MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.

,
G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Doctrine: Social Justice
LAUREL, J.:
Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to
recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications that animaldrawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of
one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street
to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940
recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of th
e provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director
with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and re
gulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval

of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the
recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting
Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules
and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed
to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an
unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to
personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the
well-being and economic security of all the people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and
avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the
public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the
desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety.
Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the
state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this
fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over
authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be
made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery.

The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government
of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or
extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi
estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.

DEL MAR vs PAGCORRaoul Del Mar vs Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, et.
Al.G.R. No. 138298 June 19, 2001
FACTS
Raoul del Mar
ISSUE
PAGCOR filed a motion for reconsideration seeking to reverse the decision of the court which
enjoined(cease and desist order; prohibit) PAGCOR from managing, maintaining and operating
jai-alai games andfrom enforcing the agreement entered into by them for that purpose.Whether or
not PAGCOR has a franchise to operate jai-alai.
HELD
The SC denied the motions for reconsideration due to lack of required number of votes
because only 7 justices voted to grant the motions.Opinions of Justices:PUNO Justice Puno
denied the motion for reconsideration of PAGCOR. PD 1869 is an express amendment of
PDs1067-A, 1067-B, 1067-C, 1399 and 1622. It is clear in the PAGCOR charter that it does not

include thosegames of chance covered by an existing franchise. Since Jai Alai has an existing
franchise to operate. Itcould not have been the intent of Congress to grant franchises to operate
jai-alai to 2 entities within thesame jurisdiction. PD 1869 suffers from the vice of vagueness
since PAGCOR had to seek the legalopinions of not just 1 but several government agencies. To
begin with, PAGCOR was not authorized tocentralize and integrate all games of chance that
have existing franchises. And the repeal of PD 810 didnot have any effect on the franchise of
PAGCOR. In contending that jai-alai is impliedly included in Section10 of PD 1869, PAGCOR is
suggesting that
an illegal act may be legalized by mere implication of law

TATEL VS. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC

Facts:

Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena,

Municipality of Virac. Complaints were received by the municipality
concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing
machine inside petitioner's warehouse. A committee was then appointed by
the municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that
an accidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to
the lives and properties of the people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29
was then passed by the Municipal council declaring said warehouse as a
public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code.
According to respondent municipal officials, petitioner's warehouse was
constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the
construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or
barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said
block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On
the other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is
unconstitutional.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner's warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning
Article
694
of
the
Civil
Code
(2) Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of
Virac
is
unconstitutional
and
void.

Held: The storage of

abaca and copra in petitioner's warehouse is a

nuisance under the provisions of Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the same
time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the
exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the criteria for a valid
municipal ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute,
2) must not be unfair or oppressive, 3) must not be partial or discriminatory,
4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade, 5) must be general and
consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. The purpose
of the said ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire
which is one of the primordial obligation of government. The lower court did
not err in its decision.

G.R. No. L-5279

October 31, 1955

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, ETC., petitioner, vs.

SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF TEXTBOOKS, respondents.
Manuel C. Briones, Vicente G. Sinco, Manuel V. Gallego and Enrique M. Fernando for
petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Assistant Solicitor
General Francisco Carreon for respondents.
FACTS:
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made a petition that Acts No.
2706 otherwise known as the Act making the Inspection and Recognition of private
schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction and was
amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared
unconstitutional on the grounds that 1) the act deprives the owner of the school and
colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process
of Law; 2) it will also deprive the parents of their Natural Rights and duty to rear
their children for civic efficiency and 3) its provisions conferred on the Secretary of
Education unlimited powers and discretion to prescribe rules and standards
constitute towards unlawful delegation of Legislative powers.

Section 1 of Act No. 2706

It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general
standard of efficiency in all private schools and colleges of the Philippines so that
the same shall furnish adequate instruction to the public, in accordance with the
class and grade of instruction given in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or
his duly authorized representative shall have authority to advise, inspect, and
regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the efficiency of instruction
given in the same,
The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary of Education
before opening a school is not originally included in the original Act 2706. And in
support to the first proposition of the petitioners they contended that the
Constitution guaranteed the right of a citizen to own and operate a school and any
law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could
exercise the said right On the other hand, the defendant Legal Representative
submitted a memorandum contending that 1) the matters presented no justiciable
controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional
question; 2) Petitioners are in estoppels to challenge the validity of the said act and
3) the Act is constitutionally valid. Thus, the petition for prohibition was dismissed
by the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075 and Commonwealth Act
no. 180 may be declared void and unconstitutional?
RATIO DECIDENTI:
The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no relief in the
form they seek to obtain. Moreover, there is no justiciable controversy presented
before the court. It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual
immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury and it is not sufficient that he has
merely invoke the judicial power to determined the validity of executive and
legislative action he must show that he has sustained common interest to all
members of the public. Furthermore, the power of the courts to declare a law
unconstitutional arises only when the interest of litigant require the use of judicial
authority for their protection against actual interference. As such, Judicial Power is
limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies and the authority to pass
on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decisions of such cases where
conflicting claims under the constitution and under the legislative act assailed as
contrary to the constitution but it is legitimate only in the last resort and it must be
necessary to determined a real and vital controversy between litigants. Thus,
actions like this are brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual positive relief
and the court does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic question to satisfy
scholarly interest therein. The court however, finds the defendant position to be
sufficiently sustained and state that the petitioner remedy is to challenge the
regulation not to invalidate the law because it needs no argument to show that
abuse by officials entrusted with the execution of the statute does not per se
demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute. On this phase of the litigation

the court conclude that there has been no undue delegation of legislative power
even if the petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the
Department of Education they fail to indicate which of such official documents was
constitutionally objectionable for being capricious or pain nuisance. Therefore, the
court denied the petition for prohibition.