Fukuzume vs People (2005) G.R.

143647
Facts:
Sometime in July 1991, Yu, a businessman engaged in buying and selling aluminum scrap wires,
accompanied by Jovate, went to the house of Fukuzume in Paraaque. Jovate introduced
Fukuzume to Yu telling the latter that Fukuzume is from Furukawa Electric Corporation and that
he has at his disposal aluminum scrap wires. Fukuzume confirmed this information and told Yu
that the scrap wires belong to Furukawa but they are under the care of NAPOCOR. Believing
Fukuzumes representation to be true, Yu agreed to buy the aluminum scrap wires from
Fukuzume. This transaction later turned uneventful as Fukuzume failed to comply his
undertaking to return Yus money when Yu was refused by NAPOCOR, thus, prompting Yu to
file an estafa case.
Upon arraignment, Fukuzume pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued, finding the accused guilty as
charged. Aggrieved by the trial courts decision, he appealed to CA but CA affirmed the trial
courts decision modifying only the penalty, hence, the petition before the SC.
Issue: WON the trial court of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Held: SC answered on the negative. We agree with Fukuzumes contention that the CA erred in
ruling that the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.
The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn statement of Yu filed with the NBI and the affidavit
subscribed by Fukuzume. With respect to the sworn statement of Yu, which was presented in
evidence by the prosecution, it is clear that he alleged that he gave Fukuzume the amount
of P50,000.00 at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we agree with Fukuzumes
contention that Yu testified during his direct examination that he gave the amount of P50,000.00
to Fukuzume in the latters house. It is not disputed that Fukuzumes house is located in
Paraaque.
Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of
a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex
parte are inferior to testimony given in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and
oftentimes inaccurate.
More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he
gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the subject
aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or
anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of
jurisdiction. Citing Uy vs. Court of Appeals: However, if the evidence adduced during the
trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the
action for want of jurisdiction.
The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside
from the sworn statement executed by Yu, the prosecution presented no other evidence,
testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yus sworn statement or to prove that any of the

above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. From the
foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime
of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said
city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be
set aside for want of jurisdiction, without
prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction.

Sanchez v. Demetriou [GR Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993]

Post under case digests, Remedial Law at Tuesday, February 21, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic
Mind
Facts: Information was filed against several people including the petitioner in relation with the
rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez. Sanchez has brought the
petition to challenge the order of the respondent judge denying his motion to quash the
information for rape with homicide filed against him and six other persons on the ground he is
being charged with sevenhomicides arising from the death of only two persons. The petitioner
submits that the seven informations charging seven separatehomicides are absurd because the
two victims in these cases could not have died seven times.
Issue: Whether or not the court acted properly on denying the petition of Sanchez to quash on
the grounds that he is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two
persons.

Held: The court ruled that where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the
homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed as a constituent
of the special complex crime of rape with homicide. Therefore, there will be as many crimes of
rape with homicide as there are rapes committed. In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the
crime of rape, thereby raising its penalty to the highest degree. Thus, homicide committed on the
occasion or by reason of rape, loses its character as an independent offense, but assumes a new
character, and functions like a qualifying circumstance. However,by fiction of law, it mergedwith
rape to constitute an constituent element of a special complex crime of rape with homicide with a
specific penalty which is in the highest degree. The petitioner and his six co-accused are not
charged with only one rape committed by him in conspiracy with the other six. Each one of the

seven accused is charged with having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply helping Sanchez
in committing only one rape. In other words, the allegation of the prosecution is that the girl was
raped seven times, with each of the seven accused taking turns in abusing her with the assistance
of the other six. Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and thus silence
Sarmenta. Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually raping
Sarmenta and later killing her instead of merely assisting the petitioner in raping and then slaying
her. The separate informations filed against each of them allege that each of the seven successive
rapes is complexed by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing
of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate rapes were committed in succession by the
seven accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.

Hizon vs CA dec 13, 1996

DOCTRINE
The authorities found nothing on the boat that would have indicated any form of illegal fishing.
All the documents of the boat and the fishermen were in order. It was only after the fish
specimens were tested, albeit under suspicious circumstances, that petitioners were charged with
illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances.
FACTS
Accused crew members and fishermen of F/B Robinson owned by First Fishermen Fishing
Industries, Inc., caught fish with use of obnoxious or poisonous substance (sodium cyanide), of
more or less one (1) ton of assorted live fishes which were illegally caught thru the use of
obnoxious/poisonous substance (sodium cyanide).
Petitioners were arraigned and they pled not guilty to the charge. As defense, they claimed that
they are legitimate fishermen of the First Fishermen Industries, Inc., a domestic corporation
licensed to engage in fishing. They alleged that they catch fish by the hook and line method and
that they had used this method for one month and a half in the waters of Cuyo Island.
n July 9, 1993, the trial court found the thirty one petitioners guilty.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition

ISSUE:
whether or not the conviction was proper
HELD
Not Guilty.
Petitioners were charged with illegal fishing penalized under sections 33 and 38 of P.D. 704
which provide as follows:
Sec. 33. Illegal fishing, illegal possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing;
dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. -- It shall be unlawful for any
person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or
fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or
poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (l), (m) and (d),
respectively, of section 3 hereof: Provided, That mere possession of such explosives with
intent to use the same for illegal fishing as herein defined shall be punishable as
hereinafter provided: Provided, That the Secretary may, upon recommendation of the
Director and subject to such safeguards and conditions he deems necessary, allow for
research, educational or scientific purposes only, the use of explosives, obnoxious or
poisonous substance or electricity to catch, take or gather fish or fishery/aquatic products
in the specified area: Provided, further, That the use of chemicals to eradicate predators
in fishponds in accordance with accepted scientific fishery practices without causing
deleterious effects in neighboring waters shall not be construed as the use of obnoxious or
poisonous substance within the meaning of this section: Provided, finally, That the use of
mechanical bombs for killing whales, crocodiles, sharks or other large dangerous fishes,
may be allowed, subject to the approval of the Secretary.

The prosecution failed to explain the contradictory findings on the fish samples and this omission
raises a reasonable doubt that the one ton of fishes in the cage were caught with the use of
sodium cyanide.
Apparently, the members of the PNP Maritime Command and the Task Force Bantay Dagat were
the ones engaged in an illegal fishing expedition.
This method of fishing needs approximately two hundred (200) fishermen to execute. What the
apprehending officers instead discovered were twenty eight (28) fishermen in their discovered
were twenty eight (28) fishermen in their sampans fishing by hook and line. The authorities
found nothing on the boat that would have indicated any form of illegal fishing. All the
documents of the boat and the fishermen were in order. It was only after the fish specimens

were tested, albeit under suspicious circumstances, that petitioners were charged with illegal
fishing with the use of poisonous substances.

G.R. No. 147782, June 25, 2008]

J U A N I TA A . AQ U I N O , P E T I T I O N E R , T E R E S I TA B . PAI S T E ,
R E S P O N D E N T.FAC T S :
Respondent alleged that petitioner along with 3 others sold fake gold bars to her
respondent brought petitioner to the NBI in the presence of a certain Atty. Tolentino where the
parties entered into an amicable settlement

in the amicable settlement, the accused waived her right to counsel despite the recital of her
constitutional rights made by NBI agent ElyTolentino in the presence of a lawyer Gordon S. Uy
respondent filed a criminal complaint against Garganta, petitioner, and three others for the crime
of
estafa
prosecution presented as documentary evidence three (3) documents, one of which is the
amicable settlement signed in the NBI, while the defenserelied solely on its testimonial evidence
trial court rendered a Decision convicting petitioner of the crime charged
CA affirmed said conviction
Petitioner ascribes error to the CA when it gave due weight and consideration to the amicable
settlement with waiver of right to counsel that shesigned in the NBI during the custodial
investigation

She claims she executed the agreement under threat and not freely and voluntarily, in violation of
Sec. 12(1)of the Constitution which guarantees her rights under the Miranda Rule
I S S U E : whether or not petitioners right to counsel was violated
HELD: NO
when petitioner was brought by respondent before the NBI-NCR on March 27, 1991 to be
investigated, she was already under custodialinvestigation and the constitutional guarantee for
her rights under the Miranda Rule has set in. Since she did not have a lawyer then, she
wasprovided with one in the person of Atty. Uy, which fact is undisputed

However, it can be gleaned from the amicable agreement, as aptly pointed out by the CA, that
the custodial investigation on the inquiry orinvestigation for the crime was either aborted or did
not push through as the parties, petitioner, and respondent agreed to amicably settle.Thus, the
amicable settlement with a waiver of right to counsel appended was executed with both parties
affixing their signatures on it inthe presence of Atty. Uy and NBI agent Atty. Ely Tolentino

Petitioner's contention that her constitutional rights were breached and she signed the document
under duress falls flat for the following reasons:1)it is undisputed that she was provided
with counsel, in the person of Atty. Uy
2) petitioner could have asserted its right "to have compulsory process to secure the attendance
of witnesses,"
[13]
for which she could havecompelled Atty. Uy to testify but she did not. Basic is the principle that
consultation and information between counsel and client isprivileged communication and
the counsel may not divulge these without the consent of the clien3)petitioner never raised any
objection against Atty. Gordon Uy's appointment during the time she was in the NBI and
thereafter, when shesigned the amicable settlement. She is deemed to have engaged Atty. Uy
when she conferred with him and thereafter signed the amicablesettlement with waiver of right to
counsel in his presence. We do not see how the answer of NBI agent Atty. Tolentino upon crossexamination about the petitioner's counsel in the NBI, could be evasive when the NBI agent
merely stated the fact that an independentcounsel, Atty. Uy, was provided petitioner.
4) when petitioner engaged Atty. Uy as her lawyer, she undoubtedly executed the amicable
settlement. Verily, she was provided with anindependent counsel and such "right to counsel is
intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admitsomething false.
The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the
truth."
Thus, the presenceof Atty. Uy safeguarded petitioner's rights even if the custodial investigation
did not push through and precluded any threat of violence,coercion, or intimidation
5)even granting arguendo that the amicable settlement is in the nature of an admission, the
document petitioner signed would still be admissible since none of her constitutional rights were
violated

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ELIZAR TOMAQUIN

G.R. No. 133188
July 23, 2004
FACTS:

ElizarTomaquin was found by the lower Court to be guilty of the crime of

murder of JaquelynTatoy beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner avers that the trial
Court erred when it convicted him on the basis of his uncounselled confession. The
Court is confronted with the issue of the admissibility of an extrajudicial confession.
This appeal particularly involves the question of whether a barangay captain who is

a lawyer can be considered an independent counsel within the purview of Section

12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Is a lawyer at the same time barangay captain competent and independent
RULING:

No, in this case, considering that Atty. Parawans role as a barangay captain,
was a peacekeeping officer of his barangay and therefore in direct conflict with the
role of providing competent legal assistance to appellant who was accused of
committing a crime in his jurisdiction, Atty. Parawan could not be considered as an
independent counsel of appellant, when the latter executed his extrajudicial
confession. What the Constitution requires is the presence of an independent and
competent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his clients defense without
any intervening conflict of interest. Neither does Atty. Parawan qualify as a
competent counsel, i.e., an effective and vigilant counsel. An "effective and vigilant
counsel" necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to
advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question
asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession.
The Court cannot imagine how Atty. Parawan could have effectively safeguarded
appellants rights as an accused during the investigation when he himself
entertained the suspicion that appellant is guilty of the crime charged, and
naturally, he would want appellant to admit having committed it.
FEDERICO MIGUEL OLBES vs HON. DANILO A. BUEMIO,
On complaint of Samir and Rowena Muhsen, Federico Miguel Olbes (petitioner) was indicted for
Grave Coercion before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila
t the scheduled pre-trial on October 23, 2003, petitioner failed to appear, prompting the trial court to
issue a warrant for his arrest, which warrant was, however, later recalled on discovery that neither
petitioner nor his counsel was notified of said schedule. Pre-trial was again reset to January 21,
2004.4
Before the scheduled pre-trial on January 21, 2004 or on November 3, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion
to Dismiss5the Information on the ground of violation of his right to a speedy trial under Republic Act
No. 84936 or the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 and Supreme Court Circular (SCC) No. 38-98. 7 He argued
that "considering that [he] was not - without any fault on his part - brought to trial within 80 days from
the date he was arraigned, this case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 119, Section 9 8 in relation
to Rule 119, Section 6 of the Rules."9
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the December 5, 2003 Order was denied by Order 11 of
March 3, 2004 after respondent judge noted that during petitioners arraignment on February 12,

2003, he interposed no objection to the setting of the pre-trial to May 28, 2003. Besides, respondent
judge held, strict compliance with the Speedy Trial Act was improbable, given the volume of cases
being filed with the MeTC. Additionally respondent judge held that the term "speedy trial" as applied
in criminal cases is a relative term such that the trial and disposition of cases depended on several
factors including the availability of counsel, witnesses and prosecutor, and weather conditions.
R.A. No. 8493 and its implementing rules and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerate
certain reasonable delays as exclusions in the computation of the prescribed time limits. They also
provide that "no provision of law on speedy trial and no rule implementing the same shall be
interpreted as a bar to any charge of denial of speedy trial as provided by Article III, Section 14(2), of
the 1987 Constitution." Thus, in spite of the prescribed time limits, jurisprudence continues to adopt
the view that the concept of "speedy trial" is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible
concept. In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, we held:
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was
designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over
him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the
courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial
and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays. x x x
While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not
mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed
to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures
rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in
mind that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not
weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent.
HELD:
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the
case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the
delay; (c) the defendants assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. (citations omitted)
(underscoring supplied)
The time limits set by the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 do not thus preclude justifiable postponements
and delays when so warranted by the situation. 25 To the Court, the reasons for the postponements
and delays attendant to the present case reflected above are not unreasonable
Applying the balancing test for determining whether an accused has been denied his constitutional
right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of his case, taking into account several factors such as
the length and reason of the delay, the accuseds assertion or non-assertion of his right, and the
prejudice to the accused resulting from the delay,29 the Court does not find petitioner to have been
unduly and excessively prejudiced by the "delay" in the proceedings, especially given that he had
posted bail.

HERRERA V. ALBA 463 SCRA 197

FACTS: 13 year old Rosendo Alba(respondent), represented by his mother Armi Alba, who, prior
to the case filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages
against Rosendo Herrera,the father.
On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the
biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondents mother.
In the year 2000, The trial court ordered the parties to go under deoxyribonucleic acid testing, or
DNA testing to establish whether Rosendo Herrera is the biological father of Rosendo Alba.
Petitioner questioned the validity Herrera questioned the validity of the order as he claimed that
DNA testing has not yet garnered widespread acceptance hence any result therefrom will not be
admissible in court; and that the said test is unconstitutional for it violates his right against selfincrimination.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rosendo Herrera is correct.
HELD: No, in People V. Vallejo, where DNA Test result, as decided in this case, already
admissible as object evidence in the Philippine courts in 2002. The Supreme Court recognized
DNA analysis as admissible evidence. On the other hand, as to determining the weight and
probative value of DNA test results, the Supreme Court provides, which is now known as the
Vallejo Guidelines: In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should
consider, among other things, the following data: (1) how the samples were collected; (2) how
they were handled; (3) the possibility of contamination of the samples; (4) the procedure
followed in analyzing the samples; (5) whether the proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests; and (6) the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
The above test is derived from the Daubert Test which is a doctrine adopted from US
jurisprudence (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) The Daubert Test is a test to be
employed by courts before admitting scientific test results in evidence. More specifically, the
Daubert Test inquires:
1. Whether the theory or technique can be tested;
2. Whether the proffered work has been subjected to peer review;
3. Whether the rate of error is acceptable; and
4. Whether the method at issue enjoys widespread acceptance.

However, the Supreme Court declared that a 99.9% DNA Test result will not be the most
concrete evidence and conclusive proof, the Vallejo Guidelines must still be complied with.
Moreover, Herrera cannot invoke self-incrimination on the grounds that, the right against selfincrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken
from his body when it may be material. There is no testimonial compulsion in the getting of
DNA sample from Herrera.

PEOPLE
vs.
ADONES ABATAYO,
Adones Abatayo was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the RTC of Mandaue of
two counts of murder and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua for each count.
The appellant was charged with the crime of double murder when he killed Dominador
Basalan and Teofredo Basalan with the use of a GI pipe
n convicting the appellant, the trial court relied on the testimony of Apolonio and
eyewitness Juanito Gutang, which were corroborated by the medical findings showing
the nature and the location of the wounds inflicted on the victims. The court brushed
aside as dubious and weak the denial and alibi interposed by the appellant. According to
the court, such defenses could not prevail over the positive identification made by
Juanito of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.30
The appellant now assails his conviction, asserting that:
The Incomplete Cross-Examination of Juanito Gutang
The appellant insists that the trial court should not have given credence to the story of
the lone eyewitness for the prosecution, Juanito Gutang, considering that his counsel
was not able to continue cross-examining the witness. He strongly argues that his
constitutional and procedural right to confront the witness against him was thereby
impaired. CitingOrtigas, Jr. v. Lufthansa German Airlines 32 as the case in point, the
appellant faults the trial court for relying on Juanitos testimony despite the warning it
made during the trial of January 23, 1995, that it would consider the entire testimony of
Juanito stricken off the record for lack of proper cross-examination. 33

HELLD
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part, asserts that while the appellant
has the constitutional right to cross-examine the witnesses against him, he waived such
right when he failed to invoke the same after his initial cross-examination of Juanito.
Under Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution, the appellant has the right to
meet the witnesses against him face to face. Under Rule 115, Section 1(f) of the Rules of
Court, he has the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the
trial, a fundamental right which is part of due process. However, the right of
confrontation and cross- examination is a personal one. It is not an absolute right which
a party can claim at all times.34
In Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino,35 we ruled that the right
to confront the witness may be waived by the accused, expressly or impliedly.
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing
witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in
proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial
powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. However,
the right is a personal one which may be waived, expressly or
impliedly, by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of
cross-examination.

Olivares VS. CA

GR 163866

FACTS:
Isidro Olivares was charged with violation of RA 7610 for touching the breast and kissing the lips of
Cristina Elitiong, a 16-year old high school student employed by the former in making sampaguita
garlands during weekends. The trial court found him guilty; affirmed by the CA. Petitioner now
alleges that his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was
violated for failure to allege in the information the essential elements of the offense for which he is
being charged.

Issue: WON Olivares can be charged with violation of RA 7610.

Held:
Yes.
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610 are as follows:

1.

The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.

2.
The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse.
3.

The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

The first element obtains in this case. It was established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner
kissed Cristina and touched her breasts with lewd designs as inferred from the nature of the acts
themselves and the environmental circumstances. The second element, i.e., that the act is performed
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, is likewise present.
Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in lascivious conduct
under the coercion or influence of any adult. In this case, Cristina was sexually abused because she
was coerced or intimidated by petitioner to indulge in a lascivious conduct. Furthermore, it is
inconsequential that the sexual abuse occurred only once. As expressly provided in Section 3 (b) of
R.A. 7610, the abuse may be habitual or not. It must be observed that Article III of R.A. 7610 is
captioned as Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse because Congress really intended to cover
a situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into lascivious conduct, not
necessarily for money or profit. The law covers not only child prostitution but also other forms of
sexual abuse.
As to the contention that the minority of Cristina was not properly alleged in the information, the SC
ruled that: Petitioner was furnished a copy of the Complaint which was mentioned in the information,
hence he was adequately informed of the age of the complainant.

People vs Del Castillo

FACTS:
Police Officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon went to serve a search warrant from the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) to Petitioner Ruben Del Castillo in search of illegal drugs. Upon arrival, somebody
shouted raid which prompted the police officers to immediately disembark from the jeep they were riding

and go directly to Del Castillos house and cordoned it off. Police men found nothing incriminating in Del
Castillos residence, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the hut several articles
including four (4) plastic packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
An Information was filed before RTC against Del Castillo, charging him with violation of Section 16, Article
III of R.A. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). During the arraignment, Del Castillo pleaded not
guilty. The RTC found Del Castillo guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against him in the information.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision.
Del Castillo appealed his case to the CA, insisting that there was a violation of his constitutional guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizure. On the contrary, the Office of the Solicitor General argued
that the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure is applicable only against
government authorities. Hence, assuming that the items seized were found in another place not
designated in the search warrant, the same items should still be admissible as evidence because the one
who discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a private individual.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of Del Castillos right against unreasonable searches and seizure
HELD:
Petition GRANTED.
It must be remembered that the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or description that points out the
place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it,
satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.
In the present case, the search warrant specifically designates or describes the residence of the petitioner
as the place to be searched. Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20
meters away from the residence of the Del Castillo. The confiscated items, having been found in a place
other than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless
search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of Del Castillos constitutional
guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure.
The OSG argued that, assuming that the items seized were found in another place not designated in the
search warrant, the same items should still be admissible as evidence because the one who discovered

them was a barangay tanod who is a private individual, the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizure being applicable only against government authorities. The contention is devoid of
merit. It was testified to during trial by the police officers who effected the search warrant that they asked
the assistance of the barangay tanods. Having been established that the assistance of the barangay
tanods was sought by the police authorities who effected the search warrant, the same barangay tanods
therefore acted as agents of persons in authority. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code defines persons
in authority and agents of persons in authority as any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as
an individual or as a member of some court or governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be
deemed a person in authority. A barangay captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a
person in authority. A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by
competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life
and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person who
comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority.
The Local Government Code also contains a provision which describes the function of a barangay tanod
as an agent of persons in authority. Section 388 of the Local Government Code reads: For purposes of
the Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and members of the
lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority in their jurisdictions,
while other barangay officials and members who may be designated by law or ordinance and charged
with the maintenance of public order, protection and security of life and property, or the maintenance of a
desirable and balanced environment, and any barangay member who comes to the aid of persons in
authority, shall be deemed agents of persons in authority.
By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as the barangay tanods were acting as
agents of a person in authority during the conduct of the search. Thus, the search conducted was
unreasonable and the confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence.