(11)

PACIFIC BANKING CORP EMPLOYEES ORG AND PAULA PAUG V. COURT OF APPEALS
AND VITALIANO NANAGAS as liquidator of PACIFIC BANKING CORP, 242 SCRA 492
(1995) G.R. No. 109373. March 27, 1998
PRESIDENT OF PDIC as liquidator of PACIFIC BANKING CORP V. CA, HON. REGINO
VERIDIANO, DEPUTY SHERIFF RAMON ENRIQUEZ AND ANG ENG-JOO, ANG KEONG
LAN AND E.J. ANG INTL LTD represented by attorney in fact GONZALO SY G.R. No.
112991. March 27, 1998
2ND DIVISION: CJ Narvasa, Bidin, Regalado, Puno, concurring
PONENTE: J. Mendoza
Atty. Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. 109373.
Puruganan Chato Tan & Geronimo for petitioner in G.R. 112991.
Balane Tamase Alampay Law Office for PDIC.
Miguel M. Gonzales and Norberto L. Martinez for respondent Land Bank of the Phils.
NATURE: Petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 65
FACTS: Pacific Banking Corp (PaBC) was placed under receivership by the Central Bank
pursuant to resolution of the Monetary Board. A few months later, it was placed under
liquidation and a liquidator was appointed.
1. In April 1986, Central Bank filed with RTC Manila Branch 31, a petition for assistance
in the liquidation of PaBC, which was granted by the court
2. In May 1991, a new liquidator, Vitaliano Nanagas (president of PDIC) was appointed
by the Central Bank
3. In March 1989, the PaBC Employees Organization (Union) filed a complaint-inintervention seeking payment of holiday pay 13 th month pay differential, and other
benefits. The RTC ordered the payment of the principal claims of the Union in Sept
13, 1991
4. When the liquidator received a copy of the order on Sept 16, 1991, he filed a Motion
for Reconsideration and Clarification of the Order. In In his order dated Dec 6, 1991,
the judge modified his Sept 13 order but in effect denied the MR. This order was
received by the liquidator on Dec 9, 1991 and the next day, he filed a notice of
appeal and motion for additional time to submit record on appeal. On December 23,
1991, another notice of appeal was filed by OSG in behalf of Nanagas
5. Respondent judge disallowed the liquidators notice of appeal on the ground it was
filed late (more than 15 days after receipt of decision). The judge declared his Sept
13 order and subsequent orders to be final and executory and denied reconsideration
6. Private respondents Ang Keong et al, filed claims for the payment of investment in
PaBC, alleging that their claim constituted foreign exchange capital investment
entitled to preference of payment under Foreign Investments Law. Respondent
judged granted the petition dated Sept 11, 1992
7. The liquidator received the order on Sept 16, 1992. On Sept 30, he filed an MR but
the same was denied. The liquidator filed a notice of appeal from the orders of Sept
16, but the judge ordered the notice of appeal be stricken off the records for having
been filed without the authority of the Central Bank and beyond 15 days
8. In the Union case, CA 5 th division (order dated Nov 17, 1992) held that the instant
case was a special proceeding and therefore the period of appeal is 30 days. Since
the notice of appeal was filed on the 30th day, the appeal was brought on time
9. On the other hand, CA 14 th division (order dated Dec 16, 1993) ruled in the
stockholder/investor case that the liquidation proceeding in an ordinary action and
therefore the period for appeal is 15 days from receipt of final order
ISSUE: WON a petition for liquidation under Sec 29 RA 265 is in the nature of a special
proceeding

RULING: Yes.
RATIO: Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the enforcement
or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while special proceeding is
the act by which one seeks to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact.
Where a party litigant seeks to recover property from another, his remedy is to file an action.
Where his purpose is to seek the appointment of a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a
special proceeding to establish the fact or status of insanity calling for an appointment of
guardianship.
A liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
deceased persons under Rules 73 to 91 ROC. The two have a common purpose: the
determination of all the assets and the payment of all debts and liabilities of the insolvent
corporation or the estate. The liquidator and administrator or executor are both charged with
the assets for the benefit of the claimants. In both instances, the liability of the corporation
and the estate is not disputed. The courts concern is with the declaration of creditors and
their rights and the determination of their order of payment.
Furthermore, as in the settlement of estates, multiple appeals are allowed in proceedings for
liquidation of an insolvent corporation.
A petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be classified as a special
proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such petition does not seek the enforcement or
protection of a right nor the prevention or redress of a wrong against a party. It does not
pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from a partys wrongful act or omission nor state
a cause of action that can be enforced against any person.
What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the corporations insolvency so
that its creditors may be able to file their claims in the settlement of the corporations debts
and obligations.
Liquidation proceedings do not resemble petitions for interpleader. An action for interpleader
involves claims on a subject matter against a person who has no interest therein. This is not
the case in a liquidation proceeding where the liquidator, as representative of the
corporation, takes charge of the assets and liabilities of the corporation for the benefit of the
creditors.
A liquidation proceeding is a single proceeding which consists of a number cases properly
classified as claims. It is basically a two-phased proceeding. The first phase is concerned
with the approval and disapproval of claims. Upon the approval of the petition seeking the
assistance of the proper court in the liquidation of a close entity, all money claims against
the bank are required to be filed with the liquidation court. This phase may end with the
declaration by the liquidation court that the claim is not proper and without basis. On the
other hand, it may also end with the liquidation court allowing the claim. In the latter case,
the claim shall be classified whether it is ordinary or preferred, and thereafter included
liquidator. In either case, the order allowing or disallowing a particular claim is final order,
and may be appealed by the party aggrieved thereby. The second phase involves the
approval by the court of the distribution plan prepared by the liquidator. The distribution
plan specifies in detail the total amount available for distribution to creditors whose claim
were earlier allowed.
CAB: In the case of the stockholders/investors, the liquidators notice of appeal was filed on
time, having been filed on the 23 rd day of receipt of the order granting the claims of the
stockholders/investors. However, the liquidator did not file a record on appeal and as a

result, he failed to perfect his appeal. A record on appeal is required under the Interim Rules
and Guidelines in special proceedings and for cases where multiple appeals are allowed. The
reason for this is that the several claims are actually separate ones and the decision or final
order with respect to any claim can be appealed. Necessarily, the original record on appeal
must remain in the trial court where other claims may still be pending. Because of the
liquidators failure to perfect his appeal, the order granting the claims of the
stockholders/investors became final. CAs decision dismissing the liquidators petition for
certiorari must be affirmed but for a different reason.
In the case of the Union, the CA 5 th division correctly granted the liquidators petition for
certiorari. The liquidator filed a notice of appeal and motion for extension to file a record on
appeal on Dec 10, 1991, within 30 days from receipt of the order granting the Unions claim.
Without waiting for the resolution of the motion for extension, he filed on Dec 20, 1991
within the extension sought a record on appeal.
DISPOSITIVE: Petitioners Omnibus Motion is denied for lack of merit. Manifestations dated
May 20, 1996 and Oct 7, 1996 by Land Bank are noted.
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF IN CIVIL CASES; CASE AT BAR. In
civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given
on either side. Plaintiff must therefore establish his case by a preponderance of evidence,
i.e., evidence as a whole which is superior to that of the defendant. In other words, the party
who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. In this case, petitioner, as the party claiming
affirmative relief from this Court by contending that had filed a record on appeal in the trial
court, must discharge the burden of convincingly proving his claim.
2.
ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTIONS; GOOD FAITH PRESUMED ABSENT TO THE CONTRARY. Good
faith is presumed and the complainant has the burden of proving any wrongdoing. Petitioner
simply failed to prove that the branch clerk either suppressed the record on appeal allegedly
filed by petitioner in the trial court, or that he was guilty of wrongdoing in certifying that
petitioner did not file the said record. The Court cannot find the branch clerk guilty of any
wrongdoing in certifying that petitioner failed to file a record on appeal in the trial court in
the face of petitioner's failure to adduce convincing proof that such a record was in fact filed
therein.
SYNOPSIS: On March 20, 1995, the Court rendered a decision holding that a petition for
liquidation under Sec 29 of the Central Bank Act, R.A. No. 265, is a special proceeding and,
therefore, the rules prescribing a period of 30 days for appealing and requiring a record on
appeal apply. Accordingly, the appeal in G.R. No. 109373 was held to have been duly
perfected but the appeal in G.R. No. 112991 had not been perfected because of petitioner's
failure to file a record on appeal. However, petitioner insists that he filed a record on appeal.
As proof, he presents a photocopy of the record on appeal allegedly received by the branch
clerk of the trial court bearing the handwritten "Received, 10-15-92, 3:45 PM" and the
alleged initials of the said clerk. He explained that the trial court does not use a stamp
"RECEIVED," but receipt of pleadings is acknowledged simply by noting this fact by hand. On
the other hand, the branch clerk of court maintains that no record on appeal was filed and
therefore none could be found in the expediente. He claims that the record on appeal
allegedly filed in the trial court could not have been unlawfully removed from the records
because all pleadings received by the court are immediately attached to the records. He
denies that the signature appearing on the alleged record on appeal was his. When referred
to the Office of the Court Administrator for investigation and recommendation, the said
office found that indeed, there was no Record on Appeal actually filed.
Petitioner, as the party claiming affirmative relief from this Court by contending that he had
filed a record on appeal in the trial court, must discharge the burden of convincingly proving

his claim. As found by the OCA, however, the evidence of the respondents even outweighs
that of petitioner. Private respondents presented proof which are affirmative, unequivocal,
convincing and consistent that no record on appeal had been filed. Petitioner not only failed
to present the PDIC employee who allegedly filed the record on appeal in the trial court but
more importantly, he failed to prove that authenticity of the alleged signature of the branch
clerk appearing in his copy of the record on appeal.

(12)
ANGEL T. LIMJOCO V. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, 80 PHIL 776
(1948)
G.R. NO L-770. April 27, 1948
EN BANC: Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, Tuason, Feria, Perfecto (dissenting)
PONENTE: J. Hilado
Counsel for petitioner: Angel Limjoco Jr. and Delfin L. Gonzales
Counsel for respondent: Bienvenido A. Tan
NATURE: Petition for review on pure questions of law

FACTS: In its decision dated May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission (PSC) authorizing
Pedro O. Fragrante the operation and maintenance of another ice plant of 2 tons in San
Juan, Rizal; and that Pedro Fragrante was a Filipino at the time of his death
1. The application was opposed by petitioner Angel Limjoco but as overruled by PSC. It
held that under Sec 15 CA no 146, a certificate of public convenience be issued to the
intestate estate of the deceased authorizing the estate of the deceased Fragrante
through its special or judicial administrator, t maintain and operate an ice plant in
San Juan, Mandaluyong and Quezon City
2. Limjoco raised the following errors:
a. The decision of PSC is not in accordance with law
b. The decision of PSC is not reasonably supported by evidence
c. PSC erred in not giving Limjoco and the Icea and Cold Storage Industries of the
Phils. Inc, as existing operators, a reasonably opportunity to meet the increased
demand
d. The PSC deision is an unwarranted departure from its announced policy with
respect to the establishment and operation of ice plant
3. Petitioner contends it was an error on the part of PSC to allow the substitution of the
legal representative of the estate of Pedro Fragrante for the latter as party applicant
in the case then pending before the PSC, and in subsequently granting to said estate
the certificate applied for
ISSUE: WON the PSC erred in granting the application for certificate of public convenience
RULING: No.
RATIO: The aforesaid right of Pedro Fragrante to prosecution said application to its final
conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes
a part of the assets of the estate, for such a right was property despite the possibility that in
the end the commission might have denied the application, although under the facts of the
case, PSC granted the application in view of the financial ability of the estate to maintain
and operate the ice plant. Such certificate would certainly be property, and the right to
acquire such a certificate, by complying with the requisites of the law, belonged to the
decedent in his lifetime, and survived to his estate and judicial administrator after his death.
Rule 88 Sec 2, provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defend actions,
among other cases, for the protection of the property or rights of the deceased which
survive, and it says that such actions may be brought or defended in the right of the
deceased.
It is true that a proceeding upon an application for a certificate of public convenience before
PSC is not an action. But the foregoing citations go to prove that the decedents rights which
by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets
of his estate which, being placed under the control and management of the executor or
administrator, cannot be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for the benefit
of the creditors, devisees, or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent.
ISSUE: WON the estate of Fragrante is a person
RULING: Yes.
RATIO: Within the framework and principles of the Constitution itself, to cite just one
example, under the Bill of Rights it seems clear that where civil rights guaranteed therein in
the majority of cases relate to natural persons, the term person used in Sec 1(1) and (2)
must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, for otherwise these latter would be

without the constitutional guarantee against being deprived of property without due process
of law, or the immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. It was the intendment of
the framers to include artificial or juridical, no less than natural, persons, in these
constitutional immunities and others of similar nature. Among these artificial or judicial
persons figure estates of deceased persons. Hence, within the framework of the
Constitution, the estate of Pedro Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical
person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of the estate which, include the
exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and fulfillment of those
obligations of his which survived after his death.
It has been the constant doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property, rights and
assets left by the decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and charge
with his rights and obligations which survive after his demise.
ISSUE: WON the estate of Pedro Fragrante is a Filipino citizen
RULING: Yes.
RATIO: If by legal fiction his personality is considered extended so that any debts or
obligations left by, and surviving him, may be paid, and any surviving rights may be
exercised for the benefit of his creditors and heirs, there is no sound and cogent reason for
denying the application of the seam fiction to his citizenship, and for not considering it as
likewise extended for the purposes of the unfinished proceeding before PSC.
The fiction is made necessary to avoid the injustice of subject his estate, creditors and heirs,
solely by reason of his death, to the loss of the investment amounting to P35,000, which he
had already made in the ice plant, not counting other expenses occasioned by the instant
proceeding.
J. PERFECTO, DISSENTING:
Commonwealth Act no 146 reserves the right to Filipino citizens the right to obtain a
certificate of public convenience to operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. The limitation is
in accordance with Sec 8 Art XIV of the 1935 Constitution.
The main question in this case is whether the estate of Pedro Fragrante fulfills the citizenship
requirement. The question can be restated by asking whether the heirs of Pedro Fragrante
fulfill the citizenship requirement of the law.
The estate is an abstract entity. As such, its value depends on what it represents. There is
nothing in the record to show conclusively the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante. If they
are Filipino citizens, the action taken by PSC should be affirmed. If they are not, it should be
reversed.
Petitioner alleges that the estate is just a front or dummy for aliens to go around the
citizenship constitutional provision. It is alleged that Gaw Suy the special administrator of
the estate, is an alien. The citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante should be determined by PSC
upon evidence that the party should present. It should also determine the dummy question
raised by Limjoco.
1.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION; CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE; RIGHT OF
ESTATE OF DECEDENT TO PROSECUTE APPLICATION; CASE AT BAR. If P. O. F. had not died,
there can be no question that he would have had the right to prosecute his application for a
certificate of public convenience to its final conclusion. No one would have denied him that
right. As declared by the commission in its decision, he had invested in the ice plant in
question P35,000, and from what the commission said regarding his other properties and

business, he would certainly have been financially able to maintain and operate said plant
had he not died. His transportation business alone was netting him about P1,440 monthly.
He was a Filipino citizen and continued to be such till his demise. The commission declared
in its decision, in view of the evidence before it, that his estate was financially able to
maintain and operate the ice plant. The aforesaid light of P. O. F. to prosecute said
application to its final conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his
death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for such a right was property
despite the possibility that in the end the commission might have denied the application,
although under the facts of the case, the commission granted the application in view of the
financial ability of the estate to maintain and operate the ice plant. Petitioner, in his
memorandum of March 19, 1947, admits (p. 3) that a certificate of public convenience once
granted "as a rule, should descend to his estate as an asset." Such certificate would
certainly be property, and the right to acquire such a certificate, by complying with the
requisites of the law, belonged to the decedent in his lifetime, and survived to his estate and
judicial administrator after his death.
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ESTATE OF DECEDENT, A PERSON; CASE AT BAR. Within the philosophy
of the present legal system and within the framework of the constitution, the estate of P. O.
F. should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and
distribution of his estate which, of course, include the exercise during the judicial
administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which
survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his pending application
before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of
said application to its final conclusion. An injustice would ensue from the opposite course.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CITIZENSHIP OF DECEDENT EXTENDED TO HIS ESTATE; CASE AT BAR.
If by legal fiction the personality of P. O. F. is considered extended so that any debts or
obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid, and any surviving rights may be
exercised for the benefit of his creditors and heirs, respectively, there is no sound and
cogent reason for denying the application of the same fiction to his citizenship, and for not
considering it as likewise extended for the purposes of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding
before the Public Service Commission. The outcome of said proceeding, if successful, would
in the end inure to the benefit of the same creditors, and the heirs. Even in that event
petitioner could not allege any prejudice in the legal sense, any more than he could have
done if F. had lived longer and obtained the desired certificate. The fiction of such extension
of his citizenship is grounded upon the same principle, and motivated by the same reason,
as the fiction of the extension of his personality. The fiction is made necessary to avoid the
injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death, to the
loss of the investment amounting to P35,000, which he already made in the ice plant, not
counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding, from the Public Service
Commission to this court.

(13)
SULPICIA VENTURA V. HON. FRANCIS J. MILITANTE, as Presiding Judge of RTC Cebu
7th Judicial District Branch 12; and JOHN UY, 316 SCRA 226 (1999)
1ST DIVISION: Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, concurring; CJ Davide and Kapunan (on official
leave)
PONENTE: J. Puno (raffled on Aug 2, 1999)
Eustacio CH. Veloso, for petitioner.
Demosthenes S. Tecson for private respondent

NATURE: Petition for certiorari assailing the Order of public respondent Militante direct
Ventura to file an answer to the complaint for a sum of money with damages filed by private
respondent John Uy after denying her motion to dismiss. MR also denied
FACTS: Private respondent John Uy filed a complaint for sum of money and damages
against petitioner Sulpicia Ventura, the spouse of the deceased Carlos Ngo
1. Uy alleged that Ngo was indebted to him during his lifetime in the amount of
P48,889,70 and that Ventura, who was taking care of the estate of the deceased
failed and refused to pay despite repeated demands
2. Ventura filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the estate of Carlos Ngo has no
legal personality, neither a natural nor legal person in contemplation of law
3. In his opposition to MTD, Uy insisted that since the money claim subject of this case
actually represents the spare parts contracted by Carlos Ngo during his lifetime for
the benefit of the family, the conjugal partnership shall be accountable for the
payment thereof
4. Subsequently, Uys counsel made a manifestation to amend the complaint in order to
state the correct party defendant whom he intends to sue in this case. Public
respondent Militante gave Uy 15 days to make the amendment.
5. Ventura then filed a motion for reconsideration to the order of respondent judge
permitting Uy to amend his complaint. Ventura argued that instituted by Uy is a
money claim which under Rule 3 Sec 21 ROC does not survive, the same having been
filed after Ngo had already died. Second respondent judge never acquired jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case, which, being an action to recover a sum of
money from a deceased person, may only be heard by a probate court
6. Uy opposed the motion and insisted that Ventura, as the wife of the decedent, is
liable to pay the obligation which benefitted their family
7. Respondent judge Militante then issued an order giving Uy 24 hours to file his
amended complaint so that the court can determine whether there is a cause of
action against Ventura, who could be substituted to the estate of Carlos Ngo
8. Uy, then, filed an amended complaint impleading Ventura as defendant
9. Ventura filed a comment to Uys amended complaint arguing that (1) the debt did not
survive the deceased; (2) the conjugal partnership of gains is terminated upon the
death of one of the spouses; and (3) the debts and charges against CPG may only be
paid after an inventory is made in the appropriate testate or intestate proceeding
10. Uy filed a rejoinder to Venturas comment countering that Ventura is now the
defendant in the amended complaint and being not deceased; the inapplicability of
the legal rules on the abatement of money claims in case the defendant dies pending
prosecution
11. Militante denied the MR and ordered Ventura to file her answer within 15 days from
receipt of the order
12. As such, petitioner filed a petition before SC that the order of the respondent judge
be set aside and the amended complaint be dismissed
ISSUE: WON a party may maintain an action against the estate of the deceased person
RULING: No.
RATIO: Rule 3 Sec 1 ROC provides that only natural or juridical persons or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. In order to maintain an action in a court of
justice, the plaintiff must have actual legal existence. The same applies to party defendants.
It is incumbent upon the plaintiff, when he files a judicial proceeding, to name the proper
party defendant to his cause of action. In a proceeding in personam of an adversary
character, the court can acquire no jurisdiction for the purpose of trial or judgment until a
party defendant who actually or legally exists and is legally capable of being sued, is
brought before it. It has been held that the question of the legal personality of a party

defendant is a question of substance going to the jurisdiction of the court and not one of
procedure.
Neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party plaintiff in a court action. Considering
that capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity to sue, to the same extent, a
decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be named a party defendant in
a court action.
ISSUE: WON the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the estate of Carlos Ngo
RULING: No.
RATIO: It is clear that the original complaint of Uy against the estate of Carlos Ngo was a
suit against Ngo himself who was already dead at the time of the filing of said complaint. Uy
himself admitted that no special proceeding to settle his estate had been filed in court. As
such, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over either the deceased Carlos Ngo or his
estate.
Uys subsequent amendment of his complaint does not cure the fatal defect of his
complaint. Amendments cannot be allowed so as to confer jurisdiction upon a court that
never acquired it in the first place. When it is evident that the court has no jurisdiction over
the person and subject matter and that the pleading is so fatally defective as not to be
susceptible of amendment, or that to permit such amendment would radically alter the
theory and the nature of the action, then the court should refuse the amendment of the
defective pleading and order the dismissal of the case.
ISSUE: What remedy should be availed of by Uy?
RULING: File a claim against the estate in the testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased person
RATIO: As correctly pointed by petitioner, the CPG terminates upon the death of either
spouse. After the death of one of the spouses, in case it is necessary to sell any portion of
the conjugal property to pay any outstanding obligations of the partnership, such sale must
be made in the manner and with the formalities established by the ROC for the sale of the
property of deceased persons. Where a complaint is brought against the surviving spouse for
the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal property, any judgment
obtained thereby is void. The proper action should be in the form of a claim to be filed in the
intestate or testate proceedings of the deceased person.
Under Rule 78 Sec 6 ROC, Uy may apply in court for letters of administration in his capacity
as a principal creditor or the deceased Carlos Ngo if after 30 days from his death, Ventura
failed to apply for administration or request that administration be granted to some other
person.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition for certiorari granted. Complaint filed by Uy is dismissed.
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS; PLAINTIFF; ESSENTIAL
TO CONFER JURISDICTION TO COURT. Parties may be either plaintiffs or defendants. The
plaintiff in an action is the party complaining, and a proper party plaintiff is essential to
confer jurisdiction on the court. In order to maintain an action in a court of justice, the
plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is, he, she or it must be a person in law
and possessed of a legal entity as either a natural or an artificial person, and no suit can be
lawfully prosecuted save in the name of such a person.

2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFENDANT; LEGAL PERSONALITY; QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE. It is
incumbent upon a plaintiff, when he institutes a judicial proceeding, to name the proper
party defendant to his cause of action. In a suit or proceeding in personam of an adversary
character, the court can acquire no jurisdiction for the purpose of trial or judgment until a
party defendant who actually or legally exists and is legally capable of being sued, is
brought before it. It has even been held that the question of the legal personality of a party
defendant is a question of substance going to the jurisdiction of the court and not one of
procedure.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; NEITHER DEAD PERSON NOR HIS ESTATE MAY BE A PARTY IN COURT
ACTION. Neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party plaintiff in a court action. A
deceased person does not have such legal entity as is necessary to bring action so much so
that a motion to substitute cannot lie and should be denied by the court. An action begun by
a decedent's estate cannot be said to have been begun by a legal person, since an estate is
not a legal entity; such an action is a nullity and a motion to amend the party plaintiff will
not likewise lie, there being nothing before the court to amend. Considering that capacity to
be sued is a correlative of the capacity to sue, to the same extent, a decedent does not have
the capacity to be sued and may not be named a party defendant in a court action.
4.
ID.; ID.; PLEADINGS; AMENDMENTS; NOT ALLOWED WHEN THE PURPOSE IS TO
CONFER JURISDICTION TO COURT. It is true that amendments to pleadings are liberally
allowed in furtherance of justice, in order that every case may so far as possible be
determined on its real facts, and in order to speed the trial of causes or prevent the circuitry
of action and unnecessary expense. But amendments cannot be allowed so as to confer
jurisdiction upon a court that never acquired it in the first place. When it is evident that the
court has no jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter and that the pleading is so
fatally defective as not to be susceptible of amendment, or that to permit such amendment
would radically alter the theory and the nature of the action, then the court should refuse
the amendment of the defective pleading and order the dismissal of the case.
5.
ID.; SPECIAL PROCEEDING; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSON;
INCLUDES MONEY CLAIMS AGAINST DECEASED PERSON. Moreover, as correctly argued by
petitioner, the conjugal partnership terminates upon the death of either spouse. After the
death of one of the spouses, in case it is necessary to sell any portion of the conjugal
property in order to pay outstanding obligations of the partnership, such sale must be made
in the manner and with the formalities established by the Rules of Court for the sale of the
property of deceased persons. Where a complaint is brought against the surviving spouse for
the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal property, any judgment
obtained thereby is void. The proper action should be in the form of a claim to be filed in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.
6.
ID.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPAL CREDITOR OF DECEASED PERSON MAY APPLY IN COURT FOR
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death
of one of the spouses, there is no liquidation of the conjugal partnership. This does not
mean, however, that the conjugal partnership continues. And private respondent cannot be
said to have no remedy. Under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court, he may apply in
court for letters of administration in his capacity as a principal creditor of the deceased
Carlos Ngo if after thirty (30) days from his death, petitioner failed to apply for
administration or request that administration be granted to some other person.
SYNOPSIS: Private respondent John Uy filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages
against the Estate of Carlos Ngo as represented by his surviving spouse Ms. Sulpicia
Ventura. Petitioner Sulpicia Ventura moved to dismiss the foregoing complaint on the ground
that the estate of Carlos Ngo has no legal personality. Private respondent opposed the said
motion to dismiss and manifested that he was going to amend the complaint. Public

respondent then gave private respondent fifteen days to make amendments in the
complaint. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Order on the ground
among others, that public respondent never acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case considering that an action to recover a sum of money from a deceased person may
only be heard by a probate court. Thereafter, private respondent filed his Amended
Complaint which substituted Sulpicia Ventura as defendant, and claiming that it was Carlos
Ngo and Sulpicia Ventura who incurred an indebtedness from him. Acting on both issues,
public respondent denied the Motion for Reconsideration and admitted the Amended
Complaint.
The Court ruled that neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party plaintiff in a court
action. A deceased person does not have such legal entity as is necessary to bring action so
much so that a motion to substitute cannot lie and should be denied by the court. An action
begun by a decedent's estate cannot be said to have been begun by a legal person, since an
estate is not a legal entity; such an action is a nullity and a motion to amend the party
plaintiff will not likewise lie, there being nothing before the court to amend. Considering that
capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity to sue, to the same extent, a decedent
does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be named a party defendant in a court
action.
Moreover, as correctly argued by petitioner, the conjugal partnership terminates upon the
death of either spouse. After the death of one of the spouses, in case it is necessary to sell
any portion of the conjugal property in order to pay outstanding obligations of the
partnership, such sale must be made in the manner and with the formalities established by
the Rules of Court for the sale of the property of deceased persons. Where a complaint is
brought against the surviving spouse for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against
said conjugal property, any judgment obtained thereby is void. The proper action should be
in the form of a claim to be filed in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse.

(14)
PEDRO ERMAC and his children, ELENA, CARLOS, ANTONIO, LUCIANO, HILARIO,
INDALECIO and NARCISA (all surnamed ERMAC) V. CENON MEDELO AND HON.
HERNANDO PINEDA as presiding judge of CFI LANAO DEL NORTE BRANCH 2, 64
SCRA 358 (1975)
2ND DIVISION:Fernando (Chair), Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, concurring
PONENTE: J. Barredo
Anthony Santos & Teddy S. Rodriguez for petitioners
Irene D. Jurado for respondents
NATURE: Petition for certiorari to set aside the order of respondent court on June 25, 1970,
in its Special Proceedings no 1517, approving the project of partition filed by private
respondent Cenon Medelo, pursuant to the order of the same court in the summary
settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased spouses Potenciano Ermac and Anastacia
Mariquit as well as of the order dated July 15, 1970, denying reconsideration of the first
order
FACTS: Spouses Potenciano Ermac and Anastacia Mariquit died, leaving as the only property
a parcel of land with an assessed value of P590.

1. Cenon Medelo, one of the grandchildren of the decedent spouses (one of the children
of the pre-deceased daughter Digna Ermac) filed a petition for summary settlement
of said estate
2. All requirements having been complied with and there being no opposition, the court,
on July 21, 1970, issued an order granting the same, enumerating all the heirs
entitled to participate in the inheritance and ordering Medelo to present the proper
project of partition for the subject property
3. However, on Feb 2, 1970, petitioner Pedro Ermac (one of the children of deceased
spouses) moved for reconsideration of the order of settlement, praying for the
elimination of subject parcel of land (Lot 1327) from the estate on the ground that it
belongs to him and his wife.
4. The court denied the motion, ruling that the proper remedy is to file a separate suit
5. As such, Pedro Ermac filed a civil case before CFI Lanao del Norte
6. Upon submission of the project of partition, the respondent court approved the same
over Ermacs objection. Pedro Ermac moved for reconsideration but the same was
denied
ISSUE: WON respondent court exceed its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion in
approving the project of partition cover Lot 1327 despite it being claimed by Pedro Ermac in
a separate civil action to be their property and not of the estate
RULING: No.
RATIO: The probate court is not the best forum for the resolution of adverse claims of
ownership of any property ostensibly belonging to the decedents estate. While there are
settled exceptions to this rule as applied to regular administration proceedings, it is not
proper to delay the summary settlement of a deceased person just because an heir or a
third person claims that certain properties do not belong to the estate but to him. Such claim
must be ventilated in an independent action, and the probate court should proceed to the
distribution of the state, if there are no other legal obstacles to it, for after all, such
distribution must always be subject to the results of the suit. For the protection of the
claimant, the appropriate step is to have the proper annotation of lis pendens entered.
DISPOSITIVE: Instant petition dismissed without prejudice to petitioner having the proper
annotation of lis pendens regarding Civil case made on the title cover Lot 1327.
1.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES; SUMMARY PROCEDURE FOR
SETTLEMENT OF SMALL ESTATES. The policy of the law is to terminate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased persons with the least loss of time. This is
especially true with small estates for which the rules provide precisely a summary procedure
dispensing with the appointment of an administrator together with the other involved and
cumbersome steps ordinarily required in the determination of the assets of the deceased
and the persons entitled to inherit therefrom and the payment of his obligations.
2.
ID.; ID.; PROBATE COURT NOT THE FORUM FOR RESOLUTION OF ADVERSE CLAIMS OF
OWNERSHIP. The probate court is not the best forum for the resolution of adverse claims
of ownership of any property ostensibly belonging to the decedent's estate. While there are
settled exceptions to this rule as applied to regular administration proceedings, it is not
proper to delay the summary of a deceased person's estate just because an heir or a third
person claims that certain properties do not belong to the estate but to him.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; INDEPENDENT ACTION WITH SAFEGUARD FOR THE PROTECTION OF
ADVERSE CLAIMANT, PROPER REMEDY. Adverse claims of ownership over property
belonging to the decedent's estate must be ventilated in an independent action, and the
probate court should proceed to the distribution of the estate, if there are no other legal

obstacles to it, for after all, such distribution must always be subject to the results of the
suit. For the protection of the claimant, the appropriate step is to have the proper annotation
of lis pendens entered.
SYNOPSIS: In proceedings for the summary settlement of the intestate estate of the
deceased spouses Potenciano Ermac and Anastacia Mariquit, respondent court approved the
project of partition, submitted by herein private respondent, covering a lot being claimed by
petitioners in a separate civil action to be their property, and not of the estate. This approval
by the court, as well as the orders denying its reconsideration and for summary settlement
of the estate are questioned in this petition for certiorari.
The Court held that the respondent court, in issuing the aforesaid orders, did not exceed its
jurisdiction nor gravely abused its discretion. Partition and distribution were proper and any
adverse claim of petitioners must be ventilated in an independent action.
Petition dismissed.

(15)
CYNTHIA C. ALABAN, FRANCIS COLLADO, JOSE P. COLLADO, JUDITH PROVIDO,
CLARITA PROVIDO, ALFREDO PROVIDO, MANUEL PROVIDO JR., LORNA DINA E.
PROVIDO, SEVERO ARENGA JR., SERIO ARENGA, EDUARDO ARENGA, CAROL
ARENGA, RUTH BABASA, NORMA HIJASTRO, DOLORES M. FLORES, ANTONIO MARIN
JR., JOSE MARIN SR. and MATHILDE MARIN V. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO
H. PROVIDO, 470 SCRA 697 (2005)
2ND DIVISION: Puno (Chair), Austria-Martinez, Callejo Sr., Chico-Nazario, concurring
PONENTE: J. Tinga

Melchor R. Flores for petitioners

Modesto Martin Y. Mamon III for private respondent
NATURE: Petition for review of the resolutions of CA in CA-GR SP no 69221, dismissing
petitioners petition for annulment of judgment
FACTS: On Nov 8, 2,000, respondent Francisco Provido filed a petition for the probate of the
last will and testament of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado, who died on Oct 26,2000
in Janiuay, Iloilo. Francisco alleged that he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of
her will
1. On May 30, 2001,RTC Iloilo Br. 68, rendered its decision allowing the probate of the
will of the decedent and directing the issuance of letters testamentary to Francisco
2. More than 4 months later (Oct 4, 2001), petitioners (Cynthia Alaban et al) filed a
motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings. Likewise, they filed an
opposition to the allowance of the will of the decedent and the issuance of letters
testamentary to Francisco
3. Petitioners alleged that they are the intestate heirs of the decedent and claimed that
the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to nonpayment of the
correct docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs.
4. Moreover, petitioners alleged that the will could not be probated because:
a. The signature of the decedent was forged
b. The will was not executed in accordance with the law, i.e. witnesses failed to sign
below the attestation clause
c. The decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute and publish a will
d. The will was executed by force under duress and improper pressure
e. The decedent had no intention to make a will at the time of affixing of her
signature; and
f. She did not know the properties to be disposed of, having included in the will
properties which no longer belonged to her
5. RTC issued an order dated Jan 11, 2002, denying petitioners motion for being
unmeritorious. RTC held that petitioners were deemed notified of the hearing by
publication and that the deficiency in the payment of docket fees is not a ground for
outright dismissal of the petition. Moreover, RTC decision was already final and
executory even before petitioners filing of the motion to reopen
6. Petitioners thereafter filed a petition with an application for preliminary injunction
with CA, seeking the annulment of the RTC decision dated May 30, 2001 and order
dated Jan 11, 2002.
7. Petitioners claimed that they had several conferences with Francisco after the death
of the decedent to discuss the matter of dividing the estate; Francisco allegedly
agreed to 1/6 portion as his share. Petitioners also claimed that they only learned of
the probate proceedings in July 2001 and as such, they filed their motion to reopen
the proceedings
8. In its resolution dated Feb 28, 2002, CA dismissed the petition. It found that there
was no showing that petitioners failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies through no
fault of their own. CA declared as baseless the petitioners claim that the RTC
proceedings were attended by extrinsic fraud. Neither does not show that they
availed of this ground in a motion for new trial or petition for relief from judgment in
the RTC. Petitioners filed MR but the same was denied
9. Petitioners assert that CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed
their petition for the alleged failure to show that they have not availed of the
remedies of MNT, appeal, petition for relief from judgment or other remedies through
no fault of their own and held that they were denied of their day in court.
10. Respondent, on the other hand, claims petitioners were in a position to avail the
remedies under Rule 37 and 38 ROC as in fact they did when they filed a MNT. They

could have filed a petition for relief from judgment since they learned of the RTC
judgment only 3 months after its promulgation. Francisco also charged petitioners
of forum shopping since the latter have pending suit involving the same issues
ebfore RTC General Santos City Br 23 and subsequently pending on appeal before CA
in CA-GR no 7429
11. It appears that one of the petitioners, Dolores Flores, who is a niece of the decedent,
filed a petition for letters of administration in RTC Gen Santos, claiming the decedent
died intestate without any issue, survived by 5 groups of collateral heirs. Flores
obtained an SPA from most of the petitioners. RTC dismissed the petition on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction since the decedent died in Janiuay, Iloilo
12. Petitioners maintain that they were not made parties to the case in which the
decision sought to be annulled was rendered and, thus they could not have availed of
the ordinary remedies of MNT, appeal, petition for relief from judgment and other
appropriate remedies. They averred that Franciscos false compromise and his failure
to notify them of the probate of the will constitute extrinsic fraud
ISSUE: WON petitioners Alaban et al have become parties to the probate proceedings
instituted by Francisco
RULING: Yes.
RATIO: Under the ROC, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other
person interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the
court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed. Notice of the time and place for proving
the will must be published for 3 consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province, as well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs of the testator.
Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of the will is one in rem, such that
with the corresponding publication of the petition the courts jurisdiction extends to all
persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent.
Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar
indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection against the right sought to be
established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in
the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Thus, even though
petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties
thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of the hearing.
ISSUE: What remedies could the parties avail in this case
RULING: Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration or petition for relief from judgment
RATIO: As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the
remedies of MNT, MR or petition for relief from judgment. In fact, petition filed essentially a
MNT, with petitioners praying for the reopening of the case and setting of further
proceedings. However, the motion was denied for having been filed out of time, long after
the decision became final and executory.
Granted that petitioners were aware of the decision after it had become final, they could
have still filed a petition for relief from judgment after the denial of the motion to reopen.
Petitioners claim the learned of the decision only on Oct 4, 2001 or almost 4 months from
the time the decision became final. But they failed to avail of the remedy.
For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said remedies available to them,
petitioners can no longer resort to a petition for annulment of judgment; otherwise, they
would benefit from their own inaction or negligence.

ISSUE: WON an action for annulment of judgment is the proper remedy in this case
RULING: No.
RATIO: An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case
where the judgment sought ot be annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is to
have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation.
It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of MNT, appeal or relief from judgment
are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner, and is based only on 2 grounds:
extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. A person need not be a
party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he can prove his
allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be
adversely affected thereby.
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or
collateral in character. Petitioners alleged that Franciscos deliberate omission or
concealment of their names as heirs in the petition for the allowance of the will, they were
not notified of the proceedings, and as such they were denied of their day in court.
CAB: A perusal of the will shows that Francisco was instituted as the sole heir of the
decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor
testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under ROC. Francisco
had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally
notify them of the same.
Assuming arguendo they are entitled to be notified, the purported infirmity is cured by the
publication of the notice.
ISSUE: WON petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping
RULING: Yes.
RATIO: Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits in different courts, either
simultaneously or successively, involving the same parties, to ask the courts to rule on the
same or related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially same reliefs, on the
supposition that one other the other court would make a favorable disposition. Obviously,
the parties in the instant case, as well as in the appealed case before CA, are the same. Both
cases deal with the existence and validity of the alleged will of the decedent. Clearly, there
is forum shopping.
Moreover, petitioners failed to inform the court of the said pending case in their certification
against forum shopping. Neither have they done so at any time thereafter.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied.
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENTS; REMEDIES
AVAILABLE TO AN AGGRIEVED PARTY. Section 37 of the Rules of Court allows an aggrieved
party to file a motion for new trial on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence. The same Rule permits the filing of a motion for reconsideration on the grounds
of excessive award of damages, insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision or final
order, or that the decision or final order is contrary to law. Both motions should be filed
within the period for taking an appeal, or fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or
final order. Meanwhile, a petition for relief from judgment under Section 3 of Rule 38 is
resorted to when a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter
taken, against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable

negligence. Said party may file a petition in the same court and in the same case to set
aside the judgment, order or proceeding. It must be filed within sixty (60) days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment and within six (6) months after entry thereof. A motion for
new trial or reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment are remedies available
only to parties in the proceedings where the assailed judgment is rendered. In fact, it has
been held that a person who was never a party to the case, or even summoned to appear
therein, cannot avail of a petition for relief from judgment.
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; EVEN THOUGH PETITIONERS WERE NOT MENTIONED IN THEIR PETITION
FOR PROBATE, THEY BECAME PARTIES THERETO AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE PUBLICATION
OF THE NOTICE OF HEARING. Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee
named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate may, at any time after the
death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed. Notice of
the time and place for proving the will must be published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in
a newspaper of general circulation in the province, as well as furnished to the designated or
other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. Thus, it has been held that a
proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding
publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will
or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent. Publication is notice to the whole world
that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an
objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such
notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the
petition for probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the
publication of the notice of hearing.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONERS COULD NO LONGER RESORT TO A PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT DUE TO THEIR FAILURE TO MAKE USE WITHOUT SUFFICIENT
JUSTIFICATION OF THE REMEDIES AVAILABLE UNDER THE RULES AND TO RULE OTHERWISE
WOULD ALLOW PETITIONERS TO BENEFIT FROM THEIR OWN INACTION OR NEGLIGENCE.
As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the remedies
of motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment. In fact,
petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion for new trial, with
petitioners praying for the reopening of the case and the setting of further proceedings.
However, the motion was denied for having been filed out of time, long after the Decision
became final and executory. Conceding that petitioners became aware of the Decision after
it had become final, they could have still filed a petition for relief from judgment after the
denial of their motion to reopen. Petitioners claim that they learned of the Decision only on 4
October 2001, or almost four (4) months from the time the Decision had attained finality. But
they failed to avail of the remedy. For failure to make use without sufficient justification of
the said remedies available to them, petitioners could no longer resort to a petition for
annulment of judgment; otherwise, they would benefit from their own inaction or negligence.
4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; AN ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT IS A REMEDY IN LAW
INDEPENDENT OF THE CASE WHERE THE JUDGMENT SOUGHT TO BE ANNULLED WAS
RENDERED AND A PERSON NEED NOT BE A PARTY TO THE CASE AND IT IS ONLY ESSENTIAL
THAT THE ASSAILED JUDGMENT WAS OBTAINED BY FRAUD AND COLLUSION AND THE
PETITIONER WOULD BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED THEREBY. An action for annulment of
judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be
annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is to have the final and executory
judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in cases
where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner, and is based
on only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. A
person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential

that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and
collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby.
5.
ID.; ID.; ID.; THE OVERRIDING CONSIDERATION WHEN EXTRINSIC FRAUD IS ALLEGED
IS THAT THE FRAUDULENT SCHEME OF THE PREVAILING LITIGANT PREVENTED A PARTY FROM
HAVING HIS DAY IN COURT. An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies
only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it
prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where
it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it
is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.
6.
ID.; ID.; ID.; THE NON-INCLUSION OF PETITIONER'S NAME IN THE PETITION AND THE
ALLEGED FAILURE TO PERSONALLY NOTIFY THEM OF THE PROCEEDINGS DO NOT
CONSTITUTE EXTRINSIC FRAUD; PETITIONERS WERE NOT DENIED THEIR DAY IN COURT, AS
THEY WERE NOT PREVENTED FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE PROCEEDINGS AND PRESENTING
THEIR CLAIM BEFORE THE PROBATE COURT. According to the Rules, notice is required to
be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. A perusal of the
will shows that respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as
nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs who are
entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal
obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of
the same. Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the
purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice. After all, personal notice upon
the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite. The noninclusion of petitioners' names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally notify
them of the proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their
day in court, as they were not prevented from participating in the proceedings and
presenting their case before the probate court.
7.
ID.; ID.; FORUM SHOPPING; COMMITTED IN CASE AT BAR. One other vital point is
the issue of forum-shopping against petitioners. Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple
suits in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, involving the same parties, to
ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or
substantially same reliefs, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition. Obviously, the parties in the instant case, as well as in the appealed
case before the CA, are the same. Both cases deal with the existence and validity of the
alleged will of the decedent, with petitioners anchoring their cause on the state of intestacy.
In the probate proceedings, petitioners' position has always been that the decedent left no
will and if she did, the will does not comply with the requisites of a valid will. Indeed, that
position is the bedrock of their present petition. Of course, respondent maintains the
contrary stance. On the other hand, in the petition for letters of administration, petitioner
Flores prayed for her appointment as administratrix of the estate on the theory that the
decedent died intestate. The petition was dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and
it is this order of dismissal which is the subject of review in CA-G.R. No. 74924. Clearly,
therefore, there is forum-shopping. Moreover, petitioners failed to inform the Court of the
said pending case in their certification against forum-shopping. Neither have they done so at
any time thereafter. The Court notes that even in the petition for annulment of judgment,
petitioners failed to inform the CA of the pendency of their appeal in CA-G.R. No. 74924,
even though the notice of appeal was filed way before the petition for annulment of
judgment was instituted.

(16)
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK V. HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, presiding judge of CFI
Manila Br. VII and CANDIDO RAMOS, 124 SCRA 483 (1983)
1ST DIVISION:Teehankee, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez, Relova, concurring
PONENTE: J. Gutierrez Jr.
Jose Diokno for petitioner
Romeo Carlos for private respondent
NATURE: Petition for review of the decision of CFI Manila Br VII presided by Judge Lantin in
Civil Case no 79914 denying the motion for reconsideration
FACTS: Spouses Filomenno and Socorro Tabligan contracted private respondent Candido
Ramos for the construction of a duplex apartment house covered by TCT no 86195 in Manila.
The total cost of the construction was P32,927.00 but the spouses paid Ramos the sum of
P7,139 only. As such, the Ramos used his own money P25,788,50, to finish the construction
of the apartment.
1. Meanwhile, the spouses Tabligan obtained from petitioner Philippine Savings Bank (PS
Bank) 3 loans (dated Dec 16, 1966, Feb 1, 1967 and Feb 28, 1967) totaling P35,000
to complete the construction of the apartment. To secure their loan, the spouses
signed 3 promissory notes and 3 Deeds of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PS Bank
2. PS Bank then registered the REM with RD Manila. At the time of the registration of the
mortgages the TCT of the covering the subject property was free from all liens and
encumbrances
3. Subsequently, the spouses defaulted on their obligation. As a result thereof, PS Bank
foreclosed the mortgages and at a public auction on July 23, 1969, PS Bank was the
highest bidder.
4. The bank then registered the certificate of sale issued in its favor. On Aug 9, 1970,
the bank consolidated its ownership over the property and a new TCT no 101864 was
issued in its name
5. On the other hand, Ramos filed a collection suit against spouses Tabligan before CFI
Manila Br 1. During its pendency, Ramos succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary
attachment and had the property attached. Consequently, a notice of adverse claim
was annotated at the back of the TCT no 86195
6. On Aug 26, 1968, a decision was rendered in the civil case in favor of Ramos and
against spouses Tabligan. A writ of execution was issued but was returned unsatisfied
7. Ramos, then, requested PS Bank to deliver to him his pro-rata share in the value of
the apartment in accordance with Art 2242 NCC. The bank refused to pay the prorata value
8. PS Bank argued that for Art 2242 NCC to apply, there must have been an insolvency
proceeding or other liquidation proceedings of similar import but there was none in
this case. As such, Ramos unpaid contractors claim did not acquire the character of
a statutory lien equal to petitioners REM
9. On the other hand, private respondent Ramos maintains that the proceedings before
the court can qualify as a general liquidation of the estate of the spouses because
the only existing property of the spouses is the duplex-apartment
ISSUE: WON the collection suit filed by Ramos is in the nature of insolvency proceeding or
settlement of a decedents estate
RULING: No.

RATIO: The proceedings in the CFI do not partake of the nature of insolvency proceedings or
settlement of a decedents estate. The action filed by Ramos was only to collect the unpaid
cost of the construction of the apartment. It is far from being a general liquidation of the
estate of Tabligan spouses.
Insolvency proceedings and settlement of a decedents estate are both proceedings in rem
which are binding against the whole world. All persons having interest in the subject matter
involved, whether notified or not, are equally bound. Consequently, a liquidation of similar
import or other equivalent general liquidation must also necessarily be a proceeding in rem.
CAB: Ramos himself admitted that the bank had no actual or constructive knowledge of any
lien against the property when it granted the loan to the spouses.
Since the action filed by Ramos is not one which can be considered as equivalent general
liquidation, the principle that a purchaser in good faith and for value takes the land free from
liens and encumbrances other than statutory liens and encumbrances other than statutory
liens and those recorded in the TCT applies. It is an admitted fact that at the time the REM
were constituted, the spouses was free from any recorded lien and encumbrance, so that the
only registered liens in the title were the REM in favor of PS Bank.
Therefore, Ramos claim must remain subordinate to the banks title over the property
evidenced by TCT no 101864.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition granted. The decision of CFI Manila Br VII is reversed and set aside.
Complaint and counterclaim are dismissed.
1.
CIVIL LAW; CREDIT TRANSACTION; CONCURRENCE AND PREFERENCE OF CREDITS;
INSUFFICIENT ASSETS OF DEBTOR RAISES QUESTION OF PREFERENCE AS WELL AS
QUESTION OF CONSEQUENCE IN CONCURRENCE OF CREDITS. Concurrence of credits
occurs when the same specific property of the debtor or all of his property is subjected to
the claims of several creditors. The concurrence of credits raises no questions of
consequence were the value of the property or the value of all assets of the debtor is
sufficient to pay in fall all the creditors. However, it becomes material when said assets are
insufficient for then some creditors of necessity will not be paid or some creditors will not
obtain the full satisfaction of their claims. In this situation, the question of preference will
then arise, that is to say who of the creditors will be paid the all of the others (Caguioa,
Comments and Cases on Civil Law, 1970 ed., Vol. VI, p. 472).
2.
ID.; ID.; PREFERENCE OF CREDITS; ARTICLES 2249 AND 2242 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES; CONSTRUED. Under the system established by Article 2249 of
the civil Code of the Philippines, only taxes and assessments upon immovable property
enjoy absolute preference. All the remaining specified classes of preferred creditors under
Article 2242 enjoy no priority among themselves. Their credits shall be satisfied pro-rata,
i.e., in proportion to the amount of the respective credits.
3.
ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 2249 AND 2242 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE; PAIL REQUISITE TO THEIR
FULL APPLICATION UNDER THE DE BARRETO CASE. Under the De Barreto decision, the full
application of Articles 2242 and 2249 demands that there must first be some proceeding
where the class of all the preferred creditors may be bindingly adjudicated, such as
insolvency, the settlement of a decedent's estate under Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, or
other liquidation proceedings of similar import.
4.
REMEDIAL LAW; INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS AND SETTLEMENT OF A DECEDENT'S
ESTATE; BOTH PROCEEDINGS IN REM, OTHER EQUIVALENT GENERAL LIQUIDATION OF

SIMILAR NATURE. Insolvency proceedings end settlement of a decedent's estate are both
proceedings in rem which are binding the whole world. All persons having interest in the
subject matter involved, whether they were notified or not, are equally bound.
Consequently, a liquidation of similar import or other equivalent general liquidation must
also necessarily be a proceeding in rem so that all interested persons whether known to the
parties or not may be bound by such proceeding.
5.
ID.; ACTION FOR COLLECTION OF UNPAID CONTRACTOR'S FEE; NOT AN ACTION IN
REM. The proceedings in the court below do not partake of the insure of insolvency
proceedings or settlement of a decedent's estate. The action filed by Ramos was only to
collect the unpaid cost of the construction of the duplex apartment. It is far from being a
general liquidation of the estate of the Tabligan spouses.
6.
CIVIL LAW; CREDIT TRANSACTION; ANNOTATION OF CLAIMS AND CREDITS AS
STATUTORY LIENS; RELEVANCE TO THE STABILITY OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM. In the case
at bar, although the lower court found that "there were no known creditors other than the
plaintiff and the defendant herein," this cannot be conclusive. It will not bar other creditors
in the event they show up and present their claims State petitioner bank, claiming that they
also have preferred liens against the property involved. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 101864 issued in favor of the bank which is supposed to be indefeasible would
remain constantly unstable and questionable. Such could not have been the intention of
Article 2243 of the Civil Code although it considers claims and credits under Article 2242 as
statutory liens. Neither does the De Barreto case sanction such instability. In fact, an
annotation, as suggested above, would insure to the benefit of the public, particularly those
who may subsequently wish to buy the property in question or who have a business
transaction in connection therewith. It would facilitate the enforcement of a legal statutory
right which cannot be barred by laches (See Manila Railroad Co. v. Luzon Stevedoring Co.,
100 Phil. 135).
7.
ID.; SALE; BUYER IN GOOD FAITH OF REALTY; TAKES IT FEE FROM LIENS AND
ENCUMBRANCES OTHER THAN STATUTORY LIENS AND THOSE ANNOTATED IN THE TITLE;
CASE AT BAR. Since the action filed by the private respondent is not one which can be
considered as "equivalent general liquidation" having the same import as an insolvency or
settlement of the decedent's estate proceeding, the well established principle must be
applied that a purchaser in good faith and for value takes register land free from liens and
encumbrances other than statutory liens and those recorded in the Certificate of Title. It Is
an limited fact that at the time the deeds of real estate mortgage in favor of the petitioner
bank were constituted, the transfer certificate of title of the spouses Tabligan was free from
any recorded lien and encumbrances, so that the only registered liens in the title were deeds
in favor of the petitioner.

(17)
INTESTATE ESTATE OF MARCELO DE BORJA, CRISTANTO DE BORJA, administratorappellant v. JUAN DE BORJA ET AL, oppositors-appellees, 101 PHIL 911 (1957)
EN BANC: Paras, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista, Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Endencia, concurring
PONENTE: J. Felix
E.V. Filamor for appellant
Juan de Borja for himself and co-appellees
NATURE:
FACTS: Quintin, Francisco, Crisanta and Juliana, are legitimate children of Marcelo de Borja.
Marcelo died intestate and Quintin became the administrator of the intestate estate of
Marcelo. Subsequently, Quintin died testate and Crisanto, Franciscos son, was appointed as
administrator of the estate of Marcelo. Francisco, on the other hand, became the executor of
the will of Quintin
1. Francisco was later required by the Court to resign as such executor and was
succeeded by Rogelio Limaco, son-in-law of Quintin; while the intestate estate
remained under the administration of Crisanto until the outbreak of WWII
2. After the war in 1945, Miguel Dayco (Crisantas son), as administrator of the estate of
Crisanta, filed a petition for the reconstitution of the records of the case, requiring the
administrator to submit his report and a copy of the project of partition. The heirs of
Quintin opposed the approval of the statement of accounts rendered by the Crisanto
on the ground that it was not detailed enough to enable the interested parties to
verify the same; that they cannot understand why the intestate could suffer any loss
considering that during the administration of the same by Quintin, the estate
accumulated gains of more than P100,000 in the form of advances to the heirs as
well as cash balance; that they desired to examine the accounts of Crisanto to verify
the loss and therefore prayed that the administrator be ordered to deposit with the
Clerk of Court all books and receipts pertaining to the estate of Marcelo
3. On July 6, 1950, the oppositors filed a motion for the delivery to them of their
inheritance in the estate, pursuant to the project of partition, and expressed their
willingness to put up a bond if required to do so. The motion was granted and
affirmed by SC
4. On Aug 16, 1950, the properties adjudicated to Juliana in the project of partition
were finally delivered to the estate of said heir upon the filing of a bond of P20,000. It
also ruled that as the petition of Fransciso and Miguel Dayco made mention of certain
properties allegedly belonging to the intestate, said petition should be properly
considered with the final accounts of the administrator
5. On Aug 27, 1951, Crisanto filed his amended statement of accounts covering the
period from March 1, 1943 to July 31, 1949, which showed a cash balance of P36,
660. An additional statement of accounts filed on Aug 31, 1961 for the period of Aug
1, 1949 to Aug 31, 1951 showed a cash balance fo P5,851,17 and pending obligations
amounting to P6,165.03
6. The heirs of Quntin again opposed the approval of the statement of accounts on the
ground that certain fruits which should have been accrued to the estate were
unaccounted for. But as the other heirs seemed satisfied with the accounts presented
by the administrator and as their group was only one of the 4 heirs of the intestate
estate, they prayed that the administrator be held liable for only P111,932.42 which
was of the amount alleged to have been omitted

7. On Oct 4, 1951, the administrator filed a reply to said opposition containing a

counterclaim for moral damages against all the heirs of Quintin which was admitted
by the court. The administrator later on filed an amended counterclaim impleading
the counsel for the oppositors as defendant, which was denied by the lower court
ISSUE: WON a claim for moral damages may be entertained in a proceeding for the
settlement of an estate
RULING: No, because a probate court is vested with limited jurisdiction only.
RATIO: The special proceeding at the CFI Rizal was instituted for the purpose of settling the
intestate estate of Marcelo de Borja. In taking cognizance of the case, the court was clothed
with limited jurisdiction which cannot expand to collateral matters not arising out of or in
any way related to the settlement and adjudication of the properties of the deceased, for it
is a settled rule that the jurisdiction of a probate court is limited and special. Although there
is a tendency now to relax this rule and extend the jurisdiction of the probate court in
respect to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers, this
should be understood to comprehend only cases related to those powers specifically allowed
by the statutes.
CAB: It was in the acknowledgment of its limited jurisdiction that the lower court dismissed
the administrators counterclaim for moral damages against the oppositors, particularly
against Marcela who allegedly uttered derogatory remarks intended to cast dishonor against
the administrator sometime in 1950 or 1951. A counterclaim for moral damages demanded
by an administrator against the heirs for alleged utterances is an extraneous matter in a
testate or intestate proceedings for the reason that: the speedy settlement of the estate of
the deceased persons for the benefit of the creditors and those entitled to the residue by
way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration have been paid,
is the ruling spirit of out probate law.
ISSUE: WON the counsel for a party in a case may be included as a defendant in a
counterclaim
RULING: No, a counsel may not be included.
RATIO: The fact that the lawyer represents the interests of his client or that he acts in their
behalf will not hold him liable for or make him entitled to any award that the Court may
adjudicate to the parties, other than his professional fees.
ISSUE:
What may be considered as acts of maladministration and whether an
administrator, as the one in the case at bar, may be held accountable for any loss or
damage that the estate under his administration may incur by reason of his negligence, bad
faith or acts of maladministration
RULING: Yes, administrator may be held accountable
RATIO: Re: (a) a 6-door building, (b) parcel of land, (c) Junta section of the Hacienda Jalajala
or the income of the property devoted to rice cultivation and (d) ricefields, the administrator
reported either no returns or lesser income than the actual fruits incurred by the estate from
the use the aforementioned properties.
SC: After a protracted and extensive hearing on the matter, the Court, finding the
administrator, Dr. Crisanto de Borja, guilty of certain acts of maladministration, held him
liable for the payment to the oppositors, the heirs of Quintin de Borja, of 1/4 of the
unreported income which the estate should have received. Hence, he is liable for: (a)
P7,084.27;

(b)12,175.00; (c) 16,113.95; and (d) 3,352.75.

The SC relied on the evidence presented by the oppositors (i.e. testimony of Lauro Aguila,
testimony of Narciso Punzal who was instructed by appellant to testify in court that he was
the overseer of the Mayapyap property for Quintin de Borja from 1937-1944, delivering the
yearly proceeds of 1,000 cavanes of Palay to Rogelio Limaco, and testimony of Basilio Javier
who worked as a tenant in the land of Juliana de Borja which is near the land belonging to
the Intestate, the 2 properties being separated only by a river. He knew the tenants and the
yields.)
TOPIC: LIST OF CHARGES disallowed by the court for being unauthorized and improper
Re: (e) loss suffered by the Intestate because of the surcharges and penalties that had to be
paid because of administrator's negligence to pay taxes on time, the oppositors presented
proof that the administrator received from Juliana de Borja the sum of P20,475.17 together
with certain papers pertaining to the intestate, aside from the checks in the name of Quintin
de Borja.
SC: For his failure to pay the taxes on the building at Azcarraga for 1947, 1948 and 1949,
said property was sold at public auction and the administrator had to redeem the same at
P3,295.48, although the amount that should have been paid was only P2,917.26. The estate
therefore suffered a loss of P378.22. The lower Court adjudged him liable to pay the
oppositors 1/4 of P1,366.97, the total loss suffered by the Intestate, or P341.74.
(f) loss of P15,000, the administrators said that sometime in 1942, a big fire razed numerous
houses in Pateros, Rizal, including that of Dr. Crisanto de Borja; that among the properties
burned therein was his safe containing P15,000 belonging to the estate under his
administration.
SC: The lower Court also found no reason why the administrator should keep in his safe such
amount of money, for ordinary prudence would dictate that as an administration funds that
come into his possession in a fiduciary capacity should not be mingled with his personal
funds and should have been deposited in the Bank in the name of the intestate.
Administrator liable for 3,750.00.
(g) UNAUTHORIZED EXPENDITURES
1. amount paid to his wife, allegedly for keeping the receipts and records for him, SC
declared that the keeping of receipts and retaining in his custody records connected with the
management of the properties under administration is a duty that properly belongs to the
administrator, necessary to support the statement of accounts that he is obliged to submit
to the court for approval. If ever his wife took charge of the safekeeping of these receipts
and for which she should be compensated, the same should be taken from his fee.
2. salaries of Enriquez, as collector of the Azcarraga property; of Matienzo and Perez, as
encargados, and of Panganiban and Macetas as forest-guards. SC found that the salaries
were found justified, although unauthorized, as they appear to be reasonable and necessary
for the care and preservation of the Intestate.
3. payment to special policemen, administrator said that he sought for the services of
Macario Kamungol and others to act as special policemen during harvest time because most
of the workers tilting the Punta property were not natives of Jalajalaand they were likely to
run away with the harvest without giving the share of the estate if they were not policed. But
the SC ruled that granting that such kind of situation existed, the proper thing for the

administrator to do would have been to secure the previous authorization from the Court if
he failed to secure the help of the local police. Liable for 366.28.
4.Repairs he spent on the house belonging to the Intestate known as "casa solariega", the
administrator asserted that had he and his family not occupied the same, they would have
to pay someone to watch and take care of said house. But SC ruled that none of these
repairs appear to be extraordinary for the receipts were for nipa, for carpenters and
thatchers. Although it is true that Rule 85, section 2 provides that the administrator shall
maintain in tenantable repair the houses and other structures and fences belonging to the
estate, and deliver the same in such repair to the heirs or devisees when directed so to do
by the court, yet considering that during his occupancy of the said "casa solariega" he was
not paying any rental at all, it is but reasonable that he should take care of the expenses for
the ordinary repair of said house.
5. Alleged repairs on the rice mill in Pateros, also belonging to the Intestate. Disbursements
were all unsigned by Claudio Reyes except for one, although some were dated; rejected for
being unauthorized. Liable for 505.87.
6. Expenses for planting in Cainta ricefields, the Supreme Court required the administrator to
turn over the balance of payments made by the tenants representing their part in the
expenditures.
7-a transportation expenses, the Court declared that the alleged disbursements made for
transportation expenses cannot be said to be economical hence it was reduced to 500.
7-b transportation expense of one of the commissioners, the administrator showed receipt of
payment made to Mr. Severo Abellera in the sum of P375 for his transportation expenses as
one of the two commissioners who prepared the Project of Partition. The oppositors were
able to prove that on May 24, 1941 the Court authorized the administrator to withdraw from
the funds of the intestate the sum of P300 to defray the transportation expenses of the
commissioners. The administrator, however, alleged that he used this amount for the
payment of certain fees necessary in connection with the approval of the proposed plan of
the Azcarraga property which was then being processed in the City Engineer's Office.
SC: From that testimony, it would seem that appellant could even go to the extent of
disobeying the order of the Court specifying for what purpose that amount should be
appropriated and took upon himself the task of judging for what it will serve best. Since he
was not able to show or prove that the money intended and ordered by the Court to be paid
for the transportation expenses of the commissioners was spent for the benefit of the estate
as claimed, the administrator should be held responsible therefor 93.75
7-c P 40.00 appeared to have been paid to the Chief of Police on Jalajala allegedly for the
service of the summons, the administrator claimed that as the defendants in said civil case
lived in remote barrios, the services of the Chief of Police as delegate or agent of the
Provincial Sheriff were necessary.
SC said he forgot probably the fact that the local chiefs
of police are deputy sheriffs ex-officio. 10
7-d sum of P550 paid to Atty. Filamor for his professional services rendered for the defense
of the administrator in G.R. No. L-4179, which was decided against him, with costs. SC held
that if the costs provided for in that case, which this Court ordered to be chargeable
personally against the administrator are not recoverable by the latter, with more reason this
item could not be charged against the Intestate. 137.50
TOPIC: ACCOUNTING

The probate Court also ordered the administrator to render an accounting of his
administration during the Japanese occupation on the ground that although appellant
maintained that whatever money he received during that period is worthless, the same
having been declared without any value. We see no practical reason for requiring appellant
to account for those occupation years when everything was affected by the abnormal
conditions created by the war.
TOPIC: COMPENSATION
It is not disputed that the administrator set aside for himself and collected from the estate
the sum of P13,294 as his fees from 1945 to 1951 at the rate of P2,400 a year. There is no
controversy as to the fact that this appropriated amount was taken without the order or
previous approval by the probate Court. Neither is there any doubt that the administration of
the Intestate estate by Crisanto de Borja is far from satisfactory. Yet it is a fact that Crisanto
de Borja exercised the functions of an administrator and is entitled also to a certain amount
as compensation for the work and services he has rendered as such. Now, considering the
extent and size of the estate, the amount involved and the nature of the properties under
administration, the amount collected by the administrator for his compensation at P200 a
month is not unreasonable and should therefore be allowed.
DISPOSITIVE: The decision appealed from is modified by reducing the amount that the
administrator was sentenced to pay the oppositors to the amount of P46, 210.78 (instead of
P83,337.31), plus legal interests on this amount, affirmed in all other respects.
1.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE; NATURE OF COUNTERCLAIM. A counterclaim is a relief
available to a party-defendant against the adverse party which may or may not be
independent from the main issue.
2.
ID.; PARTIES; COUNSEL FOR A PARTY SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED AS DEFENDANT IN
COUNTERCLAIM. The appearance of a lawyer as Counsel for a party and his participation
in a case as such counsel does not make him a party to the action. The fact that he
represents the interests of his client or that he acts in their behalf will not hold him liable for
or make him entitled to any award that the Court may adjudicate to the parties, other than
his professional fees. The principle that a counterclaim cannot be filed against persons who
are acting in representation of another such as trustees in their individual capacities
(Chambers vs. Cameron 2 Fed. Rules Service 155; 29 of Supp. 742), could be applied with
more force and effect in the case of a counsel whose participation in the action is merely
confined to the preparation of the defense of the client.
3.
COURTS; JURISDICTION OF PROBATE COURT LIMITED AND SPECIAL. In taking
cognizance of a special proceedings for the purpose of settling the estate of a deceased
person, the Court of First Instance in its capacity as a probate Court is clothed with a limited
jurisdiction which cannot expand to Collateral matters not arising out of or in anyway related
to the settlement and adjudication of the properties of the deceased for it is a settled rule
that the jurisdiction of a probate Court is limited and special. Although there is a tendency
now to relax this rule and extend the jurisdiction of the probate Court in respect to matters
incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers, this should be understood
to comprehend only cases related to those powers specifically allowed by the statutes.
4.
DAMAGES; COUNTERCLAIM; TESTATE OF INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS: MORAL DAMAGES
IS EXTRANEOUS MATTER From whatever angle it may be looked at, a counterclaim for
moral damages demanded by an administrator against the heirs for alleged utterances,
pleadings and actuations made in the course of a proceeding, is an extraneous matter in a
testate or intestate proceedings. The injection into the action of incidental questions entirely

foreign in probate proceedings should not be encouraged for to do otherwise would run
counter to the clear intention of the law.
5.
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATORS; ACTS OF ADMINISTRATOR CONSIDERED
MALADMINISTRATION; ACCOUNTABILITY FOR LOSS OR DAMAGE. Where the records are
replete with instances of highly irregular practices of the administrator such as the
pretended ignorance of the necessity of a book or ledger or at least a list of chronological
and dated entries of money or produce the intestate acquired and the amount of
disbursement made for the same properties; that admittedly the administrator did not have
even a list of the names of the lessees of the properties under his administration, nor even a
list of those who owed back rentals, and mixing the funds of the estate under his
administration with his personal funds instead of keeping a current account for the Intestate
in his capacity as administrator, in such instances the probate Court is justified in finding
him guilty of acts of maladministration and in holding him accountable for loss or damage to
Intestate.

(18)
TESTATE OF RUDOCINDO ADAPON, PEDRO ADAPON as administrator-appellant v.
FELISA MARALIT as oppositor-appellee, 69 PHIL 383 (1940)
EN BANC: Avancena, Villa-real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion, concurring
PONENTE: J. Laurel
G. Garcia and Jose Nava for appellant.
Godofredo Reyes for appellee.
NATURE:
FACTS: On Dec 16, 1936, Pedro Adapon presented for probate the last will and testament of
his father Rudocindo Adapon before CFI Batangas. The will was admitted to probate and
Pedro Adapon, as executor, filed an inventory of the properties and assets of the estate
1. The surviving spouse by a second marriage, Felisa Maralit, filed a petition asking the
court to pay her a monthly allowance of P50 and to included additional properties
which were allegedly omitted from the inventory
2. Adapon, on the other hand, alleged that he owned the properties in dispute and
should not be included in the inventory. The probate court decided in favor of Adapon
ISSUE: WON the court, acting as probate court, could determine issues of ownership
RULING: No.
RATIO: No. Under Sec 599 Code of Civil Procedure, the probate jurisdiction of CFI relates
only to matters having to do with the settlement of estates and probate of wills of deceased
persons, the appoint and removal of guardians and trustees, and the powers, duties, and
rights of guardians and wards, trustees and cestuis que trust. As may be seen, the law does
not extend the jurisdiction of a probate court to the determination of questions of ownership
that arise during the proceeding.
In the case of Bauermann v. Casas, the SC held that the mere fact that one of the parties is
an executor or administrator of a certain estate does not give exclusive jurisdiction to the

probate court wherein the estate is being settled, of questions arising between such
executors or administrators and third persons, as to the ownership of specific property.
When it is once determined that certain property is the property of the estate, exclusive
jurisdiction over the administration of the property vests in the court wherein the estate is
being settled, but until this question is decided the mere allegation that certain property is
the property of an estate in the course of administration is not sufficient to oust all other
courts of jurisdiction over questions touching the ownership of such property and rights
based on the right of ownership.
It is an established doctrine that the mere fact that one of the parties is the executor or
administrator of the estate of a deceased person does not confer upon the probate court, in
which the proceedings for the distribution and settlement of said estate are pending,
exclusive jurisdiction to decide all questions that may arise between said executor and third
persons as to the title of specific property.
DISPOSITIVE: Judgment is affirmed.
1.
ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS; EXTENT OF JURISDICTION OF PROBATE COURTS;
DETERMINATION OF QUESTIONS OF OWNERSHIP. Under section 599 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the probate jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance relates only to matters
having to do with "the settlement of estates and probate of wills of deceased persons, the
appointment and removal of guardians and trustees, and the power, duties, and rights of
guardians and wards, trustees, and cestuis que trust." As may be seen, the law does not
extend the jurisdiction of a probate court to the determination of questions of ownership that
arise during the proceeding.

(19)
VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA V. COURT OF APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA NAGAC, 174
SCRA 154 (1989)
1ST DIVISION:Narvasa, Cruz, Grino-Aquino, Medialdea, concurring
PONENTE: J. Gancayco
Benjamin J. Quitoriano for petitioner.
Linzag-Arcilla & Associates Law Offices for private respondent.
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS: Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of Philippine Airlines, passed away on Jan
3, 1983 at Bacoor, Cavite without a will. He was survived by his spouse petitioner Victoria
Pereira and his sister, Rita Pereira Nagac
1. On March 1, 1983, Rita Nagac instituted before RTC Bacoor, Cavite Br 19 a special
proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the
estate of the deceased Andres
2. Victoria contends that there is no estate of the deceased for purposes of
administration for the following reasons

a. The death benefits from PAL, PALEA, PESALA and SSS belong exclusively to
her as sole beneficiary
b. Andres bank deposits had been used to defray the funeral expenses
c. The only real property of the deceased has been extrajudicially settled
between petitioner and private respondent as the only surviving heirs of the
deceased
3. Private respondent Rita on the other hand, argued that it is not for petitioner to
decide what properties form part of the estate of the deceased and to appropriate
them for herself
ISSUE: WON there exists an estate of the deceased for purposes of administration
RULING: The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before which the
administration proceedings are pending
RATIO: The trial court is in the best position to receive evidence on the decedents estate,
the valuations thereof and the rights of the transferees of some of the assets, if any.
However, the courts determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties.
ISSUE: WON a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where the decedent left no
debts
RULING: No.
RATIO: Assuming there exists assets of the decedent for purposes of administration, the SC
held the administration proceedings instituted by Rita Nagac are unnecessary
The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint an administrator, in the order
established in Rule 78 Sec 6, in case the decedent left no will, or in case he had left one,
should he fail to name an executor therein. An exception to this rule is established in Rule 74
Sec 1 which provides that when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due
from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the
judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator.
Rule 74 Sec 1 ROC, however, does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration
proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for
good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out
of court, the estate should not be burdenedwhich is always long and costlywith an
administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons.
What constitutes good reasons to warrant a judicial administration of the estate of a
deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and there are no creditors will depend on the
circumstances of each case.
CAB: There is no reason to apply this to the case at bar. There are only 2 surviving heirs. The
parties admit there are no debts of the deceased to be paid. The only conceivable reason
why Rita Nagac seeks appointment as administrator is for her to obtain possession of the
alleged properties for her own purposes, since the same are presently in the hands of
Victoria who supposedly disposed of them fraudulently. This is not compelling reason at all.
DISPOSITIVE: Letters of administration issued by RTC Bacoor to Rita Nagac are revoked and
administration proceeding dismissed without prejudice to the right of Nagac to commence a
new action for partition.

(20)
MANOTOK REALTY INC V. COURT OF APPEALS and APOLONIO SIOJO, 149 SCRA 376
(1987)
2ND DIVISION: Fernan, Padilla, Bidin Cortes, Paras, concurring
PONENTE: J. Gutierrez
NATURE: Appeal by way of certiorari seeking to set aside the CA decision which reversed
the decision of RTC and upheld the sale of the subject property in favor of Siojo
FACTS: On Nov 21, 19151, CFI Manila, as probate court in the special proceedings of the
testate estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda, authorized Vicente Legarda, as special coadministrator, to sell the Legarda-Tambunting subdivision for P50 sqm subject to court
approval
1. Vicente allegedly sold (Dec 10, 1952) about 280 sqm of the subdivision to Abelardo
Lucero. The sale was on an installment basis and Lucero paid an initial amount of
P200
2. In 1953, Lucero leased the lot to several persons, including private respondent
Apolonio Siojo, who paid P15 monthly rental
3. Subsequently, the probate court (July 31, 1956) issued another order authorizing Phil
Trust Co (PTC) as administrator, to sell the subdivision at the best obtainable price
4. Petitioner Manotok Realty subsequently purchased the entire subdivision. On March
13, 1959, a deed of sale was executed between Manotok Realty and PTC, which was
approved by the probate court. Consequently, new TCTs were issued in the name of
Manotok Realty covering the Tambunting estate
5. In the meantime, Lucero waited for the formal contract from Vicente but as none
came, he went t PTC to make further payments but the bank refused to receive the
payment because the Tambunting estate was involved in litigation
6. Sometime in January 1966, Manotok Realty caused the publication of notice of
eviction against all-squatter occupants in the Tambunting estate. For failure to vacate
the premises, Manotok Realty filed an action (March 4, 1966) for ejectment against
Siojo. Summons were then served on March 11, 1966. Notwithstanding these events,
Lucero executed a deed of assignment on May 23, 1966 in favor of his lessees,
including Siojo
7. The trial court, in the ejectment proceedings, held in favor of Manotok Realty and
ordered Siojo to deliver possession of the lot to petitioner
8. On appeal, CA reversed the trial court decision and held that the sale made by
Vicente to Lucero was valid because the former acted within his authority as special
co-administrator and that there was no need for the court to approve the sale

9. Petitioner argued that the receipt evidencing the sale by Vicente to Lucero does not
conform to the legal requirements of a contract of sale and that the sale necessitated
court approval because the same was not in accordance with the terms specified in
the authorization to sell by the probate court
ISSUE: WON the sale of the properties of the decedent require approval of the probate court
RULING: Yes.
RATIO: An administrator under the circumstances of this case cannot enjoy blanket
authority to dispose of real estate as he pleases, especially when he ignores specific
directives to execute proper documents and get court approval for the sales validity.
As held in Estate of Olave v. Reyes: Rule 73 Sec 1 ROC expressly provides that the court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts. The law is clear that where the estate of the decedent is
already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into
any transaction involving it without prior approval of the probate court.
The authority granted by the probate court in the case at bar specifically ordered Legarda to
submit the document of sale for its approval. Since the sale was without the approval of the
probate court, the execution of the necessary documents did not bind the Tambunting estate
and could not have affected the rights of the petitioner over the lot. Furthermore, Siojo is
only a transferee of Lucero. At the time of the transfer of rights, Siojo already had notice of
Manotoks ownership because he was served with summons in the ejectment case. More
importantly, he is deemed to have constructive notice of such ownership from the time the
petitioner was able to secure a title over said property in 1959.
DISPOSITIVE: CA decision is reversed and set aside. The decision of CFI Manila is
reinstated.
1.
CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; SALE MUST BE EMBODIED IN A PUBLIC INSTRUMENT AND
DULY REGISTERED TO BE BINDING AGAINST THIRD PERSONS; CASE AT BAR. The alleged
sale made by Legarda to Lucero should have been embodied in a public instrument in
accordance with Article 1358 of the Civil Code and should have been duly registered with
the Register of Deeds to make it binding against third persons. The authority given by the
probate court to Legarda specifically required the execution of necessary documents. Lucero
not only failed to obtain a deed of sale from Legarda but also failed to secure any kind of
writing evidencing the contract of sale other than the receipt issued by Legarda
acknowledging the amount of P200.00. . . . The Court ruled that the alleged sale made by
Legarda to Lucero did not bind the Legarda-Tambunting estate, much less, the petitioner who
acquired the property in dispute with the approval of the probate court and in a sole reliance
on the clean title of the said property.
2.
REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SALE OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY OF
DECEDENT; APPROVAL OF PROBATE COURT NECESSARY; CASES OF ESTATE OF OLAVE VS.
REYES AND VDA. DE GIL VS. CANCIO CITED. We also find that the appellate court
committed an error of law when it held that the sale of the lot in question did not need the
approval of the probate court. Although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the
sale of an immovable property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding,
should be made with the approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its
capacity as a probate court. An administrator under the circumstances of this case cannot
enjoy blanket authority to dispose of real estate as he pleases, especially where he ignores
specific directives to execute proper documents and get court approval for the sale's validity.
In the case of Estate of Olave v. Reyes (123 SCRA 767, 772), we ruled: "Section 1, Rule 73 of

the Rules of Court, expressly provides that 'the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts.' The law is clear that where the estate of the deceased person is already the subject
of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction
involving it without prior approval of the probate court." Also, in Vda. de Gil v. Cancio (14
SCRA 796, 800), we ruled: ". . . And bearing in mind this situation of the two heirs which
happened during the Japanese occupation, the probate court did not hesitate in approving
the agreement thereby giving to the administratrix the necessary authority to execute the
deed of sale covering the two properties of the deceased in favor of Agustin Cancio provided
that the deed of sale be submitted to the court for its approval. And this matter is
sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, which provides: "'When it appears
that the sale of the whole or a part of the real or personal estate will be beneficial to the
heirs, devisees, legatees, and other interested persons, the court may upon application of
the executor or administrator and on written notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees who
are interested in the estate to be sold, authorize the executor or administrator to sell the
whole or a part of said estate, although not necessary to pay debts, legacies, or expenses of
administration; . . . .'" The authority granted by the probate court in the case at bar
specifically ordered Legarda to submit the document of sale for its approval."
3.
CIVIL LAW; SALES; POSSESSION IN BAD FAITH; RESPONDENT HAS NOTICE OF
PETITIONER'S OWNERSHIP. Furthermore, the private respondent is only a transferee of
Lucero. At the time of the transfer of rights, the private respondent already had notice of the
petitioner's ownership because he was served with a summons in the ejectment case filed
against him by the petitioner. More importantly, the private respondent is deemed to have
constructive notice of such ownership from the time the petitioner was able to secure a title
over the said property in 1959. The controversies and litigations over the estate, the
problems with numerous squatters, and other aspects of the acquisition of the property
attracted wide public attention and anybody in the subdivision could not have avoided being
involved or aware. Therefore, the private respondent cannot even be considered a possessor
and builder in good faith.
(21)
ROSE BUSH MALIG and JOE, THOMAS and JOHN (all surnamed BUSH) represented
by attorney-in-fact ROSE BUSH MALIG V. MARIA SANTOS BUSH, 28 SCRA 449
(1969)
EN BANC: JBL Reyes, Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Capitastrano, Teehankee, Barredo,
Concepcion, Barredo
PONENTE: J. Makalintal
Dewey G. Soriano for plaintiffs-appellants.
Feria, Feria, Lugtu & LaO for defendant-appellee
NATURE: Appeal by plaintiffs Rose Bush Malig et al from two orders of CFI Manila in Civil
Case no 51639, the first dismissing the complaint and the second denying the MR
FACTS: On Sept 10, 1962, plaintiffs Rose Bush Malig et al filed a complaint alleging that
they are the acknowledged natural children and the only heirs of John T. Bush and Apolonia
Perez, who cohabited from 1923 to Aug 1941
1. Malig alleged that private respondent Maria Santos Bush falsely alleged she was the
legal wife of the decedent and as such was able to secure her appointment as
administrator of the decedents estate
a. The decedent purportedly left a will bequeathing his estate to: Maria Santos
Bush, Anita Bush and Anna Berger
b. That plaintiffs only discovered the fraud and misrepresentation only in July
1962

2. Plaintiffs prayed that the project for partition be annulled and that Bush be required
to submit a complete inventory and accounting of all the properties left by the
deceased and adjudicating to the plaintiffs their legal participation
3. Defendant Bush moved to dismiss, alleging lack of cause of action, res judicata and
statute of limitations as defenses. The plaintiffs opposed and Bush subsequently filed
a reply to the opposition
4. On Jan 10, 1963, the lower court denied the motion. In her answer, Bush denied all
the material averments of the complaint and invoked laches, res judicata and statute
of limitations as affirmative defenses
5. (After the issues were joined), the hearing was postponed upon the defendants
manifestation that she would file a motion to dismiss. In her motion, she challenged
the jurisdiction of the court arguing that since the action was to annul the project of
partition approved by the probate court, the probate court had jurisdiction over the
case under Rule 75 Sec 1 ROC.
6. The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint on the ground that
the action had prescribed. Plaintiffs Malig filed MR but was denied
ISSUE: WON the lower court can dismiss an action on a ground not alleged in the motion to
dismiss
RULING: No.
RATIO: Rule 8 Sec 1 ROC enumerates the grounds upon which an action may be dismissed,
and it specifically provides that a motion to this end be filed. As such, the lower court had no
power to dismiss the case without the requisite motion duly presented. The fact that the
parties filed memoranda upon the courts indication or order in which they discussed the
proposition that the action was unnecessary and was improperly brought outside and
independently of the case did not supply the deficiency. Rule 30 provides for the cases in
which an action may be dismissed, and the inclusion of those therein provided excludes any
other. The only instance in which the court may dismiss an action motu proprio is when the
plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable
length of time, or to comply with the Rules or any order of the court.
CAB: Although the MTD had been presented by Bush the resolution of the court in granting
the same was based upon a ground not allegedly in said motion. But assuming the lower
court could properly consider the question of prescription, the same still did not appear to be
indubitable on the face of the allegations of the complaint.
ISSUE: WON the trial court had jurisdiction over the case
RULING: No.
RATIO: Rule 73 Sec 1 ROC fixes jurisdiction for purposes of special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased so far as it depends on the place of residence of
the deceased, or of the location of the estate. The matter really concerns venue, as the
caption of Rule 73 Sec 1 indicates, and in order to preclude different courts which may
properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts.
The present action is not for the annulment of a partition already made and approved by the
probate court and to reopen the estate proceeding so that a new partition may be made, but
for recovery of the plaintiffs portion of their alleged inheritance which they have been
deprived of through fraud.

DISPOSITIVE: Orders appealed from are set aside and case remanded for further
proceedings
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; PROCEDURE; DISMISSAL OF ACTION; COURT MAY NOT DISMISS AN
ACTION ON A GROUND NOT ALLEGED IN THE MOTION TO DISMISS. The first motion to
dismiss, alleging lack of cause of action, res judicata and statute of limitations was denied.
The second motion reiterated none of these grounds and raised only the question of
jurisdiction. The court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint, not on the ground
relied upon by the defendant but because the action had prescribed. Held: The order should
be set aside and the case remanded for further proceedings. The lower court cannot dismiss
an action on a ground not alleged in the motion to dismiss.
2.
ID.; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE; COURT THAT HAS JURISDICTION OVER SETTLEMENT.
Section 1 of Rule 75 of the Rules of Court fixes jurisdiction for purposes of the special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, "so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate." The matter really
concerns venue, as the caption of Rule cited indicates, and in order to preclude different
courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."

(22)
GIACOMINA MARINI-GONZALES V. HON. GUARDSON LOOD, presiding judge CFI
Rizal Br. VI, CELIA ANGELES-PASCUA, ELISEO ZARI as assistant clerk of court, as
appointed legal representative of deceased RAFAEL J. GONZALES, ESTEBAN
ANGELES, SPOUSES ROGELIO ANGELES AND SINFORESA SALVADOR ANGELES,
SPOUSES REMEDOIS ANGELES-FERRAER and FLORENCIO FERRAER, JAIME
ANGELES, SPOUSES BENJAMIN ANGELES and MERLINA TORRES-ACABE and her
husband, 148 SCRA 452 (1987)
2ND DIVISION: Fernan, Gutierrez Jr., Paras, Bidin, Cortes, concurring; Alampay (no part)
PONENTE: J. Padilla
Norberto J. Quisumbing for petitioner
Laso, Beltran & Domondon for respondents

NATURE: Petition for certiorari to annul and set aside orders issued by respondent judge
Lood of CFI Pasig on (1) Feb 12, 1972, denying petitioners omnibus motion; (2) March 25,
1972 appointing Eliseo Zari as legal representative of deceased Rafael Gonzales; (3) April
14, 1972, denying petitioners MR of Feb 12; and (4) May 17, 1972, denying petitioners MR
of March 25 order
FACTS: On Sept 19, 1969, petitioner Giacomina Marini-Gonzales (represented by
administrator Norberto Quisumbing) filed a complaint against her husband Rafael Gonzales
et al, for the annulment of allegedly fraudulent sale of various properties (real and personal),
which impaired her interest in the conjugal partnership properties
1. In his answer, Rafael Gonzales claimed that all the conjugal properties in his
possession were not used in any way or transferred to the other defendants and that
the properties of the co-defendants were not derived from the conjugal properties he
owned with Giacomina
2. For their part, Angeles et al alleged that the disputed properties were not acquired
with the conjugal founds of Gonzales
3. After the pre-trial conference, Rafaels deposition was taken in view of his
deteriorating health. His deposition, however, was not completed because he died on
Sept 5, 1970
4. On Sept 25, 1970, petitioner filed a Notice of Death of Party and Omnibus Motion,
notifying the court of the death of Rafael, and of her appointment as special
administratrix in his testate estate and prayed that she be substituted in place of the
deceased. Petitioner also prayed that she be allowed to amend her complaint to
allege her two capacities as wife and as special administratrix of the testate estate of
Rafael
5. Respondent judge Lood ordered the parties to submit their amended pleading
6. Pursuant thereto, petitioner filed Compliance and Motion reiterating her prayer for
the immediate grant of her Omnibus motion.
7. Respondent judge, however on Feb 12, 1972, denied the motion for lack of merit.
Petitioner subsequently filed MR of said order on March 25, 1972
8. On March 25, judge Lood appointed Eliseo Zari (assistant clerk of court) as legal
representative of Rafael.
9. Petitioner filed a MR but was denied. As such, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
10.On March 15 and 20, 1973, SC issued a TRO restraining respondent judge Lood from
proceeding with the initial reception of evidence in the civil case before CFI Pasig
ISSUE: WON respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the proposed
amendment of petitioners complaint
RULING: Yes.
RATIO: Under Rule 10 Sec 3, after the case is set for hearing, substantial amendments may
be made only upon leave of court but such leave may be refused if it appears that the
motion was made with intent to delay the action or that the cause of action or defense is
substantially altered.
There is no doubt that the proposed amendments to the petitioners complaint would alter
the position of Rafael Gonzales, from that of a defendant to that of plaintiff. But, while the
ROC authorize the courts to disallow amendment of pleadings when it appears that the
same is made to delay an action or that the cause of action or defense is substantially
altered thereby, the rule is not absolute. Courts are not precluded form allowing
amendments of pleadings even if the same will substantially change the cause of action or
defense provided that such amendments do not result in a substantial injury to the adverse
party. This is due to the permissive character of said rule. In fact, the SC has ruled that

amendments to pleadings are favored and should be liberally allowed in the furtherance of
justice.
The same is true with the principle of estoppel. It is essential that the rights of the adverse
party would be seriously affected in order to disallow a change in position, but when no
wrong is done, a change in position may be allowed.
CAB: There is no reason not have the private respondents shown any reason that they would
suffer substantial injury of the proposed amendments were allowed. The mere change in the
position of the deceased from defendant to plaintiff, will not, by itself, lend credence to
Giacominas allegation that the disputed properties belonged to conjugal partnership of the
spouses Gonzales nor will it diminish the private respondents claim that they properties
were bought by them with their own funds. In fact, they have yet to prove their respective
allegations.
To disallow the amendments would result in some absurdity. As wife and then as executrix
and sole heir of Rafael, petitioner would be giving with one and also receiving with another,
in the event that judgment were to be rendered for or against the deceased defendant.
ISSUE: WON respondent judge Lood abused his discretion in ordering the respondent Eliseo
Zari to represent the deceased as party defendant
RULING: Yes.
RATIO: Under Rule 87 Sec 2 ROC, it is the executor or administrator of the estate of the
decedent who may bring or defend actions in the name of the deceased, and the SC has
ruled that the choice of an executor is the sole prerogative of the testator and is not
addressed to the discretion of the court.
In Ozaeta v. Pecson, the SC held: It is natural that the testator should desire to appoint one
of his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of his
estate. The curtailment of this right may be considered as a curtailment of the rights to
dispose.
The joinder of the deceased Rafael as a party defendant is no longer necessary and may be
dispensed with, since no cross-claim has been filed against him by his co-defendants; and
petitioners right under Art 173 NCC may be enforced against third persons even without
joining her husband as party defendant.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is granted and a writ issued annulling and setting aside the orders
issued by respondent judge on Feb 12, 1972, March 25, 1972, April 14, 1972 and May 17,
1972. The TRO earlier issued is made permanent.

(23)
PETITION FOR THE PRESUMPTION OF DEATH OF NICOLAI SZATRAW. CONSUELO
SORS, petitioner-appellant, G.R. NO L-1780 (1948)
EN BANC: Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason, concurring
PONENTE: J. Padilla
J. Rodriguez Serra for appellant.
NATURE:
FACTS: Petitioner Consuelo Sors is the lawful wife of Nicolai Szatraw, a Polish national,
whom she married in Manila on Nov 1936, and with whom she bore a child (Alexis Szatraw)
1. Sometime in Feb 1940, Szatraw left with their child Alexis on the pretense of calling
upon some friends
2. It appears that Szatraw and her son left for Shanghai, however, upon information
from some Polish citizens who lived there, Szatraw had not been seen there
3. Szatraw remained absent for more than 7 years and any attempt to search for him
were in vain
4. As such, Consuelo filed a petition that her husband be declared dead and that her
parental authority over the child, should the latter be alive, be preserved
5. The records show that she and Szatraw did not acquire any property during their
marriage and that his life was not insured
6. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that the same was not for the
settlement of the estate of the absentee and because the rule of evidence
establishing the presumption of death of a person does not create a right upon which
a judicial pronouncement may be predicated. Petitioner appealed.
ISSUE: WON the petition for the declaration of death of Szatraw will prosper
RULING: No.
RATIO: The presumption of death may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in
an action or in a special proceeding. Independent of such action or special proceeding, the
presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or
special proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy
prayed for by Sors against her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final
determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact, since the
petition does not pray for a declaration that Szatraw is dead, but merely asks for a
declaration that he be presumed dead because he had been absent for 7 years.
ISSUE: What is the effect of a presumption of death of a person?
RULING: A judicial pronouncement of the presumptive death of a person is still a prima facie
presumption.
RATIO: Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead because he had been unheard
from in 7 years would have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact
finally determined. If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead because he
had not been heard from in 7 years cannot become final and executory even after the lapse
of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, then a petition for such
declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner.
DISPOSITIVE: Order appealed from is affirmed

(24)
IN THE MATTER OF THE DECLARATION OF THE CIVIL STATUS OF LOURDES LUKBAN
V. REPUBLIC, 98 PHIL 574 (1956)
1ST DIVISION: Paras, Padilla, Montemayor, A. Reyes, Jugo, Labrador, Concepcion, JBL Reyes,
Endencia, concurring
PONENTE: J. Bautista Angelo
NATURE: Petition filed in CFI Rizal for a declaration that petitioner Lukban is a widow of her
husband Francisco Chuidian who is presumed to be dead and has no legal impediment to
contract a subsequent marriage.
FACTS: Lourdes Lukban married Francisco Chuidian on Dec 10, 1933 in Manila. On Dec 27 of
the same year, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel and has not returned since then.
Despite diligent search, Lukban had no information regarding the whereabouts of her
husband. She believes that Chuidian is already dead because he had been absent for more
than 20 years. Because she intends to marry again, Lukban filed the instant petition so that
her civil status be defined in order that she may contract a subsequent marriage. Republic,
through OSG, opposed the petition on the ground that the same is not authorized by law.
1. After Lukban presented her evidence, the court sustained the opposition and
dismissed the petition. Hence, this appeal
ISSUE: WON a petition to declare a person presumptively dead will prosper
RULING: No.
RATIO: As held in Re Nicolai Szatraw, a petition for judicial declaration that petitioners
husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it is not authorized by law,
and if such declaration cannot be made in a special proceeding similar to the present, much
less can the court determine the status of petitioner as a widow since this matter must of
necessity depend upon the fact of death of the husband.

For purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse
judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil
marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for 7
consecutive years at the time of second marriage, that the spouse present does not known
his or former spouse to be living, that each former spouse is generally reputed to be dead
and the spouse present so believes at the time of celebration of the marriage.
DISPOSITIVE: Decision appeal from is affirmed
(25)
In the matter of the petition for declaration of WILLIAM GUE, presumptively dead.
ANGELINA GUE V. REPUBLIC, 107 PHIL 381 (1960)
EN BANC: Paras, Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, JBL Reyes, Barrera, Gutierrez David,
concurring
PONENTE: J. Montemayor
Virgilio V. David for appellant
Solicitor Gen Edilberto Barot and Solicitor E.M. Salva for appellee
NATURE: Appeal from the order CFI Manila presided by judge Bonifacio Isip dismissing the
petition of Angelina Gue
FACTS: On Nov 20, 1957, Angelina Gue filed a petition in CFI Manila alleging that she was
married to William Gue and had a child, Anthony Gue.
1. On Jan 5, 1946, William Gue left Manila and went to Shanghai but since then, he has
not been heard of or tried to communicate with Angelina
2. Despite earnest efforts, she failed locate William
3. It appears that the spouses did not own any conjugal property
4. Angelina filed the instant petition pursuant to Art 390 NCC
5. CFI dismissed the petition citing the ruling in In Re Szatraw: The presumption of death
may arise and be invoked and made in a case, whether in an action or in a special
proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a special
proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed
for by the petitioner for the final determination of his right or status, or for the
ascertainment of a particular fact.
6. OSG, as appellee, cited the decision in Lukban v. Republic: such petition cannot be
entertained because it is not authorized by law, if such declaration cannot be made in
special proceedings similar to the present, much less can the court determine the
status of petitioner as a widow since this matter depends upon the fact of death of
the husband
ISSUE: WON a declaration of presumption of death is conclusive
RULING: No.
RATIO: A judicial declaration that a person unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proofs, cannot reach the state of finality
or become final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead because he had been
unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such
particular fact finally determined. If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead,
because he had not been heard from in seven years, cannot become final and executory
even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for
such a presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition
for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the

petitioner. The Court should not waste its valuable time and be made to perform a
superfluous and meaningless act
DISPOSITIVE: Appealed order dismissing the petition is affirmed

(26)
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES INC V. JOSEPHINE LUCERO, NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD,
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, 124 SCRA 425 (1983)
2ND DIVISION: Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Gutierrez, Abad Santos, De Castro,
concurring
PONENTE: J. Escolin
Valera, Cainglet & Dala Law Office for petitioner
Jose R. Millares for private respondent
NATURE: Petition for review filed by Eastern Shipping Lines to set aside the decision of
NLRC which affirmed the judgment of National Seamen Board
FACTS: On Oct 31, 1979, Capt. Julio J. Lucero Jr. was appointed by Eastern Shipping Lines
(ESLI) as master/captain to its vessel M/V Eastern Minicon with a Hong Kong/Manila route.
Under the contract, his employment was good for 1 trip only, i.e. the contract will
automatically terminate upon arrival of the vessel in Manila
1. On Feb 16, 1980, while the vessel was en route from Hong Kong to Manila, Lucero
sent 3 messages informing petitioner Eastern of the perilous conditions of the sea
and that the ship was collapsing

2. Eastern Shipping then immediately reported the matter to the Philippine Coast Guard
for the search and rescue operation of the ships survivors but the search yielded
negative results
3. Subsequently, the Lloyds of London, insurer of M/V Eastern Minicon, confirmed the
loss of the vessel and paid the corresponding death benefits to the heirs of the crew
members, except respondent Josephine Lucero who refused to accept the same
4. On July 16, 1980, Lucero filed with National Seamen Board a complaint for the
payment of accrued monthly allotment which was stopped since March 1980. She
argued that since Julio Luceros contract was on a per voyage basis, the same was to
terminate only upon the vessels arrival in Manila
5. On the other hand, Eastern contended that Lucero was no longer entitled to such
allotments because the insurer had already confirmed the total loss of the vessel and
that it had already settled the death benefits claim of the heirs of the crew members
6. The Board rendered (dated May 19, 1981) a decision in favor of Lucero, holding that
the presumption of death could not be applied because the 4-year period under Art
391(1) NCC had not yet expired; and that the payment of death benefits to the other
crew members was based on a voluntary agreement which does not bind Lucero
7. On appeal, NLRC affirmed the decision of the National Seamen Board
ISSUE: WON Lucero can be declared dead under the circumstances of the case despite the
provisions under Art 391(1) NCC
RULING: Yes.
RATIO: There is enough evidence to show the circumstances attending the loss and
disappearance of M/V Eastern Minicon and its crew. The foregoing facts sufficiently lead us to
a moral certainty that the vessel had sunk and the persons aboard had perished with it.
Upon this premise, the rule on presumption of death under Art 391(1) NCC must yield to the
rule of preponderance of evidence. As held in Joaquin v. Navarro: Where there are facts,
known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does
not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls.
DISPOSITIVE: NLRC decision set aside and the complaint of Lucero dismissed. However,
Lucero is entitled to death benefits

(27)
REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS (2OTH DIVISION), HON. JUDGE FORTUNATO
MADRONA RTC-BR 35 and APOLINARIA MALINAO JOMIC, 458 SCRA 200 (2005)
3RD DIVISION: Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Garcia, concurring
PONENTE: J. Carpio-Morales
FACTS: Private respondent Apolinaria Malinao Jomic filed a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of her spouse Clemente Jomoc, who had left petitioner 9 years earlier.
1. RTC Ormoc Br 35 granted the petition (dated Sept 29, 1999) based on the
Commissioners report. In granting the decision, respondent judge Madrona cited Art
41(2) FC which provides that in order to contract a valid subsequent marriage during
the subsistence of a previous marriage where the prior spouse had been absent for 4
consecutive years, the spouse present must institute summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee spouse
2. Republic, through OSG, sought to appeal the order of RTC Ormoc by filing a notice of
appeal
3. By Order of Nov 22, 1999, the trial court disapproved the notice of appeal since no
record of appeal was filed and served as required under Rule 41 Sec 2(a) ROC
4. OSG filed MR but was denied on Jan 13, 2000 and as such, it filed a petition for
certiorari before CA, contending that the presumptive death of a person under Art 41
FC is not a special proceeding requiring a record on appeal
5. On appeal CA denied the Republics petition on the following grounds:
a. It failed to attach to its petition a certified true copy of the assailed order dated
Jan 13, 2000
b. Petition questioned the trial courts order dated Aug 15, 1999 for having been
issued with GAD but no copy was found in the records
c. The instant petition was in the nature of a special proceeding and as such, OSG
should have filed a record on appeal
2. Republic, through OSG, contends that the declaration of presumptive death under Art
41 FC is not a special proceeding involving multiple appeals where a record on appeal
shall be filed
ISSUE: WON a petition for declaration of the presumptive of a person is in the nature of a
special proceeding
RULING: No.
RATIO: Art 41 FC requires that for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under
the preceding paragraph, the spouses present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee spouse.
By the trial courts citation of Art 41 FC, it is gathered that the petition of Apolinaria Jomioc
to have her absentee spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire to
contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that for that purpose is a
summary proceeding under FC and not a special proceeding under ROC. It being a summary
ordinary proceeding, the filing of a notice of appeal from the trial courts order sufficed.
On the petitioners failure to attach to his petition a copy of the trial court denying its MR of
the disapproval of the notice of appeal, such is not necessary fatal, for the rules of procedure
are not to be applied in a technical sense. Given the issue raised before by petitioner, what
CA should have done was to direct petitioner to comply with the said rule.

As for petitioners failure to submit a copy of the trial courts order granting the petition for
declaration of presumptive death, it merely assailed the order disapproving the notice of
appeal.
DISPOSITIVE: The assailed May 5, 2004 decision of CA is reversed and set aside. Case is
remanded to it for appropriate act in light of the foregoing discussion.
CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; A PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF THE PRESUMPTIVE DEATH OF A
PERSON IS IN THE NATURE OF A SUMMARY ORDINARY PROCEEDING; CASE AT BAR. By the
trial court's citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the petition of
Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose
her desire to contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a
"summary proceeding," following above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY
LAW, contains the following provision, inter alia: . . . Art. 238. Unless modified by the
Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this
Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious
manner without regard to technical rules. . . ., there is no doubt that the petition of
Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family Code,
not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls for the filing
of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of
Appeal from the trial court's order sufficed.

(28)
ANGELITA VALDEZ V. REPUBLIC, 598 SCRA 646 (2009)
3RD DIVISION: Ynares-Santiago, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Peralta, concurring
PONENTE: J. Nachura
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the decision of RTC
Camiling, Tarlac dated Nov 12, 2007 dismissing Valdezs petition for declaration of
presumptive death of her husband Sofio Polborosa
FACTS: Petitioner Angelita Valdez married Sofio POlborosa on Jan 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal.
They had one child, Nancy, who was born on Dec 13, 1971. According to petitioner, the
spouses argued constantly because the latter was unemployed.
1. Sometime in March 1972, Sofio left their conjugal dwelling and did not return. In May
1972, Valdez decided to go back to her parents home in Tarlac.
2. In Oct 1975, Sofio showed up in Valdez parental home and agreed to separate with
Valdez. They executed a document to that effect. Since then, petitioner had no news
of Sofio or his whereabouts
3. Believing Sofio to be dead, Valdez subsequently contracted a marriage with Virgio
Reyes on June 20, 1985. However, Virgilios application for naturalization in the US
was denied because Valdezs marriage to Sofio was subsisting
4. RTC dismissed the petition for lack of merit, ruling that Angelita was unable to prove
the well-grounded belief that Sofio was already dead. This must result from inquiries
and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse.
a. RTC found that she did not find her husband in light of their agreement to live
separately.

5. Petition filed a MR arguing that the Civil Code applies in this case and not the Family
Code since her marriage to Sofio was celebrated way before the effectivity of the
Family Code. MR denied
6. In its manifestation and motion, OSG recommended that the court set aside the RTC
decision and grant the petition to declare Sofio presumptively dead:
a. Art 41 FC does not apply because Valdez married Virgilio in 1985 (before
effectivity of FC)
b. Before FC, Valdez already acquired a vested right as to the validity of her
marriage to Virgilio based on the presumed death of Sofioand such cannot be
affected by the provisions under FC
c. Art 390 was not repealed by Art 41 FC
ISSUE: WON the petitioner availed of the proper remedy
RULING: Yes.
RATIO: Under the ROC, a party may directly appeal to SC from a decision of the trial court
only on pure questions of law. Here, the facts are not disputed; the controversy merely
relates to the correct application of the law or jurisprudence to the undisputed facts.
ISSUE: WON Art 41 FC is applicable in this case
RULING: No.
RATIO: It is readily apparent that the marriage of Valdez to Sofio and Virgilio in 1971 and
1985 were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: WON it is necessary to declare the former spouse judicially declared an absentee in
order to contract a subsequent valid marriage
RULING: No.
RATIO: As held in In Re Szatraw and Lukban v. Republic, a petition for judicial declaration
that petitioners husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it is not
authorized by law.
Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no court
declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have taken
place by the 7th year of absence, Sofio is to be presumed dead starting Oct 1982.
Consequently, at the time of petitioners marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to
petitioners capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under Art 83 par 2 NCC.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition dismissed.