POLS244

TA: Dalal Daoud

Nicole Fitzgerald
10107233
April 2nd, 2015
Analyzing Democratization in Light of the Arab Spring: Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria
Though temporal and geographic proximity have produced in academia the tendency
to examine, evaluate, and characterize the Arab Spring period in its entirety, further scrutiny
shows its individual components to be host to a distinct array of features and factors to
which a given countrys democratic performance may be attributed. This particular paper
shall direct its focus towards the respective democratic performances of Tunisia, Egypt, and
Algeria in regards to the degree in which inclusion and accountability (within the context of
this study, our dependent variables) have been implemented in each states political regime. As
per the previous paper, accountability and inclusion (and by extension democratic
performance) were assessed by way of appraisal of (i) the manner in which formal structures
in particular elections and constitutional features function within the political structure;
(ii) the manner in which systems of checks and balances, of vertical and accountability, have
been integrated into the structure; and (iii) in the manner in which civil society has been
augmented by various measures of pluralism and civil liberties; in addition to the various
accessory factors as stipulated by the paper1. Again reference to my previous work, in terms
of overall democratic performance, Tunisia ranked first, boasting an overall score of 78.6;
Algeria second, with a score of 62.2; and Egypt third with a score of 49 In terms of overall
accountability (accounting for necessary + accessory features), Tunisia scored an 80, Algeria
scored a 59, and Egypt scored a 50. In terms of overall inclusion (accounting for necessary +
Fitzgerald, Nicole: A Comparative Assessment of the Democratic Performances of Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria
(2015). 6.
1

accessory features), Tunisia scored an 81, Algeria scored a 66, and Egypt scored 502. Indeed,
the vast discrepancies in performance indicate the vast oversight in evaluating the Arab
Spring as an aggregate movement.
Keeping in mind the wide-ranging performances of each country, this paper shall
look to investigate our independent variables: the chapters, we could say, of the story underlying
the superficialities of our evaluation. The story is not, by any means, one which is easy to tell;
factors and variables are far more entangled and intertwined than they are remote and
distinct. It is most appropriate then to examine the tale in a more unconventional fashion,
placing a greater emphasis on the manner in which each element interacts with and
influences the others to examine each element within its particular context, we might say
rather than examining the element itself in isolation.
Academic literature on democratization theory and the Arab Spring has typically
outlined three predominant factors contributing to the transitory phases experienced by
states within this particular region, and it is these which we shall designate as our variables:
(i) economic structure and setting, relating in particular to the degree to which rentierism
affects the state; (ii) civil society and mass participation, with considerable emphasis on the
organization of the working class; and (iii) the interactions between significant political
forces and actors, focusing on (but not limited to) the often hostile divide between Islamic
and secular liberal parties. I shall begin with a conceptual overview of our three factors:
defining and explicating terms, identifying areas of overlap and influence, and illustrating
their relevance to the Middle Eastern and North African regions. Subsequent sections shall
then examine each country in isolation, looking to outline the factors existing within the
historical context preceding the Arab Spring revolutions before attempting to link said
2

Ibid.

factors to the post-Arab Spring outcomes as they relate to democratization. Upon

completion, I hope this paper shall provide a comprehensive picture as to the democratic
performances of our selected cases.

Civil Society: Organizing the Working Class

While the vast majority of contemporary literature tends to gear its focus towards the
effects of oil wealth and the Islamic/secular divide (our following two sections), there is
much to be learned from tracking class movements over the duration of the transitory
period. As per Cavatorta, one of the most relevant findings in the literature on transition to
democracy postulates that the creation and strengthening of an autonomous middle-class
will generate significant pressure on the authoritarian regime to democratize3. As shall be
demonstrated in our three cases, the labour class movements have proved to be a greatly
significant force in the transitory process both in terms of mobilizing a large percentile of
the population and in providing a voice to counter that of the political, social, and economic
elite.s

Economic Settings: Rentierism and the Rentier State

Within the broader term that is the Rentier Effect, there exist three distinct causal mechanisms
each finding origin in the overabundance in oil or mineral revenues and producing similar
outcomes in regards to their damper effect upon the development of civil society within a
state. The first of these sub-effects, which Ross refers to as the Taxation Effect, occurs when
the government opts to allow for lower levels of taxation from their civilian population. This
manipulation of fiscal policy accommodated for by way of inflated oil revenues serves a
3

Cavatorta, Francesco: The Middle East and North Africa in Routeledge Handbook of Democratization.
ed. Jeffery Haynes (Routelege, 2012).

placatory function: with tax demands low, civilians have been shown to be far less likely to
demand accountability from or representation in their government4. The second mechanism
takes the title of the Spending Effect. Similar in nature to the Taxation Effect, the Spending Effect
postulates that increased oil wealth also allows governments to increase spending on
patronage, which in turn shall serve to stifle pressure for democratization.5 To round off the
trio, Ross introduces the Group Formation Effect, the less subtle and far more substantial
sibling of our previous two. The Group Formation Effect is grounded upon the claim that
Middle Eastern states, their largesse bolstered by the influx of oil wealth, simply leave no
space for the formation of alternative social and political groups who might operate
independently of the state6. Though there exists a degree of contention as to whether the
Middle Eastern state suppression of a developed civil society is wholly intentional, the end
result is quite clearly pronounced. As Ross concludes his study, the oil-impedes-democracy
claim is both valid and statistically robust7 oil, it appears, does hurt democracy.
While one might point out that it is not the case that every state situated within the
Middle Eastern and North African range has access to immense quantities of crude oil
resources, it is not at all the case that they escape the reach of the rentier effect (Ross cites
large supplies of mineral wealth as an alternate form of rent generation)8. Additionally,
externally generated quasi-rents, in the form of foreign aid money, workers remittances, and
foreign investments from oil-rich to oil-poor countries serve to provide the same effect9.

Civil Society: The Islamic Secular Divide

Ross, Michael L.: Does Oil Hinder Democracy? (2001).
Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
Cavatorta.
4
5

Cavatortas text cites four views regarding the role and importance of civil society in
the Arab world. It is the fourth view which we shall examine here, as I believe it to be the
one holding the greatest degree of relevance and applicability to our selected cases. The view
stands as such: that civil society within the Arab world should be treated as a neutral,
explanatory category, operating devoid of any sort of critically imposed normative
judgements, [suggesting] that Islam should not be a priori treated as possessing an
authoritarian nature. Cavatorta implies here that the critical aspect to be examined is not so
much the groups themselves operating within a states civil society, but the dynamics and
relations between them with particular emphasis on the Islamic/Secular Liberal divide that
is prevalent within the region. While facing the challenge of having to accommodate for and
reconcile some vast ideological differences, Islamist and secular political groups must work
to create some form of balance and cohesion between themselves in order to pursue any sort
of democratic transition. Conversely, the unregulated division between the two allows
authoritarian regimes to use divide and conquer strategies in order to remain in power10.
Furthermore, the segregation holds potential to develop into a formidable security problem:
in blocking the rise of moderate Islamism, incumbent regimes have unleashed a much more
virulent form of Islamic radicalism, one that cares little for cooperation or compromise11.
While certain political attitudes may ultimately prove to be irreconcilable, an open dialogue
between Islamist and secular groups certainly provides at the very least the basis for
democratic progression.

Tunisia

10
11

Cavatorta
Entelis, John: Abandoning Reformist Islam, Democracy at Large 1 (2004).

We might say with a fair degree of certitude, that Tunisia has certainly put on the
greatest display of democratic progression of any case examined within this paper a feat
(so I believe) to be attributed to the favourable behaviour of our three variables as discussed
above. Tunisia has long enjoyed the Arab worlds best educational system, largest middle
class, and strongest organized labour movements12. Following Mohamed Bouzazis highly
symbolic self-immolation, political dissent spread quickly among the mass populace. The key
here, however, was not so much in the discourse itself but in its setting not only was the
discourse charged with dissent and desire for change (current unemployment rates in Tunisia
were recorded to be at an approximate 14.2%)13, but it was incubated within an already firmly
established institution. In this case, the institution was the Tunisian General Union of Workers
(UGTT). Though often overlooked as an instigative force in the mass revolutions (Jamie
Allinson notes the vast discrepancy between the focus on Islam and secularism
opposed to that upon trade unions and labour movements within Stepans article on
Tunisia), the UGTTT played the most significant role in anti-colonial struggle of any Arab
stateit would be almost impossible to find another organization not even the Islamist
Nahda party, which was relatively marginal at the beginning of the revolt that played as
consistently significant a role as the UGTT14. Serving as not only an instigative force, the
UGTT also functioned as a conciliatory one, mediating between the plurality of ideological
groups invested in the revolution and earning itself a nomination from the Norwegian Nobel
Committee for the 2014 Nobel Peace Prize.

12

Anderson, Lisa: Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya
(2011).
13
Al-Rawashdeh, Rami; Sl-Nawafleh, Hani; and Al-Shboul, Mohammad: Understanding Oil and Mineral
Resources in a Political Economy Context: The Case of the Middle East and North Africa (Mena) (2013). p. 14.
14
Allinson, Jamie: Class Forces, Transition, and the Arab Uprisings: A Comparison of Tunisia, Egypt, and
Syria (2015). p. 4-5.

In addition to the UGTT, two other political forces proved to extremely conducive
to overall democratization efforts. The predominant Islamist political party, Ennahda, and
those operating in the name of secular liberalism had long set the stage for democratic future
a full eight years before the Ben Ali ouster15. Though initially backed by a far more extreme
political ideology, Ennahda took on a much more moderate approached as it began to
develop, winning a total 37.04 of the popular vote16 and 41% of eligible seats17 to form a
coalition government with the secular opposition in Tunisias October 2011 elections. Party
leader Ali Laarayedh later stepped down in January 2014 to make way for the neutral interim
government who shall oversee the final drafting of the constitution under which the next
elections shall operate. In essence, though their views were by no means reconciled, Tunisian
Islamists and secularists were able to convene on (near) neutral terms, rather than opting to
perpetuate the custom of an antagonistic relationship.
Though a non-oil country, Tunisia was a recipient of certain forms of externally
generated rents as noted in the previous section (Economic Settings: Rentierism and the Rentier
State), particularly as worker remittances and foreign aid from Gulf countries18. However, the
ratio of non-oil exports to oil exports and other rents was such that I have found the rentier
effect to have been largely prohibited from producing a potent impact upon the country.

Egypt:
Having experienced a rollercoaster of progression and regression since the 2011
Mubarak ouster, Egypt has developed into a fitting representation of the third course of
15

Linz, Juan J. and Stepan, Alfred: Democratization Theory and the Arab Spring (2013). p.
Decree of 23 Nov. 2011 about the Final Results of the National Constituent Assembly Elections (in Arabic).
(2011).
17
Bay, Austin: Tunisia and its Islamists: The Revolution, Phase Two. Real Clear Politics (Nov 30, 2011).
18
Al-Rawashdeh, Sl-Nawafleh, and Al-Shboul,.
16

Dahlian polyarchal development. The route is one, Dahl postulates, characterized by mixed
or temporarily favourable conditions for democratization, in turn producing an unstable
polyarchy which may face one of three possible end outcomes: (i) a polyarchal collapse, (ii) a
collapse followed by a more stable re-democratization process, or (iii) an oscillation between
polyarchy and nonpolyarchy for an indeterminate period of time19. Considering the 2013
coup detat that saw the ousting of president Morsi not more than two years after that of
Mubarak, Egypts future seems indeed to be quite oscillatory. It is not so much the purpose
of this paper, however, to attempt to anticipate the trajectory of Egypts political
development as it is to identify the precedent conditions contributing to the oscillation.
In terms of applying our knowledge of the rentier effect (in particular, the group
formation effect), we may note this: the intervention of Gulf oil states into Egypts postrevolution scene was extensive. With Qatar funding and supporting the Brotherhood on the
one hand, and Saudi Arabia backing the Salafi groups on the other, the influx of external
revenue was did not see even distribution among subaltern groups but was concentrated
upon the Egypts hegemonic circle. Empowering both the authoritarian-esque military force
and the Islamist elites, these revenues served not to bolster the Egyptian economy but to
obstruct the original revolutionary groups particularly those involved with the labour
movement from entering the political arena20. Thus, while initially host to an array of
groups including but not limited to the Lawyers Union, the Egyptian Trade Union
Federation, and the Workers Committee for National Liberation Egyptian pluralism within
the political sphere became greatly diluted while, as an inverse effect, power was
concentrated.
19

Dahl, Robert: How Polyarachy Developed in Some Countries and Not in Others in Democracy
and its Critics (Yale University Press, 1989).
20
Allinson.

As in Tunisia, a great deal of political power was split between the two forces
committed to ousting the current regime the Islamist and secular camps. The key
difference, however, lay in that unlike Tunisia in which we saw a conduct of communication
and coalition established years before the actual revolution, the two groups had not met until
a full four months after the Mubarak ouster to discuss democratic governing alternatives21.
The bitter contention between the two parties eventually gave way to the chaotic protests
against Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood on behalf of the secularists, and subsequent
protests against the Egyptian military by the Islamists. Set in political stability, the 2013 coup
detat was by no means a peoples revolution but a forceful military takeover and no solution
to the political and cultural rife inhibiting the country.

Algeria
Whereas in our previous case, the rentier effect served to severely handicap the
development of Egyptian civil society, its near-overbearing presence in Algeria proved to
have inverse consequences. To an extent, the Algerian case acts to substantiate the antithesis
of the theory that a heavy reliance upon oil wealth sets the stage for political instability in
the face of economic downturns. During the 1980s, Algeria was dependent on its oil and
gas sector for 98% of its foreign revenues22 in essence, the entire Algerian economy
centred around the distribution of oil and gas rents. When the drop in the price of oil
significantly reduced the resources available, the ensuing economic crisis hit the population
very hard and the cost-cutting measures the regime had to undertake to face the recession
made the situation even worse, leading to widespread demands for change23. With this,
21

Linz and Stepan.

Cavatorta. p. 331.
23
Ibid.
22

president Bendjedid was in a way shoehorned into liberalizing the Algerian political sphere,
opening the door into a multi-party system. It is here, with the beginnings of a pluralist civil
society that Algeria lay the groundwork for democratic potential. Though beyond the
Bendjedid regime Algeria has retained the same presidency in Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algeria
is now host to more than 40 legal political parties. The multi-party presence truly came into
play with the Arab Spring uprising, with a core group of left-wing parties and unions
notably, Algerian League for Human Rights, the Party of Liberty and Justice, and the
Democratic and Social Movement organizing to form the Coordination Nationale pour le
changement et la Dmocratie, which took the lead in coordinating a significant portion of
Algerian protests24.
While nodding to the success of the secularization of Algerias pseudo-democracy, it
is worthy to note the cultural tension underlying the political sphere. With the Front Islamique
du Salut (FIS) garnering great success in 1990s legitimate democratic elections, the military
intervened in a coup instigated by secular and liberal forces25. It is here where branches of
radical Islam began to develop in Algeria26. With the military delegitimizing the integrity of
the Algerian democracy, more moderate divisions of Islamist political groups have altogether
abstained from participation in the political process, claiming election results to be rigged27.
Coupled with the rising tensions accompanying the cultural divide between francophone
intellectual elites and Islamist Algerians (with great interest, we may look to the dichotomy
between the Arabic-taught literature courses and the more opportunistic French-taught
science and technology courses within the Algerian university system), I would assert that
24

"''Le FFS estime que la concertation doit sapprofondir et ventuellement slargir lavenir'' (Jan
22, 2011) ". Ffs1963.unblog.fr.
25
Cavatorta.
26
Takeyh, Ray: Islamism in Algeria: A Struggle Between Hope and Agony (Summer 2003).
www.cfr.org.
27
Ibid.

the radical disunion hints at an underlying resentment and potential for political instability
for Algerias future.

Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, it has been made apparent that the democratic performance of a given
state is very much dependent upon a myriad of interconnected variables which underlie the
transitory period in pursuit of a democratized state. From my research, I have found the
robustness, diversity, and overall functionality of a states civil society to be the greatest
determinate in regards to its democratic performance. While a high degree of pluralism is
necessary to fulfill the mandate of a polyarchal state, it appears to me that this plurality
despite the ideological differences characterizing its component groups must operate in
cohesive pursuit of a democratic state. As displayed in Tunisia, each group must commit to
(for lack of a better phrase) playing by the rules of the agreed upon system. While party
interests are indeed of great importance, the ultimate end goal must be the upholding of
democratic structure.
While maintaining emphasis on the great importance of civil society, it is not my
intention to diminish the impact of our other variables. In fact, as we have found, the form
of a civil society is very much reliant upon the influences of the state of its economic setting
and social settings. As noted, unregulated rentierism serves to provide a dramatically
damaging effect on the development of a robust civil society, placating the mass populace
and preventing the formation of an autonomous middle class. As professed at the beginning
of this paper, I hope that with the completion of our examination I have provided a clear
picture as to the democratic performances of our case studies.

Works Cited
1. Allinson, Jamie: Class Forces, Transition, and the Arab Uprisings: A Comparison of Tunisia, Egypt,
and Syria (2015). p. 4-5.
2. Al-Rawashdeh, Rami; Sl-Nawafleh, Hani; Al-Shboul, Mohammad: Understanding Oil and
Mineral Resources in a Political Economy Context: The Case of the Middle East and North Africa
(Mena) (2013). p. 14.
3. Anderson, Lisa: Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and
Libya (2011).
4. Bay, Austin: Tunisia and its Islamists: The Revolution, Phase Two. Real Clear Politics (Nov 30,
2011).
5. Cavatorta, Francesco: The Middle East and North Africa in Routeledge Handbook of
Democratization. ed. Jeffery Haynes (Routelege, 2012).
6. Dahl, Robert: Democracy and its Critics (1989).
7. Entelis, John: Abandoning Reformist Islam, Democracy at Large 1 (2004).
8. Fitzgerald, Nicole: A Comparative Assessment of the Democratic Performances of Tunisia, Egypt, and
Algeria (2015).
9. Linz, Juan J.; Stepan, Alfred: Democratization Theory and the Arab Spring (2013). p.
10. Ross, Michael L.: Does Oil Hinder Democracy? (2001).
11. Takeyh, Ray: Islamism in Algeria: A Struggle Between Hope and Agony (Summer 2003).
www.cfr.org.
12. Decree of 23 Nov. 2011 about the Final Results of the National Constituent Assembly Elections (in
Arabic). (2011).