Analysis

July 30, 2015

Summary: As the dramatic

suicide bombing in Suru on
July 20 confirmed, Turkey is
increasingly exposed to the
self-proclaimed Islamic State
(ISIS) and ISIS-inspired attacks
on its own territory. Ankara now
sees an opportunity to create a
buffer zone, to roll-back ISIS from
areas close to Turkey, but also
to limit the freedom of action of
PKK-affiliated Kurdish groups
in Syria, and perhaps to help
manage the steadily mounting
problem of Syrian refugees
entering Turkey. With regard to
ISIS and the PKK, Turkey will
seek reassurance from its NATO
allies, and will regard solidarity
on these threats as a key test
of Alliance commitments. At
the same time, NATO allies will
be sensitive to the question
of priorities in Turkeys crossborder strategy. After years
of ambivalence in strategic
cooperation, Ankara may finally
have turned to a coalition
approach with its key security
guarantors.

OFFICES

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Turkey at War?
by Ian O. Lesser

Introduction
Since the start of the conflict in
Syria indeed since the start of the
Arab revolutions Turkish and
foreign observers have focused on
the collapse of the regional order and
its implications for Turkish security.
For the most part, these analyses
have assumed that Turkey could
hold direct security threats at armslength, while continuing to pursue
an active and sometimes less than
transparent strategy on its eastern
and southern borders. Recent events
have made clear that these assumptions were unfounded. As the dramatic
suicide bombing in Suru on July
20 confirmed, Turkey is increasingly exposed to the self-proclaimed
Islamic State (ISIS) and ISIS-inspired
attacks on its own territory. At the
same time, the collapse of the Kurdish
peace process and the renewed battle
with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers
Party) and other violent groups with
grievances against the Turkish state
illustrates the extent to which Turkeys
internal scene remains troubled and
insecure. These external and domestic
challenges are likely to have significant
consequences for Ankaras key security
partners in the West. In particular,
the dramatic change in the character
of U.S.-Turkish cooperation on Syria,

including the use of Incirlik Air Base

for offensive air operations for the
first time in over 20 years, raises some
critical open questions for all sides.
External Threats,
Domestic Insecurity
In many respects, it is surprising that
Turkey has managed to hold the threat
of ISIS attacks inside Turkey at armslength for so long. Several possible
explanations can be offered for this
apparent immunity, despite the battles
raging just across the border in Syria
and Iraq, and despite the substantial
flow of foreign fighters from Europe
and elsewhere destined for these
theaters. First, the Justice and Development Party (AKParty) governments
political support for Islamist movements across the Middle East since
the start of the Arab revolutions has
given Islamist radicals little cause for
animosity toward Ankara. Second,
as a practical matter, ISIS and its
recruiters would have had little reason
to spur a tougher Turkish approach
to the flow of foreign fighters across
Turkeys permeable borders. Third,
and much more difficult to assess, is
the possibility that some sort of tacit
understanding was in place, perhaps
dating to the release of Turkish diplo-

Analysis
mats and other hostages held in ISIS-controlled territory.
Fourth, it is possible that the ISIS-related threat in Turkey
was always greater than it appeared, even in the absence of
dramatic terrorist incidents. Turkey itself has been a source
of recruitment for ISIS, together with Muslim communities
across Europe.
The number of arrests in the wake of the Suru bombing
suggests the potential extent of support for ISIS among
disaffected and radicalized individuals inside Turkey. As
Turkey becomes more deeply involved in the battle against
ISIS, with its own forces, and via coalition access to Turkish
bases, the risk of new terrorist attacks, whether in border
areas or in the major cities of western Turkey, will surely
grow. Here, Turkey will be fully in the European mainstream when it comes to facing the problems of radicalization and terrorism. It is worth recalling that Turkey has had
long experience with the struggle against terrorism, from
the radical left and right, from the PKK and related groups
as well as from Islamic extremists. Counter-terrorism for
much of the 1990s closely linked to friction with Syria
has been the center of gravity for Turkish security strategy
for most of the post-Cold War period (and arguably, even
during the Cold War).
During the 1990s, Turkey was drawn into repeated crossborder interventions against the PKK in northern Iraq. On
occasion, Ankara and Damascus came close to open conflict
over Syrias role as a safe haven for PKK militants. But on
the whole, Turkey has been a cautious actor in the Middle
East, and the Turkish military, in particular, has been wary
of cross-border operations. Historically, the threshold for
Turkish intervention has been high. That said, questions
of Turkish territorial integrity and security inside Turkish
territory are taken very seriously across the political spectrum. In this respect, the attack in Suru and the resurgence
of PKK attacks crossed an important psychological and
policy line. In both the anti-ISIS and anti-PKK contexts, the
distinction between external and internal security is necessarily unclear. Ankara now sees an opportunity to create
a zone free of forces aligned with Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad (Washington prefers to describe it as an ISIS-free
zone) inside the border with Syria. This is an opening for
Turkey to create a buffer zone, to roll-back ISIS from areas
close to Turkey, but also to limit the freedom of action of
PKK-affiliated Kurdish groups in Syria, and perhaps to help
2

manage the steadily mounting problem of Syrian refugees entering Turkey. (As many as 2 million refugees have
crossed into Turkey since the start of the Syrian conflict.)
If Turkey now faces an extended problem of chaos and
conflict on its borders, with Turks as targets, Turkish planners may well conclude that it is better to fight this battle on
Syrian and Iraqi territory.

If Turkey now faces an extended

problem of chaos and conflict
on its borders, with Turks as
targets, Turkish planners may well
conclude that it is better to fight
this battle on Syrian and Iraqi
territory.
The Fire Next Time
Nationalism and religion are potent forces on the Turkish
domestic scene. The June 7, 2015, elections made clear the
strength of these forces, as well as the vigor of opposing
tendencies, especially among disaffected Kurdish and
secular voters. In the uncertain negotiations over possible
coalition arrangements, and with the potential for new
elections, the AKParty leadership and others will be
strongly tempted to play the nationalist card. Elements of
this approach are already apparent in moves to discredit
HDP (the Peoples Democratic Party), tying its leadership to a failed Kurdish peace process and even to PKK
terrorism per se. This could end in the outright closure of
a party that has shaken up the political scene and deprived
the AKParty of majority rule. In both political and security terms, Turkey could be headed for a return to the
violent, confrontational atmosphere of Turkish-Kurdish
relations in the 1990s. If so, there is a risk that the conflict
will not be limited to southeastern Anatolia, but could
affect major cities elsewhere in Turkey, and more troubling

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

July 2015

Analysis
still, acquire a wider inter-communal character, pitting a
younger generation of nationalist Turks against radicalized Kurds. With large Turkish and Kurdish communities
spread across Europe, this friction may not be confined to
Turkey. To be sure, Turkish-Kurdish relations have not yet
acquired these dimensions, but continued escalation in the
conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state substantially
increases the risk of this scenario.
Against this backdrop, a secondary series of security
operations are unfolding, aimed at radical leftist groups
such as the Revolutionary Peoples Liberation Party/Front
(DHKP/C). Turkish officials note that some 600 terrorist
attacks of various kinds have occurred in Turkey since the
June elections, with at least 52 deaths and hundreds injured.
The effect of this rising atmosphere of internal insecurity on
Turkeys international connections, including investment
and tourism, is unclear. But if terrorist attacks and violent
confrontations increase, this will almost certainly have
an isolating effect, just as Turkeys once highly dynamic
economy is beginning to show signs of real strain.

If terrorist attacks and violent

confrontations increase, this will
almost certainly have an isolating
effect.
A convergence of perspectives on ISIS and counterterrorism between Ankara and its NATO and EU partners
should pay dividends in terms of practical cooperation
on intelligence sharing, the foreign fighter challenge, and
regional security. With regard to ISIS and the PKK, Turkey
will seek reassurance from its NATO allies, and will regard
solidarity on these threats as a key test of Alliance commitments. At the same time, NATO allies will be sensitive to
the question of priorities in Turkeys cross-border strategy.
The PKK is widely regarded as a terrorist organization, but
the fight against ISIS clearly is at the top of the agenda for
the United States and European allies, and both Washington
and Brussels remain attached to the idea of a political
3

dialogue on the Kurdish issue. Both perspectives were on

view in and around the extraordinary NATO Article IV
meeting held on July 28 at Ankaras request. In addition, the
morale and competence of Kurdish forces confronting ISIS
in the battle for Kobane and elsewhere has not been lost on
Western observers, and the Kurds in general now enjoy a
fair amount of international good will. The EU approach to
this question, while supportive of Ankara, is likely to lean
even further in the direction of a proportionate military
response to the PKK threat and the need for a parallel
political process.
Beyond the potential for friction with Europe over the
Kurdish issue, an open-ended Turkish engagement in the
conflicts raging in Syria and Iraq will likely place the question of Turkey-EU cooperation on foreign and security
policy at the center of the broader debate on Turkey-EU
relations. The pressure for coordination on this front,
long caught up in Turkeys troubled accession process, is
acquiring overwhelming importance. Among other things,
it could well influence the incentives and outlook for a
Cyprus settlement a source of perennial frustration but
now showing real signs of movement.
The New Turn in Turkish Security Cooperation
Ankaras agreement to the use of Incirlik and other Turkish
bases for strikes against ISIS in Syria is valuable in the
context of ongoing coalition operations. In terms of U.S.Turkish strategic cooperation, it is a potentially revolutionary development. The recent differences between
Washington and Ankara over access to Incirlik, and Syria
policy more generally, are well known and have been extensively discussed. Less widely noted is the significance of the
agreement in the context of several decades of friction over
U.S. use of the base. U.S. forces have used Incirlik on many
occasions for logistical and other purposes. But Ankara has
not allowed the use of the base for significant offensive air
operations since 1991, despite repeated requests by successive U.S. administrations, most notably in the context of the
Iraq war in 2003 (Incirlik was the principal base for Operations Provide Comfort and Northern Watch in the years
after the first Iraq war, but essentially to enforce a no-fly
zone rather than for ground attack missions).

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

July 2015

Analysis
The agreement over Incirlik is a major step, and not without
risks for a Turkish government facing steady pressure
over sovereignty issues. Why did Ankara agree? The short
answer is that Turkey appears to have gotten at least something of what it sought in terms of a de-facto buffer zone
across the border, together with political reassurance from
NATO allies. The longer, and perhaps more significant
answer is that Turkey is preparing for the possibility of a
very protracted, perhaps open-ended battle with Islamic
extremists, the PKK, and in a more diffuse sense, chaos on
its southern and eastern borders. The complex and durable
nature of these challenges effectively precludes, or should
preclude, a unilateral strategy. After years of ambivalence in
strategic cooperation and with the additional complication of a potential Western dtente with Iran on the horizon
Ankara may finally have turned to a coalition approach
with its key security guarantors.
Will this approach prove durable? Recent developments
raise a series of open questions. Despite the current agreement, the longer-term (even the short term?) balance of
strategic and operational priorities between Ankara and the
anti-ISIS coalition remains unclear. If the Turkish commitment to the anti-ISIS campaign proves secondary to the
campaign against the PKK, Ankaras partners in the United
States and Europe, and perhaps elsewhere, will complain.
If coalition operations from Incirlik appear to depart from
Turkish operational preferences, the political commitment
to the use of the base, and the wider structure of cooperation with Western partners, may not hold. Much will likely
depend on the ability to show some near-term success in
rolling back ISIS, and in securing a security zone across the
border. The effect on public and elite opinion of any new
terrorist attacks in Turkey is hard to predict, but would
surely be part of the equation. Above all, the commitment
of Turkey and its transatlantic partners will be tested by
engagement on this front measured in years rather than
months. Given prevailing conditions in the region, this is a
very real possibility.

The views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the

views of the author alone.

About the Author

Ian Lesser is Executive Director of the Transatlantic Center, the Brussels office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, where
he also directs foreign and security policy programs across GMF. The
opinions expressed here are the authors and do not represent the
views of GMF, its staff or directors.

About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens
transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges
and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF contributes
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relevant to policymakers. GMF offers rising leaders opportunities to
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About the On Turkey Series

GMFs On Turkey is an ongoing series of analysis briefs about Turkeys
current political situation and its future. GMF provides regular
analysis briefs by leading Turkish, European, and U.S. writers and
intellectuals, with a focus on dispatches from on-the-ground Turkish
observers. To access the latest briefs, please visit our web site at www.
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States

July 2015