"Elenchus, Epode", and Magic: Socrates as Silenus

Author(s): Elizabeth Belfiore

Source: Phoenix, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer, 1980), pp. 128-137
Published by: Classical Association of Canada
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ELENCHUS, EPODE, AND MAGIC: SOCRATES AS SILENUS

ELIZABETHBELFIORE
PLATO oftenuses the vocabulary of magic (for example, goes,goeteia,
kelesis,and theircognates),spells (epodai), and drugs(pharmaka) to condemnan enemy.Thus, the sophistis called a deceitfulmagicianat Sophist
234c, 235a, 241b, and in the Republic the imitatoris called a magician
(598d, 602d) who enchants (601b, 607c-d). Physical pleasure is condemned as mere magic at Phaedo 81b, Philebus 44c, and Republic584a.
Yet Socrates himselfis compared with a magician (Meno 80b) who enchants people (Symposium215c-d); the mythat the end of the Phaedo
is said to be an epode(114d); knowledgeis called a pharmakonat Republic
595b and an epode at Republic 608a.1 These applications of the termiifwe
nologyof magic to Socratesand philosophyare morecomprehensible
realize that Plato is sometimes deliberately opposing philosophy to
deceitfulmagic,establishinga sortof "counter-magic."As Jacquelinede
Romillyputs it: "Whereas the magic of the sophistsaimed at producing
illusion,Socrates' magic restson the obstinatedestructionof all illusions.
It is the magic of implacable truth..... It is thereforeone magic against
another,the one taking the former'splace, but with opposite aims and
means." Philosophyopposes and disarmsdeceitfulmagic in a numberof
veryclearlydefinedareas, and is in thissense a kindof "counter-magic."
A comparisonof the definitionof deceptive magic in Republic III with
Plato's statementsabout the "magic" of philosophycan help us to attain
a betterunderstandingof how detailed and deliberatethis oppositionis.
Socrates definesmagic,goeteia,in the course of describingsome tests
1For furtherreferencesand discussion of these topics I have found the following
studies most helpful: A. Dies, "La Transposition Platonicienne," in Autour de Platon
(Paris 1927); P. Boyanc6, Le Culte des Muses chez les Philosophes Grecs (Paris 1936):
hereafterBoyance; L. Edelstein, "The Function of the Myth in Plato's Philosophy,"
fournal of the History of Ideas 10 (1949) 463-481: hereafterEdelstein; E. R. Dodds,
"Plato, the Irrational Soul and the Inherited Conglomerate," in The Greeksand the
Irrational (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1951): hereafterDodds; W. Burkert,"Goes. Zum
griechischen'Schamanismus'," RhMus 105 (1962) 36-55; J. Derrida, "La Pharmacie de
Platon," Tel Quel 32 (1968) 3-48, 33 (1968) 18-58: hereafterDerrida I and II; P. Lain
Entralgo, "The Platonic Rationalization of the Charm," in L. J. Rather and J. M. Sharp,
eds. and trans., The TherapyoftheWord in Classical Antiquity(New Haven 1970), also
published separately in German: Hermes 86 (1958) 298-323, and in Spanish: Archivo
Iberoamericanode Historia de la Medicina 10 (1958) 133-160: hereafterLain Entralgo;
J. de Romilly, Magic and Rhetoricin AncientGreece(Cambridge, Mass. 1975): hereafter
Romilly. See also D. Hitchcock, "The Role of the Myth and Its Relation to Rational
Argumentin Plato's Dialogues," Diss. Claremont Graduate School, 1973.
2Romilly36-37. A similar point is made by Edelstein (475) and Derrida (11.21).
128
PHOENIx, Vol. 34 (1980) 2.

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ELENCHUS,

EPODE,

AND MAGIC

129

to determinewhichof the young people of the ideal city are least likely
to cast out and forgetthe opinionthat one should do what is best forthe
city (412e). He explains that we cast opinion out of our minds either
willingly(hekousios),when we learn better and get rid of false opinion,
or unwillingly(akousios), when we lose true opinion. This is because we
are deprivedof evils willinglyand of good thingsunwillingly.But to have
a false opinion is evil and to have a true opinion is good (413a). We
should note that akousios is used here in the peculiarlyPlatonic sense,
accordingto whichwe are deprivedof good thingsunwillinglyeven ifwe
wantto be deprivedof them,not knowingthem to be good.3 Afterthis
explanation,Socrates describesthreeways in whichpeople are deprived
unwillinglyof the truth(413b-c): robbery(klope), force(bia), and magic
(goeteia).Those robbed are those whom time makes forgetor argument
(logos) persuades, and those forced are those made to change their
opinions by pain (b6'vY,aXyqrGcv).
Finally, Socrates says that "those
bewitched,as I think,you also would say are those who change their
opinioneitherbecause theyare enchantedby pleasureor because theyare
terrified
by some fear" (413c1-3): TobsAv yo/TEvOEvras,
4ycAat, K&v aUi
cs
i
olt
av
Je
rt
Etvat
rcaoa
'i
46
60ov
'br
?OV^Sf
caLrs
waotv it'
KrtkrtOE'rE
l5all7-es.4
This passage gives us a definitionof magic:
(1) The aim of magic is to
changeour opinions,drivingout trueopinionand givingus falseopinion.
(2) Magic affectsus by means of the emotionsof pleasure (hedone)and
fear (phobos). (3) Because magic drives out true opinion it compels its
victims,that is, makes themact unwillingly(akousios).
The passage also tellsus that the man who is best able to resistmagic
is mostharmoniousand the best guard of himself,and that
(dysgoeteutos)
he is most usefulto himselfand to the city (413e). Since we later learn
that this guardian is a philosopher,we see that Plato is deliberately
settingout to oppose the aims and means ofphilosophyto thoseofmagic.
Plato does not say in this passage what kind of magic he has in mind.
However, it is reasonable to suppose that he is not directingsuch a
serious attack against the cruder formsof magic, such as placing wax
figuresin crossroads,6but against the magic of the sophistsand poets he
condemnslater in the Republic.Throughoutthe Republic,Plato attacks
as the opponents of philosophythose who persuade the multitudeby
appealing to the emotionsand appetitesratherthan to reason and truth.
In RepublicVI he attacks the "educators and sophists" (492d6), among
*See Adam on Republic 412e and 382a, and below, 136 and note 22.
'Adam, on Republic 413c, gives some examples in the Laws of tests forresistance to
forceand magic. However, the distinctionin Republic III betweenforceas causing pain,
and magic as causingfear is probably more rhetoricalthan philosophical. At least, it is
clear in Republic X that pain falls within the province of the magic of poetry (below,
130), and many passages, e.g., Laws 633c9-dl, link pain with fear.
5Mentioned at Laws 933b.

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130

PHOENIX

whom he includes politicians, painters, musicians, and poets (493d),

who know nothingabout the truthbut instead have learned the passions
and desires of the multitude and how to please or anger it (493a-c).
These sophists who want to please the crowd necessarilyblame philosophy (494a). In RepublicVIII tragedyis blamed forpraisingthe tyrant
and fordrawingregimestowards democracies and tyrannies(568a-d),
and in RepublicIX the tyrantis associated withthe desiresand appetites.
The "terriblemagicians(magoi) and tyrantmakers" producea tyrantby
implantingerosin him (572e-573a). The tyrantis ruledby eros,physical
pleasures, thus enjoying only a phantasma of true pleasure, a sort of
magic (584a) whichPlato compareswithshadow-painting(586b-c).
The attack on the opponent of philosophyculminatesin Republic X,
wherePlato condemnsthe poet as a magician (598d, 602d) who makes
pleasure and pain rule in the city instead of law and the best argument
(607a-b) and tries to please the multitude(604e-605a).6 Plato explains
that poetry imitates those who display excessive grief (605c-606c),
excessive laughter (606c), or lust, anger, and "all the desiresand pains
and pleasures in the soul" (606d) and that it produces and increases
theseemotionalexcessesin us (605b, 606d). It is significantthat the love
ofpoetryis called erosat 607e5. Plato explicitlycontraststheseemotional
excesses with the restrainedgriefor pleasure of the "reasonable man"
who feelsemotionsbut neverthelessuses reason to controlthem (603e604d). In him rule "reason and law," whichbid us resistpain, instead of
that "drawing" (helkon,a word oftenused of magical spells) us towards
pain (604a10-bl).7 The pleasure and pain by means of which the poetmagician affectsus are excessive emotions which are not merely nonrational,as are all emotions,but anti-rational,having the powerto make
reason "let down its guard" (606a8). The poet-magicianof RepublicX,
like the magicianofRepublicIII, drivesout trueopinion,makingus take
the illusion for the reality (598c, 602b, 602c, 603b, and passim). In
Republic X Plato also contrasts the magician's emotionalmeans with
simple argument.He compares meter,rhythm,and harmonywith the
colors of painting (chromata),and says that without these the mere
wordsof poetrycannotenchantus (601a-b).8
'Gerald Else, "The Structureand Date of Book 10 of Plato's Republic," AbhHeidelberg1972, argues convincinglythat we should connect the poet and painter of Republic
X with the painter and sophist of the Sophist,all of whom are called magicians. In both
dialogues, Plato is attacking the same enemy: the deceitfulmagic of rhetoric.
71 wish to thank the anonymous refereeof Phoenix for calling my attention to this
passage. See also Phdr. 238al fora similar use of helko.
8This passage should be compared with Gorgias 465b-c, where "cosmetology" is said
to give a veneerof alien beauty, partly by means of color. Though Plato does not use the
wordpharmakonin these passages, it is commonlyused of the colorsused by painters (for
example in Cratylus424e and 434b, Republic 420c). See P. M. Schuhl, Platon etL'Art de
son temps(Paris 1952) 22 and Derrida 11.34-35.

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ELENCHUS,

EPODE,

AND MAGIC

131

A comparisonof Plato's descriptionof magic in Republic III and X

with Gorgias' descriptionof the magic of rhetoricand poetry in the
Encomiumof Helen' also gives much support to the view that Plato is
attackingthe sophistsand poets in our passage in Republic III. Gorgias
calls speech,logos,a formof magic whichcompelspeople to change their
opinionsby means of pleasureand pain. Divine spells (epodai) charmand
persuade by means of magic, goeteia(10), and speech can drug and bewitch the soul (14). The person who persuades, says Gorgias, exercizes
compulsion,while the personpersuaded is compelled (12). Speech comes
togetherwith the opinionand changes it by means of magic (10). It can
take away pain and bring pleasure (10) but it can also cause "fearful
shudderingand much-weepingpity" (9)10 or pain and fear(14). Gorgias
gives an account of pleasure and pain very much like Plato's. Poetry, a
formof speech, produces pleasure which helps to change the opinions,
producingerrorsand deceptionsof the soul (10), and pleasure is associated witheros(18-19). Gorgiascomparesthe pain and fearcaused by the
logoswith fearfulsightswhich cause men to fleein panic beforethereis
actual danger,and so to "neglectthat whichis judged to be noble by the
law and the good whichcomes fromvictory" (16). Fear is anti-rational,
for it "extinguishesand drives out law" (17). Gorgias' account of the
magicof the logosis thus substantiallythe same as Plato's account of the
aims and means of magic in the Republic."
Plato's enemythemagician,then,is a seriousand dangerousadversary.
The philosopherattackshimin the verythreeareas coveredby the definitionin RepublicIII. Philosophy(1) drivesout falseopinion,attackingthe
aim of magic, and (2) it enables us to resist the power of pleasure and
fear,preventingthe means of magic frombeing effective.In this way,
(3) it does not compel, but on the contraryenables us to act without
compulsion.
Philosophydrivesout falseopinionveryoftenby meansof theelenchus,
whichdoes not teach any positivedoctrinesor impartany actual information, but instead purifiesthe soul of the worst kind of ignorance,the
beliefthat one knowswhat one doesn't know.These points are discussed
in the Sophist(229b ff.)wherethe elenchusis definedas a kind of educaB11.
9Diels-Kranz,Vorsokr.7
1oFora discussionofpityand fear(phobosand eleos)in Gorgias,Plato, and Aristotle
see H. Flashar,"Die Medizinischen
derLehrevon der WirkungderDichGrundlagen
tungin der Griechischen
Poetik,"Hermes84 (1956) 12-48; W. Schadewaldt,"Furcht
und Mitleid?,"Hermes83 (1955) 129-171; M. Pohlenz,"Furchtund Mitleid?Ein
Nachwort,"Hermes84 (1956) 49-74.
"For a goodaccountofGorgias'psychological
theoriessee C. P. Segal,"Gorgiasand
thePsychology
oftheLogos,"HSCP 66 (1962) 99-155.On Gorgias'ideas aboutrhetoric
as magicsee Romilly3-22 and also herarticle"Gorgiaset le pouvoirde la po6sie,"7HS
93 (1973) 155-162.

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132

PHOENIX

tion. Those who practice the elenchusquestion people about thingsthey

claim to know until they contradict themselves.This instruction,or
purification,makes those who undergo it angry with themselvesand
gentletowardsothers.The Eleatic Strangercomparesthosewho practice
it withdoctors:"Doctors of thebody believethat the body cannotbenefit
fromthe nourishmentbroughtto it until one casts out the obstructions
withinit. These othersbelieve the same thingabout the soul, that it will
never profitfromthe learning brought to it until by cross-examining
(elenchon)one shames the person cross-examined,thus removingthe
opinions which are obstructionsto learning and renderinghim pure,
thinkingthat he knowsonly those thingshe does know and not more."'2
The elenchus,then, affectsthe reason, though it does not impart
informationor offercounter-arguments.
It is instructionin the negative
sense of removal of false belief. Nevertheless,it has the very positive
effectof preparingthe soul to receive learning.The comparisonwith
medicineis interesting.True medicine,Plato again tells us at Republic
426a-b, consistsin the removal of the obstacles to health,such as overindulgencesof all sorts, while drugs and spells are useless until these
obstacles are removed.Health is not somethingput into the body by a
drugalien to it. This is exactlyhow Plato describesthe healthycondition
of the rational part of the soul (phronesis)in Republic VII. The other
virtuesare not in the soul until theyare put thereby practiceand habit,
but the power of exercizingphronesisis always in the soul. The true
teacherdoes not put knowledgeinto the soul like sight into blind eyes,
but instead removesthe obstacles to the properfunctioning
ofphronesis,
"turningit around" to thelight.'3Similarly,in theSophistpassage quoted
above, the elenchusrestoresthe reason to its natural,healthycondition
ratherthan givingit a "drug" forwisdom.
But the elenchusdoes not affectthe reason alone. Our Sophistpassage
says that it makes people ashamed and angrywith themselves.It thus
arouses certain emotionswhich are the allies of reason.'4 Accordingto
12Sophist230c-d, Cf. Theaetetus210c. The Sophist passage is usually taken to be a
descriptionof the methodof Socrates and his followers.See, forexample, F. M. Cornford,
Plato's Theoryof Knowledge(London 1935) 177-183; V. Goldschmidt,Les Dialogues de
Platon (Paris 1963) 29-31; G. M. A. Grube, Plato's Thought(London 1935) 241-242.
For other views see A. E. Taylor, Plato, the Man and His Work' (New York 1952)
380-381; J. Burnet,GreekPhilosophy,Thales to Plato (London 1914) 224; G. B. Kerferd,
"Plato's Noble Art of Sophistry," C9 N.s. 4 (1954). I agree with F. Oscanyan that the
passage is "a perfect description of Socratic dialectics:" "On Six Definitions of the
Sophist: Sophist 221c-231e," Philosophical Forum 4 (1972-1973) 254.
"'Republic 518b-519a. Cf. Timaeus 89a-d and Derrida 11.32 ff.on artificialremedies
(pharmaka) as opposed to natural methods of curing.
14P. W. Gooch, "'Vice is Ignorance': The Interpretation of Sophist 226a-231b,"
Phoenix 25 (1971) 130, makes the point that cross-examinationdeals with the "irrational
aspects of the soul" at least indirectly,by "bringing the irrational parts into a right
relationshipby pointingout inconsistenciesto the rational part."

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ELENCHUS, EPODE, AND MAGIC

133

the account given in the Republic,anger with oneselfis situated in the

thumos,which sometimesmakes war against the desires when these try
to forcesomeone contraryto reason, but which never becomes the ally
of the desires against the reason (440b). We find a similar distinction
between emotion allied with reason and emotion that works against
reason at Laws 646e ff.There are, says the Athenian,two kindsof fear.
One is the fearof evil whenwe expect it to befallus; the otheris fearof a
deserved evil reputation,i.e., shame, aischune. This latter kind of fear
actually opposes our otherpains and fearsand our greatestpleasures. It
contributesto fearlessnessof the enemyand to a fearof disgrace before
The shame and angerwithoneselfthat the elenchusstirsup are
friends.15
thus the opposite of the fearproduced by the deceitfulmagician,which
opposes and overcomesthe reason.
The elenchusis theopposite ofmagic in still anotherway. The deceitful
magician works by affectingonly his victims,while Socrates' "magic"
affectshimselfas well. Thus, after Meno compares Socrates with the
electricray of the sea, Socrates repliesthat he is a ray that stings itself
as well as others(Meno 80c). And in the EuthyphroSocrates says that he
makes bothhis own and others'argumentsmove around,but that he has
this skill against his own will

(aiKWV dMl oTO46S,lid).

While the magician

deliberatelyuses his skill to make his victims act against their will,
Socrates uses his skill against his own will and makes his "victims" able
to act willingly.
We can now betterunderstandthe serious intentionbehind the irony
in those passages in which the people who experience the Socratic
elenchuscompareit withmagic. Plato is at once attackinghis enemyand
showing how philosophyis a kind of "counter-magic." Meno says to
Socrates, "You are bewitchingand druggingand simply spellbinding
me" (yo'qrebES E Kalt apALa77lELKa ~7aTExvco
Ets, 80a). This is because
KaT7aror

he is now unable to speak: "I have oftenmade many speeches about

virtuebeforemanypeople, and I spoke verywell,as it seemedto me. But
now I am not at all able to say even what it is." Anywherebut in Athens,
he concludes,Socrates mightbe arrestedas a magician (80b). Meno is
comparing the elenchus with a definite kind of magic, spellbinding
(katadesis),in whicha victimagainst his will is renderedunable to speak,
oftenbecause he knows a truth that will harm the spellbinder.In this
case, however,Meno is able but unwillingto speak because he realizes
that he doesn't know the truth."'
15Cf.Republic 465a-b and Euthyphro12b-c for a similardistinctionbetween6Rosfear
of some evil such as bodily harm, and albt's, shame of wrongdoing.
"eCf. Gorgias 482e, where Callicles accuses Socrates of binding and gagging Polus;
Laches 194b, where Laches says he is not able to say what he knows; Republic 350d and
358b-c, where Thrasymachus blushes and is said to have been charmed like a snake.
W. K. C. Guthrie, The Greeksand TheirGods (London 1950) 270-274, gives some exam-

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134

PHOENIX

In another well-knownpassage, Alcibiades compares Socrates with

the satyr Marsyas, whose flutetunes enchanted people. We who hear
Socrates,says Alcibiades, are "amazed and possessed." Alcibiades' heart
leaps and tears flowfromhis eyes more than if he were a participantin
the Corybanticrites.His soul is troubledand criesout as thoughhe were
a slave, and, moreover,Socrates is the only man who can make him feel
shame. He admits,just as Meno did, that he does not knowthe rightway
to live. He has to escape fromSocrates holdinghis ears as thoughfroma
Siren,yet as soon as he is out of earshothe returnsto his formeropinions
(Symposium215a-216c). In this passage, as I. M. Linforthhas correctly
shown, Socrates is being compared not with a deceitfulmagician who
in a catharticrite who uses spells to
produces fearbut with an officiator
cast out the fearwhichis already presentas a disease. The firststage of
this cure consistsin allowingthe fearto be consciouslyperceivedso that
those who sufferfromit will realize that they need a cure.'7These catharticritesare thusin manyways similarto the Socraticelenchus.Socrates
firstmakes someone with false beliefsrealize his condition.This realization is accompanied by strongemotion: shame and anger with oneself
(or with Socrates if the process backfires).The "disease" can then be
expelled.As we shall see next,Plato oftenshows Socrates helpingpeople
to cast out fearas well as false belief.
When the vocabulary of magic is used for this second purpose, it is
often associated with the epode,which differsin several ways fromthe
elenchus.When they are associated with magic, the elenchus,a catharsis
of the reason, is usually seen as directedagainst magic's aim of driving
out trueopinion,whilethe philosophicalepodeis mostoften.conceivedas
blockingthe means by which magic works: the use of the emotions to
overcomereason. In many passages, whetherthe vocabulary of magic is
used or not, the epode differsradically fromthe elenchus,forit has an
emotionalappeal, as explicitlyopposed to a rationalappeal. For example,
at Laws 903a10-b2 a distinctionis made between the arguments(logoi)
that attempt to convince the atheist and the epode he will need in
addition. In contrastto the elenchuswhichis dangerousforyoungpeople
(Republic538d-539d), the epodeis usefulin the trainingof childrenwho
cannot yet reason. In the second book of theLaws the musical trainingof
young people is said to provide an epode forthe soul so that it will feel
pleasure,pain, love, and hate in concord with reason and law, beforeit
is able to reason (653b, 659d-e). In the Republic,musical trainingof the
ples of katadesis that allow us to connect Meno's description of the effects of the
elenchuswith this particular kind of magic. A typical katadesissays, forexample, "may
his tongue and his soul become lead that he may not be able to speak or act, and pierce
thou his tongue and his soul" (272).
17TheCorybanticRites in Plato (Berkeley 1946) 140-144.

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ELENCHUS, EPODE, AND MAGIC

135

young is described in much the same way: music seeps into the inner
part of the soul and makes it love and praise the good and hate evil,
beforethe youngpersonis able to reason (401d-402a). The mythat the
end of the Phaedo is also said to be an epodethat adults can use to inspire
themselveswith the courage to despise bodily pleasure (114d-e). Here
again, it is distinguishedfromrational argument,forSocrates says that
no reasonable man would affirmthat the myth is the literal truth. At
othertimes,argumentitselfmay be called an epode,but in thesepassages
the emotionaleffectof argumentis what is stressed.Thus, in a passage
in the Phaedo that uses the vocabulary of magic, Socrates says that
though the existenceof the soul after death has already been proved,
Cebes and Simmias are afraidlike childrenwho fear that the wind will
scatterthe soul whensomeonedies. Cebes agrees: "Perhaps thereis in us
also a child who fearssuch things.Try to persuade him notto feardeath
as thoughit were a bogey-man."Socrates replies,"You must say a spell
(epaidein) over him everyday until you charmaway his fears."He suggests that dialectic"8will provide this charm (Phaedo 77d-78a). Here it
would seem that the emotional effectof repetitionis the effectiveingredientofthecharm.Again,at the end ofthe Crito(54d), Socratessays that
the words of the Laws ringin his ears, like the flutesCorybantesthink
theyhear, and actually preventhim fromlisteningto the otherside.'9 It
is truethat in the Charmides(157a-c) "noble words" are called an epode,
and no particularemphasisis placed on the emotional,as opposed to the
rational, effects.This is, however,unusual.20 Most oftenPlato has two
distinctweapons that may be used against the deceitfulmagician: one
that purifiesthe rational element,drivingout false belief (the elenchus
or a processsimilarto it that will "turn around" the reason to its proper
objects, as Republic 518e describesit) and another procedure that will
actively train and strengthenthe emotionsso that they will be in harmony with the reason (the epode,the myth,musical education).2'
If philosophysucceeds in drivingout falsebeliefand in enablingus to
resistthe anti-rationalemotionsofpleasureand fear,it succeedsin freeing
'8R. S. Bluck, Plato's Phaedo (London 1955) ad loc. gives this interpretationof the
passage.
"9This passage was called to my attentionby Charles Young.
20Dodds (226, note 20) says that in the Charmidesthe epode is a Socratic cross-examination. The bes t account of thisunusual passage is that given by T. M. Robinson, Plato's
Psychology(Toronto 1970 [Phoenix Supp. Vol. 3]) 4-10. Robinson says that the "noble
words" have both an intellectual and a moral effect(7), and that in the Charmides"the
selfis ... thewholeman (156e7-8), of whichbody is an integraland inalienable part" (8).
The psychological theories of the Charmides thus differradically from those of the
Phaedo and Republic.
21For some good discussions of the emotional effectsof the epode and the myth in
Plato see Boyanc6 155 ff., Dodds 212 and note 20, Edelstein 473 ff.,Lain Entralgo
118 ff.

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136

PHOENIX

us fromcompulsion,not,of course in the usual sense of allowingus to do

what seemsgood to us, but in the Platonic sense of allowingus to do what
is actually forour good.22The philosopherwho can do this has greater
skillthan the deceitfulmagicianwhomhe overcomes.And he may appear
to be a sortof"counter-magician"in that he has thetechnefalselyclaimed
by Gorgias: powerover the opinionsand the emotions.23
The contrastbetweenthe deceitfulmagician and Socrates the "counter-magician"is brought out most clearly in a little parable in the
Symposium.Immediatelyfollowinghis descriptionof the magical effects
Socrates has on his hearers (215-216) Alcibiades tells how, under the
influenceof Socrates' spells, the "mania and Bacchic frenzyof the
philosopher" (218b), he tried to seduce Socrates (216-222). Alcibiades
reportsthat Socrates told him jokingly that in tryingto exchange his
own beauty forSocrates' he mightbe tryingto exchange mere opinion
(doxa) fortruth,bronze forgold (218e). Just as the deceitfulmagician
uses our emotionsto get us to take the illusionforthe reality,Alcibiades
uses pleasure,eros,to tryto make Socrates tradegold forbronze.But this
sort of magic has no effecton the philosopher.Not only does Alcibiades
fail to seduce Socrates, thoughhe spends the nightin his bed, Socrates
"seduces" Alcibiades into love of virtue,so that he ends by "admiring
(agamenon) this man's nature and self-controland courage" (219d4-5).
It is significantthat agamenosis the verywordused of the philosopher's
love of truthat Republic500c6.
The storyshows clearlyhow philosophyopposes a rationallove of the
good to the enslaving and anti-rationaleros associated with magic. It
also shows how Socrates ultimatelyleads us beyond magic of any kind.
Throughoutthissectionof the Symposium,AlcibiadescomparesSocrates
with a little statue of a Silenus with a flutein its hand, which can be
opened up to reveal figuresof the gods inside (215a-b, 216c-217a, 221d222a). Socrates' words,as we have seen, enchant and possess people like
the flutetunesof the satyrMarsyas (215b-c). But the fluteis only part
of the outer casing; Socrates' words only appear to be like magic, since
they are equally powerfuland appear to the ignorantto have similar
effects.Inside, ifone takes the troubleto look, are the "divine images of
22SeeGorgias468d-e.
23Aninterestingparallel to our contrast between the philosopher and the magician
is that drawn by Morton Smith between the "divine man," who works "miracles by his
indwellingdivine power and thereforedoes not need rituals or spells," and the "magician," who merelygives orders to a spirit: 7esus theMagician (San Francisco 1978) 74.
See also the distinctiondrawn between the "hero," who worksby his own power,and the
"saint," who is the vehicle of divine will, in M. Hadas and M. Smith, Heroes and Gods
(New York 1965) 12. Hadas and Smith see Plato's Socrates as the model fora particular
kind of benevolent hero (17-18, 49-56) but do not explicitly contrast him with the
magician.

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ELENCHUS, EPODE, AND MAGIC

137

virtue" (216e-217a, 222a). If one sees these,one realizes, as Alcibiades

does, that Socrates' outer casing of magician-seduceris only a deception,
that Socrates only appears to be a magicianand seduceruntilwe open up
his arguments.Then we understandthat he is not the seducer but the
beloved, whom the lover of virtue followsof his own freewill (222a-b).
And here we reach the limitsof a metaphor.24
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
24I wish to thank the anonymousrefereesof Phoenix and ProfessorCharles Young for
theirvaluable criticismsof an earlier version of this paper.

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