REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.

PLDT, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011
26 SCRA 620 (1969) (Constitutional Law Eminent Domain, Expropriation,
Just Compensation)
FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent
praying for the right of the Bureau of Telecommunications to demand
interconnection between the Government Telephone System and that of
PLDT, so that the Government Telephone System could make use of the
lines and facilities of the PLDT. Private respondent contends that it cannot
be compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between
them.
ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government
Telephone System can be a valid object for expropriation.
HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the
Republic may require the telephone company to permit interconnection as
the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of
just compensation. The use of lines and services to allow inter-service
connection between the both telephone systems, through expropriation can
be a subject to an easement of right of way.

Percival Moday vs Court of Appeals

68 SCRA 586 Political Law Municipal Corporation Eminent Domain

Disapproval by SP of SB Resolution
Percival Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the mayor
to initiate an expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion of Modays
land. Purpose of which was to erect a gymnasium and other public
buildings. The mayor approved the resolution and the resolution was
transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved the said
resolution ruling that the expropriation is not necessary because there are

other lots owned by Bunawan that can be used for such purpose. The
mayor pushed through with the expropriation nonetheless.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by
virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
HELD: Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan
exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is
inseparable from sovereignty. It is governments right to appropriate, in the
nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or
purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of
eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other
public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the
government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be
just compensation. The only ground upon which a provincial board may
declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such
resolution, ordinance, or order is beyond the powers conferred upon the
council or president making the same. This was not the case in the case at
bar as the SP merely stated that there are other available lands for the
purpose sought, the SP did not even bother to declare the SB resolution as
invalid. Hence, the expropriation case is valid.

De dlana vs. alba

Posted by kaye lee on 12:18 PM

GR No. L-57883 March 12 1982
FACTS:
De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for
Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice
from taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that
Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except
the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless
appointed to the inferior courts established by such act, would be
considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of
their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of this
character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure
provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of
justices and judges as provided for under the Constitution.
RULING:
What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of
the judges and justices from their services. What is important is
the validity of the abolition of their offices.
Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not
amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that,
in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.

Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid

abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent
office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of
removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby
lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of
strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure
does not arise.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1

Norton vs. Shelby County118 U.S. 425 May 10, 1886

Facts:A case was filed before the Tennessee Court, questioning the action upon
twenty-ninebonds of $1,000 each, alleged to be the bonds of Shelby County,
Tennessee, issued on the first of March, 1869, and payable on the first of January,
1873, with interest from January 1, 1869 at 6percent per annum; and three coupons
of $60 each. Plaintiffs contend that the commissionerswho issued to them the said
bonds were lawful officers, thereby authorized to bind the county tothe legal
obligations of the bonds. However, the defendants contend that such
commissionerswere not lawful officers, thereby absolving them from the legal
obligations of the bonds, and thatthere was no office in Tennessee as that of a
county commissioner, and thereby rendering theissued bonds as void. Also they
challenged the statutes that commissioned the commissioners,particularly the act of
March 9, 1867 which provides for the creation of the board of commissioners in
issuing the bonds, as unconstitutional.
Issue:Whether or not the act of March 9, 1867 is unconstitutional, therefore
rendering thecommissioned officers as illegally appointed.
Held:The Tennessee high court rendered the act of March 9, 1867 unconstitutional.
Thecreation of the board of commissioners also confers the powers of the justices
of the peace of thecounty court, and such a provision is unconstitutional and void,
since these powers shall beexercised only by the justices.
It is difficult to meet it by any argument beyond thisstatement: An unconstitutional act is
not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; itaffords no protection; it creates no
office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative asthough it had never been passed.
The Supreme Court affirmed this decision. However, it said that even if
thecommissioners were not appointed de jure, they were working de facto, thus
still providinglawful authority. It is contended that if the act creating the board was
void, and thecommissioners were not officers de jure, they were nevertheless
officers de facto, and that theacts of the board as a de facto court are binding upon
the county. This contention is met by thefact that there can be no officer, either de
jure or de facto, if there be no office to fill

Centeno vs. Pernillos and People (G.R. No. 113092. September

01, 1994)
25APR
MARTIN CENTENO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10, and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Santiago V. Marcos, Jr. for petitioner.
Ponente: REGALADO J.
FACTS:
Respondent Judge filed a case against petitioner in violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial
Court (criminal case). Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on
the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense,
claiming that Presidential Decree No. 1564 only covers solicitations made
for charitable or public welfare purposes, but not those made for a religious
purpose such as the construction of a chapel. This was denied by the trial
court, and petitioners motion for reconsideration having met the same fate,
trial on the merits ensued. Trial court found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. The motion for reconsideration of the decision was
denied by the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the phrase charitable purposes should be construed in its
broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose.
HELD:
NO. Decision appealed was reversed and set aside. Petitioner was
acquitted.
RATIO:
[S]olicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by
the State in the exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar,
considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within
the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated,
petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor.

[I]t is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly

against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. They are not to be
extended or enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies or equitable
considerations.
[I]t is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention
of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is
expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may
not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule
proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made
specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its
meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994

Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos
G.R. No. 113092
September 1, 1994
KTA: Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation
by the State in the exercise of police power. The State has authority under
the exercise of its police power to determine whether or not there shall be
restrictions on soliciting by unscrupulous persons or for unworthy causes or
for fraudulent purposes. Certainly the solicitation of contributions in good
faith for worthy purposes should not be denied, but somewhere should be
lodged the power to determine within reasonable limits the worthy from the
unworthy.

Facts:
This petition is an appeal on the decision of the Trial Court convicting
Centeno and Yco for violating P.D. 1564 known as the Solicitation Permit
Law when they both solicited money for the renovation of their chapel
without a permit from the DSWD.
In 1985, the petitioners, officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng
Tikay, launched a fund drive for the renovation of their chapel in Bulacan.
The petitioners approached and solicited from Judge Adoracion G.
Angeles, a resident of Tikay, a contribution of P1,500.00. The solicitation
was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD). Hon. Angeles filed a complaint against the
petitioners for violation of P.D. 1564 known as the Soliciation Permit Law.
P.D. 1564 provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to
solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public welfare

purposes shall first secure a permit from the Regional Offices of the
Department of Social Services and Development as provided in the
Integrated Reorganization Plan.
In 1992, the trial court found the petitioners guilty of violating the
Solicitation Permit Law.
In this instant case, the petitioners assert among others that the term
religious purpose is not expressly included in the provisions of the statute,
hence what the law does not include, it excludes.

Issue: Whether or not the phrase charitable purposes should be

construed in the broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose.

Held/Ratio:
The 1987 Constitution and other statutes treat the words charitable and
religious separately and independently of each other.
In P.D. 1564, it merely stated charitable or public welfare purposes which
means that it was not the intention of the framers of the law to include
solicitations for religious purposes. The world religious purpose is not
interchangeable with the expression charitable purpose.
The acts of the petitioners cannot be punished under the said law because
the law does not contemplate solicitation for religious purposes.
The solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation
by the State in the exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar,
considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within
the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated,
petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor.
The decision appealed from is reversed and set aside, and
petitioner Martin Centeno is acquitted of the offense charged.

Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes

Facts: The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the Court of First
Instance of Cebu City for theexpropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling
land situated in barangay Alubog and Babag, Cebu City, under PTAsexpress
authority to acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings
any private land withinand without the tourist zones for the purposes indicated in
Section 5, paragraph B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD564). The heirs of Juancho
Ardona et. Al, ) filed their oppositions, and had a common allegation in that the
taking isallegedly not impressed with public use under the Constitution; alleging
that there is no specific constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private
property for tourism purposes; that assuming that PTA has such power,the intended
use cannot be paramount to the determination of the land as a land reform area;
that limiting the amountof compensation by legislative fiat is constitutionally
repugnant; and that since the land is under the land reform program, it is the Court
of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First Instance (CFI), that has
jurisdiction over theexpropriation cases. The Philippine Tourism Authority having
deposited with the Philippine National Bank, CebuCity Branch, an amount
equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 1533,the lower court issued separate orders authorizing PTA to take immediate
possession of the premises and directingthe issuance of writs of possession. The
Heirs of Ardona, et. al. then filed a petition for certiorari with preliminaryinjunction
before the Supreme Court
.Issue: Whether the expropriation of parcels of land for the purpose of constructing
a sports complex by thePhilippine Tourism Authority be considered taking for
public use.
Held: The states power of eminent domain extends to the expropriation of land for
tourism purposes although thisspecific objective is not expressed in the
constitution. The policy objectives of the framers can be expressed only ingeneral
terms such as social justice, local autonomy, conservation and development of the
national patrimony publicinterest, and general welfare, among others. The
programs to achieve these objectives vary from time to time andaccording to place.
To freeze specific programs like tourism into express provisions would make the

constitutionmore prolix than bulky code and require of the framers a prescience
beyond Delphic proportions. The particular mention in the constitution of agrarian
reform and transfer of utilities and other private enterprises to publicownership
merely underscores the magnitude of the problems sought to be remedied by this
programs. They do not preclude nor limit the exercise of the power of eminent
domain for the purposes like tourism and other development program

Republic vs. La Orden De PP. Benedictinos De

Filipinas, G.R. No. L-12792, February 28, 1961
The Power of Eminent Domain
To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda Street, the Government
drew plans to extend Azcarraga street from its junction with Mendiola street, up to
the Sta. Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila.
The petitioner in this case is the Republic of the Philippines through the Office
of the Solicitor General; and the respondent is La Orden de PP. Benedictinos
de Filipinas, a domestic religious corporation that owns the San Beda
College.

Facts: To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda Street, the
Government drew plans to extend Azcarraga St. (now Recto) from its junction
with Mendiola St., up to the Sta. Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila. To carry out this

plan it offered to buy a portion of approximately 6,000 square meters of a

bigger parcel belonging to La Orden situated on Mendiola St. Not having been able
to reach an agreement on the matter with the owner, the Government instituted an
expropriation proceeding. On May 27, 1957 the trial court valued the property in
question at P270,000.00 and authorized appellant to take immediate possession
upon depositing said amount. The deposit having been made with the City
Treasurer of Manila, the trial court issued the corresponding order directing the
Sheriff of Manila to place appellant in possession of the property aforesaid.
In answer, the herein appellee filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the
grounds that: (1) the property sought to be expropriated is already dedicated to
public use and therefore is not subject to expropriation; (2) there is no necessity for
the proposed expropriation; (3) the proposed Azcarraga Extension could pass
through a different site which would entail less expense to the Government and
which would not necessitate the expropriation of a property dedicated to education.
The trial court granted the motion, holding that the expropriation was not of
extreme necessity. Hence this present petition.

Issue: Whether or not there is a genuine necessity for the exercise of the Power of
Eminent Domain.

Held: It is the rule in this jurisdiction that private property may be expropriated for
public use and upon payment of just compensation; that condemnation of private
property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine necessity
therefor of a public character. Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire
into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine
whether or not there is a genuine necessity therefor.
It does not need extended argument to show that whether or not the proposed
opening of the Azcarraga extension is a necessity in order to relieve the daily
congestion of traffic on Legarda St., is a question of fact dependent not only upon
the facts of which the trial court very liberally took judicial notice but also up on
other factors that do not appear of record and must, therefore, be established by
means of evidence. The parties should have been given an opportunity to
present their respective evidence upon these factors and others that might be
of direct or indirect help in determining the vital question of fact involved, namely,
the need to open the extension of Azcarraga street to ease and solve the traffic
congestion on Legarda street.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is set aside and the present
case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with
this decision.

PLDT vs NTC
G.R. No. 88404 October 18, 1990
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO. [PLDT], petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND CELLCOM,
INC., (EXPRESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS CO., INC. [ETCI]),
respondents.
EN BANC
Facts:
There are two (2) Orders, namely, Order of 12 December 1988 granting
private respondent Express Telecommunications Co., Inc. (ETCI) provisional
authority to install, operate and maintain a Cellular Mobile Telephone System
in Metro-Manila (Phase A) in accordance with specified conditions; and the
Order, dated 8 May 1988, denying reconsideration, enacted by the
respondent National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) but assailed by
petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).
ETCI filed an application with NTC for the issuance of a Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) to construct, install, establish, operate
and maintain a Cellular Mobile Telephone System and an Alpha Numeric
Paging System in Metro Manila and in the Southern Luzon regions, with a
prayer for provisional authority to operate Phase A of its proposal within
Metro Manila.
But in an Order, dated 12 November 1987, NTC overruled PLDT's Opposition
and declared that Rep. Act No. 2090 (1958) should be liberally construed as
to include among the services under said franchise the operation of a cellular
mobile telephone service.
After evaluating the reconsideration sought by PLDT, the NTC, in October
1988, maintained its ruling that liberally construed, applicant's franchise
carries with it the privilege to operate and maintain a cellular mobile
telephone service.
In a "Motion to Set Aside the Order" granting provisional authority, PLDT
alleged essentially that the interconnection ordered was in violation of due
process and that the grant of provisional authority was jurisdictionally and
procedurally infirm.

PLDT urges the Court to annul the NTC Orders of 12 December 1988 and 8
May 1989 and to order ETCI to desist from, suspend, and/or discontinue any
and all acts intended for its implementation.
Issues:
1. Whether the status and coverage of Rep. Act No. 2090 includes franchise;
2. Whether there is transfer of shares of stock of a corporation in holding a
CPCN; and
3. Whether there is a need to merge principle and procedure of
interconnection.
Held:
There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of NTC, upon the following
considerations:
1. NTC Jurisdiction
The NTC is the regulatory agency of the national government with jurisdiction
over alltelecommunications entities. It is legally clothed with authority and
given ample discretion to grant a provisional permit or authority. In fact, NTC
may, on its own initiative, grant such relief even in the absence of a motion
from an applicant.
What the NTC granted was such a provisional authority, with a definite expiry
period of eighteen (18) months unless sooner renewed, and which may be
revoked, amended or revised by the NTC. It is also limited to Metro Manila
only.
What is more, the main proceedings are clearly to continue as stated in the
NTC Order of 8 May 1989.
The provisional authority was issued after due hearing, reception of evidence
and evaluation, with the hearings attended by various oppositors, including
PLDT. It was granted only after a prima facie showing that ETCI has the
necessary legal, financial, and technical capabilities and that public interest,
convenience, and necessity so demanded.
Hence, the final outcome of the application rests within the exclusive
prerogative of the NTC. Whether or not a CPCN would eventually issue would
depend on the evidence to be presented during the hearings still to be
conducted, and only after a full evaluation of the proof thus presented.
2. The Coverage of ETCI's Franchise
Rep. Act No. 2090 grants ETCI (formerly FACI) "the right and privilege of
constructing, installing, establishing and operating in the entire Philippines
radio stations for reception and transmission of messages on radio stations
in the foreign and domestic public fixed point-to-point and public base,
aeronautical and land mobile stations, ... with the corresponding relay
stations for the reception and transmission of wireless messages on
radiotelegraphy and/or radiotelephony ...." PLDT maintains that the scope of
the franchise is limited to "radio stations" and excludes telephone services

such as the establishment of the proposed Cellular Mobile Telephone System

(CMTS). However, in its Order of 12 November 1987, the NTC construed the
technical term "radiotelephony" liberally as to include the operation of a
cellular mobile telephone system.
3. The Status of ETCI Franchise
PLDT alleges that the ETCI franchise had lapsed into nonexistence for failure
of the franchise holder to begin and complete construction of the radio
system authorized under the franchise as explicitly required in Section 4 of
its franchise, Rep. Act No. 2090.
More importantly, PLDT's allegation partakes of a Collateral attack on a
franchise Rep. Act No. 2090), which is not allowed.
A franchise is a property right and cannot be revoked or forfeited without due
process of law. The determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise,
or whether the right to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is
more properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto, the right
to assert which, as a rule, belongs to the State "upon complaint or otherwise"
(Sections 1, 2 and 3, Rule 66, Rules of Court), 2 the reason being that the
abuse of a franchise is a public wrong and not a private injury. A forfeiture of
a franchise will have to be declared in a direct proceeding for the purpose
brought by the State because a franchise is granted by law and its unlawful
exercise is primarily a concern of Government.
4. ETCI's Stock Transactions
ETCI admits that in 1964, the Albertos, as original owners of more than 40%
of the outstanding capital stock sold their holdings to the Orbes. In 1968, the
Albertos re-acquired the shares they had sold to the Orbes. In 1987, the
Albertos sold more than 40% of their shares to Horacio Yalung. Thereafter,
the present stockholders acquired their ETCI shares. Moreover, in 1964, ETCI
had increased its capital stock from P40,000.00 to P360,000.00; and in 1987,
from P360,000.00 to P40M.
In other words, transfers of shares of a public utility corporation need only
NTC approval, not Congressional authorization. What transpired in ETCI were
a series of transfers of shares starting in 1964 until 1987. But again, whether
ETCI has offended against a provision of its franchise, or has subjected it to
misuse or abuse, may more properly be inquired into in quo warranto
proceedings instituted by the State. It is the condition of every franchise that
it is subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal when the common good so
requires (1987 Constitution, Article XII, Section 11).
5. The NTC Interconnection Order
In the provisional authority granted by NTC to ETCI, one of the conditions
imposed was that the latter and PLDT were to enter into an interconnection
agreement to be jointly submitted to NTC for approval.
Rep. Act No. 6849, or the Municipal Telephone Act of 1989, approved on 8
February 1990, mandates interconnection providing as it does that "all
domestic telecommunications carriers or utilities ... shall be interconnected
to the public switch telephone network." Such regulation of the use and
ownership of telecommunications systems is in the exercise of the plenary

police power of the State for the promotion of the general welfare.
The importance and emphasis given to interconnection dates back to
Ministry Circular No. 82-81, dated 6 December 1982; Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC) Circular No. 87-188, issued in
1987; The sharing of revenue was an additional feature considered in DOTC
Circular No. 90-248, dated 14 June 1990, laying down the "Policy on
Interconnection and Revenue Sharing by Public Communications Carriers."
The NTC order to interconnect allows the parties themselves to discuss and
agree upon the specific terms and conditions of the interconnection
agreement instead of the NTC itself laying down the standards of
interconnection which it can very well impose. Thus it is that PLDT cannot
justifiably claim denial of clue process. It has been heard. It will continue to
be heard in the main proceedings.
6. Ultimate Considerations
The decisive considerations are public need, public interest, and the common
good. Those were the overriding factors which motivated NTC in granting
provisional authority to ETCI.
Free competition in the industry may also provide the answer to a muchdesired improvement in the quality and delivery of this type of public utility,
to improved technology, fast and handy mobile service, and reduced user
dissatisfaction. After all, neither PLDT nor any other public utility has a
constitutional right to a monopoly position in view of the Constitutional
proscription that no franchise certificate or authorization shall be exclusive in
character or shall last longer than fifty (50) years.
Ruling:
There is no grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of or excess of
jurisdiction, on the part of the NTC in issuing its challenged Orders of 12
December 1988 and 8 May 1989 in NTC Case No. 87-39, and this Petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.