and impress the thing which is under it~ and that the
thing be affected and receive impressions from the things which is next higher to it. This
is because the higher thing impresses the thing that is lower.
IS: It is as if he said: in divine Providence, qua Providence, need for the existence of a
thing [is manifested] as matter, so what is made is a receiver of generation and
corruption. It is for this reason that [matter] becomes receptive of the administration of
the soul. In [this way also] the development of the rational souls is in the angels, in an
indefinite way. What does not receive forms in the best way (5) is made an instrument
and utility for the substance which is for the sake of the rational soul. Likewise, every
inferior thing is for the sake of what is more surpassing. The possibles that exist are not
wasted in the noble process of generation, even though they are not the first intention
according to Providence.
Th.A VII.17-19
Because matter receives form from the sout nature is produced. Then [the soul] infonns
nature and inevitably induces it to become receptive of generation. Nature only becomes
recepti ve to generation because the power of soul and the high causes are placed in it.
Then the act of the intellect stops at nature and the beginning of generation. Generation is
the last of the intellectual formative causes and the first of the generative causes. It is
necessary that the active causes formative of substances do not stop before they come to
nature. This is only the case because the First Cause, which makes the intellectual beings
active causes, is formative of the accidental forms that fall under generation and
corruption.

7-1

The last sentence does not appear in the alternate text (p.65. I8-20). It may refer ahead to Th.A

VII.IO.

352

IS: [He says] that the divine emanation is divided into giving existence to that whose
existence is fixed and eternal in number, and giving existence to that whose existence is
not eternal and not fixed except in species. If existence did not emanate according to one
of [these] two ways, existence would not include all modes of possible existence. It is
necessary that existence not stop before arrival in (10) the domain of generation and
corruption. He says that the intellect and the soul, if they are prior to nature in essence,
succeed nature in its impressions in the sensible world, which receives generation and
corruption.
Th.A VII.39-40
We say that, when the soul comes to be in these sensible, dirty things, it comes to things
with weak power and little light. This is because, when it acts in this world and makes
wondrous impressions upon it, [the soul] finds it necessary not to release them, so that
they are quickly destroyed. For they are pictures, and the picture, if the artist does not
provide it with color75 , disappears and corrupts and is obliterated, so that its beauty is not
evident and is in vain, and the wisdom and power of the painter is not apparent. Since
this is the case, and the soul is that which makes these wondrous impressions in this
world, it brings it about that these impressions are permanent. This is because, when [the
soul] returns to its world, and comes to be in it, it sees that brilliance, light, and power,
and takes from that light and that power, and radiates it into this world, providing [this
world] with light, life, and power. This is the state of the soul, and in this way it governs
the state of this world, and adheres to it.
IS: He says: this claims that our souls, when they have separated from the bodies, leave
impressions on this world, and preserve [69] the arrangement of the world. What is
necessary to know about this is that the substances of the souls, when they have separated
from the bodies and been perfected through the intellect complete in act, have a more
excellent power than what they had. They are like a genus which has procreated and
which has, in the procreated world, other states and another power. It is tantamount to the
causes and principles participating in the emanation according as this world does -insofar as, if there could be in this world an increase in perfection it would receive, and in
the readiness (5) it has, then it would be necessary that the arrangement and excellences
of this world would increase at every moment, and even that this would acquire infinity in
increase. But the readiness of the matter and the utmost limit of what it can bear are _
limited. The first principles are not incapable of governing this limit. Even if something
that has another power is added to it, it increases in this. This is like when one imagines
that water has a certain limit in being heated, and that this limit is reached in actuality
because of a fire which is designated to come into relation with it. [If] the fire were
increased twofold, the water would not receive (10) any heating except what is in its
potency to receive, [though] your statement that every fire is a principle for heat, and that
in [water] is a potency for being heated, remains true.

75

Reading lalm with Lewis.

353

Th.A VU.42-43
[f someone says: why do we not sense that world as we sense this world? We say:
because the sensible world dominates us, and our souls have been filled with its
abominable cravings, and our ears with the great uproar and clamor in it. So we do not
sense that intellectual world, nor do we know what the soul brings us from it. We are
only able to sense the intellectual world and what the soul brings us from it when we rise
from this world, and abandon its base cravings, and are not preoccupied with anything of
its states.
IS: That is, just as the ears do not hear anything when uproar and tumult distract them, so
the soul is distracted from its awareness of its world by what the sensible world brings to
it.
Th.A VIlA5
We say that every soul has something that unites it to the body below, and [something]
that unites it to the intellect above.
[S: That is, every soul has two powers: a power such that through it, [the soul] may sense
its union to the world of the intellect, and a power (15) such that, through it, [the soul]
may sense its union to the world of sense. The first power is the material intellect, and
the intellect through natural disposition. The second power - [and it] is closer to the soul
-- is the practical intellect, which is the internal and external senses.

Th.A VIl.46-47
The universal soul governs the universal body through some of its powers, without
exertion or fatigue, because it does not govern through discursive thought as our souls
govern our bodies, but rather only governs it intellectually and universally, without
discursive thought or deliberation. And [the soul] only comes to govern it without
deliberation because it is a universal body, without variation in it. Its parts are similar to
the whole, and [the soul] does not govern varying mixtures or dissimilar members, so as
to need varied governance, but it is one body, united, similar in members, and one nature
without variation in it.
[S: He says that the soul of heaven is not afflicted by the fact that its body varies in its
states and times, such that its governance would vary, and it would need to procure
useful things and reject harms, so that its governance would again vary. But rather, it is
one substance similar in its [70] parts, similar in [its] states at [all] times. It is not
necessary that the case be different with regard to the whole [as opposed to] its parts, nor
is it affected so as to have to govern those things that are exterior to it. Thus the soul
does not need attachment or simple motions belonging to it alone -- for bodily attachment
does not come to it from intellectual attachment. So it has an existence from intellect
which, from the character [of intellect], exists for it since its first existence.

354

Th.A VO.50
If the soul were able to abandon sense and the sensible things which pass away, and not
cling to them. then would govern this body with the le~t effort, without exertion or
fatigue, assimilate itself to the universal soul. and be like in a situation similar to (the
universal soul] in conduct and governance, with no separation or difference between the
two.
(5) IS: He means that the soul is fixed to its world, to which it is attached as when one has

something in his hand and has forgotten it. And if [the soul] forgets its world, it forgets
the true pleasure it had from [that world] and is preoccupied with perishing pleasure.
Unless, by God, it purifies itself so that there remains to it from the body only the things
necessitated [by its] attachment. and most of the preoccupations are abolished from it. At
that point it is on the verge of assimilating to the soul of the all, even though [that
universal soul] is more noble than it in a way.
C.6 Notes on Mimar VIII
Th.A Vrn.61-63
If someone says: when the soul is in this world, how does it know the things that are in
the intellectual worlds, and how does it perceive 76 them? Through the potency through
which it knows them when it is in that world, or through some act that is other than that
potency? If it knows them through that potency, it is inevitable that it perceive the
intellectual things here just as it perceived them there. Yet this would be absurd, because
there it is freed and pure, but here it is blended with the body. If the soul perceives the
things here through some act. and act is not potency, then it is certain that it perceives the
intellectual things without its perceptive potency. But this would be absurd, because no
perceiver perceives anything except by its native potency, which does not separate from
the thing except through its corruption.
We say that the soul knows the high intellectual things there through the potency
by which it knows them when it is there, although when it comes to be in the body, it
needs something else through which to attain the things which it attains [while it is]
separated. So the potency manifests the act, and brings it to operation, because the soul is
content with its potency in the upper world, and does not need act, but when it comes to
be here, it needs act. and is not content with its potency.. Potency is. in the intellectual,
high substances, that which manifests act and completes it, but in the bodily substances, it
is the act that completes the potency, and brings it to the limit.
(10) IS: If someone asks: the soul has perceived the intelligibles in this body, yet this is
through observation of the world of intellect -- does it perceive them through a potency
purely of its essence, or through the application of an operation together with [such a
potency]? If it perceives them through a potency which [71] it has in its essence, then it
has no need for the act and the operation, and it is in the body as separated from the body.
But this is not the case. Rather, it is in the body and perfects its acts through acts. And if
76

Reading llldrikll with Lewis.

355

it cannot refrain from having act, it derives no utility from its potency in perception of the
intelligibles, and its perception of the intelligibles is through the organs. But this is
absurd, for the intelligibles are only perceived through the native potency belonging to the
psychic substance, to the exclusion of (5) external organs.
The answer is that the soul does not perceive the pure intelligibles except through
that power it has, but when it is bodily, that is, requires the body in its acts, then it needs
something else through which it fulfilJs the potency, and which perfects it and brings it to
be as it should be in its essence. This potency is not perfected owing to its act, because it
needs an increase in itself and a clarification and interpreter for itself. [The soul] is only
perfected from the acts through which it attains this clarification and complete
inclination, so that it comes to perform an operation which perfects the potency, and
which, through the observation of sensible things, makes it ready for reception of an
emanation (10) from above, through which its potency is fulfilled. If the soul had a
perfect potency through which it would unite to the intellect, it would not need to
associate with bodies, yet its association with the bodies is in order to perfect that
potency.
He says that the potencies in the higher substances are complete and connected to
the act. [n [that case,] it is not possible that the potency both come to act and not come to
act, but rather it can only be that the act proceeds from it necessarily, owing to its
perfection and then to the self-sufficiency that is posterior to the perfection [it has]
through itself. For everything which is from it comes into act posterior to [its] first
[aspect], and everything which is from its essence is posterior to its essence, because it is
necessitated. 77 But in (15) the substances which are in this world, potency is only
perfected through act, just as you see that that power to write is distant, and comes to be
near through use, and likewise for the other arts. There, the potency necessitates the act
and completes it, but here, the potency is only strengthened and derived through the act.
Th.A VID.64-5
If this is the case, we return and we say that the thing through which the soul sees the
higher intellectual things while it is there, [is also that by which] it sees while it is here,78
namely its potency. And its act only enhances that potency. This is because it desires to
behold that world, and raises up its potency and uses it in another way than the way it has
used it while it was there, because it perceived the things there through the least effon,
but does not perceive them here except with exertion and hardship. It only raises up that
potency in people of distinction and in him who is among the people of good fonune.
And through this potency, the soul sees the noble, high things, whether it be there or here.
IS: He mentions true vision,79 which is turning towards the true forms without needing to
observe what they bear or what is from them. This is [the case] only when the power is
completed and perfected, and when it has true vision of the true genus through the
potency, without the employment of anything beyond what [the author] calls "raising up:'
17

I offer this as a somewhat speculative translation - Vajda declines to translate the text here.

78

Following the alternate text provided by Badawi, p.1 02, fn.l.

79

See p.44. In.5 tT. of Ibn Sin~fs notes.

356

namely shunning this world and its preoccupations, and approaching the world of truth.
There is no need for this raising up'~ when [the soul] is separated.

[72] IS: He says that the souls which separate from the bodies are not free of wrappings
and garments, and that they need to have some body, to which they have some attachment
and through which they are preserved if they have found intellectual perfection. Indeed
the heavenly bodies are not prevented from using souls other than their own souls, in
some manner of use. Then all the more so, when the soul's potency is completed in this
body, it may use as a replacement - out of some necessity (5) or some need -- a loftier
and more nobler body than [the original body].
Th.A

vrn

IS: He says that the soul can remember particular concepts only as long as the instruments
subsist through which [the soul] attains and represents the particular concepts, namely
bodily instruments. And if what we believe about our souls is true, that they may
possibly have an attachment with the heavenly bodies such that they are like mirrors for
them -- and there is one common mirror for a number of viewers - it is possible that there
is memory there. When [the soul] descends from the intellectual world, which is (10)
where the pure intellect is, and the pure memories of the universal, intellectual concept,
then the beginning of the domain of memory is the heavenly world. So it is possible that
it belongs to our souls to remember something there. As for how this is possible and
through what intermediary this is the case, you must consult the Oriental Wisdom. It is
not improbable that some of our souls, when we are in these bodies, have some
attachment to heavenly states. and that through these we are united to the heavenly soul,
and we take the particular [concepts] from them in dreams and in other ways. When (the
soul] is separated from the body and is still bodily, it has this attachment more strongly.
Through this (15) bodily attachment it results for [the soul] that states are innovated in it~
and it is stripped of conditions acquired from these [lower] bodies.
Th.A Vrn.l06
We say that the soul is intellectual when it comes to be in the intellect. Except that, if it
is intellectual, its intellect is only through discursive thought and deliberation, because it
is an acquired intellect. So, for this reason, it comes to think and deliberate, because its
intellect is deficient, but the intellect completes it [Le. the soul] like the father and the
so For the following comment by Ibn Sfn~ Badawi suggests the following source: Th.A V1I1.74:
This is because. when the existences constantly grasp the soul, it forgets what was in it before it entered
into the existent. and does not remember that because of its distance from the first state it was in. and its
staying in constant downward motion. Then the soul does not remember anything at all, and when it does
not remember, it cannot imagine its intellectual world. And when it cannot imagine this, it does not want to
make distinctions. and it is like the brute soul. and this is most repugnant:' However. the text does not seem
a particularly appropriate one for Ibn Sfna's comment. It is more likely that. as Vajda remarks. this and the
next sections by Ibn Sina comment on a longer stretch of mfmar VII[ without having any specific passage in
mind. See Vajda. pA03 n.3.

357

son. Indeed the father rears and completes the son. So the intellect is that which
completes the soul, because it is that which procreates it.
IS: He says: the material forms are not appropriate to conceive the intelligibles, insofar as
they are intelligible, but rather they conceive them in another way.
IS: He says that the soul is adorned and completed by the active intelligibles, and it is like
an offspring for them, because the intellectuality of the soul is not substantial, but
acquired. 81
C.7 Notes on MIrnar IX
Th.A 1X.74
And we, too, [have] our subsisting and fixity through the First Agent: we attach to Him,
desire Him, and incline towards Him and return to Him, even though we are far and
distant from Him, our place of arrival and return is towards Him.
[73] IS: He says that, since the Principle of all things is the Everlasting through His
essence and the Truth through His essence, all things long for Him, either by free will, by
wish, by a sort of inspiration, or because of [an inclination] of natures towards love of the
abiding, which is sought individually or considered, so that they abide through it in
species and are moved by this.

IS: He says that all that to which existence comes enters into divine Providence. Because
of (5) divine Providence, decayed things are not changed into animals, which are too
noble to be decayed things. It is these which are nourished by the decayed things, and
they take [them] from the air, from the water, and from the earth, as if they were the
refuse of the world.
Th.A IX.75_6 83
If someone says: why is it, if we are such as to be in that first essence which originates all
things, and there are found in us many virtues from the soul, that we do not sense the First
Cause or the intellect or the soul or the eminent, noble, virtues, and do not use them, but
ignore them most of our lifetime, and among men are some who ignore them and do not
know them for their whole lifetime, and when they hear someone speak of them, they
SJ

This is a second comment on the same passage from Th.A.

81 Badawl implausibly suggests Th.A VIII. 13 as the text for the following comment. Given its
placement in the Notes. Ibn SIn~rs comment should be based on the latter portions of Atfimar IX. but no
passage there seems to be an obvious source.
SJ Vajda (p.406 n.t) suggests that the following comment by Ibn STna corresponds to the long
stretch of text from Th.A IX.64-90. and that we cannot pin down a source text more precisely than this.
This is probably true: however. I give here a translation of IX_75-6 as representative of this section. and as a
plausible source given that it follows the last identifiable source text used by Ibn SYna (i.e. IX.74).

358

believe that they are superstitions having no truth, and their whole lifetimes do not use
any of the noble, eminent virtues? We say: we are ignorant of these things only because
we have become sensory and do not know non-sensory things, and so not want anything
but them. So when we seek the acquisition of knowledge, we only want to acquire it
from sense.
IS: He says that the virtues - and in general, intellectual concepts - are not traced in the
soul in act abidingly, as if it is gazing at them, but rather they are only present to it when
it thinks about them. I say that, when [the soul] is seeking them, it thinks, and when they
exist for it, every time it wants [them] it turns away from bodily concerns towards the
side of the intellect, (10) and unites to the intellect. The intelligibles are not abidingly
represented in act with the intellect only because the soul is devoid of them. If it were not
devoid of them, [the intelligibles] would be represented in act for it. It does not have
them in a storage, like memory, since memory is for the sensible things. Rather, the soul
has conjunction [sometimes] and disjunction [at other times], and memory is seeking
preparation for complete conjunction. When [the soul] thinks and knows, it belongs to it
to be conjoined as long as it wants. As for how error happens from [the soul], and how
[this error] leaves it, and how [error] returns to it, this requires a long discussion.
(15) Platos arguments for the immortality of the soul

84

: He said, '4the rational soul knows

its own essence and the things that are not associated with matter at all. And everything
which knows its essence and the things not associated with matter at all are non-body and
separated from the bodies." "Non-body," because it knows its own essence, and
"separated from the bodies," because of its knowledge of things which are not associated
with matter at all. Therefore, the rational soul is not bodily, and is separated from the
bodies.
Everything which is not bodily, and is separated from the bodies, does not
dissolve like the dissolution of bodies, and does not become separated, (20) and does not
pass away when it is separated from the body. as the accident passes away. Therefore the
rational soul does not dissolve, and does not pass away when it is separated [74] from the
body.
Everything which does not corrupt in one of these two ways is non-eorruptible.
Therefore, the rational soul is also non-corruptible.
Everything which corrupts in its substance has in it a bad property through which
[it is corrupted] in its substance, and the soul does not have any such bad property
through which it is corrupted in its substance. Therefore the soul is not corruptible in its
substance.
Furthermore, the soul knows the totality of existent things through its substance,
and everything which knows the totality of existent things through its substance is (5)

8-l As Badawi remarks (p.74, m.I), there are two possible explanations of this final section in the
text. The first is that it is a later addition. and not by Ibn Sina, which seems likely since it departs from the
commentaries on the Theology. The second. however, is that Ibn STna added the discussion ofPlato's
views in light of the subtitle of mfmar IX: On the Soul. and That it Does not Die: The former seems
much more likely. especially in view of the pedantic nature of the section and its stylistic dissimilarity from
Ibn STnas commentary.

359

non-bodily and is separated from all bodies. Therefore. the soul is non-bodily and is
separated from the bodies. And everything that is non-bodily and separated from all
bodies is non-corruptible and undying. Therefore the soul is non-corruptible and
undying.
Another argument on the immortality of the soul: the soul gives life always to that
in which it exists, since it is always the cause of life in what lives. and is what gives life
always to that in which it exists. If it received the contrary of life. since it would not be
one of the things which always gives something, it would receive the contrary of what
(10) it gives. So it is impossible that the soul receives the contrary of life. which is what
it gives. yet the contrary of life is death. So it is impossible that the soul receive this
death. which is the thing the body gives, that is, life (?).
Another argument. in the book of Politics 85 . He says: the soul is not corrupted in
its specific essence, and everything that is corrupted is only corrupted from its specific
essence. Therefore the soul is not corrupted.

85

i.e. (he Republic.

360

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371

THE ARABIC PLOTINUS:

A STUDY OF THE "THEOLOGY
'"THEOLOGY OF ARISTOTLE" AND RELATED TEXTS

Abstract

by

Peter S. Adamson

Even though it is arguably the most important source for Neoplatonic ideas in the
Arabic speaking philosophical tradition.
tradition, the Arabic Plotinus has until recently received
little philosophical attention. This is regrettable.
regrettable, because of the enormous historical and
philosophical interest of the work. HistoricaIly, it stands at the beginning of a vital
tradition that passed on Greek thought first to Islamic thinkers and.
and, later.
later, to the Christian
world. Philosophically.
Philosophically, the text presents a unique opportunity to study the earliest
confrontation of several traditions of thought, Neoplatonism.
Neoplatonism, Aristotelianism and Islam
being chief among them. Thus the dissertation explores the ramifications for Platonic
philosophy.
construed, in a new context where philosophers began to show how
philosophy, broadly construed.
Neoplatonism could be reconciled with monotheism, and how Islam could be reconciled
with the various strands of the Greek tradition.

Peter S. Adamson

The text of the Arabic Plotinus. which includes the so-called "Theology of
Aristotle:' is the work of an anonymous author from al-Kindi's translation circle who
paraphrased parts of Plotinus' Enneads. [argue that this author. whom [ call the Adaptor,
set out not only to translate the works of Plotinus but to alter them philosophically in a
systematic way. After dealing with philological issues regarding the text, I move through
the Adaptor's handling of Plotinus' three main hypostases: Soul, Intellect. and the First
Principle. I argue that changes introduced into the text demonstrate that the Adaptor was
trying to fashion a text that would cohere with other philosophical sources (especially
Aristotle) and answer contemporary theological debates. In conclusion I discuss the
integrity and philosophical viability of the resulting text, as well as the identity of the
Adaptor. Appendices include discussions of al-Kindi's and Avicenna's use of the Arabic
Plotinus, and a translation of Avicenna's commentary on the ''Theology of Aristotle:'