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PROMISSORY NOTE
120,000.00
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
proceed
to
the
facts.
A.
In
G.R.
No.
184458
In
G.R.
No.
184472
ruled
disagree.
explicitly
Code
2.
credit.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 184458
is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 90609 is MODIFIED. Petitioner
Rodrigo Rivera is ordered to pay respondents Spouse
Salvador
and
Violeta
Chua
the
following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) the principal amount of P120,000.00;
(2) legal interest of 12% per annum of the principal
amount of P120,000.00 reckoned from 1 January
1996 until 30 June 2013;
(3) legal interest of 6% per annum of the principal
amount of P120,000.00 form 1 July 2013 to date
when this Decision becomes final and executory;
(4) 12% per annum applied to the total of
paragraphs 2 and 3 from 11 June 1999, date of
judicial demand, to 30 June 2013, as interest due
earning legal interest;
(5) 6% per annum applied to the total amount of
paragraphs 2 and 3 from 1 July 2013 to date
when this Decision becomes final and executor,
as interest due earning legal interest;
(6) Attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00; and
(7) 6% per annum interest on the total of the
monetary awards from the finality of this
Decision until full payment thereof.
Costs against petitioner Rodrigo Rivera.
SO ORDERED
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,
Bersamin, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Held:
Yes, Section 52 of the NIL provides what constitutes
a holder in due course. The evidence shows that: on
the faces of the post dated checks were complete
and regular; that State Investment House Inc. bought
the checks from Victoriano before the due dates;
that it was taken in good faith and for value; and
there was no knowledge with regard that the checks
were issued as security and not for value. A prima
facie presumption exists that a holder of a
negotiable instrument is a holder in due course.
Moulic failed to prove the contrary.
No, Moulic can only invoke this defense against the
petitioner if it was a privy to the purpose for which
they were issued and therefore is not a holder in due
course.
No, Section 119 of NIL provides how an instruments
be discharged. Moulic can only invoke paragraphs c
and d as possible grounds for the discharge of the
instruments. Since Moulic failed to get back the
July 4, 2012
EMILIA
LIM, Petitioner,
vs.
MINDANAO WINES & LIQUOR GALLERIA, a Single
Proprietorship Business Outfit Owned by Evelyn S.
Valdevieso, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Acquittal from a crime does not necessarily mean
absolution from civil liability.
Despite her acquittal from the charges of violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) or the Bouncing
Checks Law, the lower courts still found petitioner
Emilia Lim (Emilia) civilly liable and ordered her to
pay the value of the bounced checks, a ruling which
was upheld by the Court of Appeals (CA) in its June
1
30, 2006 Decision and November 9, 2006
2
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 64897.
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, Emilia prays
for the reversal and setting aside of the said rulings
of the CA. She contends that since her acquittal was
based on insuffiency of evidence, it should then
follow that the civil aspect of the criminal cases filed
against her be likewise dismissed. Hence, there is no
basis for her adjudged civil liability.
Factual Antecedents
3
15
16
19
21
22
process impel this rule. Any issue raised for the first
26
time on appeal is barred by estoppel.
For this reason, the said issues do not merit the
Courts consideration.
Notwithstanding her acquittal, Emilia is civilly liable.
"The extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it the extinction of the civil liability where x x x
the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
27
preponderance of evidence is required" in civil
cases. On this basis, Emilia insists that the MTCC
dismissed the BP 22 cases against her not on the
ground of reasonable doubt but on insufficiency of
evidence. Hence, the civil liability should likewise be
extinguished. Emilias Demurrer to Evidence,
however, betrays this claim. Asserting insufficiency
of evidence as a ground for granting said demurrer,
Emilia herself argued therein that the prosecution
has not proven [her] guilt beyond reasonable
28
doubt. And in consonance with such assertion, the
MTCC in its judgment expressly stated that her guilt
was indeed not established beyond reasonable
29
doubt, hence the acquittal.
In any case, even if the Court treats the subject
dismissal as one based on insufficiency of evidence
as Emilia wants to put it, the same is still tantamount
to a dismissal based on reasonable doubt. As may be
recalled, the MTCC dismissed the criminal cases
because one essential element of BP 22 was missing,
i.e., the fact of the banks dishonor. The evidence
was insufficient to prove said element of the crime
as no proof of dishonor of the checks was presented
by the prosecution. This, however, only means that
the trial court cannot convict Emilia of the crime
since the prosecution failed to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, the quantum of evidence
required in criminal cases. Conversely, the lack of
such proof of dishonor does not mean that Emilia
has no existing debt with Mindanao Wines, a civil
aspect which is proven by another quantum of
evidence, a mere preponderance of evidence.
Emilia also avers that a courts determination of
preponderance of evidence necessarily entails the
presentation of evidence of both parties. She thus
believes that she should have been first required to
present evidence to dispute her civil liability before
the lower courts could determine preponderance of
evidence.
We disagree.
"Preponderance of evidence is [defined as] the
weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence
on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term greater weight of the
evidence or greater weight of the credible
evidence. It is evidence which is more convincing to
the court as worthy of belief than that which is
30
offered in opposition thereto." Contrary to Emilias
interpretation, a determination of this quantum of
evidence does not need the presentation of
evidence by both parties. As correctly reasoned out
by the CA, Emilias interpretation is absurd as this
will only encourage defendants to waive their
presentation of evidence in order for them to be
absolved from civil liability for lack of preponderance
of evidence. Besides, Emilia should note that even
when a respondent does not present evidence, a
complainant in a civil case is nevertheless burdened
to substantiate his or her claims by preponderance
of evidence before a court may rule on the reliefs
prayed for by the latter. Settled is the principle that
"parties must rely on the strength of their own
evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense
31
offered by their opponent."
Lastly, we see no reason to disturb the ruling of the
CA anent Emilias civil liability. As may be recalled,
the CA affirmed the lower courts factual findings on
the matter. Factual findings of the trial court, when
32
affirmed by the CA, will not be disturbed. Also, "[i]t
is a settled rule that in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of [Court], only
questions of law may be raised by the parties and
33
passed upon by this Court." Moreover, "it is well to
remember that a check may be evidence of
indebtedness. A check, the entries of which are in
34
writing, could prove a loan transaction." While
Emilia is acquitted of violations of BP 22, she should
nevertheless pay the debt she owes.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is
DENIED. The challenged June 30, 2006 Decision and
November 9, 2006 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64897 are hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
CHUA-GAW
vs.
CHUA
Facts:
Lumber.
of
their
CA
parents
businesses.
affirmed.
At
that
time,
both
petitioner
and
entitled to?
Held:
account.
APPLICABLE LAWS:
Under section 1 of Act no. 2031 an instrument to be
negotiable must conform to the following
requirements: (a) It must be in writing and signed by
the maker or drawer; (b) Must contain an
unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain
in money; (c) Must be payable on demand, or at a
fixed or determinable future time; (d) Must be
payable to order or to bearer; and (e) Where the
instrument is addressed to a drawee, he must be
named or otherwise indicated therein with
reasonable certainty.
Under section 3, Article V of Rules and Regulations
Governing Central Bank Certificates of Indebtedness
June 4, 2014
Tomas
C.
Toledo
Gentlemen:
This refers to your letter dated July 26, 1999
requesting on behalf of your clients, the CITIBANK &
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, for a ruling as to
whether or not the electronic instructions involving
the following transactions of residents and nonresidents of the Philippines with respect to their
local or foreign currency accounts are subject to
documentary stamp tax under Section 181 of the
1997 Tax Code, viz:
RUALO
xxxx
(h) Upon any acceptance or payment upon
acceptance of any bill of exchange or order for the
payment of money purporting to be drawn in a
foreign country but payable in the Philippine Islands,
on each two hundred pesos, or fractional part
thereof, of the face value of any such bill of
exchange or order, or the Philippine equivalent of
such value, if expressed in foreign currency, two
centavos[.] (Emphasis supplied.)
It was implemented by Section 46 in relation to
20
Section 39 of Revenue Regulations No. 26, as
amended:
SEC. 39. A Bill of Exchange is one that "denotes
checks, drafts, and all other kinds of orders for the
payment of money, payable at sight or on demand,
or after a specific period after sight or from a stated
date."
SEC. 46. Bill of Exchange, etc. When any bill of
exchange or order for the payment of money drawn
in a foreign country but payable in this country
whether at sight or on demand or after a specified
period after sight or from a stated date, is presented
for acceptance or payment, there must be affixed
upon acceptance or payment of documentary stamp
equal to P0.02 for each P200 or fractional part
thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
It took its present form in Section 218 of the Tax
21
Code of 1939, which provided:
SEC. 218. Stamp Tax Upon Acceptance of Bills of
Exchange and Others. Upon any acceptance or
payment of any bill of exchange or order for the
payment of money purporting to be drawn in a
foreign country but payable in the Philippines, there
shall be collected a documentary stamp tax of four
centavos on each two hundred pesos, or fractional
part thereof, of the face value of any such bill of
exchange or order, or the Philippine equivalent of
such value, if expressed in foreign currency.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It then became Section 230 of the 1977 Tax
22
Code, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos.
1457 and 1959,which, as stated earlier, was worded
exactly as Section 181 of the current Tax Code:
SO ORDERED.