Privacy Impact Assessment

Neoface Technology Facial Recognition

2014

PIA 29 10 2014

CONTENTS

Why Carry Out a Privacy Impact Assessment

Regulatory Considerations

The Need for Facial Recognition

Custody Images
NeoFace Facial Recognition Technology and the Impact on Privacy

4
5

Information Flow

Consultation

Privacy and Related Risks

Privacy Solutions

Security of the NeoFace System

Location

Management
Operators
Use of Neoface

10

Risk

11

Evaluation

12

Sign off

12

Integration of the PIA Outcomes Back into the Project Plan

12

Action to be Taken

12

Date for Completion of Actions

12

Appendix 1

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Privacy Impact Assessment for Facial Recognition

1

Why Carry Out a Privacy Impact Assessment

1.1

All processing of personal information must be undertaken within a clear legal

framework, resulting in the minimum intrusion of an individual's privacy.

1.2

The Police Service has a statutory duty under the Police Act 1996 and a duty at
Common Law to prevent, investigate and detect crime as well as safeguarding the
public. Clearly that duty requires the Force to introduce new methods and
technology to meet public expectations, but at the same time, ensuring such
methods and technology are in compliance with relevant legislation.

1.3

This Privacy Impact Assessment is an assessment of the privacy risks to individuals

resulting from the introduction of facial recognition technology to identify individuals
from images presented to it.

Regulatory Considerations

2.1

When processing personal information, the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) and the
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) must be adhered to. The DPA provides the
Conditions under which the processing of personal information can occur. The HRA
provides information around the privacy considerations which must be taken into
account when using personal information, including decisions around proportionality
and public interest.

2.2

Reference should also be made to the :

Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984

Common Law Duty of Confidentiality

Police Act 1997

Statutory Code of Practice for the Management of Police information 2006

and associated Guidance

The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000

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Common Law Duty of a Constable.

Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974

Policies, procedures and protocols Force and National

CCTV Code of Practice

Surveillance Camera Code of Practice

The Need for Facial Recognition

3.1

The facial recognition system is focused on the implementation of new technology to

enable the Force to identify individuals whose images have been obtained during the
perpetration of offences to enable the arrest of the individual.

3.2

A successful investigation leading to the identification and arrest of an individual

suspected of committing an offence or offences is an obligation and duty placed on
every Police Constable.

3.3

The policing purpose prescribed under Common Law includes the prevention and
detection of crime, the apprehension and prosecution of offenders and the
maintenance of law and order. Identifying and dealing with individuals who
perpetrate offences fulfils the first two objectives of Our Duty; a commitment by the
Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner and the Chief Constable to the people
of Leicestershire to deal with those who cause most harm and to protect vulnerable
people from future offences.

3.4

The ability to identify a suspect as soon as possible and make an early arrest is
extremely important for several reasons:

to secure evidence

to ensure the victim is not subject of further offences

to ensure no crimes are committed against other victims

to remove any threat of crime, further crime or violence to the public at

large

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3.5

to ensure public confidence in the police is maintained.

The software technology identified to assist the Force in their policing purpose is
NEC NeoFace, which fulfils a further two of the Our Duty principles namely
effectively deploying our people and ensuring effective and efficient use of
technology. With the budgetary constraints placed upon the Force, both principles
are becoming ever more important if the Force is to meet its policing obligations and
the expectations of the public it protects.

3.6

Importantly, such software technology provides the opportunity to meet the

requirements at para.2.4

Custody Images

4.1

Custody images are those images obtained when an individual is detained by the
police.

4.2

The police derive their powers to obtain an individuals image from Section 64A of
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) 1. PACE and the PACE Codes of
Practice provide the core framework of police powers and safeguards around stop
and search, arrest, detention, investigation, identification and interviewing detainees.
The legislation looks to address the balance between the powers of the police and
the rights and freedoms of the public. Maintaining that balance is a key element of
PACE.

4.3

PACE states that where a person is detained at a police station they may be
photographed with the appropriate consent or if the appropriate consent is withheld,
or where it is not practicable to obtain it, without consent.

4.4

Additionally a person may be photographed at a place other than a police station by

a constable, as a result of a relevant event
(a) with the appropriate consent; or

PACE has received a number of amendments including those under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, the Serious
Organised Crime Act 2005, the Police reform Act 2002 etc.

PIA 29 10 2014

(b) if the appropriate consent is withheld or it is not practicable to obtain it, without it.
4.5

PACE permits the police to photograph an individual where the individual has been:
(a) arrested by a constable for an offence;
(b) taken into custody by a constable after being arrested for an offence by a person
other than a constable;
(c) made subject to a requirement to wait with a community support officer;
(ca) given a direction by a constable under section 27 of the Violent Crime
Reduction Act 2006
(d) given a penalty notice by a constable in uniform
(e) given a notice in relation to a relevant fixed penalty offence by a community
support officer by virtue of a designation applying that paragraph to him ;
(f) given a notice in relation to a relevant fixed penalty offence by an accredited
person by virtue of accreditation specifying that that paragraph applies to him ;
(g) given a notice in relation to a relevant fixed penalty offence by an accredited
inspector by virtue of accreditation specifying that paragraph 1 of Schedule 5A to the
Police Reform Act 2002 Act applies to him.

4.6

The custody photograph is then stored within the police data base known as
Custody Image Management (CIM) which holds over 104,000 such photographs.

NeoFace Facial Recognition Technology and the Impact on Privacy

5.1

The NeoFace technology is software that is able to compare images presented to it,
which have been captured on media such as CCTV and body cams (one data set)
against photographs of individuals detained under the Police and Criminal Evidence
Act 1984 (second data set).

5.2

NeoFace technology compares the two data sets and identifies matches from facial
characteristics.

5.3

NeoFace does not base its selection on gender, age or race and so will return
images of all ages, genders and race. (Leicestershire Police has chosen not to
incorporate metadata at this time).
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5.4

For each comparison search, NeoFace will select the most likely matches, up to a
total of two hundred. Using new technology to identify potential suspects from an
existing database by automated means, clearly results in a vast amount of personal
data being processed, during each search.

5.5

The use of this technology is not only new to Leicestershire, but to the police service
in general and given the extent of processing by automatic means, a full Privacy
Impact Assessment was undertaken. This decision was also based on the interest
the technology may attract to ensure that during implementation privacy issues had
been identified, recorded and ultimately addressed.

Information Flow

6.1

Requests for searches to enable images to be compared against custody

photographs may originate from a number of sources. It is therefore essential that
the provenance of each of the images presented is established to ensure there is a
legal basis before the matching process takes place.

6.2

The images of unknown individuals may originate from a number of sources,

including:
Close Circuit Television Cameras (CCTV) before, during or after the perpetration of
a crime or incident.
Body Cam images taken by an officer when dealing with an incident or crime ( The
Force has a Bodycam Use procedure in place)
Social Media before, during or after an incident has taken place.
E-Fit image taken from a witness or victim of crime
Surveillance image.

6.3

As previously stated, it is the 104 000 photographs held in CIM that Neoface
compares with the photographic images presented to it. A process for the use of
NeoFace has been identified and is illustrated in the flow chart below.

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Fig 1
Request received by ID unit for Facial Recognition Analysis in one of the
following methods:

Email sent to
IMU

Bodycam
Image

Social Media or
Photo from
mobile phone

Surveillance
Image

EFIT-V

Image quality assessed by ID Unit for suitability to be

used on NeoFace software

Unsuitable:
Inform the requesting
OIC.
Log on spreadsheet and
file image

Suitable:
ID officer will run the image through NeoFace and check the
top 200 returned faces for potential suspects.
Images compared against the lawfully held custody database

Potential suspect(s) identified

No Potential suspects found.

Inform requesting OIC.
Log on spreadsheet and file image

Complete return sheet for OIC with a copy of the image

tested and an image of each potential suspect.
OIC made aware this is purely an intelligence tool.
Log on spreadsheet and file image

6.4

The image of the suspect to be identified is input into NeoFace. The Technology
compares the image of the unknown suspect, to the database containing images of
known persons, detained by the Force. Those NeoFace identifies as matching the
image of the suspect are selected. A search can return up to a maximum of 200
images and will include images of both male and females.

6.5

The operator will view the matches identified by Neoface and manually remove
photographs of those whose images do not resemble the image of the suspect. This
is the point at which human intervention takes over from automated processing.

6.6

Some of the reasons the Operator may eliminate images include:

Wrong gender

Wrong ethnicity

Physical appearance differs

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Consultation

7.1

Consultation over the implementation of NeoFace has taken place with:

Home Office

Office of the Police Commissioner

Chief Constable

Human Rights Lawyer

During the pilot period and subsequently, the technology and the process has been
televised, using fictional images. It has also attracted visits from the legal profession,
other enforcement agencies and other police forces from around the world.

Privacy and Related Risks

8.1

The CIM system contains over 104,000 images, all of which were obtained under
PACE when the person was detained and therefore provides an audit trail showing
both the name provided by the individual at the time and their description also
recorded at the time, which is then held with their image.

8.2

An image and the personal data associated with it, is used before charge for the
following reasons:

To enable a person to be sought, should they fail to answer pre-charge police

bail;

in the event of an allegation that an individual has given a false name which
has resulted in an innocent party being summoned;

in the event of further police enquiries revealing a person detained has

provided false details;

8.3

An image and the personal data associated with it, is used after charge but before
conviction for the following reasons:

to identify an individual when a warrant has been issued by the Court and
police officers have a duty execute it as soon as possible 2.

If issued under s13 Magistrates Courts Act 1980, it will be valid indefinitely.

PIA 29 10 2014

To enable a person to be sought, should they have been bailed to appear

before a court and failed to do so.
Should they have been remanded in custody and after being taken before a
court, bailed to re-appear, but have failed to do so.

Where the court has issued a further bail notice (court bail) and the person
does not attend the hearing

To identify an individual subject of a European Arrest Warrant where it is

suspected that the person has fled the UK whilst on police or court bail.

8.4

Key privacy issues relate to the retention of images whereby the individual, although
arrested, did not appear before the court because:

8.5

CPS decide not to prosecute the case;

The case was discontinued;

The person was not charged due to lack of evidence.

Cases lying sine die.

Images of detained persons are held on CIM.

Therefore, images of those not

convicted will also be retained.

8.6

The Police and Criminal Evidence Act states that photographs taken under s64 may
be used by, or disclosed to, any person for any purpose, related to the prevention or
detection of crime, the investigation of an offence of the conduct of a prosecution or
to the enforcement of a sentence and may be retained provided they are used for
the same purpose for which they were initially obtained.

8.7

Retaining all images of individuals taken under PACE, whether later convicted or not
allows Neoface to search across the whole of the data base and may return images
found in both data sets.

Privacy Solutions

9.1

Action being taken to address issues and reduce the risk is already being
undertaken by the Identification Suite (See Data Protection Table).

9.2

Security of the NeoFace system.

8.2.1 Location
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The NeoFace system has been installed in the Identification Suite (ID Suite).

The Identification Suite is situated in a secure building which has limited

access

The Identification Suite is separated from the reminder of the building and is
secured.

The NeoFace is located on a stand-alone computer.

9.2.2 Management

Neoface is owned by the Delivering Justice Directorate. A Detective Chief

Superintendent is in overall charge.

The day to day management is undertaken by the ID Suite Manager.

9.2.3 Operators

The number of NeoFace operators is kept to a minimum.

Their training is undertaken in house under the supervision of the ID Suite

Manager.

10.3

Use of NeoFace

10.3.1 All requests for the use of NeoFace are submitted to the ID Suite and overseen by
the ID Suite Manager.
10.3.2 A Form has been created and must be submitted with each request, which details
the reason for the request and the provenance of the images being presented.
10.3.3 After accepting the image(s), the Operator will undertake the search.
10.3.4 Once the matches are returned by Neoface, the Operator will undertake a visual
assessment and remove any that clearly do not match the image of the individual
sought. E.g. different gender etc.
10.3.5 The Operator will provide the matches which NeoFace has identified and have
been verified, to the OIC as well as making it clear that the images are to be
11

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treated as information only and that further police enquiries are required to
establish whether the person could be considered as a suspect or not.

10.3.6 The OIC will be reminded that the information being provided is sensitive personal
information and therefore must be treated as Restricted and if the images
returned are to be sent to the OIC by e-mail, then the Operator will ensure the email is marked Restricted.
10.3.7 The Form which accompanies the returned images, reminds the OIC that the
matches are for intelligence purposes only and cannot be used as evidence. They
are not informed as to the status of the person in the custody image.
10.3.8 Guidance should be issued to ensure the decision making during the public interest
test is recorded.
11

Risk
See Appendix 1.

12

Evaluation

12.1

In addition to the assessment around the effectiveness of the Neoface Technology in

preventing and detecting crime, the evaluation will take into account the impact on
the privacy of individuals.

12.2

Solutions have already been implemented to address compliance issues identified

during the early project stages, which are proportionate to the aims of the project. (

13

Sign off and record the PIA outcomes

13.1

The Project and the privacy risk have been accepted by D/ Ch. Supt Prior.
The privacy risks involved in the project have been accepted by D/Ch. Supt Prior.
(Still awaiting the outcome of the two privacy court cases).

12

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14

Integration of the PIA Outcomes Back into the Project Plan

14.1

The ID Suite Manager will be responsible for integrating the PIA outcomes back into
the Project Plan and keeping the Head of the Delivering Justice Directorate
informed.

14.2

PIA outcomes will be addressed by the ID Suite Manager in consultation with the
Head of the Delivering Justice Directorate.

14.3

The ID Suite Manager will be responsible for implementing any solutions to issues
identified back in to the project.

14.4

The ID Suite Manager will confer with Information Management Section regarding
future privacy concerns which will then be raised with the SIRO.

15

Action to be Taken

15.1

As the Data Protection Act 1998 provides the legal framework around the
management and use of personal information, recording the implications the DPA
has on the use of existing custody photographs with the Neoface technology, will
sign post issues to be considered and addressed.

16

Date for Completion of Actions

16.1

As per the Project Documentation.

17

Data Protection Implications

17.1

See Appendix 1

13

Appendix 1
Neoface Privacy Impact Assessment implications for the compliance with the Data Protection Act commenced on
the 29.10.2014
The following are the Principles of the Data Protection alongside the risk to the Act in relation to the use of Neoface. This is a
living document and should be updated and dated accordingly.
Principle 1
Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully and, in particular, shall not be processed unless:
a) at least one of the conditions in Schedule 2 is met, and
b) in the case of sensitive personal data, at least one of the conditions in Schedule 3 is also met.
Considerations
What is the purpose of
this technology?

Explanation
To introduce technology
to assist in the early
identification of a
suspect.
Photographs of detained
persons are collected under
PACE and are known as
Custody Photographs..
The photograph is used as:
An audit trail
In the event of an
individual failing to
report for bail or to
court or for the
payment of a fine

Additional
Considerations/Risks
The use of facial technology to
compare existing lawfully held
information against new
information, lawfully obtained
and processed;
Reduces the chance of the wrong
person being arrested
Eliminates the need to arrest
large numbers of suspects

Action/Mitigation/Justifica
tion
ID Suite Operator overseas
the management of PACE
Photographs.
ID Suite Operator undertakes
Human intervention to
ensure the photographs
identified by Neoface are
similar or the same as the
image being presented for
comparison. Any photographs
returned by Neoface which
do not match are rejected.
Only details of those whose
image is identified as being
the same or similar are
provided to the officer in the

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issued by the court.

Having been convicted, the
photograph is then used:
As part of any
prohibition order
Retained and used to
identify recidivists
whether by showing
them to a victim of a
further crime in an
effort to identify the
perpetrator
Access to photographic
images in an effort to identify
a person suspected of being
involved in an incident
leading to a crime, or a crime
per see is an integral part of
any police investigation.
Using conventional methods
to identify an individual who
may be a suspect is time
consuming.

Due to financial constraints

facing the Force, employing
police staff to carry out
research to identify potential
15

case, who will undertake a

second sift and again reject
any they feel do not match
the person they are seeking.

Reduces the need for additional

witnesses.
Time lapse may result in the
suspect disappearing, continuing
to commit crime, threatening
potential witnesses to ensure
they do not come forward.
There is a critical period - the
Golden Hour-during which a
crime should be detected. The
greater the delay, the less
chance of arresting a person.

Reduces the workload of an

Operator
Provides an audit trail

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suspects from information

held is difficult to justify,
when technology is available.
Despite reduced funding, the
Police Service still has to
meet legal obligations under
Common Law, the Police Act
1996 and other legislation
contained in statute.
Pressures to find quicker and
more efficient ways of
identifying suspects and
solving crime are at the
forefront of the Police
Service.
The use of biometric
technology to identify
potential suspects from
existing photographs held by
the police is clearly a more
efficient, effective and a less
time consuming process.
The efficiency of the system
does increase the privacy
concerns surrounding its use.
To identify individuals subject
of covert operations, where
the photographs have been
obtained under RIPA

16

Ensures an individual can be

identified and sought quickly
reducing the chance of them:
A disappearing
B creating an alibi
C committing further offences
D Threatening Witnesses

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How will individuals be

told about the use of
their personal data in
relation to existing
custody records?

Photographs of those
arrested are obtained under
the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act (PACE).
Section 64A permits the
police to obtain photographs
of those arrested in
circumstances where a
person detained at a police
station may be photographed
with the appropriate consent
or if the appropriate consent
is withheld or where it is not
practicable to obtain it,
without consent.
In terms of the images
presented to Neoface, these
are obtained from a number
of sources including CCTV,
bodycam, other Forces
Custody images (See below).

The use of CCTV images by the

Force is included in Policy and
supported by procedures drawn
up, between the Councils and the
Force.
CCTV systems owned by the
Councils are installed for the
purposes of Crime reduction.
Consider including advice to
detainee, that their photograph
will be retained whether charged
or not.
At closure without charge,
consider the rational of retention
to ensure it is proportionate.

RIPA Authority

Photographs submitted for

comparison as a result of a
covert operation, will be
unaware.
How will individuals be
told about the use of
their personal data in
relation to the images
being presented (other
than custody images)
17

The individual will be

unaware that the police have
their image, until interview/
detention.
The CCTV images obtained
by the police are mainly from

Websites already provides

information re the use of CCTV
CCTV Cameras all have notices
regarding their use for prevention
of crime.

Following the CATT case,

consider reviewing your
photograph retention policy.
(date)
Following the CATT case, the
need to set review dates of
photos obtained of
individuals who have not
been charged. (date)
Following the CATT case, the
rationale behind the retention
and importantly, the further
use of photographs where
the individual has not been
charged or convicted (date)
Consider a review of the
photographic policy in
relation to:
Media release when
attempting to trace an
individual suspected of
an offence,
Day to day policing

Consider a review of the

photographic policy in
relation to:
media release when
attempting to identify
an individual,
Day to day policing

PIA 29 10 2014

three sources.
1 Council owned
2 Privately owned
3 Commercially owned i.e.
shop owner.
The responsibility as to the
lawful signage relating to the
use of the CCTV falls to the
CCTV owner.
Bodycam images from
officers wearing bodycam.
The use of bodycam is
managed through the
procedural documents
issued. Bodycam may be
used where the situation
requires them. They must not
be left on throughout tour of
duty. They will be worn
overtly

Suggest a reminder of the

existence of CCTV Policy.
Suggest a review of the
instructions around the use of
CCTV when drawing up shop
watch agreements.
Useful to remind officers of lawful
use of bodycams and to remind
them of the policy and procedure
around such use.
Bodycams are used overtly.

RIPA will apply

Photographs obtained as a
result of a covert operation
will not be aware
Can Neoface be used in
real time?

Who will have access

to Neoface?

18

There is no direct connection

between CCTV/bodycam and
Neoface.
Access to Neoface is
restricted to the ID Suite staff
only under the direction of
the ID Suite Manager. There

Ensure procedures are put in

place and also that there is an
overarching Policy in relation to
the use/access of NeoFace.

Policy and Procedure

implemented.

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is no intention to allow
unrestricted access to
Neoface.
Do you need to amend
your privacy notices?

Have you established

which conditions for
processing apply?

The Privacy Notice provides

information on the processing
of information in connection
with the policing purpose.
CCTV cameras all have the
legal plates describing the
reason for their use and their
ownership.
Schedule 2
(3) Compliance with legal
obligations;
(5) For the administration of
justice
(6) (1) The legitimate
interests pursued by the Data
Controller
Schedule 3
(6) Legal Proceedings
(7) Administration of Justice
SI 417 regarding the
processing of sensitive
personal information.

If you are relying on

consent to process
personal data, how will
this be collected and
what will you do if it is
withheld or withdrawn?
19

Photographs of those
arrested are obtained under
the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act (PACE). Section
64A permits the police to
obtain photographs of those
arrested in circumstances

Privacy Notice is being reviewed

in line with the use of Neoface

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where a person detained at a

police station may be
photographed with the
appropriate consent or if the
appropriate consent is
withheld or where it is not
practicable to obtain it,
without consent.
Images obtained are either
covert CCTV and Bodycam.
Obtained as part of the
investigation E-Fit.
Or by covert means
authorised under RIPA
Who will have access
to the matches
produced from
Neoface?

The matches are provided to

the Officer in Case.

Ensure the data produced is

marked as Restricted.

It is made clear that the

matches are for information
only and provide a sign post
for the officer to assist in the
investigation plan.

That GPMS is applied whenever it

is processed .
Ensure the OIC is aware of the
handling procedures to ensure
the information is processed
fairly and lawfully and remains
so, until destruction.
Leaving the information
visible/accessible to other
officers, could result in the
individual being detained if seen
on the assumption that they are
being sought.

20

Ensure the policy procedure

reflects the need to ensure
the data is kept secure at all
times and not accessible to
those not involved in the
enquiries.

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Principle 2
Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful purposes, and shall not be further
processed in any manner incompatible with that purpose or those purposes.
Considerations
Explanation
Additional
Action/Mitigation/Justificatio
Considerations/Risks
n
PACE permits the use and
retention of photographs
obtained lawfully. The further
use of the photographs
already held is in connection
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with the policing purpose.

Does your use of
Facial Recognition
cover all of the
purposes for
processing personal
data?

Yes at present.

Have potential new

purposes been
identified as the scope
of the technology
expands?

No. The use of technology

over existing procedures to
identify those committing
offences is purely to ensure
more efficient and effective
use of the personal data.

Any additional use over and

above that outlined in this PIA,
if the Project becomes business
as usual will need to be risk
assessed and a new PIA
completed.

There is a need to ensure that

policies and procedures
develop, as the use develops.
NB The presence of policies and
procedures do not legitimise
use. They merely clearly define
their parameters.

Principle 3
Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose or purposes for which
they are processed.
Considerations
Additional Considerations/Risks
Action/Mitigation/Justification
The photographs obtained
Is the information you
under PACE are of very good
are using of good
quality.
enough quality for the
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purposes it is used
for?

The images obtained for

comparison are assessed
and if they are of poor
quality, are not presented to
Neoface.

Have you considered

what personal data
should not be used,
without compromising
the needs of the
project?

Following the case of The

Queen on the application of
(1) RMC and (2) FJ and the
Commissioner of the
Metropolis and the Secretary
of State for the Home Office
and (1) Liberty and (2)
Equality and Human Rights
Commission, the retention of
photographs held within the
existing database, where
either the person has not
been convicted or the case
discontinued or the person
found not guilty. The legality
of the retention of such data
is still being reviewed by the
ICOs Legal Team. It was
thought that the decision on
the retention of photographic
information would be
included within the Freedom
Act, which ultimately
addressed and reinforces the
rules around the retention of
DNA and fingerprints.
However, both the Data
Protection Act 1998 and the
Statutory Code of Practice for
the Management of

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Information require the Force

to manage such information
in such a way that it does not
breach legislation. It will
however, be more likely to
capture individuals who are
in the group described
above, if they have
committed the offence, but
less likely to involve the
arrest of an innocent
individual whose image is
held, where they have not
been previously prosecuted
for an offence.

Principle 4
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Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date.

Considerations
Explanation
Additional Considerations/Risks
If you are procuring
new software does it
allow you to amend
data when
necessary?
How are you ensuring
that personal data
obtained from
individuals or other
organisations is
accurate?

Neoface is not a storage

system

Photographs taken of a
person under PACE will
have the name of the
individual attached to
them. The fingerprints of
the individual are also
taken under PACE and are
subject of checking against
the National Database. Any
discrepancies found are
rectified as soon as they
are identified.
Any requests for NeoFace
to be used by Police
Partners, will be submitted
on a request form. The
form will record the
requestors details, the
reason for the request and
the circumstances by
which the image was
obtained.

How will you

differentiate
25

Searches are managed

individually, so there can

However, Neoface can be used as

a search engine in the event of
searching for and removing
images from the custody system

Action/Mitigation/Justification

PIA 29 10 2014

information received
from other
organisations?

be no cross contamination

How long will non

custody images be
retained?

Images obtained for

comparison against
Neoface, will only be
retained for as long as is
necessary.

Procedural document in place.

Where an individual is
identified by Neoface, then
the original photograph will
be provided to the officer,
if required for identification
purposes and also if the
individual is charged,
where it will form part of
the evidence.
The reference number of
any match will be kept for
audit purposes.
How long are Custody
Images retained,
where a person is
either
1 Not charged
2 Charged, but the
case is not taken to
court
3 Charged and taken
to court but
discontinued
26

All photographs are

originally obtained under
PACE.
PACE states that such
photographs can be
retained, provided they are
only processed for the
same purpose.

Additional advice /guidance

following CATT decision.

PIA 29 10 2014

Charged taken to
court and found
guilty
Charged and taken to
court and found
guilty, but found not
guilty on appeal.
Case allowed to sit
sine die

Principle 5
Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for longer than necessary for that
purpose or those purposes.
Considerations
What retention
periods are suitable
for the personal data
you will be
processing?
Are you procuring
software which will
allow you to delete
information in line
with your retention
periods?
How many duplicate
images are there?
27

Explanation
All custody photographs
are retained.

The use of biometric

technology will not change
the existing ability in terms
of the NeoFace technology

NeoFace technology has

enabled duplicate entries

Additional Considerations/Risks

Action/Mitigation/Justification

Old images are not removed when

new ones are taken.

Historic cases are reported to the

police.

Searches using Neoface are saved

on secure network and kept in
accordance with MOPI

PIA 29 10 2014

to be identified and dealt

with accordingly.

Principle 6
Personal data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of data subjects under this Act.
Considerations

Explanation
No change

Additional Considerations/Risks

Action/Mitigation/Justification

Process does not involve

marketing.

Is the documented process for the

request for removal of
photographs by an individual, up
to date?
If not, it should be updated.

Requests for removal come in via

Data Protection and there is a
documented process for dealing
with requests for removal.

Will the systems you

are putting in place
allow you to respond
to subject access
requests more easily?
If the project involves
marketing, have you
got a procedure for
individuals to opt out
of their information
being used for that
purpose?
28

PIA 29 10 2014

Can the system

provide information
about the searches
that have been
presented to it, in
the event of such a
question from a data
subject?

The system is fully

auditable and will keep a
record of all searches
carried out.
Searches are retained in a
spreadsheet, along with
the details of the returns
for monitoring purposes.

Principle 7
Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing
of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data.
Considerations
Explanation
Additional Considerations/Risks
Action/Mitigation/Justification
Do any new systems
provide protection
against the security
risks you have
identified?

Access to enable use of

the biometric technology
is restricted to
Identification Suite staff
under the supervision of
the ID Suite Manager
Access is by use of a user
name and password, to
permit individual access,
which is then auditable.

29

PIA 29 10 2014

What training and

instructions are
necessary to ensure
that staff will operate
a new system
securely?

Access to biographical
technology is restricted to
Identification Unit Staff
only.
Each Operator is
individually trained in the
operation of the system
and the rules around its
use.
Each Operator is reminded
of the general
requirements around
security:
Logging on and off
Password composition of
Prevent shoulder surfing
Positioning of the screen to
prevent it being viewed by
others
Staff are reminded of the
legislation surrounding the
use of custody
photographs.

Will your actions

interfere with the
right to privacy under
Article 8?

30

Under Article 8 there is the

exemption from
interference with private
life, where the
interference is in relation
to the investigation in
relation to the commission
of an offence.

Ensure use and privacy

requirements are reiterated.
Ensure the policy and procedure
reflects the requirements of the
Operator, to ensure this is
continued if and when new staff
are employed.
Ensure policy and procedure is in
existence for the day to day
monitoring around use.

Consider fitting a security

screen.

PIA 29 10 2014

Have you identified

the social need and
aims of the project?

The social pressing need

to deal with those who
commit crimes against
victims and society.

You need to consider the

justification for the use of
technology to identify individuals
involved in other
crimes/incidents.
The justification may include the
fact that individuals who start by
committing low level crime i.e.
theft from washing lines, can
move on to commit further and
more serious crimes, if not
identified and dealt with.

Are your actions a

proportionate
response to the social
need?

Our Duty has identified

the expectations of the
public to protect the
vulnerable and to deal
with those who cause
most harm.
Failure to do this
effectively, may also
attract disciplinary action,
if it can be shown that a
delay was caused by any
neglect to investigate a
crime, where the identity
of the suspect could have
been established and as
such the officer may be
disciplined under the
Police Act 1996. Dealing
with staff who have failed

31

Included in Policy

PIA 29 10 2014

to carry out the

requirements of their
roles, can bring the Force
into disrepute and reduce
public confidence.

Principle 8
Not Transferred out of Europe
Considerations
Explanation
Is there an intention
to transfer any of the
data out of the
European Union
32

No

Additional
Considerations/Risks

Action/Mitigation/Justification

PIA 29 10 2014

33